@article{penigaud_truth_2024,
	title = {Truth, the {People}, and {Climate} {Change}: {Toward} a {Non}-{Ideal} {Approach} to {Democratic} {Legitimacy}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0891-3811},
	shorttitle = {Truth, the {People}, and {Climate} {Change}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2024.2340248},
	doi = {10.1080/08913811.2024.2340248},
	abstract = {Democracy in Spite of the Demos challenges democratic authority when the people are no longer able to make good decisions in an economic environment generating systemic social delusion. However, the solution offered to overcome the stalemate remains precarious, and the tension between democracy and emancipation is addressed with wrong conceptual tools. This calls for a reflection on the conditions for a democratically legitimate refoundation of democracy, bridging the gap between critical and democratic theory.},
	number = {1-2},
	urldate = {2024-09-17},
	journal = {Critical Review},
	author = {Penigaud, Theophile},
	month = apr,
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2024.2340248},
	keywords = {democracy, global warming, legitimacy, non-ideal theory, political epistemology},
	pages = {20--44},
}

Democracy in Spite of the Demos challenges democratic authority when the people are no longer able to make good decisions in an economic environment generating systemic social delusion. However, the solution offered to overcome the stalemate remains precarious, and the tension between democracy and emancipation is addressed with wrong conceptual tools. This calls for a reflection on the conditions for a democratically legitimate refoundation of democracy, bridging the gap between critical and democratic theory.

@article{garcia_charles_2024,
	title = {{CHARLES} {MILLS}’ {EPISTEMOLOGY} {AND} {ITS} {IMPORTANCE} {FOR} {SOCIAL} {SCIENCE} {AND} {SOCIAL} {THEORY}},
	volume = {15},
	doi = {10.5840/logos-episteme202415213},
	abstract = {In Charles Mills’ essay, “White Ignorance,” and his trail-blazing monograph, The Racial Contract, he developed a view of how Whiteness or anti-Black-Indigenous-and-Latinx racism causes individuals to hold false beliefs or lack beliefs about racial injustice in particular and the world in general. I will defend a novel exegetical claim that Mills’ view is part of a more general view regarding how racial injustice can affect a subject’s epistemic standing such as whether they are justified in a belief and whether their degree of confidence in the belief is rational given their evidence. Then, in light of this novel exegetical claim, I show how this interpretation of Mills’ view about how racial injustice causes ignorance relates to proper evaluation of whether justified philosophers and social scientists count as epistemologically justified in holding the views that dominate their respective scholarly literature. © (2024), (Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch). All Rights Reserved.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Logos and Episteme},
	author = {García, E.B.},
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {Epistemic Justification, causal connection, racial injustice, social science, white ignorance},
	pages = {137--162},
}

In Charles Mills’ essay, “White Ignorance,” and his trail-blazing monograph, The Racial Contract, he developed a view of how Whiteness or anti-Black-Indigenous-and-Latinx racism causes individuals to hold false beliefs or lack beliefs about racial injustice in particular and the world in general. I will defend a novel exegetical claim that Mills’ view is part of a more general view regarding how racial injustice can affect a subject’s epistemic standing such as whether they are justified in a belief and whether their degree of confidence in the belief is rational given their evidence. Then, in light of this novel exegetical claim, I show how this interpretation of Mills’ view about how racial injustice causes ignorance relates to proper evaluation of whether justified philosophers and social scientists count as epistemologically justified in holding the views that dominate their respective scholarly literature. © (2024), (Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch). All Rights Reserved.

@incollection{denicola_institutionalized_2024,
	title = {Institutionalized expertise: {Trust}, rejection, and ignorance},
	shorttitle = {Institutionalized expertise},
	booktitle = {Expertise: {Philosophical} {Perspectives}},
	author = {DeNicola, D.R.},
	year = {2024},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198877301.003.0004},
	pages = {44--62},
}

@incollection{bowden_ignorance_2024,
	title = {From ignorance to action on climate change},
	abstract = {Observing the broad shift from climate change denial to ignorance over the last decade, this chapter outlines how perceptions of climate change have altered, and how they might further develop into meaningful action. Although the political and economic motivations for resisting action on climate change has been well illustrated, the past decade has seen an increasing acceptance that climate change is occurring. This acceptance, however, has failed to result in emission reductions. Rather, increasing use of fossil fuels and investment in unproven technologies suggests an ignorance of the urgency of the issue. In this chapter, we use the sociology of ignorance to understand how climate change, even in the face of increasing danger from its worst impacts, has been deprioritized as a concern. We outline three barriers in responding to the issue: the notion that humans are separate from the environment, a mistrust of science, and disempowerment of individuals. In response, we suggest strategies to further deepen perceptions of both the urgency of the issue and the possibilities for change. We argue that through an interdisciplinary understanding of how these barriers are formed and the social processes through which they can be overcome, we can gain insight into the potential for a shift beyond ignorance, and toward urgent action on climate change. © 2024 Taylor \& Francis.},
	booktitle = {The {Routledge} {International} {Handbook} of {Changes} in {Human} {Perceptions} and {Behaviors}},
	author = {Bowden, V. and Nyberg, D.},
	year = {2024},
	doi = {10.4324/9781003316602-25},
	pages = {349--364},
}

Observing the broad shift from climate change denial to ignorance over the last decade, this chapter outlines how perceptions of climate change have altered, and how they might further develop into meaningful action. Although the political and economic motivations for resisting action on climate change has been well illustrated, the past decade has seen an increasing acceptance that climate change is occurring. This acceptance, however, has failed to result in emission reductions. Rather, increasing use of fossil fuels and investment in unproven technologies suggests an ignorance of the urgency of the issue. In this chapter, we use the sociology of ignorance to understand how climate change, even in the face of increasing danger from its worst impacts, has been deprioritized as a concern. We outline three barriers in responding to the issue: the notion that humans are separate from the environment, a mistrust of science, and disempowerment of individuals. In response, we suggest strategies to further deepen perceptions of both the urgency of the issue and the possibilities for change. We argue that through an interdisciplinary understanding of how these barriers are formed and the social processes through which they can be overcome, we can gain insight into the potential for a shift beyond ignorance, and toward urgent action on climate change. © 2024 Taylor & Francis.

@article{carter_brute_2024,
	title = {Brute ignorance},
	doi = {10.1111/phpr.13086},
	abstract = {We know a lot about what the world is like. We know less, it seems, about what we know about what the world is like. According to a common thought, it is easier for us to come to know about the state of the world than to come to know about the state of our own knowledge. What explains this gap? An attractively simple hypothesis is that our ignorance about what we know is explained by our ignorance about the world. There are things we fail to know about what we know about the world because there are things we fail to know about the world. This hypothesis is often motivated by the idea that knowledge requires a margin-for-error. In this paper, I'll argue that this simple hypothesis is inadequate. Not all our ignorance of our knowledge can be explained by our ignorance about the world. In this sense, at least some of our ignorance about what we know is brute. © 2024 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC.},
	journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
	author = {Carter, S.},
	year = {2024},
}

We know a lot about what the world is like. We know less, it seems, about what we know about what the world is like. According to a common thought, it is easier for us to come to know about the state of the world than to come to know about the state of our own knowledge. What explains this gap? An attractively simple hypothesis is that our ignorance about what we know is explained by our ignorance about the world. There are things we fail to know about what we know about the world because there are things we fail to know about the world. This hypothesis is often motivated by the idea that knowledge requires a margin-for-error. In this paper, I'll argue that this simple hypothesis is inadequate. Not all our ignorance of our knowledge can be explained by our ignorance about the world. In this sense, at least some of our ignorance about what we know is brute. © 2024 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC.

@incollection{pritchard_public_2024,
	title = {Public {Expertise} and {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-887730-1},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877301.003.0015},
	abstract = {One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often to manufacture the very ignorance that is being combatted. This is because there is more to ignorance than simply the absence of knowledge, as ignorance more specifically concerns lacking the knowledge that one should have. In this way, ignorance is never normatively neutral (in the manner that mere lack of knowledge can be). What expert-led public information does is thus create a reasonable expectation that one should know certain important truths, and hence ensures that those who remain unaware of them are now ignorant of them. Ignorance must thus often be manufactured by public experts before those same experts can combat it.},
	urldate = {2024-08-12},
	booktitle = {Expertise: {Philosophical} {Perspectives}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Pritchard, Duncan},
	editor = {Pritchard, Duncan and Farina, Mirko and Lavazza, Andrea},
	month = jun,
	year = {2024},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198877301.003.0015},
	pages = {0},
}

One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often to manufacture the very ignorance that is being combatted. This is because there is more to ignorance than simply the absence of knowledge, as ignorance more specifically concerns lacking the knowledge that one should have. In this way, ignorance is never normatively neutral (in the manner that mere lack of knowledge can be). What expert-led public information does is thus create a reasonable expectation that one should know certain important truths, and hence ensures that those who remain unaware of them are now ignorant of them. Ignorance must thus often be manufactured by public experts before those same experts can combat it.

@incollection{denicola_institutionalized_2024-1,
	title = {Institutionalized {Expertise}: {Trust}, {Rejection}, and {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-887730-1},
	shorttitle = {Institutionalized {Expertise}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877301.003.0004},
	abstract = {The problematic of this article is the apparently oppositional interaction of two contemporary social trends: (1) the expansion, institutionalization, and specialization of expertise; and (2) rising public distrust and rejection of expert authority and the institutions that create and certify it. Among various forms of expertise, it is those that are normative-regulative (not merely descriptive), those that advise clients, those I call open-loop professions, for which the two trends are most acute. The erosion of public trust in advisory experts (health officials, economists, environmentalists, educators, etc.) is widely documented for the USA and the UK. I offer an analysis of forces propelling this disrespect and argue that, ironically, aspects of the first trend—the evolution of the professions—are implicated. I conclude with suggestions for coping with the epistemic asymmetry of client and expert advisor.},
	urldate = {2024-08-12},
	booktitle = {Expertise: {Philosophical} {Perspectives}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {DeNicola, Daniel R.},
	editor = {Pritchard, Duncan and Farina, Mirko and Lavazza, Andrea},
	month = jun,
	year = {2024},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198877301.003.0004},
	pages = {0},
}

The problematic of this article is the apparently oppositional interaction of two contemporary social trends: (1) the expansion, institutionalization, and specialization of expertise; and (2) rising public distrust and rejection of expert authority and the institutions that create and certify it. Among various forms of expertise, it is those that are normative-regulative (not merely descriptive), those that advise clients, those I call open-loop professions, for which the two trends are most acute. The erosion of public trust in advisory experts (health officials, economists, environmentalists, educators, etc.) is widely documented for the USA and the UK. I offer an analysis of forces propelling this disrespect and argue that, ironically, aspects of the first trend—the evolution of the professions—are implicated. I conclude with suggestions for coping with the epistemic asymmetry of client and expert advisor.

@article{yaure_two_2024,
	title = {Two {Varieties} of {White} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {86},
	doi = {10.1086/729937},
	abstract = {The concept of white ignorance refers to phenomena of not-knowing that are produced by and reinforce systems of white supremacist domination and exploitation. I distinguish two varieties of white ignorance, belief-based white ignorance and practice-based white ignorance. Belief-based white ignorance consists in an information deficit about systems of racist oppression. Practice-based white ignorance consists in unresponsiveness to the political agency of persons and groups subject to racist oppression. Drawing on the antebellum political thought of Black abolitionists Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs, I contend that an antiracist politics that conceives of its epistemic task in terms of combating practice-based white ignorance offers a more promising frame for liberatory struggle. A focus on practice-based white ignorance calls for a distinctive form of humility that involves recognition of the limits of one’s own political agency in relation to others, which is integral to democratic relations between free, equal, yet mutually dependent persons. © 2024 Southern Political Science Association.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Journal of Politics},
	author = {Yaure, P.},
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {Frederick Douglass, Harriet Jacobs, democratic theory, humility, white ignorance},
	pages = {920--933},
}

The concept of white ignorance refers to phenomena of not-knowing that are produced by and reinforce systems of white supremacist domination and exploitation. I distinguish two varieties of white ignorance, belief-based white ignorance and practice-based white ignorance. Belief-based white ignorance consists in an information deficit about systems of racist oppression. Practice-based white ignorance consists in unresponsiveness to the political agency of persons and groups subject to racist oppression. Drawing on the antebellum political thought of Black abolitionists Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs, I contend that an antiracist politics that conceives of its epistemic task in terms of combating practice-based white ignorance offers a more promising frame for liberatory struggle. A focus on practice-based white ignorance calls for a distinctive form of humility that involves recognition of the limits of one’s own political agency in relation to others, which is integral to democratic relations between free, equal, yet mutually dependent persons. © 2024 Southern Political Science Association.

@article{dixon_challenges_2024,
	title = {Challenges to correcting pluralistic ignorance: false consensus effects, competing information environments, and anticipated social conflict},
	volume = {50},
	shorttitle = {Challenges to correcting pluralistic ignorance},
	doi = {10.1093/hcr/hqae001},
	abstract = {For many policy issues, people holding the majority opinion often do not act in accordance with their beliefs. While underestimating public opinion appears as a likely cause, correcting this misperception often fails to motivate those in the majority to act. Investigating further, we surveyed a nationally representative sample (N ¼ 1,000) of Republican voters about vaccination. Despite a majority supporting vaccines, Republicans on average underestimated other Republicans’ support. However, this misperception occurred primarily among anti-vaccine Republicans—a group that reported a greater willingness to share their vaccine views. We show how an information environment overrepresented with minority views may discourage majority view holders from speaking out even when they are aware of their majority status. That is, instead of experiencing pluralistic ignorance, those in the majority may be discouraged from expressing their views due to anticipated social conflict from engaging in an information environment disproportionately made up of minority views. \# The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of International Communication Association. All rights reserved.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Human Communication Research},
	author = {Dixon, G.N. and Lerner, B. and Bashian, S.},
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {false consensus effect, information environment, opinion climate, pluralistic ignorance, vaccine hesitancy},
	pages = {419--429},
}

For many policy issues, people holding the majority opinion often do not act in accordance with their beliefs. While underestimating public opinion appears as a likely cause, correcting this misperception often fails to motivate those in the majority to act. Investigating further, we surveyed a nationally representative sample (N ¼ 1,000) of Republican voters about vaccination. Despite a majority supporting vaccines, Republicans on average underestimated other Republicans’ support. However, this misperception occurred primarily among anti-vaccine Republicans—a group that reported a greater willingness to share their vaccine views. We show how an information environment overrepresented with minority views may discourage majority view holders from speaking out even when they are aware of their majority status. That is, instead of experiencing pluralistic ignorance, those in the majority may be discouraged from expressing their views due to anticipated social conflict from engaging in an information environment disproportionately made up of minority views. # The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of International Communication Association. All rights reserved.

