@article{yaure_two_2024,
	title = {Two {Varieties} of {White} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {86},
	doi = {10.1086/729937},
	abstract = {The concept of white ignorance refers to phenomena of not-knowing that are produced by and reinforce systems of white supremacist domination and exploitation. I distinguish two varieties of white ignorance, belief-based white ignorance and practice-based white ignorance. Belief-based white ignorance consists in an information deficit about systems of racist oppression. Practice-based white ignorance consists in unresponsiveness to the political agency of persons and groups subject to racist oppression. Drawing on the antebellum political thought of Black abolitionists Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs, I contend that an antiracist politics that conceives of its epistemic task in terms of combating practice-based white ignorance offers a more promising frame for liberatory struggle. A focus on practice-based white ignorance calls for a distinctive form of humility that involves recognition of the limits of one’s own political agency in relation to others, which is integral to democratic relations between free, equal, yet mutually dependent persons. © 2024 Southern Political Science Association.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Journal of Politics},
	author = {Yaure, P.},
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {Frederick Douglass, Harriet Jacobs, democratic theory, humility, white ignorance},
	pages = {920--933},
}

The concept of white ignorance refers to phenomena of not-knowing that are produced by and reinforce systems of white supremacist domination and exploitation. I distinguish two varieties of white ignorance, belief-based white ignorance and practice-based white ignorance. Belief-based white ignorance consists in an information deficit about systems of racist oppression. Practice-based white ignorance consists in unresponsiveness to the political agency of persons and groups subject to racist oppression. Drawing on the antebellum political thought of Black abolitionists Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs, I contend that an antiracist politics that conceives of its epistemic task in terms of combating practice-based white ignorance offers a more promising frame for liberatory struggle. A focus on practice-based white ignorance calls for a distinctive form of humility that involves recognition of the limits of one’s own political agency in relation to others, which is integral to democratic relations between free, equal, yet mutually dependent persons. © 2024 Southern Political Science Association.

@article{dixon_challenges_2024,
	title = {Challenges to correcting pluralistic ignorance: false consensus effects, competing information environments, and anticipated social conflict},
	volume = {50},
	shorttitle = {Challenges to correcting pluralistic ignorance},
	doi = {10.1093/hcr/hqae001},
	abstract = {For many policy issues, people holding the majority opinion often do not act in accordance with their beliefs. While underestimating public opinion appears as a likely cause, correcting this misperception often fails to motivate those in the majority to act. Investigating further, we surveyed a nationally representative sample (N ¼ 1,000) of Republican voters about vaccination. Despite a majority supporting vaccines, Republicans on average underestimated other Republicans’ support. However, this misperception occurred primarily among anti-vaccine Republicans—a group that reported a greater willingness to share their vaccine views. We show how an information environment overrepresented with minority views may discourage majority view holders from speaking out even when they are aware of their majority status. That is, instead of experiencing pluralistic ignorance, those in the majority may be discouraged from expressing their views due to anticipated social conflict from engaging in an information environment disproportionately made up of minority views. \# The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of International Communication Association. All rights reserved.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Human Communication Research},
	author = {Dixon, G.N. and Lerner, B. and Bashian, S.},
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {false consensus effect, information environment, opinion climate, pluralistic ignorance, vaccine hesitancy},
	pages = {419--429},
}

For many policy issues, people holding the majority opinion often do not act in accordance with their beliefs. While underestimating public opinion appears as a likely cause, correcting this misperception often fails to motivate those in the majority to act. Investigating further, we surveyed a nationally representative sample (N ¼ 1,000) of Republican voters about vaccination. Despite a majority supporting vaccines, Republicans on average underestimated other Republicans’ support. However, this misperception occurred primarily among anti-vaccine Republicans—a group that reported a greater willingness to share their vaccine views. We show how an information environment overrepresented with minority views may discourage majority view holders from speaking out even when they are aware of their majority status. That is, instead of experiencing pluralistic ignorance, those in the majority may be discouraged from expressing their views due to anticipated social conflict from engaging in an information environment disproportionately made up of minority views. # The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of International Communication Association. All rights reserved.

@article{meylan_defence_2024,
	title = {In {Defence} of the {Normative} {Account} of {Ignorance}},
	volume = {89},
	issn = {01650106},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85132841713&doi=10.1007%2fs10670-022-00529-7&partnerID=40&md5=25c855b58c4f420529ed6770fefae4b2},
	doi = {10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7},
	abstract = {The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Erkenntnis},
	author = {Meylan, Anne},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {207 -- 221},
}

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{barker_long_2024,
	title = {The long tail of {COVID} and the tale of long {COVID}: {Diagnostic} construction and the management of ignorance},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {01419889},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85145299697&doi=10.1111%2f1467-9566.13599&partnerID=40&md5=35acb017cf30ed79f3b33bc323503ee3},
	doi = {10.1111/1467-9566.13599},
	abstract = {We bring together insights from the sociology of diagnosis and the sociology of ignorance to examine the early diagnostic unfolding of ‘Long COVID’ (LC). Originally described by patient activists, researchers set out to ponder its unwieldy clinical boundaries. Using a scoping review method in tandem with qualitative content analytic techniques, we analyse medicine’s initial struggles to construct a LC diagnosis. Paying attention to the dynamics of ignorance, we highlight three consequential conceptual manoeuvres in the early classifications of LC: causal agnosticism concerning the relationship between COVID-19 and LC, evasion of lumping LC with similar conditions; and the predictable splitting off of medically explainable cases from the LC designation. These manoeuvres are not maleficent, inept or unreasonable. They are practical but impactful responses to the classificatory dilemmas present in the construction of diagnoses amidst ignorance. Although there are unique aspects to LC, we suggest that its early fate is nevertheless emblematic of medicine’s diagnostic standardisation processes more generally. To varying degrees, diagnoses are ignorance management strategies; they create a pathway through the uncertainty at the core of disease realities. However, while diagnoses circumscribe some types of ignorance, they produce others through the creation of blind spots and paths not taken. © 2022 Foundation for the Sociology of Health \& Illness.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Sociology of Health and Illness},
	author = {Barker, Kristin Kay and Whooley, Owen and Madden, Erin F. and Ahrend, Emily E. and Greene, R. Neil},
	year = {2024},
	pmid = {36580406},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
	keywords = {COVID-19, COVID-19 Testing, COVID-19 testing, Humans, Post-Acute COVID-19 Syndrome, Sociology, Uncertainty, contested illnesses, coronavirus disease 2019, human, long COVID, long COVID-19, scoping review, sociology, sociology of diagnosis, sociology of ignorance, sociology of medical knowledge, uncertainty},
	pages = {189 -- 207},
}

We bring together insights from the sociology of diagnosis and the sociology of ignorance to examine the early diagnostic unfolding of ‘Long COVID’ (LC). Originally described by patient activists, researchers set out to ponder its unwieldy clinical boundaries. Using a scoping review method in tandem with qualitative content analytic techniques, we analyse medicine’s initial struggles to construct a LC diagnosis. Paying attention to the dynamics of ignorance, we highlight three consequential conceptual manoeuvres in the early classifications of LC: causal agnosticism concerning the relationship between COVID-19 and LC, evasion of lumping LC with similar conditions; and the predictable splitting off of medically explainable cases from the LC designation. These manoeuvres are not maleficent, inept or unreasonable. They are practical but impactful responses to the classificatory dilemmas present in the construction of diagnoses amidst ignorance. Although there are unique aspects to LC, we suggest that its early fate is nevertheless emblematic of medicine’s diagnostic standardisation processes more generally. To varying degrees, diagnoses are ignorance management strategies; they create a pathway through the uncertainty at the core of disease realities. However, while diagnoses circumscribe some types of ignorance, they produce others through the creation of blind spots and paths not taken. © 2022 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness.

@book{heikes_epistemic_2023,
	series = {Epistemic {Responsibility} for {Undesirable} {Beliefs}},
	title = {Epistemic responsibility for undesirable beliefs},
	abstract = {This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an "undesirable belief" will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023. All rights reserved.},
	author = {Heikes, D.K.},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-41858-7},
	note = {Pages: 233},
	keywords = {Belief, Ignorance, Involuntarism, Racism, Responsibility, Sexism},
}

This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an "undesirable belief" will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023. All rights reserved.

@article{kirfel2023,
	title = {Why blame the ostrich? {Understanding} culpability for willful ignorance},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kswtu},
	abstract = {Willful Ignorance (WI) is a term in Anglo-American law to refer to circumstances in which a defendant remains intentionally unaware of a fact that would render them liable. These cases pose a unique problem for the law,as it is uncertain whether deliberate ignorance can be viewed as a form of knowledge and, therefore, whether they satisfy the mens rea requirement for culpability. In this chapter, we report two experimental studies modeled on United States vs. Jewell, a case in which Jewell aided an international drug-trafficking operation by transporting a suitcase which he deliberately avoided inspecting. We manipulated various features of the defendant’s epistemic state, relating to their suspicion, its reasonableness and its specificity. Our results showed that WI partially satisfies the mens rea requirement, though not to the extent of genuine knowledge. Participants considered willful ignorance incriminating, as long as the defendant suspected that they were involved in criminal activity, and regardless of whether their suspicion was reasonable or even true. Additionally, our studies suggested that judgment of culpability are related to broader inferences about the defendant’s antisocial tendencies—in line with theories that conceptualise WI as a demonstration of ‘ill will’. In closing, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for the broader legal-theoretical debate around the normative propriety of the willful ignorance doctrine.},
	journal = {Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law},
	author = {Kirfel, L. and Hannikainen, I. R.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Willful Ignorance (WI) is a term in Anglo-American law to refer to circumstances in which a defendant remains intentionally unaware of a fact that would render them liable. These cases pose a unique problem for the law,as it is uncertain whether deliberate ignorance can be viewed as a form of knowledge and, therefore, whether they satisfy the mens rea requirement for culpability. In this chapter, we report two experimental studies modeled on United States vs. Jewell, a case in which Jewell aided an international drug-trafficking operation by transporting a suitcase which he deliberately avoided inspecting. We manipulated various features of the defendant’s epistemic state, relating to their suspicion, its reasonableness and its specificity. Our results showed that WI partially satisfies the mens rea requirement, though not to the extent of genuine knowledge. Participants considered willful ignorance incriminating, as long as the defendant suspected that they were involved in criminal activity, and regardless of whether their suspicion was reasonable or even true. Additionally, our studies suggested that judgment of culpability are related to broader inferences about the defendant’s antisocial tendencies—in line with theories that conceptualise WI as a demonstration of ‘ill will’. In closing, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for the broader legal-theoretical debate around the normative propriety of the willful ignorance doctrine.

@article{carrier_fake_2023,
	title = {Fake {Research} and {Harmful} {Findings}: {Introduction} to the {Special} {Issue}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0269-8595},
	shorttitle = {Fake {Research} and {Harmful} {Findings}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2284624},
	doi = {10.1080/02698595.2023.2284624},
	abstract = {The traditional mutual support of scientific progress and social advancement has given way to public reservation. Research is no longer considered worthwhile in general. Parts of the public have come to fear both scientific error and scientific success. This raises the question of how to deal with findings that could have a detrimental impact on society. In a different vein, fake research poses a serious challenge to science in that it could undermine the credibility of scientific accounts. Fake research actively produces ignorance rather than knowledge (agnotology). The question is how such actively misleading approaches are to be identified and separated from usual scientific error.},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2024-03-07},
	journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Carrier, Martin},
	month = jul,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2284624},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {167--171},
}

The traditional mutual support of scientific progress and social advancement has given way to public reservation. Research is no longer considered worthwhile in general. Parts of the public have come to fear both scientific error and scientific success. This raises the question of how to deal with findings that could have a detrimental impact on society. In a different vein, fake research poses a serious challenge to science in that it could undermine the credibility of scientific accounts. Fake research actively produces ignorance rather than knowledge (agnotology). The question is how such actively misleading approaches are to be identified and separated from usual scientific error.

