@article{Andersenetal2023,
  title = {Monetary Policy and Inequality},
  author = {Andersen, Asger Lau and Johannesen, Niels and J{\o}rgensen, Mia and Peydr{\'o}, Jos{\'e}-Luis},
  year = {2023},
  month = jul,
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.13262},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13262},
  abstract = {We analyze the distributional effects of monetary policy on income, wealth, and consumption. We use administrative household-level data covering the entire population in Denmark over the period 1987 to 2014 and exploit a long-standing currency peg as a source of exogenous variation in monetary policy. We find that gains from softer monetary policy in terms of income, wealth, and consumption are monotonically increasing in ex ante income. The distributional effects reflect systematic differences in exposure to the various channels of monetary policy, especially nonlabor channels (e.g., leverage and risky assets). Our estimates imply that softer monetary policy increases income inequality.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We analyze the distributional effects of monetary policy on income, wealth, and consumption. We use administrative household-level data covering the entire population in Denmark over the period 1987 to 2014 and exploit a long-standing currency peg as a source of exogenous variation in monetary policy. We find that gains from softer monetary policy in terms of income, wealth, and consumption are monotonically increasing in ex ante income. The distributional effects reflect systematic differences in exposure to the various channels of monetary policy, especially nonlabor channels (e.g., leverage and risky assets). Our estimates imply that softer monetary policy increases income inequality.

@unpublished{BaselgiaMartinez2023,
  title = {Using Rich Lists to Study the Super-Rich and Top Wealth Inequality: Insights from {{Switzerland}}},
  author = {Baselgia, Enea and Mart{\'i}nez, Isabel Z.},
  year = {2023},
  month = apr,
  url = {https://sites.google.com/view/isabelzmartinez/work-in-progress},
  urldate = {2023-10-17},
  abstract = {We collect, digitize, and supplement Swiss rich lists published in the ``BILANZ'' business magazine since 1989, to gain new insights on the structure and dynamics of top wealth in Switzerland. We show that 60\% of the super-rich are heirs\textemdash a fraction twice as large as in the US, where many super-rich are self-made\textemdash and that wealth mobility at the very top has declined significantly over the past decade. Finally, we estimate the top 0.01\% wealth share. Our results suggest that in Switzerland wealth concentration at the top is likely higher than previous estimates based on wealth tax statistics suggest, highlighting the central role of wealthy expenditure-base taxed foreigners at the very top of the distribution. At the same time, we discuss why top wealth shares based on rich lists likely lead to overestimating wealth inequality\textemdash at least in the Swiss case. While rich lists are a valuable source to study the super-rich, we recommend that researchers use wealth figures from rich lists with caution.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We collect, digitize, and supplement Swiss rich lists published in the ``BILANZ'' business magazine since 1989, to gain new insights on the structure and dynamics of top wealth in Switzerland. We show that 60% of the super-rich are heirs— a fraction twice as large as in the US, where many super-rich are self-made— and that wealth mobility at the very top has declined significantly over the past decade. Finally, we estimate the top 0.01% wealth share. Our results suggest that in Switzerland wealth concentration at the top is likely higher than previous estimates based on wealth tax statistics suggest, highlighting the central role of wealthy expenditure-base taxed foreigners at the very top of the distribution. At the same time, we discuss why top wealth shares based on rich lists likely lead to overestimating wealth inequality— at least in the Swiss case. While rich lists are a valuable source to study the super-rich, we recommend that researchers use wealth figures from rich lists with caution.

@article{BlanchetMartinez-Toledano2023,
  title = {Wealth Inequality Dynamics in {{Europe}} and the {{United States}}: Understanding the Determinants},
  author = {Blanchet, Thomas and {Mart{\'i}nez-Toledano}, Clara},
  year = {2023},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
  volume = {133},
  pages = {25--43},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jmoneco.2022.11.010},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2022.11.010},
  urldate = {2023-10-17},
  abstract = {This paper studies the interaction between the long-term dynamics of aggregate household wealth and the wealth distribution in Europe and the United States. We do so by building the first Distributional Wealth Accounts for Europe, including households' assets, liabilities, investment flows, and the wealth distribution for most European countries from 1970\textendash 2020. We find that although aggregate household wealth to income ratios have followed a similar increasing pattern in both Europe and the United States since 1970, wealth concentration has increased much faster in the United States. Using wealth accumulation decompositions and counterfactual simulations, we show that the weaker rise in labor income inequality and the stronger rise in house prices relative to financial assets in Europe versus the United States appear to explain why Europe has experienced a more moderate rise in wealth concentration since the mid-1980s.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper studies the interaction between the long-term dynamics of aggregate household wealth and the wealth distribution in Europe and the United States. We do so by building the first Distributional Wealth Accounts for Europe, including households' assets, liabilities, investment flows, and the wealth distribution for most European countries from 1970– 2020. We find that although aggregate household wealth to income ratios have followed a similar increasing pattern in both Europe and the United States since 1970, wealth concentration has increased much faster in the United States. Using wealth accumulation decompositions and counterfactual simulations, we show that the weaker rise in labor income inequality and the stronger rise in house prices relative to financial assets in Europe versus the United States appear to explain why Europe has experienced a more moderate rise in wealth concentration since the mid-1980s.

@techreport{Carranzaetal2023,
  type = {{{III Working Paper}}},
  title = {Wealth Inequality in {{Latin America}}},
  author = {Carranza, Rafael and De Rosa, Mauricio and Flores, Ignacio},
  year = {2023},
  month = jun,
  number = {108},
  institution = {{International Inequalities Institute}},
  url = {https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/119426/},
  urldate = {2023-10-17},
  abstract = {How wealth has accumulated in the region and how is it distributed across households? Despite being widely recognized for its extreme income inequality, reliable data on wealth is scarce, partial and oftentimes contradictory, making it difficult to answer these basic questions. In this study, we estimate aggregates based on macroeconomic data, and inequality based on recently available surveys. We contrast our results with the literature, with a handful of state-of-the-art estimates from administrative sources, and with more available but extrapolated estimates from Credit Suisse and wid.world. Considering all the evidence, we distinguish reliable facts from what can only be conjectured or speculated. We find that aggregate wealth increased over two decades in four countries, now ranging close to 3.5 the national income for market value estimates and 5-6 times at book values. We also find that wealth inequality is amongst the highest in the world were it can be measured. Given data limitations, one can only speculate about aggregates in opaque countries and about inequality trends in any country in the region. Although recent research in the developed world has focused in combining data sources to better understand wealth, the region lags behind and urgently requires more and better public information.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

How wealth has accumulated in the region and how is it distributed across households? Despite being widely recognized for its extreme income inequality, reliable data on wealth is scarce, partial and oftentimes contradictory, making it difficult to answer these basic questions. In this study, we estimate aggregates based on macroeconomic data, and inequality based on recently available surveys. We contrast our results with the literature, with a handful of state-of-the-art estimates from administrative sources, and with more available but extrapolated estimates from Credit Suisse and wid.world. Considering all the evidence, we distinguish reliable facts from what can only be conjectured or speculated. We find that aggregate wealth increased over two decades in four countries, now ranging close to 3.5 the national income for market value estimates and 5-6 times at book values. We also find that wealth inequality is amongst the highest in the world were it can be measured. Given data limitations, one can only speculate about aggregates in opaque countries and about inequality trends in any country in the region. Although recent research in the developed world has focused in combining data sources to better understand wealth, the region lags behind and urgently requires more and better public information.

@unpublished{Disslbacheretal2023,
  title = {On Top of the Top: A Generalized Approach to the Estimation of Wealth Distributions},
  author = {Disslbacher, Franziska and Ertl, Michael and List, Emanuel and Mokre, Patrick and Schnetzer, Matthias},
  year = {2023},
  month = jul,
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4499915},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4499915},
  abstract = {The wealth distribution is infamously top-heavy, while the decisive upper tail is missing from survey data on household wealth in European countries. We provide a novel quantile regression approach to estimate all parameters of the Pareto and Generalized Pareto distribution to adjust for the rich missing in survey data due to differential non-response and under-reporting. In contrast to existing Pareto-based adjustment routines, the generalized and rules-based method is scalable, flexible in the face of heterogeneities in data quality and wealth accumulation regimes, transparent, and prevents over-shooting of wealth aggregates and wealth concentration estimates. We apply the method to data on fourteen Eurozone countries by supplementing the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) with a novel database on country-specific rich lists from the European Rich List Database (ERLDB) compiled from country-specific rich lists. The magnitude of the resulting upper-tail adjustments varies substantially across countries, highlighting the importance of the rules-based method developed here. In addition, while the results are highly stable across an extensive range of sensitivity tests addressing the opacities of ERLDB data, the resulting estimates vary substantially across parameters borrowed from prior work.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

The wealth distribution is infamously top-heavy, while the decisive upper tail is missing from survey data on household wealth in European countries. We provide a novel quantile regression approach to estimate all parameters of the Pareto and Generalized Pareto distribution to adjust for the rich missing in survey data due to differential non-response and under-reporting. In contrast to existing Pareto-based adjustment routines, the generalized and rules-based method is scalable, flexible in the face of heterogeneities in data quality and wealth accumulation regimes, transparent, and prevents over-shooting of wealth aggregates and wealth concentration estimates. We apply the method to data on fourteen Eurozone countries by supplementing the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) with a novel database on country-specific rich lists from the European Rich List Database (ERLDB) compiled from country-specific rich lists. The magnitude of the resulting upper-tail adjustments varies substantially across countries, highlighting the importance of the rules-based method developed here. In addition, while the results are highly stable across an extensive range of sensitivity tests addressing the opacities of ERLDB data, the resulting estimates vary substantially across parameters borrowed from prior work.

@article{Genscheletal2023,
  title = {Revenue, Redistribution, and the Rise and Fall of Inheritance Taxation},
  author = {Genschel, Philipp and Limberg, Julian and Seelkopf, Laura},
  year = {2023},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
  doi = {10.1177/00104140231194065},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231194065},
  abstract = {Why do countries repeal the inheritance tax? To investigate this question, we use a novel dataset on inheritance tax introductions and repeals worldwide. We argue that revenue requirements are the main determinant of repeal risks: The inheritance tax is resilient as long as it is central to the national revenue system; it becomes vulnerable to attacks once the rise of more efficient tax instruments marginalizes its revenue contribution. Devoid of fiscal purpose, its survival depends mainly on its redistributive features. Redistribution, however, is essentially contested and should be more important in democracies. The evidence is in line with our conjecture: The likelihood of inheritance tax repeal increases as other more buoyant taxes rise and non-democracies are more likely to repeal the tax than democracies.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,{Data Sources: Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}},
  url_file = {Genscheletal2023.pdf}
}

Why do countries repeal the inheritance tax? To investigate this question, we use a novel dataset on inheritance tax introductions and repeals worldwide. We argue that revenue requirements are the main determinant of repeal risks: The inheritance tax is resilient as long as it is central to the national revenue system; it becomes vulnerable to attacks once the rise of more efficient tax instruments marginalizes its revenue contribution. Devoid of fiscal purpose, its survival depends mainly on its redistributive features. Redistribution, however, is essentially contested and should be more important in democracies. The evidence is in line with our conjecture: The likelihood of inheritance tax repeal increases as other more buoyant taxes rise and non-democracies are more likely to repeal the tax than democracies.

@techreport{Heathcoteetal2023,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {More Unequal We Stand? Inequality Dynamics in the {{United States}} 1967\textendash 2021},
  author = {Heathcote, Jonathan and Perri, Fabrizio and Violante, Giovanni L. and Zhang, Lichen},
  year = {2023},
  month = jul,
  number = {31486},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  doi = {10.3386/w31486},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w31486},
  abstract = {Heathcote et al. (2010) conducted an empirical analysis of several dimensions of inequality in the United States over the years 1967-2006, using publicly-available survey data. This paper expands the analysis, and extends it to 2021. We find that since the early 2000s, the college wage premium has stopped growing, and the race wage gap has stalled. However, the gender wage gap has kept shrinking. Both individual- and household-level income inequality have continued to rise at the top, while the cyclical component of inequality dominates dynamics below the median. Inequality in consumption expenditures has remained remarkably stable over time. Income pooling within the family and redistribution by the government have enormous impacts on the dynamics of household-level inequality, with the role of the family diminishing and that of the government growing over time. In particular, largely due to generous government transfers, the COVID recession has been the first downturn in fifty years in which inequality in disposable income and consumption actually declined.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Heathcote et al. (2010) conducted an empirical analysis of several dimensions of inequality in the United States over the years 1967-2006, using publicly-available survey data. This paper expands the analysis, and extends it to 2021. We find that since the early 2000s, the college wage premium has stopped growing, and the race wage gap has stalled. However, the gender wage gap has kept shrinking. Both individual- and household-level income inequality have continued to rise at the top, while the cyclical component of inequality dominates dynamics below the median. Inequality in consumption expenditures has remained remarkably stable over time. Income pooling within the family and redistribution by the government have enormous impacts on the dynamics of household-level inequality, with the role of the family diminishing and that of the government growing over time. In particular, largely due to generous government transfers, the COVID recession has been the first downturn in fifty years in which inequality in disposable income and consumption actually declined.

@article{IaconoPalagi2023,
  title = {A Micro Perspective on r {$>$} g},
  author = {Iacono, Roberto and Palagi, Elisa},
  year = {2023},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Economica},
  volume = {90},
  number = {358},
  pages = {531--556},
  doi = {10.1111/ecca.12464},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12464},
  abstract = {By exploiting large-scale administrative data on income and estimated personal wealth in Norway from 2010 to 2018, this paper establishes the first micro-level analysis of the difference between the real return on wealth and the real growth rate of total pre-tax income, across the entire net wealth distribution. We show that for the top 40\% of the distribution, the aggregate R-G of 1.8\% underestimates its micro counterpart r-g, while the opposite happens for the bottom 60\%. Moreover, for the bottom 50\% of the net wealth distribution, it is indeed the case that r},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {IaconoPalagi2023.pdf}
}

By exploiting large-scale administrative data on income and estimated personal wealth in Norway from 2010 to 2018, this paper establishes the first micro-level analysis of the difference between the real return on wealth and the real growth rate of total pre-tax income, across the entire net wealth distribution. We show that for the top 40% of the distribution, the aggregate R-G of 1.8% underestimates its micro counterpart r-g, while the opposite happens for the bottom 60%. Moreover, for the bottom 50% of the net wealth distribution, it is indeed the case that r

@article{IschinskyTisch2023,
  title = {Women in the Global Super Rich. {{An}} Analysis of the {{Forbes}} World's Billionaires List, 2010\textendash 2023},
  author = {Ischinsky, Emma and Tisch, Daria},
  year = {2023},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Australian Feminist Studies},
  doi = {10.1080/08164649.2023.2243649},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2023.2243649},
  abstract = {Although wealth concentration and large fortunes have attracted increased scholarly attention in recent decades, this work has been largely gender-blind. This study examines changes in the gender composition of global billionaires over the last 14 years (Forbes world's billionaires list, 2010 \textendash{} 2023) and asks how male and female billionaires differ in their likelihood to perpetuate their billionaire status. Between 2010 and 2023, we find a modest increase in the percentage share of female billionaires, from 9.0 to 12.8 percent. While the share of female self-made billionaires more than doubled, the share of female billionaire heirs increased only by 43 percent during the observed period, highlighting the importance to differentiate between the source of billionaires' wealth when studying gender differences. To examine differences in the long-term perpetuation of billionaire fortunes by gender and source of wealth of billionaires, we apply survival analyses. We find that men stay on the Forbes list significantly longer than women. Overall, this study contributes to the literature on gender wealth inequalities by showing how billionaires' wealth is structured by gender.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Although wealth concentration and large fortunes have attracted increased scholarly attention in recent decades, this work has been largely gender-blind. This study examines changes in the gender composition of global billionaires over the last 14 years (Forbes world's billionaires list, 2010 – 2023) and asks how male and female billionaires differ in their likelihood to perpetuate their billionaire status. Between 2010 and 2023, we find a modest increase in the percentage share of female billionaires, from 9.0 to 12.8 percent. While the share of female self-made billionaires more than doubled, the share of female billionaire heirs increased only by 43 percent during the observed period, highlighting the importance to differentiate between the source of billionaires' wealth when studying gender differences. To examine differences in the long-term perpetuation of billionaire fortunes by gender and source of wealth of billionaires, we apply survival analyses. We find that men stay on the Forbes list significantly longer than women. Overall, this study contributes to the literature on gender wealth inequalities by showing how billionaires' wealth is structured by gender.

