@article{bonzio_logical_2023,
	title = {A {Logical} {Modeling} of {Severe} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {52},
	issn = {1573-0433},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09697-x},
	doi = {10.1007/s10992-022-09697-x},
	abstract = {In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one.},
	language = {en},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2024-03-29},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
	author = {Bonzio, S. and Fano, V. and Graziani, P. and Pra Baldi, M.},
	month = aug,
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Bochvar external logic, Ignorance, Three-valued modal logic, Weak Kleene logic},
	pages = {1053--1080},
}

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one.

@misc{thibaud-latour_ignorance_2023,
	title = {Ignorance, injustice structurelle et responsabilité [{Mémoire}]},
	url = {https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/32010},
	abstract = {S’inscrivant en épistémologie sociale, ce projet souhaite comprendre l’ignorance comme  un phénomène actif dans la production de connaissance et non comme sa simple absence. Se  détachant des théories traditionnelles d’épistémologie comprenant l’ignorance comme un état passif, comme antinomie de la connaissance, ce mémoire à l’ambition de comprendre l’ignorance  comme un phénomène multifactoriel soit comme une pratique se situant à l’intersection entre le  social, le structurel et l’épistémique. Précisément, l’objectif de ce mémoire est de démontrer que,  présentes sous plusieurs formes, les pratiques d’ignorances ont des ramifications concrètes sur  plusieurs aspects de nos vies telles que nos interactions sociales, notre univers intellectuel et notre  partage de connaissances. Se basant sur un cadre critique, sollicitant des écrits issus des études  féministes, décoloniales et intersectionnelles, la visée majeure de ce projet est de démontrer la  possibilité de considérer l’ignorance comme un élément clef de la production et du maintien  d’injustices sociales. Par exemple, le rôle de l’ignorance quant à certaines formes de racisme et de sexisme tels l’incapacité à être considéré comme un individu pouvant produire des connaissances légitimes ou le refus, non fondé, de comprendre certains individus issus des groupes marginalisés comme égaux sur le plan social et épistémique. Accorder un rôle déterminant à l’ignorance permettra d’amener une meilleure compréhension de la persistance de certaines formes d’injustices sociales en rendant compte de leur nature abstraite et parfois difficile à saisir. Nous analyserons l’ignorance en termes sociaux et en relation aux vices épistémiques ce qui rendra compte de la systématicité de certaines actions sexistes ou racistes et permettra de comprendre plus clairement les mécanismes soutenant le maintien de ces inégalités. Avec ceci, nous tenterons de rendre compte du type de vice épistémique que constitue l’ignorance, c’est-à-dire le type de traits de caractère, d’attitudes, ou de manières de penser qui nuit à l’accessibilité de la connaissance. Cette approche permet de souligner le fait que l’ignorance n’est pas la même chose que l’erreur et qu’elle peut être durable et activement maintenue.},
	language = {fra},
	urldate = {2023-11-24},
	publisher = {Université de Montréal},
	author = {Thibaud-Latour, Ellena},
	month = sep,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Accepted: 2023-10-25T19:20:08Z},
}

S’inscrivant en épistémologie sociale, ce projet souhaite comprendre l’ignorance comme un phénomène actif dans la production de connaissance et non comme sa simple absence. Se détachant des théories traditionnelles d’épistémologie comprenant l’ignorance comme un état passif, comme antinomie de la connaissance, ce mémoire à l’ambition de comprendre l’ignorance comme un phénomène multifactoriel soit comme une pratique se situant à l’intersection entre le social, le structurel et l’épistémique. Précisément, l’objectif de ce mémoire est de démontrer que, présentes sous plusieurs formes, les pratiques d’ignorances ont des ramifications concrètes sur plusieurs aspects de nos vies telles que nos interactions sociales, notre univers intellectuel et notre partage de connaissances. Se basant sur un cadre critique, sollicitant des écrits issus des études féministes, décoloniales et intersectionnelles, la visée majeure de ce projet est de démontrer la possibilité de considérer l’ignorance comme un élément clef de la production et du maintien d’injustices sociales. Par exemple, le rôle de l’ignorance quant à certaines formes de racisme et de sexisme tels l’incapacité à être considéré comme un individu pouvant produire des connaissances légitimes ou le refus, non fondé, de comprendre certains individus issus des groupes marginalisés comme égaux sur le plan social et épistémique. Accorder un rôle déterminant à l’ignorance permettra d’amener une meilleure compréhension de la persistance de certaines formes d’injustices sociales en rendant compte de leur nature abstraite et parfois difficile à saisir. Nous analyserons l’ignorance en termes sociaux et en relation aux vices épistémiques ce qui rendra compte de la systématicité de certaines actions sexistes ou racistes et permettra de comprendre plus clairement les mécanismes soutenant le maintien de ces inégalités. Avec ceci, nous tenterons de rendre compte du type de vice épistémique que constitue l’ignorance, c’est-à-dire le type de traits de caractère, d’attitudes, ou de manières de penser qui nuit à l’accessibilité de la connaissance. Cette approche permet de souligner le fait que l’ignorance n’est pas la même chose que l’erreur et qu’elle peut être durable et activement maintenue.

@article{girel_what_2023,
	title = {What {Exactly} is {Presupposed} by {Agnotology}? {The} {Challenge} of {Intentions}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0269-8595},
	shorttitle = {What {Exactly} is {Presupposed} by {Agnotology}?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2257111},
	doi = {10.1080/02698595.2023.2257111},
	abstract = {The paper seeks to contribute to clarifying agnotology as an ‘epistemic strategy’, conceived as ‘epistemically damaging and hurt[ing] the production of knowledge’. My general claim is that the grammar of intentions ‘embedded’ in agnotological arguments is often not considered accurately. I use considerations from the philosophy of action as a theoretical framework to make more explicit what is implied in agnogenetic manoeuvres. Agnotology, as a ‘theory’ about epistemic states, in particular knowledge and ignorance, would be seriously incomplete without that component. The following can thus be read as a contribution to an analysis of the presuppositions of the strategic variant of Agnotology. My first claim is that the more common objections to the introduction of intentions are in no way definitive. My second, more specific, claim is that we need a room, in our conceptual toolbox, for ‘anti-epistemic intentions’, which play a key role in agnotological arguments.},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2024-01-16},
	journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Girel, Mathias},
	month = jul,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2257111},
	keywords = {Normatively inappropriate dissent, action (philosophy of), agnotology, intentions},
	pages = {229--246},
}

The paper seeks to contribute to clarifying agnotology as an ‘epistemic strategy’, conceived as ‘epistemically damaging and hurt[ing] the production of knowledge’. My general claim is that the grammar of intentions ‘embedded’ in agnotological arguments is often not considered accurately. I use considerations from the philosophy of action as a theoretical framework to make more explicit what is implied in agnogenetic manoeuvres. Agnotology, as a ‘theory’ about epistemic states, in particular knowledge and ignorance, would be seriously incomplete without that component. The following can thus be read as a contribution to an analysis of the presuppositions of the strategic variant of Agnotology. My first claim is that the more common objections to the introduction of intentions are in no way definitive. My second, more specific, claim is that we need a room, in our conceptual toolbox, for ‘anti-epistemic intentions’, which play a key role in agnotological arguments.

@article{faini_advertising_2023,
	title = {Advertising doubt in early modern {Italy}: {Doubt} and ignorance in early modern paratexts},
	issn = {0269-1213},
	shorttitle = {Advertising doubt in early modern {Italy}},
	doi = {10.1111/rest.12900},
	abstract = {Spelled in several different ways, the word ‘doubt’, usually in the plural ‘doubts’ (dubbi, dubitazioni) appears on the frontispiece of several works printed in Venice and elsewhere in Italy in the sixteenth century. Building on different traditions, ranging from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata to Medieval didactic literature, these texts, normally in the vernacular, address questions that the average reader may have on a variety of topics: from thermal baths to indulgences, from natural philosophy to duel. While usually the term ‘doubt’ means ‘question’, things can be sometimes less straightforward, especially when it comes to religious texts or works penned by unorthodox writers, as in the case of Ortensio Lando's Quattro libri di dubbi. This article will explore paratextual elements of works addressing doubts focusing on a variety of topics such as readership, definitions of doubt and its function, the role of these works in the dissemination of knowledge. © 2023 Society for Renaissance Studies and John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Renaissance Studies},
	author = {Faini, M.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {doubt, ignorance, natural philosophy, paratexts, renaissance},
}

Spelled in several different ways, the word ‘doubt’, usually in the plural ‘doubts’ (dubbi, dubitazioni) appears on the frontispiece of several works printed in Venice and elsewhere in Italy in the sixteenth century. Building on different traditions, ranging from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata to Medieval didactic literature, these texts, normally in the vernacular, address questions that the average reader may have on a variety of topics: from thermal baths to indulgences, from natural philosophy to duel. While usually the term ‘doubt’ means ‘question’, things can be sometimes less straightforward, especially when it comes to religious texts or works penned by unorthodox writers, as in the case of Ortensio Lando's Quattro libri di dubbi. This article will explore paratextual elements of works addressing doubts focusing on a variety of topics such as readership, definitions of doubt and its function, the role of these works in the dissemination of knowledge. © 2023 Society for Renaissance Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

@article{jahaj_beraten_2023,
	title = {Beraten und {Prognostizieren}. {Unsicheres} {Wissen} in der institutionellen vs. der massenmedialen {Politikberatung}},
	volume = {45},
	copyright = {Copyright (c) 2023},
	issn = {2523-9201},
	url = {https://ejournals.facultas.at},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2230},
	abstract = {Scientific policy advice provides a special framework for processing scientific uncertainties. Socio-political decisions often require a reliable scientific basis that can be used as orientation and legitimation for political decisions. On the one hand, policy advice takes place institutionalized (e. g. by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag [TAB] and the National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina), but also in public media discourse, when scientists give interviews or inform about scientific topics in talk shows. The need for advice concerns future actions and is thus closely linked to uncertain knowledge and the providing of forecasts, i. e. a look into the future. In this article, we focus on the practices of consulting and forecasting in the context of policy advice and capture them in their differentiations as well as show what role uncertain knowledge plays in their argumentation. In addition, we analyze to what extent the formulation of prognoses and advice is influenced by the genre and media context of the statement (expert opinion vs. interview / talk show, i. e. also: written and oral contexts).},
	language = {de},
	number = {1-2},
	urldate = {2023-06-06},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Jahaj, Dorothee and Rhein, Lisa},
	month = may,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Number: 1-2},
	pages = {66--84},
}

Scientific policy advice provides a special framework for processing scientific uncertainties. Socio-political decisions often require a reliable scientific basis that can be used as orientation and legitimation for political decisions. On the one hand, policy advice takes place institutionalized (e. g. by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag [TAB] and the National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina), but also in public media discourse, when scientists give interviews or inform about scientific topics in talk shows. The need for advice concerns future actions and is thus closely linked to uncertain knowledge and the providing of forecasts, i. e. a look into the future. In this article, we focus on the practices of consulting and forecasting in the context of policy advice and capture them in their differentiations as well as show what role uncertain knowledge plays in their argumentation. In addition, we analyze to what extent the formulation of prognoses and advice is influenced by the genre and media context of the statement (expert opinion vs. interview / talk show, i. e. also: written and oral contexts).