@article{meylan_defence_2024,
	title = {In {Defence} of the {Normative} {Account} of {Ignorance}},
	volume = {89},
	issn = {01650106},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85132841713&doi=10.1007%2fs10670-022-00529-7&partnerID=40&md5=25c855b58c4f420529ed6770fefae4b2},
	doi = {10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7},
	abstract = {The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Erkenntnis},
	author = {Meylan, Anne},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {207 -- 221},
}

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{barker_long_2024,
	title = {The long tail of {COVID} and the tale of long {COVID}: {Diagnostic} construction and the management of ignorance},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {01419889},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85145299697&doi=10.1111%2f1467-9566.13599&partnerID=40&md5=35acb017cf30ed79f3b33bc323503ee3},
	doi = {10.1111/1467-9566.13599},
	abstract = {We bring together insights from the sociology of diagnosis and the sociology of ignorance to examine the early diagnostic unfolding of ‘Long COVID’ (LC). Originally described by patient activists, researchers set out to ponder its unwieldy clinical boundaries. Using a scoping review method in tandem with qualitative content analytic techniques, we analyse medicine’s initial struggles to construct a LC diagnosis. Paying attention to the dynamics of ignorance, we highlight three consequential conceptual manoeuvres in the early classifications of LC: causal agnosticism concerning the relationship between COVID-19 and LC, evasion of lumping LC with similar conditions; and the predictable splitting off of medically explainable cases from the LC designation. These manoeuvres are not maleficent, inept or unreasonable. They are practical but impactful responses to the classificatory dilemmas present in the construction of diagnoses amidst ignorance. Although there are unique aspects to LC, we suggest that its early fate is nevertheless emblematic of medicine’s diagnostic standardisation processes more generally. To varying degrees, diagnoses are ignorance management strategies; they create a pathway through the uncertainty at the core of disease realities. However, while diagnoses circumscribe some types of ignorance, they produce others through the creation of blind spots and paths not taken. © 2022 Foundation for the Sociology of Health \& Illness.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Sociology of Health and Illness},
	author = {Barker, Kristin Kay and Whooley, Owen and Madden, Erin F. and Ahrend, Emily E. and Greene, R. Neil},
	year = {2024},
	pmid = {36580406},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
	keywords = {COVID-19, COVID-19 Testing, COVID-19 testing, Humans, Post-Acute COVID-19 Syndrome, Sociology, Uncertainty, contested illnesses, coronavirus disease 2019, human, long COVID, long COVID-19, scoping review, sociology, sociology of diagnosis, sociology of ignorance, sociology of medical knowledge, uncertainty},
	pages = {189 -- 207},
}

We bring together insights from the sociology of diagnosis and the sociology of ignorance to examine the early diagnostic unfolding of ‘Long COVID’ (LC). Originally described by patient activists, researchers set out to ponder its unwieldy clinical boundaries. Using a scoping review method in tandem with qualitative content analytic techniques, we analyse medicine’s initial struggles to construct a LC diagnosis. Paying attention to the dynamics of ignorance, we highlight three consequential conceptual manoeuvres in the early classifications of LC: causal agnosticism concerning the relationship between COVID-19 and LC, evasion of lumping LC with similar conditions; and the predictable splitting off of medically explainable cases from the LC designation. These manoeuvres are not maleficent, inept or unreasonable. They are practical but impactful responses to the classificatory dilemmas present in the construction of diagnoses amidst ignorance. Although there are unique aspects to LC, we suggest that its early fate is nevertheless emblematic of medicine’s diagnostic standardisation processes more generally. To varying degrees, diagnoses are ignorance management strategies; they create a pathway through the uncertainty at the core of disease realities. However, while diagnoses circumscribe some types of ignorance, they produce others through the creation of blind spots and paths not taken. © 2022 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness.

@book{parageau_paradoxes_2023,
	address = {Stanford},
	title = {The {Paradoxes} of {Ignorance} in {Early} {Modern} {England} and {France}},
	isbn = {978-1-5036-3256-1},
	abstract = {In the early modern period, ignorance was commonly perceived as a sin, a flaw, a defect, and even a threat to religion and the social order. Yet praises of ignorance were also expressed in the same context. Reclaiming the long-lasting legacy of medieval doctrines of ignorance and taking a comparative perspective, Sandrine Parageau tells the history of the apparently counter-intuitive moral, cognitive and epistemological virtues attributed to ignorance in the long seventeenth century (1580s-1700) in England and in France. With close textual analysis of hitherto neglected sources and a reassessment of canonical philosophical works by Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and others, Parageau specifically examines the role of ignorance in the production of knowledge, identifying three common virtues of ignorance as a mode of wisdom, a principle of knowledge, and an epistemological instrument, in philosophical and theological works. How could an essentially negative notion be turned into something profitable and even desirable? Taken in the context of Renaissance humanism, the Reformation and the "Scientific Revolution"—which all called for a redefinition and reaffirmation of knowledge—ignorance, Parageau finds, was not dismissed in the early modern quest for renewed ways of thinking and knowing. On the contrary, it was assimilated into the philosophical and scientific discourses of the time. The rehabilitation of ignorance emerged as a paradoxical cornerstone of the nascent modern science.},
	publisher = {Stanford University Press},
	author = {Parageau, Sandrine},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Cultural Studies, History -- Intellectual and Cultural, History -- Science, Technology, and Medicine, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Philosophy -- History and Philosophy of Science},
}

In the early modern period, ignorance was commonly perceived as a sin, a flaw, a defect, and even a threat to religion and the social order. Yet praises of ignorance were also expressed in the same context. Reclaiming the long-lasting legacy of medieval doctrines of ignorance and taking a comparative perspective, Sandrine Parageau tells the history of the apparently counter-intuitive moral, cognitive and epistemological virtues attributed to ignorance in the long seventeenth century (1580s-1700) in England and in France. With close textual analysis of hitherto neglected sources and a reassessment of canonical philosophical works by Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and others, Parageau specifically examines the role of ignorance in the production of knowledge, identifying three common virtues of ignorance as a mode of wisdom, a principle of knowledge, and an epistemological instrument, in philosophical and theological works. How could an essentially negative notion be turned into something profitable and even desirable? Taken in the context of Renaissance humanism, the Reformation and the "Scientific Revolution"—which all called for a redefinition and reaffirmation of knowledge—ignorance, Parageau finds, was not dismissed in the early modern quest for renewed ways of thinking and knowing. On the contrary, it was assimilated into the philosophical and scientific discourses of the time. The rehabilitation of ignorance emerged as a paradoxical cornerstone of the nascent modern science.

@book{mckenna_non-ideal_2023,
	title = {Non-{Ideal} {Epistemology}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-198242-2 978-0-19-288882-2},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85186014893&doi=10.1093%2foso%2f9780192888822.001.0001&partnerID=40&md5=93bad42b27f5fe87dafc81c3141bd20f},
	abstract = {Epistemologists often work with idealized pictures of what inquirers are like, how they interact with each other, and the social institutions and environment in which they do the interacting. These idealizations might be appropriate for the foundational issues in epistemology, such as the theory of knowledge. But they become problematic when epistemologists address applied and practical topics, such as public ignorance about important political and scientific issues, or our obligations and responsibilities as inquirers. A solution to a problem like public ignorance that might work in an ideal world could be disastrous in the real world. Ways of interacting that would yield epistemic benefits in an epistemically just world might not be so beneficial in an epistemically unjust world. In this book, McKenna argues that, to avoid these problems, we need to make space for non-ideal epistemology-a way of doing epistemology that eschews the idealizations typical in much contemporary epistemology and instead makes use of empirical research in political psychology and science communication. But this book is not just an exercise in philosophical methodology. McKenna also develops distinctive approaches to a range of important topics in applied and political epistemology, such as what to do about science denial, whether we should try to be intellectually autonomous, and the implications of epistemic injustice for our responsibilities as inquirers. The result is an illustration of why we need non-ideal epistemology and what it can do for us. © Robin McKenna 2023.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {McKenna, Robin},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192888822.001.0001},
	note = {Publication Title: Non-Ideal Epistemology
Type: Book},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Epistemologists often work with idealized pictures of what inquirers are like, how they interact with each other, and the social institutions and environment in which they do the interacting. These idealizations might be appropriate for the foundational issues in epistemology, such as the theory of knowledge. But they become problematic when epistemologists address applied and practical topics, such as public ignorance about important political and scientific issues, or our obligations and responsibilities as inquirers. A solution to a problem like public ignorance that might work in an ideal world could be disastrous in the real world. Ways of interacting that would yield epistemic benefits in an epistemically just world might not be so beneficial in an epistemically unjust world. In this book, McKenna argues that, to avoid these problems, we need to make space for non-ideal epistemology-a way of doing epistemology that eschews the idealizations typical in much contemporary epistemology and instead makes use of empirical research in political psychology and science communication. But this book is not just an exercise in philosophical methodology. McKenna also develops distinctive approaches to a range of important topics in applied and political epistemology, such as what to do about science denial, whether we should try to be intellectually autonomous, and the implications of epistemic injustice for our responsibilities as inquirers. The result is an illustration of why we need non-ideal epistemology and what it can do for us. © Robin McKenna 2023.

@article{arora-jonsson2023a,
	title = {Unraveling the production of ignorance in climate policymaking: {The} imperative of a decolonial feminist intervention for transformation},
	volume = {149},
	doi = {10.1016/j.envsci.2023.103564},
	abstract = {Feminist decolonial scholars have called for disengaging from the current system built on a hierarchical logic of race and gender central to modern, colonial thinking. They have looked to worlds outside the modern system to lead us out of current unjust practices harming both humans and the environment. Although policymaking may be seen as the stronghold of the current political agenda and of the structures that have led to the climate crisis, we argue that climate policies too, are also crucial for rethinking and transforming societies. Our examination of climate adaptation policies in Sweden and the literature from Europe shows how policy documents ignore and unknow the oppressive intersections of gender and power despite the knowledge that exists on these issues in the public domain. Drawing on the tools of agnotology, we examine how this is achieved by strategies of 'denial, dismissal, diversion and displacement.' Building on feminist post and decolonial scholarship, we make explicit the gendered and racial hierarchies and dichotomies underpinning these policy documents. At the same time, we bring attention to the nuances in the policy documents we study and look for the openings that might be used to bring about transformation by making these hierarchies explicit and calling them into question. We argue that a transformation is possible through a feminist post and decolonial intervention, even in policymaking otherwise ignorant of culture, values and the colonial histories that have produced contemporary society.},
	journal = {Environmental Science \& Policy},
	author = {Arora-Jonsson, Seema and Wahlström, Nora},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {103564},
}

Feminist decolonial scholars have called for disengaging from the current system built on a hierarchical logic of race and gender central to modern, colonial thinking. They have looked to worlds outside the modern system to lead us out of current unjust practices harming both humans and the environment. Although policymaking may be seen as the stronghold of the current political agenda and of the structures that have led to the climate crisis, we argue that climate policies too, are also crucial for rethinking and transforming societies. Our examination of climate adaptation policies in Sweden and the literature from Europe shows how policy documents ignore and unknow the oppressive intersections of gender and power despite the knowledge that exists on these issues in the public domain. Drawing on the tools of agnotology, we examine how this is achieved by strategies of 'denial, dismissal, diversion and displacement.' Building on feminist post and decolonial scholarship, we make explicit the gendered and racial hierarchies and dichotomies underpinning these policy documents. At the same time, we bring attention to the nuances in the policy documents we study and look for the openings that might be used to bring about transformation by making these hierarchies explicit and calling them into question. We argue that a transformation is possible through a feminist post and decolonial intervention, even in policymaking otherwise ignorant of culture, values and the colonial histories that have produced contemporary society.

@article{henry_toxic_2023,
	title = {Toxic {Avoidance}: {Using} {Science} and {Regulation} to {Produce} {Nonproblems}},
	volume = {35},
	issn = {0899-2363},
	shorttitle = {Toxic {Avoidance}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-10742523},
	doi = {10.1215/08992363-10742523},
	abstract = {If the words “our product is doubt” characterize the production of ignorance, in turn, the production of nonproblem could be encapsulated by “our product is silence.” This article looks behind both these words and this concept of nonproblems, drawing attention to public policy mechanisms whose effect (whether explicitly intended or not) is to reduce the attention paid to a given problem, resulting in public inaction, not taking charge of a problem. It highlights the role in those dynamics of two factors: the scientific instruments attempting to quantify environmental and occupational health issues and the scientific expertise in the field of the regulation of chemicals. Downstream of these regulatory processes, the use of science‐based regulatory instruments implicitly steers regulatory policies in a direction that results in tolerance of certain risks (rendering them acceptable) and can lead to public inaction.},
	number = {3 (101)},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Public Culture},
	author = {Henry, Emmanuel},
	month = sep,
	year = {2023},
	pages = {355--365},
}

If the words “our product is doubt” characterize the production of ignorance, in turn, the production of nonproblem could be encapsulated by “our product is silence.” This article looks behind both these words and this concept of nonproblems, drawing attention to public policy mechanisms whose effect (whether explicitly intended or not) is to reduce the attention paid to a given problem, resulting in public inaction, not taking charge of a problem. It highlights the role in those dynamics of two factors: the scientific instruments attempting to quantify environmental and occupational health issues and the scientific expertise in the field of the regulation of chemicals. Downstream of these regulatory processes, the use of science‐based regulatory instruments implicitly steers regulatory policies in a direction that results in tolerance of certain risks (rendering them acceptable) and can lead to public inaction.

@book{heikes_epistemic_2023,
	series = {Epistemic {Responsibility} for {Undesirable} {Beliefs}},
	title = {Epistemic responsibility for undesirable beliefs},
	abstract = {This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an "undesirable belief" will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023. All rights reserved.},
	author = {Heikes, D.K.},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-41858-7},
	note = {Pages: 233},
	keywords = {Belief, Ignorance, Involuntarism, Racism, Responsibility, Sexism},
}

This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an "undesirable belief" will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023. All rights reserved.

@article{kirfel2023,
	title = {Why blame the ostrich? {Understanding} culpability for willful ignorance},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kswtu},
	abstract = {Willful Ignorance (WI) is a term in Anglo-American law to refer to circumstances in which a defendant remains intentionally unaware of a fact that would render them liable. These cases pose a unique problem for the law,as it is uncertain whether deliberate ignorance can be viewed as a form of knowledge and, therefore, whether they satisfy the mens rea requirement for culpability. In this chapter, we report two experimental studies modeled on United States vs. Jewell, a case in which Jewell aided an international drug-trafficking operation by transporting a suitcase which he deliberately avoided inspecting. We manipulated various features of the defendant’s epistemic state, relating to their suspicion, its reasonableness and its specificity. Our results showed that WI partially satisfies the mens rea requirement, though not to the extent of genuine knowledge. Participants considered willful ignorance incriminating, as long as the defendant suspected that they were involved in criminal activity, and regardless of whether their suspicion was reasonable or even true. Additionally, our studies suggested that judgment of culpability are related to broader inferences about the defendant’s antisocial tendencies—in line with theories that conceptualise WI as a demonstration of ‘ill will’. In closing, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for the broader legal-theoretical debate around the normative propriety of the willful ignorance doctrine.},
	journal = {Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law},
	author = {Kirfel, L. and Hannikainen, I. R.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Willful Ignorance (WI) is a term in Anglo-American law to refer to circumstances in which a defendant remains intentionally unaware of a fact that would render them liable. These cases pose a unique problem for the law,as it is uncertain whether deliberate ignorance can be viewed as a form of knowledge and, therefore, whether they satisfy the mens rea requirement for culpability. In this chapter, we report two experimental studies modeled on United States vs. Jewell, a case in which Jewell aided an international drug-trafficking operation by transporting a suitcase which he deliberately avoided inspecting. We manipulated various features of the defendant’s epistemic state, relating to their suspicion, its reasonableness and its specificity. Our results showed that WI partially satisfies the mens rea requirement, though not to the extent of genuine knowledge. Participants considered willful ignorance incriminating, as long as the defendant suspected that they were involved in criminal activity, and regardless of whether their suspicion was reasonable or even true. Additionally, our studies suggested that judgment of culpability are related to broader inferences about the defendant’s antisocial tendencies—in line with theories that conceptualise WI as a demonstration of ‘ill will’. In closing, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for the broader legal-theoretical debate around the normative propriety of the willful ignorance doctrine.

@article{carrier_fake_2023,
	title = {Fake {Research} and {Harmful} {Findings}: {Introduction} to the {Special} {Issue}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0269-8595},
	shorttitle = {Fake {Research} and {Harmful} {Findings}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2284624},
	doi = {10.1080/02698595.2023.2284624},
	abstract = {The traditional mutual support of scientific progress and social advancement has given way to public reservation. Research is no longer considered worthwhile in general. Parts of the public have come to fear both scientific error and scientific success. This raises the question of how to deal with findings that could have a detrimental impact on society. In a different vein, fake research poses a serious challenge to science in that it could undermine the credibility of scientific accounts. Fake research actively produces ignorance rather than knowledge (agnotology). The question is how such actively misleading approaches are to be identified and separated from usual scientific error.},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2024-03-07},
	journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Carrier, Martin},
	month = jul,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2284624},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {167--171},
}

The traditional mutual support of scientific progress and social advancement has given way to public reservation. Research is no longer considered worthwhile in general. Parts of the public have come to fear both scientific error and scientific success. This raises the question of how to deal with findings that could have a detrimental impact on society. In a different vein, fake research poses a serious challenge to science in that it could undermine the credibility of scientific accounts. Fake research actively produces ignorance rather than knowledge (agnotology). The question is how such actively misleading approaches are to be identified and separated from usual scientific error.