@article{SchechtlTisch2023,
  title = {Tax Principles, Policy Feedback and Self-Interest: Cross-National Experimental Evidence on Wealth Tax Preferences},
  author = {Schechtl, Manuel and Tisch, Daria},
  year = {2023},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Socio-Economic Review},
  doi = {10.1093/ser/mwac071},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwac071},
  abstract = {Rising wealth inequality and squeezed public budgets has brought wealth tax back into policy discussions. A net wealth tax might help to boost state revenue and reduce wealth inequality. Yet little is known about citizens' attitudes towards the design of a net wealth tax (i.e. the tax unit, exemption and rate). Using a novel multifactorial survey experiment, we examine citizens' endorsement of fundamental principles of taxation. Building on policy feedback theory, we examine if preferences differ in three policy arenas (USA, Germany and UK) and whether individuals' reasoning is dependent on self-interest. While a clear majority in all three countries generally endorses a wealth tax, our findings show that citizens care more about the amount exempted than the tax unit or rate. We do not identify a preference for any specific tax unit. Furthermore, tax preferences seem to be strikingly similar among citizens of all three countries. Yet we show that individuals are mostly concerned about not being personally affected by such a tax, which is reflected in their preference for substantial exemptions. We discuss our findings with regard to our understanding of wealth inequality, tax equity and the potential implications for policymakers.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {mwac071}
}

Rising wealth inequality and squeezed public budgets has brought wealth tax back into policy discussions. A net wealth tax might help to boost state revenue and reduce wealth inequality. Yet little is known about citizens' attitudes towards the design of a net wealth tax (i.e. the tax unit, exemption and rate). Using a novel multifactorial survey experiment, we examine citizens' endorsement of fundamental principles of taxation. Building on policy feedback theory, we examine if preferences differ in three policy arenas (USA, Germany and UK) and whether individuals' reasoning is dependent on self-interest. While a clear majority in all three countries generally endorses a wealth tax, our findings show that citizens care more about the amount exempted than the tax unit or rate. We do not identify a preference for any specific tax unit. Furthermore, tax preferences seem to be strikingly similar among citizens of all three countries. Yet we show that individuals are mostly concerned about not being personally affected by such a tax, which is reflected in their preference for substantial exemptions. We discuss our findings with regard to our understanding of wealth inequality, tax equity and the potential implications for policymakers.

@article{Smithetal2023,
  title = {Top Wealth in {{America}}: New Estimates under Heterogeneous Returns},
  author = {Smith, Matthew and Zidar, Owen and Zwick, Eric},
  year = {2023},
  month = feb,
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {138},
  number = {1},
  pages = {515--573},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qjac033},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac033},
  abstract = {This article uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We assemble new data that link people to their sources of capital income and develop new methods to estimate the degree of return heterogeneity within asset classes. Disaggregated fixed-income data reveal that rich individuals earn much more of their interest income in higher-yielding forms and have much greater exposure to credit risk. Consequently, in recent years, the interest rate on fixed income at the top is approximately 3.5 times higher than the average. We value the population of U.S. firms using firm-level characteristics and apportion this wealth using firm-owner links. We combine this new data on fixed income and pass-through business returns with refined estimates of C-corporation equity, housing, and pension wealth to deliver new capitalized wealth estimates that build upon the methods of Saez and Zucman (2016a). From 1989 to 2016, the top 1\%, 0.1\%, and 0.01\% wealth shares increased by 6.6, 4.6, and 2.9 percentage points, respectively, to 33.7\%, 15.7\%, and 7.1\%. Overall, although we estimate a large degree of return heterogeneity, accounting for this heterogeneity does not change the fundamental story for top wealth shares and their growth\textemdash wealth inequality is high and has risen substantially over recent decades.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/smith-zidar-zwick-topwealthinamericanewestimatesunderheterogeneousreturnsonlineappendix-2022},
  url_replication_package = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/smith-zidar-zwick-topwealthinamericanewestimatesunderheterogeneousreturnsreplicationpackage-2022},
  url_2020_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/smith-zidar-zwick-topwealthinamericanewestimatesandimplicationsfortaxingtherich-2020}
}

This article uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We assemble new data that link people to their sources of capital income and develop new methods to estimate the degree of return heterogeneity within asset classes. Disaggregated fixed-income data reveal that rich individuals earn much more of their interest income in higher-yielding forms and have much greater exposure to credit risk. Consequently, in recent years, the interest rate on fixed income at the top is approximately 3.5 times higher than the average. We value the population of U.S. firms using firm-level characteristics and apportion this wealth using firm-owner links. We combine this new data on fixed income and pass-through business returns with refined estimates of C-corporation equity, housing, and pension wealth to deliver new capitalized wealth estimates that build upon the methods of Saez and Zucman (2016a). From 1989 to 2016, the top 1%, 0.1%, and 0.01% wealth shares increased by 6.6, 4.6, and 2.9 percentage points, respectively, to 33.7%, 15.7%, and 7.1%. Overall, although we estimate a large degree of return heterogeneity, accounting for this heterogeneity does not change the fundamental story for top wealth shares and their growth— wealth inequality is high and has risen substantially over recent decades.

@techreport{Stojanovic2023,
  type = {Working {{Paper Series}}},
  title = {Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: Implications for Income and Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Stojanovi{\'c}, Du{\v s}an},
  year = {2023},
  month = aug,
  number = {760},
  institution = {{CERGE-EI}},
  url = {https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp760.pdf},
  urldate = {2023-08-29},
  abstract = {This study examines how and to what extent quantitative easing of the ECB affects household income and wealth inequality in the euro area. Previous theoretical models have investigated the dynamics of inequality measures through differential access of households to financial/capital market (the portfolio rebalancing channel), neglecting the labor market differential (the earnings heterogeneity channel). Although the portfolio rebalancing channel may provide insight into wealth inequality and non-labor income inequality, this is not the case with labor (and thus total) income inequality. To be in line with the empirical evidence on labor income inequality, this study also considers segmented labor market on the basis of capital-skill complementarity in production and asymmetric real wage rigidities. When only financial market segmentation is considered, the quantitative results indicate a drop in total income inequality that is diminished over time, while wealth inequality experiences a rise that gradually becomes weaker. The introduction of the segmented labor market significantly mitigates the observed drop in total income inequality, while a rise in wealth inequality is largely amplified. Given the possible broadening of the ECB's mandate towards distributional issues in the future, the analysis of segmented labor and financial markets can be more beneficial to the ECB as it provides a clearer picture of the inequality effects.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This study examines how and to what extent quantitative easing of the ECB affects household income and wealth inequality in the euro area. Previous theoretical models have investigated the dynamics of inequality measures through differential access of households to financial/capital market (the portfolio rebalancing channel), neglecting the labor market differential (the earnings heterogeneity channel). Although the portfolio rebalancing channel may provide insight into wealth inequality and non-labor income inequality, this is not the case with labor (and thus total) income inequality. To be in line with the empirical evidence on labor income inequality, this study also considers segmented labor market on the basis of capital-skill complementarity in production and asymmetric real wage rigidities. When only financial market segmentation is considered, the quantitative results indicate a drop in total income inequality that is diminished over time, while wealth inequality experiences a rise that gradually becomes weaker. The introduction of the segmented labor market significantly mitigates the observed drop in total income inequality, while a rise in wealth inequality is largely amplified. Given the possible broadening of the ECB's mandate towards distributional issues in the future, the analysis of segmented labor and financial markets can be more beneficial to the ECB as it provides a clearer picture of the inequality effects.

@article{TischIschinsky2023,
  title = {Top Wealth and Its Historical Origins: Identifying Entrenched Fortunes by Linking Rich Lists over 100 Years},
  author = {Tisch, Daria and Ischinsky, Emma},
  year = {2023},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Socius},
  volume = {9},
  doi = {10.1177/23780231231192774},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/23780231231192774},
  abstract = {The authors examine the historical origins of Germany's 1,032 largest fortunes. The innovation of this research is to link a rich list from 2019 with rich lists from 1913 and genealogical data provided in Wikidata. The authors find a remarkable historical continuity of large fortunes despite two world wars, the Great Depression, regime changes, and different currency reforms. One third of the companies associated with today's largest fortunes were founded before World War I. About 8 percent of today's fortunes can be traced back to fortunes on rich lists from 1913. Regression analyses show that these entrenched fortunes rank on average higher on the rich list than fortunes of younger origin. Network analyses indicate that some of today's largest fortunes are intertwined through marital lines, hinting at social closure at the top. These findings indicate that the accumulation and perpetuation of fortunes over many generations is an important feature of top wealth in Germany.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The authors examine the historical origins of Germany's 1,032 largest fortunes. The innovation of this research is to link a rich list from 2019 with rich lists from 1913 and genealogical data provided in Wikidata. The authors find a remarkable historical continuity of large fortunes despite two world wars, the Great Depression, regime changes, and different currency reforms. One third of the companies associated with today's largest fortunes were founded before World War I. About 8 percent of today's fortunes can be traced back to fortunes on rich lists from 1913. Regression analyses show that these entrenched fortunes rank on average higher on the rich list than fortunes of younger origin. Network analyses indicate that some of today's largest fortunes are intertwined through marital lines, hinting at social closure at the top. These findings indicate that the accumulation and perpetuation of fortunes over many generations is an important feature of top wealth in Germany.

@unpublished{Acciarietal2022,
  title = {The Concentration of Personal Wealth in {{Italy}} 1995\textendash 2016},
  author = {Acciari, Paolo and Alvaredo, Facundo and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2022},
  abstract = {Italy is one the countries with the highest wealth-to-income ratio in the developed world. Despite the growing policy interest, knowledge about the size distribution of wealth is currently limited. In this paper we expand the windows of observation on the distribution of personal wealth using a novel source on the full records of inheritance tax files that we combine with surveys and national accounts, between 1995 and 2016, a period of economic turbulence and structural reforms. Our benchmark results rely on the distribution of the net wealth in the National Accounts balance sheets. Unlike available statistics estimated from household surveys, our results point to a strong rise in wealth inequality since the mid-1990s. Whereas the level of wealth concentration in Italy is in line with other European countries, its time trend appears more in line with the U.S. Moreover, Italy stands out as one of the countries with the strongest decline in the wealth share of the bottom 50\% of the adult population. The paper also sheds light on the determinants on wealth inequality trends. We explore the role of age and the life-cycle, portfolio compositions, inheritance flows, including its concentration, and taxation patterns as main drivers of the observed trends. A range of alternative series of wealth concentration helps us better understand the role of adjustments and imputations, based on a multi-series approach, i.e., comparing the pieces of information given by different and competing sources.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Acciarietal2022.pdf},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Italy is one the countries with the highest wealth-to-income ratio in the developed world. Despite the growing policy interest, knowledge about the size distribution of wealth is currently limited. In this paper we expand the windows of observation on the distribution of personal wealth using a novel source on the full records of inheritance tax files that we combine with surveys and national accounts, between 1995 and 2016, a period of economic turbulence and structural reforms. Our benchmark results rely on the distribution of the net wealth in the National Accounts balance sheets. Unlike available statistics estimated from household surveys, our results point to a strong rise in wealth inequality since the mid-1990s. Whereas the level of wealth concentration in Italy is in line with other European countries, its time trend appears more in line with the U.S. Moreover, Italy stands out as one of the countries with the strongest decline in the wealth share of the bottom 50% of the adult population. The paper also sheds light on the determinants on wealth inequality trends. We explore the role of age and the life-cycle, portfolio compositions, inheritance flows, including its concentration, and taxation patterns as main drivers of the observed trends. A range of alternative series of wealth concentration helps us better understand the role of adjustments and imputations, based on a multi-series approach, i.e., comparing the pieces of information given by different and competing sources.

@incollection{AcciariMorelli2022,
  title = {Wealth Transfers and Net Wealth at Death: Evidence from the {{Italian}} Inheritance Tax Records, 1995\textendash 2016},
  booktitle = {Measuring Distribution and Mobility of Income and Wealth},
  author = {Acciari, Paolo and Morelli, Salvatore},
  editor = {Chetty, Raj and Friedman, John N. and Gornick, Janet C. and Johnson, Barry and Kennickell, Arthur},
  year = {2022},
  month = oct,
  series = {National {{Bureau}} of {{Economic Research}} Studies in Income and Wealth},
  volume = {80},
  pages = {175--204},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  address = {{Chicago}},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/measuring-distribution-and-mobility-income-and-wealth/wealth-transfers-and-net-wealth-death-evidence-italian-inheritance-tax-records-1995-2016},
  urldate = {2023-10-06},
  isbn = {978-0-226-81604-3},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Intergenerational Wealth},
  chapter = {6}
}

@techreport{Albaceteetal2022,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {The Wealth Distribution and Redistributive Preferences: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment},
  author = {Albacete, Nicol{\'a}s and Fessler, Pirmin and Lindner, Peter},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  number = {239},
  institution = {{Oesterreichische Nationalbank}},
  url = {https://www.oenb.at/en/Publications/Economics/Working-Papers.html},
  urldate = {2022-05-20},
  abstract = {We analyze a large-scale randomized experiment on redistributive preferences within the Austrian part of one of the most comprehensive wealth surveys - the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Austria displays a nearly perfect laboratory for such an experiment as it has very low levels of wealth taxation and no inheritance tax but at the same time a rather high level of wealth inequality. We estimate the causal effect of information of one's own rank in the wealth distribution on preference for wealth taxation. Previous literature has mostly focused on the income distribution instead of wealth. We find the average treatment effect to be very small and insignificant. For the group however, who overestimates their own position in the wealth distribution information on their true rank has a strong positive effect, while for the group underestimating their position originally the effect turns out to be negative. Both combined show up as the null effect overall. As theory suggests, information thus has a different effect depending on prior beliefs.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

We analyze a large-scale randomized experiment on redistributive preferences within the Austrian part of one of the most comprehensive wealth surveys - the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Austria displays a nearly perfect laboratory for such an experiment as it has very low levels of wealth taxation and no inheritance tax but at the same time a rather high level of wealth inequality. We estimate the causal effect of information of one's own rank in the wealth distribution on preference for wealth taxation. Previous literature has mostly focused on the income distribution instead of wealth. We find the average treatment effect to be very small and insignificant. For the group however, who overestimates their own position in the wealth distribution information on their true rank has a strong positive effect, while for the group underestimating their position originally the effect turns out to be negative. Both combined show up as the null effect overall. As theory suggests, information thus has a different effect depending on prior beliefs.

@techreport{Albersetal2022,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Wealth and Its Distribution in {{Germany}}, 1895-2018},
  author = {Albers, Thilo N. H. and Bartels, Charlotte and Schularick, Moritz},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  number = {9739},
  institution = {{CESifo}},
  url = {https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2022/working-paper/wealth-and-its-distribution-germany-1895-2018},
  urldate = {2022-05-05},
  abstract = {German history over the past 125 years has been turbulent. Marked by two world wars, revolutions and major regime changes, as well as a hyperinflation and three currency reforms, expropriations and territorial divisions, it provides unique insights into the role of country-specific shocks in shaping long-run wealth dynamics. This paper presents the first comprehensive study of wealth and its distribution in Germany since the 19th century. We combine tax and archival data, household surveys, historical national accounts, and rich lists to analyze the evolution of the German wealth distribution over the long run. We show that the top 1\% wealth share has fallen by half, from close to 50\% in 1895 to 27\% today. Nearly all of this decline was the result of changes that occurred between 1914 and 1952. The interwar period and the wealth taxation in the aftermath of World War II stand out as the great equalizers in 20th century German history. After unification in 1990, two trends have left their mark on the German wealth distribution. Households at the top made substantial capital gains from rising business wealth while the middle-class had large capital gains in the housing market. The wealth share of the bottom 50\% halved since 1990. Our findings speak to the importance of historical shocks to the distribution and valuations of existing wealth in explaining the evolution of the wealth distribution over the long run.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Albersetal2022.pdf},
  url_data_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/albers-bartels-schularick-dataappendixforwealthanditsdistributioningermany18952018-2022},
  url_data_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/albers-bartels-schularick-wealthanditsdistributioningermany18952018datafiles-2022}
}

German history over the past 125 years has been turbulent. Marked by two world wars, revolutions and major regime changes, as well as a hyperinflation and three currency reforms, expropriations and territorial divisions, it provides unique insights into the role of country-specific shocks in shaping long-run wealth dynamics. This paper presents the first comprehensive study of wealth and its distribution in Germany since the 19th century. We combine tax and archival data, household surveys, historical national accounts, and rich lists to analyze the evolution of the German wealth distribution over the long run. We show that the top 1% wealth share has fallen by half, from close to 50% in 1895 to 27% today. Nearly all of this decline was the result of changes that occurred between 1914 and 1952. The interwar period and the wealth taxation in the aftermath of World War II stand out as the great equalizers in 20th century German history. After unification in 1990, two trends have left their mark on the German wealth distribution. Households at the top made substantial capital gains from rising business wealth while the middle-class had large capital gains in the housing market. The wealth share of the bottom 50% halved since 1990. Our findings speak to the importance of historical shocks to the distribution and valuations of existing wealth in explaining the evolution of the wealth distribution over the long run.