@article{muller_corpus_2023,
	title = {Corpus {Approaches} to {Analysing} {Uncertainty} and {Ignorance} in {Academic} {Discourse}},
	volume = {45},
	copyright = {Copyright (c) 2023},
	issn = {2523-9201},
	url = {https://ejournals.facultas.at},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2232},
	abstract = {The article provides an overview of corpus approaches to researching linguistic practices for dealing with ignorance and uncertainty. Uncertainty and ignorance are first and foremost epistemological or socio-psychological categories rather than linguistic ones. But they can be applied to a corpus linguistic setting. Based on a presentation of the central terms and their relevance for digital corpus research, this paper exemplifies proposals for operationalisations using a corpus of political science texts from the field of International Relations (DIReC). It gives an overview of various methods of researching ignorance and uncertainty in academic discourse, focusing on lexicon-based, annotation-based and pattern-search-based approaches as well as combinations thereof. The structure of the explanations reflects a central conflict of aims: On the one hand, corpus-based research on ignorance and uncertainty requires a precise, interpretive approach to the contextual meaning and epistemic function of each individual piece of evidence. On the other hand, it seems advantageous to investigate the largest possible corpora for reasons of reliability. The final section presents an application sketch that addresses and exemplifies several methodological problems. It compares uncertainty markers in political science discourse as found in the DIReC corpus with those in conspiracy theories, drawing on the LOCO corpus and journalistic discourse represented in a reference corpus of US newspapers.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1-2},
	urldate = {2023-06-06},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Müller, Marcus},
	month = may,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Number: 1-2},
	pages = {28--47},
}

The article provides an overview of corpus approaches to researching linguistic practices for dealing with ignorance and uncertainty. Uncertainty and ignorance are first and foremost epistemological or socio-psychological categories rather than linguistic ones. But they can be applied to a corpus linguistic setting. Based on a presentation of the central terms and their relevance for digital corpus research, this paper exemplifies proposals for operationalisations using a corpus of political science texts from the field of International Relations (DIReC). It gives an overview of various methods of researching ignorance and uncertainty in academic discourse, focusing on lexicon-based, annotation-based and pattern-search-based approaches as well as combinations thereof. The structure of the explanations reflects a central conflict of aims: On the one hand, corpus-based research on ignorance and uncertainty requires a precise, interpretive approach to the contextual meaning and epistemic function of each individual piece of evidence. On the other hand, it seems advantageous to investigate the largest possible corpora for reasons of reliability. The final section presents an application sketch that addresses and exemplifies several methodological problems. It compares uncertainty markers in political science discourse as found in the DIReC corpus with those in conspiracy theories, drawing on the LOCO corpus and journalistic discourse represented in a reference corpus of US newspapers.

@article{bartl_governance_2023,
	title = {Governance between ignorance and evidence: {Technology} assessment in the context of pandemic crisis management},
	volume = {32},
	issn = {2568-020X},
	shorttitle = {Governance zwischen {Nichtwissen} und {Evidenz}: {Technikfolgen}-abschätzung im {Kontext} des {Pandemie}-{Krisenmanagements}},
	doi = {10.14512/tatup.32.2.30},
	abstract = {This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Zeitschrift fur Technikfolgenabschatzung in Theorie und Praxis / Journal for Technology Assessment in Theory and Practice},
	author = {Bartl, G.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {co-production of knowledge, ignorance, pandemic simulation models, technologies of preparedness},
	pages = {30--35},
}

This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.

@article{pongiglione_climate_2022,
	title = {Climate {Change} and {Culpable} {Ignorance}: {The} {Case} of {Pseudoscience}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0269-1728},
	shorttitle = {Climate {Change} and {Culpable} {Ignorance}},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2022.2052994},
	abstract = {Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Pongiglione, F. and Martini, C.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Climate ethics, culpable ignorance, pseudoscience},
	pages = {425--435},
}

Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{liu_ignorance_2022,
	title = {Ignorance in {Plato}'s {Protagoras}},
	volume = {67},
	issn = {0031-8868},
	doi = {10.1163/15685284-bja10058},
	abstract = {Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw - the soul's domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. © 2022 Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Phronesis},
	author = {Liu, W.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Protagoras, Socrates, akrasia, ignorance, knowledge, vice},
	pages = {309--337},
}

Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw - the soul's domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. © 2022 Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

@article{arfini_how_2022,
	title = {How {Do} {We} {Become} {Ignorant}? {Affording} {Ignorance} {Through} {Epistemic} {Actions}},
	volume = {463},
	issn = {0166-6991},
	shorttitle = {How {Do} {We} {Become} {Ignorant}?},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_10},
	abstract = {Which cognitive processes allow us to become ignorant of something? In this chapter, I will discuss “to-ignorance processes” – which I will describe as processes that allow people to shift from a state of partial knowledge or unaware ignorance to another state of ignorance (of which they could be aware or not). I will argue that these processes affect how cognitive agents encounter new information and may in part explain some pressing socio-epistemological issues, such as the fake news problem. In the first section, I will describe some to-ignorance processes that commonly occur in people’s ordinary life. In the following section, I will focus on how people can become misinformed online by discussing what both “true” and “fake” news have in common, which is the fact that they present action-suggesting qualities to users, or affordances. The third section will be dedicated to how we should describe these affordances and which kinds of actions they offer to users online. In the fourth section, I will specifically discuss the action-based relations between agents and the information offered online and I will argue that some epistemic actions imply the explicit or implicit engagement to one’s ignorance. Finally, in the fifth section, I will return to the idea that to-ignorance processes affect how agents encounter information and I will argue that we should address and study to-ignorance processes to set up and manage rich environments in which people should have more opportunities to become curious and surprised than misinformed. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Synthese Library},
	author = {Arfini, S.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Affordance, Epistemic Action, Fake News, Ignorance Processes, Pragmatic Action},
	pages = {209--230},
}

Which cognitive processes allow us to become ignorant of something? In this chapter, I will discuss “to-ignorance processes” – which I will describe as processes that allow people to shift from a state of partial knowledge or unaware ignorance to another state of ignorance (of which they could be aware or not). I will argue that these processes affect how cognitive agents encounter new information and may in part explain some pressing socio-epistemological issues, such as the fake news problem. In the first section, I will describe some to-ignorance processes that commonly occur in people’s ordinary life. In the following section, I will focus on how people can become misinformed online by discussing what both “true” and “fake” news have in common, which is the fact that they present action-suggesting qualities to users, or affordances. The third section will be dedicated to how we should describe these affordances and which kinds of actions they offer to users online. In the fourth section, I will specifically discuss the action-based relations between agents and the information offered online and I will argue that some epistemic actions imply the explicit or implicit engagement to one’s ignorance. Finally, in the fifth section, I will return to the idea that to-ignorance processes affect how agents encounter information and I will argue that we should address and study to-ignorance processes to set up and manage rich environments in which people should have more opportunities to become curious and surprised than misinformed. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

@article{fonseca_demarcating_2022,
	title = {Demarcating {Patriotic} {Science} on {Digital} {Platforms}: {Covid}-19, {Chloroquine} and the {Institutionalisation} of {Ignorance} in {Brazil}},
	volume = {31},
	issn = {0950-5431},
	shorttitle = {Demarcating {Patriotic} {Science} on {Digital} {Platforms}},
	doi = {10.1080/09505431.2022.2105691},
	abstract = {As supporters of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, the Bolsonarism movement has promoted the drug chloroquine for treating Covid-19 in Brazil, despite it being mostly rejected by mainstream health institutions as an effective treatment. This situation can be investigated through the lens of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and ignorance studies supported by methods from digital sociology. Bolsonarist discourse does not contest scientific authority tout court, but rather constructs boundaries between what supporters of the president see as legitimate and illegitimate science. This institutionalised ignorance is produced and maintained through Telegram messenger, a backbone of the multi-platform media ecosystem of Bolsonarism. It is accomplished through boundary work: the exclusion or inclusion of knowledge via two complementary practices–pejorative accusations against mainstream science and the crafting of affective bonds with the chloroquine alternative. While the former aims to invalidate knowledge held by experts opposed to the use of chloroquine, the latter focuses on mobilising trust in an alternative model of science, which we refer to as patriotic science. This model of science is demarcated from mainstream science, framed as corrupt and ill-equipped for the needs of Brazilians. This case study advances STS resources for examining the epistemic demarcation between science/non-science, relevant to other polities and publics that use such boundary work to institutionalise ignorance. © 2022 Process Press.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Science as Culture},
	author = {Fonseca, P.F.C. and Ribeiro, B.E. and Nascimento, L.F.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Bolsonarism, Chloroquine, Covid-19, Telegram, boundary work, ignorance},
	pages = {530--554},
}

As supporters of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, the Bolsonarism movement has promoted the drug chloroquine for treating Covid-19 in Brazil, despite it being mostly rejected by mainstream health institutions as an effective treatment. This situation can be investigated through the lens of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and ignorance studies supported by methods from digital sociology. Bolsonarist discourse does not contest scientific authority tout court, but rather constructs boundaries between what supporters of the president see as legitimate and illegitimate science. This institutionalised ignorance is produced and maintained through Telegram messenger, a backbone of the multi-platform media ecosystem of Bolsonarism. It is accomplished through boundary work: the exclusion or inclusion of knowledge via two complementary practices–pejorative accusations against mainstream science and the crafting of affective bonds with the chloroquine alternative. While the former aims to invalidate knowledge held by experts opposed to the use of chloroquine, the latter focuses on mobilising trust in an alternative model of science, which we refer to as patriotic science. This model of science is demarcated from mainstream science, framed as corrupt and ill-equipped for the needs of Brazilians. This case study advances STS resources for examining the epistemic demarcation between science/non-science, relevant to other polities and publics that use such boundary work to institutionalise ignorance. © 2022 Process Press.

@article{andone_arguments_2022,
	title = {On {Arguments} from {Ignorance} in {Policy}-{Making}},
	volume = {43},
	issn = {1566-7650},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-91017-4_6},
	abstract = {“Schools should remain open during the COVID-19 pandemic, because there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus.” Many European policy-makers have employed such arguments from ignorance to argue for a course of action in a situation in which science lacked vital information. What is particularly challenging about such arguments is that, despite the ignorance involved, they are used to justify policies meant to deal with practical problems. Limited information (‘there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus’) is used as a basis for decision-making that might have significant consequences for the population (‘schools should remain open’). This chapter explains the intricate but unavoidable relationship between arguments from ignorance and policy-making. Moreover, evaluation criteria are developed to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable arguments from ignorance in policy-making by taking into consideration the structure of these argument types and their contexts of application. Finally, the chapter assesses two real-life instances of arguments from ignorance employed by the European Commission and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an assessment sets important steps in understanding how arguments from ignorance can facilitate or reduce acceptance of the measures proposed by policy-makers. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Argumentation Library},
	author = {Andone, C. and Lomelí Hernández, J.A.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Arguments from ignorance, Policy-making, Risk, Uncertainty},
	pages = {105--123},
}

“Schools should remain open during the COVID-19 pandemic, because there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus.” Many European policy-makers have employed such arguments from ignorance to argue for a course of action in a situation in which science lacked vital information. What is particularly challenging about such arguments is that, despite the ignorance involved, they are used to justify policies meant to deal with practical problems. Limited information (‘there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus’) is used as a basis for decision-making that might have significant consequences for the population (‘schools should remain open’). This chapter explains the intricate but unavoidable relationship between arguments from ignorance and policy-making. Moreover, evaluation criteria are developed to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable arguments from ignorance in policy-making by taking into consideration the structure of these argument types and their contexts of application. Finally, the chapter assesses two real-life instances of arguments from ignorance employed by the European Commission and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an assessment sets important steps in understanding how arguments from ignorance can facilitate or reduce acceptance of the measures proposed by policy-makers. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{moore_architects_2021,
	title = {Architects and {Engineers}: {Two} {Types} of {Technocrat} and {Their} {Relation} to {Democracy}},
	shorttitle = {Architects and {Engineers}},
	doi = {10.1080/08913811.2020.1857610},
	abstract = {Technocracy is a contested concept, but it is typically associated with the exercise of political power justified by claims to expertise, and is often contrasted with populist forms of politics. In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman reframes the concept of technocracy as a form of politics oriented to solving social and economic problems, and thereby extends it to cover not only epistemic elites but ordinary people. This move usefully challenges the simplistic framing of populism and technocracy as opposites, but at the expense of effacing other dimensions of democratic politics. Friedman also suggests that maximizing individuals’ exit opportunities will allow them to take advantage of their relatively reliable personal knowledge. The architecture of “exitocracy” would itself, however, be designed by experts who, as such, might be tempted to insulate the institutional architecture they design against democratic interference. © 2021 Critical Review Foundation.},
	journal = {Critical Review},
	author = {Moore, A.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {democratic technocracy, epistocracy, exitocracy, naïve technocratic realism, public ignorance, radical ignorance, technocracy},
}

Technocracy is a contested concept, but it is typically associated with the exercise of political power justified by claims to expertise, and is often contrasted with populist forms of politics. In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman reframes the concept of technocracy as a form of politics oriented to solving social and economic problems, and thereby extends it to cover not only epistemic elites but ordinary people. This move usefully challenges the simplistic framing of populism and technocracy as opposites, but at the expense of effacing other dimensions of democratic politics. Friedman also suggests that maximizing individuals’ exit opportunities will allow them to take advantage of their relatively reliable personal knowledge. The architecture of “exitocracy” would itself, however, be designed by experts who, as such, might be tempted to insulate the institutional architecture they design against democratic interference. © 2021 Critical Review Foundation.