@article{kirkegaard2023,
	title = {The organization of ignorance: {An} ethnographic study of the production of subjects and objects in an artificial intelligence project},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {2052-1499},
	abstract = {This article is a study of the role of organization of ignorance in an artificial intelligence project in a municipality in Denmark. It raises the issue of how to understand the process through which a seemingly ordinary project involving the development of an algorithm for decision support turns into a fantastical, creative reimagining of subjects and objects through the organization of ignorance. Unlike many ignorance studies, we do not examine ignorance and knowledge through the lens of intentionality or strategic interest. We instead adopt a distinct Deleuzian perspective on ignorance based on the idea of the  ́will to ignorance ́ as productive force that forms subjects and objects of ignorance. By observing the project management team over time, the article shows how it transforms a mundane task into an imaginative quest through the will to ignorance. The findings contribute not only empirically to the understanding of ignorance in organizations but also show the utility of adopting a non-intentional perspective in this kind of study.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ephemera. Theory and Politics in Organization},
	author = {Kirkegaard, L. and Kristensen, A. and Skov Lauridsen, T.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {161--187},
}

This article is a study of the role of organization of ignorance in an artificial intelligence project in a municipality in Denmark. It raises the issue of how to understand the process through which a seemingly ordinary project involving the development of an algorithm for decision support turns into a fantastical, creative reimagining of subjects and objects through the organization of ignorance. Unlike many ignorance studies, we do not examine ignorance and knowledge through the lens of intentionality or strategic interest. We instead adopt a distinct Deleuzian perspective on ignorance based on the idea of the ́will to ignorance ́ as productive force that forms subjects and objects of ignorance. By observing the project management team over time, the article shows how it transforms a mundane task into an imaginative quest through the will to ignorance. The findings contribute not only empirically to the understanding of ignorance in organizations but also show the utility of adopting a non-intentional perspective in this kind of study.

@book{llopart_aux_2023,
	address = {Rennes},
	title = {Aux origines d'{AZF}. {Le} problème de l'azote en {France} (1919-1940)},
	isbn = {978-2-86906-913-8},
	url = {https://pufr-editions.fr/produit/aux-origines-dazf/},
	abstract = {Il y a bientôt cent ans, naissait à Toulouse l'Office national industriel de l'Azote (ONIA), l'ancêtre de ce qui deviendra plus tard AZF. La création de cette usine d'ammoniaque synthétique découle de la volonté des dirigeants politiques français de résoudre le problème d'approvisionnement du pays en azote qui s'était posé brutalement durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Outre l'incapacité de son industrie à pouvoir fournir assez de poudres et d'explosifs en cas de guerre, la France ne fabrique pas assez d'engrais azotés en temps de paix, ce qui nuit à la modernisation de son agriculture.
Cependant, malgré l'urgence de la situation, la création de cette entreprise publique ne fait pas l'unanimité, dans la mesure où l'opinion perçoit mal le fait que l'Etat intervienne sur un marché dévolu jusqu'ici aux seuls intérêts privés. De plus pour se développer et faire la preuve de son utilité industrielle, l'ONIA a dû surmonter de très nombreux défis. Revenant sur les origines de l'usine AZF et sur les raisons de sa création, ce livre analyse également les deux premières décennies d'existence de l'entreprise, en essayant de comprendre comment elle a contribué à la résolution du "problème de l'azote" durant l'entre-deux-guerres.
Adoptant une perspective globale, ce livre replace la trajectoire de l'ONIA dans le contexte plus large d'une époque marqué par une évolution rapide des techniques, des marchés, de la législation sociale, et du rôle de l'Etat en matière économique.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-03-18},
	publisher = {PU François Rabelais},
	author = {Llopart, Michäel},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Il y a bientôt cent ans, naissait à Toulouse l'Office national industriel de l'Azote (ONIA), l'ancêtre de ce qui deviendra plus tard AZF. La création de cette usine d'ammoniaque synthétique découle de la volonté des dirigeants politiques français de résoudre le problème d'approvisionnement du pays en azote qui s'était posé brutalement durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Outre l'incapacité de son industrie à pouvoir fournir assez de poudres et d'explosifs en cas de guerre, la France ne fabrique pas assez d'engrais azotés en temps de paix, ce qui nuit à la modernisation de son agriculture. Cependant, malgré l'urgence de la situation, la création de cette entreprise publique ne fait pas l'unanimité, dans la mesure où l'opinion perçoit mal le fait que l'Etat intervienne sur un marché dévolu jusqu'ici aux seuls intérêts privés. De plus pour se développer et faire la preuve de son utilité industrielle, l'ONIA a dû surmonter de très nombreux défis. Revenant sur les origines de l'usine AZF et sur les raisons de sa création, ce livre analyse également les deux premières décennies d'existence de l'entreprise, en essayant de comprendre comment elle a contribué à la résolution du "problème de l'azote" durant l'entre-deux-guerres. Adoptant une perspective globale, ce livre replace la trajectoire de l'ONIA dans le contexte plus large d'une époque marqué par une évolution rapide des techniques, des marchés, de la législation sociale, et du rôle de l'Etat en matière économique.

@book{mcculloch_mining_2023,
	title = {Mining {Gold} and {Manufacturing} {Ignorance}: {Occupational} {Lung} {Disease} and the {Buying} and {Selling} of {Labour} in {Southern} {Africa}},
	isbn = {978-981-19832-7-6 978-981-19832-6-9},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85171518494&doi=10.1007%2f978-981-19-8327-6&partnerID=40&md5=7d5bea766ff6f0c98188bf4576a7a9b0},
	abstract = {This open access book charts how South Africa’s gold mines have systematically suppressed evidence of hazardous work practices and the risks associated with mining. For most of the twentieth century, South Africa was the world’s largest producer of gold. Although the country enjoyed a reputation for leading the world in occupational health legislation, the mining companies developed a system of medical surveillance and workers’ compensation which compromised the health of black gold miners, facilitated the spread of tuberculosis, and ravaged the communities and economies of labour-sending states. The culmination of two decades of meticulous archival research, this book exposes the making, contesting, and unravelling of the companies’ capacity to shape – and corrupt – medical knowledge. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Springer Nature},
	author = {McCulloch, Jock and Miller, Pavla},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1007/978-981-19-8327-6},
	note = {Publication Title: Mining Gold and Manufacturing Ignorance: Occupational Lung Disease and the Buying and Selling of Labour in Southern Africa
Type: Book},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This open access book charts how South Africa’s gold mines have systematically suppressed evidence of hazardous work practices and the risks associated with mining. For most of the twentieth century, South Africa was the world’s largest producer of gold. Although the country enjoyed a reputation for leading the world in occupational health legislation, the mining companies developed a system of medical surveillance and workers’ compensation which compromised the health of black gold miners, facilitated the spread of tuberculosis, and ravaged the communities and economies of labour-sending states. The culmination of two decades of meticulous archival research, this book exposes the making, contesting, and unravelling of the companies’ capacity to shape – and corrupt – medical knowledge. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.

@article{lee2023,
	title = {Un(ac)countable no-bodies: the politics of ignorance in global health policymaking},
	volume = {33},
	doi = {10.1080/09581596.2022.2025578},
	abstract = {By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories – non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities – are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Public Health},
	author = {Lee, Po-Han},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Evidence-based public health, World Health Organisation, World Health Organization, article, drawing, female, human, human experiment, male, medical research, politics, public health, sexual and gender minorities, sexual and gender minority, sociology, sociology of ignorance, sociology of nothing},
	pages = {48--59},
}

By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories – non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities – are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic.

@article{simon_constitution_2023,
	title = {Constitution of ignorance and uncertainty in language use - a programmatic attempt at systematization; [{Konstitution} von {Nichtwissen} und {Unsicherheit} im {Sprachgebrauch} – ein programmatischer {Systematisierungsversuch}]},
	volume = {45},
	issn = {10173285},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85159844110&doi=10.24989%2ffs.v45i1-2.2235&partnerID=40&md5=7c1ed9326dee624dc76c60c3c32d58ec},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2235},
	abstract = {In this paper, we propose a systematisation of the constitution of ignorance and uncertainty in language use and interaction. To this end, we first distinguish between a local and a global perspective on ignorance and uncertainty constitution. For the local level of ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose that four different types of linguistically indexed attributions of ignorance and uncertainty can be distinguished, with which the speaker/writer refers to different knowledge domains involved in the social process of local knowledge constitution. We then provide an overview of the inventory of linguistic signs that can be used to index such attributions and, building on this, distinguish four different forms of ignorance and uncertainty indexing that can be used in heterogeneous ways to signal the different types of ignorance and uncertainty attributions in specific contexts and situations. For the global level of collective ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose a model of different types of propositional constellations that can be used discourse-analytically as a basis for external ignorance and uncertainty attributions. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.},
	language = {German},
	number = {1-2},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Simon, Niklas and Janich, Nina},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG
Type: Article},
	pages = {5 -- 27},
}

In this paper, we propose a systematisation of the constitution of ignorance and uncertainty in language use and interaction. To this end, we first distinguish between a local and a global perspective on ignorance and uncertainty constitution. For the local level of ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose that four different types of linguistically indexed attributions of ignorance and uncertainty can be distinguished, with which the speaker/writer refers to different knowledge domains involved in the social process of local knowledge constitution. We then provide an overview of the inventory of linguistic signs that can be used to index such attributions and, building on this, distinguish four different forms of ignorance and uncertainty indexing that can be used in heterogeneous ways to signal the different types of ignorance and uncertainty attributions in specific contexts and situations. For the global level of collective ignorance and uncertainty constitution, we propose a model of different types of propositional constellations that can be used discourse-analytically as a basis for external ignorance and uncertainty attributions. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.

@article{yanai_what_2022,
	title = {What puzzle are you in?},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {1474-760X},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-022-02748-1},
	doi = {10.1186/s13059-022-02748-1},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2024-10-28},
	journal = {Genome Biology},
	author = {Yanai, Itai and Lercher, Martin J.},
	month = aug,
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {heuristique, question, à lire},
	pages = {179},
}

@article{yanai_improvisational_2022,
	title = {Improvisational science},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {1474-760X},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-021-02575-w},
	doi = {10.1186/s13059-021-02575-w},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2024-10-28},
	journal = {Genome Biology},
	author = {Yanai, Itai and Lercher, Martin},
	month = jan,
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {heuristique, question, à lire},
	pages = {4},
}

@book{zimmerman_ignorance_2022,
	title = {Ignorance and {Moral} {Responsibility}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-285957-0},
	abstract = {Michael J. Zimmerman investigates the relation between ignorance and moral responsibility. He begins with the presentation of a case in which a tragedy occurs, one to which many people have unwittingly contributed, and addresses the question of whether their ignorance absolves them of blame for what happened. Inspection of the case issues in the Argument from Ignorance, whose conclusion is that, to be blameworthy for one's behaviour and its consequences, one must at some time in the history of that behaviour have known that one was engaged in wrongdoing-a thesis that threatens to undermine many everyday ascriptions of responsibility. This argument is examined and refined in ensuing chapters by way of, first, a detailed inquiry into the nature of moral responsibility, ignorance, and control, all of which play a crucial role in the argument, and then an application of the fruits of this investigation to the question of whether and how someone might be to blame for behaviour that stems from either culpable ignorance, negligence, recklessness, or the kind of fundamental moral ignorance that often characterizes evildoers. The Argument from Ignorance implies that in a great many such cases the agent has an excuse for the wrongdoing in question. This is a disturbing verdict, and in the final chapter challenges to the argument are entertained. Despite the merits of some of these challenges, it is held that the argument, revised one last time, survives them.},
	language = {en},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Zimmerman, Michael J.},
	month = aug,
	year = {2022},
	note = {Google-Books-ID: 3Jd8EAAAQBAJ},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), Philosophy / Epistemology, Philosophy / Ethics \& Moral Philosophy},
}

Michael J. Zimmerman investigates the relation between ignorance and moral responsibility. He begins with the presentation of a case in which a tragedy occurs, one to which many people have unwittingly contributed, and addresses the question of whether their ignorance absolves them of blame for what happened. Inspection of the case issues in the Argument from Ignorance, whose conclusion is that, to be blameworthy for one's behaviour and its consequences, one must at some time in the history of that behaviour have known that one was engaged in wrongdoing-a thesis that threatens to undermine many everyday ascriptions of responsibility. This argument is examined and refined in ensuing chapters by way of, first, a detailed inquiry into the nature of moral responsibility, ignorance, and control, all of which play a crucial role in the argument, and then an application of the fruits of this investigation to the question of whether and how someone might be to blame for behaviour that stems from either culpable ignorance, negligence, recklessness, or the kind of fundamental moral ignorance that often characterizes evildoers. The Argument from Ignorance implies that in a great many such cases the agent has an excuse for the wrongdoing in question. This is a disturbing verdict, and in the final chapter challenges to the argument are entertained. Despite the merits of some of these challenges, it is held that the argument, revised one last time, survives them.

@book{dedieu_pesticides_2022,
	address = {Paris, France},
	series = {Anthropocène},
	title = {Pesticides: le confort de l'ignorance},
	isbn = {978-2-02-147349-0},
	shorttitle = {Pesticides},
	url = {https://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/pesticides-francois-dedieu/9782021473490},
	abstract = {Depuis soixante ans, les dangers des pesticides pour la biodiversité et la santé sont avérés. Alors pourquoi notre modèle agricole et alimentaire reste-t-il toujours dopé aux pesticides ? Les Monsanto Papers l’ont montré, les lobbyistes du secteur entretiennent savamment le doute quant à la gravité de leurs impacts environnementaux et sanitaires. Mais l’influence des industriels n’est que la face émergée d’une machinerie plus vaste de production de l’ignorance, reposant moins sur la manipulation que sur un déni collectif favorisé par les protocoles officiels de l’évaluation des risques. Face à l’ampleur des données et des dangers potentiels, il devient plus confortable d’ignorer des pans entiers de la connaissance plutôt que d’assumer le vertige de leurs conséquences sur notre modèle agricole.Au terme de ce voyage inédit au cœur de la fabrique de l’ignorance, l’auteur apporte des pistes et réflexions pour accélérer la transition vers une agriculture affranchie des pesticides.François Dedieu est sociologue à l’INRAE, au Laboratoire interdisciplinaire science innovation sociétés (Lisis). Expert pour l'ANSES, il enseigne notamment à Sciences Po Paris et à l’École des ponts et chaussées.},
	language = {français},
	publisher = {Éditions du Seuil},
	author = {Dedieu, François},
	year = {2022},
	note = {ISSN: 2270-2431},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), Pesticides -- Aspect environnemental, Pesticides -- Politique publique, Pesticides -- Évaluation du risque},
}

Depuis soixante ans, les dangers des pesticides pour la biodiversité et la santé sont avérés. Alors pourquoi notre modèle agricole et alimentaire reste-t-il toujours dopé aux pesticides ? Les Monsanto Papers l’ont montré, les lobbyistes du secteur entretiennent savamment le doute quant à la gravité de leurs impacts environnementaux et sanitaires. Mais l’influence des industriels n’est que la face émergée d’une machinerie plus vaste de production de l’ignorance, reposant moins sur la manipulation que sur un déni collectif favorisé par les protocoles officiels de l’évaluation des risques. Face à l’ampleur des données et des dangers potentiels, il devient plus confortable d’ignorer des pans entiers de la connaissance plutôt que d’assumer le vertige de leurs conséquences sur notre modèle agricole.Au terme de ce voyage inédit au cœur de la fabrique de l’ignorance, l’auteur apporte des pistes et réflexions pour accélérer la transition vers une agriculture affranchie des pesticides.François Dedieu est sociologue à l’INRAE, au Laboratoire interdisciplinaire science innovation sociétés (Lisis). Expert pour l'ANSES, il enseigne notamment à Sciences Po Paris et à l’École des ponts et chaussées.