@article{AlfaniGarciaMontero2022,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in Pre-Industrial {{England}}: {{A}} Long-Term View (Late Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries)},
  author = {Alfani, Guido and Garc{\'i}a Montero, Hector},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {The Economic History Review},
  doi = {10.1111/ehr.13158},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13158},
  abstract = {This article provides an overview of wealth inequality in England from the late thirteenth to the sixteenth century, based on a novel database of distributions of taxable household wealth across 17 counties plus London. To account for high thresholds of fiscal exemption, a new method is introduced to reconstruct complete distributions from left-censored observations. First, we analyse inequality at the county level, finding an impressive stability across time in the relative position of the English counties, perturbed only by the tendency of the South and South-East to become relatively more inegalitarian. Then, we produce an aggregate distribution representative of England as a whole, and we detect an overall tendency for inequality to grow from medieval to early modern times due largely to North\textendash South divergence in average household wealth. We discuss our results in the light of the recent literature on historical inequality.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This article provides an overview of wealth inequality in England from the late thirteenth to the sixteenth century, based on a novel database of distributions of taxable household wealth across 17 counties plus London. To account for high thresholds of fiscal exemption, a new method is introduced to reconstruct complete distributions from left-censored observations. First, we analyse inequality at the county level, finding an impressive stability across time in the relative position of the English counties, perturbed only by the tendency of the South and South-East to become relatively more inegalitarian. Then, we produce an aggregate distribution representative of England as a whole, and we detect an overall tendency for inequality to grow from medieval to early modern times due largely to North– South divergence in average household wealth. We discuss our results in the light of the recent literature on historical inequality.

@unpublished{AnandKumar2022,
  title = {The Sky and the Stratosphere: Concentrated Wealth in {{India}} during the `Lost Decade'},
  author = {Anand, Ishan and Kumar, Rishabh},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/726c8},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/726c8},
  abstract = {Recently released official survey data show a decline in wealth inequality (measured by the Gini) and wealth concentration (shares of the top fractiles) over 2012-2018. We investigate a puzzling detail \textendash{} the rich hold equities, whose prices increased over 2012-2018, while the middle class holds precious metals, whose prices declined over the same period. The survey predicts the richest Indian to be worth Rs 244 million in 2018; according to glossy magazine covers, the richest Indian has, in fact, a net worth of Rs 2,560 billion. We correct this series using data from named rich lists and find that the decline in wealth inequality is more modest. More strikingly, we find a sharp increase in wealth concentration, with the share of the Top 0.001 percent doubling in size \textendash{} as of 2018, the wealth of the richest 7000 (approx.) Indians exceeds the wealth of the poorest 50 percent.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {AnandKumar2022.pdf},
  url_supplementary_data = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/anand-kumar-theskyandthestratosphereconcentratedwealthinindiaduringthelostdecadesupplementarydata-2022},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Recently released official survey data show a decline in wealth inequality (measured by the Gini) and wealth concentration (shares of the top fractiles) over 2012-2018. We investigate a puzzling detail – the rich hold equities, whose prices increased over 2012-2018, while the middle class holds precious metals, whose prices declined over the same period. The survey predicts the richest Indian to be worth Rs 244 million in 2018; according to glossy magazine covers, the richest Indian has, in fact, a net worth of Rs 2,560 billion. We correct this series using data from named rich lists and find that the decline in wealth inequality is more modest. More strikingly, we find a sharp increase in wealth concentration, with the share of the Top 0.001 percent doubling in size – as of 2018, the wealth of the richest 7000 (approx.) Indians exceeds the wealth of the poorest 50 percent.

@techreport{Andersenetal2022,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Pension Reform and Wealth Inequality: Evidence from {{Denmark}}},
  author = {Andersen, Torben M. and Bhattacharya, Joydeep and {Grodecka-Messi}, Anna and Mann, Katja},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  number = {411},
  institution = {{Sveriges Riksbank}},
  url = {https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/working-papers/2022/no.-411-pension-reform-and-wealth-inequality-evidence-from-denmark.pdf},
  urldate = {2023-02-06},
  abstract = {A growing literature explores reasons for rising wealth inequality, but disregards the role of pension systems despite their well-understood influence on life-cycle saving. In theory and according to available evidence, both pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and fully-funded (FF) pension schemes crowd out voluntary retirement saving. They differ because aggregate savings decrease in the former but increase under the latter system. Unlike most nations, Denmark has seen a decline in wealth inequality in recent decades. This paper studies a calibrated life-cycle model of Denmark and employs unique registry data to argue that a Danish pension system transition, from a mostly PAYG to a dominant, mandated FF scheme, explains much of this decline.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

A growing literature explores reasons for rising wealth inequality, but disregards the role of pension systems despite their well-understood influence on life-cycle saving. In theory and according to available evidence, both pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and fully-funded (FF) pension schemes crowd out voluntary retirement saving. They differ because aggregate savings decrease in the former but increase under the latter system. Unlike most nations, Denmark has seen a decline in wealth inequality in recent decades. This paper studies a calibrated life-cycle model of Denmark and employs unique registry data to argue that a Danish pension system transition, from a mostly PAYG to a dominant, mandated FF scheme, explains much of this decline.

@techreport{Bajardetal2022,
  type = {Technical {{Note}}},
  title = {Global Wealth Inequality on {{WID}}.World: Estimates and Imputations},
  author = {Bajard, F{\'e}lix and Chancel, Lucas and Moshrif, Rowaida and Piketty, Thomas},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  number = {2021/16},
  institution = {{World Inequality Lab}},
  url = {https://wid.world/document/global-wealth-inequality-on-wid-world-estimates-and-imputations-world-inequality-lab-technical-note-2021-16/},
  urldate = {2023-02-01},
  abstract = {This technical note describes the imputation procedures used to construct a global wealth inequality estimates on the World Inequality Database and the sources used. Estimates are available on www.wid.world.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This technical note describes the imputation procedures used to construct a global wealth inequality estimates on the World Inequality Database and the sources used. Estimates are available on www.wid.world.

@techreport{BaselgiaFoellmi2022,
  type = {{{WIDER Working Paper}}},
  title = {Inequality and Growth: A Review on a Great Open Debate in Economics},
  author = {Baselgia, Enea and Foellmi, Reto},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  number = {2022/5},
  institution = {{United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research}},
  doi = {10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2022/136-5},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2022/136-5},
  abstract = {What is the relationship between inequality and growth? This question has occupied and fascinated social scientists for more than a century. This article critically reviews the recent empirical and theoretical literature on the complex interplay between inequality and economic growth. Inequality might come in many forms: (top) incomes, wages, wealth, land, or opportunities. At the same time, growth performance could be measured as average growth rates, variability of growth, or the potential for growth to `take off'. We consider causality running from inequality to growth; hence, the Kuznets hypothesis is only touched on in passing. The empirical literature estimating the effect of inequality on growth has produced a wide range of results, precluding clear-cut conclusions on the inequality\textendash growth relationship. Consequently, it remains central to understand the underlying economic causes and channels through which (different aspects of) inequality can promote or hamper economic growth. This review aims to provide a broad overview of the contemporary results and an outline for prospective empirical and theoretical work.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

What is the relationship between inequality and growth? This question has occupied and fascinated social scientists for more than a century. This article critically reviews the recent empirical and theoretical literature on the complex interplay between inequality and economic growth. Inequality might come in many forms: (top) incomes, wages, wealth, land, or opportunities. At the same time, growth performance could be measured as average growth rates, variability of growth, or the potential for growth to `take off'. We consider causality running from inequality to growth; hence, the Kuznets hypothesis is only touched on in passing. The empirical literature estimating the effect of inequality on growth has produced a wide range of results, precluding clear-cut conclusions on the inequality– growth relationship. Consequently, it remains central to understand the underlying economic causes and channels through which (different aspects of) inequality can promote or hamper economic growth. This review aims to provide a broad overview of the contemporary results and an outline for prospective empirical and theoretical work.

@inproceedings{Battyetal2022,
  title = {The {{Distributional Financial Accounts}} of the {{United States}}},
  booktitle = {Measuring Distribution and Mobility of Income and Wealth},
  author = {Batty, Michael and Bricker, Jesse and Briggs, Joseph and Friedman, Sarah and Nemschoff, Danielle and Nielsen, Eric and Sommer, Kamila and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  editor = {Chetty, Raj and Friedman, John N. and Gornick, Janet C. and Johnson, Barry and Kennickell, Arthur},
  year = {2022},
  month = oct,
  pages = {641--677},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  address = {{Chicago}},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/measuring-distribution-and-mobility-income-and-wealth/distributional-financial-accounts-united-states},
  urldate = {2023-08-08},
  abstract = {This paper describes the construction of the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA), a dataset containing quarterly estimates of the distribution of US household wealth since 1989. The DFA builds on two existing Federal Reserve Board statistical products\textemdash quarterly aggregate measures of household wealth from the Financial Accounts of the United States, and triennial wealth distribution measures from the Survey of Consumer Finances\textemdash to incorporate distributional information into a national accounting framework. The DFA complements other sources by generating distributional statistics that are consistent with macro aggregates by providing quarterly data on a timely basis, and by constructing wealth distributions across demographic characteristics. We encourage policymakers, researchers, and other interested parties to use the DFA to better understand issues related to the distribution of US household wealth.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_dfas = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/boardofgovernorsofthefederalreservesystem-dfadistributionalfinancialaccounts-2023},
  url_2019_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/batty-bricker-briggs-holmquist-mcintosh-moore-nielsen-reber-etal-introducingthedistributionalfinancialaccountsoftheunitedstates-2019},
  url_2020_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/batty-bricker-briggs-friedman-nemschoff-nielsen-sommer-volz-thedistributionalfinancialaccountsoftheunitedstates-2020},
  note = {Chapter 22}
}

This paper describes the construction of the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA), a dataset containing quarterly estimates of the distribution of US household wealth since 1989. The DFA builds on two existing Federal Reserve Board statistical products— quarterly aggregate measures of household wealth from the Financial Accounts of the United States, and triennial wealth distribution measures from the Survey of Consumer Finances— to incorporate distributional information into a national accounting framework. The DFA complements other sources by generating distributional statistics that are consistent with macro aggregates by providing quarterly data on a timely basis, and by constructing wealth distributions across demographic characteristics. We encourage policymakers, researchers, and other interested parties to use the DFA to better understand issues related to the distribution of US household wealth.

@techreport{Bauluzetal2022,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {The Anatomy of the Global Saving Glut},
  author = {Bauluz, Luis and Novokmet, Filip and Schularick, Moritz},
  year = {2022},
  number = {9732},
  institution = {{CESifo}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4103945},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4103945},
  abstract = {This paper provides a household-level perspective on the rise of global saving and wealth since the 1980s. We calculate asset-specific saving flows and capital gains across the wealth distribution for the G3 economies \textendash{} the U.S., Europe, and China. In the past four decades, global saving inequality has risen sharply. The share of household saving flows coming from the richest 10\% of household increased by 60\% while saving of middle-class households has fallen sharply. The most important source for the surge in top-10\% saving was the secular rise of global corporate saving whose ultimate owners the rich households are. Housing capital gains have supported wealth growth for middle-class households despite falling saving and rising debt. Without meaningful capital gains in risky assets, the wealth share of the bottom half of the population declined substantially in most G3 economies.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper provides a household-level perspective on the rise of global saving and wealth since the 1980s. We calculate asset-specific saving flows and capital gains across the wealth distribution for the G3 economies – the U.S., Europe, and China. In the past four decades, global saving inequality has risen sharply. The share of household saving flows coming from the richest 10% of household increased by 60% while saving of middle-class households has fallen sharply. The most important source for the surge in top-10% saving was the secular rise of global corporate saving whose ultimate owners the rich households are. Housing capital gains have supported wealth growth for middle-class households despite falling saving and rising debt. Without meaningful capital gains in risky assets, the wealth share of the bottom half of the population declined substantially in most G3 economies.

@article{Beckert2022,
  title = {Durable Wealth: Institutions, Mechanisms, and Practices of Wealth Perpetuation},
  author = {Beckert, Jens},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Annual Review of Sociology},
  volume = {48},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1146/annurev-soc-030320-115024},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-030320-115024},
  abstract = {Research indicates that positions of very high private wealth can often be maintained by families over many generations. This article puts front and center the institutions, mechanisms and practices through which families at the very top of the wealth distribution protect and enlarge their wealth. Opportunity hoarding is based on legal institutions, most importantly inheritance law, trust law, advantageous financial regulations and estate tax policies. Wealthy owners also pay for a growing number of legal and financial experts whose task it is to protect their fortunes. The stipulations of legal institutions are shaped through lobbying, campaign donations and the influencing of public opinion, facilitating the intergenerational preservation of large fortunes. Philanthropy appears to be not primarily a means of supporting general welfare, but rather a further instrument of wealth protection of the super-rich through their role in legitimizing large fortunes and the reaping of tax benefits. The entrenched character of large fortunes opens up questions regarding the normative identity of contemporary societies.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Research indicates that positions of very high private wealth can often be maintained by families over many generations. This article puts front and center the institutions, mechanisms and practices through which families at the very top of the wealth distribution protect and enlarge their wealth. Opportunity hoarding is based on legal institutions, most importantly inheritance law, trust law, advantageous financial regulations and estate tax policies. Wealthy owners also pay for a growing number of legal and financial experts whose task it is to protect their fortunes. The stipulations of legal institutions are shaped through lobbying, campaign donations and the influencing of public opinion, facilitating the intergenerational preservation of large fortunes. Philanthropy appears to be not primarily a means of supporting general welfare, but rather a further instrument of wealth protection of the super-rich through their role in legitimizing large fortunes and the reaping of tax benefits. The entrenched character of large fortunes opens up questions regarding the normative identity of contemporary societies.

@incollection{BermanMorelli2022,
  title = {On the Distribution of Estates and the Distribution of Wealth: Evidence from the Dead},
  booktitle = {Measuring Distribution and Mobility of Income and Wealth},
  author = {Berman, Yonatan and Morelli, Salvatore},
  editor = {Chetty, Raj and Friedman, John N. and Gornick, Janet C. and Johnson, Barry and Kennickell, Arthur},
  year = {2022},
  month = oct,
  series = {National {{Bureau}} of {{Economic Research}} Studies in Income and Wealth},
  volume = {80},
  pages = {205--220},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  address = {{Chicago}},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/measuring-distribution-and-mobility-income-and-wealth/distribution-estates-and-distribution-wealth-evidence-dead},
  urldate = {2023-10-06},
  abstract = {Detailed information about the distribution of estates left at death has commonly served as the basis for the estimation of wealth distributions among the living via the mortality multiplier method. The application of detailed mortality rates by demographics and other determinants of mortality is crucial for obtaining an unbiased representation of the wealth distribution of the living. Yet, in this paper we suggest that a simplified mortality multiplier method, derived using average mortality rates and aggregate tabulations by estate size, may be sufficient to derive compelling estimates of wealth concentration. We show that the application of homogeneous multipliers leads to estimates that are close in level and trend to the concentration of wealth derived in the existing literature with the detailed mortality multiplier method for a variety of countries. The use of mortality rates graduated by estate size does not confute this finding. We also derive the general formal conditions for the similarity between the distributions of wealth of the living and estates at death and discuss the main caveats. These findings may unlock a wide array of aggregate estate tabulations, previously thought to be unusable, for estimating historical trends of wealth concentration.},
  isbn = {978-0-226-81604-3},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  chapter = {7}
}

Detailed information about the distribution of estates left at death has commonly served as the basis for the estimation of wealth distributions among the living via the mortality multiplier method. The application of detailed mortality rates by demographics and other determinants of mortality is crucial for obtaining an unbiased representation of the wealth distribution of the living. Yet, in this paper we suggest that a simplified mortality multiplier method, derived using average mortality rates and aggregate tabulations by estate size, may be sufficient to derive compelling estimates of wealth concentration. We show that the application of homogeneous multipliers leads to estimates that are close in level and trend to the concentration of wealth derived in the existing literature with the detailed mortality multiplier method for a variety of countries. The use of mortality rates graduated by estate size does not confute this finding. We also derive the general formal conditions for the similarity between the distributions of wealth of the living and estates at death and discuss the main caveats. These findings may unlock a wide array of aggregate estate tabulations, previously thought to be unusable, for estimating historical trends of wealth concentration.

@unpublished{Blacketal2022,
  title = {Gender and Inheritances},
  author = {Black, Sandra E. and Devereux, Paul J. and Landaud, Fanny and Salvanes, Kjell G.},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  url = {https://www.sandraeblack.com/research/},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  abstract = {Using administrative data from Norway, we document that gifts and inheritances are a more important component of total income for women than for men. This is particularly the case at the very top of the distribution of total lifetime income and at the top of the net wealth distribution. We find that the gender difference in the ratio of gifts and inheritances to total income received over a 19-year period is not due to gender differences in the receipt of intergenerational transfers but is driven by gender differences in total income. We conclude by comparing gender differences in the distribution of total lifetime income to counterfactual measures where gifts and inheritances are equalized across all individuals and show that gifts and inheritances tend to reduce gender gaps across the distribution.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Using administrative data from Norway, we document that gifts and inheritances are a more important component of total income for women than for men. This is particularly the case at the very top of the distribution of total lifetime income and at the top of the net wealth distribution. We find that the gender difference in the ratio of gifts and inheritances to total income received over a 19-year period is not due to gender differences in the receipt of intergenerational transfers but is driven by gender differences in total income. We conclude by comparing gender differences in the distribution of total lifetime income to counterfactual measures where gifts and inheritances are equalized across all individuals and show that gifts and inheritances tend to reduce gender gaps across the distribution.