@article{pamuk_what_2021,
	title = {What {Follows} from the {Problem} of {Ignorance}?},
	volume = {0},
	issn = {0891-3811},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1846309},
	doi = {10.1080/08913811.2020.1846309},
	abstract = {In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman develops a critique of social science to argue that current technocratic practices are prone to predictive failures and unintended consequences. However, he does not provide evidence that the cause he singles out—“ideational heterogeneity”—is in fact a non-negligible source of technocratic limitations, more than or alongside better-known problems such as missing data, measurement issues, interpretive difficulties, and researcher bias. Even if we grant ideational heterogeneity, Friedman’s preferred institutional solution of exitocracy does not necessarily follow. His critical epistemology would also be compatible with radical forms of collective action.},
	number = {0},
	urldate = {2021-02-23},
	journal = {Critical Review},
	author = {Pamuk, Zeynep},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1846309},
	keywords = {democracy, expertise, ignorance, prediction, social science, technocracy},
	pages = {1--10},
}

In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman develops a critique of social science to argue that current technocratic practices are prone to predictive failures and unintended consequences. However, he does not provide evidence that the cause he singles out—“ideational heterogeneity”—is in fact a non-negligible source of technocratic limitations, more than or alongside better-known problems such as missing data, measurement issues, interpretive difficulties, and researcher bias. Even if we grant ideational heterogeneity, Friedman’s preferred institutional solution of exitocracy does not necessarily follow. His critical epistemology would also be compatible with radical forms of collective action.

@article{perry_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance or culture war? {Christian} nationalism and scientific illiteracy},
	issn = {0963-6625},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance or culture war?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/09636625211006271},
	doi = {10.1177/09636625211006271},
	abstract = {Religiously conservative Americans consistently demonstrate lower scientific literacy than other Americans. Some argue, however, that Americans’ scientific literacy is contingent on subcultural conflict, showing differences in scientific literacy that emerge only on religiously contested scientific claims. Building on these insights, we find that the most salient factor explaining Americans’ divergence on contested (though not on uncontested) scientific claims is not religious commitment or conservatism per se, but an ideology that seeks political—and consequently epistemic—dominance: Christian nationalism. National data show that Christian nationalism is unassociated with Americans’ answers on questions about uncontested scientific knowledge. However, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of incorrect answers on questions about religiously contested scientific claims. Contemporary “culture war” debates over science have little to do with outright ignorance of science, nor are they strictly about religiosity or theological conservatism. Rather, disputes over science and religion reflect politically motivated denials of scientific facts that threaten Christian nationalism’s claims to epistemic and cultural authority.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2021-05-06},
	journal = {Public Understanding of Science},
	author = {Perry, Samuel L. and Baker, Joseph O. and Grubbs, Joshua B.},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd},
	keywords = {Christian nationalism, acceptance of evolution, evangelicals, politics, public views of science, science and religion, scientific literacy},
	pages = {09636625211006271},
}

Religiously conservative Americans consistently demonstrate lower scientific literacy than other Americans. Some argue, however, that Americans’ scientific literacy is contingent on subcultural conflict, showing differences in scientific literacy that emerge only on religiously contested scientific claims. Building on these insights, we find that the most salient factor explaining Americans’ divergence on contested (though not on uncontested) scientific claims is not religious commitment or conservatism per se, but an ideology that seeks political—and consequently epistemic—dominance: Christian nationalism. National data show that Christian nationalism is unassociated with Americans’ answers on questions about uncontested scientific knowledge. However, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of incorrect answers on questions about religiously contested scientific claims. Contemporary “culture war” debates over science have little to do with outright ignorance of science, nor are they strictly about religiosity or theological conservatism. Rather, disputes over science and religion reflect politically motivated denials of scientific facts that threaten Christian nationalism’s claims to epistemic and cultural authority.

@article{meylan_ignorance_2020,
	title = {Ignorance and {Its} {Disvalue}},
	volume = {97},
	doi = {10.1163/18756735-000106},
	abstract = {It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
	author = {Meylan, Anne},
	month = aug,
	year = {2020},
	pages = {433--447},
}

It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.

@incollection{voigt_ignorance_2019,
	address = {Cambridge},
	series = {Studies on {International} {Courts} and {Tribunals}},
	title = {Ignorance, {Uncertainty} and {Biodiversity}: {Decision}-{Making} by the {Court} of {Justice} of the {European} {Union}},
	isbn = {978-1-108-49717-6},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance, {Uncertainty} and {Biodiversity}},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/international-judicial-practice-on-the-environment/ignorance-uncertainty-and-biodiversity-decisionmaking-by-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union/BF9606DA898F732CEBFD00D5606FD07B},
	urldate = {2021-01-06},
	booktitle = {International {Judicial} {Practice} on the {Environment}: {Questions} of {Legitimacy}},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {Mauerhofer, Volker},
	editor = {Voigt, Christina},
	year = {2019},
	doi = {10.1017/9781108684385.006},
	pages = {146--164},
}

@incollection{chang_patent_2019,
	address = {Cambridge},
	title = {Do {Patent} {Law} {Suits} {Target} {Invalid} {Patents}?},
	isbn = {978-1-108-47487-0},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/selection-and-decision-in-judicial-process-around-the-world/do-patent-law-suits-target-invalid-patents/09A8DCD2372EF8C561720B1A8DE76E56},
	abstract = {One objective of the patent litigation system is to screen meritorious from non-meritorious patents and invalidate the latter. While much of this screening may occur at trial, some amount of targeting may take place at the time of the filing of the suit itself. In this chapter, we assess the targeting efficiency of the patent litigation system at this earlier filing stage. Should the system indeed screen at this stage, one would predict a higher likelihood of patent lawsuits among a set of patents with weaker underlying validity relative to a set of patents with stronger underlying validity. In prior work (Frakes and Wasserman, Review of Economics and Statistics, 2017), we found that as examiners were given less time to review applications, they granted patents at higher rates, with the resulting marginal patents exhibiting greater markers of invalidity and attracting more litigation. An implication of these findings is that patents with more questionable validity—due to the leniency of the examiner—are indeed more likely to wind up in litigation, a finding supportive of filing-stage screening of meritorious claims. Our analysis in this book chapter attempts to generalize these prior findings to sources of examiner leniency beyond time constraints. More broadly, we characterize an examiner’s leniency by their overall grant rate, taking advantage of the fact that applications are effectively randomized across examiners. Consistent with our prior findings, we find that lenient examiners are more likely, on average, to issue patents with markers suggestive of weaker underlying validity and that are more likely to attract litigation. Ultimately, our findings suggest that legally invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office are substantially more likely to be the target of litigation relative to legally valid patents.},
	urldate = {2021-01-06},
	booktitle = {Selection and {Decision} in {Judicial} {Process} around the {World}: {Empirical} {Inquires}},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {Frakes, Michael D. and Wasserman, Melissa F.},
	editor = {Chang, Yun-chien},
	year = {2019},
	doi = {10.1017/9781108694469.002},
	keywords = {Litigation screening, litigation efficiency, patent examination, patent examiner heterogeneity, patent grant rates, patent litigation, rational ignorance},
	pages = {6--29},
}

One objective of the patent litigation system is to screen meritorious from non-meritorious patents and invalidate the latter. While much of this screening may occur at trial, some amount of targeting may take place at the time of the filing of the suit itself. In this chapter, we assess the targeting efficiency of the patent litigation system at this earlier filing stage. Should the system indeed screen at this stage, one would predict a higher likelihood of patent lawsuits among a set of patents with weaker underlying validity relative to a set of patents with stronger underlying validity. In prior work (Frakes and Wasserman, Review of Economics and Statistics, 2017), we found that as examiners were given less time to review applications, they granted patents at higher rates, with the resulting marginal patents exhibiting greater markers of invalidity and attracting more litigation. An implication of these findings is that patents with more questionable validity—due to the leniency of the examiner—are indeed more likely to wind up in litigation, a finding supportive of filing-stage screening of meritorious claims. Our analysis in this book chapter attempts to generalize these prior findings to sources of examiner leniency beyond time constraints. More broadly, we characterize an examiner’s leniency by their overall grant rate, taking advantage of the fact that applications are effectively randomized across examiners. Consistent with our prior findings, we find that lenient examiners are more likely, on average, to issue patents with markers suggestive of weaker underlying validity and that are more likely to attract litigation. Ultimately, our findings suggest that legally invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office are substantially more likely to be the target of litigation relative to legally valid patents.

@incollection{weaver_economics_2018,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Critical {Studies} of {Education}},
	title = {The {Economics} of {Science}, {Neoliberal} {Thought}, and the {Loss} of {Democracy}},
	isbn = {978-3-319-93840-0},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93840-0_5},
	abstract = {I consider this chapter the linchpin that connects the chapters around the theme of science and democracy. I begin with a look at the rise and dominance of the Neoliberal Thought Collective and how this collective has destroyed democracies in the United States in particular. I rely on the work of Philip Mirowski and Wendy Brown in this section. This I discuss the tradition of distrusting and public involvement in science and the creation of the myth that science is inherently democratic and people need not get involved. I include of critique of Friedrich Hayek, Michael Polyani, and Thomas Kuhn’s work from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s in which they rationalize the separation of science from democratic, public institutions and suggest the republic of science is merely for scientists. I also note how recent thought, especially the work of Helga Nowotny, in some ways accepts this argument developed by Hayek, Polyani, and Kuhn. I think move into a discussion of Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ work on expertise and how their model can promote more public involvement in science matters.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	booktitle = {Science, {Democracy}, and {Curriculum} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Weaver, John A.},
	editor = {Weaver, John A.},
	year = {2018},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-93840-0_5},
	keywords = {Expertise, Harry Collins, Neoliberal thought collective, Philip Mirowski, Robert Evans, Wendy Brown},
	pages = {95--121},
}

I consider this chapter the linchpin that connects the chapters around the theme of science and democracy. I begin with a look at the rise and dominance of the Neoliberal Thought Collective and how this collective has destroyed democracies in the United States in particular. I rely on the work of Philip Mirowski and Wendy Brown in this section. This I discuss the tradition of distrusting and public involvement in science and the creation of the myth that science is inherently democratic and people need not get involved. I include of critique of Friedrich Hayek, Michael Polyani, and Thomas Kuhn’s work from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s in which they rationalize the separation of science from democratic, public institutions and suggest the republic of science is merely for scientists. I also note how recent thought, especially the work of Helga Nowotny, in some ways accepts this argument developed by Hayek, Polyani, and Kuhn. I think move into a discussion of Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ work on expertise and how their model can promote more public involvement in science matters.

@incollection{weaver_working_2018,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Critical {Studies} of {Education}},
	title = {Working {Our} {Way} {Back}: {Colonial} {Science} in {Light} of {Postcolonial} {Thought}},
	isbn = {978-3-319-93840-0},
	shorttitle = {Working {Our} {Way} {Back}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93840-0_7},
	abstract = {This Chapter like Chap. 4 is an attempt at application. If science has always been colonial and there can be a postcolonial science what might it look like. I adopt Wynter’s concept of Mythoi, Gilroy’s concept of raciology, and Harding’s studying up to show how there is already a postcolonial historiography and a postcolonial reading of science. I rely on the work of Daniela Bleichmar, Londa Schiebinger, and Judith Carney.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	booktitle = {Science, {Democracy}, and {Curriculum} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Weaver, John A.},
	editor = {Weaver, John A.},
	year = {2018},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-93840-0_7},
	keywords = {Bleichmar, Botany, Carney, Colonial science, Schiebinger},
	pages = {147--160},
}

This Chapter like Chap. 4 is an attempt at application. If science has always been colonial and there can be a postcolonial science what might it look like. I adopt Wynter’s concept of Mythoi, Gilroy’s concept of raciology, and Harding’s studying up to show how there is already a postcolonial historiography and a postcolonial reading of science. I rely on the work of Daniela Bleichmar, Londa Schiebinger, and Judith Carney.