@article{hannon_are_2022,
	title = {Are knowledgeable voters better voters?},
	issn = {1470-594X},
	doi = {10.1177/1470594X211065080},
	abstract = {It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like. © The Author(s) 2022.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics},
	author = {Hannon, M.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {democracy, epistocracy, motivated reasoning, objectivity, political ignorance, political knowledge},
}

It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like. © The Author(s) 2022.

@article{janich_fragen_2021,
	title = {Fragen und {Antworten}.  {Wissenskonstitution} in {Kontroversen} am {Beispiel} des {Glyphosat}-{Diskurses}},
	volume = {43},
	issn = {1017-3285},
	url = {https://ejournals.facultas.at/index.php/fachsprache/article/view/1938},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v43i1-2.1938},
	language = {de\_DE},
	number = {1-2},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Janich, Nina and Simon, Niklas},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	pages = {22--51},
}

@article{robbins_legibility_2021,
	title = {Legibility as a {Design} {Principle}: {Surfacing} {Values} in {Sensing} {Technologies}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Legibility as a {Design} {Principle}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243920975488},
	doi = {10.1177/0162243920975488},
	abstract = {This paper introduces the design principle of legibility as means to examine the epistemic and ethical conditions of sensing technologies. Emerging sensing technologies create new possibilities regarding what to measure, as well as how to analyze, interpret, and communicate said measurements. In doing so, they create ethical challenges for designers to navigate, specifically how the interpretation and communication of complex data affect moral values such as (user) autonomy. Contemporary sensing technologies require layers of mediation and exposition to render what they sense as intelligible and constructive to the end user, which is a value-laden design act. Legibility is positioned as both an evaluative lens and a design criterion, making it complimentary to existing frameworks such as value sensitive design. To concretize the notion of legibility, and understand how it could be utilized in both evaluative and anticipatory contexts, the case study of a vest embedded with sensors and an accompanying app for patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is analyzed.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Robbins, Holly and Stone, Taylor and Bolte, John and van den Hoven, Jeroen},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {1104--1135},
}

This paper introduces the design principle of legibility as means to examine the epistemic and ethical conditions of sensing technologies. Emerging sensing technologies create new possibilities regarding what to measure, as well as how to analyze, interpret, and communicate said measurements. In doing so, they create ethical challenges for designers to navigate, specifically how the interpretation and communication of complex data affect moral values such as (user) autonomy. Contemporary sensing technologies require layers of mediation and exposition to render what they sense as intelligible and constructive to the end user, which is a value-laden design act. Legibility is positioned as both an evaluative lens and a design criterion, making it complimentary to existing frameworks such as value sensitive design. To concretize the notion of legibility, and understand how it could be utilized in both evaluative and anticipatory contexts, the case study of a vest embedded with sensors and an accompanying app for patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is analyzed.

@article{smolka_affect_2021,
	title = {From {Affect} to {Action}: {Choices} in {Attending} to {Disconcertment} in {Interdisciplinary} {Collaborations}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {From {Affect} to {Action}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243920974088},
	doi = {10.1177/0162243920974088},
	abstract = {Reports from integrative researchers who have followed calls for sociotechnical integration emphasize that the potential of interdisciplinary collaboration to inflect the social shaping of technoscience is often constrained by their liminal position. Integrative researchers tend to be positioned as either adversarial outsiders or co-opted insiders. In an attempt to navigate these dynamics, we show that attending to affective disturbances can open up possibilities for productive engagements across disciplinary divides. Drawing on the work of Helen Verran, we analyze “disconcertment” in three sociotechnical integration research studies. We develop a heuristic that weaves together disconcertment, affective labor, and responsivity to analyze the role of the body in interdisciplinary collaborations. We draw out how bodies do affective labor when generating responsivity between collaborators in moments of disconcertment. Responsive bodies can function as sensors, sources, and processors of disconcerting experiences of difference. We further show how attending to disconcertment can stimulate methodological choices to recognize, amplify, or minimize the difference between collaborators. Although these choices are context-dependent, each one examined generates responsivity that supports collaborators to readjust the technical in terms of the social. This analysis contributes to science and technology studies scholarship on the role of affect in successes and failures of interdisciplinary collaboration.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Smolka, Mareike and Fisher, Erik and Hausstein, Alexandra},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {1076--1103},
}

Reports from integrative researchers who have followed calls for sociotechnical integration emphasize that the potential of interdisciplinary collaboration to inflect the social shaping of technoscience is often constrained by their liminal position. Integrative researchers tend to be positioned as either adversarial outsiders or co-opted insiders. In an attempt to navigate these dynamics, we show that attending to affective disturbances can open up possibilities for productive engagements across disciplinary divides. Drawing on the work of Helen Verran, we analyze “disconcertment” in three sociotechnical integration research studies. We develop a heuristic that weaves together disconcertment, affective labor, and responsivity to analyze the role of the body in interdisciplinary collaborations. We draw out how bodies do affective labor when generating responsivity between collaborators in moments of disconcertment. Responsive bodies can function as sensors, sources, and processors of disconcerting experiences of difference. We further show how attending to disconcertment can stimulate methodological choices to recognize, amplify, or minimize the difference between collaborators. Although these choices are context-dependent, each one examined generates responsivity that supports collaborators to readjust the technical in terms of the social. This analysis contributes to science and technology studies scholarship on the role of affect in successes and failures of interdisciplinary collaboration.

@article{silva_keep_2021,
	title = {Keep {Calm} and {Carry} {On}: {Climate}-ready {Crops} and the {Genetic} {Codification} of {Climate} {Myopia}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Keep {Calm} and {Carry} {On}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243920974092},
	doi = {10.1177/0162243920974092},
	abstract = {The diverse ways that extreme climate events are expressed at the local level have represented a challenge for the development of transgenic “climate-ready” (resilient to environmental stress) seeds. Based on the Argentinean “HB4” technology, this paper analyzes how ignorance and a sunflower gene are mobilized to overcome this difficulty in soy and wheat. HB4 seeds can be understood as myopic: the technology does not obstruct the capacity of soy and wheat plants to sense droughts, but it prevents their natural reaction, which would be to put a halt on crop production and redirect their energy toward survival. Plants thus become “short-sighted” to droughts. Informed by ignorance studies and by the immunological concept of tolerance, this paper analyzes HB4 myopia as a type of nonhuman ignorance: an asset that allows plant breeders to achieve varied plant responses to droughts and to encode their capitalist values (that prioritize production over survival) into plants’ DNA. Moreover, ignorance becomes a molecular commodity that can be selected, transferred between organisms, and traded in markets. HB4’s prioritization of production resonates with other technologies of climate adaptation and mitigation that do not promote structural changes to the capitalist system.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Silva, Diego},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {1048--1075},
}

The diverse ways that extreme climate events are expressed at the local level have represented a challenge for the development of transgenic “climate-ready” (resilient to environmental stress) seeds. Based on the Argentinean “HB4” technology, this paper analyzes how ignorance and a sunflower gene are mobilized to overcome this difficulty in soy and wheat. HB4 seeds can be understood as myopic: the technology does not obstruct the capacity of soy and wheat plants to sense droughts, but it prevents their natural reaction, which would be to put a halt on crop production and redirect their energy toward survival. Plants thus become “short-sighted” to droughts. Informed by ignorance studies and by the immunological concept of tolerance, this paper analyzes HB4 myopia as a type of nonhuman ignorance: an asset that allows plant breeders to achieve varied plant responses to droughts and to encode their capitalist values (that prioritize production over survival) into plants’ DNA. Moreover, ignorance becomes a molecular commodity that can be selected, transferred between organisms, and traded in markets. HB4’s prioritization of production resonates with other technologies of climate adaptation and mitigation that do not promote structural changes to the capitalist system.

@article{thomas_defects_2021,
	title = {Defects in {Doubt} {Manufacturing}: {The} {Trajectory} of a {Pro}-industrial {Argument} in the {Struggle} for the {Definition} of {Carcinogenic} {Substances}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Defects in {Doubt} {Manufacturing}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211026746},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211026746},
	abstract = {Recent work in science and technology studies has looked at how chemical industries manufacture doubt about the toxicity of their products and manage to establish their scientific views in the field of international regulations on toxic substances. Rather than examining yet another “victory” for the industry, this article analyzes the deployment of a “pro-industrial” scientific position, punctuated mainly by failure and opposition. This trajectory is tracked through the analysis of several data sets: archives, scientific documentation, and sociological interviews. The first part of the article charts the development of a biochemical concept, “peroxisome proliferation,” within an academic subfield and its subsequent appropriation by certain industrial parties who used it as a defensive weapon for their commercial interests. Through the example of the International Agency for Research on Cancer and its network of interdependent institutions, the article goes on to analyze the multiple attempts of chemical industry players to establish their interpretation of the concept within the regulatory bodies for carcinogenic substances. The study of such systems of sociological interdependence shows that a full analysis of the “doubt manufacturing” requires an examination not only of the manufacturing process but also of the reception of the ideas produced.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Thomas, Valentin},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {998--1020},
}

Recent work in science and technology studies has looked at how chemical industries manufacture doubt about the toxicity of their products and manage to establish their scientific views in the field of international regulations on toxic substances. Rather than examining yet another “victory” for the industry, this article analyzes the deployment of a “pro-industrial” scientific position, punctuated mainly by failure and opposition. This trajectory is tracked through the analysis of several data sets: archives, scientific documentation, and sociological interviews. The first part of the article charts the development of a biochemical concept, “peroxisome proliferation,” within an academic subfield and its subsequent appropriation by certain industrial parties who used it as a defensive weapon for their commercial interests. Through the example of the International Agency for Research on Cancer and its network of interdependent institutions, the article goes on to analyze the multiple attempts of chemical industry players to establish their interpretation of the concept within the regulatory bodies for carcinogenic substances. The study of such systems of sociological interdependence shows that a full analysis of the “doubt manufacturing” requires an examination not only of the manufacturing process but also of the reception of the ideas produced.

@article{henry_governing_2021,
	title = {Governing {Occupational} {Exposure} {Using} {Thresholds}: {A} {Policy} {Biased} {Toward} {Industry}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Governing {Occupational} {Exposure} {Using} {Thresholds}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211015300},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211015300},
	abstract = {Strongly grounded in scientific knowledge, the instrument known as occupational exposure limits or threshold limit values has changed government modalities of exposure to hazardous chemicals in workplaces, transforming both the substance of the problem at hand and the power dynamics between the actors involved. Some of the characteristics of this instrument favor the interests of industries at the expense of employees, their representatives, and the authorities in charge of regulating these risks. First, this instrument can be analyzed as a boundary object that has very different uses in space and time. In particular, it is increasingly masking its industrial origins to appear as an instrument that is almost exclusively based on scientific rationale. In the case of asbestos and its substitutes, the use of an instrument relying on scientific expertise generates a specific temporality of implementation that allows manufacturers to take advantage of periods during which regulations are either nonexistent or very loose. Finally, the choice of a technoscientific definition of the issues contributes to shifting the negotiations to a field where companies are in a position of strength and their opponents are weakened.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Henry, Emmanuel},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {953--974},
}

Strongly grounded in scientific knowledge, the instrument known as occupational exposure limits or threshold limit values has changed government modalities of exposure to hazardous chemicals in workplaces, transforming both the substance of the problem at hand and the power dynamics between the actors involved. Some of the characteristics of this instrument favor the interests of industries at the expense of employees, their representatives, and the authorities in charge of regulating these risks. First, this instrument can be analyzed as a boundary object that has very different uses in space and time. In particular, it is increasingly masking its industrial origins to appear as an instrument that is almost exclusively based on scientific rationale. In the case of asbestos and its substitutes, the use of an instrument relying on scientific expertise generates a specific temporality of implementation that allows manufacturers to take advantage of periods during which regulations are either nonexistent or very loose. Finally, the choice of a technoscientific definition of the issues contributes to shifting the negotiations to a field where companies are in a position of strength and their opponents are weakened.

@article{lanier-christensen_creating_2021,
	title = {Creating {Regulatory} {Harmony}: {The} {Participatory} {Politics} of {OECD} {Chemical} {Testing} {Standards} in the {Making}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Creating {Regulatory} {Harmony}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211029369},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211029369},
	abstract = {In recent decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become a powerful forum for trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. OECD members have worked to reconcile divergent national regulatory approaches, applying a single framework across sovereign states, in effect determining whose knowledge-making practices would guide regulatory action throughout the industrialized world. Focusing on US regulators, industry associations, and environmental groups, this article explores the participatory politics of OECD chemical regulation harmonization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. These efforts were conditioned by differential institutional access and resources among stakeholders who sought to shape regulatory knowledge rules. Facing competing European and US approaches to chemical data—a minimum “base set” of test data versus case-by-case determinations—OECD members chose the European approach in 1980. However, US regulatory politics shifted with the election of President Reagan, prompting industry associations to lobby the US government to block the agreement. Examining the micropolitics of these standards in the making, I demonstrate that while long-term structures advantaged industrial actors, ideological alignment with the US government precipitated their decisive influence. The case illustrates the importance of attending to the distinctive politics of international harmonization and the effects on transnational knowledge-making and regulatory intervention.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Lanier-Christensen, Colleen},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {925--952},
}

In recent decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become a powerful forum for trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. OECD members have worked to reconcile divergent national regulatory approaches, applying a single framework across sovereign states, in effect determining whose knowledge-making practices would guide regulatory action throughout the industrialized world. Focusing on US regulators, industry associations, and environmental groups, this article explores the participatory politics of OECD chemical regulation harmonization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. These efforts were conditioned by differential institutional access and resources among stakeholders who sought to shape regulatory knowledge rules. Facing competing European and US approaches to chemical data—a minimum “base set” of test data versus case-by-case determinations—OECD members chose the European approach in 1980. However, US regulatory politics shifted with the election of President Reagan, prompting industry associations to lobby the US government to block the agreement. Examining the micropolitics of these standards in the making, I demonstrate that while long-term structures advantaged industrial actors, ideological alignment with the US government precipitated their decisive influence. The case illustrates the importance of attending to the distinctive politics of international harmonization and the effects on transnational knowledge-making and regulatory intervention.

@article{paris_internet_2021,
	title = {The {Internet} of {Futures} {Past}: {Values} {Trajectories} of {Networking} {Protocol} {Projects}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {The {Internet} of {Futures} {Past}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243920974083},
	doi = {10.1177/0162243920974083},
	abstract = {The Internet was conceptualized as a technology that would be capable of bringing about a better future, but recent literature in science and technology studies and adjacent fields provides numerous examples of how this pervasive sociotechnical system has been shaped and used to dystopic ends. This article examines different future imaginaries present in Future Internet Architecture (FIA) projects funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) from 2006 to 2016, whose goal was to incorporate social values while building new protocols to replace Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol to transfer and route information across the ever-expanding Internet. I examine the findings from two of the NSF’s FIA projects—Mobility First (MF) and eXpressive Internet Architecture—to understand the projects’ trajectories and values directives through their funding cycle and their projections into the future. I discuss how project documentation and participant articulations fall into the following three distinct themes about past experience and speculation: understanding the public, negotiating resources, and carrying project values into the future. I conclude that if the future Internet is to promote positive sociotechnical relationships, its architects must recognize that complex social and political decisions pervade each step of technical work and do more to honor this fact.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Paris, Britt},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {1021--1047},
}

The Internet was conceptualized as a technology that would be capable of bringing about a better future, but recent literature in science and technology studies and adjacent fields provides numerous examples of how this pervasive sociotechnical system has been shaped and used to dystopic ends. This article examines different future imaginaries present in Future Internet Architecture (FIA) projects funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) from 2006 to 2016, whose goal was to incorporate social values while building new protocols to replace Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol to transfer and route information across the ever-expanding Internet. I examine the findings from two of the NSF’s FIA projects—Mobility First (MF) and eXpressive Internet Architecture—to understand the projects’ trajectories and values directives through their funding cycle and their projections into the future. I discuss how project documentation and participant articulations fall into the following three distinct themes about past experience and speculation: understanding the public, negotiating resources, and carrying project values into the future. I conclude that if the future Internet is to promote positive sociotechnical relationships, its architects must recognize that complex social and political decisions pervade each step of technical work and do more to honor this fact.