@unpublished{BlanchetMartinez-Toledano2022,
  title = {Wealth Inequality Dynamics in {{Europe}} and the {{United States}}: Understanding the Determinants},
  author = {Blanchet, Thomas and {Mart{\'i}nez-Toledano}, Clara},
  year = {2022},
  month = oct,
  abstract = {This paper studies the interaction between the long-term dynamics of aggregate household wealth and the wealth distribution in Europe and the United States. We do so by building the first Distributional Wealth Accounts for Europe, including households' assets, liabilities, investment flows, and the wealth distribution for most European countries from 1970\textendash 2020. We find that although aggregate household wealth to income ratios have followed a similar increasing pattern in both Europe and the United States since 1970, wealth concentration has increased much faster in the United States. Using wealth accumulation decompositions and counterfactual simulations, we show that the weaker rise in labor income inequality and the stronger rise in house prices relative to financial assets in Europe versus the United States appear to explain why Europe has experienced a more moderate rise in wealth concentration since the mid-1980s},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper studies the interaction between the long-term dynamics of aggregate household wealth and the wealth distribution in Europe and the United States. We do so by building the first Distributional Wealth Accounts for Europe, including households' assets, liabilities, investment flows, and the wealth distribution for most European countries from 1970– 2020. We find that although aggregate household wealth to income ratios have followed a similar increasing pattern in both Europe and the United States since 1970, wealth concentration has increased much faster in the United States. Using wealth accumulation decompositions and counterfactual simulations, we show that the weaker rise in labor income inequality and the stronger rise in house prices relative to financial assets in Europe versus the United States appear to explain why Europe has experienced a more moderate rise in wealth concentration since the mid-1980s

@article{Boberg-Fazlicetal2022,
  title = {Winners and Losers from Agrarian Reform: Evidence from {{Danish}} Land Inequality 1682\textendash 1895},
  author = {{Boberg-Fazli{\'c}}, Nina and Lampe, Markus and Martinelli, Pablo Lasheras and Sharp, Paul},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
  volume = {155},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102813},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102813},
  abstract = {Pro-market and pro-farmer agrarian reforms enacted in eighteenth century Denmark laid the basis for rural development but we demonstrate that they also resulted in increased inequality. We investigate this using a novel parish-level database spanning more than two centuries. We identify the impact of land quality on inequality following the reforms by instrumenting with soil type and find increases in areas with more productive land. We propose and find evidence for a mechanism whereby agrarian reforms allowed areas with better soil quality to realize greater productivity gains. This in turn led to greater population increases, and a larger share of smallholders and landless laborers. Finally, we demonstrate the impact on the winners and losers: more unequal areas witnessed increases in top incomes, but greater emigration of the rural poor, to the United States in particular. Thus, the losers were able to vote with their feet, in stark contrast to those who might lose from similar reforms in developing countries today.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {102813}
}

Pro-market and pro-farmer agrarian reforms enacted in eighteenth century Denmark laid the basis for rural development but we demonstrate that they also resulted in increased inequality. We investigate this using a novel parish-level database spanning more than two centuries. We identify the impact of land quality on inequality following the reforms by instrumenting with soil type and find increases in areas with more productive land. We propose and find evidence for a mechanism whereby agrarian reforms allowed areas with better soil quality to realize greater productivity gains. This in turn led to greater population increases, and a larger share of smallholders and landless laborers. Finally, we demonstrate the impact on the winners and losers: more unequal areas witnessed increases in top incomes, but greater emigration of the rural poor, to the United States in particular. Thus, the losers were able to vote with their feet, in stark contrast to those who might lose from similar reforms in developing countries today.

@unpublished{BoertienLopez-Gay2022,
  title = {The Polarization of Real Estate Ownership and Increasing Wealth Inequality in {{Spain}}},
  author = {Boertien, Diederik and {L{\'o}pez-Gay}, Antonio},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/b4k8t},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/b4k8t},
  abstract = {Recent research has shown that differences in the distribution of real estate wealth across households are the most important explanation for cross-national variation in wealth inequality. We extend this line of research by quantifying to what extent real estate wealth can also explain increases in wealth inequality over time. Our analysis is based on data from the Spanish survey Encuesta Financiera de Familias covering the period 2002-2017. We show how real estate ownership is becoming increasingly polarized: both the share of households without any property at all as well as the share of households with multiple properties is increasing. Decomposition models show, first, that inequality between home owners and non-owners is becoming a more important component of wealth inequality between households. Second, whereas real estate that is not used by households as their main residence constituted a relatively small part of wealth inequality in 2002, its absolute contribution had almost doubled by 2017. We conclude that household investments in non-residence real estate are an important channel through which wealth inequality increased over time in Spain.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Recent research has shown that differences in the distribution of real estate wealth across households are the most important explanation for cross-national variation in wealth inequality. We extend this line of research by quantifying to what extent real estate wealth can also explain increases in wealth inequality over time. Our analysis is based on data from the Spanish survey Encuesta Financiera de Familias covering the period 2002-2017. We show how real estate ownership is becoming increasingly polarized: both the share of households without any property at all as well as the share of households with multiple properties is increasing. Decomposition models show, first, that inequality between home owners and non-owners is becoming a more important component of wealth inequality between households. Second, whereas real estate that is not used by households as their main residence constituted a relatively small part of wealth inequality in 2002, its absolute contribution had almost doubled by 2017. We conclude that household investments in non-residence real estate are an important channel through which wealth inequality increased over time in Spain.

@article{CharpentierFlachaire2022,
  title = {Pareto Models for Top Incomes and Wealth},
  author = {Charpentier, Arthur and Flachaire, Emmanuel},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--25},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-021-09514-6},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-021-09514-6},
  abstract = {Top incomes are often related to Pareto distribution. To date, economists have mostly used Pareto Type I distribution to model the upper tail of income and wealth distribution. It is a parametric distribution, with interesting properties, that can be easily linked to economic theory. In this paper, we first show that modeling top incomes with Pareto Type I distribution can lead to biased estimation of inequality, even with millions of observations. Then, we show that the Generalized Pareto distribution and, even more, the Extended Pareto distribution, are much less sensitive to the choice of the threshold. Thus, they can provide more reliable results. We discuss different types of bias that could be encountered in empirical studies and, we provide some guidance for practice. To illustrate, two applications are investigated, on the distribution of income in South Africa in 2012 and on the distribution of wealth in the United States in 2013.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Top incomes are often related to Pareto distribution. To date, economists have mostly used Pareto Type I distribution to model the upper tail of income and wealth distribution. It is a parametric distribution, with interesting properties, that can be easily linked to economic theory. In this paper, we first show that modeling top incomes with Pareto Type I distribution can lead to biased estimation of inequality, even with millions of observations. Then, we show that the Generalized Pareto distribution and, even more, the Extended Pareto distribution, are much less sensitive to the choice of the threshold. Thus, they can provide more reliable results. We discuss different types of bias that could be encountered in empirical studies and, we provide some guidance for practice. To illustrate, two applications are investigated, on the distribution of income in South Africa in 2012 and on the distribution of wealth in the United States in 2013.

@article{Chatterjeeetal2022,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in {{South Africa}}, 1993\textendash 2017},
  author = {Chatterjee, Aroop and Czajka, L{\'e}o and Gethin, Amory},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  journal = {The World Bank Economic Review},
  volume = {36},
  number = {1},
  pages = {19--36},
  doi = {10.1093/wber/lhab012},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhab012},
  abstract = {This article estimates the distribution of personal wealth in South Africa by combining microdata covering the universe of income tax returns, household surveys, and macroeconomic balance sheet statistics. South Africa is characterized by unparalleled levels of wealth concentration. The top 10 percent own 86 percent of aggregate wealth and the top 0.1 percent close to one-third. The top 0.01 percent of the distribution (3,500 individuals) concentrate 15 percent of household net worth, more than the bottom 90 percent as a whole. Such levels of inequality can be accounted for in all forms of assets at the top end, including housing, pension funds, and financial assets. There has been no sign of decreasing inequality since the end of apartheid.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_supplementary_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/chatterjee-czajka-gethin-supplementaryonlineappendixwealthinequalityinsouthafrica19932017-2022},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/chatterjee-czajka-gethin-wealthinequalityinsouthafrica19932017datafile-2022}
}

This article estimates the distribution of personal wealth in South Africa by combining microdata covering the universe of income tax returns, household surveys, and macroeconomic balance sheet statistics. South Africa is characterized by unparalleled levels of wealth concentration. The top 10 percent own 86 percent of aggregate wealth and the top 0.1 percent close to one-third. The top 0.01 percent of the distribution (3,500 individuals) concentrate 15 percent of household net worth, more than the bottom 90 percent as a whole. Such levels of inequality can be accounted for in all forms of assets at the top end, including housing, pension funds, and financial assets. There has been no sign of decreasing inequality since the end of apartheid.

@article{CohenRavivLewin-Epstein2022,
  title = {Homeownership Regimes and Class Inequality among Young Adults},
  author = {Cohen Raviv, Or and {Lewin-Epstein}, Noah},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  journal = {International Journal of Comparative Sociology},
  doi = {10.1177/00207152211070817},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/00207152211070817},
  abstract = {In this study, we merge the literature on homeownership regimes, which focuses to a lesser extent on the consequences of wealth and social inequality, with the literature on wealth and social stratification, which overlooks the importance of homeownership regimes in contributing to those inequalities. Within this framework, we examine to what extent homeownership regimes shape class inequality in homeownership among young adults and the mortgage debt burden that usually accompanies it. We first develop an updated typology of homeownership regimes that incorporates the role of the family via intergenerational wealth transfers (IWT) such as gifts and housing assets. This dimension was theoretically underdeveloped and empirically absent from previous homeownership typologies. Second, we employ this typology to investigate class-based gaps in homeownership and mortgage debt burden within and between homeownership regimes. This is done by pooling data for a total of 20 countries from two sources: the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2013\textendash 2014 (EuroStat) for EU countries, and the Household Expenditure Survey 2012\textendash 2013 (CBS) for Israel. Using multivariate modeling, we find that homeownership regimes in which IWT in the form of financial support is common practice increase class inequality in homeownership compared to regimes in which IWT of assets is common practice. Contrary to the literature suggesting that liberal mortgage markets advance inclusion, it appears that in the homeownership regime characterized by the most liberal housing finance system (which includes Northern European countries and the Netherlands), class inequality in mortgaged homeownership is the widest but class inequality in mortgage debt burden is the narrowest. Homeownership regimes characterized by IWT of assets (which include Southern and Central Eastern European countries) reveal the opposite patterns. We discuss the implications of our findings for the literature on homeownership regimes and wealth inequality, with a specific focus on young adults.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

In this study, we merge the literature on homeownership regimes, which focuses to a lesser extent on the consequences of wealth and social inequality, with the literature on wealth and social stratification, which overlooks the importance of homeownership regimes in contributing to those inequalities. Within this framework, we examine to what extent homeownership regimes shape class inequality in homeownership among young adults and the mortgage debt burden that usually accompanies it. We first develop an updated typology of homeownership regimes that incorporates the role of the family via intergenerational wealth transfers (IWT) such as gifts and housing assets. This dimension was theoretically underdeveloped and empirically absent from previous homeownership typologies. Second, we employ this typology to investigate class-based gaps in homeownership and mortgage debt burden within and between homeownership regimes. This is done by pooling data for a total of 20 countries from two sources: the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2013– 2014 (EuroStat) for EU countries, and the Household Expenditure Survey 2012– 2013 (CBS) for Israel. Using multivariate modeling, we find that homeownership regimes in which IWT in the form of financial support is common practice increase class inequality in homeownership compared to regimes in which IWT of assets is common practice. Contrary to the literature suggesting that liberal mortgage markets advance inclusion, it appears that in the homeownership regime characterized by the most liberal housing finance system (which includes Northern European countries and the Netherlands), class inequality in mortgaged homeownership is the widest but class inequality in mortgage debt burden is the narrowest. Homeownership regimes characterized by IWT of assets (which include Southern and Central Eastern European countries) reveal the opposite patterns. We discuss the implications of our findings for the literature on homeownership regimes and wealth inequality, with a specific focus on young adults.

@article{Daysaletal2022,
  title = {The Correlation of Net and Gross Wealth across Generations: The Role of Parent Income and Child Age},
  author = {Daysal, N. Meltem and Lovenheim, Michael F. and Wasser, David N.},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  journal = {AEA Papers and Proceedings},
  volume = {112},
  pages = {73--77},
  doi = {10.1257/pandp.20221058},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20221058},
  abstract = {We use Danish register data to examine intergenerational rank-rank correlations in net wealth and gross housing wealth by child age and parental income. Our results indicate that gross housing wealth correlations are more stable by child age than are net wealth correlations, which we argue is due to a downward bias in net wealth correlations from transitory debt. Intergenerational housing wealth correlations also are larger for lower-income families, while net wealth correlations do not vary much across the income distribution. Finally, we show that intergenerational net wealth and gross housing wealth correlations move in opposite directions across the income distribution.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

We use Danish register data to examine intergenerational rank-rank correlations in net wealth and gross housing wealth by child age and parental income. Our results indicate that gross housing wealth correlations are more stable by child age than are net wealth correlations, which we argue is due to a downward bias in net wealth correlations from transitory debt. Intergenerational housing wealth correlations also are larger for lower-income families, while net wealth correlations do not vary much across the income distribution. Finally, we show that intergenerational net wealth and gross housing wealth correlations move in opposite directions across the income distribution.

@techreport{DeRosa2022,
  type = {Serie {{Documentos}} de {{Trabajo}}},
  title = {Accumulation, Inheritance and Wealth Distribution: First Estimates of the Untold Half},
  author = {De Rosa, Mauricio},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  number = {DT 07/22},
  institution = {{Instituto de Econom\'ia}},
  url = {http://www.iecon.ccee.edu.uy/dt-07-22-accumulation-inheritance-and-wealth-distribution-first-estimates-of-the-untold-half/publication/890/en/},
  urldate = {2022-06-16},
  abstract = {While wealth accumulation and its distribution are arguably two of the key drivers of overall economic inequality and of major importance in their own right, very little is known about them in the developing world. I contribute to filling this gap by providing micro-macro consistent series of aggregate wealth and its distribution in Uruguay. The country's balance sheet, which is not estimated by official institutions, is constructed for the first time by combining a wide array of data sources, reaching a wealth to income ratio of 500\%. Private wealth distribution is then estimated based on the capitalization method, taking stock of combined survey-tax-national accounts micro-data, resulting in a top 1\% of 38-40\%. Estimates are systematically compared with results based on the estate multiplier method, real estate wealth tax, household wealth survey and Forbes billionaires list. Moreover, the inheritance flow is estimated, reaching 9-10\% throughout the period, consistent with a 60\% inheritance stock. These estimates represent the first coherent and comparable depiction of wealth and its distribution for a Latin American country, hence providing insights to a completely unknown reality thus-far.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

While wealth accumulation and its distribution are arguably two of the key drivers of overall economic inequality and of major importance in their own right, very little is known about them in the developing world. I contribute to filling this gap by providing micro-macro consistent series of aggregate wealth and its distribution in Uruguay. The country's balance sheet, which is not estimated by official institutions, is constructed for the first time by combining a wide array of data sources, reaching a wealth to income ratio of 500%. Private wealth distribution is then estimated based on the capitalization method, taking stock of combined survey-tax-national accounts micro-data, resulting in a top 1% of 38-40%. Estimates are systematically compared with results based on the estate multiplier method, real estate wealth tax, household wealth survey and Forbes billionaires list. Moreover, the inheritance flow is estimated, reaching 9-10% throughout the period, consistent with a 60% inheritance stock. These estimates represent the first coherent and comparable depiction of wealth and its distribution for a Latin American country, hence providing insights to a completely unknown reality thus-far.

@techreport{Garbintietal2022,
  type = {{{CREST Working Papers Series}}},
  title = {Wealth Heterogeneity and the Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Wealth},
  author = {Garbinti, Bertrand and Lamarche, Pierre and Savignac, Fred{\'e}rique},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  number = {2022-02},
  institution = {{Center for Research in Economics and Statistics}},
  url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/crs/wpaper/2022-02.html},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  abstract = {We study how the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (MPC) varies across households depending on the level and composition of their wealth. We build a unique household-level panel dataset which combines wealth and consumption surveys for five European countries to estimate country-specific marginal propensity to consume out wealth. We use instrumented household-level panel regressions. First, we show that the MPC out of total wealth is higher for lowwealth households, whatever the country. Second, we find that the MPC out of housing assets is significant and decreasing along the wealth distribution in all countries. Third, we show that the observed cross-country heterogeneity in MPC is strongly correlated with the use of mortgages, suggesting a collateral channel. Finally, we conduct a simulation exercise to investigate to what extent heterogeneous MPC and wealth inequality affect consumption inequality.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

We study how the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (MPC) varies across households depending on the level and composition of their wealth. We build a unique household-level panel dataset which combines wealth and consumption surveys for five European countries to estimate country-specific marginal propensity to consume out wealth. We use instrumented household-level panel regressions. First, we show that the MPC out of total wealth is higher for lowwealth households, whatever the country. Second, we find that the MPC out of housing assets is significant and decreasing along the wealth distribution in all countries. Third, we show that the observed cross-country heterogeneity in MPC is strongly correlated with the use of mortgages, suggesting a collateral channel. Finally, we conduct a simulation exercise to investigate to what extent heterogeneous MPC and wealth inequality affect consumption inequality.