@article{kirkegaard2023,
	title = {The organization of ignorance: {An} ethnographic study of the production of subjects and objects in an artificial intelligence project},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {2052-1499},
	abstract = {This article is a study of the role of organization of ignorance in an artificial intelligence project in a municipality in Denmark. It raises the issue of how to understand the process through which a seemingly ordinary project involving the development of an algorithm for decision support turns into a fantastical, creative reimagining of subjects and objects through the organization of ignorance. Unlike many ignorance studies, we do not examine ignorance and knowledge through the lens of intentionality or strategic interest. We instead adopt a distinct Deleuzian perspective on ignorance based on the idea of the  ́will to ignorance ́ as productive force that forms subjects and objects of ignorance. By observing the project management team over time, the article shows how it transforms a mundane task into an imaginative quest through the will to ignorance. The findings contribute not only empirically to the understanding of ignorance in organizations but also show the utility of adopting a non-intentional perspective in this kind of study.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ephemera. Theory and Politics in Organization},
	author = {Kirkegaard, L. and Kristensen, A. and Skov Lauridsen, T.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {161--187},
}

This article is a study of the role of organization of ignorance in an artificial intelligence project in a municipality in Denmark. It raises the issue of how to understand the process through which a seemingly ordinary project involving the development of an algorithm for decision support turns into a fantastical, creative reimagining of subjects and objects through the organization of ignorance. Unlike many ignorance studies, we do not examine ignorance and knowledge through the lens of intentionality or strategic interest. We instead adopt a distinct Deleuzian perspective on ignorance based on the idea of the ́will to ignorance ́ as productive force that forms subjects and objects of ignorance. By observing the project management team over time, the article shows how it transforms a mundane task into an imaginative quest through the will to ignorance. The findings contribute not only empirically to the understanding of ignorance in organizations but also show the utility of adopting a non-intentional perspective in this kind of study.

@book{llopart_aux_2023,
	address = {Rennes},
	title = {Aux origines d'{AZF}. {Le} problème de l'azote en {France} (1919-1940)},
	isbn = {978-2-86906-913-8},
	url = {https://pufr-editions.fr/produit/aux-origines-dazf/},
	abstract = {Il y a bientôt cent ans, naissait à Toulouse l'Office national industriel de l'Azote (ONIA), l'ancêtre de ce qui deviendra plus tard AZF. La création de cette usine d'ammoniaque synthétique découle de la volonté des dirigeants politiques français de résoudre le problème d'approvisionnement du pays en azote qui s'était posé brutalement durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Outre l'incapacité de son industrie à pouvoir fournir assez de poudres et d'explosifs en cas de guerre, la France ne fabrique pas assez d'engrais azotés en temps de paix, ce qui nuit à la modernisation de son agriculture.
Cependant, malgré l'urgence de la situation, la création de cette entreprise publique ne fait pas l'unanimité, dans la mesure où l'opinion perçoit mal le fait que l'Etat intervienne sur un marché dévolu jusqu'ici aux seuls intérêts privés. De plus pour se développer et faire la preuve de son utilité industrielle, l'ONIA a dû surmonter de très nombreux défis. Revenant sur les origines de l'usine AZF et sur les raisons de sa création, ce livre analyse également les deux premières décennies d'existence de l'entreprise, en essayant de comprendre comment elle a contribué à la résolution du "problème de l'azote" durant l'entre-deux-guerres.
Adoptant une perspective globale, ce livre replace la trajectoire de l'ONIA dans le contexte plus large d'une époque marqué par une évolution rapide des techniques, des marchés, de la législation sociale, et du rôle de l'Etat en matière économique.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-03-18},
	publisher = {PU François Rabelais},
	author = {Llopart, Michäel},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Il y a bientôt cent ans, naissait à Toulouse l'Office national industriel de l'Azote (ONIA), l'ancêtre de ce qui deviendra plus tard AZF. La création de cette usine d'ammoniaque synthétique découle de la volonté des dirigeants politiques français de résoudre le problème d'approvisionnement du pays en azote qui s'était posé brutalement durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Outre l'incapacité de son industrie à pouvoir fournir assez de poudres et d'explosifs en cas de guerre, la France ne fabrique pas assez d'engrais azotés en temps de paix, ce qui nuit à la modernisation de son agriculture. Cependant, malgré l'urgence de la situation, la création de cette entreprise publique ne fait pas l'unanimité, dans la mesure où l'opinion perçoit mal le fait que l'Etat intervienne sur un marché dévolu jusqu'ici aux seuls intérêts privés. De plus pour se développer et faire la preuve de son utilité industrielle, l'ONIA a dû surmonter de très nombreux défis. Revenant sur les origines de l'usine AZF et sur les raisons de sa création, ce livre analyse également les deux premières décennies d'existence de l'entreprise, en essayant de comprendre comment elle a contribué à la résolution du "problème de l'azote" durant l'entre-deux-guerres. Adoptant une perspective globale, ce livre replace la trajectoire de l'ONIA dans le contexte plus large d'une époque marqué par une évolution rapide des techniques, des marchés, de la législation sociale, et du rôle de l'Etat en matière économique.

@book{mcculloch_mining_2023,
	title = {Mining {Gold} and {Manufacturing} {Ignorance}: {Occupational} {Lung} {Disease} and the {Buying} and {Selling} of {Labour} in {Southern} {Africa}},
	isbn = {978-981-19832-7-6 978-981-19832-6-9},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85171518494&doi=10.1007%2f978-981-19-8327-6&partnerID=40&md5=7d5bea766ff6f0c98188bf4576a7a9b0},
	abstract = {This open access book charts how South Africa’s gold mines have systematically suppressed evidence of hazardous work practices and the risks associated with mining. For most of the twentieth century, South Africa was the world’s largest producer of gold. Although the country enjoyed a reputation for leading the world in occupational health legislation, the mining companies developed a system of medical surveillance and workers’ compensation which compromised the health of black gold miners, facilitated the spread of tuberculosis, and ravaged the communities and economies of labour-sending states. The culmination of two decades of meticulous archival research, this book exposes the making, contesting, and unravelling of the companies’ capacity to shape – and corrupt – medical knowledge. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Springer Nature},
	author = {McCulloch, Jock and Miller, Pavla},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1007/978-981-19-8327-6},
	note = {Publication Title: Mining Gold and Manufacturing Ignorance: Occupational Lung Disease and the Buying and Selling of Labour in Southern Africa
Type: Book},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This open access book charts how South Africa’s gold mines have systematically suppressed evidence of hazardous work practices and the risks associated with mining. For most of the twentieth century, South Africa was the world’s largest producer of gold. Although the country enjoyed a reputation for leading the world in occupational health legislation, the mining companies developed a system of medical surveillance and workers’ compensation which compromised the health of black gold miners, facilitated the spread of tuberculosis, and ravaged the communities and economies of labour-sending states. The culmination of two decades of meticulous archival research, this book exposes the making, contesting, and unravelling of the companies’ capacity to shape – and corrupt – medical knowledge. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.

@article{lee2023,
	title = {Un(ac)countable no-bodies: the politics of ignorance in global health policymaking},
	volume = {33},
	doi = {10.1080/09581596.2022.2025578},
	abstract = {By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories – non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities – are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Public Health},
	author = {Lee, Po-Han},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Evidence-based public health, World Health Organisation, World Health Organization, article, drawing, female, human, human experiment, male, medical research, politics, public health, sexual and gender minorities, sexual and gender minority, sociology, sociology of ignorance, sociology of nothing},
	pages = {48--59},
}

By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories – non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities – are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic.

@article{simon_constitution_2023,
	title = {Constitution of ignorance and uncertainty in language use - a programmatic attempt at systematization; [{Konstitution} von {Nichtwissen} und {Unsicherheit} im {Sprachgebrauch} – ein programmatischer {Systematisierungsversuch}]},
	volume = {45},
	issn = {10173285},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85159844110&doi=10.24989%2ffs.v45i1-2.2235&partnerID=40&md5=7c1ed9326dee624dc76c60c3c32d58ec},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2235},
	abstract = {In this paper, we propose a systematisation of the constitution of ignorance and uncertainty in language use and interaction. To this end, we first distinguish between a local and a global perspective on ignorance and uncertainty constitution. For the local level of ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose that four different types of linguistically indexed attributions of ignorance and uncertainty can be distinguished, with which the speaker/writer refers to different knowledge domains involved in the social process of local knowledge constitution. We then provide an overview of the inventory of linguistic signs that can be used to index such attributions and, building on this, distinguish four different forms of ignorance and uncertainty indexing that can be used in heterogeneous ways to signal the different types of ignorance and uncertainty attributions in specific contexts and situations. For the global level of collective ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose a model of different types of propositional constellations that can be used discourse-analytically as a basis for external ignorance and uncertainty attributions. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.},
	language = {German},
	number = {1-2},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Simon, Niklas and Janich, Nina},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG
Type: Article},
	pages = {5 -- 27},
}

In this paper, we propose a systematisation of the constitution of ignorance and uncertainty in language use and interaction. To this end, we first distinguish between a local and a global perspective on ignorance and uncertainty constitution. For the local level of ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose that four different types of linguistically indexed attributions of ignorance and uncertainty can be distinguished, with which the speaker/writer refers to different knowledge domains involved in the social process of local knowledge constitution. We then provide an overview of the inventory of linguistic signs that can be used to index such attributions and, building on this, distinguish four different forms of ignorance and uncertainty indexing that can be used in heterogeneous ways to signal the different types of ignorance and uncertainty attributions in specific contexts and situations. For the global level of collective ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose a model of different types of propositional constellations that can be used discourse-analytically as a basis for external ignorance and uncertainty attributions. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.

@article{varwig_functions_2023,
	title = {Functions of uncertainty thematizations in journalistic media; [{Funktionen} von {Unsicherheitsthematisierungen} in journalistischen {Medien}]},
	volume = {45},
	issn = {10173285},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85159814722&doi=10.24989%2ffs.v45i1-2.2237&partnerID=40&md5=562dfd2c65910a7ba45f33dfc46c45ee},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2237},
	abstract = {Cornelia Varwig Abstract Theoretical and methodological approaches of discourse analysis in the wake of Foucault focus on how knowledge is constituted in discourses. They are therefore well suited for investigating the epistemic status of knowledge, and thus also uncertain knowledge and igno-rance. However, discourse research does not offer specialized analytical approaches to media discourses with their specific boundary conditions and inherent logics, while at the same time in practice many analyses deal with media products. Some writers even bemoan a “media oblivion” in discourse theory. This article aims to demonstrate how theoretical approaches in communication studies can help to specify the role of journalists as discourse producers and participants, as well as journalistic production principles. In the empirical part of the article, the scientifically ambiguous knowledge about burnout is used as an example to show ten discursive-communi-cative functions that the thematization of epistemic uncertainty can have in journalistic articles. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.},
	language = {German},
	number = {1-2},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Varwig, Cornelia},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG
Type: Article},
	pages = {48 -- 65},
}

Cornelia Varwig Abstract Theoretical and methodological approaches of discourse analysis in the wake of Foucault focus on how knowledge is constituted in discourses. They are therefore well suited for investigating the epistemic status of knowledge, and thus also uncertain knowledge and igno-rance. However, discourse research does not offer specialized analytical approaches to media discourses with their specific boundary conditions and inherent logics, while at the same time in practice many analyses deal with media products. Some writers even bemoan a “media oblivion” in discourse theory. This article aims to demonstrate how theoretical approaches in communication studies can help to specify the role of journalists as discourse producers and participants, as well as journalistic production principles. In the empirical part of the article, the scientifically ambiguous knowledge about burnout is used as an example to show ten discursive-communi-cative functions that the thematization of epistemic uncertainty can have in journalistic articles. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.

@article{bartl_governance_2023,
	title = {Governance between ignorance and evidence: {Technology} assessment in the context of pandemic crisis management},
	volume = {32},
	issn = {2568-020X},
	shorttitle = {Governance zwischen {Nichtwissen} und {Evidenz}: {Technikfolgen}-abschätzung im {Kontext} des {Pandemie}-{Krisenmanagements}},
	doi = {10.14512/tatup.32.2.30},
	abstract = {This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Zeitschrift fur Technikfolgenabschatzung in Theorie und Praxis / Journal for Technology Assessment in Theory and Practice},
	author = {Bartl, G.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {co-production of knowledge, ignorance, pandemic simulation models, technologies of preparedness},
	pages = {30--35},
}

This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.

@article{de_mendonca_can_2023,
	title = {Can ignorance about the interest rate and macroeconomic surprises affect the stock market return? {Evidence} from a large emerging economy},
	volume = {64},
	issn = {10629408},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85144280499&doi=10.1016%2fj.najef.2022.101868&partnerID=40&md5=4d35e7e021d4620836c0f686a44418c1},
	doi = {10.1016/j.najef.2022.101868},
	abstract = {This paper analyzes whether the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate and macroeconomic surprises affects the return in the stock exchange in a large emerging economy. Based on the Brazilian economy from January 2005 to September 2021, we build a measure of “ignorance” from the signal-to-noise ratio of the monetary policy interest rate and evaluate its effect on the stock market return. Furthermore, we analyze whether the “surprises” from macroeconomic variables can affect the stock market return. The findings indicate that increases in the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate have a negative and statistically significant effect on the stock exchange return. Moreover, macroeconomic “surprises” have effects on stock market return. © 2022 Elsevier Inc.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {North American Journal of Economics and Finance},
	author = {de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira and Díaz, Raime Rolando Rodríguez},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Elsevier Inc.
Type: Article},
}

This paper analyzes whether the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate and macroeconomic surprises affects the return in the stock exchange in a large emerging economy. Based on the Brazilian economy from January 2005 to September 2021, we build a measure of “ignorance” from the signal-to-noise ratio of the monetary policy interest rate and evaluate its effect on the stock market return. Furthermore, we analyze whether the “surprises” from macroeconomic variables can affect the stock market return. The findings indicate that increases in the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate have a negative and statistically significant effect on the stock exchange return. Moreover, macroeconomic “surprises” have effects on stock market return. © 2022 Elsevier Inc.