@article{creager_test_2021,
	title = {To {Test} or {Not} to {Test}: {Tools}, {Rules}, and {Corporate} {Data} in {US} {Chemicals} {Regulation}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {To {Test} or {Not} to {Test}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211013373},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211013373},
	abstract = {When the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was passed by the US Congress in 1976, its advocates pointed to new generation of genotoxicity tests as a way to systematically screen chemicals for carcinogenicity. However, in the end, TSCA did not require any new testing of commercial chemicals, including these rapid laboratory screens. In addition, although the Environmental Protection Agency was to make public data about the health effects of industrial chemicals, companies routinely used the agency’s obligation to protect confidential business information to prevent such disclosures. This paper traces the contested history of TSCA and its provisions for testing, from the circulation of the first draft bill in the Nixon administration through the debates over its implementation, which stretched into the Reagan administration. The paucity of publicly available health and environmental data concerning chemicals, I argue, was a by-product of the law and its execution, leading to a situation of institutionalized ignorance, the underside of regulatory knowledge.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Creager, Angela N. H.},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {975--997},
}

When the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was passed by the US Congress in 1976, its advocates pointed to new generation of genotoxicity tests as a way to systematically screen chemicals for carcinogenicity. However, in the end, TSCA did not require any new testing of commercial chemicals, including these rapid laboratory screens. In addition, although the Environmental Protection Agency was to make public data about the health effects of industrial chemicals, companies routinely used the agency’s obligation to protect confidential business information to prevent such disclosures. This paper traces the contested history of TSCA and its provisions for testing, from the circulation of the first draft bill in the Nixon administration through the debates over its implementation, which stretched into the Reagan administration. The paucity of publicly available health and environmental data concerning chemicals, I argue, was a by-product of the law and its execution, leading to a situation of institutionalized ignorance, the underside of regulatory knowledge.

@article{henry_introduction_2021,
	title = {Introduction: {Beyond} the {Production} of {Ignorance}: {The} {Pervasiveness} of {Industry} {Influence} through the {Tools} of {Chemical} {Regulation}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Introduction},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211026749},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211026749},
	abstract = {Research on the influence of industry on chemical regulation has mostly been conducted within the framework of the production of ignorance. This special issue extends this research by looking at how industry asserts its interests––not just in the scientific sphere but also at other stages of policy-making and regulatory process––with a specific focus on the types of tools or instruments industry has used. Bringing together sociologists and historians specialized in Science and Technology Studies (STS), the articles of the special issue study the arenas in which instruments and practical guidelines for public policy are negotiated or used. The aim is to observe the devices in the making or in action, from the selection of actors to the production of thresholds, criteria, and other technical regulations. The introduction highlights how industry influence on expertise and regulation is undoubtedly far more pervasive and multifarious than has been conceptualized to date by social scientists. Putting this issue back at the heart of both the STS and social sciences research agendas is increasingly urgent and could lead to new inquiries able to highlight these logics even more widely, using fresh empirical examples.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Henry, Emmanuel and Thomas, Valentin and Aguiton, Sara Angeli and Déplaude, Marc-Olivier and Jas, Nathalie},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {911--924},
}

Research on the influence of industry on chemical regulation has mostly been conducted within the framework of the production of ignorance. This special issue extends this research by looking at how industry asserts its interests––not just in the scientific sphere but also at other stages of policy-making and regulatory process––with a specific focus on the types of tools or instruments industry has used. Bringing together sociologists and historians specialized in Science and Technology Studies (STS), the articles of the special issue study the arenas in which instruments and practical guidelines for public policy are negotiated or used. The aim is to observe the devices in the making or in action, from the selection of actors to the production of thresholds, criteria, and other technical regulations. The introduction highlights how industry influence on expertise and regulation is undoubtedly far more pervasive and multifarious than has been conceptualized to date by social scientists. Putting this issue back at the heart of both the STS and social sciences research agendas is increasingly urgent and could lead to new inquiries able to highlight these logics even more widely, using fresh empirical examples.

@book{boudia_residues_2021,
	address = {New Brunswick, NJ},
	title = {Residues: {Thinking} {Through} {Chemical} {Environments}},
	isbn = {978-1-978818-01-9},
	shorttitle = {Residues},
	language = {Anglais},
	publisher = {Rutgers University Press},
	author = {Boudia, Soraya and Creager, Angela N. H. and Frickel, Scott and Henry, Emmanuel and Jas, Nathalie and Reinhardt, Carsten and Roberts, Jody A.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

@article{kubyshkina_logic_2021,
	title = {A logic for factive ignorance},
	volume = {198},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02440-1},
	abstract = {In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$, then \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Kubyshkina, Ekaterina and Petrolo, Mattia},
	month = jun,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Agnoiology, Epistemic logic, Factive ignorance, Ignorance representation, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {5917--5928},
}

In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of $$\phi $$, then $$\phi $$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.

@incollection{ahlstrom-vij_policy_2021,
	title = {Policy, ignorance, and the will of the people: {The} case of “good immigrants”},
	isbn = {978-0-19-289333-8},
	shorttitle = {Policy, ignorance, and the will of the people},
	abstract = {It is well established that the general population tend to lack in-depth knowledge about key political and policy matters. What are the implications for policymaking? This chapter considers this question in the context of immigration policy, reporting first on a focus group study which offers evidence that reported desires for a reduced number of immigrants might ultimately reflect a desire for immigrants of (perceived) high quality, not a reduction in overall quantity, where quality is defined in terms of fiscal impact. The chapter then argues that public preferences for such “good immigrants” are problematic, deploying a number of counterfactual models that suggest that such preferences are based on mistaken beliefs, and arguing that they thereby likely fail to reflect what the person truly desires. These findings extend beyond immigration policy and serve to highlight the often-overlooked problem that policies implemented with reference to popular sentiments might not capture “the will of the people.”. © the several contributors 2021.},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {Political {Epistemology}},
	author = {Ahlstrom-Vij, K. and Steele, J.R.},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192893338.003.0011},
	keywords = {Counterfactual modeling, Immigration, Informed preferences, Policy, Political epistemology, Political knowledge, Will of the people},
	pages = {180--205},
}

It is well established that the general population tend to lack in-depth knowledge about key political and policy matters. What are the implications for policymaking? This chapter considers this question in the context of immigration policy, reporting first on a focus group study which offers evidence that reported desires for a reduced number of immigrants might ultimately reflect a desire for immigrants of (perceived) high quality, not a reduction in overall quantity, where quality is defined in terms of fiscal impact. The chapter then argues that public preferences for such “good immigrants” are problematic, deploying a number of counterfactual models that suggest that such preferences are based on mistaken beliefs, and arguing that they thereby likely fail to reflect what the person truly desires. These findings extend beyond immigration policy and serve to highlight the often-overlooked problem that policies implemented with reference to popular sentiments might not capture “the will of the people.”. © the several contributors 2021.

@article{yanai_two_2020,
	title = {The two languages of science},
	volume = {21},
	issn = {1474-760X},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-020-02057-5},
	doi = {10.1186/s13059-020-02057-5},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2024-10-28},
	journal = {Genome Biology},
	author = {Yanai, Itai and Lercher, Martin},
	month = jun,
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {heuristique, question, à lire},
	pages = {147},
}

@book{demortain_science_2020,
	title = {The {Science} of {Bureaucracy}: {Risk} {Decision}-{Making} and the {US} {Environmental} {Protection} {Agency}},
	isbn = {978-0-262-35667-1},
	shorttitle = {The {Science} of {Bureaucracy}},
	url = {https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/4600/The-Science-of-BureaucracyRisk-Decision-Making-and},
	abstract = {How the US Environmental Protection Agency designed the governance of risk and forged its legitimacy over the course of four decades.The US Environmental Protec},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-31},
	publisher = {The MIT Press},
	author = {Demortain, David},
	month = jan,
	year = {2020},
	doi = {10.7551/mitpress/12248.001.0001},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

How the US Environmental Protection Agency designed the governance of risk and forged its legitimacy over the course of four decades.The US Environmental Protec

@article{yanai_night_2019,
	title = {Night science},
	volume = {20},
	issn = {1474-760X},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-019-1800-6},
	doi = {10.1186/s13059-019-1800-6},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2024-10-28},
	journal = {Genome Biology},
	author = {Yanai, Itai and Lercher, Martin},
	month = aug,
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {heuristique, question, à lire},
	pages = {179},
}

@article{yanai_what_2019,
	title = {What is the question?},
	volume = {20},
	issn = {1474-760X},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-019-1902-1},
	doi = {10.1186/s13059-019-1902-1},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2024-10-25},
	journal = {Genome Biology},
	author = {Yanai, Itai and Lercher, Martin},
	month = dec,
	year = {2019},
	pages = {289},
}

@incollection{gerund_ignorance_2019,
	address = {Cham},
	title = {Ignorance},
	isbn = {978-3-030-28987-4},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28987-4_25},
	abstract = {This entry discusses the notion of “ignorance” as it circulates in popular parlance and academic discourse. It summarizes the main strands of scholarship on the concept and shows how ignorance has developed from a largely neglected issue to a valid topic in its own right in various disciplines. Ignorance emerges as a contested and complex term that is often situated within different political projects and sometimes even conflicting ideological agendas.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2019-12-09},
	booktitle = {Critical {Terms} in {Futures} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing. Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan},
	author = {Gerund, Katharina},
	editor = {Paul, Heike},
	year = {2019},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-28987-4_25},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {157--161},
}

This entry discusses the notion of “ignorance” as it circulates in popular parlance and academic discourse. It summarizes the main strands of scholarship on the concept and shows how ignorance has developed from a largely neglected issue to a valid topic in its own right in various disciplines. Ignorance emerges as a contested and complex term that is often situated within different political projects and sometimes even conflicting ideological agendas.

@book{bretesche_risque_2019,
	series = {Développement durable},
	title = {Le risque environnemental : entre sciences physiques et sciences humaines},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-571-5},
	shorttitle = {Le risque environnemental},
	url = {https://documentation.insp.gouv.fr/insp/doc/SYRACUSE/114801/le-risque-environnemental-entre-sciences-physiques-et-sciences-humaines-sophie-bretesche-cyrille-har},
	abstract = {La façon dont les sociétés prennent en charge la question de l'environnement met en jeu des transactions entre les différents acteurs sociaux impliqués. Le défaut de consensus social sur ce qui est dangereux ou non, sur le niveau de dangerosité ou sur ce qu'il convient de faire en situation d'incertitude et, en définitive, sur le degré d'acceptation du risque, constituent des défis sociétaux majeurs. La notion de "risque" englobe aussi bien les grandes menaces planétaires (destruction de la couche d'ozone, effet de serre, etc.) que les comportements individuels qui ponctuent notre quotidien (tabagisme, conduite automobile, etc.). Les risques écologiques ou technologiques révèlent le fossé qui sépare les experts des profanes et suscitent de nouvelles exigences démocratiques, tandis que les risques individuels modifient notre façon de concevoir nos rapports avec autrui. Nous proposons une lecture interdisciplinaire du risque environnemental sous trois aspects : sa mesure, sa perception et sa gestion. Cet ouvrage initie des regards croisés entre scientifiques, gestionnaires et acteurs publics autour du sol, de l'air et de l'eau. C'est dans une démarche de science accessible au citoyen que cet ouvrage souhaite s'inscrire.},
	language = {français},
	urldate = {2024-01-17},
	publisher = {Presses des Mines},
	author = {Bretesché, Sophie and Harpet, Cyrille and Ollitrault, Sylvie and Héquet, Valérie},
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Environnement -- Protection -- Participation des citoyens -- France -- 1990-2020, Environnement -- Évaluation du risque -- France -- 1990-2020, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Risques écotoxicologiques},
}

La façon dont les sociétés prennent en charge la question de l'environnement met en jeu des transactions entre les différents acteurs sociaux impliqués. Le défaut de consensus social sur ce qui est dangereux ou non, sur le niveau de dangerosité ou sur ce qu'il convient de faire en situation d'incertitude et, en définitive, sur le degré d'acceptation du risque, constituent des défis sociétaux majeurs. La notion de "risque" englobe aussi bien les grandes menaces planétaires (destruction de la couche d'ozone, effet de serre, etc.) que les comportements individuels qui ponctuent notre quotidien (tabagisme, conduite automobile, etc.). Les risques écologiques ou technologiques révèlent le fossé qui sépare les experts des profanes et suscitent de nouvelles exigences démocratiques, tandis que les risques individuels modifient notre façon de concevoir nos rapports avec autrui. Nous proposons une lecture interdisciplinaire du risque environnemental sous trois aspects : sa mesure, sa perception et sa gestion. Cet ouvrage initie des regards croisés entre scientifiques, gestionnaires et acteurs publics autour du sol, de l'air et de l'eau. C'est dans une démarche de science accessible au citoyen que cet ouvrage souhaite s'inscrire.

@article{lind_save_2019,
	title = {Save the planet or close your eyes? {Testing} strategic ignorance in a charity context},
	volume = {161},
	shorttitle = {Save the planet or close your eyes?},
	doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.02.010},
	abstract = {Do people try to avoid unpleasant information about the environmental consequences of their actions? If so, do they react with hostility towards others who provide the unwanted information? Fearing such hostility, do others abstain from providing the information? These are the questions we set out to explore by means of lab experiments presented here. To our surprise, and in stark contrast to related previous literature, we found few indications of willful ignorance. In a binary dictator game with an environmental charity as the recipient, an option to stay uninformed about the effects of one's actions for the charity was infrequently chosen, and did not significantly affect generosity. When another subject might choose to impose information on the dictator, almost all dictators asked for information themselves – but this was not associated with increased dictator generosity. We argue that the phenomenon of strategic ignorance is likely to be less robust and more context-dependent than one might expect based on previous research, and that this result may be important from an environmental policy perspective. © 2019},
	journal = {Ecological Economics},
	author = {Lind, J.T. and Nyborg, K. and Pauls, A.},
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Carbon offset, Dictator game, Experiment, Social sanctions, Strategic ignorance},
	pages = {9--19},
}

Do people try to avoid unpleasant information about the environmental consequences of their actions? If so, do they react with hostility towards others who provide the unwanted information? Fearing such hostility, do others abstain from providing the information? These are the questions we set out to explore by means of lab experiments presented here. To our surprise, and in stark contrast to related previous literature, we found few indications of willful ignorance. In a binary dictator game with an environmental charity as the recipient, an option to stay uninformed about the effects of one's actions for the charity was infrequently chosen, and did not significantly affect generosity. When another subject might choose to impose information on the dictator, almost all dictators asked for information themselves – but this was not associated with increased dictator generosity. We argue that the phenomenon of strategic ignorance is likely to be less robust and more context-dependent than one might expect based on previous research, and that this result may be important from an environmental policy perspective. © 2019

@book{janich_unsicherheit_2018,
	title = {Unsicherheit als {Herausforderung} für die {Wissenschaft}},
	isbn = {978-3-631-76152-6 978-3-631-76153-3 978-3-631-76104-5 978-3-631-76154-0},
	url = {https://www.peterlang.com/document/1068065},
	abstract = {Das Buch präsentiert eine disziplinäre Vielfalt an Perspektiven auf Unsicherheit in der Wissenschaft. Schwerpunkte sind Klimaforschung, ...},
	language = {de},
	urldate = {2024-09-06},
	editor = {Janich, Nina and Rhein, Lisa},
	month = sep,
	year = {2018},
	note = {ISSN: 1869-523X},
}

Das Buch präsentiert eine disziplinäre Vielfalt an Perspektiven auf Unsicherheit in der Wissenschaft. Schwerpunkte sind Klimaforschung, ...