@incollection{GarbintiSavignac2022,
  title = {Intergenerational Home Ownership in {{France}} over the Twentieth Century},
  booktitle = {Measuring Distribution and Mobility of Income and Wealth},
  author = {Garbinti, Bertrand and Savignac, Fr{\'e}d{\'e}rique},
  editor = {Chetty, Raj and Friedman, John N. and Gornick, Janet C. and Johnson, Barry and Kennickell, Arthur},
  year = {2022},
  series = {National {{Bureau}} of {{Economic Research}} Studies in Income and Wealth},
  volume = {80},
  pages = {411--436},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  address = {{Chicago}},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/measuring-distribution-and-mobility-income-and-wealth/intergenerational-home-ownership-france-over-twentieth-century},
  urldate = {2022-09-29},
  isbn = {978-0-226-81604-3},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  chapter = {13}
}

@techreport{GreggKanabar2022,
  type = {{{CEPEO Working Paper}}},
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and Mobility in {{Great Britain}}: What Components of Wealth Matter?},
  author = {Gregg, Paul and Kanabar, Ricky},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  number = {22-01},
  institution = {{Centre for Education Policy and Equalising Opportunities}},
  url = {https://repec-cepeo.ucl.ac.uk/cepeow/cepeowp22-01r1.pdf},
  urldate = {2022-02-24},
  abstract = {The rapid widening of intergenerational wealth inequalities has led to sharp differences in living standards in Great Britain. Understanding which components of wealth are driving such inequalities is important for improving wealth and social mobility. We show the change in the intergenerational persistence in wealth in Great Britain is due to inequality in offspring housing wealth and that offspring homeownership has become increasingly stratified by parental wealth even after controlling for individual's own characteristics. Our findings imply the intergenerational wealth elasticity in housing wealth is set to double in approximately one century and highlight the increasingly important role parental wealth has for determining whether offspring hold and the rate at which they accumulate particular types of wealth.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

The rapid widening of intergenerational wealth inequalities has led to sharp differences in living standards in Great Britain. Understanding which components of wealth are driving such inequalities is important for improving wealth and social mobility. We show the change in the intergenerational persistence in wealth in Great Britain is due to inequality in offspring housing wealth and that offspring homeownership has become increasingly stratified by parental wealth even after controlling for individual's own characteristics. Our findings imply the intergenerational wealth elasticity in housing wealth is set to double in approximately one century and highlight the increasingly important role parental wealth has for determining whether offspring hold and the rate at which they accumulate particular types of wealth.

@article{HouSchuler2022,
  title = {The Nonlinear Effect of Financial Literacy on Wealth: Evidence from {{Germany}}},
  author = {Hou, Jia and Schuler, Sebastian},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  journal = {Empirica},
  doi = {10.1007/s10663-022-09541-0},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-022-09541-0},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the nonlinearity in the relationship of financial literacy and wealth and addresses the potentially inadequate measurement of financial literacy. Using data from the Panel on Household Finances, a nationally representative survey for Germany, we show a positive relationship between financial literacy and wealth that declines in wealth. Among households with positive wealth, which constitute approximately 94\% of the observations in the sample and represent 91\% of the whole population, we find the highest positive correlation at the 5th percentile of wealth. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the current measurement of financial literacy may not be adequate to differentiate among households above approximately the 80th percentile of wealth. By exploiting an additional question on the compound interest rate, we highlight the sensitivity of the coefficients of interest to the measurement of financial literacy.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper investigates the nonlinearity in the relationship of financial literacy and wealth and addresses the potentially inadequate measurement of financial literacy. Using data from the Panel on Household Finances, a nationally representative survey for Germany, we show a positive relationship between financial literacy and wealth that declines in wealth. Among households with positive wealth, which constitute approximately 94% of the observations in the sample and represent 91% of the whole population, we find the highest positive correlation at the 5th percentile of wealth. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the current measurement of financial literacy may not be adequate to differentiate among households above approximately the 80th percentile of wealth. By exploiting an additional question on the compound interest rate, we highlight the sensitivity of the coefficients of interest to the measurement of financial literacy.

@article{HallstenThaning2022,
  title = {Wealth as One of the ``Big Four'' {{SES}} Dimensions in Intergenerational Transmissions},
  author = {H{\"a}llsten, Martin and Thaning, Max},
  year = {2022},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Social Forces},
  volume = {100},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1533--1560},
  doi = {10.1093/sf/soab080},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soab080},
  abstract = {Recent scholarship on mobility has increasingly incorporated wealth. We ask if wealth brings anything new to mobility research or is just a standard socioeconomic status (SES) dimension in disguise. We exploit Swedish administrative registers, which contain rich SES measures over individuals' lives for both parents' and children's generations. Using sibling correlations to estimate a baseline of shared family background influence, we then perform a total decomposition for each SES dimension and their overlaps. We find that wealth is a distinct dimension of SES that is very different from education, occupation, and income. Parental wealth cannot be substituted for other SES dimensions in understanding child's wealth attainment. Moreover, parental wealth substantially moderates intergenerational reproduction in other dimensions: The wealthiest have higher reproduction rates in all child outcomes, but in particular for children's income and wealth. Excluding wealth leads to underestimating intergenerational inequality, aggravated by its qualitatively unique status as an SES resource. We conclude that\textemdash alongside the SES resources education, occupation, and income\textemdash wealth emerges as an integral and unique dimension of what we choose to call the ``big four'' of social stratification.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Recent scholarship on mobility has increasingly incorporated wealth. We ask if wealth brings anything new to mobility research or is just a standard socioeconomic status (SES) dimension in disguise. We exploit Swedish administrative registers, which contain rich SES measures over individuals' lives for both parents' and children's generations. Using sibling correlations to estimate a baseline of shared family background influence, we then perform a total decomposition for each SES dimension and their overlaps. We find that wealth is a distinct dimension of SES that is very different from education, occupation, and income. Parental wealth cannot be substituted for other SES dimensions in understanding child's wealth attainment. Moreover, parental wealth substantially moderates intergenerational reproduction in other dimensions: The wealthiest have higher reproduction rates in all child outcomes, but in particular for children's income and wealth. Excluding wealth leads to underestimating intergenerational inequality, aggravated by its qualitatively unique status as an SES resource. We conclude that— alongside the SES resources education, occupation, and income— wealth emerges as an integral and unique dimension of what we choose to call the ``big four'' of social stratification.

@techreport{Haneretal2022,
  type = {{{IFF-HSG Working Papers}}},
  title = {Marry into New or Old Money? {{The}} Distributional Impact of Marital Decisions from an Intergenerational Perspective},
  author = {H{\"a}ner, Melanie and Salvi, Michele and Schaltegger, Christoph A.},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  number = {2022-11},
  institution = {{Institute of Public Finance, Fiscal Law and Law \& Economics}},
  url = {https://iff.unisg.ch/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/WP-11-Haener-Salvi-Schaltegger.pdf},
  urldate = {2022-02-28},
  abstract = {This paper examines the distributional consequences of marital decisions on family wealth and potential inheritances. We use a large administrative dataset from Switzerland that contains detailed wealth information and enables us to identify spouses and their parents. We find that marital sorting is particularly pronounced at the tails of the wealth distribution. However, the financial similarity of couples' parents is much smaller. The distributional effect on parental wealth is only half the size. We identify intergenerational social mobility as the mechanism behind this attenuation over generations. Consequently, chances of making a "good match" depend much more on one's own wealth than on potential inheritances.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This paper examines the distributional consequences of marital decisions on family wealth and potential inheritances. We use a large administrative dataset from Switzerland that contains detailed wealth information and enables us to identify spouses and their parents. We find that marital sorting is particularly pronounced at the tails of the wealth distribution. However, the financial similarity of couples' parents is much smaller. The distributional effect on parental wealth is only half the size. We identify intergenerational social mobility as the mechanism behind this attenuation over generations. Consequently, chances of making a "good match" depend much more on one's own wealth than on potential inheritances.

@article{Kennickelletal2022,
  title = {A New Instrument to Measure Wealth Inequality: Distributional Wealth Accounts},
  author = {Kennickell, Arthur B. and Lindner, Peter and Sch{\"u}rz, Martin},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Monetary Policy \& the Economy},
  volume = {Q4/21},
  url = {https://www.oenb.at/dam/jcr:37664c81-2d0d-409e-8d33-a19fc2b25854/05_mop_q4_21_A-new-instrument-to-measure-wealth-inequality.pdf},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  abstract = {In this study we investigate the sensitivity of different wealth measurement approaches. In this context, we analyze the alignment of Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) data with national accounts data and examine the production of distributional wealth accounts, which poses severe conceptual challenges. For a number of reasons, household surveys underestimate top wealth shares. We show that different assumptions generate a wide range of results for different wealth inequality indicators. In particular, the share of the top 1\% of households in net wealth ranges from about 25\% to about 50\%, depending on the underlying assumption. Thus, while the true value of the wealth share held by the top 1\% is unknown, all available information indicates that it is closer to 50\% than to HFCS results. We call for caution in interpreting top shares as the underlying assumptions are mostly ad hoc choices made by data producers. Our study argues that we need better microdata on the top end of the net wealth distribution.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

In this study we investigate the sensitivity of different wealth measurement approaches. In this context, we analyze the alignment of Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) data with national accounts data and examine the production of distributional wealth accounts, which poses severe conceptual challenges. For a number of reasons, household surveys underestimate top wealth shares. We show that different assumptions generate a wide range of results for different wealth inequality indicators. In particular, the share of the top 1% of households in net wealth ranges from about 25% to about 50%, depending on the underlying assumption. Thus, while the true value of the wealth share held by the top 1% is unknown, all available information indicates that it is closer to 50% than to HFCS results. We call for caution in interpreting top shares as the underlying assumptions are mostly ad hoc choices made by data producers. Our study argues that we need better microdata on the top end of the net wealth distribution.

@article{Levy2022,
  title = {Wealth, Race, and Place: How Neighborhood (Dis)Advantage from Emerging to Middle Adulthood Affects Wealth Inequality and the Racial Wealth Gap},
  author = {Levy, Brian L.},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Demography},
  volume = {59},
  number = {1},
  pages = {293--320},
  doi = {10.1215/00703370-9710284},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-9710284},
  abstract = {Do neighborhood conditions affect wealth accumulation? This study uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort and a counterfactual estimation strategy to analyze the effect of prolonged exposure to neighborhood (dis)advantage from emerging adulthood through middle adulthood. Neighborhoods have sizable, plausibly causal effects on wealth, but these effects vary significantly by race/ethnicity and homeownership. White homeowners receive the largest payoff to reductions in neighborhood disadvantage. Black adults, regardless of homeownership, are doubly disadvantaged in the neighborhood\textendash wealth relationship. They live in more-disadvantaged neighborhoods and receive little return to reductions in neighborhood disadvantage. Findings indicate that disparities in neighborhood (dis)advantage figure prominently in wealth inequality and the racial wealth gap.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Do neighborhood conditions affect wealth accumulation? This study uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort and a counterfactual estimation strategy to analyze the effect of prolonged exposure to neighborhood (dis)advantage from emerging adulthood through middle adulthood. Neighborhoods have sizable, plausibly causal effects on wealth, but these effects vary significantly by race/ethnicity and homeownership. White homeowners receive the largest payoff to reductions in neighborhood disadvantage. Black adults, regardless of homeownership, are doubly disadvantaged in the neighborhood– wealth relationship. They live in more-disadvantaged neighborhoods and receive little return to reductions in neighborhood disadvantage. Findings indicate that disparities in neighborhood (dis)advantage figure prominently in wealth inequality and the racial wealth gap.

@unpublished{Martinez-Toledano2022,
  title = {House Price Cycles, Wealth Inequality and Portfolio Reshuffling},
  author = {{Mart{\'i}nez-Toledano}, Clara},
  year = {2022},
  month = aug,
  url = {https://sites.google.com/view/claramartinez-toledanotoledano/research},
  urldate = {2022-09-29},
  abstract = {This paper studies the determinants of wealth inequality during housing booms and busts. I examine two episodes over the last four decades in Spain by combining fiscal data with household surveys and national accounts. I find that heterogeneity in capital gains is the main driver behind the fall in wealth inequality during housing booms, while heterogeneity in saving rates and portfolio choices are the main explanatory forces of the rise in wealth concentration during housing busts. Top wealth holders are better at timing the market and reshuffling their portfolios, as they appear to be subject to less portfolio adjustment frictions.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Martinez-Toledano2022.pdf},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/martineztoledano-housepricecycleswealthinequalityandportfolioreshufflingdatafile-2022},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper studies the determinants of wealth inequality during housing booms and busts. I examine two episodes over the last four decades in Spain by combining fiscal data with household surveys and national accounts. I find that heterogeneity in capital gains is the main driver behind the fall in wealth inequality during housing booms, while heterogeneity in saving rates and portfolio choices are the main explanatory forces of the rise in wealth concentration during housing busts. Top wealth holders are better at timing the market and reshuffling their portfolios, as they appear to be subject to less portfolio adjustment frictions.

@techreport{Maki-Frantietal2022,
  type = {Bank of {{Finland Research Discussion Paper}}},
  title = {Monetary Policy and Inequality: The {{Finnish}} Case},
  author = {{M{\"a}ki-Fr{\"a}nti}, Petri and Silvo, Aino and Gulan, Adam and Kilponen, Juha},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  number = {3/2022},
  institution = {{Bank of Finland}},
  url = {https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=4014139},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  abstract = {We use Finnish household-level registry and survey data to study the effects of ECB's monetary policy on the distribution of income and wealth. We find that monetary easing has a large positive effect on aggregate economic activity in Finland, but its overall net impact on income and wealth inequality is negligible. Monetary easing increases households' gross income by reducing unemployment and leading to a general rise in wages, while at the same time it boosts asset prices. These different channels have counteracting effects on income and wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and the ratios of income and wealth of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile. The reduction in aggregate unemployment benefits especially households in lower income quintiles, where the initial rate of unemployment is high. Households in the upper income quintiles, where the rate of employment is higher, benefit relatively more from an increase in wages. An increase in house prices benefits all homeowners. In terms of net wealth, households with large mortgages, in the lower wealth quintiles, benefit the most from an increase in house prices due to a leverage effect. An increase in stock prices, in turn, benefits mainly households in the top wealth quintile.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We use Finnish household-level registry and survey data to study the effects of ECB's monetary policy on the distribution of income and wealth. We find that monetary easing has a large positive effect on aggregate economic activity in Finland, but its overall net impact on income and wealth inequality is negligible. Monetary easing increases households' gross income by reducing unemployment and leading to a general rise in wages, while at the same time it boosts asset prices. These different channels have counteracting effects on income and wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and the ratios of income and wealth of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile. The reduction in aggregate unemployment benefits especially households in lower income quintiles, where the initial rate of unemployment is high. Households in the upper income quintiles, where the rate of employment is higher, benefit relatively more from an increase in wages. An increase in house prices benefits all homeowners. In terms of net wealth, households with large mortgages, in the lower wealth quintiles, benefit the most from an increase in house prices due to a leverage effect. An increase in stock prices, in turn, benefits mainly households in the top wealth quintile.

@article{Nolanetal2022,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Transfers in {{Great Britain}} from the {{Wealth}} and {{Assets Survey}} in Comparative Perspective},
  author = {Nolan, Brian and Palomino, Juan C. and Van Kerm, Philippe and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2022},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Fiscal Studies},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-5890.12299},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12299},
  abstract = {Wealth surveys that collect information on intergenerational transfers provide new scope for comparative study of those transfers and their relationship with wealth across rich countries. However, this is problematic in the case of Great Britain, due to specific features of the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), the central source of survey-based household wealth data, in particular the extent of missing information in its first wave. This has severely constrained efforts to investigate patterns of wealth transfer in Great Britain in comparative perspective. In this paper, we set out these issues and present ways of dealing with them. On this basis, we then examine the main similarities and differences in patterns of intergenerational transmission of wealth between Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United States. Our findings reveal common features across these countries as well as some important respects in which Great Britain was distinctive, though less of an outlier than the US. About 35 per cent of British households reported receiving an intergenerational wealth transfer at some point, similar to most of the comparator countries but much higher than the US. We conclude by setting out how WAS can be enhanced to address these issues at source, proposals with which the Office for National Statistics is seriously engaged.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Wealth surveys that collect information on intergenerational transfers provide new scope for comparative study of those transfers and their relationship with wealth across rich countries. However, this is problematic in the case of Great Britain, due to specific features of the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), the central source of survey-based household wealth data, in particular the extent of missing information in its first wave. This has severely constrained efforts to investigate patterns of wealth transfer in Great Britain in comparative perspective. In this paper, we set out these issues and present ways of dealing with them. On this basis, we then examine the main similarities and differences in patterns of intergenerational transmission of wealth between Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United States. Our findings reveal common features across these countries as well as some important respects in which Great Britain was distinctive, though less of an outlier than the US. About 35 per cent of British households reported receiving an intergenerational wealth transfer at some point, similar to most of the comparator countries but much higher than the US. We conclude by setting out how WAS can be enhanced to address these issues at source, proposals with which the Office for National Statistics is seriously engaged.