@incollection{egan_chemical_2018,
	title = {Chemical {Unknowns}: {Preliminary} {Outline} for an {Environmental} {History} of {Fear}},
	isbn = {978-90-04-36048-8},
	shorttitle = {Chemical {Unknowns}},
	url = {https://brill.com/abstract/book/edcoll/9789004360488/B9789004360488_010.xml},
	abstract = {The concept of framing has long intrigued and troubled scholars in fields including philosophy, rhetoric, media studies and literary criticism. But framing also has rich implications for environmental debate, urging us to reconsider how we understand the relationship between humans and their ecological environment, culture and nature.
The contributors to this wide-ranging volume use the concept of framing to engage with key questions in environmental literature, history, politics, film, TV, and pedagogy. In so doing, they show that framing can serve as a valuable analytical tool connecting different academic discourses within the emergent interdisciplinary field of the environmental humanities. No less importantly, they demonstrate how increased awareness of framing strategies and framing effects can help us move society in a more sustainable direction.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	booktitle = {Framing the {Environmental} {Humanities}},
	publisher = {Brill},
	author = {Egan, Michael},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {124--138},
}

The concept of framing has long intrigued and troubled scholars in fields including philosophy, rhetoric, media studies and literary criticism. But framing also has rich implications for environmental debate, urging us to reconsider how we understand the relationship between humans and their ecological environment, culture and nature. The contributors to this wide-ranging volume use the concept of framing to engage with key questions in environmental literature, history, politics, film, TV, and pedagogy. In so doing, they show that framing can serve as a valuable analytical tool connecting different academic discourses within the emergent interdisciplinary field of the environmental humanities. No less importantly, they demonstrate how increased awareness of framing strategies and framing effects can help us move society in a more sustainable direction.

@incollection{heffernan_geographies_2018,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Knowledge and {Space}},
	title = {Geographies of the {University}: {An} {Introduction}},
	isbn = {978-3-319-75593-9},
	shorttitle = {Geographies of the {University}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75593-9_1},
	abstract = {This volume analyzes the history and character of the modern university from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, with particular emphasis on the constitutive significance of geography as a factor shaping the internal and external dynamics of universities and the national and international systems of higher education in which they have operated.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	booktitle = {Geographies of the {University}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Heffernan, Michael and Suarsana, Laura and Meusburger, Peter},
	editor = {Meusburger, Peter and Heffernan, Michael and Suarsana, Laura},
	year = {2018},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-75593-9_1},
	pages = {1--20},
}

This volume analyzes the history and character of the modern university from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, with particular emphasis on the constitutive significance of geography as a factor shaping the internal and external dynamics of universities and the national and international systems of higher education in which they have operated.

@article{tran_ignorance_2018,
	title = {Ignorance and {Professional} {Military} {Education}: {The} {Case} for {Operational} {Engagement}},
	copyright = {This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance and {Professional} {Military} {Education}},
	url = {https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/60591},
	abstract = {There are libraries full of books on the quest for knowledge, but little is known about how things are not learned (or, once learned, not retained). The intellectual historians Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger coined the term “agnotology” to refer to the study of ignorance and how it is produced. They make the powerful case that “ignorance is often not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political struggle.” The perspective that Proctor and Schiebinger provide offers a critical lens through which to evaluate the trajectory of professional military education.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	author = {Tran, Thang and Oliveira, Michael and Sider, Josh and Blanken, Leo},
	month = nov,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {applications, ignorance et enseignement},
}

There are libraries full of books on the quest for knowledge, but little is known about how things are not learned (or, once learned, not retained). The intellectual historians Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger coined the term “agnotology” to refer to the study of ignorance and how it is produced. They make the powerful case that “ignorance is often not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political struggle.” The perspective that Proctor and Schiebinger provide offers a critical lens through which to evaluate the trajectory of professional military education.

@article{field_ignorance_2018,
	title = {Ignorance can be evolutionarily beneficial},
	volume = {8},
	copyright = {© 2017 The Authors.           Ecology and Evolution published by John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
	issn = {2045-7758},
	url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ece3.3627},
	doi = {10.1002/ece3.3627},
	abstract = {Information is increasingly being viewed as a resource used by organisms to increase their fitness. Indeed, it has been formally shown that there is a sensible way to assign a reproductive value to information and it is non-negative. However, all of this work assumed that information collection is cost-free. Here, we account for such a cost and provide conditions for when the reproductive value of information will be negative. In these instances, counterintuitively, it is in the interest of the organism to remain ignorant. We link our results to empirical studies where Bayesian behavior appears to break down in complex environments and provide an alternative explanation of lowered arousal thresholds in the evolution of sleep.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-09-10},
	journal = {Ecology and Evolution},
	author = {Field, Jared M. and Bonsall, Michael B.},
	month = jan,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {Bayes’ theorem, ignorance, information, sleep, statistical decision theory},
	pages = {71--77},
}

Information is increasingly being viewed as a resource used by organisms to increase their fitness. Indeed, it has been formally shown that there is a sensible way to assign a reproductive value to information and it is non-negative. However, all of this work assumed that information collection is cost-free. Here, we account for such a cost and provide conditions for when the reproductive value of information will be negative. In these instances, counterintuitively, it is in the interest of the organism to remain ignorant. We link our results to empirical studies where Bayesian behavior appears to break down in complex environments and provide an alternative explanation of lowered arousal thresholds in the evolution of sleep.

@phdthesis{eydieux_gouverner_2017,
	type = {phdthesis},
	title = {Gouverner les risques par le doute. {Une} approche pragmatiste du dialogue technique.},
	url = {https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01644503},
	abstract = {Depuis les années 1970, la gouvernance des grandes organisations fait de plus en plus l'objet d'un contrôle externe, matérialisé par des relations contrôleur / contrôlé. C'est le cas de la gouvernance des risques nucléaires des exploitants, contrôlée en France par le dialogue technique relatif aux démonstrations de sûreté. Cette thèse vise à identifier comment ce dialogue peut articuler les stratégies d'anticipation et de résilience, ce que la littérature ne permet pas de dire. Nous proposons pour ce faire une approche pragmatiste, fondée sur les notions de croyance et de valuation. Notre enquête sur le dialogue technique est fondée sur une collecte de documents, puis une analyse narrative du dialogue et des écrits de démonstration et d'évaluation. Pour y tracer la résilience, nous réalisons un détour méthodologique par la manutention, une activité organisée en "résilience forcée", pour laquelle nous avons réalisé une enquête ethnographique puis une analyse de situations. Dans le dialogue technique, nous identifions 8 types de travails impliqués dans l'animation du dialogue et dans la production des documents. Nous identifions 7 facteurs de fiabilité de la manutention. Par comparaison, nous montrons que l'articulation anticipation / résilience peut être produite par le maintien d'une absence ou par l'intégration d’éléments relatifs aux activités de travail. Nos résultats invitent à penser l'articulation anticipation / résilience comme une convergence de doutes produits par des acteurs de la résilience et de l'anticipation, et à penser les relations contrôleur / contrôlé comme des dispositifs menant à l'élaboration de croyances nuancées en produisant des doutes inédits.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2022-06-15},
	school = {Université de Nantes (Unam)},
	author = {Eydieux, Jérémy},
	month = sep,
	year = {2017},
}

Depuis les années 1970, la gouvernance des grandes organisations fait de plus en plus l'objet d'un contrôle externe, matérialisé par des relations contrôleur / contrôlé. C'est le cas de la gouvernance des risques nucléaires des exploitants, contrôlée en France par le dialogue technique relatif aux démonstrations de sûreté. Cette thèse vise à identifier comment ce dialogue peut articuler les stratégies d'anticipation et de résilience, ce que la littérature ne permet pas de dire. Nous proposons pour ce faire une approche pragmatiste, fondée sur les notions de croyance et de valuation. Notre enquête sur le dialogue technique est fondée sur une collecte de documents, puis une analyse narrative du dialogue et des écrits de démonstration et d'évaluation. Pour y tracer la résilience, nous réalisons un détour méthodologique par la manutention, une activité organisée en "résilience forcée", pour laquelle nous avons réalisé une enquête ethnographique puis une analyse de situations. Dans le dialogue technique, nous identifions 8 types de travails impliqués dans l'animation du dialogue et dans la production des documents. Nous identifions 7 facteurs de fiabilité de la manutention. Par comparaison, nous montrons que l'articulation anticipation / résilience peut être produite par le maintien d'une absence ou par l'intégration d’éléments relatifs aux activités de travail. Nos résultats invitent à penser l'articulation anticipation / résilience comme une convergence de doutes produits par des acteurs de la résilience et de l'anticipation, et à penser les relations contrôleur / contrôlé comme des dispositifs menant à l'élaboration de croyances nuancées en produisant des doutes inédits.

@incollection{medina_epistemic_2017,
	title = {Epistemic injustice and epistemologies of ignorance},
	abstract = {Miranda Fricker has defined epistemic injustice “as a kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower” (2007: 20). Although the topic of epistemic injustice has recently received a lot of attention, it had been systematically ignored in idealized discussions in epistemology that assumed the equal status and participation of all subjects in the epistemic practices in which understanding, belief, and knowledge are formed, communicated, and used. Idealized theories of understanding, belief, and knowledge disregard the differential epistemic agency of different subject positions and social locations, and they also neglect the internal relations and dialectics between understanding and misunderstanding, believing and disbelieving, knowing and ignoring. Taking seriously the power dynamics within epistemic practices involves unmasking “epistemologies of ignorance” that protect the voices, meaning, and perspectives of some by silencing the voices, meanings, and perspectives of others. Marxist theory, critical race theory, feminist theory, and queer theory have all produced powerful diagnoses of these “epistemologies of ignorance” by analyzing the impact of different forms of oppression (linked to class, race, gender, and sexuality) on our epistemic practices, and the different forms of epistemic injustice that relations of oppression produce. Although epistemologies of ignorance have been discussed by that name only recently (Mills 1997; Sullivan and Tuana 2007), they have always been a key theme of race theory, and they have figured prominently in the philosophies of race of classic authors such as Sojourner Truth, Anna J. Cooper, W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, and Frantz Fanon, to name a few. Philosophers of race have developed robust discussions of social facts, experiences, and meanings that, as a result of racial oppression, become invisible, inaudible, or simply unintelligible in certain social locations and for certain perspectives that protect themselves from facing their involvement in racial oppression with a shield of active ignorance. The sections that follow elucidate the accounts of racial active ignorance and racial epistemic injustices developed in classic philosophies of race and in contemporary reflections on “epistemologies of ignorance.”. © 2018 Taylor \& Francis.},
	booktitle = {The {Routledge} {Companion} to the {Philosophy} of {Race}},
	author = {Medina, J.},
	year = {2017},
	doi = {10.4324/9781315884424},
	pages = {247--260},
}

Miranda Fricker has defined epistemic injustice “as a kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower” (2007: 20). Although the topic of epistemic injustice has recently received a lot of attention, it had been systematically ignored in idealized discussions in epistemology that assumed the equal status and participation of all subjects in the epistemic practices in which understanding, belief, and knowledge are formed, communicated, and used. Idealized theories of understanding, belief, and knowledge disregard the differential epistemic agency of different subject positions and social locations, and they also neglect the internal relations and dialectics between understanding and misunderstanding, believing and disbelieving, knowing and ignoring. Taking seriously the power dynamics within epistemic practices involves unmasking “epistemologies of ignorance” that protect the voices, meaning, and perspectives of some by silencing the voices, meanings, and perspectives of others. Marxist theory, critical race theory, feminist theory, and queer theory have all produced powerful diagnoses of these “epistemologies of ignorance” by analyzing the impact of different forms of oppression (linked to class, race, gender, and sexuality) on our epistemic practices, and the different forms of epistemic injustice that relations of oppression produce. Although epistemologies of ignorance have been discussed by that name only recently (Mills 1997; Sullivan and Tuana 2007), they have always been a key theme of race theory, and they have figured prominently in the philosophies of race of classic authors such as Sojourner Truth, Anna J. Cooper, W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, and Frantz Fanon, to name a few. Philosophers of race have developed robust discussions of social facts, experiences, and meanings that, as a result of racial oppression, become invisible, inaudible, or simply unintelligible in certain social locations and for certain perspectives that protect themselves from facing their involvement in racial oppression with a shield of active ignorance. The sections that follow elucidate the accounts of racial active ignorance and racial epistemic injustices developed in classic philosophies of race and in contemporary reflections on “epistemologies of ignorance.”. © 2018 Taylor & Francis.

@incollection{blann_sustainability_2017,
	title = {Sustainability science and ‘ignorance-based’ management for a resilient future},
	abstract = {Western civilization has reached a watershed in its history of co-evolution with nature. For the past 300 years humans have employed science as a means to subdue and exploit nature. But our unwillingness to embrace error and adapt our societies is eroding our life support systems irreversibly. © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Michel Pimbert; individual chapters, the contributors.},
	booktitle = {Food {Sovereignty}, {Agroecology} and {Biocultural} {Diversity}: {Constructing} and {Contesting} {Knowledge}},
	author = {Blann, K. and Light, S.S.},
	year = {2017},
	doi = {10.4324/9781315666396},
	pages = {93--114},
}

Western civilization has reached a watershed in its history of co-evolution with nature. For the past 300 years humans have employed science as a means to subdue and exploit nature. But our unwillingness to embrace error and adapt our societies is eroding our life support systems irreversibly. © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Michel Pimbert; individual chapters, the contributors.