@article{de_saxe_disrupting_2023,
	title = {Disrupting an {Epistemology} of {White} {Ignorance} through writing a {Racial} {Autobiography}},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {19204175},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85168990154&partnerID=40&md5=9d00635aa5adb4fb942cef8c09adbbe8},
	abstract = {White students who enter university having few experiences engaging with race and white supremacy are likely limited in their ability to perceive and understand structural white ignorance and racial bias towards Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC). As a result, these students and their professors tend to gloss over the insidious ways that hegemonic whiteness is upheld within the university setting. Such failure to critically examine structural whiteness misses opportunities to confront an epistemology of white ignorance, the Racial Contract, and their connection to sustained racial domination. Throughout this article, we argue that students can work towards identifying and disrupting white ignorance by writing a racial autobiography that critically reflects upon students' own experiences of race and racism. We use this assignment to illustrate what it might mean for students to 'become' co-conspirators within and beyond the university setting. © 2023 The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Critical Education},
	author = {de Saxe, Jennifer Gale and Ker, Alex},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Institute for Critical Education Studies
Type: Article},
	pages = {86 -- 100},
}

White students who enter university having few experiences engaging with race and white supremacy are likely limited in their ability to perceive and understand structural white ignorance and racial bias towards Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC). As a result, these students and their professors tend to gloss over the insidious ways that hegemonic whiteness is upheld within the university setting. Such failure to critically examine structural whiteness misses opportunities to confront an epistemology of white ignorance, the Racial Contract, and their connection to sustained racial domination. Throughout this article, we argue that students can work towards identifying and disrupting white ignorance by writing a racial autobiography that critically reflects upon students' own experiences of race and racism. We use this assignment to illustrate what it might mean for students to 'become' co-conspirators within and beyond the university setting. © 2023 The Author(s).

@article{portfliet2023,
	title = {How to study strategic ignorance in organizations},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {2052-1499},
	abstract = {This special issue is a testament to the interest in ignorance which has been shown across fields. However, questions remain on how to study the phenomenon. Methods diverge based on what type of ignorance is being examined and what field the study is located in. In this note, we find that a method to study a particular kind of ignorance, namely organizational strategic ignorance, is lacking, primarily due to the power and temporal dimensions at play. We offer that a material approach, specifically one focused on ‘boundary objects’, may be a fruitful avenue for investigating the topic. Objects have long been understood as sites of interpretive flexibility (Star, 2010), and there are parallels that can be drawn between materiality/absence and knowledge/ignorance, incorporating aspects of power, but also the temporal qualities that strategic ignorance encompasses. We draw on our research on whistleblowing to illustrate how boundary objects are a useful starting point for studies of strategic ignorance, and how a material approach in general may be an effective method for ignorance research more widely.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ephemera},
	author = {Portfliet, M. Van and Fanchini, M.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {217--230},
}

This special issue is a testament to the interest in ignorance which has been shown across fields. However, questions remain on how to study the phenomenon. Methods diverge based on what type of ignorance is being examined and what field the study is located in. In this note, we find that a method to study a particular kind of ignorance, namely organizational strategic ignorance, is lacking, primarily due to the power and temporal dimensions at play. We offer that a material approach, specifically one focused on ‘boundary objects’, may be a fruitful avenue for investigating the topic. Objects have long been understood as sites of interpretive flexibility (Star, 2010), and there are parallels that can be drawn between materiality/absence and knowledge/ignorance, incorporating aspects of power, but also the temporal qualities that strategic ignorance encompasses. We draw on our research on whistleblowing to illustrate how boundary objects are a useful starting point for studies of strategic ignorance, and how a material approach in general may be an effective method for ignorance research more widely.

@article{nordstrom2023a,
	title = {Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences},
	volume = {7},
	doi = {10.1017/bpp.2019.52},
	abstract = {AbstractWe examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46\% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Behavioural Public Policy},
	author = {NORDSTRÖM, JONAS and THUNSTRÖM, LINDA and VAN ’T VELD, KLAAS and SHOGREN, JASON F. and EHMKE, MARIAH},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {83--114},
}

AbstractWe examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.

@article{kirfel2023b,
	title = {Determining the {Epistemic} {Condition} of {Responsibility}-{Manipulation} of people's motivation for ignorance and knowledge in positive outcome cases},
	abstract = {In this study, we are interested in people’s responsibility attributions to wilfully ignorant agents whose actions result in a positive outcome. In previous studies, we have investigated the factors that drive people’s responsibility judgments to willfully ignorant agents who cause harm. In this study, we examine whether agents who remain ignorant with the intent to remain unbiased in their decision-making receive more responsibility for a positive outcome than agents who did not do so. More precisely, we will investigate cases in which an agent remains willfully ignorant to remain unbiased in their choice of a candidate for an international music competition. Just judging on the candidates’ musical quality but intentionally not knowing their identity, the agent unknowingly ends up choosing a candidate they have family or romantic ties with. That candidate then ends up winning the music competition. We are interested in people’s responsibility judgments in such a case, and how these compare to a case in which the agent had no choice of knowing the candidates’ identity, or a case in which the agent knowingly chooses their partner/relative.},
	journal = {osf.io},
	author = {Kirfel, L. and Gerstenberg, T.},
	year = {2023},
}

In this study, we are interested in people’s responsibility attributions to wilfully ignorant agents whose actions result in a positive outcome. In previous studies, we have investigated the factors that drive people’s responsibility judgments to willfully ignorant agents who cause harm. In this study, we examine whether agents who remain ignorant with the intent to remain unbiased in their decision-making receive more responsibility for a positive outcome than agents who did not do so. More precisely, we will investigate cases in which an agent remains willfully ignorant to remain unbiased in their choice of a candidate for an international music competition. Just judging on the candidates’ musical quality but intentionally not knowing their identity, the agent unknowingly ends up choosing a candidate they have family or romantic ties with. That candidate then ends up winning the music competition. We are interested in people’s responsibility judgments in such a case, and how these compare to a case in which the agent had no choice of knowing the candidates’ identity, or a case in which the agent knowingly chooses their partner/relative.

@article{asplin2023,
	title = {Unintended ignorance: {The} narrative of 'the missing patient voice'.},
	abstract = {This paper brings attention to the production of unintended ignorance in the
context of patient involvement in the re-design of healthcare services. Ignorance is
usually treated as the result of human and intentional inattention. Recent calls
stress that more empirical studies are needed that go beyond understanding
ignorance as performed by individuals to explore ignorance as a sociomaterial
practice, including all its heterogeneous elements. Actor-network-theory (ANT)
assumes that power does not relate primarily to human intention, but instead to the
capability of actors, human and non-human, to cause relational effect. Through the
lens of ANT and translation, this ethnographic study illustrates how ignorance is
produced throughout a service design process in Norwegian health care seeking to
involve patients and include the patient voice. It finds that ignorance is produced as
patient-centred policy translates into a label — ‘the missing patient voice’ —
enrolling actors and contributing to unintentionally ignoring the real patient voices.
This article brings empirical insight into ignorance as practice by giving voice to the
non-human actors involved in such efforts, bringing conceptual attention to the
material dimension of ignorance. Furthermore, this study affords nuance in
understanding practices of patient-centred care by offering a critical perspective on
how well-intended efforts of locating and including the patient voice in healthcare
services can become symbolic and instead bring passive, token patients (with no
voices) into being.},
	journal = {Ephemera: theory \& politics in organization},
	author = {Asplin, Betina Riis},
	year = {2023},
}

This paper brings attention to the production of unintended ignorance in the context of patient involvement in the re-design of healthcare services. Ignorance is usually treated as the result of human and intentional inattention. Recent calls stress that more empirical studies are needed that go beyond understanding ignorance as performed by individuals to explore ignorance as a sociomaterial practice, including all its heterogeneous elements. Actor-network-theory (ANT) assumes that power does not relate primarily to human intention, but instead to the capability of actors, human and non-human, to cause relational effect. Through the lens of ANT and translation, this ethnographic study illustrates how ignorance is produced throughout a service design process in Norwegian health care seeking to involve patients and include the patient voice. It finds that ignorance is produced as patient-centred policy translates into a label — ‘the missing patient voice’ — enrolling actors and contributing to unintentionally ignoring the real patient voices. This article brings empirical insight into ignorance as practice by giving voice to the non-human actors involved in such efforts, bringing conceptual attention to the material dimension of ignorance. Furthermore, this study affords nuance in understanding practices of patient-centred care by offering a critical perspective on how well-intended efforts of locating and including the patient voice in healthcare services can become symbolic and instead bring passive, token patients (with no voices) into being.

@article{becker2023,
	title = {Silence, secrecy, ignorance, and the making of class and status across generations},
	abstract = {A peculiar aura of uncertainty and difficulty of knowing surrounds class, and especially its transmission from one generation to another. In this programmatic text we trace silences around the reproduction of class through our ethnographic research in Kenya, Egypt, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, and Palestine, and among migrant diasporas that link those countries with Somalia, Afghanistan, Western Europe, Russia, and the Arab Gulf states. We propose a comparative and nuanced attention to the ways in which concealment and silences – that is, ways of not display- ing things or not speaking openly about them even while they may be known; secrets – that is, knowledge that is actively prevented from circulating; and ignorance – that is, ways of not knowing or not addressing something, together contribute to the reproduction of social status across generations. That reproduction, we argue, is in need of not being known or addressed because the mor- al and institutional claims and the public image that are inherent to status are frequently contradicted or compli- cated by the process in which the resources have been gathered, and by the ways in which they are passed on. The passing on of status from one generation to another therefore needs to be understood in a way that is not restricted to its discursive and performative dimension of explicit markers and accomplishments. Marks of dis- tinction, accomplishment of status – and also stigmas of discrimination and stories of failure – are likely to consist equally of aspects that are concealed, forcibly kept se- cret, or not addressed. At the same time, every display and utterance that qualitatively or quantitatively values a person’s or group’s standing vis-à-vis others is likely to be enabled and accompanied by blind spots and silenc- es. These can be best studied from the bottom up through a qualitative enquiry.},
	journal = {ssoar.info},
	author = {Becker, J. and Bromber, K. and Chavoshian, S.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--15},
}

A peculiar aura of uncertainty and difficulty of knowing surrounds class, and especially its transmission from one generation to another. In this programmatic text we trace silences around the reproduction of class through our ethnographic research in Kenya, Egypt, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, and Palestine, and among migrant diasporas that link those countries with Somalia, Afghanistan, Western Europe, Russia, and the Arab Gulf states. We propose a comparative and nuanced attention to the ways in which concealment and silences – that is, ways of not display- ing things or not speaking openly about them even while they may be known; secrets – that is, knowledge that is actively prevented from circulating; and ignorance – that is, ways of not knowing or not addressing something, together contribute to the reproduction of social status across generations. That reproduction, we argue, is in need of not being known or addressed because the mor- al and institutional claims and the public image that are inherent to status are frequently contradicted or compli- cated by the process in which the resources have been gathered, and by the ways in which they are passed on. The passing on of status from one generation to another therefore needs to be understood in a way that is not restricted to its discursive and performative dimension of explicit markers and accomplishments. Marks of dis- tinction, accomplishment of status – and also stigmas of discrimination and stories of failure – are likely to consist equally of aspects that are concealed, forcibly kept se- cret, or not addressed. At the same time, every display and utterance that qualitatively or quantitatively values a person’s or group’s standing vis-à-vis others is likely to be enabled and accompanied by blind spots and silenc- es. These can be best studied from the bottom up through a qualitative enquiry.