@incollection{rhein_thematisierung_2018,
	address = {Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Wien,},
	edition = {Rhein, Lisa},
	title = {Thematisierung von {Nichtwissen} und {Unsicherheiten} in wissenschaftlichen {Diskussionen}},
	isbn = {978-3-631-76153-3},
	url = {https://www.peterlang.com/view/9783631761533/chapter-005.xhtml},
	abstract = {Ignorance and insecurities are important elements of science and research. Every researcher is confronted not only with his or her own non-knowledge but also with non-knowledge of a discipline or research group. Ignorance, however, can also threaten a researcher’s reputation, it can be used strategically in scientific discussions, for example to weaken another’s contribution or to heighten one’s own image. The article explores the influence of non-knowledge communication on the images of discussants in scientific, interdisciplinary contexts.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2019-01-31},
	booktitle = {Unsicherheit als {Herausforderung} für die {Wissenschaft} : {Reflexionen} aus {Natur}-, {Sozial}- und {Geisteswissenschaften}},
	publisher = {Peter Lang},
	author = {Rhein, Lisa},
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {71--92},
}

Ignorance and insecurities are important elements of science and research. Every researcher is confronted not only with his or her own non-knowledge but also with non-knowledge of a discipline or research group. Ignorance, however, can also threaten a researcher’s reputation, it can be used strategically in scientific discussions, for example to weaken another’s contribution or to heighten one’s own image. The article explores the influence of non-knowledge communication on the images of discussants in scientific, interdisciplinary contexts.

@article{giroux_compte_2018,
	title = {Compte rendu : {Jacob} {STEGENGA}. — {Medical} {Nihilism}, {Oxford}, {Oxford} {University} {Press}, 2018, 227 p.},
	volume = {81},
	issn = {0003-9632},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2018-4-page-816.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/aphi.814.0816},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2024-08-16},
	journal = {Archives de Philosophie},
	author = {Giroux, Élodie},
	year = {2018},
	note = {Place: Paris
Publisher: Facultés Loyola Paris},
	pages = {816--818},
}

@incollection{kourany_agnotology_2018,
	title = {Agnotology, {Feminism}, and {Philosophy}: {Potentially} the {Closest} of {Allies}},
	isbn = {978-1-4742-9778-3 978-1-4742-9777-6 978-1-4742-9779-0 978-1-4742-9780-6},
	url = {http://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/the-bloomsbury-companion-to-analytic-feminism},
	urldate = {2021-08-02},
	booktitle = {The {Bloomsbury} {Companion} to {Analytic} {Feminism}},
	publisher = {Bloomsbury Academic},
	author = {Kourany, Janet A.},
	year = {2018},
	doi = {10.5040/9781474297806},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {281--309},
}

@book{foray_leconomie_2018,
	address = {Paris},
	edition = {3e éd. entièrement refondue et mise à jour},
	series = {Repères},
	title = {L'économie de la connaissance},
	isbn = {978-2-7071-9757-3},
	abstract = {Cet ouvrage analyse l'évolution des sociétés développées vers une économie fondée
 sur la connaissance, avec l'avènement des nouvelles technologies de l'information
 et de la communication, et la discipline dont les concepts et les outils permettent
 d'interpréter ces mutations. À l'image de l'économie industrielle fondée en France
 vers 1820, au moment de l'avènement de la grande industrie, l'économie de la connaissance
 se développe en tant que discipline quand se mettent progressivement en place les
 économies fondées sur la connaissance. Ce livre porte sur une double nouveauté : une
 nouveauté scientifique qui correspond au développement d'une sous-discipline économique
 originale dont l'objet de recherche – la connaissance – pose des problèmes spécifiques,
 tant théoriques qu'empiriques ; une nouveauté historique liée à une période particulière
 sur le plan des caractéristiques de la croissance et de l'organisation des activités
 économiques. C'est autour de la dualité de l'économie de la connaissance, comme discipline
 et comme période historique, que cet ouvrage est organisé. Cette nouvelle édition
 étudie aussi la question de la relation entre l'économie de la connaissance et la
 révolution digitale en cours},
	language = {fre},
	number = {302},
	publisher = {la Découverte},
	author = {Foray, Dominique},
	year = {2018},
	note = {Country: FR
ill. 18 cm. Bibliogr. p. 113-122.},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), Technologies de l'information et de la communication, Échange de savoirs, Économie du savoir},
}

Cet ouvrage analyse l'évolution des sociétés développées vers une économie fondée sur la connaissance, avec l'avènement des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication, et la discipline dont les concepts et les outils permettent d'interpréter ces mutations. À l'image de l'économie industrielle fondée en France vers 1820, au moment de l'avènement de la grande industrie, l'économie de la connaissance se développe en tant que discipline quand se mettent progressivement en place les économies fondées sur la connaissance. Ce livre porte sur une double nouveauté : une nouveauté scientifique qui correspond au développement d'une sous-discipline économique originale dont l'objet de recherche – la connaissance – pose des problèmes spécifiques, tant théoriques qu'empiriques ; une nouveauté historique liée à une période particulière sur le plan des caractéristiques de la croissance et de l'organisation des activités économiques. C'est autour de la dualité de l'économie de la connaissance, comme discipline et comme période historique, que cet ouvrage est organisé. Cette nouvelle édition étudie aussi la question de la relation entre l'économie de la connaissance et la révolution digitale en cours

@article{moore_strictness_2018,
	title = {The {Strictness} of {Strict} {Liability}},
	volume = {12},
	issn = {1871-9805},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9438-5},
	doi = {10.1007/s11572-017-9438-5},
	abstract = {This article conceptualizes what strict liability is in the criminal law. Four properties are found to be individually necessary, only jointly sufficient, for there to be the kind of moral blameworthiness that must underlie any just punishment: prima facie wrongdoing, absence of justification, prima facie culpability, and absence of excuse. Whenever criminal liability is imposed without the presence of one or more of these properties, the liabuility is said to be strict.},
	language = {en},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2018-09-10},
	journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
	author = {Moore, Michael S.},
	month = sep,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {Ignorance of law, Negligence, Strict liability, Vicarious liability},
	pages = {513--529},
}

This article conceptualizes what strict liability is in the criminal law. Four properties are found to be individually necessary, only jointly sufficient, for there to be the kind of moral blameworthiness that must underlie any just punishment: prima facie wrongdoing, absence of justification, prima facie culpability, and absence of excuse. Whenever criminal liability is imposed without the presence of one or more of these properties, the liabuility is said to be strict.

@article{tran_ignorance_2018,
	title = {Ignorance and {Professional} {Military} {Education}: {The} {Case} for {Operational} {Engagement}},
	copyright = {This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance and {Professional} {Military} {Education}},
	url = {https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/60591},
	abstract = {There are libraries full of books on the quest for knowledge, but little is known about how things are not learned (or, once learned, not retained). The intellectual historians Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger coined the term “agnotology” to refer to the study of ignorance and how it is produced. They make the powerful case that “ignorance is often not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political struggle.” The perspective that Proctor and Schiebinger provide offers a critical lens through which to evaluate the trajectory of professional military education.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-11-22},
	author = {Tran, Thang and Oliveira, Michael and Sider, Josh and Blanken, Leo},
	month = nov,
	year = {2018},
}

There are libraries full of books on the quest for knowledge, but little is known about how things are not learned (or, once learned, not retained). The intellectual historians Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger coined the term “agnotology” to refer to the study of ignorance and how it is produced. They make the powerful case that “ignorance is often not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political struggle.” The perspective that Proctor and Schiebinger provide offers a critical lens through which to evaluate the trajectory of professional military education.

@article{bjornberg_climate_2017,
	title = {Climate and environmental science denial: {A} review of the scientific literature published in 1990–2015},
	volume = {167},
	issn = {0959-6526},
	shorttitle = {Climate and environmental science denial},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652617317821},
	doi = {10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.08.066},
	abstract = {Denial of scientific findings is neither a new nor an unexplored phenomenon. In the area of environmental science and policy though, the research on denial has not been systematically summarized and analyzed. This article reviews 161 scientific articles on environmental and climate science denial published in peer reviewed international journals in the last 25 years and aims to both identify research gaps and enable learning on the phenomenon. Such knowledge is needed for the increasingly important task to provide effective response to science denial, in order to put an end to its influence on environmental policy making. The review, which is based on articles found in the databases Web of Science, Scopus and Philosopher's Index, shows that denial by far is most studied in relation to climate change, with a focus on Anglo-American countries, where this form of denial is most common. Other environmental issues and other geographical areas have received much less scientific attention. While the actors behind climate science denial, their various motives and the characteristics of their operations have been thoroughly described, more comparative research between issues and countries is needed in order to draw reliable conclusions about the factors explaining the peculiarities of denial. This may in turn lay the ground for developing and actually testing the effectiveness and efficiency of strategies to counter environmental science denial. Irrespective of the ambitions of environmental goals, science-based policies are always preferable. The scientific community therefore needs to increase its efforts to dismantle false claims and to disclose the schemes of denialists.},
	urldate = {2024-09-20},
	journal = {Journal of Cleaner Production},
	author = {Björnberg, Karin Edvardsson and Karlsson, Mikael and Gilek, Michael and Hansson, Sven Ove},
	month = nov,
	year = {2017},
	keywords = {Climate change, Doubt, Environment, Evidence, Policy, Science denial},
	pages = {229--241},
}

Denial of scientific findings is neither a new nor an unexplored phenomenon. In the area of environmental science and policy though, the research on denial has not been systematically summarized and analyzed. This article reviews 161 scientific articles on environmental and climate science denial published in peer reviewed international journals in the last 25 years and aims to both identify research gaps and enable learning on the phenomenon. Such knowledge is needed for the increasingly important task to provide effective response to science denial, in order to put an end to its influence on environmental policy making. The review, which is based on articles found in the databases Web of Science, Scopus and Philosopher's Index, shows that denial by far is most studied in relation to climate change, with a focus on Anglo-American countries, where this form of denial is most common. Other environmental issues and other geographical areas have received much less scientific attention. While the actors behind climate science denial, their various motives and the characteristics of their operations have been thoroughly described, more comparative research between issues and countries is needed in order to draw reliable conclusions about the factors explaining the peculiarities of denial. This may in turn lay the ground for developing and actually testing the effectiveness and efficiency of strategies to counter environmental science denial. Irrespective of the ambitions of environmental goals, science-based policies are always preferable. The scientific community therefore needs to increase its efforts to dismantle false claims and to disclose the schemes of denialists.

@book{robichaud_responsibility_2017,
	address = {Oxford, New York},
	title = {Responsibility: {The} {Epistemic} {Condition}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-877966-7},
	shorttitle = {Responsibility},
	abstract = {Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
             
             
              
            ,  
             Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	editor = {Robichaud, Philip and Wieland, Jan Willem},
	month = jun,
	year = {2017},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition? , Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?

@article{dubois_generalized_2017,
	title = {Generalized possibilistic logic: {Foundations} and applications to qualitative reasoning about uncertainty},
	volume = {252},
	shorttitle = {Generalized possibilistic logic},
	doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2017.08.001},
	abstract = {This paper introduces generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), a logic for epistemic reasoning based on possibility theory. Formulas in GPL correspond to propositional combinations of assertions such as “it is certain to degree λ that the propositional formula α is true”. As its name suggests, the logic generalizes possibilistic logic (PL), which at the syntactic level only allows conjunctions of the aforementioned type of assertions. At the semantic level, PL can only encode sets of epistemic states encompassed by a single least informed one, whereas GPL can encode any set of epistemic states. This feature makes GPL particularly suitable for reasoning about what an agent knows about the beliefs of another agent, e.g., allowing the former to draw conclusions about what the other agent does not know. We introduce an axiomatization for GPL and show its soundness and completeness w.r.t. possibilistic semantics. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness of GPL as a powerful unifying framework for various knowledge representation formalisms. Among others, we show how comparative uncertainty and ignorance can be modelled in GPL. We also exhibit a close connection between GPL and various existing formalisms, including possibilistic logic with partially ordered formulas, a logic of conditional assertions in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, answer set programming and a fragment of the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of reasoning in GPL, identifying decision problems at the first, second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.},
	journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
	author = {Dubois, D. and Prade, H. and Schockaert, S.},
	year = {2017},
	keywords = {Epistemic reasoning, Non-monotonic reasoning, Possibilistic logic},
	pages = {139--174},
}

This paper introduces generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), a logic for epistemic reasoning based on possibility theory. Formulas in GPL correspond to propositional combinations of assertions such as “it is certain to degree λ that the propositional formula α is true”. As its name suggests, the logic generalizes possibilistic logic (PL), which at the syntactic level only allows conjunctions of the aforementioned type of assertions. At the semantic level, PL can only encode sets of epistemic states encompassed by a single least informed one, whereas GPL can encode any set of epistemic states. This feature makes GPL particularly suitable for reasoning about what an agent knows about the beliefs of another agent, e.g., allowing the former to draw conclusions about what the other agent does not know. We introduce an axiomatization for GPL and show its soundness and completeness w.r.t. possibilistic semantics. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness of GPL as a powerful unifying framework for various knowledge representation formalisms. Among others, we show how comparative uncertainty and ignorance can be modelled in GPL. We also exhibit a close connection between GPL and various existing formalisms, including possibilistic logic with partially ordered formulas, a logic of conditional assertions in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, answer set programming and a fragment of the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of reasoning in GPL, identifying decision problems at the first, second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.

@book{pritchard_epistemology_2016,
	address = {New York},
	edition = {2nd edition},
	series = {Palgrave philosophy {Today}},
	title = {Epistemology},
	isbn = {978-1-137-52690-8 978-1-137-52691-5 978-1-137-52692-2},
	language = {eng},
	publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
	author = {Pritchard, Duncan},
	year = {2016},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

@misc{dapollonia_controverses_2014,
	title = {Les controverses climatiques: une analyse socioépistémique},
	shorttitle = {Les controverses climatiques},
	url = {http://rgdoi.net/10.13140/2.1.1399.0401},
	doi = {10.13140/2.1.1399.0401},
	abstract = {This PhD dissertation sets out to analyze, in a socioepistemic way, the various controversies relating to global warming. This work is based on two objectives: (1) to develop and test a reflective analysis tool developed as an ongoing investigation in a single analytical framework articulating existing and occasionally controversial frameworks. (2) To analyze actors’ strategies and arguments in the different areas of mediation concerning controversial climate system of knowledge, regarding the understanding to disentangle epistemological and axiological dimensions. This thesis is based on a bibliometric work to build a socio-historical reconstruction of the main controversial elements from the eighteenth century to the present time. Following this epistemological basis the analysis progresses in three steps. The first is an analysis based on a researcher’s corpus (climatologists or otherwise) in various situation of communication, secondly completed by inquiry detailed survey with individual and collective interviews and finally a sociolinguistic analysis. Only then does it become possible to provide a radiography of global warming controversies restoring the part we can see, the In and the Off, to unravel the ontological, epistemological and axiological dimensions.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2024-09-17},
	publisher = {Unpublished},
	author = {D'Apollonia, Lionel Scotto},
	year = {2014},
}

This PhD dissertation sets out to analyze, in a socioepistemic way, the various controversies relating to global warming. This work is based on two objectives: (1) to develop and test a reflective analysis tool developed as an ongoing investigation in a single analytical framework articulating existing and occasionally controversial frameworks. (2) To analyze actors’ strategies and arguments in the different areas of mediation concerning controversial climate system of knowledge, regarding the understanding to disentangle epistemological and axiological dimensions. This thesis is based on a bibliometric work to build a socio-historical reconstruction of the main controversial elements from the eighteenth century to the present time. Following this epistemological basis the analysis progresses in three steps. The first is an analysis based on a researcher’s corpus (climatologists or otherwise) in various situation of communication, secondly completed by inquiry detailed survey with individual and collective interviews and finally a sociolinguistic analysis. Only then does it become possible to provide a radiography of global warming controversies restoring the part we can see, the In and the Off, to unravel the ontological, epistemological and axiological dimensions.