@article{Pikettyetal2022,
  title = {Twenty Years and Counting: Thoughts about Measuring the Upper Tail},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {255--264},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-022-09536-8},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-022-09536-8},
  abstract = {This article first describes the main developments in measuring the upper tail of the income and wealth distributions over the last twenty years. Second, it points out some of the key methodological challenges and how better data could address them. Third, it discusses the academic and policy impacts of upper tail measurement.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This article first describes the main developments in measuring the upper tail of the income and wealth distributions over the last twenty years. Second, it points out some of the key methodological challenges and how better data could address them. Third, it discusses the academic and policy impacts of upper tail measurement.

@article{PikettyYang2022,
  title = {Income and Wealth Inequality in {{Hong Kong}}, 1981\textendash 2020: The Rise of Pluto-Communism?},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Yang, Li},
  year = {2022},
  month = nov,
  journal = {The World Bank Economic Review},
  volume = {36},
  number = {4},
  pages = {803--834},
  doi = {10.1093/wber/lhac019},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhac019},
  abstract = {The objective of this paper is to better understand the evolution and institutional roots of Hong Kong's growing economic inequality and political cleavages. By combining multiple sources of data (household surveys, fiscal data, wealth rankings, national accounts) and methodological innovations, two main findings are obtained. First, he evidence suggests a very large rise in income and wealth inequality in Hong Kong over the last four decades. Second, based on the latest opinion poll data, business elites, who carry disproportionate weight in Hong Kong's Legislative Council, are found to be more likely to vote for the pro-establishment camp (presumably to ensure that policies are passed that protect their political and economic interests). This paper argues that the unique alliance of government and business elites in a partially democratic political system is the plausible institutional root of Hong Kong's rising inequality and political cleavages.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-yang-incomeandwealthinequalityinhongkong19812020theriseofplutocommunismappendix-2021},
  url_data_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-yang-incomeandwealthinequalityinhongkong19812020theriseofplutocommunismdatafiles-2021}
}

The objective of this paper is to better understand the evolution and institutional roots of Hong Kong's growing economic inequality and political cleavages. By combining multiple sources of data (household surveys, fiscal data, wealth rankings, national accounts) and methodological innovations, two main findings are obtained. First, he evidence suggests a very large rise in income and wealth inequality in Hong Kong over the last four decades. Second, based on the latest opinion poll data, business elites, who carry disproportionate weight in Hong Kong's Legislative Council, are found to be more likely to vote for the pro-establishment camp (presumably to ensure that policies are passed that protect their political and economic interests). This paper argues that the unique alliance of government and business elites in a partially democratic political system is the plausible institutional root of Hong Kong's rising inequality and political cleavages.

@article{Ranaldi2022,
  title = {Income Composition Inequality},
  author = {Ranaldi, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {68},
  number = {1},
  pages = {139--160},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12503},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12503},
  abstract = {The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces a novel inequality concept called income composition inequality, which describes how the composition of income in two sources, such as capital and labor income, varies across the income distribution. Second, it constructs an indicator for its measurement. This paper argues that the study of income composition inequality allows for: (i) a novel political economy analysis of the evolution of economic systems; and (ii) the technical assessment of the relationship between the functional and personal distributions of income. Following an empirical application, this paper discusses possible avenues for future research on the matter, ranging from development issues to public finance.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces a novel inequality concept called income composition inequality, which describes how the composition of income in two sources, such as capital and labor income, varies across the income distribution. Second, it constructs an indicator for its measurement. This paper argues that the study of income composition inequality allows for: (i) a novel political economy analysis of the evolution of economic systems; and (ii) the technical assessment of the relationship between the functional and personal distributions of income. Following an empirical application, this paper discusses possible avenues for future research on the matter, ranging from development issues to public finance.

@techreport{RanaldiPalagi2022,
  type = {Stone {{Center Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {Heterogeneity in Macroeconomics: The Compositional Inequality Perspective},
  author = {Ranaldi, Marco and Palagi, Elisa},
  year = {2022},
  month = oct,
  number = {57},
  institution = {{Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/fjcxb},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/fjcxb},
  abstract = {This work presents a framework to jointly study individuals' heterogeneity in terms of their capital and labor endowments (endowment heterogeneity) and of their saving and consumption behaviors (behavioral heterogeneity), from an empirical perspective. By adopting a newly developed synthetic measure of compositional inequality, this work classifies more than 20 economies across over two decades on the basis of their heterogeneity characteristics. Modern economies are far from being characterized by agents with same propensities to save and consume and same endowments (Representative Agent systems), or by the existence of rich capital-abundant savers and poor hand-to-mouth consumers (Kaldorian systems). Our framework and results are discussed in light of the heterogeneity assumptions underlying several types of macroeconomic models with heterogeneous agents (Kaldorian, TANK \& HANK, OLG, and ABM models). A negative relationship between behavioral heterogeneity and the economy's saving rate is also documented. (Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality Working Paper)},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This work presents a framework to jointly study individuals' heterogeneity in terms of their capital and labor endowments (endowment heterogeneity) and of their saving and consumption behaviors (behavioral heterogeneity), from an empirical perspective. By adopting a newly developed synthetic measure of compositional inequality, this work classifies more than 20 economies across over two decades on the basis of their heterogeneity characteristics. Modern economies are far from being characterized by agents with same propensities to save and consume and same endowments (Representative Agent systems), or by the existence of rich capital-abundant savers and poor hand-to-mouth consumers (Kaldorian systems). Our framework and results are discussed in light of the heterogeneity assumptions underlying several types of macroeconomic models with heterogeneous agents (Kaldorian, TANK & HANK, OLG, and ABM models). A negative relationship between behavioral heterogeneity and the economy's saving rate is also documented. (Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality Working Paper)

@techreport{SaezZucman2022,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Top Wealth in {{America}}: A Reexamination},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2022},
  month = aug,
  number = {30396},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  doi = {10.3386/w30396},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w30396},
  abstract = {Recent estimates of US top wealth shares obtained by capitalizing income tax returns (Saez and Zucman, 2020; Smith, Zidar and Zwick, 2022) are close in both levels and trends except for the top 0.01\% where a large discrepancy remains. We examine this difference and, using public data, quantify three main issues in Smith et al. (2022). First, Securities and Exchange Commission data at the shareholder firm level show that billionaires' equity wealth is underestimated by a factor of 2.1. Second, interest-bearing assets at the top are under-estimated by a factor of 1.6, because of an extrapolation from a small and unrepresentative sample of investment funds. We quantify this issue using mandatory filings of US hedge funds. Third, issues involving tiered partnerships and the measurement of business profits suggest that large S-corporations are undervalued by a factor of 1.2 and top-owned partnerships by up to 2.2. After incorporating these results, the top 0.01\% wealth share of Smith et al. (2022) is close to the one found in Saez and Zucman (2020) and estimates of US wealth inequality are reconciled.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Recent estimates of US top wealth shares obtained by capitalizing income tax returns (Saez and Zucman, 2020; Smith, Zidar and Zwick, 2022) are close in both levels and trends except for the top 0.01% where a large discrepancy remains. We examine this difference and, using public data, quantify three main issues in Smith et al. (2022). First, Securities and Exchange Commission data at the shareholder firm level show that billionaires' equity wealth is underestimated by a factor of 2.1. Second, interest-bearing assets at the top are under-estimated by a factor of 1.6, because of an extrapolation from a small and unrepresentative sample of investment funds. We quantify this issue using mandatory filings of US hedge funds. Third, issues involving tiered partnerships and the measurement of business profits suggest that large S-corporations are undervalued by a factor of 1.2 and top-owned partnerships by up to 2.2. After incorporating these results, the top 0.01% wealth share of Smith et al. (2022) is close to the one found in Saez and Zucman (2020) and estimates of US wealth inequality are reconciled.

@article{Salas-RojoRodriguez2022,
  title = {Inheritances and Wealth Inequality: A Machine Learning Approach},
  author = {{Salas-Rojo}, Pedro and Rodr{\'i}guez, Juan Gabriel},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {27--51},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-022-09528-8},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-022-09528-8},
  abstract = {This paper explores the relationship between received inheritances and the distribution of wealth (financial, non-financial and total) in four developed countries: the United States, Canada, Italy and Spain. We follow the inequality of opportunity (IOp) literature and\,-\,considering inheritances as the only circumstance- we show that traditional IOp approaches can lead to non-robust and arbitrary measures of IOp depending on discretionary cut-off choices of a continuous circumstance such as inheritances. To overcome this limitation, we apply Machine Learning methods (`random forest' algorithm) to optimize the choice of cut-offs and we find that IOp explains over 60\% of wealth inequality in the US and Spain (using the Gini coefficient), and more than 40\% in Italy and Canada. Including parental education as an additional circumstance -available for the US and Italy- we find that inheritances are still the main contributor. Finally, using the S-Gini index with different parameters to weight different parts of the distribution, we find that the effect of inheritances is more prominent at the middle of the wealth distribution, while parental education is more important for the asset-poor.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper explores the relationship between received inheritances and the distribution of wealth (financial, non-financial and total) in four developed countries: the United States, Canada, Italy and Spain. We follow the inequality of opportunity (IOp) literature and\,-\,considering inheritances as the only circumstance- we show that traditional IOp approaches can lead to non-robust and arbitrary measures of IOp depending on discretionary cut-off choices of a continuous circumstance such as inheritances. To overcome this limitation, we apply Machine Learning methods (`random forest' algorithm) to optimize the choice of cut-offs and we find that IOp explains over 60% of wealth inequality in the US and Spain (using the Gini coefficient), and more than 40% in Italy and Canada. Including parental education as an additional circumstance -available for the US and Italy- we find that inheritances are still the main contributor. Finally, using the S-Gini index with different parameters to weight different parts of the distribution, we find that the effect of inheritances is more prominent at the middle of the wealth distribution, while parental education is more important for the asset-poor.

@article{Shchepelevaetal2022,
  title = {Has the Global Financial Crisis Increased Wealth Inequality?},
  author = {Shchepeleva, Maria and Stolbov, Mikhail and Weill, Laurent},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  journal = {International Economics},
  volume = {169},
  pages = {148--160},
  doi = {10.1016/j.inteco.2021.12.004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inteco.2021.12.004},
  abstract = {This paper examines the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on wealth inequality. We investigate this question, using data for 143 countries for the period 2010\textendash 2018. We find no significant impact of the occurrence of the crisis on wealth inequality. We show limited evidence that the severity of the banking crisis affects the change in wealth inequality. Furthermore, the impact of the GFC on the change in wealth inequality is influenced by the country characteristics: the GFC has more enhanced wealth inequality in countries with higher levels of economic and financial development as well as lower initial levels of wealth inequality. We therefore contribute to a better understanding of the real effects of banking crises by providing evidence of the distributional effects of the GFC.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper examines the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on wealth inequality. We investigate this question, using data for 143 countries for the period 2010– 2018. We find no significant impact of the occurrence of the crisis on wealth inequality. We show limited evidence that the severity of the banking crisis affects the change in wealth inequality. Furthermore, the impact of the GFC on the change in wealth inequality is influenced by the country characteristics: the GFC has more enhanced wealth inequality in countries with higher levels of economic and financial development as well as lower initial levels of wealth inequality. We therefore contribute to a better understanding of the real effects of banking crises by providing evidence of the distributional effects of the GFC.

@article{Tiwarietal2022,
  title = {Poverty, Wealth Inequality and Financial Inclusion among Castes in {{Hindu}} and {{Muslim}} Communities in {{Uttar Pradesh}}, {{India}}},
  author = {Tiwari, Chhavi and Goli, Srinivas and Siddiqui, Mohammad Zahid and Salve, Pradeep S.},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Journal of International Development},
  doi = {10.1002/jid.3626},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3626},
  abstract = {This study estimates poverty, wealth inequality and financial inclusion, for the first time, at the sub-caste level in both Hindus and Muslims using a unique survey data collected from 7124 households in Uttar Pradesh, India, during 2014\textendash 2015. The results confirm the existing hypothesis that Brahmins, Thakurs and other Hindu general castes have higher wealth accumulation, lower poverty and lesser exclusion from formal financial services than Dalits. Exclusion from formal financial services forces Dalits to depend primarily on informal financial sources for borrowing\textemdash which leads to financial misfortune and further dragging them into a vicious cycle of poverty.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This study estimates poverty, wealth inequality and financial inclusion, for the first time, at the sub-caste level in both Hindus and Muslims using a unique survey data collected from 7124 households in Uttar Pradesh, India, during 2014– 2015. The results confirm the existing hypothesis that Brahmins, Thakurs and other Hindu general castes have higher wealth accumulation, lower poverty and lesser exclusion from formal financial services than Dalits. Exclusion from formal financial services forces Dalits to depend primarily on informal financial sources for borrowing— which leads to financial misfortune and further dragging them into a vicious cycle of poverty.

@techreport{Toussaintetal2022,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Household Wealth and Its Distribution in the {{Netherlands}}, 1854-2019},
  author = {Toussaint, Simon J. and {de Vicq}, Amaury and Moatsos, Michail and {van der Valk}, Tim},
  year = {2022},
  month = nov,
  number = {2022/19},
  institution = {{World Inequality Lab}},
  url = {https://wid.world/document/household-wealth-and-its-distribution-in-the-netherlands-1854-2019-world-inequality-lab-working-paper-2022-19/},
  urldate = {2023-05-17},
  abstract = {We analyze the evolution of aggregate household wealth, its composition, and top wealth shares since the mid-19th century for the Netherlands, a country which played a significant role in economic history. The main forces at play are the size and variation of colonial wealth up until WWII, and the introduction of a \textendash particularly strong\textendash{} pension system thereafter. We show that the wealth-income ratio followed the familiar U-shaped pattern over the 20th century. The Netherlands, however, had the largest wealth-income ratio on record, growing since the mid-1850s, driven by industrialization and booming private foreign investments, to a peak of 900\% around 1880. In contrast to other countries, the wealth-income ratio remained high up until 1929. To better understand these trends, we construct the first series on colonial wealth and show that colonial and other foreign investment account for most of the gap with other countries in the pre-WWII period. The initial post-war decline in the ratio is driven by rapid income growth. The increase in the ratio since the 1970s has been mainly driven by the uniquely large capital-funded pension system. In contrast with other major countries, housing plays only a secondary role in net wealth accumulation due to significant mortgage debt. Methodologically, we are the first to compare historical national accounts, estate multiplier, and wealth tax data approaches to construct aggregate wealth. We find that the estate multiplier is a good alternative to the historical national accounts benchmark, while the use of wealth tax data results in unrealistically low estimates.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Toussaintetal2022.pdf}
}

We analyze the evolution of aggregate household wealth, its composition, and top wealth shares since the mid-19th century for the Netherlands, a country which played a significant role in economic history. The main forces at play are the size and variation of colonial wealth up until WWII, and the introduction of a – particularly strong– pension system thereafter. We show that the wealth-income ratio followed the familiar U-shaped pattern over the 20th century. The Netherlands, however, had the largest wealth-income ratio on record, growing since the mid-1850s, driven by industrialization and booming private foreign investments, to a peak of 900% around 1880. In contrast to other countries, the wealth-income ratio remained high up until 1929. To better understand these trends, we construct the first series on colonial wealth and show that colonial and other foreign investment account for most of the gap with other countries in the pre-WWII period. The initial post-war decline in the ratio is driven by rapid income growth. The increase in the ratio since the 1970s has been mainly driven by the uniquely large capital-funded pension system. In contrast with other major countries, housing plays only a secondary role in net wealth accumulation due to significant mortgage debt. Methodologically, we are the first to compare historical national accounts, estate multiplier, and wealth tax data approaches to construct aggregate wealth. We find that the estate multiplier is a good alternative to the historical national accounts benchmark, while the use of wealth tax data results in unrealistically low estimates.

@article{WaltlChakraborty2022,
  title = {Missing the Wealthy in the {{HFCS}}: Micro Problems with Macro Implications},
  author = {Waltl, Sofie R. and Chakraborty, Robin},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {169--203},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-021-09519-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-021-09519-1},
  abstract = {Wealth aggregates implied by the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) usually yield much lower amounts than macroeconomic statistics reported in the National Accounts. An important source of this gap may be the under-representation of the wealthiest households in the HFCS. This article therefore combines a semi-parametric Pareto model estimated from top survey data and observations from rich lists with a non-parametric stratification approach to quantify the impact of the missing wealthy households on component-specific micro-macro gaps. We find that unadjusted micro data substantially underestimates wealth inequality. The largest effects are documented for equity. For other components, the missing wealthy explain less than ten percentage points of the micro-macro gap. We find that differences in oversampling strategies limit the cross-country comparability of unadjusted survey-implied wealth distributions and that our top tail adjustment leads to measures that are internationally better comparable.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Wealth aggregates implied by the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) usually yield much lower amounts than macroeconomic statistics reported in the National Accounts. An important source of this gap may be the under-representation of the wealthiest households in the HFCS. This article therefore combines a semi-parametric Pareto model estimated from top survey data and observations from rich lists with a non-parametric stratification approach to quantify the impact of the missing wealthy households on component-specific micro-macro gaps. We find that unadjusted micro data substantially underestimates wealth inequality. The largest effects are documented for equity. For other components, the missing wealthy explain less than ten percentage points of the micro-macro gap. We find that differences in oversampling strategies limit the cross-country comparability of unadjusted survey-implied wealth distributions and that our top tail adjustment leads to measures that are internationally better comparable.