@incollection{mason_right_2017,
	title = {Do the right thing: {An} account of subjective obligation},
	volume = {7},
	shorttitle = {Do the right thing},
	abstract = {Subjective rightness (or 'ought' or obligation) seems to be the sense of rightness that should be action guiding where more objective senses fail. However, there is an ambiguity between strong and weak senses of action guidance. No general account of subjective rightness can succeed in being action guiding in a strong sense by providing an immediately helpful instruction, because helpfulness always depends on the context. Subjective rightness is action guiding in a weaker sense, in that it is always accessible and comprehensible to the agent. Hence traditional belief formulations say roughly, "do what you believe is best." This is not yet a satisfactory formulation, because it cannot make sense of our ongoing subjective duty to improve our beliefs. The notion of 'trying' does capture the dynamic and diachronic nature of our subjective obligation. Thus, we should formulate subjective obligation in terms of trying: "try to do well by morality." © the several contributors 2017. All rights reserved.},
	booktitle = {Oxford {Studies} in {Normative} {Ethics}},
	author = {Mason, E.},
	year = {2017},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198808930.003.0007},
	keywords = {Action guidance, Culpable ignorance, Fred Feldman, Holly Smith, Michael Zimmerman, Subjective 'ought', Subjective obligation, Subjective rightness, Trying},
	pages = {117--137},
}

Subjective rightness (or 'ought' or obligation) seems to be the sense of rightness that should be action guiding where more objective senses fail. However, there is an ambiguity between strong and weak senses of action guidance. No general account of subjective rightness can succeed in being action guiding in a strong sense by providing an immediately helpful instruction, because helpfulness always depends on the context. Subjective rightness is action guiding in a weaker sense, in that it is always accessible and comprehensible to the agent. Hence traditional belief formulations say roughly, "do what you believe is best." This is not yet a satisfactory formulation, because it cannot make sense of our ongoing subjective duty to improve our beliefs. The notion of 'trying' does capture the dynamic and diachronic nature of our subjective obligation. Thus, we should formulate subjective obligation in terms of trying: "try to do well by morality." © the several contributors 2017. All rights reserved.

@article{dubois_generalized_2017,
	title = {Generalized possibilistic logic: {Foundations} and applications to qualitative reasoning about uncertainty},
	volume = {252},
	shorttitle = {Generalized possibilistic logic},
	doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2017.08.001},
	abstract = {This paper introduces generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), a logic for epistemic reasoning based on possibility theory. Formulas in GPL correspond to propositional combinations of assertions such as “it is certain to degree λ that the propositional formula α is true”. As its name suggests, the logic generalizes possibilistic logic (PL), which at the syntactic level only allows conjunctions of the aforementioned type of assertions. At the semantic level, PL can only encode sets of epistemic states encompassed by a single least informed one, whereas GPL can encode any set of epistemic states. This feature makes GPL particularly suitable for reasoning about what an agent knows about the beliefs of another agent, e.g., allowing the former to draw conclusions about what the other agent does not know. We introduce an axiomatization for GPL and show its soundness and completeness w.r.t. possibilistic semantics. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness of GPL as a powerful unifying framework for various knowledge representation formalisms. Among others, we show how comparative uncertainty and ignorance can be modelled in GPL. We also exhibit a close connection between GPL and various existing formalisms, including possibilistic logic with partially ordered formulas, a logic of conditional assertions in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, answer set programming and a fragment of the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of reasoning in GPL, identifying decision problems at the first, second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.},
	journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
	author = {Dubois, D. and Prade, H. and Schockaert, S.},
	year = {2017},
	keywords = {Epistemic reasoning, Long pour impression, Non-monotonic reasoning, Possibilistic logic, applications},
	pages = {139--174},
}

This paper introduces generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), a logic for epistemic reasoning based on possibility theory. Formulas in GPL correspond to propositional combinations of assertions such as “it is certain to degree λ that the propositional formula α is true”. As its name suggests, the logic generalizes possibilistic logic (PL), which at the syntactic level only allows conjunctions of the aforementioned type of assertions. At the semantic level, PL can only encode sets of epistemic states encompassed by a single least informed one, whereas GPL can encode any set of epistemic states. This feature makes GPL particularly suitable for reasoning about what an agent knows about the beliefs of another agent, e.g., allowing the former to draw conclusions about what the other agent does not know. We introduce an axiomatization for GPL and show its soundness and completeness w.r.t. possibilistic semantics. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness of GPL as a powerful unifying framework for various knowledge representation formalisms. Among others, we show how comparative uncertainty and ignorance can be modelled in GPL. We also exhibit a close connection between GPL and various existing formalisms, including possibilistic logic with partially ordered formulas, a logic of conditional assertions in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, answer set programming and a fragment of the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of reasoning in GPL, identifying decision problems at the first, second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.

@incollection{turner_ignorance_2017,
	address = {Oxford, UK},
	title = {Ignorance},
	isbn = {978-1-118-43086-6 978-1-118-43087-3},
	url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781118430873.est0673},
	abstract = {Ignorance denotes a deficiency. It usually refers to a lack of knowledge, information, or understanding. In social science research ignorance can have at least three additional meanings: ignorance can be described as the driver of scientific research, be depicted as an integral part of social life, and be used as a heuristic model to analyze the normative aspects of a given society.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-20},
	booktitle = {The {Wiley}-{Blackwell} {Encyclopedia} of {Social} {Theory}},
	publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd},
	author = {Ruser, Alexander},
	editor = {Turner, Bryan S},
	month = dec,
	year = {2017},
	doi = {10.1002/9781118430873.est0673},
	pages = {1--2},
}

Ignorance denotes a deficiency. It usually refers to a lack of knowledge, information, or understanding. In social science research ignorance can have at least three additional meanings: ignorance can be described as the driver of scientific research, be depicted as an integral part of social life, and be used as a heuristic model to analyze the normative aspects of a given society.

@incollection{gross_shaping_2017,
	title = {Shaping new horizons: {Proactionary} attitudes, precautionary principles and the experimentalities of science in society},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85020757715&doi=10.4324%2f9781315440842&partnerID=40&md5=2901f9635fbcfd500421106a0e9cc0a0},
	booktitle = {Imagined {Futures} in {Science}, {Technology} and {Society}},
	publisher = {Taylor and Francis Inc.},
	author = {Gross, M.},
	year = {2017},
	doi = {10.4324/9781315440842},
	pages = {201--216},
}

@incollection{kallestrup_knowing_2016,
	address = {Leiden},
	edition = {Kuźniar, Adrian et Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Joanna},
	series = {Poznań {Studies} in the {Philosophy} of the {Sciences} and the {Humanities}},
	title = {Knowing from {Not} {Knowing}.},
	isbn = {978-90-04-31265-4},
	url = {DOI 10.1163/9789004312654004},
	abstract = {Arguments from ignorance are typically fallacious: one shouldn't infer that p is true merely from the fact that p isn,'t known to be false. The reason one cannot invariably come to know that p on the basis of lack of knowledge that not-p is that p may well be false even though one hasn't been in a position to know that not-p. The qualifiers 'typically, and 'invariably, are key here. In cases where one would have known that not-p had p been false, reasoning from ignorance seems perfectly kosher, indeed where one knows that counterfactual independently, one is positioned to gain knowledge. Goldberg (2010a; 2010b) has developed a set of conditions sufficient for such epistemic coverage to obtain in the domain of social epistemology. This paper elaborates, extends and critically discusses Goldberg's pioneering framework.},
	language = {en},
	booktitle = {Uncovering {Facts} and {Values}: {Studies} in {Contemporary} {Epistemology} and {Political} {Philosophy} .},
	publisher = {Brill {\textbar} Rodopi},
	author = {Kallestrup, Jesper},
	year = {2016},
	pages = {41--55},
}

Arguments from ignorance are typically fallacious: one shouldn't infer that p is true merely from the fact that p isn,'t known to be false. The reason one cannot invariably come to know that p on the basis of lack of knowledge that not-p is that p may well be false even though one hasn't been in a position to know that not-p. The qualifiers 'typically, and 'invariably, are key here. In cases where one would have known that not-p had p been false, reasoning from ignorance seems perfectly kosher, indeed where one knows that counterfactual independently, one is positioned to gain knowledge. Goldberg (2010a; 2010b) has developed a set of conditions sufficient for such epistemic coverage to obtain in the domain of social epistemology. This paper elaborates, extends and critically discusses Goldberg's pioneering framework.

@phdthesis{danelon_ignorance_2015,
	type = {{PhD} {Thesis}},
	title = {Ignorance {Production} and {Corporate} {Science}},
	url = {http://hdl.handle.net/1974/13723},
	abstract = {This thesis is a philosophical exploration of “agnotology”, the study of ignorance or non-knowledge, and focuses on the production of ignorance for private interests. In particular, I argue that corporate science often deliberately produces ignorance in an effort to promote corporate interests. My thesis is structured into five chapters. In Chapter 1, I introduce agnotology and outline Robert N. Proctor’s three categories thereof: ignorance as native state, ignorance as selective choice, and ignorance as active construct. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the agnotological literature on the basis of which I argue for two expanded categories of ignorance: ignorance from ideology, and ignorance from interest. In Chapter 3, I address the question of the normative assumptions underlying agnotology. As well, given agnotology’s task of unpacking the values laden in science, agnotology’s normative conception of science may stand in tension with a conception of science as objective, neutral inquiry. In the end, I argue that agnotologists need not deny science’s objectivity when they view science as value-laden. In Chapter 4, I present a case study. Through an agnotological analysis, I argue that some HPV vaccine legislation was passed via agnogenesis. I also argue that the silencing of vaccine skeptics is a form of agnogenesis. This case, interpreted in the light of the novel agnotological framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3, supports my main thesis that corporate science serves primarily corporate interests via agnogenesis. And, finally, in Chapter 5, I present concluding remarks, draw out the limitations of the thesis, and offer suggestions for directions of future research},
	language = {English},
	school = {Queen's University},
	author = {Danelon, Marilena},
	year = {2015},
}

This thesis is a philosophical exploration of “agnotology”, the study of ignorance or non-knowledge, and focuses on the production of ignorance for private interests. In particular, I argue that corporate science often deliberately produces ignorance in an effort to promote corporate interests. My thesis is structured into five chapters. In Chapter 1, I introduce agnotology and outline Robert N. Proctor’s three categories thereof: ignorance as native state, ignorance as selective choice, and ignorance as active construct. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the agnotological literature on the basis of which I argue for two expanded categories of ignorance: ignorance from ideology, and ignorance from interest. In Chapter 3, I address the question of the normative assumptions underlying agnotology. As well, given agnotology’s task of unpacking the values laden in science, agnotology’s normative conception of science may stand in tension with a conception of science as objective, neutral inquiry. In the end, I argue that agnotologists need not deny science’s objectivity when they view science as value-laden. In Chapter 4, I present a case study. Through an agnotological analysis, I argue that some HPV vaccine legislation was passed via agnogenesis. I also argue that the silencing of vaccine skeptics is a form of agnogenesis. This case, interpreted in the light of the novel agnotological framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3, supports my main thesis that corporate science serves primarily corporate interests via agnogenesis. And, finally, in Chapter 5, I present concluding remarks, draw out the limitations of the thesis, and offer suggestions for directions of future research

@article{__2014,
	title = {Тематизация Незнания: Прагматический И Эпистемологический Контексты},
	issn = {19950055},
	shorttitle = {Тематизация Незнания},
	url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=121179448&site=ehost-live},
	abstract = {The article reconstructs two semantic contexts for thematizing ignorance. Pragmatic context refers to the modern debate on the applied aspects of ignorance as one of the most important means for the production of everyday life. It is examined by a new scientifi c discipline called agnotology.Th e author traces the epistemological context for theming ignorance to tradition of docta ignorantia. Th e basic hypothesis is that “learning (recognized) ignorance” is the stable invariant of the cognitive strategy concerning problematic objects (the absolute, the infi nite, the transcendental). Tracing the historical versions of “learning ignorance” in Plato, Nicolas of Cusa, Kant, and Ferrier, the author concludes that they can be grouped under agnoiology. (English)},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2018-11-26},
	journal = {THEMATIZING IGNORANCE: PRAGMATIC AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTS.},
	author = {Цыпина, Л. В.},
	month = sep,
	year = {2014},
	keywords = {Ignorance, agnoiology, agnotology, docta ignorantia, агнойология, агнотология, незнание},
	pages = {23--28},
}

The article reconstructs two semantic contexts for thematizing ignorance. Pragmatic context refers to the modern debate on the applied aspects of ignorance as one of the most important means for the production of everyday life. It is examined by a new scientifi c discipline called agnotology.Th e author traces the epistemological context for theming ignorance to tradition of docta ignorantia. Th e basic hypothesis is that “learning (recognized) ignorance” is the stable invariant of the cognitive strategy concerning problematic objects (the absolute, the infi nite, the transcendental). Tracing the historical versions of “learning ignorance” in Plato, Nicolas of Cusa, Kant, and Ferrier, the author concludes that they can be grouped under agnoiology. (English)

@incollection{taebi_intergenerational_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Intergenerational {Risks} of {Nuclear} {Energy}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_12},
	abstract = {Nuclear energy is one of the clearest examples of a technology that brings about risks beyond generational borders. These risks emanate particularly from nuclear waste that needs to be isolated from the biosphere for very long periods of time. Principles of intergenerational equity currently underlie waste management policies, arguing that we should not impose undue burdens on future generations. This chapter scrutinizes the way in which such intergenerational equity principles deal with the issue of long-term risks.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Taebi, Behnam},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_12},
	keywords = {Fuel Cycle, Geological Repository, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Waste, Spend Fuel},
	pages = {295--318},
}

Nuclear energy is one of the clearest examples of a technology that brings about risks beyond generational borders. These risks emanate particularly from nuclear waste that needs to be isolated from the biosphere for very long periods of time. Principles of intergenerational equity currently underlie waste management policies, arguing that we should not impose undue burdens on future generations. This chapter scrutinizes the way in which such intergenerational equity principles deal with the issue of long-term risks.