@book{spears_baptized_2014,
	title = {Baptized in {PCBs}: {Race}, {Pollution}, and {Justice} in an {All}-{American} {Town}},
	isbn = {978-1-4696-1171-6},
	shorttitle = {Baptized in {PCBs}},
	url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469611723_spears},
	abstract = {In the mid-1990s, residents of Anniston, Alabama, began a legal fight against the agrochemical company Monsanto over the dumping of PCBs in the city's historically African American and white working-class west side. Simultaneously, Anniston environmentalists sought to safely eliminate chemical weaponry that had been secretly stockpiled near the city during the Cold War. In this probing work, Ellen Griffith Spears offers a compelling narrative of Anniston's battles for environmental justice, exposing how systemic racial and class inequalities reinforced during the Jim Crow era played out in these intense contemporary social movements.Spears focuses attention on key figures who shaped Anniston--from Monsanto's founders, to white and African American activists, to the ordinary Anniston residents whose lives and health were deeply affected by the town's military-industrial history and the legacy of racism. Situating the personal struggles and triumphs of Anniston residents within a larger national story of regulatory regimes and legal strategies that have affected toxic towns across America, Spears unflinchingly explores the causes and implications of environmental inequalities, showing how civil rights movement activism undergirded Anniston's campaigns for redemption and justice.},
	urldate = {2024-08-21},
	publisher = {University of North Carolina Press},
	author = {Spears, Ellen Griffith},
	year = {2014},
}

In the mid-1990s, residents of Anniston, Alabama, began a legal fight against the agrochemical company Monsanto over the dumping of PCBs in the city's historically African American and white working-class west side. Simultaneously, Anniston environmentalists sought to safely eliminate chemical weaponry that had been secretly stockpiled near the city during the Cold War. In this probing work, Ellen Griffith Spears offers a compelling narrative of Anniston's battles for environmental justice, exposing how systemic racial and class inequalities reinforced during the Jim Crow era played out in these intense contemporary social movements.Spears focuses attention on key figures who shaped Anniston–from Monsanto's founders, to white and African American activists, to the ordinary Anniston residents whose lives and health were deeply affected by the town's military-industrial history and the legacy of racism. Situating the personal struggles and triumphs of Anniston residents within a larger national story of regulatory regimes and legal strategies that have affected toxic towns across America, Spears unflinchingly explores the causes and implications of environmental inequalities, showing how civil rights movement activism undergirded Anniston's campaigns for redemption and justice.

@article{lewandowsky_nasa_2013,
	title = {{NASA} {Faked} the {Moon} {Landing}—{Therefore}, ({Climate}) {Science} {Is} a {Hoax}: {An} {Anatomy} of the {Motivated} {Rejection} of {Science}},
	volume = {24},
	issn = {0956-7976},
	shorttitle = {{NASA} {Faked} the {Moon} {Landing}—{Therefore}, ({Climate}) {Science} {Is} a {Hoax}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612457686},
	doi = {10.1177/0956797612457686},
	abstract = {Although nearly all domain experts agree that carbon dioxide emissions are altering the world’s climate, segments of the public remain unconvinced by the scientific evidence. Internet blogs have become a platform for denial of climate change, and bloggers have taken a prominent role in questioning climate science. We report a survey of climate-blog visitors to identify the variables underlying acceptance and rejection of climate science. Our findings parallel those of previous work and show that endorsement of free-market economics predicted rejection of climate science. Endorsement of free markets also predicted the rejection of other established scientific findings, such as the facts that HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer. We additionally show that, above and beyond endorsement of free markets, endorsement of a cluster of conspiracy theories (e.g., that the Federal Bureau of Investigation killed Martin Luther King, Jr.) predicted rejection of climate science as well as other scientific findings. Our results provide empirical support for previous suggestions that conspiratorial thinking contributes to the rejection of science. Acceptance of science, by contrast, was strongly associated with the perception of a consensus among scientists.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-10-02},
	journal = {Psychological Science},
	author = {Lewandowsky, Stephan and Oberauer, Klaus and Gignac, Gilles E.},
	month = may,
	year = {2013},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	pages = {622--633},
}

Although nearly all domain experts agree that carbon dioxide emissions are altering the world’s climate, segments of the public remain unconvinced by the scientific evidence. Internet blogs have become a platform for denial of climate change, and bloggers have taken a prominent role in questioning climate science. We report a survey of climate-blog visitors to identify the variables underlying acceptance and rejection of climate science. Our findings parallel those of previous work and show that endorsement of free-market economics predicted rejection of climate science. Endorsement of free markets also predicted the rejection of other established scientific findings, such as the facts that HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer. We additionally show that, above and beyond endorsement of free markets, endorsement of a cluster of conspiracy theories (e.g., that the Federal Bureau of Investigation killed Martin Luther King, Jr.) predicted rejection of climate science as well as other scientific findings. Our results provide empirical support for previous suggestions that conspiratorial thinking contributes to the rejection of science. Acceptance of science, by contrast, was strongly associated with the perception of a consensus among scientists.

@article{fallis_privacy_2013,
	title = {Privacy and {Lack} of {Knowledge}},
	volume = {10},
	issn = {1742-3600},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/privacy-and-lack-of-knowledge/035F3385A8ED7A0A828BA6DABB1BF1DF},
	doi = {10.1017/epi.2013.13},
	abstract = {Two sorts of connections between privacy and knowledge (or lack thereof) have been suggested in the philosophical literature. First, Alvin Goldman has suggested that protecting privacy typically leads to less knowledge being acquired. Second, several other philosophers (e.g. Parent, Matheson, Blaauw and Peels) have claimed that lack of knowledge is definitive of having privacy. In other words, someone not knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else having privacy about that thing. Or equivalently, someone knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else losing privacy about that thing. In this paper, I argue that both of these suggestions are incorrect. I begin by arguing, contra Goldman, that protecting privacy often leads to more knowledge being acquired. I argue in the remainder of the paper, contra the defenders of the knowledge account of privacy, that someone knowing something is not necessary for someone else losing privacy about that thing.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Episteme},
	author = {Fallis, Don},
	year = {2013},
	note = {Edition: 2013/05/24
Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {153--166},
}

Two sorts of connections between privacy and knowledge (or lack thereof) have been suggested in the philosophical literature. First, Alvin Goldman has suggested that protecting privacy typically leads to less knowledge being acquired. Second, several other philosophers (e.g. Parent, Matheson, Blaauw and Peels) have claimed that lack of knowledge is definitive of having privacy. In other words, someone not knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else having privacy about that thing. Or equivalently, someone knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else losing privacy about that thing. In this paper, I argue that both of these suggestions are incorrect. I begin by arguing, contra Goldman, that protecting privacy often leads to more knowledge being acquired. I argue in the remainder of the paper, contra the defenders of the knowledge account of privacy, that someone knowing something is not necessary for someone else losing privacy about that thing.

@article{henry_common_2012,
	title = {A {Common} {Pesticide} {Decreases} {Foraging} {Success} and {Survival} in {Honey} {Bees}},
	volume = {336},
	copyright = {Copyright © 2012, American Association for the Advancement of Science},
	issn = {0036-8075, 1095-9203},
	url = {https://science.sciencemag.org/content/336/6079/348},
	doi = {10.1126/science.1215039},
	abstract = {Nonlethal exposure of honey bees to thiamethoxam (neonicotinoid systemic pesticide) causes high mortality due to homing failure at levels that could put a colony at risk of collapse. Simulated exposure events on free-ranging foragers labeled with a radio-frequency identification tag suggest that homing is impaired by thiamethoxam intoxication. These experiments offer new insights into the consequences of common neonicotinoid pesticides used worldwide.
Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide.
Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide.},
	language = {en},
	number = {6079},
	urldate = {2019-10-04},
	journal = {Science},
	author = {Henry, Mickaël and Béguin, Maxime and Requier, Fabrice and Rollin, Orianne and Odoux, Jean-François and Aupinel, Pierrick and Aptel, Jean and Tchamitchian, Sylvie and Decourtye, Axel},
	month = apr,
	year = {2012},
	pmid = {22461498},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {348--350},
}

Nonlethal exposure of honey bees to thiamethoxam (neonicotinoid systemic pesticide) causes high mortality due to homing failure at levels that could put a colony at risk of collapse. Simulated exposure events on free-ranging foragers labeled with a radio-frequency identification tag suggest that homing is impaired by thiamethoxam intoxication. These experiments offer new insights into the consequences of common neonicotinoid pesticides used worldwide. Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide. Honey bees cannot find their way home after exposure to sublethal doses of a widely used insecticide.

@book{tudor_hart_political_2010,
	address = {Bristol ; Portland, OR},
	edition = {2nd ed},
	title = {The political economy of health care: where the {NHS} came from and where it could lead},
	isbn = {978-1-84742-783-0},
	shorttitle = {The political economy of health care},
	publisher = {Policy Press},
	author = {Tudor Hart, Julian},
	year = {2010},
	keywords = {Great Britain, Medical economics, National Health Service, National health services, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

@book{bammer_uncertainty_2009,
	address = {London},
	edition = {Pbk. ed},
	series = {Earthscan risk and society series},
	title = {Uncertainty and risk: multidisciplinary perspectives},
	isbn = {978-1-84407-851-6},
	shorttitle = {Uncertainty and risk},
	url = {http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0804/2007041551.html},
	abstract = {Uncertainty governs our lives. This title examines uncertainty in emergency management, intelligence, law enforcement, music, policy and politics. It focuses on key problems such as environmental management, communicable diseases and illicit drugs. It offers major conceptual strands in uncertainty thinking.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2024-09-06},
	publisher = {Earthscan},
	author = {Bammer, Gabriele and Smithson, Michael},
	year = {2009},
	note = {OCLC: 694771237},
	keywords = {Entscheidung, Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit, Incertitude, Risiko, Risikobewusstsein, Risk, Risque, Uncertainty, Unsicherheit},
}

Uncertainty governs our lives. This title examines uncertainty in emergency management, intelligence, law enforcement, music, policy and politics. It focuses on key problems such as environmental management, communicable diseases and illicit drugs. It offers major conceptual strands in uncertainty thinking.

@book{rescher_ignorance_2009,
	title = {Ignorance: ({On} the {Wider} {Implications} of {Deficient} {Knowledge})},
	isbn = {978-0-8229-6014-0},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance},
	url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wrb89},
	abstract = {Historically, there has been great deliberation about the limits of human knowledge. Isaac Newton, recognizing his own shortcomings, once described himself as "a boy standing on the seashore . . . whilst the great ocean of truth lay all underscored before me."  In \textit{Ignorance,} Nicholas Rescher presents a broad-ranging study that examines the manifestations, consequences, and occasional benefits of ignorance in areas of philosophy, scientific endeavor, and ordinary life. Citing philosophers, theologians, and scientists from Socrates to Steven Hawking, Rescher seeks to uncover the factors that hinder our cognition.  Rescher categorizes ignorance as ontologically grounded (rooted in acts of nature-erasure, chaos, and chance-that prevent fact determination), or epistemically grounded (the inadequacy of our information-securing resources). He then defines the basis of ignorance: inaccessible data; statistical fogs; secreted information; past data that have left no trace; future discoveries; future contingencies; vagrant predicates; and superior intelligences. Such impediments set limits to inquiry and mean that while we can always extend our existing knowledge-variability here is infinite-there are things that we will never know.Cognitive finitude also hinders our ability to assimilate more than a certain number of facts. We may acquire additional information, but lack the facility to interpret it. More information does not always increase knowledge; it may point us further down the path toward an erroneous conclusion. In light of these deficiencies, Rescher looks to the role of computers in solving problems and expanding our knowledge base, but finds limits to their reasoning capacity.  As Rescher's comprehensive study concludes, ignorance itself is a fertile topic for knowledge, and recognizing the boundaries of our comprehension is where wisdom begins.},
	urldate = {2024-06-24},
	publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press},
	author = {Rescher, Nicholas},
	year = {2009},
	doi = {10.2307/j.ctt6wrb89},
}

Historically, there has been great deliberation about the limits of human knowledge. Isaac Newton, recognizing his own shortcomings, once described himself as "a boy standing on the seashore . . . whilst the great ocean of truth lay all underscored before me." In Ignorance, Nicholas Rescher presents a broad-ranging study that examines the manifestations, consequences, and occasional benefits of ignorance in areas of philosophy, scientific endeavor, and ordinary life. Citing philosophers, theologians, and scientists from Socrates to Steven Hawking, Rescher seeks to uncover the factors that hinder our cognition. Rescher categorizes ignorance as ontologically grounded (rooted in acts of nature-erasure, chaos, and chance-that prevent fact determination), or epistemically grounded (the inadequacy of our information-securing resources). He then defines the basis of ignorance: inaccessible data; statistical fogs; secreted information; past data that have left no trace; future discoveries; future contingencies; vagrant predicates; and superior intelligences. Such impediments set limits to inquiry and mean that while we can always extend our existing knowledge-variability here is infinite-there are things that we will never know.Cognitive finitude also hinders our ability to assimilate more than a certain number of facts. We may acquire additional information, but lack the facility to interpret it. More information does not always increase knowledge; it may point us further down the path toward an erroneous conclusion. In light of these deficiencies, Rescher looks to the role of computers in solving problems and expanding our knowledge base, but finds limits to their reasoning capacity. As Rescher's comprehensive study concludes, ignorance itself is a fertile topic for knowledge, and recognizing the boundaries of our comprehension is where wisdom begins.

@article{jacques_organisation_2008,
	title = {The organisation of denial: {Conservative} think tanks and environmental scepticism},
	volume = {17},
	issn = {0964-4016},
	shorttitle = {The organisation of denial},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010802055576},
	doi = {10.1080/09644010802055576},
	abstract = {Environmental scepticism denies the seriousness of environmental problems, and self-professed ‘sceptics’ claim to be unbiased analysts combating ‘junk science’. This study quantitatively analyses 141 English-language environmentally sceptical books published between 1972 and 2005. We find that over 92 per cent of these books, most published in the US since 1992, are linked to conservative think tanks (CTTs). Further, we analyse CTTs involved with environmental issues and find that 90 per cent of them espouse environmental scepticism. We conclude that scepticism is a tactic of an elite-driven counter-movement designed to combat environmentalism, and that the successful use of this tactic has contributed to the weakening of US commitment to environmental protection.},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2024-10-02},
	journal = {Environmental Politics},
	author = {Jacques, Peter J. and Dunlap, Riley E. and Freeman, Mark},
	month = jun,
	year = {2008},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010802055576},
	pages = {349--385},
}

Environmental scepticism denies the seriousness of environmental problems, and self-professed ‘sceptics’ claim to be unbiased analysts combating ‘junk science’. This study quantitatively analyses 141 English-language environmentally sceptical books published between 1972 and 2005. We find that over 92 per cent of these books, most published in the US since 1992, are linked to conservative think tanks (CTTs). Further, we analyse CTTs involved with environmental issues and find that 90 per cent of them espouse environmental scepticism. We conclude that scepticism is a tactic of an elite-driven counter-movement designed to combat environmentalism, and that the successful use of this tactic has contributed to the weakening of US commitment to environmental protection.