@article{Wangetal2022,
  title = {Accounting for Wealth Inequality and Its Change: Decomposition Analyses for the {{US}}, 1995-2019},
  author = {Wang, Zuobao and Dong, Lin and Li, Dongxue},
  year = {2022},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Applied Economics Letters},
  doi = {10.1080/13504851.2022.2091743},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2022.2091743},
  abstract = {This paper decomposes the components of wealth inequality and its change in the United States during the period 2006\textendash 2016. The results show that wealth inequality in the US is extremely high. Real estate, non-housing assets and financial investments are the first three important components of equivalent wealth and overall inequality. Financial investments, real estate liabilities and nonhousing liabilities have positive marginal impacts on overall inequality, while other assets' marginal impacts are negative. Financial investments changes had the largest impact on the aggregate trends of wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper decomposes the components of wealth inequality and its change in the United States during the period 2006– 2016. The results show that wealth inequality in the US is extremely high. Real estate, non-housing assets and financial investments are the first three important components of equivalent wealth and overall inequality. Financial investments, real estate liabilities and nonhousing liabilities have positive marginal impacts on overall inequality, while other assets' marginal impacts are negative. Financial investments changes had the largest impact on the aggregate trends of wealth inequality.

@article{Wolff2022,
  title = {The Stock Market and the Evolution of Top Wealth Shares in the {{United States}}},
  author = {Wolff, Edward N.},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {53--66},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-022-09535-9},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-022-09535-9},
  abstract = {The mean wealth of the top wealth percentile surged more than two-and-a-half fold in real terms from 1983 to 2019. Changes in wealth over time can be decomposed into capital gains and savings. Capital gains in turn depend on asset price movements and portfolio composition. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, the paper provides a decomposition of the change in the mean wealth and wealth share of the top percentile into a capital gains and savings effect. It then analyzes how much stock price movements and movements in other asset prices individually affect changes in the wealth of the top percentile. It finds that the rise in the stock market accounted for about a third of the advance in the wealth holdings of the super-rich, while increased business values explained about a quarter and gains in non-home real estate about a sixth.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The mean wealth of the top wealth percentile surged more than two-and-a-half fold in real terms from 1983 to 2019. Changes in wealth over time can be decomposed into capital gains and savings. Capital gains in turn depend on asset price movements and portfolio composition. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, the paper provides a decomposition of the change in the mean wealth and wealth share of the top percentile into a capital gains and savings effect. It then analyzes how much stock price movements and movements in other asset prices individually affect changes in the wealth of the top percentile. It finds that the rise in the stock market accounted for about a third of the advance in the wealth holdings of the super-rich, while increased business values explained about a quarter and gains in non-home real estate about a sixth.

@article{Zwijnenburg2022,
  title = {The Use of Distributional National Accounts in Better Capturing the Top Tail of the Distribution},
  author = {Zwijnenburg, Jorrit},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {245--254},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-022-09534-w},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-022-09534-w},
  abstract = {This article explains how the compilation of distributional results in line with national accounts' totals may assist in overcoming some of the challenges faced by micro data statistics in measuring inequality, including capturing the top tail. As national accounts rely on a harmonised system of concepts and definitions in which multiple data sources are brought together in order to arrive at comprehensive, coherent and consistent results, they may capture elements that may be missing from underlying statistics and may provide more reliable estimates for items that may be more prone to quality issues in underlying statistics. This implies that aligning micro data to national accounts totals may improve the overall quality of distributional results, mainly depending on the way in which any gaps between the micro and macro data are allocated to underlying households. This article provides an overview of possible underlying reasons for the micro-macro gaps, including the issue of the missing rich, and provides guidance on how to deal with them in order to arrive at the best possible distributional results.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This article explains how the compilation of distributional results in line with national accounts' totals may assist in overcoming some of the challenges faced by micro data statistics in measuring inequality, including capturing the top tail. As national accounts rely on a harmonised system of concepts and definitions in which multiple data sources are brought together in order to arrive at comprehensive, coherent and consistent results, they may capture elements that may be missing from underlying statistics and may provide more reliable estimates for items that may be more prone to quality issues in underlying statistics. This implies that aligning micro data to national accounts totals may improve the overall quality of distributional results, mainly depending on the way in which any gaps between the micro and macro data are allocated to underlying households. This article provides an overview of possible underlying reasons for the micro-macro gaps, including the issue of the missing rich, and provides guidance on how to deal with them in order to arrive at the best possible distributional results.

@article{vanBavel2022,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in Pre-Industrial {{Europe}}: What Role Did Associational Organizations Have?},
  author = {{van Bavel}, Bas},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  journal = {The Economic History Review},
  doi = {10.1111/ehr.13137},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13137},
  abstract = {A host of studies on wealth inequality in pre-industrial Europe has recently been published. Out of these, a narrative emerges of rising inequality in a context of emerging markets and growing state taxation, punctuated by calamities. By surveying the available material, this article highlights an element that is less systematically discussed in this literature: the role of associational organizations. They developed less regressive forms of taxation and redistribution, embedded the transfer and use of land and capital in coordination systems that curtailed accumulation, and sometimes even imposed maximums of wealth ownership. The article tentatively argues that the resulting downward effect on wealth inequality was found most conspicuously in societies where associations of middling groups of owners-producers held strong positions in economic and political life, even despite the exclusive character of their organizations. Such societies were gradually eroded in the early modern period, most notably as a result of the emergence of factor markets and state centralization, and the associated processes of proletarianization and scale enlargement. This did not happen without opposition and conflict, however, as the process was sometimes halted and showed distinct geographical patterns, which in turn influenced patterns of wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

A host of studies on wealth inequality in pre-industrial Europe has recently been published. Out of these, a narrative emerges of rising inequality in a context of emerging markets and growing state taxation, punctuated by calamities. By surveying the available material, this article highlights an element that is less systematically discussed in this literature: the role of associational organizations. They developed less regressive forms of taxation and redistribution, embedded the transfer and use of land and capital in coordination systems that curtailed accumulation, and sometimes even imposed maximums of wealth ownership. The article tentatively argues that the resulting downward effect on wealth inequality was found most conspicuously in societies where associations of middling groups of owners-producers held strong positions in economic and political life, even despite the exclusive character of their organizations. Such societies were gradually eroded in the early modern period, most notably as a result of the emergence of factor markets and state centralization, and the associated processes of proletarianization and scale enlargement. This did not happen without opposition and conflict, however, as the process was sometimes halted and showed distinct geographical patterns, which in turn influenced patterns of wealth inequality.

@techreport{AcciariMorelli2021,
  type = {Stone {{Center Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {Wealth Transfers and Net Wealth at Death: Evidence from the {{Italian}} Inheritance Tax Records 1995\textendash 2016},
  author = {Acciari, Paolo and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2021},
  month = mar,
  number = {26},
  institution = {{Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/87nmv},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/87nmv},
  abstract = {In this paper we describe a novel source of data on the full record of inheritance tax files in Italy, covering up to 63\% of total deceased. The work documents a substantial rise in the total value of inheritance and gifts as a share of national income, from 8.4\% in 1995 to 15.1\% in 2016. Consistent with the increasing role of total personal net wealth in the economy, the weight of inheritance and gifts in Italy appears relatively high by international standards. Over the same period, total wealth left at death has also become increasingly concentrated. The estates valued at least \texteuro 1 million were worth 18.7\% of total estate in the mid 1990s and 24.8\% in 2016. This paper also documents that revenues collected from the inheritance tax underwent a threefold decline from 0.15\% to 0.05\% of total tax revenue between 1995 and 2016. Data also allow a disaggregated analysis by demographic and geographic characteristics.},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Intergenerational Wealth}
}

In this paper we describe a novel source of data on the full record of inheritance tax files in Italy, covering up to 63% of total deceased. The work documents a substantial rise in the total value of inheritance and gifts as a share of national income, from 8.4% in 1995 to 15.1% in 2016. Consistent with the increasing role of total personal net wealth in the economy, the weight of inheritance and gifts in Italy appears relatively high by international standards. Over the same period, total wealth left at death has also become increasingly concentrated. The estates valued at least \texteuro 1 million were worth 18.7% of total estate in the mid 1990s and 24.8% in 2016. This paper also documents that revenues collected from the inheritance tax underwent a threefold decline from 0.15% to 0.05% of total tax revenue between 1995 and 2016. Data also allow a disaggregated analysis by demographic and geographic characteristics.

@article{Advanietal2021,
  title = {The {{UK}}'s Wealth Distribution and Characteristics of High-Wealth Households},
  author = {Advani, Arun and Bangham, George and Leslie, Jack},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Fiscal Studies},
  volume = {42},
  number = {3-4},
  pages = {397--430},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-5890.12286},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12286},
  abstract = {We show that wealth inequality in the UK is high and has increased slightly over the past decade as financial asset prices have increased in the wake of the financial crisis. But data deficiencies are a major barrier in understanding the true distribution, composition and size of household wealth. The most comprehensive survey of household wealth in the UK does a good job of capturing the vast majority of the wealth distribution, but nearly \textsterling 800 billion of wealth held by the very wealthiest UK households is missing. We also find tentative evidence that survey measures of high-wealth families undervalue their assets \textendash{} our central estimate of the true value of wealth held by households in the UK is 5 per cent higher than the survey data suggest.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Advanietal2021.pdf},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/advani-bangham-leslie-theukswealthdistributionandcharacteristicsofhighwealthhouseholdsonlineappendix-2021},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/advani-bangham-leslie-theukswealthdistributionandcharacteristicsofhighwealthhouseholdsdatafile-2021}
}

We show that wealth inequality in the UK is high and has increased slightly over the past decade as financial asset prices have increased in the wake of the financial crisis. But data deficiencies are a major barrier in understanding the true distribution, composition and size of household wealth. The most comprehensive survey of household wealth in the UK does a good job of capturing the vast majority of the wealth distribution, but nearly £ 800 billion of wealth held by the very wealthiest UK households is missing. We also find tentative evidence that survey measures of high-wealth families undervalue their assets – our central estimate of the true value of wealth held by households in the UK is 5 per cent higher than the survey data suggest.

@article{Ageretal2021,
  title = {The Intergenerational Effects of a Large Wealth Shock: White {{Southerners}} after the {{Civil War}}},
  author = {Ager, Philipp and Boustan, Leah and Eriksson, Katherine},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {111},
  number = {11},
  pages = {3767--3794},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20191422},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191422},
  abstract = {The nullification of slave wealth after the US Civil War (1861\textendash 1865) was one of the largest episodes of wealth compression in history. We document that White Southern households that owned more slaves in 1860 lost substantially more wealth by 1870, relative to Southern households that had been equally wealthy before the war. Yet, their sons almost entirely recovered from this wealth shock by 1900, and their grandsons completely converged by 1940. Marriage networks and connections to other elite families may have aided in recovery, whereas transmission of entrepreneurship and skills appear less central.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

The nullification of slave wealth after the US Civil War (1861– 1865) was one of the largest episodes of wealth compression in history. We document that White Southern households that owned more slaves in 1860 lost substantially more wealth by 1870, relative to Southern households that had been equally wealthy before the war. Yet, their sons almost entirely recovered from this wealth shock by 1900, and their grandsons completely converged by 1940. Marriage networks and connections to other elite families may have aided in recovery, whereas transmission of entrepreneurship and skills appear less central.

@article{ArtolaBlancoetal2021,
  title = {Wealth in {{Spain}} 1900\textendash 2017 {{A}} Country of Two Lands},
  author = {Artola Blanco, Miguel and Bauluz, Luis and {Mart{\'i}nez-Toledano}, Clara},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {131},
  number = {633},
  pages = {129--155},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaa103},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa103},
  abstract = {This study reconstructs Spain's national wealth from 1900 to 2017. By combining new sources with existing accounts, we estimate the wealth of both private and government sectors and use a new asset-specific decomposition of the long-run accumulation of wealth. We find that, during the twentieth century, the national wealth-to-income ratio remained within a relatively narrow range\textemdash between 400\% and 600\%\textemdash until the housing boom of the early 2000s led to an unprecedented rise to 800\% in 2007. Our results highlight the importance of land, housing capital gains and international capital flows as key elements of wealth accumulation.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This study reconstructs Spain's national wealth from 1900 to 2017. By combining new sources with existing accounts, we estimate the wealth of both private and government sectors and use a new asset-specific decomposition of the long-run accumulation of wealth. We find that, during the twentieth century, the national wealth-to-income ratio remained within a relatively narrow range— between 400% and 600%— until the housing boom of the early 2000s led to an unprecedented rise to 800% in 2007. Our results highlight the importance of land, housing capital gains and international capital flows as key elements of wealth accumulation.

@techreport{Assouad2021,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Rethinking the {{Lebanese}} Economic Miracle: The Extreme Concentration of Income and Wealth in Lebanon 2005-2014},
  author = {Assouad, Lydia},
  year = {2021},
  month = feb,
  number = {2017/13},
  institution = {{World Inequality Lab}},
  url = {https://wid.world/document/rethinking-lebanese-economic-miracle-extreme-concentration-income-wealth-lebanon-2005-2014-wid-world-working-paper-201713/},
  urldate = {2022-04-01},
  abstract = {I combine household surveys, national accounts and unique personal income tax records to produce the first estimates of the national income distribution in an Arab country, Lebanon. I find that income is extremely concentrated over the 2005-2014 period: The top 1 and 10 percent of the adult population received almost 25 and 55 percent of national income on average, placing Lebanon among the countries with the highest levels of income inequality in the world. Results are robust to sensitivity analysis and suggest that one should not give up on tracking the dynamics of wealth and income concentration in a developing country, as long as the the assumptions made are clearly and systematically stated. The extreme level on inequality found question the long-lasting narrative of the "Lebanese economic miracle" that showcases the country as a paragon of economic success in the Middle East. They also confirm results from a large literature that emphasizes how the Lebanese sectarian-based mode of governance has allowed the ruling elite to extract large rents on most economic activities in the last decades at the expense of the majority of citizens.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Assouad2021.pdf},
  url_data_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/assouad-datafilestorethinkingthelebaneseeconomicmiracletheextremeconcentrationofincomeandwealthinlebanon20052014-2017}
}

I combine household surveys, national accounts and unique personal income tax records to produce the first estimates of the national income distribution in an Arab country, Lebanon. I find that income is extremely concentrated over the 2005-2014 period: The top 1 and 10 percent of the adult population received almost 25 and 55 percent of national income on average, placing Lebanon among the countries with the highest levels of income inequality in the world. Results are robust to sensitivity analysis and suggest that one should not give up on tracking the dynamics of wealth and income concentration in a developing country, as long as the the assumptions made are clearly and systematically stated. The extreme level on inequality found question the long-lasting narrative of the "Lebanese economic miracle" that showcases the country as a paragon of economic success in the Middle East. They also confirm results from a large literature that emphasizes how the Lebanese sectarian-based mode of governance has allowed the ruling elite to extract large rents on most economic activities in the last decades at the expense of the majority of citizens.

@article{BartelsMorelli2021,
  title = {A Tale of Two Countries: {{The}} Long Shadow of the Crisis on Income and Wealth in {{Germany}} and {{Italy}}},
  author = {Bartels, Charlotte and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2021},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Journal of Modern European History},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {33--39},
  doi = {10.1177/1611894420974299},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1611894420974299},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

@techreport{BermanMorelli2021,
  type = {Stone {{Center Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {On the Distribution of Estates and the Distribution of Wealth: Evidence from the Dead},
  author = {Berman, Yonatan and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2021},
  month = mar,
  number = {31},
  institution = {{Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/n5rvc},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/n5rvc},
  abstract = {Detailed information about the distribution of estates left at death has commonly served as the basis for the estimation of wealth distributions among the living via the mortality multiplier method. The application of detailed mortality rates by demographics and other determinants of mortality is crucial for obtaining an unbiased representation of the wealth distribution of the living. Yet, in this paper we suggest that a simplified mortality multiplier method, derived using average mortality rates and aggregate tabulations by estate size, may be sufficient to derive compelling estimates of wealth concentration. We show that the application of homogeneous multipliers leads to estimates that are close in level and trend to the concentration of wealth derived in the existing literature with the detailed mortality multiplier method for a variety of countries. The use of mortality rates graduated by estate size does not confute this finding. We also derive the general formal conditions for the similarity between the distributions of wealth of the living and estates at death and discuss the main caveats. These findings may unlock a wide array of aggregate estate tabulations, previously thought to be unusable, for estimating historical trends of wealth concentration.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Detailed information about the distribution of estates left at death has commonly served as the basis for the estimation of wealth distributions among the living via the mortality multiplier method. The application of detailed mortality rates by demographics and other determinants of mortality is crucial for obtaining an unbiased representation of the wealth distribution of the living. Yet, in this paper we suggest that a simplified mortality multiplier method, derived using average mortality rates and aggregate tabulations by estate size, may be sufficient to derive compelling estimates of wealth concentration. We show that the application of homogeneous multipliers leads to estimates that are close in level and trend to the concentration of wealth derived in the existing literature with the detailed mortality multiplier method for a variety of countries. The use of mortality rates graduated by estate size does not confute this finding. We also derive the general formal conditions for the similarity between the distributions of wealth of the living and estates at death and discuss the main caveats. These findings may unlock a wide array of aggregate estate tabulations, previously thought to be unusable, for estimating historical trends of wealth concentration.