@incollection{rid_risk_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Risk and {Risk}-{Benefit} {Evaluations} in {Biomedical} {Research}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_8},
	abstract = {One of the fundamental ethical concerns about biomedical research is that it exposes participants to risks for the benefit of others. Therefore, a key ethical requirement for biomedical research studies is that they have an acceptable risk-benefit profile. Yet, despite widespread endorsement of this requirement, how it should be implemented remains controversial. The present paper critically reviews recent debates about risk and risk-benefit evaluations in biomedical research. It traces the history of risk-benefit evaluations in research, which were traditionally conceived of as an extension of the risk-benefit assessment occurring in clinical care. From there, the paper presents and evaluates the four existing ethical frameworks for risk-benefit evaluations: the component analysis, the integrative approach, the agreement principle, and the net risks test. It is argued that the net risks test is superior to the alternative approaches, but fails to offer guidance for evaluating the ethical acceptability of risks that participants incur for research purposes only. This leaves two of the fundamental problems of risk-benefit evaluations in research inadequately addressed, namely, (1) how to weigh the risks to the individual research participant against the potential social value of the knowledge to be gained from a study and (2) how to set upper limits of acceptable research risk. Discussions about the “minimal” risk threshold in research with participants who cannot consent, such as children or patients with dementia, go some way to specifying upper risk limits in this study context. However, these discussions apply only to a small portion of research studies. The paper ends by highlighting several important questions that future research will need to address.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Rid, Annette},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_8},
	keywords = {Basic Interest, Clinical Equipoise, Research Intervention, Research Risk, Risk Limit},
	pages = {179--211},
}

One of the fundamental ethical concerns about biomedical research is that it exposes participants to risks for the benefit of others. Therefore, a key ethical requirement for biomedical research studies is that they have an acceptable risk-benefit profile. Yet, despite widespread endorsement of this requirement, how it should be implemented remains controversial. The present paper critically reviews recent debates about risk and risk-benefit evaluations in biomedical research. It traces the history of risk-benefit evaluations in research, which were traditionally conceived of as an extension of the risk-benefit assessment occurring in clinical care. From there, the paper presents and evaluates the four existing ethical frameworks for risk-benefit evaluations: the component analysis, the integrative approach, the agreement principle, and the net risks test. It is argued that the net risks test is superior to the alternative approaches, but fails to offer guidance for evaluating the ethical acceptability of risks that participants incur for research purposes only. This leaves two of the fundamental problems of risk-benefit evaluations in research inadequately addressed, namely, (1) how to weigh the risks to the individual research participant against the potential social value of the knowledge to be gained from a study and (2) how to set upper limits of acceptable research risk. Discussions about the “minimal” risk threshold in research with participants who cannot consent, such as children or patients with dementia, go some way to specifying upper risk limits in this study context. However, these discussions apply only to a small portion of research studies. The paper ends by highlighting several important questions that future research will need to address.

@incollection{moller_concepts_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {The {Concepts} of {Risk} and {Safety}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_3},
	abstract = {The aim of this chapter is to analyze the concepts of risk and safety in the context of societal decision-making. Risk and safety research is a heterogeneous field, and different areas have conceived of the nature of risk in different ways. In the chapter, I categorize risk perspectives in three broad groups: the scientist approach, the psychological approach, and the cultural approach to risk. Between these groups, the nature and status of risk and safety have been the debated subjects. I will attempt to bring some light onto complicated and controversial philosophical topics such as whether risk and safety are natural or normative notions, whether they are social constructions, objective, or even real. This investigation will focus on a range of different questions. I will distinguish between five common definitions of the term “risk,” as well as contrast the notion of risk with both the notion of safety and the notion of acceptable risk. The main part of the chapter will focus on a quantitative or comparative concept of risk, that is, a notion that is in play in statements such as “the risk of flying is lower than the risk of traveling by car” and “the risk of nuclear power is 10−4 deaths per reactor year.” The central aspects of such a notion of risk and safety will be discussed, in particular the notions of probability and harm. I will also discuss the common claim that it is the expectation value of the severity of harm that is the correct measure of risk. Furthermore, I investigate additional aspects such as epistemic uncertainty and other, more controversial aspects that have been proposed.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Möller, Niklas},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_3},
	keywords = {Acceptable Risk, Epistemic Uncertainty, Normative Aspect, Safety Culture, Unwanted Event},
	pages = {55--85},
}

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the concepts of risk and safety in the context of societal decision-making. Risk and safety research is a heterogeneous field, and different areas have conceived of the nature of risk in different ways. In the chapter, I categorize risk perspectives in three broad groups: the scientist approach, the psychological approach, and the cultural approach to risk. Between these groups, the nature and status of risk and safety have been the debated subjects. I will attempt to bring some light onto complicated and controversial philosophical topics such as whether risk and safety are natural or normative notions, whether they are social constructions, objective, or even real. This investigation will focus on a range of different questions. I will distinguish between five common definitions of the term “risk,” as well as contrast the notion of risk with both the notion of safety and the notion of acceptable risk. The main part of the chapter will focus on a quantitative or comparative concept of risk, that is, a notion that is in play in statements such as “the risk of flying is lower than the risk of traveling by car” and “the risk of nuclear power is 10−4 deaths per reactor year.” The central aspects of such a notion of risk and safety will be discussed, in particular the notions of probability and harm. I will also discuss the common claim that it is the expectation value of the severity of harm that is the correct measure of risk. Furthermore, I investigate additional aspects such as epistemic uncertainty and other, more controversial aspects that have been proposed.

@incollection{stoel_interpretation_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Interpretation of {Forensic} {Evidence}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_6},
	abstract = {One of the central questions in a legal trial is whether the suspect did or did not commit the crime. It will be apparent that absolute certainty cannot be attained. Because there is always a certain degree of uncertainty when interpreting the evidence, none of the evidence rules out all hypotheses except one. The central question should therefore be formulated in terms of probability. For instance, how probable is it that the suspect is the offender, given the situation and a number of inherent uncertain pieces of evidence? The answer to this question requires the estimation, and subsequent combination, of all relevant probabilities, and cannot be provided by the forensic expert. What the forensic expert can provide is just a piece of the puzzle: an estimate of the evidential value of her investigation. This evidential value is based on estimates of the probabilities of the evidence given at least two prespecified hypotheses. These probabilities can subsequently be used by the legal decision maker in order to determine an answer to the question above, but they are, of course, not sufficient. They need to be combined with all the other information in the case. A probabilistic framework to do this is the Likelihood Ratio approach for the interpretation of forensic evidence. In this chapter we will describe this framework.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Stoel, Reinoud D. and Sjerps, Marjan},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_6},
	keywords = {Crime Scene, Forensic Evidence, Glass Fragment, Positive Test Result, Posterior Odds},
	pages = {135--158},
}

One of the central questions in a legal trial is whether the suspect did or did not commit the crime. It will be apparent that absolute certainty cannot be attained. Because there is always a certain degree of uncertainty when interpreting the evidence, none of the evidence rules out all hypotheses except one. The central question should therefore be formulated in terms of probability. For instance, how probable is it that the suspect is the offender, given the situation and a number of inherent uncertain pieces of evidence? The answer to this question requires the estimation, and subsequent combination, of all relevant probabilities, and cannot be provided by the forensic expert. What the forensic expert can provide is just a piece of the puzzle: an estimate of the evidential value of her investigation. This evidential value is based on estimates of the probabilities of the evidence given at least two prespecified hypotheses. These probabilities can subsequently be used by the legal decision maker in order to determine an answer to the question above, but they are, of course, not sufficient. They need to be combined with all the other information in the case. A probabilistic framework to do this is the Likelihood Ratio approach for the interpretation of forensic evidence. In this chapter we will describe this framework.

@incollection{roeser_introduction_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Introduction to {Risk} {Theory}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_1},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_1},
	keywords = {Capability Approach, Cultural Theory, Precautionary Principle, Risk Communication, Risk Perception},
	pages = {1--23},
}

@incollection{riesch_levels_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Levels of {Uncertainty}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_4},
	abstract = {There exist a variety of different understandings, definitions, and classifications of risk, which can make the resulting landscape of academic literature on the topic seem somewhat disjointed and often confusing. In this chapter, I will introduce a map on how to think about risks, and in particular uncertainty, which is arranged along the different questions of what the different academic disciplines find interesting about risk. This aims to give a more integrated idea of where the different literatures intersect and thus provide some order in our understanding of what risk is and what is interesting about it. One particular dimension will be presented in more detail, answering the question of what exactly we are uncertain about and distinguishing between five different levels of uncertainty. I will argue, through some concrete examples, that concentrating on the objects of uncertainty can give us an appreciation on how different perspectives on a given risk scenario are formed and will use the more general map to show how this perspective intersects with other classifications and analyses of risk.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Riesch, Hauke},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_4},
	keywords = {Bowel Cancer, Carbon Capture, Risk Assessment, Risk Scenario, Risk Situation},
	pages = {87--110},
}

There exist a variety of different understandings, definitions, and classifications of risk, which can make the resulting landscape of academic literature on the topic seem somewhat disjointed and often confusing. In this chapter, I will introduce a map on how to think about risks, and in particular uncertainty, which is arranged along the different questions of what the different academic disciplines find interesting about risk. This aims to give a more integrated idea of where the different literatures intersect and thus provide some order in our understanding of what risk is and what is interesting about it. One particular dimension will be presented in more detail, answering the question of what exactly we are uncertain about and distinguishing between five different levels of uncertainty. I will argue, through some concrete examples, that concentrating on the objects of uncertainty can give us an appreciation on how different perspectives on a given risk scenario are formed and will use the more general map to show how this perspective intersects with other classifications and analyses of risk.