@book{mcculloch_defending_2008,
	address = {Oxford ; New York},
	title = {Defending the indefensible: the global asbestos industry and its fight for survival},
	isbn = {978-0-19-953485-2},
	shorttitle = {Defending the indefensible},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {McCulloch, Jock and Tweedale, Geoffrey},
	year = {2008},
	note = {OCLC: ocn192027118},
	keywords = {20th century, Asbestos industry, Corrupt practices, Health aspects, History},
}

@article{fitzpatrick_moral_2008,
	title = {Moral {Responsibility} and {Normative} {Ignorance}: {Answering} a {New} {Skeptical} {Challenge}},
	volume = {118},
	issn = {0014-1704},
	shorttitle = {Moral {Responsibility} and {Normative} {Ignorance}},
	url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/589532},
	doi = {10.1086/589532},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2024-06-24},
	journal = {Ethics},
	author = {FitzPatrick, William J.},
	month = jul,
	year = {2008},
	note = {Publisher: The University of Chicago Press},
	pages = {589--613},
}

@article{biddle_lessons_2007,
	title = {Lessons from the {Vioxx} {Debacle}: {What} the {Privatization} of {Science} {Can} {Teach} {Us} {About} {Social} {Epistemology}},
	volume = {21},
	issn = {0269-1728},
	shorttitle = {Lessons from the {Vioxx} {Debacle}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02691720601125472},
	doi = {10.1080/02691720601125472},
	abstract = {Since the early 1980s, private, for‐profit corporations have become increasingly involved in all aspects of scientific research, especially of biomedical research. In this essay, I argue that there are dangerous epistemic consequences of this trend, which should be more thoroughly examined by social epistemologists. In support of this claim, I discuss a recent episode of pharmaceutical research involving the painkiller Vioxx. I argue that the research on Vioxx was epistemically problematic and that the primary cause of these inadequacies was faulty institutional arrangements. More specifically, the research was organized in such a way as to allow short‐term commercial interests to compromise epistemic integrity. Thus, the Vioxx case study, in conjunction with numerous case studies developed elsewhere, provides strong reasons for believing that the privatization of the biomedical sciences is epistemically worrisome, and it suggests that the primary response to this situation should be a social, or organizational, one. What kind of organizational response would be most beneficial? I briefly discuss two prominent social epistemological proposals for how scientific research should be organized—namely those of Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino—and I suggest that they are incapable of dealing with the phenomenon of privatization. I then draw upon the Vioxx episode in order to outline an alternative suggestion for reorganizing certain aspects of pharmaceutical research.},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-09-21},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Biddle, Justin},
	month = jan,
	year = {2007},
	keywords = {Commercialization of Science, Kitcher, Longino, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Privatization of Science, Social Epistemology, Vioxx},
	pages = {21--39},
}

Since the early 1980s, private, for‐profit corporations have become increasingly involved in all aspects of scientific research, especially of biomedical research. In this essay, I argue that there are dangerous epistemic consequences of this trend, which should be more thoroughly examined by social epistemologists. In support of this claim, I discuss a recent episode of pharmaceutical research involving the painkiller Vioxx. I argue that the research on Vioxx was epistemically problematic and that the primary cause of these inadequacies was faulty institutional arrangements. More specifically, the research was organized in such a way as to allow short‐term commercial interests to compromise epistemic integrity. Thus, the Vioxx case study, in conjunction with numerous case studies developed elsewhere, provides strong reasons for believing that the privatization of the biomedical sciences is epistemically worrisome, and it suggests that the primary response to this situation should be a social, or organizational, one. What kind of organizational response would be most beneficial? I briefly discuss two prominent social epistemological proposals for how scientific research should be organized—namely those of Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino—and I suggest that they are incapable of dealing with the phenomenon of privatization. I then draw upon the Vioxx episode in order to outline an alternative suggestion for reorganizing certain aspects of pharmaceutical research.

@article{coady_are_2007,
	title = {Are {Conspiracy} {Theorists} {Irrational}?},
	volume = {4},
	issn = {1750-0117, 1742-3600},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/are-conspiracy-theorists-irrational/7E0DC481ECA2701512F55FFB6950ED5A},
	doi = {10.3366/epi.2007.4.2.193},
	abstract = {It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best definitions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be occasions on which we should settle for an inferior definition which entails that conspiracy theorists are after all irrational. Three, if and when we do this, we should recognise that conspiracy theorists so understood are at one end of a spectrum, and the really worrying form of irrationality is at the other end.},
	language = {en},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2020-11-18},
	journal = {Episteme},
	author = {Coady, David},
	month = jun,
	year = {2007},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {193--204},
}

It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best definitions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be occasions on which we should settle for an inferior definition which entails that conspiracy theorists are after all irrational. Three, if and when we do this, we should recognise that conspiracy theorists so understood are at one end of a spectrum, and the really worrying form of irrationality is at the other end.

@book{hauray_europe_2006,
	address = {Paris},
	title = {L'{Europe} du médicament. {Politique}, expertise, intérêts privés},
	isbn = {978-2-7246-0979-0},
	abstract = {Lancés à partir de 1960, les efforts pour construire des politiques pharmaceutiques communes se sont vite heurtés aux intérêts nationaux et aux écarts de pratiques et de normes entre pays. En 1993, la création d’une structure institutionnelle innovante, l’Agence européenne du médicament, est finalement décidée et s’impose rapidement comme le cœur du contrôle des médicaments en Europe.
Ce livre analyse, dans une Europe devenue le cadre normatif central et l’horizon stratégique des acteurs, toutes les questions traditionnellement appliquées aux politiques du médicament : comment et pourquoi juge-t-on un médicament acceptable ? Quelle implication les industriels ont-ils dans les procédures de contrôle ? La protection de la santé publique est-elle correctement assurée ? Quelle place les experts ont-ils dans les processus de décision politique ?
S’intéresser à la régulation des médicaments paraît d’autant plus pertinent que le secteur pharmaceutique et son contrôle par les pouvoirs publics traversent une crise grave depuis quelques années.},
	publisher = {Presses de Sciences Po},
	author = {Hauray, Boris},
	year = {2006},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Lancés à partir de 1960, les efforts pour construire des politiques pharmaceutiques communes se sont vite heurtés aux intérêts nationaux et aux écarts de pratiques et de normes entre pays. En 1993, la création d’une structure institutionnelle innovante, l’Agence européenne du médicament, est finalement décidée et s’impose rapidement comme le cœur du contrôle des médicaments en Europe. Ce livre analyse, dans une Europe devenue le cadre normatif central et l’horizon stratégique des acteurs, toutes les questions traditionnellement appliquées aux politiques du médicament : comment et pourquoi juge-t-on un médicament acceptable ? Quelle implication les industriels ont-ils dans les procédures de contrôle ? La protection de la santé publique est-elle correctement assurée ? Quelle place les experts ont-ils dans les processus de décision politique ? S’intéresser à la régulation des médicaments paraît d’autant plus pertinent que le secteur pharmaceutique et son contrôle par les pouvoirs publics traversent une crise grave depuis quelques années.

@article{henry_du_2003,
	title = {Du silence au scandale. {Des} difficultés des médias d'information à se saisir de la question de l'amiante},
	volume = {122},
	issn = {0751-7971},
	shorttitle = {Du silence au scandale},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-reseaux1-2003-6-page-237.htm},
	abstract = {Cet article analyse quelques-unes des logiques de fonctionnement de 
l’espace médiatique qui peuvent expliquer que la question de l’amiante passe
en quelques mois du statut de problème méconnu et/ou perçu comme peu
intéressant à celui d’affaire ou de scandale de santé publique de premier
plan. Sont principalement mis en évidence : 1. la forte prégnance dans le
groupe des journalistes de routines professionnelles de sélection (quelle
information est jugée pertinente ?) et de construction (comment intéresser le
public ?) de l’information ; 2. la profonde dépendance du champ de
production de l’information vis-à-vis de groupes sociaux extérieurs à leur
secteur d’activités qui contribuent à définir le problème tel qu’il apparaît
publiquement. Cet article met aussi en évidence certaines spécificités des
parcours empruntés par les définitions marginales d’un problème pour
acquérir droit de cité dans l’espace médiatique.},
	language = {fr},
	number = {6},
	urldate = {2024-07-26},
	journal = {Réseaux},
	author = {Henry, Emmanuel},
	year = {2003},
	note = {Place: Montrouge
Publisher: JLE Editions},
	pages = {237--272},
}

Cet article analyse quelques-unes des logiques de fonctionnement de l’espace médiatique qui peuvent expliquer que la question de l’amiante passe en quelques mois du statut de problème méconnu et/ou perçu comme peu intéressant à celui d’affaire ou de scandale de santé publique de premier plan. Sont principalement mis en évidence : 1. la forte prégnance dans le groupe des journalistes de routines professionnelles de sélection (quelle information est jugée pertinente ?) et de construction (comment intéresser le public ?) de l’information ; 2. la profonde dépendance du champ de production de l’information vis-à-vis de groupes sociaux extérieurs à leur secteur d’activités qui contribuent à définir le problème tel qu’il apparaît publiquement. Cet article met aussi en évidence certaines spécificités des parcours empruntés par les définitions marginales d’un problème pour acquérir droit de cité dans l’espace médiatique.

@book{lagroye_politisation_2003,
	series = {Socio-histoires},
	title = {La politisation},
	isbn = {978-2-7011-3588-5},
	abstract = {Trop souvent encore, la politique est réduite à son personnel, à ses partis, à leur concurrence et à leurs crises. Prendre la politique sous l'angle de la politisation, permet d'élargir le champ d'investigation à toutes les modalités, militants ou professionnelles, d'entrée en politique, de volonté ou de refus d'en faire.},
	language = {fr},
	publisher = {Belin},
	editor = {Lagroye, Jacques},
	year = {2003},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Trop souvent encore, la politique est réduite à son personnel, à ses partis, à leur concurrence et à leurs crises. Prendre la politique sous l'angle de la politisation, permet d'élargir le champ d'investigation à toutes les modalités, militants ou professionnelles, d'entrée en politique, de volonté ou de refus d'en faire.

@book{goldman_knowledge_1999,
	address = {Oxford : New York},
	title = {Knowledge in a social world},
	isbn = {978-0-19-823777-8 978-0-19-823820-1},
	publisher = {Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press},
	author = {Goldman, Alvin I.},
	year = {1999},
	keywords = {Old references, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Social epistemology},
}

@article{roussellier_quest-ce_1995,
	title = {Qu'est-ce qu'on ne sait pas ?},
	volume = {47},
	copyright = {free},
	url = {https://www.persee.fr/doc/xxs_0294-1759_1995_num_47_1_3194},
	doi = {10.3406/xxs.1995.3194},
	language = {fre},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-05-28},
	journal = {Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire},
	author = {Roussellier, Nicolas},
	year = {1995},
	pages = {194--195},
}

@article{rappaport_threshold_1993,
	title = {Threshold limit values, permissible exposure limits, and feasibility: {The} bases for exposure limits in the {United} {States}},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {1097-0274},
	shorttitle = {Threshold limit values, permissible exposure limits, and feasibility},
	url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ajim.4700230502},
	doi = {10.1002/ajim.4700230502},
	abstract = {The development of exposure limits in the United States has always relied heavily upon the threshold limit values (TLVs) developed by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). In fact, the TLVs were adopted as official exposure limits by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1972 and 1989. Given the continuing importance of the ACGIH limits, this paper compares the basis of the TLVs with that employed by OSHA de novo in its 12 new permissible exposure limits (PELs). Using benzene as an example, it is shown that OSHA's new PELs have been established following a rigorous assessment of the inherent risks and the feasibility of instituting the limit. The TLVs, on the other hand, have been developed by ad hoc procedures and appear to have traditionally reflected levels thought to be achievable at the time. However, this might be changing. Analysis of the historical reductions of TLVs, for 27 substances on the 1991–1992 list of intended changes, indicates smaller reductions in the past (median reduction of 2.0–2.5-fold between 1946 and 1988) compared to those currently being observed (median reduction of 7.5-fold between 1989 and 1991). Further analysis suggests a more aggressive policy of the ACGIH regarding TLVs for carcinogens but not for substances that produce effects other than cancer. Regardless of whether the basis of the TLVs has changed recently, it would take a relatively long time for the impact of any change to be felt, since the median age of the 1991–1992 TLVs is 16.5 years, and 75\% of these limits are more than 10 years old. The implications of OSHA's continued reliance on the TLVs as a means of updating its PELs are discussed, and four alternatives are presented to the ACGIH regarding the future of its activities related to exposure limits. It is concluded that new mechanisms are needed for OSHA to update its PELs in a timely fashion so that the TLVs will not be adopted by default in the future. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2024-07-17},
	journal = {American Journal of Industrial Medicine},
	author = {Rappaport, S. M.},
	year = {1993},
	note = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/ajim.4700230502},
	keywords = {ACGIH, OSHA, PEL, TLV, benzene, significant risk, standard setting},
	pages = {683--694},
}

The development of exposure limits in the United States has always relied heavily upon the threshold limit values (TLVs) developed by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). In fact, the TLVs were adopted as official exposure limits by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1972 and 1989. Given the continuing importance of the ACGIH limits, this paper compares the basis of the TLVs with that employed by OSHA de novo in its 12 new permissible exposure limits (PELs). Using benzene as an example, it is shown that OSHA's new PELs have been established following a rigorous assessment of the inherent risks and the feasibility of instituting the limit. The TLVs, on the other hand, have been developed by ad hoc procedures and appear to have traditionally reflected levels thought to be achievable at the time. However, this might be changing. Analysis of the historical reductions of TLVs, for 27 substances on the 1991–1992 list of intended changes, indicates smaller reductions in the past (median reduction of 2.0–2.5-fold between 1946 and 1988) compared to those currently being observed (median reduction of 7.5-fold between 1989 and 1991). Further analysis suggests a more aggressive policy of the ACGIH regarding TLVs for carcinogens but not for substances that produce effects other than cancer. Regardless of whether the basis of the TLVs has changed recently, it would take a relatively long time for the impact of any change to be felt, since the median age of the 1991–1992 TLVs is 16.5 years, and 75% of these limits are more than 10 years old. The implications of OSHA's continued reliance on the TLVs as a means of updating its PELs are discussed, and four alternatives are presented to the ACGIH regarding the future of its activities related to exposure limits. It is concluded that new mechanisms are needed for OSHA to update its PELs in a timely fashion so that the TLVs will not be adopted by default in the future. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

@book{rosner_deadly_1991,
	address = {Princeton, N.J},
	title = {Deadly dust: silicosis and the politics of occupational disease in twentieth-century {America}},
	isbn = {978-0-691-04758-4},
	shorttitle = {Deadly dust},
	publisher = {Princeton University Press},
	author = {Rosner, David and Markowitz, Gerald E.},
	year = {1991},
	keywords = {History of Medicine, 20th Cent, Occupational Diseases, Occupational diseases, Political aspects, Politics, Silicosis, Social Environment, Social aspects, United States, history},
}

@article{bromberger_rational_1988,
	title = {Rational ignorance},
	volume = {74},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869618},
	doi = {10.1007/BF00869618},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2024-07-08},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Bromberger, Sylvain},
	month = jan,
	year = {1988},
	pages = {47--64},
}

@article{tudor_hart_inverse_1971,
	series = {Originally published as {Volume} 1, {Issue} 7696},
	title = {The inverse care law},
	volume = {297},
	issn = {0140-6736},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014067367192410X},
	doi = {10.1016/S0140-6736(71)92410-X},
	abstract = {The availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in the population served. This inverse care law operates more completely where medical care is most exposed to market forces, and less so where such exposure is reduced. The market distribution of medical care is a primitive and historically outdated social form, and any return to it would further exaggerate the maldistribution of medical resources.},
	number = {7696},
	urldate = {2024-02-08},
	journal = {The Lancet},
	author = {Tudor Hart, Julian},
	month = feb,
	year = {1971},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {405--412},
}

The availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in the population served. This inverse care law operates more completely where medical care is most exposed to market forces, and less so where such exposure is reduced. The market distribution of medical care is a primitive and historically outdated social form, and any return to it would further exaggerate the maldistribution of medical resources.

@incollection{bromberger_science_1971,
	title = {Science and the {Forms} of {Ignorance}},
	booktitle = {Observation and {Theory} in {Science}},
	publisher = {The Johns Hopkins Press},
	author = {Bromberger, Sylvain},
	editor = {Mandelbaum, Maurice},
	year = {1971},
	pages = {45--67},
}