@article{geiger2023,
	title = {What we think others think about climate change: generalizability of pluralistic ignorance across 11 countries},
	abstract = {The majority of people worldwide believe in human-caused climate change. Yet this social consensus is often underestimated, potentially undermining individual climate action. This preregistered study tests (a) whether systematic misperceptions of climate change beliefs generalize across a diverse sample of 11 countries, particularly those countries that are typically underrepresented in psychological research, and (b) whether presenting country-specific public opinion data on climate change beliefs can promote factors related to climate action. Using cross-quota samples (age and sex; N = 3,653), we find that people across all 11 countries underestimate the prevalence of pro-climate views (‘mainly and partly human-caused’), ranging from 7.5\% in Indonesia to 20.8\% in Brazil. However, providing social consensus information is largely ineffective, except for minimal effects on willingness to express one’s opinion on climate change. This effect may, nevertheless, be meaningful if it reduces ‘self-silencing’. The overall results question the continued use of social consensus messaging on social media and as an educational intervention.},
	journal = {osf.io},
	author = {Geiger, S. J. and Köhler, J. K. and Delabrida…, Z. N. C.},
	year = {2023},
}

The majority of people worldwide believe in human-caused climate change. Yet this social consensus is often underestimated, potentially undermining individual climate action. This preregistered study tests (a) whether systematic misperceptions of climate change beliefs generalize across a diverse sample of 11 countries, particularly those countries that are typically underrepresented in psychological research, and (b) whether presenting country-specific public opinion data on climate change beliefs can promote factors related to climate action. Using cross-quota samples (age and sex; N = 3,653), we find that people across all 11 countries underestimate the prevalence of pro-climate views (‘mainly and partly human-caused’), ranging from 7.5% in Indonesia to 20.8% in Brazil. However, providing social consensus information is largely ineffective, except for minimal effects on willingness to express one’s opinion on climate change. This effect may, nevertheless, be meaningful if it reduces ‘self-silencing’. The overall results question the continued use of social consensus messaging on social media and as an educational intervention.

@book{dedieu_pesticides_2022,
	address = {Paris, France},
	series = {Anthropocène},
	title = {Pesticides: le confort de l'ignorance},
	isbn = {978-2-02-147349-0},
	shorttitle = {Pesticides},
	url = {https://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/pesticides-francois-dedieu/9782021473490},
	abstract = {Depuis soixante ans, les dangers des pesticides pour la biodiversité et la santé sont avérés. Alors pourquoi notre modèle agricole et alimentaire reste-t-il toujours dopé aux pesticides ? Les Monsanto Papers l’ont montré, les lobbyistes du secteur entretiennent savamment le doute quant à la gravité de leurs impacts environnementaux et sanitaires. Mais l’influence des industriels n’est que la face émergée d’une machinerie plus vaste de production de l’ignorance, reposant moins sur la manipulation que sur un déni collectif favorisé par les protocoles officiels de l’évaluation des risques. Face à l’ampleur des données et des dangers potentiels, il devient plus confortable d’ignorer des pans entiers de la connaissance plutôt que d’assumer le vertige de leurs conséquences sur notre modèle agricole.Au terme de ce voyage inédit au cœur de la fabrique de l’ignorance, l’auteur apporte des pistes et réflexions pour accélérer la transition vers une agriculture affranchie des pesticides.François Dedieu est sociologue à l’INRAE, au Laboratoire interdisciplinaire science innovation sociétés (Lisis). Expert pour l'ANSES, il enseigne notamment à Sciences Po Paris et à l’École des ponts et chaussées.},
	language = {français},
	publisher = {Éditions du Seuil},
	author = {Dedieu, François},
	year = {2022},
	note = {ISSN: 2270-2431},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), Pesticides -- Aspect environnemental, Pesticides -- Politique publique, Pesticides -- Évaluation du risque},
}

Depuis soixante ans, les dangers des pesticides pour la biodiversité et la santé sont avérés. Alors pourquoi notre modèle agricole et alimentaire reste-t-il toujours dopé aux pesticides ? Les Monsanto Papers l’ont montré, les lobbyistes du secteur entretiennent savamment le doute quant à la gravité de leurs impacts environnementaux et sanitaires. Mais l’influence des industriels n’est que la face émergée d’une machinerie plus vaste de production de l’ignorance, reposant moins sur la manipulation que sur un déni collectif favorisé par les protocoles officiels de l’évaluation des risques. Face à l’ampleur des données et des dangers potentiels, il devient plus confortable d’ignorer des pans entiers de la connaissance plutôt que d’assumer le vertige de leurs conséquences sur notre modèle agricole.Au terme de ce voyage inédit au cœur de la fabrique de l’ignorance, l’auteur apporte des pistes et réflexions pour accélérer la transition vers une agriculture affranchie des pesticides.François Dedieu est sociologue à l’INRAE, au Laboratoire interdisciplinaire science innovation sociétés (Lisis). Expert pour l'ANSES, il enseigne notamment à Sciences Po Paris et à l’École des ponts et chaussées.

@article{hannon_are_2022,
	title = {Are knowledgeable voters better voters?},
	issn = {1470-594X},
	doi = {10.1177/1470594X211065080},
	abstract = {It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like. © The Author(s) 2022.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics},
	author = {Hannon, M.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {democracy, epistocracy, motivated reasoning, objectivity, political ignorance, political knowledge},
}

It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like. © The Author(s) 2022.

@article{kumar_understanding_2022,
	title = {Understanding the phases of vaccine hesitancy during the {COVID}-19 pandemic},
	volume = {11},
	issn = {2045-4015},
	doi = {10.1186/s13584-022-00527-8},
	abstract = {Vaccine hesitancy is an important feature of every vaccination and COVID-19 vaccination is not an exception. During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine hesitancy has exhibited different phases and has shown both temporal and spatial variation in these phases. This has likely arisen due to varied socio-behavioural characteristics of humans and their response towards COVID 19 pandemic and its vaccination strategies. This commentary highlights that there are multiple phases of vaccine hesitancy: Vaccine Eagerness, Vaccine Ignorance, Vaccine Resistance, Vaccine Confidence, Vaccine Complacency and Vaccine Apathy. Though the phases seem to be sequential, they may co-exist at the same time in different regions and at different times in the same region. This may be attributed to several factors influencing the phases of vaccine hesitancy. The complexities of the societal reactions need to be understood in full to be addressed better. There is a dire need of different strategies of communication to deal with the various nuances of all of the phases. To address of vaccine hesitancy, an understanding of the societal reactions leading to various phases of vaccine hesitancy is of utmost importance. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Israel Journal of Health Policy Research},
	author = {Kumar, D. and Mathur, M. and Kumar, N. and Rana, R.K. and Tiwary, R.C. and Raghav, P.R. and Kumar, A. and Kapoor, N. and Mathur, M. and Tanu, T. and Sethia, S. and Lahariya, C.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {COVID 19 pandemic, COVID vaccine, Vaccine apathy, Vaccine complacency, Vaccine confidence, Vaccine eagerness, Vaccine hesitancy, Vaccine ignorance, Vaccine resistance},
}

Vaccine hesitancy is an important feature of every vaccination and COVID-19 vaccination is not an exception. During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine hesitancy has exhibited different phases and has shown both temporal and spatial variation in these phases. This has likely arisen due to varied socio-behavioural characteristics of humans and their response towards COVID 19 pandemic and its vaccination strategies. This commentary highlights that there are multiple phases of vaccine hesitancy: Vaccine Eagerness, Vaccine Ignorance, Vaccine Resistance, Vaccine Confidence, Vaccine Complacency and Vaccine Apathy. Though the phases seem to be sequential, they may co-exist at the same time in different regions and at different times in the same region. This may be attributed to several factors influencing the phases of vaccine hesitancy. The complexities of the societal reactions need to be understood in full to be addressed better. There is a dire need of different strategies of communication to deal with the various nuances of all of the phases. To address of vaccine hesitancy, an understanding of the societal reactions leading to various phases of vaccine hesitancy is of utmost importance. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{medvecky_public_2022,
	title = {Public {Understanding} of {Ignorance} as {Critical} {Science} {Literacy}},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {2071-1050},
	doi = {10.3390/su14105920},
	abstract = {We are largely ignorant. At least, there are many more things we are ignorant of than knowledgeable of. Yet, the common perception of ignorance as a negative trait has left it rather unloved in debates around making knowledge public, including science communication in its various guises. However, ignorance is a complex and essential part of science; it performs a number of legitimate roles, and is performed in a range of legitimate ways within science. In this paper, I argue that it is vital to understand when ignorance is an appropriate, legitimate part of the scientific process, and when ignorance is misused or abused in science. I argue that understanding ignorance is a central aspect of public understanding of science, especially in terms critical science literacy. Critical science literacy argues that more than simply an understanding of scientific facts and processes, a key component of what scientific literacy should aim for is an understanding of the tacit knowledge of science. I present a typology of ignorance and argue that fostering a greater public understanding of ignorance is a rarely acknowledged, yet essential, aspect of making science public, and that it is a challenge that those engaged in and committed to better public understanding of science should take very seriously. © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.},
	language = {English},
	number = {10},
	journal = {Sustainability (Switzerland)},
	author = {Medvecky, F.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {agnotology, critical science literacy, ignorance, public understanding of science, science communication},
}

We are largely ignorant. At least, there are many more things we are ignorant of than knowledgeable of. Yet, the common perception of ignorance as a negative trait has left it rather unloved in debates around making knowledge public, including science communication in its various guises. However, ignorance is a complex and essential part of science; it performs a number of legitimate roles, and is performed in a range of legitimate ways within science. In this paper, I argue that it is vital to understand when ignorance is an appropriate, legitimate part of the scientific process, and when ignorance is misused or abused in science. I argue that understanding ignorance is a central aspect of public understanding of science, especially in terms critical science literacy. Critical science literacy argues that more than simply an understanding of scientific facts and processes, a key component of what scientific literacy should aim for is an understanding of the tacit knowledge of science. I present a typology of ignorance and argue that fostering a greater public understanding of ignorance is a rarely acknowledged, yet essential, aspect of making science public, and that it is a challenge that those engaged in and committed to better public understanding of science should take very seriously. © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

@article{gargani_scientific_2022,
	title = {Scientific truth and social issues},
	volume = {30},
	issn = {1240-1307},
	shorttitle = {Vérités scientifiques et enjeux sociaux},
	doi = {10.1051/nss/2022026},
	abstract = {We present a synthesis of the interdisciplinary conference on 'Scientific truth and social issues', which dealt with current debates about the relationships between academic research and social needs. The conference's aim was to discuss the potential negative effects of the current organization of sciences on the diffusion of scientific truths and to reflect on forms of organization best able to share scientific proofs with a broad audience including non-academic citizens, and taking into account social issues and their positive impacts on research projects. One of the difficulties identified was that criteria used to validate scientific knowledge are often variable inside scientific communities and over time. In contemporary sciences, most scientific evidences are not produced or even fully understood by one individual only but result from collective work. Production of knowledge and production of ignorance occur both in the scientific arena. To address these problems, developing interdisciplinary expert groups, participatory sciences, and collective scientific synthesis are some of the avenues discussed during this event. © F. Charvolin et E. Kohlmann, Hosted by EDP Sciences, 2022.},
	language = {French},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Natures Sciences Societes},
	author = {Gargani, J. and Jacq, A. and Gispert, H. and Brunet, P.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Expertise, Ignorance, Organization, Proof, Truth},
	pages = {184--190},
}

We present a synthesis of the interdisciplinary conference on 'Scientific truth and social issues', which dealt with current debates about the relationships between academic research and social needs. The conference's aim was to discuss the potential negative effects of the current organization of sciences on the diffusion of scientific truths and to reflect on forms of organization best able to share scientific proofs with a broad audience including non-academic citizens, and taking into account social issues and their positive impacts on research projects. One of the difficulties identified was that criteria used to validate scientific knowledge are often variable inside scientific communities and over time. In contemporary sciences, most scientific evidences are not produced or even fully understood by one individual only but result from collective work. Production of knowledge and production of ignorance occur both in the scientific arena. To address these problems, developing interdisciplinary expert groups, participatory sciences, and collective scientific synthesis are some of the avenues discussed during this event. © F. Charvolin et E. Kohlmann, Hosted by EDP Sciences, 2022.