@incollection{mansnerus_understanding_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Understanding and {Governing} {Public} {Health} {Risks} by {Modeling}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_9},
	abstract = {Increase in the use and development of computational tools to govern public health risks invites us to study their benefits and limitations. To analyze how risk is perceived and expressed through these tools is relevant to risk theory. This chapter clarifies the different concepts of risk, contrasting especially the mathematically expressed ones with culturally informed notions, which address a broader view on risk. I will suggest that a fruitful way to contextualize computational tools, such mathematical models in risk assessment is “analytics of risk,” which ties together the technological, epistemological, and political dimensions of the process of governance of risk. I will clarify the development of mathematical modeling techniques through their use in infectious disease epidemiology. Epidemiological modeling functions as a form of “risk calculation,” which provides predictions of the infectious outbreak in question. These calculations help direct and design preventive actions toward the health outcomes of populations. This chapter analyzes two cases in which modeling methods are used for explanation-based and scenario-building predictions in order to anticipate the risks of infections caused by Haemophilus influenzae type b bacteria and A(H1N1) pandemic influenza virus. I will address an interesting tension that arises when model-based estimates exemplify the population-level reasoning of public health risks but has restricted capacity to address risks on individual level. Analyzing this tension will lead to a fuller account to understand the benefits and limitations of computational tools in the governance of public health risks.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Mansnerus, Erika},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_9},
	keywords = {Haemophilus Influenzae Type, Infectious Risk, Preparedness Planning, Public Health Risk, Risk Governance},
	pages = {213--237},
}

Increase in the use and development of computational tools to govern public health risks invites us to study their benefits and limitations. To analyze how risk is perceived and expressed through these tools is relevant to risk theory. This chapter clarifies the different concepts of risk, contrasting especially the mathematically expressed ones with culturally informed notions, which address a broader view on risk. I will suggest that a fruitful way to contextualize computational tools, such mathematical models in risk assessment is “analytics of risk,” which ties together the technological, epistemological, and political dimensions of the process of governance of risk. I will clarify the development of mathematical modeling techniques through their use in infectious disease epidemiology. Epidemiological modeling functions as a form of “risk calculation,” which provides predictions of the infectious outbreak in question. These calculations help direct and design preventive actions toward the health outcomes of populations. This chapter analyzes two cases in which modeling methods are used for explanation-based and scenario-building predictions in order to anticipate the risks of infections caused by Haemophilus influenzae type b bacteria and A(H1N1) pandemic influenza virus. I will address an interesting tension that arises when model-based estimates exemplify the population-level reasoning of public health risks but has restricted capacity to address risks on individual level. Analyzing this tension will lead to a fuller account to understand the benefits and limitations of computational tools in the governance of public health risks.

@incollection{hillerbrand_climate_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Climate {Change} as {Risk}?},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_13},
	abstract = {This chapter analyzes the types of uncertainties involved in climate modeling. It is shown that as regards climate change, unquantified uncertainties can neither be ignored in decision making nor be reduced to quantified ones by assigning subjective probabilities. This poses central problems as therefore the well-known elementary as well as probabilistic decision approaches are not applicable. While a maximized-utility approach has to presuppose probability estimates that are not at hand for climate predictions, the precautionary principle is not capable of adequately implementing questions of fairness between different nations or generations. Thus an adequate response to global warming must deal with an intricate interplay between epistemic and ethical considerations. The contribution argues that the epistemic problems involved in modeling the climate system are generic for modeling complex systems. Possible paths for future research to circumvene these problems are adumbrated.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Hillerbrand, Rafaela},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_13},
	keywords = {Climate System, Global Warming, Precautionary Approach, Precautionary Principle, Subjective Probability},
	pages = {319--339},
}

This chapter analyzes the types of uncertainties involved in climate modeling. It is shown that as regards climate change, unquantified uncertainties can neither be ignored in decision making nor be reduced to quantified ones by assigning subjective probabilities. This poses central problems as therefore the well-known elementary as well as probabilistic decision approaches are not applicable. While a maximized-utility approach has to presuppose probability estimates that are not at hand for climate predictions, the precautionary principle is not capable of adequately implementing questions of fairness between different nations or generations. Thus an adequate response to global warming must deal with an intricate interplay between epistemic and ethical considerations. The contribution argues that the epistemic problems involved in modeling the climate system are generic for modeling complex systems. Possible paths for future research to circumvene these problems are adumbrated.

@incollection{hansson_panorama_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {A {Panorama} of the {Philosophy} of {Risk}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_2},
	abstract = {The role of philosophy in the development of the risk sciences has been rather limited. This is unfortunate since there are many problems in the analysis and management of risk that philosophers can contribute to solving. Several of the central terms, including “risk” itself, are still in need of terminological clarification. Much of the argumentation in risk issues is unclear and in need of argumentation analysis. There is also still a need to uncover implicit or “hidden” values in allegedly value-free risk assessments. Eight philosophical perspectives in risk theory are outlined: From the viewpoint of epistemology, risk issues have brought forth problems of trust in expertise and division of epistemological labor. In decision theory, the decision-maker’s degree of control over risks is often problematic and difficult to model. In the philosophy of probability, posterior revisions of risk estimates (in so-called hindsight bias) pose a challenge to the standard model of probabilistic reasoning. In the philosophy of science, issues of risk give us reason to investigate what influence the practical uses of knowledge can legitimately have on the scientific process. In the philosophy of technology, the nature of safety engineering principles and their relationship to risk assessment need to be investigated. In ethics, the most pressing problem is how standard ethical theories can be extended or adjusted to cope with the ethics of risk taking. In the philosophy of economics, the comparison and aggregation of risks falling to different persons give rise to new foundational problems for the theory of welfare. In political philosophy, issues such as trust and consent that have been discussed in connection with risk give us reason to reconsider central issues in the theory of democracy.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Hansson, Sven Ove},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_2},
	keywords = {Contract Theory, Moral Theory, Precautionary Principle, Safety Engineering, Safety Factor},
	pages = {27--54},
}

The role of philosophy in the development of the risk sciences has been rather limited. This is unfortunate since there are many problems in the analysis and management of risk that philosophers can contribute to solving. Several of the central terms, including “risk” itself, are still in need of terminological clarification. Much of the argumentation in risk issues is unclear and in need of argumentation analysis. There is also still a need to uncover implicit or “hidden” values in allegedly value-free risk assessments. Eight philosophical perspectives in risk theory are outlined: From the viewpoint of epistemology, risk issues have brought forth problems of trust in expertise and division of epistemological labor. In decision theory, the decision-maker’s degree of control over risks is often problematic and difficult to model. In the philosophy of probability, posterior revisions of risk estimates (in so-called hindsight bias) pose a challenge to the standard model of probabilistic reasoning. In the philosophy of science, issues of risk give us reason to investigate what influence the practical uses of knowledge can legitimately have on the scientific process. In the philosophy of technology, the nature of safety engineering principles and their relationship to risk assessment need to be investigated. In ethics, the most pressing problem is how standard ethical theories can be extended or adjusted to cope with the ethics of risk taking. In the philosophy of economics, the comparison and aggregation of risks falling to different persons give rise to new foundational problems for the theory of welfare. In political philosophy, issues such as trust and consent that have been discussed in connection with risk give us reason to reconsider central issues in the theory of democracy.

@incollection{beisbart_rational_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {A {Rational} {Approach} to {Risk}? {Bayesian} {Decision} {Theory}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	shorttitle = {A {Rational} {Approach} to {Risk}?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_15},
	abstract = {The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview over decision theory, in particular Bayesian decision theory, to explain its main ideas with some emphasis on risk and to flag the most important controversies about the theory. The paper starts out with the St. Petersburg paradox and motivates the idea that rational agents maximize expected utility. Since “rationality” is ambiguous, the attention is restricted to a core notion of rationality that evaluates an agent’s choices in relation to her desires and beliefs. Accordingly, in Bayesian decision theory, the expected utility arises from utilities and probabilities that measure the strengths of the agent’s desires and beliefs, respectively. This raises two questions: (1) Why do rational agents maximize expected utility? (2) How can the strengths of the agent’s desires and beliefs be measured? Both questions are commonly answered in terms of representation theorems. Such theorems show that the strengths of the agent’s beliefs and desires can be represented in terms of numerical probabilities and utilities if the choices she would take in hypothetical cases fulfill certain conditions. The theorems further entail that an option is preferred to another if and only if it has a higher expected utility than the latter. This chapter covers results by von Neumann–Morgenstern, Ramsey, Savage, and Bolker–Jeffrey. It discusses the consequences for choices that are risky in a nontechnical sense and concludes by pointing out major controversies concerning Bayesian decision theory.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Beisbart, Claus},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_15},
	keywords = {Bayesian Decision Theory, Decision Theory, Expected Utility, Objective Probability, Rational Agent},
	pages = {375--404},
}

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview over decision theory, in particular Bayesian decision theory, to explain its main ideas with some emphasis on risk and to flag the most important controversies about the theory. The paper starts out with the St. Petersburg paradox and motivates the idea that rational agents maximize expected utility. Since “rationality” is ambiguous, the attention is restricted to a core notion of rationality that evaluates an agent’s choices in relation to her desires and beliefs. Accordingly, in Bayesian decision theory, the expected utility arises from utilities and probabilities that measure the strengths of the agent’s desires and beliefs, respectively. This raises two questions: (1) Why do rational agents maximize expected utility? (2) How can the strengths of the agent’s desires and beliefs be measured? Both questions are commonly answered in terms of representation theorems. Such theorems show that the strengths of the agent’s beliefs and desires can be represented in terms of numerical probabilities and utilities if the choices she would take in hypothetical cases fulfill certain conditions. The theorems further entail that an option is preferred to another if and only if it has a higher expected utility than the latter. This chapter covers results by von Neumann–Morgenstern, Ramsey, Savage, and Bolker–Jeffrey. It discusses the consequences for choices that are risky in a nontechnical sense and concludes by pointing out major controversies concerning Bayesian decision theory.

@incollection{basta_risk_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Risk and {Spatial} {Planning}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_11},
	abstract = {Proponents of site-specific hazardous technologies and members of involved communities are often in conflicting positions regarding the most appropriate location for their siting. Because of the component of uncertainty that characterizes the assessment of the potential consequences of these technologies and the different perception of risks by the side of individuals, the “where of risks” is rarely uncontroversial.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Basta, Claudia},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_11},
	keywords = {Accident Scenario, Major Accident, Risky Technology, Spatial Planning, Technological Risk},
	pages = {265--294},
}

Proponents of site-specific hazardous technologies and members of involved communities are often in conflicting positions regarding the most appropriate location for their siting. Because of the component of uncertainty that characterizes the assessment of the potential consequences of these technologies and the different perception of risks by the side of individuals, the “where of risks” is rarely uncontroversial.

@incollection{adams_management_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Management of the {Risks} of {Transport}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_10},
	abstract = {What does a transport safety regulator have in common with a shaman conducting a rain dance? They both have an inflated opinion of the effectiveness of their interventions in the functioning of the complex systems they purport to influence or control. There is however a significant difference. The clouds are indifferent to the antics of the shaman and his followers. But people react to the edicts of a regulator and frequently not in the way the regulator intends. There are two different kinds of managers involved in the management of transport risks: there are the “official,” institutional, risk managers who strive incessantly to make the systems for which they are responsible safer, and there are the billions of individual fallible human users of the systems, each balancing the rewards of risk against the potential accident risks associated with their behavior. Conventional road safety measures rest on a model of human behavior that assumes that road users are stupid, obedient automatons who are unresponsive to perceived changes in risk and who need protecting, by law, from their own and others’ stupidity. The idea of risk compensation underpins an alternative model of human behavior that road users are intelligent, vigilant, and responsive to evidence of safety and danger and, given the right signals and incentives, considerate.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Adams, John},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_10},
	keywords = {Antilock Brake System, Risk Compensation, Road Accident, Road User, Speed Limit},
	pages = {239--264},
}

What does a transport safety regulator have in common with a shaman conducting a rain dance? They both have an inflated opinion of the effectiveness of their interventions in the functioning of the complex systems they purport to influence or control. There is however a significant difference. The clouds are indifferent to the antics of the shaman and his followers. But people react to the edicts of a regulator and frequently not in the way the regulator intends. There are two different kinds of managers involved in the management of transport risks: there are the “official,” institutional, risk managers who strive incessantly to make the systems for which they are responsible safer, and there are the billions of individual fallible human users of the systems, each balancing the rewards of risk against the potential accident risks associated with their behavior. Conventional road safety measures rest on a model of human behavior that assumes that road users are stupid, obedient automatons who are unresponsive to perceived changes in risk and who need protecting, by law, from their own and others’ stupidity. The idea of risk compensation underpins an alternative model of human behavior that road users are intelligent, vigilant, and responsive to evidence of safety and danger and, given the right signals and incentives, considerate.

@incollection{jensen_philosophical_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {A {Philosophical} {Assessment} of {Decision} {Theory}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_16},
	abstract = {The significance of decision theory consists of giving an account of rational decision making under circumstances of uncertainty. This question is important both from the point of view of what is in our personal interest and from the point of view of what is ethically right. But decision theory is often poorly understood and its significance only sparsely discussed in the literature.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Jensen, KarstenKlint},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_16},
	keywords = {Decision Theory, Individual Utility, Risk Aversion, Subjective Probability, Utility Function},
	pages = {405--439},
}

The significance of decision theory consists of giving an account of rational decision making under circumstances of uncertainty. This question is important both from the point of view of what is in our personal interest and from the point of view of what is ethically right. But decision theory is often poorly understood and its significance only sparsely discussed in the literature.