@article{martinez-ordaz_is_2022,
	title = {Is {There} {Anything} {Special} {About} the {Ignorance} {Involved} in {Big} {Data} {Practices}?},
	volume = {143},
	issn = {0921-8599},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-75267-5_4},
	abstract = {Here, I address the question of whether there anything special about the ignorance involved in big data practices. I submit that the ignorance that emerges when using big data in the empirical sciences is ignorance of theoretical structure with reliable consequences and I explain how this ignorance relates to different epistemic achievements such as knowledge and understanding. I illustrate this with a case study from observational cosmology. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies Series},
	author = {Martínez-Ordaz, M.R.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Bullet cluster, Epistemic opacity, Epistemology of big data, Ignorance, Ignorance of theoretical structure, Modal understanding},
	pages = {113--140},
}

Here, I address the question of whether there anything special about the ignorance involved in big data practices. I submit that the ignorance that emerges when using big data in the empirical sciences is ignorance of theoretical structure with reliable consequences and I explain how this ignorance relates to different epistemic achievements such as knowledge and understanding. I illustrate this with a case study from observational cosmology. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

@article{kubyshkina_logic_2021,
	title = {A logic for factive ignorance},
	volume = {198},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02440-1},
	abstract = {In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$, then \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Kubyshkina, Ekaterina and Petrolo, Mattia},
	month = jun,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Agnoiology, Epistemic logic, Factive ignorance, Ignorance representation, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {5917--5928},
}

In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of $$\phi $$, then $$\phi $$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.

@incollection{ahlstrom-vij_policy_2021,
	title = {Policy, ignorance, and the will of the people: {The} case of “good immigrants”},
	isbn = {978-0-19-289333-8},
	shorttitle = {Policy, ignorance, and the will of the people},
	abstract = {It is well established that the general population tend to lack in-depth knowledge about key political and policy matters. What are the implications for policymaking? This chapter considers this question in the context of immigration policy, reporting first on a focus group study which offers evidence that reported desires for a reduced number of immigrants might ultimately reflect a desire for immigrants of (perceived) high quality, not a reduction in overall quantity, where quality is defined in terms of fiscal impact. The chapter then argues that public preferences for such “good immigrants” are problematic, deploying a number of counterfactual models that suggest that such preferences are based on mistaken beliefs, and arguing that they thereby likely fail to reflect what the person truly desires. These findings extend beyond immigration policy and serve to highlight the often-overlooked problem that policies implemented with reference to popular sentiments might not capture “the will of the people.”. © the several contributors 2021.},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {Political {Epistemology}},
	author = {Ahlstrom-Vij, K. and Steele, J.R.},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192893338.003.0011},
	keywords = {Counterfactual modeling, Immigration, Informed preferences, Policy, Political epistemology, Political knowledge, Will of the people},
	pages = {180--205},
}

It is well established that the general population tend to lack in-depth knowledge about key political and policy matters. What are the implications for policymaking? This chapter considers this question in the context of immigration policy, reporting first on a focus group study which offers evidence that reported desires for a reduced number of immigrants might ultimately reflect a desire for immigrants of (perceived) high quality, not a reduction in overall quantity, where quality is defined in terms of fiscal impact. The chapter then argues that public preferences for such “good immigrants” are problematic, deploying a number of counterfactual models that suggest that such preferences are based on mistaken beliefs, and arguing that they thereby likely fail to reflect what the person truly desires. These findings extend beyond immigration policy and serve to highlight the often-overlooked problem that policies implemented with reference to popular sentiments might not capture “the will of the people.”. © the several contributors 2021.

@article{goranko_relative_2021,
	title = {On {Relative} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {8},
	number = {1},
	author = {Goranko, Valentin},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {119--140},
}

@article{townsend_representation_2021,
	title = {Representation and {Epistemic} {Violence}},
	volume = {29},
	issn = {0967-2559},
	doi = {10.1080/09672559.2021.1997398},
	abstract = {Sometimes an individual gets taken as speaking for a wider group without laying claim to any such authority–they are thrust unwillingly, and sometimes even unknowingly, into the role of that group’s representative. Especially for members of subordinated social groups in certain contexts, this can be hard to shake: despite their best efforts to disavow any authority to speak in the name of others, their voice might be taken as the voice of their group. In this paper we explore the intuitive injustice involved in such cases. After establishing the felicity conditions of speaking for a group, we argue that certain forms of pernicious ignorance often stand in the way of the fulfilment of these conditions. The result is a distinctive kind of ‘epistemic violence’, which can result in the silencing of both the group that is taken to be spoken for, and the spokesperson who is taken to speak for them. © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
	author = {Townsend, L. and Lupin, D.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Silencing, epistemic violence, ignorance, representation},
	pages = {577--594},
}

Sometimes an individual gets taken as speaking for a wider group without laying claim to any such authority–they are thrust unwillingly, and sometimes even unknowingly, into the role of that group’s representative. Especially for members of subordinated social groups in certain contexts, this can be hard to shake: despite their best efforts to disavow any authority to speak in the name of others, their voice might be taken as the voice of their group. In this paper we explore the intuitive injustice involved in such cases. After establishing the felicity conditions of speaking for a group, we argue that certain forms of pernicious ignorance often stand in the way of the fulfilment of these conditions. The result is a distinctive kind of ‘epistemic violence’, which can result in the silencing of both the group that is taken to be spoken for, and the spokesperson who is taken to speak for them. © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{nunez_nihil_2021,
	title = {Nihil maius. {Maximitas} dei in unum argumentum of {Anselm}'s {Proslogion} and {Nicholas} of {Cusa}'s {De} docta ignorantia},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {1851-8753},
	shorttitle = {Nihil maius. {La} maximidad de {Dios} en el unum argumentum del {Proslogion} de {Anselmo} y en {De} docta ignorantia de {Nicolás} de {Cusa}},
	doi = {10.48162/rev.35.008},
	abstract = {This article explores a relationship between the notion of maximitas dei in the unum argumentum of the Anselm's Proslogion and by Nicholas of Cusa's De docta ignorantia. Although the explicit anselmian allusions in works of the Cusano do not allow to speak a direct influence, it is tried to show how both authors come together in the speculative yield around the negativity of the maximitas dei. © 2021 Editorial de la Facultad de Filosofia y Letras de la Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. All rights reserved.},
	language = {Spanish},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Scripta Mediaevalia},
	author = {Núñez, R.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Anselm of Canterbury, Nicholas of Cusa, coincidence of opposites, learned ignorance, maximitas dei},
	pages = {107--126},
}

This article explores a relationship between the notion of maximitas dei in the unum argumentum of the Anselm's Proslogion and by Nicholas of Cusa's De docta ignorantia. Although the explicit anselmian allusions in works of the Cusano do not allow to speak a direct influence, it is tried to show how both authors come together in the speculative yield around the negativity of the maximitas dei. © 2021 Editorial de la Facultad de Filosofia y Letras de la Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. All rights reserved.

@incollection{gerund_ignorance_2019,
	address = {Cham},
	title = {Ignorance},
	isbn = {978-3-030-28987-4},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28987-4_25},
	abstract = {This entry discusses the notion of “ignorance” as it circulates in popular parlance and academic discourse. It summarizes the main strands of scholarship on the concept and shows how ignorance has developed from a largely neglected issue to a valid topic in its own right in various disciplines. Ignorance emerges as a contested and complex term that is often situated within different political projects and sometimes even conflicting ideological agendas.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2019-12-09},
	booktitle = {Critical {Terms} in {Futures} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing. Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan},
	author = {Gerund, Katharina},
	editor = {Paul, Heike},
	year = {2019},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-28987-4_25},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {157--161},
}

This entry discusses the notion of “ignorance” as it circulates in popular parlance and academic discourse. It summarizes the main strands of scholarship on the concept and shows how ignorance has developed from a largely neglected issue to a valid topic in its own right in various disciplines. Ignorance emerges as a contested and complex term that is often situated within different political projects and sometimes even conflicting ideological agendas.

@book{bretesche_risque_2019,
	series = {Développement durable},
	title = {Le risque environnemental : entre sciences physiques et sciences humaines},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-571-5},
	shorttitle = {Le risque environnemental},
	url = {https://documentation.insp.gouv.fr/insp/doc/SYRACUSE/114801/le-risque-environnemental-entre-sciences-physiques-et-sciences-humaines-sophie-bretesche-cyrille-har},
	abstract = {La façon dont les sociétés prennent en charge la question de l'environnement met en jeu des transactions entre les différents acteurs sociaux impliqués. Le défaut de consensus social sur ce qui est dangereux ou non, sur le niveau de dangerosité ou sur ce qu'il convient de faire en situation d'incertitude et, en définitive, sur le degré d'acceptation du risque, constituent des défis sociétaux majeurs. La notion de "risque" englobe aussi bien les grandes menaces planétaires (destruction de la couche d'ozone, effet de serre, etc.) que les comportements individuels qui ponctuent notre quotidien (tabagisme, conduite automobile, etc.). Les risques écologiques ou technologiques révèlent le fossé qui sépare les experts des profanes et suscitent de nouvelles exigences démocratiques, tandis que les risques individuels modifient notre façon de concevoir nos rapports avec autrui. Nous proposons une lecture interdisciplinaire du risque environnemental sous trois aspects : sa mesure, sa perception et sa gestion. Cet ouvrage initie des regards croisés entre scientifiques, gestionnaires et acteurs publics autour du sol, de l'air et de l'eau. C'est dans une démarche de science accessible au citoyen que cet ouvrage souhaite s'inscrire.},
	language = {français},
	urldate = {2024-01-17},
	publisher = {Presses des Mines},
	author = {Bretesché, Sophie and Harpet, Cyrille and Ollitrault, Sylvie and Héquet, Valérie},
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Environnement -- Protection -- Participation des citoyens -- France -- 1990-2020, Environnement -- Évaluation du risque -- France -- 1990-2020, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Risques écotoxicologiques},
}

La façon dont les sociétés prennent en charge la question de l'environnement met en jeu des transactions entre les différents acteurs sociaux impliqués. Le défaut de consensus social sur ce qui est dangereux ou non, sur le niveau de dangerosité ou sur ce qu'il convient de faire en situation d'incertitude et, en définitive, sur le degré d'acceptation du risque, constituent des défis sociétaux majeurs. La notion de "risque" englobe aussi bien les grandes menaces planétaires (destruction de la couche d'ozone, effet de serre, etc.) que les comportements individuels qui ponctuent notre quotidien (tabagisme, conduite automobile, etc.). Les risques écologiques ou technologiques révèlent le fossé qui sépare les experts des profanes et suscitent de nouvelles exigences démocratiques, tandis que les risques individuels modifient notre façon de concevoir nos rapports avec autrui. Nous proposons une lecture interdisciplinaire du risque environnemental sous trois aspects : sa mesure, sa perception et sa gestion. Cet ouvrage initie des regards croisés entre scientifiques, gestionnaires et acteurs publics autour du sol, de l'air et de l'eau. C'est dans une démarche de science accessible au citoyen que cet ouvrage souhaite s'inscrire.

@article{lind_save_2019,
	title = {Save the planet or close your eyes? {Testing} strategic ignorance in a charity context},
	volume = {161},
	shorttitle = {Save the planet or close your eyes?},
	doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.02.010},
	abstract = {Do people try to avoid unpleasant information about the environmental consequences of their actions? If so, do they react with hostility towards others who provide the unwanted information? Fearing such hostility, do others abstain from providing the information? These are the questions we set out to explore by means of lab experiments presented here. To our surprise, and in stark contrast to related previous literature, we found few indications of willful ignorance. In a binary dictator game with an environmental charity as the recipient, an option to stay uninformed about the effects of one's actions for the charity was infrequently chosen, and did not significantly affect generosity. When another subject might choose to impose information on the dictator, almost all dictators asked for information themselves – but this was not associated with increased dictator generosity. We argue that the phenomenon of strategic ignorance is likely to be less robust and more context-dependent than one might expect based on previous research, and that this result may be important from an environmental policy perspective. © 2019},
	journal = {Ecological Economics},
	author = {Lind, J.T. and Nyborg, K. and Pauls, A.},
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Carbon offset, Dictator game, Experiment, Social sanctions, Strategic ignorance},
	pages = {9--19},
}

Do people try to avoid unpleasant information about the environmental consequences of their actions? If so, do they react with hostility towards others who provide the unwanted information? Fearing such hostility, do others abstain from providing the information? These are the questions we set out to explore by means of lab experiments presented here. To our surprise, and in stark contrast to related previous literature, we found few indications of willful ignorance. In a binary dictator game with an environmental charity as the recipient, an option to stay uninformed about the effects of one's actions for the charity was infrequently chosen, and did not significantly affect generosity. When another subject might choose to impose information on the dictator, almost all dictators asked for information themselves – but this was not associated with increased dictator generosity. We argue that the phenomenon of strategic ignorance is likely to be less robust and more context-dependent than one might expect based on previous research, and that this result may be important from an environmental policy perspective. © 2019

@misc{serra-garcia_elasticity_2019,
	address = {Rochester, NY},
	type = {{SSRN} {Scholarly} {Paper}},
	title = {The ({In}){Elasticity} of {Moral} {Ignorance}},
	url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3357132},
	doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3357132},
	abstract = {Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in policy circles, where there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In this paper, we study the (in)elasticity of moral ignorance, with respect to monetary incentives, social norms messages and moral context. We propose a simple behavioral model in which individuals suffer moral costs when behaving selfishly in the face of moral information. In several experiments, we find that moral ignorance is strongly elastic with respect to monetary incentives, yet rather inelastic with respect to social norms and moral context. Consistent with the model, there are heterogeneous effects of social norms, depending on subjects’ level of altruism. These findings indicate that rather simple messaging interventions may have limited effects on ignorance, while costlier changes in incentives or team composition could be highly effective.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2024-03-07},
	author = {Serra-Garcia, Marta and Szech, Nora},
	month = aug,
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {information avoidance, morality, social norms, unethical behavior},
}

Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in policy circles, where there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In this paper, we study the (in)elasticity of moral ignorance, with respect to monetary incentives, social norms messages and moral context. We propose a simple behavioral model in which individuals suffer moral costs when behaving selfishly in the face of moral information. In several experiments, we find that moral ignorance is strongly elastic with respect to monetary incentives, yet rather inelastic with respect to social norms and moral context. Consistent with the model, there are heterogeneous effects of social norms, depending on subjects’ level of altruism. These findings indicate that rather simple messaging interventions may have limited effects on ignorance, while costlier changes in incentives or team composition could be highly effective.

@misc{mansuy_patient_2019,
	title = {Le patient expert},
	url = {https://documentation.ehesp.fr/memoires/2019/master2droitdelasante/Margot%20Mansuy.pdf},
	abstract = {mémoire : Ecole des hautes études en santé publique (EHESP) / Université Rennes 1 Rennes},
	language = {français},
	author = {Mansuy, Margot},
	year = {2019},
}

mémoire : Ecole des hautes études en santé publique (EHESP) / Université Rennes 1 Rennes

@incollection{kourany_agnotology_2018,
	title = {Agnotology, {Feminism}, and {Philosophy}: {Potentially} the {Closest} of {Allies}},
	isbn = {978-1-4742-9778-3 978-1-4742-9777-6 978-1-4742-9779-0 978-1-4742-9780-6},
	url = {http://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/the-bloomsbury-companion-to-analytic-feminism},
	urldate = {2021-08-02},
	booktitle = {The {Bloomsbury} {Companion} to {Analytic} {Feminism}},
	publisher = {Bloomsbury Academic},
	author = {Kourany, Janet A.},
	year = {2018},
	doi = {10.5040/9781474297806},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {281--309},
}

@book{foray_leconomie_2018,
	address = {Paris},
	edition = {3e éd. entièrement refondue et mise à jour},
	series = {Repères},
	title = {L'économie de la connaissance},
	isbn = {978-2-7071-9757-3},
	abstract = {Cet ouvrage analyse l'évolution des sociétés développées vers une économie fondée
 sur la connaissance, avec l'avènement des nouvelles technologies de l'information
 et de la communication, et la discipline dont les concepts et les outils permettent
 d'interpréter ces mutations. À l'image de l'économie industrielle fondée en France
 vers 1820, au moment de l'avènement de la grande industrie, l'économie de la connaissance
 se développe en tant que discipline quand se mettent progressivement en place les
 économies fondées sur la connaissance. Ce livre porte sur une double nouveauté : une
 nouveauté scientifique qui correspond au développement d'une sous-discipline économique
 originale dont l'objet de recherche – la connaissance – pose des problèmes spécifiques,
 tant théoriques qu'empiriques ; une nouveauté historique liée à une période particulière
 sur le plan des caractéristiques de la croissance et de l'organisation des activités
 économiques. C'est autour de la dualité de l'économie de la connaissance, comme discipline
 et comme période historique, que cet ouvrage est organisé. Cette nouvelle édition
 étudie aussi la question de la relation entre l'économie de la connaissance et la
 révolution digitale en cours},
	language = {fre},
	number = {302},
	publisher = {la Découverte},
	author = {Foray, Dominique},
	year = {2018},
	note = {Country: FR
ill. 18 cm. Bibliogr. p. 113-122.},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), Technologies de l'information et de la communication, Échange de savoirs, Économie du savoir},
}

Cet ouvrage analyse l'évolution des sociétés développées vers une économie fondée sur la connaissance, avec l'avènement des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication, et la discipline dont les concepts et les outils permettent d'interpréter ces mutations. À l'image de l'économie industrielle fondée en France vers 1820, au moment de l'avènement de la grande industrie, l'économie de la connaissance se développe en tant que discipline quand se mettent progressivement en place les économies fondées sur la connaissance. Ce livre porte sur une double nouveauté : une nouveauté scientifique qui correspond au développement d'une sous-discipline économique originale dont l'objet de recherche – la connaissance – pose des problèmes spécifiques, tant théoriques qu'empiriques ; une nouveauté historique liée à une période particulière sur le plan des caractéristiques de la croissance et de l'organisation des activités économiques. C'est autour de la dualité de l'économie de la connaissance, comme discipline et comme période historique, que cet ouvrage est organisé. Cette nouvelle édition étudie aussi la question de la relation entre l'économie de la connaissance et la révolution digitale en cours

@article{moore_strictness_2018,
	title = {The {Strictness} of {Strict} {Liability}},
	volume = {12},
	issn = {1871-9805},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9438-5},
	doi = {10.1007/s11572-017-9438-5},
	abstract = {This article conceptualizes what strict liability is in the criminal law. Four properties are found to be individually necessary, only jointly sufficient, for there to be the kind of moral blameworthiness that must underlie any just punishment: prima facie wrongdoing, absence of justification, prima facie culpability, and absence of excuse. Whenever criminal liability is imposed without the presence of one or more of these properties, the liabuility is said to be strict.},
	language = {en},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2018-09-10},
	journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
	author = {Moore, Michael S.},
	month = sep,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {Ignorance of law, Negligence, Strict liability, Vicarious liability},
	pages = {513--529},
}

This article conceptualizes what strict liability is in the criminal law. Four properties are found to be individually necessary, only jointly sufficient, for there to be the kind of moral blameworthiness that must underlie any just punishment: prima facie wrongdoing, absence of justification, prima facie culpability, and absence of excuse. Whenever criminal liability is imposed without the presence of one or more of these properties, the liabuility is said to be strict.

@article{tran_ignorance_2018,
	title = {Ignorance and {Professional} {Military} {Education}: {The} {Case} for {Operational} {Engagement}},
	copyright = {This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance and {Professional} {Military} {Education}},
	url = {https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/60591},
	abstract = {There are libraries full of books on the quest for knowledge, but little is known about how things are not learned (or, once learned, not retained). The intellectual historians Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger coined the term “agnotology” to refer to the study of ignorance and how it is produced. They make the powerful case that “ignorance is often not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political struggle.” The perspective that Proctor and Schiebinger provide offers a critical lens through which to evaluate the trajectory of professional military education.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	author = {Tran, Thang and Oliveira, Michael and Sider, Josh and Blanken, Leo},
	month = nov,
	year = {2018},
}

There are libraries full of books on the quest for knowledge, but little is known about how things are not learned (or, once learned, not retained). The intellectual historians Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger coined the term “agnotology” to refer to the study of ignorance and how it is produced. They make the powerful case that “ignorance is often not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political struggle.” The perspective that Proctor and Schiebinger provide offers a critical lens through which to evaluate the trajectory of professional military education.

@article{kirchhelle_toxic_2018,
	title = {Toxic {Tales}—{Recent} {Histories} of {Pollution}, {Poisoning}, and {Pesticides} (ca. 1800–2010)},
	volume = {26},
	issn = {1420-9144},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00048-018-0190-2},
	doi = {10.1007/s00048-018-0190-2},
	abstract = {Review of three books},
	language = {en},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	journal = {NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin},
	author = {Kirchhelle, Claas},
	month = jun,
	year = {2018},
	pages = {213--229},
}

Review of three books

@article{bandini_willful_2018,
	title = {Willful blindness},
	volume = {143},
	issn = {0035-3833},
	url = {https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-revue-philosophique-2018-3-page-391.htm},
	abstract = {The concept of willful blindness is rightfully considered a puzzling object for the philosophy of knowledge. Closely associated with that of denial, it seems to assume that one and the same subject could see and could nonetheless succeed, willfully, in not seeing that something is the case. This paper claims that this paradox is merely superficial and that it is not only perfectly rational to blind oneself willfully at times, but that it is also something one is sometimes perfectly entitled to do. Yet, in all cases, the agent must take responsibility for the beliefs and actions built on that very foundation.},
	language = {fr},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2023-11-24},
	journal = {Revue philosophique de la France et de letranger},
	author = {Bandini, Aude},
	month = sep,
	year = {2018},
	note = {Bibliographie\_available: 0
Cairndomain: www.cairn-int.info
Cite Par\_available: 0
Publisher: P.U.F.},
	pages = {391--406},
}

The concept of willful blindness is rightfully considered a puzzling object for the philosophy of knowledge. Closely associated with that of denial, it seems to assume that one and the same subject could see and could nonetheless succeed, willfully, in not seeing that something is the case. This paper claims that this paradox is merely superficial and that it is not only perfectly rational to blind oneself willfully at times, but that it is also something one is sometimes perfectly entitled to do. Yet, in all cases, the agent must take responsibility for the beliefs and actions built on that very foundation.

@article{dubois_generalized_2017,
	title = {Generalized possibilistic logic: {Foundations} and applications to qualitative reasoning about uncertainty},
	volume = {252},
	shorttitle = {Generalized possibilistic logic},
	doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2017.08.001},
	abstract = {This paper introduces generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), a logic for epistemic reasoning based on possibility theory. Formulas in GPL correspond to propositional combinations of assertions such as “it is certain to degree λ that the propositional formula α is true”. As its name suggests, the logic generalizes possibilistic logic (PL), which at the syntactic level only allows conjunctions of the aforementioned type of assertions. At the semantic level, PL can only encode sets of epistemic states encompassed by a single least informed one, whereas GPL can encode any set of epistemic states. This feature makes GPL particularly suitable for reasoning about what an agent knows about the beliefs of another agent, e.g., allowing the former to draw conclusions about what the other agent does not know. We introduce an axiomatization for GPL and show its soundness and completeness w.r.t. possibilistic semantics. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness of GPL as a powerful unifying framework for various knowledge representation formalisms. Among others, we show how comparative uncertainty and ignorance can be modelled in GPL. We also exhibit a close connection between GPL and various existing formalisms, including possibilistic logic with partially ordered formulas, a logic of conditional assertions in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, answer set programming and a fragment of the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of reasoning in GPL, identifying decision problems at the first, second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.},
	journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
	author = {Dubois, D. and Prade, H. and Schockaert, S.},
	year = {2017},
	keywords = {Epistemic reasoning, Non-monotonic reasoning, Possibilistic logic},
	pages = {139--174},
}

This paper introduces generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), a logic for epistemic reasoning based on possibility theory. Formulas in GPL correspond to propositional combinations of assertions such as “it is certain to degree λ that the propositional formula α is true”. As its name suggests, the logic generalizes possibilistic logic (PL), which at the syntactic level only allows conjunctions of the aforementioned type of assertions. At the semantic level, PL can only encode sets of epistemic states encompassed by a single least informed one, whereas GPL can encode any set of epistemic states. This feature makes GPL particularly suitable for reasoning about what an agent knows about the beliefs of another agent, e.g., allowing the former to draw conclusions about what the other agent does not know. We introduce an axiomatization for GPL and show its soundness and completeness w.r.t. possibilistic semantics. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness of GPL as a powerful unifying framework for various knowledge representation formalisms. Among others, we show how comparative uncertainty and ignorance can be modelled in GPL. We also exhibit a close connection between GPL and various existing formalisms, including possibilistic logic with partially ordered formulas, a logic of conditional assertions in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, answer set programming and a fragment of the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of reasoning in GPL, identifying decision problems at the first, second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.