@incollection{eeckhoudt_economics_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {The {Economics} of {Risk}: {A} ({Partial}) {Survey}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	shorttitle = {The {Economics} of {Risk}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_5},
	abstract = {This survey provides a brief overview of the treatment of risk in economics, starting from early principles in the 1940s and 1950s and extending until the most recent developments. It shows how original ideas about economic behavior under conditions of risk and earlier definitions of risk aversion were progressively refined to include prudent behavior in risky situations and precise concepts of risk measurement. The survey is partial because it focuses on the mainstream model of economic behavior under risk. It ignores, among other topics, issues raised by the contractual relationships between imperfectly informed agents in markets for risk transfers, as well as behavioral traits (such as loss aversion) often observed among market participants. Besides, it does not cover models of risk management that have become popular in financial mathematics. Some applications of the economics of risk in the insurance domain are however briefly reviewed.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Eeckhoudt, Louis and Loubergé, Henri},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_5},
	keywords = {Absolute Risk Aversion, Marginal Utility, Relative Risk Aversion, Risk Aversion, Utility Function},
	pages = {113--133},
}

This survey provides a brief overview of the treatment of risk in economics, starting from early principles in the 1940s and 1950s and extending until the most recent developments. It shows how original ideas about economic behavior under conditions of risk and earlier definitions of risk aversion were progressively refined to include prudent behavior in risky situations and precise concepts of risk measurement. The survey is partial because it focuses on the mainstream model of economic behavior under risk. It ignores, among other topics, issues raised by the contractual relationships between imperfectly informed agents in markets for risk transfers, as well as behavioral traits (such as loss aversion) often observed among market participants. Besides, it does not cover models of risk management that have become popular in financial mathematics. Some applications of the economics of risk in the insurance domain are however briefly reviewed.

@incollection{donovan_earthquakes_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Earthquakes and {Volcanoes}: {Risk} from {Geophysical} {Hazards}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	shorttitle = {Earthquakes and {Volcanoes}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_14},
	abstract = {The aims of this chapter are to present a brief history of ideas in the interdisciplinary study of volcanic and seismic risk, to discuss the current state of the subject, and to suggest pathways for further research. This is a very extensive topic – while much of the scientific literature tends to focus on hazard assessment (and, increasingly, risk assessment), the social sciences have tended to focus on vulnerability reduction and risk communication. There have been very few holistic epistemological studies of the broader context of risk. Yet the philosophical aspects of uncertainty are increasingly important for scientists in particular as they seek to assess and understand these risks, not least because of heated debates within both fields concerning the relative values of deterministic and probabilistic methods and the ways in which they deal with uncertainty. Social scientific and philosophical methods therefore have significant potential to inform this discussion, and are also increasingly important in assessing vulnerability and popular understanding of risks in hazardous areas. There has been a large volume of work done in recent years to examine seismic and volcanic risk perception and communication, much of which suggests that these risks are not high on the social agenda until an event happens. This calls for new approaches to population management, preparedness, and proactive roles for scientists and social scientists.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Donovan, Amy},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_14},
	keywords = {Disaster Risk Reduction, Pyroclastic Flow, Risk Perception, Seismic Risk, Volcanic Eruption},
	pages = {341--371},
}

The aims of this chapter are to present a brief history of ideas in the interdisciplinary study of volcanic and seismic risk, to discuss the current state of the subject, and to suggest pathways for further research. This is a very extensive topic – while much of the scientific literature tends to focus on hazard assessment (and, increasingly, risk assessment), the social sciences have tended to focus on vulnerability reduction and risk communication. There have been very few holistic epistemological studies of the broader context of risk. Yet the philosophical aspects of uncertainty are increasingly important for scientists in particular as they seek to assess and understand these risks, not least because of heated debates within both fields concerning the relative values of deterministic and probabilistic methods and the ways in which they deal with uncertainty. Social scientific and philosophical methods therefore have significant potential to inform this discussion, and are also increasingly important in assessing vulnerability and popular understanding of risks in hazardous areas. There has been a large volume of work done in recent years to examine seismic and volcanic risk perception and communication, much of which suggests that these risks are not high on the social agenda until an event happens. This calls for new approaches to population management, preparedness, and proactive roles for scientists and social scientists.

@incollection{weckert_risks_2012,
	address = {Dordrecht},
	title = {Risks and {Scientific} {Responsibilities} in {Nanotechnology}},
	isbn = {978-94-007-1433-5},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_7},
	abstract = {This chapter outlines a number of risks of nanotechnology and considers whether scientists can be held responsible, and if so, to what extent. The five risks discussed are representative of different kinds of risks and the list is not comprehensive: nanoparticles, privacy, grey goo, cyborgs, and nanodivides. The extent to which scientists can be held responsible for harms resulting from their research depends on the nature of science and here two models are outlined and assessed; the linear model and the social. The relationship of moral values to scientific research is examined with respect to both models and four interfaces are considered: the issues of concern to ethics committees, moral values in the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses, setting research agendas, and scientific responsibility. This leads to a discussion of responsibility itself, and on the basis of this, the five risks noted at the beginning of the chapter are revisited and an assessment given of the moral responsibility of scientists in each case.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Risk} {Theory}: {Epistemology}, {Decision} {Theory}, {Ethics}, and {Social} {Implications} of {Risk}},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	author = {Weckert, John},
	editor = {Roeser, Sabine and Hillerbrand, Rafaela and Sandin, Per and Peterson, Martin},
	year = {2012},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_7},
	keywords = {Moral Responsibility, Natural Rubber, Research Agenda, Scientific Enterprise, Social Model},
	pages = {159--177},
}

This chapter outlines a number of risks of nanotechnology and considers whether scientists can be held responsible, and if so, to what extent. The five risks discussed are representative of different kinds of risks and the list is not comprehensive: nanoparticles, privacy, grey goo, cyborgs, and nanodivides. The extent to which scientists can be held responsible for harms resulting from their research depends on the nature of science and here two models are outlined and assessed; the linear model and the social. The relationship of moral values to scientific research is examined with respect to both models and four interfaces are considered: the issues of concern to ethics committees, moral values in the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses, setting research agendas, and scientific responsibility. This leads to a discussion of responsibility itself, and on the basis of this, the five risks noted at the beginning of the chapter are revisited and an assessment given of the moral responsibility of scientists in each case.

@phdthesis{topcu_agir_2010,
	address = {Paris},
	title = {L'agir contestataire à l'épreuve de l'atome : critique et gouvernement de la critique dans l'histoire de l'énergie nucléaire en {France} (1968-2008)},
	shorttitle = {L'agir contestataire à l'épreuve de l'atome},
	url = {http://www.theses.fr/2010EHES0071},
	abstract = {Cette thèse a pour objet la transformation des critiques portées à l'énergie nucléaire en France dans les quatre dernières décennies. Elle s'intéresse à l'évolution des critiques, en particulier du milieu associatif, en termes de production alternative de savoirs, comme en termes. De construction dynamique de nouvelles manières d'agir politique. Elle est construite autour d'une comparaison historique sur trois périodes clés caractérisées par des controverses et des enjeux majeurs pour J'avenir de la filière nucléaire. La première partie traite des années 1970 qui voient le lancement d'un programme antinucléaire massif ainsi que la montée d'un mouvement antinucléaire national très riche dans ses formes d'action. La deuxième partie s'intéresse à la décennie post-Tchernobyl qui engendre un renouveau de contestations sous forme de contre-expertises associatives, d'alertes médiatiques et de négociations continues autour de la nouvelle identité du nucléaire désormais voulue transparente. Dans la troisième partie, nous portons notre regard sur la période d'après le milieu des années 1990, marquée par la montée d'un impératif « participatif et écologiste» transformant l'énergie nucléaire en une énergie « verte et démocratique ». Cette recherche s'attache ainsi à proposer une narration sur des temps longs dans le domaine de l'histoire sociale et culturelle des productions de savoir, en mariant des micro-études de cas avec l'analyse des transformations plus globales du management du nucléaire dans l'espace public, en assocIant approches cognitives de la sociologie d'action collective et études de gouvernementalité.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2017-05-30},
	school = {EHESS},
	author = {Topçu, Sezin},
	month = jan,
	year = {2010},
}

Cette thèse a pour objet la transformation des critiques portées à l'énergie nucléaire en France dans les quatre dernières décennies. Elle s'intéresse à l'évolution des critiques, en particulier du milieu associatif, en termes de production alternative de savoirs, comme en termes. De construction dynamique de nouvelles manières d'agir politique. Elle est construite autour d'une comparaison historique sur trois périodes clés caractérisées par des controverses et des enjeux majeurs pour J'avenir de la filière nucléaire. La première partie traite des années 1970 qui voient le lancement d'un programme antinucléaire massif ainsi que la montée d'un mouvement antinucléaire national très riche dans ses formes d'action. La deuxième partie s'intéresse à la décennie post-Tchernobyl qui engendre un renouveau de contestations sous forme de contre-expertises associatives, d'alertes médiatiques et de négociations continues autour de la nouvelle identité du nucléaire désormais voulue transparente. Dans la troisième partie, nous portons notre regard sur la période d'après le milieu des années 1990, marquée par la montée d'un impératif « participatif et écologiste» transformant l'énergie nucléaire en une énergie « verte et démocratique ». Cette recherche s'attache ainsi à proposer une narration sur des temps longs dans le domaine de l'histoire sociale et culturelle des productions de savoir, en mariant des micro-études de cas avec l'analyse des transformations plus globales du management du nucléaire dans l'espace public, en assocIant approches cognitives de la sociologie d'action collective et études de gouvernementalité.

@phdthesis{demortain_mettre_2006,
	type = {These de doctorat},
	title = {Mettre les risques sous surveillance : l'outillage de la sécurité sanitaire des médicaments et des aliments en {Europe}},
	copyright = {Licence Etalab},
	shorttitle = {Mettre les risques sous surveillance},
	url = {http://www.theses.fr/2006DENS0005},
	abstract = {L'action publique sanitaire change sous l'effet de la mise au point de ses outils autant qu'avec l'émergence de nouveaux risques. La surveillance sanitaire repose ainsi sur des protocoles ensembles de prescriptions codifiées et standardisées rendant possible l'action commune et systématique face aux produits, contaminants ou évènements sanitaires qualifiés comme indésirables. La fabrication de ces outils passe par deux processus imbriqués de problématisation et de normalisation, et de l'action de collèges invisibles, groupes d'experts scientifiques polyvalents, dont l'influence se révèle aux points où les outils passent du statut de concept à celui de norme. Les collèges invisibles relient les organisations internationales, agences sanitaires gouvernementales, sociétés savantes, conférences de consensus, etc. , qui composent des champs réglementaires. Ils schématisent et mettent en ordre l'outillage. Ils font émerger des théories pour l'action, de plus en plus forgées autour de la notion de risque. Elles donnent à l'action commune son statut d'action publique et légitiment le recours à la forme institutionnelle de l'agence indépendante.},
	urldate = {2020-08-17},
	school = {Cachan, Ecole normale supérieure},
	author = {Demortain, David},
	collaborator = {Thœnig, Jean-Claude},
	month = jan,
	year = {2006},
	keywords = {Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments, Risques pour la santé, Évaluation du risque},
}

L'action publique sanitaire change sous l'effet de la mise au point de ses outils autant qu'avec l'émergence de nouveaux risques. La surveillance sanitaire repose ainsi sur des protocoles ensembles de prescriptions codifiées et standardisées rendant possible l'action commune et systématique face aux produits, contaminants ou évènements sanitaires qualifiés comme indésirables. La fabrication de ces outils passe par deux processus imbriqués de problématisation et de normalisation, et de l'action de collèges invisibles, groupes d'experts scientifiques polyvalents, dont l'influence se révèle aux points où les outils passent du statut de concept à celui de norme. Les collèges invisibles relient les organisations internationales, agences sanitaires gouvernementales, sociétés savantes, conférences de consensus, etc. , qui composent des champs réglementaires. Ils schématisent et mettent en ordre l'outillage. Ils font émerger des théories pour l'action, de plus en plus forgées autour de la notion de risque. Elles donnent à l'action commune son statut d'action publique et légitiment le recours à la forme institutionnelle de l'agence indépendante.

@article{roussellier_quest-ce_1995,
	title = {Qu'est-ce qu'on ne sait pas ?},
	volume = {47},
	copyright = {free},
	url = {https://www.persee.fr/doc/xxs_0294-1759_1995_num_47_1_3194},
	doi = {10.3406/xxs.1995.3194},
	language = {fre},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-05-28},
	journal = {Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire},
	author = {Roussellier, Nicolas},
	year = {1995},
	keywords = {applications, ignorance et histoire},
	pages = {194--195},
}