@misc{noauthor_martin_2017,
	title = {Martin {Carrier} – {Agnotological} {Challenges}: {How} to {Capture} the {Production} of {Ignorance}},
	shorttitle = {Martin {Carrier} – {Agnotological} {Challenges}},
	url = {https://philomtl.wordpress.com/2017/01/19/martin-carrier-agnotological-challenges-how-to-capture-the-production-of-ignorance/},
	abstract = {Le Réseau montréalais de philosophie des sciences a le plaisir d’annoncer sa conférence inaugurale par / The Montreal Philosophy of Science Network is pleased to announce its inaugural speaker: Mar…},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-09-14},
	journal = {PHILO.MTL},
	month = jan,
	year = {2017},
}

Le Réseau montréalais de philosophie des sciences a le plaisir d’annoncer sa conférence inaugurale par / The Montreal Philosophy of Science Network is pleased to announce its inaugural speaker: Mar…

@article{fallis_privacy_2013,
	title = {Privacy and {Lack} of {Knowledge}},
	volume = {10},
	issn = {1742-3600},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/privacy-and-lack-of-knowledge/035F3385A8ED7A0A828BA6DABB1BF1DF},
	doi = {10.1017/epi.2013.13},
	abstract = {Two sorts of connections between privacy and knowledge (or lack thereof) have been suggested in the philosophical literature. First, Alvin Goldman has suggested that protecting privacy typically leads to less knowledge being acquired. Second, several other philosophers (e.g. Parent, Matheson, Blaauw and Peels) have claimed that lack of knowledge is definitive of having privacy. In other words, someone not knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else having privacy about that thing. Or equivalently, someone knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else losing privacy about that thing. In this paper, I argue that both of these suggestions are incorrect. I begin by arguing, contra Goldman, that protecting privacy often leads to more knowledge being acquired. I argue in the remainder of the paper, contra the defenders of the knowledge account of privacy, that someone knowing something is not necessary for someone else losing privacy about that thing.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Episteme},
	author = {Fallis, Don},
	year = {2013},
	note = {Edition: 2013/05/24
Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {153--166},
}

Two sorts of connections between privacy and knowledge (or lack thereof) have been suggested in the philosophical literature. First, Alvin Goldman has suggested that protecting privacy typically leads to less knowledge being acquired. Second, several other philosophers (e.g. Parent, Matheson, Blaauw and Peels) have claimed that lack of knowledge is definitive of having privacy. In other words, someone not knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else having privacy about that thing. Or equivalently, someone knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else losing privacy about that thing. In this paper, I argue that both of these suggestions are incorrect. I begin by arguing, contra Goldman, that protecting privacy often leads to more knowledge being acquired. I argue in the remainder of the paper, contra the defenders of the knowledge account of privacy, that someone knowing something is not necessary for someone else losing privacy about that thing.

@article{henry_common_2012,
	title = {A {Common} {Pesticide} {Decreases} {Foraging} {Success} and {Survival} in {Honey} {Bees}},
	volume = {336},
	copyright = {Copyright © 2012, American Association for the Advancement of Science},
	issn = {0036-8075, 1095-9203},
	url = {https://science.sciencemag.org/content/336/6079/348},
	doi = {10.1126/science.1215039},
	abstract = {Nonlethal exposure of honey bees to thiamethoxam (neonicotinoid systemic pesticide) causes high mortality due to homing failure at levels that could put a colony at risk of collapse. Simulated exposure events on free-ranging foragers labeled with a radio-frequency identification tag suggest that homing is impaired by thiamethoxam intoxication. These experiments offer new insights into the consequences of common neonicotinoid pesticides used worldwide.
Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide.
Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide.},
	language = {en},
	number = {6079},
	urldate = {2019-10-04},
	journal = {Science},
	author = {Henry, Mickaël and Béguin, Maxime and Requier, Fabrice and Rollin, Orianne and Odoux, Jean-François and Aupinel, Pierrick and Aptel, Jean and Tchamitchian, Sylvie and Decourtye, Axel},
	month = apr,
	year = {2012},
	pmid = {22461498},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {348--350},
}

Nonlethal exposure of honey bees to thiamethoxam (neonicotinoid systemic pesticide) causes high mortality due to homing failure at levels that could put a colony at risk of collapse. Simulated exposure events on free-ranging foragers labeled with a radio-frequency identification tag suggest that homing is impaired by thiamethoxam intoxication. These experiments offer new insights into the consequences of common neonicotinoid pesticides used worldwide. Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide. Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide.

@book{rescher_ignorance_2009,
	title = {Ignorance: ({On} the {Wider} {Implications} of {Deficient} {Knowledge})},
	isbn = {978-0-8229-6014-0},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance},
	url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wrb89},
	abstract = {Historically, there has been great deliberation about the limits of human knowledge. Isaac Newton, recognizing his own shortcomings, once described himself as "a boy standing on the seashore . . . whilst the great ocean of truth lay all underscored before me."  In \textit{Ignorance,} Nicholas Rescher presents a broad-ranging study that examines the manifestations, consequences, and occasional benefits of ignorance in areas of philosophy, scientific endeavor, and ordinary life. Citing philosophers, theologians, and scientists from Socrates to Steven Hawking, Rescher seeks to uncover the factors that hinder our cognition.  Rescher categorizes ignorance as ontologically grounded (rooted in acts of nature-erasure, chaos, and chance-that prevent fact determination), or epistemically grounded (the inadequacy of our information-securing resources). He then defines the basis of ignorance: inaccessible data; statistical fogs; secreted information; past data that have left no trace; future discoveries; future contingencies; vagrant predicates; and superior intelligences. Such impediments set limits to inquiry and mean that while we can always extend our existing knowledge-variability here is infinite-there are things that we will never know.Cognitive finitude also hinders our ability to assimilate more than a certain number of facts. We may acquire additional information, but lack the facility to interpret it. More information does not always increase knowledge; it may point us further down the path toward an erroneous conclusion. In light of these deficiencies, Rescher looks to the role of computers in solving problems and expanding our knowledge base, but finds limits to their reasoning capacity.  As Rescher's comprehensive study concludes, ignorance itself is a fertile topic for knowledge, and recognizing the boundaries of our comprehension is where wisdom begins.},
	urldate = {2024-06-24},
	publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press},
	author = {Rescher, Nicholas},
	year = {2009},
	doi = {10.2307/j.ctt6wrb89},
}

Historically, there has been great deliberation about the limits of human knowledge. Isaac Newton, recognizing his own shortcomings, once described himself as "a boy standing on the seashore . . . whilst the great ocean of truth lay all underscored before me." In Ignorance, Nicholas Rescher presents a broad-ranging study that examines the manifestations, consequences, and occasional benefits of ignorance in areas of philosophy, scientific endeavor, and ordinary life. Citing philosophers, theologians, and scientists from Socrates to Steven Hawking, Rescher seeks to uncover the factors that hinder our cognition. Rescher categorizes ignorance as ontologically grounded (rooted in acts of nature-erasure, chaos, and chance-that prevent fact determination), or epistemically grounded (the inadequacy of our information-securing resources). He then defines the basis of ignorance: inaccessible data; statistical fogs; secreted information; past data that have left no trace; future discoveries; future contingencies; vagrant predicates; and superior intelligences. Such impediments set limits to inquiry and mean that while we can always extend our existing knowledge-variability here is infinite-there are things that we will never know.Cognitive finitude also hinders our ability to assimilate more than a certain number of facts. We may acquire additional information, but lack the facility to interpret it. More information does not always increase knowledge; it may point us further down the path toward an erroneous conclusion. In light of these deficiencies, Rescher looks to the role of computers in solving problems and expanding our knowledge base, but finds limits to their reasoning capacity. As Rescher's comprehensive study concludes, ignorance itself is a fertile topic for knowledge, and recognizing the boundaries of our comprehension is where wisdom begins.

@book{mcculloch_defending_2008,
	address = {Oxford ; New York},
	title = {Defending the indefensible: the global asbestos industry and its fight for survival},
	isbn = {978-0-19-953485-2},
	shorttitle = {Defending the indefensible},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {McCulloch, Jock and Tweedale, Geoffrey},
	year = {2008},
	note = {OCLC: ocn192027118},
	keywords = {20th century, Asbestos industry, Corrupt practices, Health aspects, History},
}

@article{fitzpatrick_moral_2008,
	title = {Moral {Responsibility} and {Normative} {Ignorance}: {Answering} a {New} {Skeptical} {Challenge}},
	volume = {118},
	issn = {0014-1704},
	shorttitle = {Moral {Responsibility} and {Normative} {Ignorance}},
	url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/589532},
	doi = {10.1086/589532},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2024-06-24},
	journal = {Ethics},
	author = {FitzPatrick, William J.},
	month = jul,
	year = {2008},
	note = {Publisher: The University of Chicago Press},
	pages = {589--613},
}

@article{biddle_lessons_2007,
	title = {Lessons from the {Vioxx} {Debacle}: {What} the {Privatization} of {Science} {Can} {Teach} {Us} {About} {Social} {Epistemology}},
	volume = {21},
	issn = {0269-1728},
	shorttitle = {Lessons from the {Vioxx} {Debacle}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02691720601125472},
	doi = {10.1080/02691720601125472},
	abstract = {Since the early 1980s, private, for‐profit corporations have become increasingly involved in all aspects of scientific research, especially of biomedical research. In this essay, I argue that there are dangerous epistemic consequences of this trend, which should be more thoroughly examined by social epistemologists. In support of this claim, I discuss a recent episode of pharmaceutical research involving the painkiller Vioxx. I argue that the research on Vioxx was epistemically problematic and that the primary cause of these inadequacies was faulty institutional arrangements. More specifically, the research was organized in such a way as to allow short‐term commercial interests to compromise epistemic integrity. Thus, the Vioxx case study, in conjunction with numerous case studies developed elsewhere, provides strong reasons for believing that the privatization of the biomedical sciences is epistemically worrisome, and it suggests that the primary response to this situation should be a social, or organizational, one. What kind of organizational response would be most beneficial? I briefly discuss two prominent social epistemological proposals for how scientific research should be organized—namely those of Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino—and I suggest that they are incapable of dealing with the phenomenon of privatization. I then draw upon the Vioxx episode in order to outline an alternative suggestion for reorganizing certain aspects of pharmaceutical research.},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-09-21},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Biddle, Justin},
	month = jan,
	year = {2007},
	keywords = {Commercialization of Science, Kitcher, Longino, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Privatization of Science, Social Epistemology, Vioxx},
	pages = {21--39},
}

Since the early 1980s, private, for‐profit corporations have become increasingly involved in all aspects of scientific research, especially of biomedical research. In this essay, I argue that there are dangerous epistemic consequences of this trend, which should be more thoroughly examined by social epistemologists. In support of this claim, I discuss a recent episode of pharmaceutical research involving the painkiller Vioxx. I argue that the research on Vioxx was epistemically problematic and that the primary cause of these inadequacies was faulty institutional arrangements. More specifically, the research was organized in such a way as to allow short‐term commercial interests to compromise epistemic integrity. Thus, the Vioxx case study, in conjunction with numerous case studies developed elsewhere, provides strong reasons for believing that the privatization of the biomedical sciences is epistemically worrisome, and it suggests that the primary response to this situation should be a social, or organizational, one. What kind of organizational response would be most beneficial? I briefly discuss two prominent social epistemological proposals for how scientific research should be organized—namely those of Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino—and I suggest that they are incapable of dealing with the phenomenon of privatization. I then draw upon the Vioxx episode in order to outline an alternative suggestion for reorganizing certain aspects of pharmaceutical research.

@article{coady_are_2007,
	title = {Are {Conspiracy} {Theorists} {Irrational}?},
	volume = {4},
	issn = {1750-0117, 1742-3600},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/are-conspiracy-theorists-irrational/7E0DC481ECA2701512F55FFB6950ED5A},
	doi = {10.3366/epi.2007.4.2.193},
	abstract = {It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best definitions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be occasions on which we should settle for an inferior definition which entails that conspiracy theorists are after all irrational. Three, if and when we do this, we should recognise that conspiracy theorists so understood are at one end of a spectrum, and the really worrying form of irrationality is at the other end.},
	language = {en},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2020-11-18},
	journal = {Episteme},
	author = {Coady, David},
	month = jun,
	year = {2007},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {193--204},
}

It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best definitions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be occasions on which we should settle for an inferior definition which entails that conspiracy theorists are after all irrational. Three, if and when we do this, we should recognise that conspiracy theorists so understood are at one end of a spectrum, and the really worrying form of irrationality is at the other end.

@book{hauray_europe_2006,
	address = {Paris},
	title = {L'{Europe} du médicament. {Politique}, expertise, intérêts privés},
	isbn = {978-2-7246-0979-0},
	abstract = {Lancés à partir de 1960, les efforts pour construire des politiques pharmaceutiques communes se sont vite heurtés aux intérêts nationaux et aux écarts de pratiques et de normes entre pays. En 1993, la création d’une structure institutionnelle innovante, l’Agence européenne du médicament, est finalement décidée et s’impose rapidement comme le cœur du contrôle des médicaments en Europe.
Ce livre analyse, dans une Europe devenue le cadre normatif central et l’horizon stratégique des acteurs, toutes les questions traditionnellement appliquées aux politiques du médicament : comment et pourquoi juge-t-on un médicament acceptable ? Quelle implication les industriels ont-ils dans les procédures de contrôle ? La protection de la santé publique est-elle correctement assurée ? Quelle place les experts ont-ils dans les processus de décision politique ?
S’intéresser à la régulation des médicaments paraît d’autant plus pertinent que le secteur pharmaceutique et son contrôle par les pouvoirs publics traversent une crise grave depuis quelques années.},
	publisher = {Presses de Sciences Po},
	author = {Hauray, Boris},
	year = {2006},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Lancés à partir de 1960, les efforts pour construire des politiques pharmaceutiques communes se sont vite heurtés aux intérêts nationaux et aux écarts de pratiques et de normes entre pays. En 1993, la création d’une structure institutionnelle innovante, l’Agence européenne du médicament, est finalement décidée et s’impose rapidement comme le cœur du contrôle des médicaments en Europe. Ce livre analyse, dans une Europe devenue le cadre normatif central et l’horizon stratégique des acteurs, toutes les questions traditionnellement appliquées aux politiques du médicament : comment et pourquoi juge-t-on un médicament acceptable ? Quelle implication les industriels ont-ils dans les procédures de contrôle ? La protection de la santé publique est-elle correctement assurée ? Quelle place les experts ont-ils dans les processus de décision politique ? S’intéresser à la régulation des médicaments paraît d’autant plus pertinent que le secteur pharmaceutique et son contrôle par les pouvoirs publics traversent une crise grave depuis quelques années.

@article{smith_medical_2005,
	title = {Medical {Journals} {Are} an {Extension} of the {Marketing} {Arm} of {Pharmaceutical} {Companies}},
	volume = {2},
	issn = {1549-1676},
	url = {https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020138},
	doi = {10.1371/journal.pmed.0020138},
	abstract = {Medical journals have become dependent on the pharmaceutical industry for their survival, which can have a corrupting influence on their content, argues Smith, the former editor of the BMJ.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2021-01-28},
	journal = {PLOS Medicine},
	author = {Smith, Richard},
	year = {2005},
	note = {Publisher: Public Library of Science},
	keywords = {Advertising, Drug dependence, Drug marketing, Medical journals, Peer review, Pharmaceutical advertisements in medical journals, Physicians, Scientific publishing},
	pages = {e138},
}

Medical journals have become dependent on the pharmaceutical industry for their survival, which can have a corrupting influence on their content, argues Smith, the former editor of the BMJ.

@book{lagroye_politisation_2003,
	series = {Socio-histoires},
	title = {La politisation},
	isbn = {978-2-7011-3588-5},
	abstract = {Trop souvent encore, la politique est réduite à son personnel, à ses partis, à leur concurrence et à leurs crises. Prendre la politique sous l'angle de la politisation, permet d'élargir le champ d'investigation à toutes les modalités, militants ou professionnelles, d'entrée en politique, de volonté ou de refus d'en faire.},
	language = {fr},
	publisher = {Belin},
	editor = {Lagroye, Jacques},
	year = {2003},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Trop souvent encore, la politique est réduite à son personnel, à ses partis, à leur concurrence et à leurs crises. Prendre la politique sous l'angle de la politisation, permet d'élargir le champ d'investigation à toutes les modalités, militants ou professionnelles, d'entrée en politique, de volonté ou de refus d'en faire.

@article{roussellier_quest-ce_1995,
	title = {Qu'est-ce qu'on ne sait pas ?},
	volume = {47},
	copyright = {free},
	url = {https://www.persee.fr/doc/xxs_0294-1759_1995_num_47_1_3194},
	doi = {10.3406/xxs.1995.3194},
	language = {fre},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-05-28},
	journal = {Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire},
	author = {Roussellier, Nicolas},
	year = {1995},
	pages = {194--195},
}

@article{rappaport_threshold_1993,
	title = {Threshold limit values, permissible exposure limits, and feasibility: {The} bases for exposure limits in the {United} {States}},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {1097-0274},
	shorttitle = {Threshold limit values, permissible exposure limits, and feasibility},
	url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ajim.4700230502},
	doi = {10.1002/ajim.4700230502},
	abstract = {The development of exposure limits in the United States has always relied heavily upon the threshold limit values (TLVs) developed by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). In fact, the TLVs were adopted as official exposure limits by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1972 and 1989. Given the continuing importance of the ACGIH limits, this paper compares the basis of the TLVs with that employed by OSHA de novo in its 12 new permissible exposure limits (PELs). Using benzene as an example, it is shown that OSHA's new PELs have been established following a rigorous assessment of the inherent risks and the feasibility of instituting the limit. The TLVs, on the other hand, have been developed by ad hoc procedures and appear to have traditionally reflected levels thought to be achievable at the time. However, this might be changing. Analysis of the historical reductions of TLVs, for 27 substances on the 1991–1992 list of intended changes, indicates smaller reductions in the past (median reduction of 2.0–2.5-fold between 1946 and 1988) compared to those currently being observed (median reduction of 7.5-fold between 1989 and 1991). Further analysis suggests a more aggressive policy of the ACGIH regarding TLVs for carcinogens but not for substances that produce effects other than cancer. Regardless of whether the basis of the TLVs has changed recently, it would take a relatively long time for the impact of any change to be felt, since the median age of the 1991–1992 TLVs is 16.5 years, and 75\% of these limits are more than 10 years old. The implications of OSHA's continued reliance on the TLVs as a means of updating its PELs are discussed, and four alternatives are presented to the ACGIH regarding the future of its activities related to exposure limits. It is concluded that new mechanisms are needed for OSHA to update its PELs in a timely fashion so that the TLVs will not be adopted by default in the future. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-17},
	journal = {American Journal of Industrial Medicine},
	author = {Rappaport, S. M.},
	year = {1993},
	note = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/ajim.4700230502},
	keywords = {ACGIH, OSHA, PEL, TLV, benzene, significant risk, standard setting},
	pages = {683--694},
}

The development of exposure limits in the United States has always relied heavily upon the threshold limit values (TLVs) developed by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). In fact, the TLVs were adopted as official exposure limits by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1972 and 1989. Given the continuing importance of the ACGIH limits, this paper compares the basis of the TLVs with that employed by OSHA de novo in its 12 new permissible exposure limits (PELs). Using benzene as an example, it is shown that OSHA's new PELs have been established following a rigorous assessment of the inherent risks and the feasibility of instituting the limit. The TLVs, on the other hand, have been developed by ad hoc procedures and appear to have traditionally reflected levels thought to be achievable at the time. However, this might be changing. Analysis of the historical reductions of TLVs, for 27 substances on the 1991–1992 list of intended changes, indicates smaller reductions in the past (median reduction of 2.0–2.5-fold between 1946 and 1988) compared to those currently being observed (median reduction of 7.5-fold between 1989 and 1991). Further analysis suggests a more aggressive policy of the ACGIH regarding TLVs for carcinogens but not for substances that produce effects other than cancer. Regardless of whether the basis of the TLVs has changed recently, it would take a relatively long time for the impact of any change to be felt, since the median age of the 1991–1992 TLVs is 16.5 years, and 75% of these limits are more than 10 years old. The implications of OSHA's continued reliance on the TLVs as a means of updating its PELs are discussed, and four alternatives are presented to the ACGIH regarding the future of its activities related to exposure limits. It is concluded that new mechanisms are needed for OSHA to update its PELs in a timely fashion so that the TLVs will not be adopted by default in the future. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

@book{bromberger_what_1992,
	address = {Chicago},
	title = {On what we know we don't know: explanation, theory, linguistics, and how questions shape them},
	isbn = {978-0-226-07540-2},
	shorttitle = {On what we know we don't know},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {University Press},
	author = {Bromberger, Sylvain},
	year = {1992},
	note = {OCLC: 850788581},
}

@book{rosner_deadly_1991,
	address = {Princeton, N.J},
	title = {Deadly dust: silicosis and the politics of occupational disease in twentieth-century {America}},
	isbn = {978-0-691-04758-4},
	shorttitle = {Deadly dust},
	publisher = {Princeton University Press},
	author = {Rosner, David and Markowitz, Gerald E.},
	year = {1991},
	keywords = {History of Medicine, 20th Cent, Occupational Diseases, Occupational diseases, Political aspects, Politics, Silicosis, Social Environment, Social aspects, United States, history},
}

@article{bromberger_rational_1988,
	title = {Rational ignorance},
	volume = {74},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869618},
	doi = {10.1007/BF00869618},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2024-07-08},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Bromberger, Sylvain},
	month = jan,
	year = {1988},
	pages = {47--64},
}

@book{brickman_controlling_1985,
	address = {Ithaca},
	title = {Controlling chemicals: the politics of regulation in {Europe} and the {United} {States}},
	isbn = {978-0-8014-1677-4},
	shorttitle = {Controlling chemicals},
	publisher = {Cornell University Press},
	author = {Brickman, Ronald and Jasanoff, Sheila and Ilgen, Thomas},
	year = {1985},
	keywords = {Chemicals, Europe, Hazardous substances, Law and legislation, United States},
}

@incollection{bromberger_science_1971,
	title = {Science and the {Forms} of {Ignorance}},
	booktitle = {Observation and {Theory} in {Science}},
	publisher = {The Johns Hopkins Press},
	author = {Bromberger, Sylvain},
	editor = {Mandelbaum, Maurice},
	year = {1971},
	pages = {45--67},
}

@article{tudor_hart_inverse_1971,
	series = {Originally published as {Volume} 1, {Issue} 7696},
	title = {The inverse care law},
	volume = {297},
	issn = {0140-6736},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014067367192410X},
	doi = {10.1016/S0140-6736(71)92410-X},
	abstract = {The availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in the population served. This inverse care law operates more completely where medical care is most exposed to market forces, and less so where such exposure is reduced. The market distribution of medical care is a primitive and historically outdated social form, and any return to it would further exaggerate the maldistribution of medical resources.},
	number = {7696},
	urldate = {2024-02-08},
	journal = {The Lancet},
	author = {Tudor Hart, Julian},
	month = feb,
	year = {1971},
	pages = {405--412},
}

The availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in the population served. This inverse care law operates more completely where medical care is most exposed to market forces, and less so where such exposure is reduced. The market distribution of medical care is a primitive and historically outdated social form, and any return to it would further exaggerate the maldistribution of medical resources.

@misc{bloomsburycom_chapitre_nodate,
	title = {Chapitre sur {Bataille} dans {Spaces} of {Crisis} and {Critique}},
	url = {https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/spaces-of-crisis-and-critique-9781350021129/},
	abstract = {In Of Other Spaces Foucault coined the term “heterotopias” to signify “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture" which "are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.” For Foucault, heterotopic spaces were first of all spaces of crisis, or transformative spaces, however these have given way to heterotopias of deviation and spaces of discipline, such as psychiatric hospitals or prisons. Foucault's essay provokes us to think through how spaces of crisis and critique function to open up disruptive, subversive or minoritarian fields within philosophical, political, cultural or aesthetic discourses. This book takes this interdisciplinary and international approach to the spatial, challenging existing borders, boundaries, and horizons; from Claire Colebrook's chapter unpacking the heterotopic spaces of America and Mexico that lie beyond reductive ideological spaces of light and darkness, to a Foucauldian reading of the Zapatista resistance.  With essays on politics, philosophy, literature, post-colonial studies, and aesthetics from established and emerging academics, this book answers Foucault's call to give us a better understanding of our present cultural epoch.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	journal = {Bloomsbury Publishing},
	author = {Bloomsbury.com},
}

In Of Other Spaces Foucault coined the term “heterotopias” to signify “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture" which "are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.” For Foucault, heterotopic spaces were first of all spaces of crisis, or transformative spaces, however these have given way to heterotopias of deviation and spaces of discipline, such as psychiatric hospitals or prisons. Foucault's essay provokes us to think through how spaces of crisis and critique function to open up disruptive, subversive or minoritarian fields within philosophical, political, cultural or aesthetic discourses. This book takes this interdisciplinary and international approach to the spatial, challenging existing borders, boundaries, and horizons; from Claire Colebrook's chapter unpacking the heterotopic spaces of America and Mexico that lie beyond reductive ideological spaces of light and darkness, to a Foucauldian reading of the Zapatista resistance. With essays on politics, philosophy, literature, post-colonial studies, and aesthetics from established and emerging academics, this book answers Foucault's call to give us a better understanding of our present cultural epoch.

@misc{noauthor_routledge_nodate,
	title = {The {Routledge} {Handbook} of {Epistemic} {Injustice}},
	url = {https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Epistemic-Injustice/Kidd-Medina-Pohlhaus-Jr/p/book/9780367370633},
	abstract = {In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. Epistemic injustice - one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years - refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices.

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and de},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-11-22},
	journal = {Routledge \& CRC Press},
}

In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. Epistemic injustice - one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years - refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and de