@misc{Blanchetetal2021,
  title = {Distributional {{National Accounts}} Guidelines: Concepts and Methods Used in the {{World Inequality Database}}},
  author = {Blanchet, Thomas and Chancel, Lucas and Flores, Ignacio and Morgan, Marc},
  year = {2021},
  month = jun,
  url = {https://wid.world/document/distributional-national-accounts-guidelines-2020-concepts-and-methods-used-in-the-world-inequality-database/},
  urldate = {2023-01-13},
  abstract = {This is an updated and extended version of the DINA Guidelines first published as WID Working Paper 2016/2.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {World Inequality Lab}
}

This is an updated and extended version of the DINA Guidelines first published as WID Working Paper 2016/2.

@unpublished{Bourquinetal2021,
  title = {Report Summary: Inheritances and Inequality over the Life Cycle: What Will They Mean for Younger Generations?},
  author = {Bourquin, Pascale and Joyce, Robert and Sturrock, David},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.1920/re.ifs.2021.0188},
  url = {https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/15407},
  abstract = {Inheritances have been growing as a share of national income in the UK since the 1970s. This trend looks set to continue as generations at older ages hold more wealth than their immediate predecessors but younger generations have no higher incomes than the generations born just before them. What will this mean for inequalities in living standards and wealth? Does the growth in inheritances mean people's living standards will increasingly be determined by who their parents are? If people anticipate that they are going to inherit in future, could that influence their decisions about how much to spend and save today? New IFS research, released today and funded by the Nuffield foundation, makes projections of the inheritances to be received by the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s-born generations in the UK.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Inheritances have been growing as a share of national income in the UK since the 1970s. This trend looks set to continue as generations at older ages hold more wealth than their immediate predecessors but younger generations have no higher incomes than the generations born just before them. What will this mean for inequalities in living standards and wealth? Does the growth in inheritances mean people's living standards will increasingly be determined by who their parents are? If people anticipate that they are going to inherit in future, could that influence their decisions about how much to spend and save today? New IFS research, released today and funded by the Nuffield foundation, makes projections of the inheritances to be received by the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s-born generations in the UK.

@techreport{Brickeretal2021,
  type = {Finance and {{Economics Discussion Series}}},
  title = {A Wealth of Information: Augmenting the Survey of Consumer Finances to Characterize the Full {{U}}.{{S}}. Wealth Distribution},
  author = {Bricker, Jesse and Goodman, Sarena and Moore, Kevin B. and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  year = {2021},
  month = jun,
  number = {2021-053},
  institution = {{Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System}},
  doi = {10.17016/FEDS.2021.053},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2021.053},
  abstract = {We use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to advance U.S. wealth analysis along several dimensions. We develop a comprehensive framework that modifies the SCF to recover the wealth distribution over families, tax units, and individuals from 1989 to 2019. We show that, by ignoring unequal holdings within families, existing estimates considerably understate U.S. inequality across individuals. We find wealth concentration rose through the recent economic recovery, which differs from leading models that capitalize income into wealth even after aligning conceptual differences. We illustrate that private businesses are a growing impediment to accurately modeling wealth from income.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Brickeretal2021.pdf},
  url_accessible_version_of_figures = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/bricker-goodman-moore-volz-awealthofinformationaugmentingthesurveyofconsumerfinancestocharacterizethefulluswealthdistributionaccessibleversionoffigures-2021}
}

We use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to advance U.S. wealth analysis along several dimensions. We develop a comprehensive framework that modifies the SCF to recover the wealth distribution over families, tax units, and individuals from 1989 to 2019. We show that, by ignoring unequal holdings within families, existing estimates considerably understate U.S. inequality across individuals. We find wealth concentration rose through the recent economic recovery, which differs from leading models that capitalize income into wealth even after aligning conceptual differences. We illustrate that private businesses are a growing impediment to accurately modeling wealth from income.

@unpublished{BurrowsLennartz2021,
  title = {The Timing of Intergenerational Transfers and Household Wealth: Too Little, Too Late?},
  author = {Burrows, Vivien and Lennartz, Chris},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://research.reading.ac.uk/economics/research/discussion-papers/},
  abstract = {Wealth transfers between family members play an important role in explaining wealth accumulation and wealth inequalities. While part of this is accounted for by the size of the transfer, the timing of the transfer is also likely to be important, reflecting either a cumulative advantage effect or a lifecycle effect. This paper uses data from the Eurosystem Housing Finance and Consumption Survey to analyse how the age at which a transfer was received affects household net wealth and different components of household wealth. We find that the age at which a transfer is received does matter: after controlling for the total value and number of transfers received, receiving a transfer later in life has a negative impact on household net wealth, and this effect appears to operate primarily through housing wealth, and in particular non-HMR property wealth. We then explore the extent to which these effects vary across European countries.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Wealth transfers between family members play an important role in explaining wealth accumulation and wealth inequalities. While part of this is accounted for by the size of the transfer, the timing of the transfer is also likely to be important, reflecting either a cumulative advantage effect or a lifecycle effect. This paper uses data from the Eurosystem Housing Finance and Consumption Survey to analyse how the age at which a transfer was received affects household net wealth and different components of household wealth. We find that the age at which a transfer is received does matter: after controlling for the total value and number of transfers received, receiving a transfer later in life has a negative impact on household net wealth, and this effect appears to operate primarily through housing wealth, and in particular non-HMR property wealth. We then explore the extent to which these effects vary across European countries.

@article{Callaghanetal2021,
  title = {Testing the Efficacy of Three Informational Interventions for Reducing Misperceptions of the Black\textendash White Wealth Gap},
  author = {Callaghan, Bennett and Harouni, Leilah and Dupree, Cydney H. and Kraus, Michael W. and Richeson, Jennifer A.},
  year = {2021},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {118},
  number = {38},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2108875118},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2108875118},
  abstract = {Americans remain unaware of the magnitude of economic inequality in the nation and the degree to which it is patterned by race. We exposed a community sample of respondents to one of three interventions designed to promote a more realistic understanding of the Black\textendash White wealth gap. The interventions conformed to recommendations in messaging about racial inequality drawn from the social sciences yet differed in how they highlighted data-based trends in Black\textendash White wealth inequality, a single personal narrative, or both. Data interventions were more effective than the narrative in both shifting how people talk about racial wealth inequality\textemdash eliciting less speech about personal achievement\textemdash and, critically, lowering estimates of Black\textendash White wealth equality for at least 18 mo following baseline, which aligned more with federal estimates of the Black\textendash White wealth gap. Findings from this study highlight how data, along with current recommendations in the social sciences, can be leveraged to promote more accurate understandings of the magnitude of racial inequality in society, laying the necessary groundwork for messaging about equity-enhancing policy.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Americans remain unaware of the magnitude of economic inequality in the nation and the degree to which it is patterned by race. We exposed a community sample of respondents to one of three interventions designed to promote a more realistic understanding of the Black– White wealth gap. The interventions conformed to recommendations in messaging about racial inequality drawn from the social sciences yet differed in how they highlighted data-based trends in Black– White wealth inequality, a single personal narrative, or both. Data interventions were more effective than the narrative in both shifting how people talk about racial wealth inequality— eliciting less speech about personal achievement— and, critically, lowering estimates of Black– White wealth equality for at least 18 mo following baseline, which aligned more with federal estimates of the Black– White wealth gap. Findings from this study highlight how data, along with current recommendations in the social sciences, can be leveraged to promote more accurate understandings of the magnitude of racial inequality in society, laying the necessary groundwork for messaging about equity-enhancing policy.

@techreport{CarrollCohen-Kristiansen2021,
  type = {Economic {{Commentary}}},
  title = {Evaluating Homeownership as the Solution to Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Carroll, Daniel and {Cohen-Kristiansen}, Ross},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  number = {2021-22},
  institution = {{Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland}},
  doi = {10.26509/frbc-ec-202122},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-ec-202122},
  abstract = {Homeownership presents an opportunity to accumulate wealth, making it an appealing vehicle for reducing wealth inequality. In this Commentary, we explore the investment side of homeownership. The opportunity for leveraged returns can lead to wealth gains among lower-income households; however, we note that homeownership for low-income homeowners carries three types of risk that are higher for them than for high-income homeowners: location, timing, and liquidity. Thus, policies that incentivize purchasing homes to reduce wealth inequality or close racial wealth gaps should be adopted only after great care has been taken to protect against these risks.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Homeownership presents an opportunity to accumulate wealth, making it an appealing vehicle for reducing wealth inequality. In this Commentary, we explore the investment side of homeownership. The opportunity for leveraged returns can lead to wealth gains among lower-income households; however, we note that homeownership for low-income homeowners carries three types of risk that are higher for them than for high-income homeowners: location, timing, and liquidity. Thus, policies that incentivize purchasing homes to reduce wealth inequality or close racial wealth gaps should be adopted only after great care has been taken to protect against these risks.

@unpublished{Catherineetal2021,
  title = {Social Security and Trends in Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Catherine, Sylvain and Miller, Max and Sarin, Natasha},
  year = {2021},
  month = aug,
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3546668},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546668},
  abstract = {Recent influential work finds large increases in inequality in the U.S. based on measures of wealth concentration that notably exclude the value of social insurance programs. This paper revisits this conclusion by incorporating Social Security retirement benefits into measures of wealth inequality. We find that top wealth shares have not increased in the last three decades when Social Security is properly accounted for. This finding is robust to assumptions about how taxes and benefits may change in response to system financing concerns. When discounted at the risk-free rate, real Social Security wealth increased substantially from \$4.8 trillion in 1989 to \$41.3 trillion in 2016. When we adjust the discount rate for long-run macroeconomic risk, this increase remains sizable, growing from over \$3.9 trillion in 1989 to \$33.9 trillion in 2016. Consequently, by 2016, Social Security wealth represents 57\% of the wealth of the bottom 90\% of the wealth distribution.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Catherineetal2021.pdf},
  url_data_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/catherine-miller-sarin-socialsecurityandtrendsinwealthinequalitydatafiles-2021},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Recent influential work finds large increases in inequality in the U.S. based on measures of wealth concentration that notably exclude the value of social insurance programs. This paper revisits this conclusion by incorporating Social Security retirement benefits into measures of wealth inequality. We find that top wealth shares have not increased in the last three decades when Social Security is properly accounted for. This finding is robust to assumptions about how taxes and benefits may change in response to system financing concerns. When discounted at the risk-free rate, real Social Security wealth increased substantially from $4.8 trillion in 1989 to $41.3 trillion in 2016. When we adjust the discount rate for long-run macroeconomic risk, this increase remains sizable, growing from over $3.9 trillion in 1989 to $33.9 trillion in 2016. Consequently, by 2016, Social Security wealth represents 57% of the wealth of the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution.

@techreport{Chatterjeeetal2021,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {A Wealth Tax for {{South Africa}}},
  author = {Chatterjee, Aroop and Czajka, L{\'e}o and Gethin, Amory},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  number = {2021/02},
  institution = {{World Inequality Lab}},
  url = {https://wid.world/news-article/a-wealth-tax-for-southafrica/},
  urldate = {2023-02-16},
  abstract = {This paper considers the feasibility of implementing a progressive wealth tax to collect additional government revenue to both reinforce fiscal sustainability in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis and reduce persistent extreme inequality in South Africa. Drawing on our new companion paper, we first identify the tax base and discuss the design of potential tax schedules. Testing alternative tax schedules, we estimate how much additional revenue could be collected from a progressive tax on the top 1\% richest South Africans. Our results show that under conservative assumptions, a wealth tax could raise between 70 and 160 billion Rands \textemdash{} 1.5\% to 3.5\% of the South African GDP. We discuss in turn how sensitive our estimates are to assumptions on (1) mismeasurement of wealth and (2) tax avoidance and evasion, based on the most recent tax policy literature. We examine technical issues related to the enforcement of the tax, and how third-party reporting and pre-filled declarations could be used to optimize measurement of taxable wealth and minimize evasion and avoidance opportunities. Finally, we explain how this new tax could interact with other capital related taxes already in place in South Africa, and discuss the potential impact on growth.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper considers the feasibility of implementing a progressive wealth tax to collect additional government revenue to both reinforce fiscal sustainability in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis and reduce persistent extreme inequality in South Africa. Drawing on our new companion paper, we first identify the tax base and discuss the design of potential tax schedules. Testing alternative tax schedules, we estimate how much additional revenue could be collected from a progressive tax on the top 1% richest South Africans. Our results show that under conservative assumptions, a wealth tax could raise between 70 and 160 billion Rands — 1.5% to 3.5% of the South African GDP. We discuss in turn how sensitive our estimates are to assumptions on (1) mismeasurement of wealth and (2) tax avoidance and evasion, based on the most recent tax policy literature. We examine technical issues related to the enforcement of the tax, and how third-party reporting and pre-filled declarations could be used to optimize measurement of taxable wealth and minimize evasion and avoidance opportunities. Finally, we explain how this new tax could interact with other capital related taxes already in place in South Africa, and discuss the potential impact on growth.

@article{Cheetal2021,
  title = {Taxation of Land and Economic Growth},
  author = {Che, Shulu and Kumar, Ronald Ravinesh and Stauvermann, Peter J.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economies},
  volume = {9},
  number = {2},
  pages = {61--80},
  doi = {10.3390/economies9020061},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.3390/economies9020061},
  abstract = {In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or consumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or consumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy.

@unpublished{Colagrossietal2021,
  title = {Two Generations of Siblings and Cousins Correlations across the Ancestors' Wealth Distribution},
  author = {Colagrossi, Marco and Deiana, Claudio and Geraci, Andrea and Giua, Ludovica and Mazzarella, Gianluca},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3749134},
  url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3749134},
  abstract = {We reconstruct the genealogical tree of all individuals ever appearing in Dutch municipalities records starting in 1995. Using microdata from tax authorities, we compute a measure of their permanent earnings and assess the degree to which pairs of cousins and siblings correlate across two cohorts, those born around the 50s and those born around the 80s. We find that cousins and siblings correlations in earnings vary substantially across ancestors' wealth quantiles. In particular, those having ancestors in the bottom decile, show a much higher correlation in earnings. Further, the intergenerational transmission parameter, estimated through a latent factor model without assuming a steady state process, is much stronger for those families whose ancestors left no inheritance. Even in the relatively equal and wealthy Netherlands, misfortunes are transmitted across generations.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We reconstruct the genealogical tree of all individuals ever appearing in Dutch municipalities records starting in 1995. Using microdata from tax authorities, we compute a measure of their permanent earnings and assess the degree to which pairs of cousins and siblings correlate across two cohorts, those born around the 50s and those born around the 80s. We find that cousins and siblings correlations in earnings vary substantially across ancestors' wealth quantiles. In particular, those having ancestors in the bottom decile, show a much higher correlation in earnings. Further, the intergenerational transmission parameter, estimated through a latent factor model without assuming a steady state process, is much stronger for those families whose ancestors left no inheritance. Even in the relatively equal and wealthy Netherlands, misfortunes are transmitted across generations.

@article{DaviesDiMatteo2021,
  title = {Long Run {{Canadian}} Wealth Inequality in International Context},
  author = {Davies, James B. and Di Matteo, Livio},
  year = {2021},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {67},
  number = {1},
  pages = {134--164},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12453},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12453},
  abstract = {A gap in estimates of the personal distribution of Canadian wealth between 1902 and 1970 is partly filled, using estate multiplier estimates for 1945\textendash 1968. The historical record is extended by adjusting the upper tail in survey results since 1970 to make it consistent with respected journalists' ``rich lists.'' Top wealth shares decline from 1892 to 1902 and from 1945 to the late 1960s, consistent with the downward trend in most advanced western countries over much of the 20th century. Since 1984 there has been a clear upward trend in wealth inequality in Canada, as in many other countries, and in the United States. Currently, wealth inequality is higher in Canada than in the U.K. and much of continental Europe, somewhat lower than Austria or Germany, and distinctly lower than the U.S. Contrasts between Canada and the U.S. in wealth inequality trends are discussed.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_appendices = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/davies-dimatteo-longruncanadianwealthinequalityininternationalcontextappendices-2021}
}

A gap in estimates of the personal distribution of Canadian wealth between 1902 and 1970 is partly filled, using estate multiplier estimates for 1945– 1968. The historical record is extended by adjusting the upper tail in survey results since 1970 to make it consistent with respected journalists' ``rich lists.'' Top wealth shares decline from 1892 to 1902 and from 1945 to the late 1960s, consistent with the downward trend in most advanced western countries over much of the 20th century. Since 1984 there has been a clear upward trend in wealth inequality in Canada, as in many other countries, and in the United States. Currently, wealth inequality is higher in Canada than in the U.K. and much of continental Europe, somewhat lower than Austria or Germany, and distinctly lower than the U.S. Contrasts between Canada and the U.S. in wealth inequality trends are discussed.

@incollection{DaviesShorrocks2021,
  title = {Comparing Global Inequality of Income and Wealth},
  booktitle = {Inequality in the Developing World},
  author = {Davies, James and Shorrocks, Anthony},
  editor = {Grad{\'i}n, Carlos and Leibbrandt, Murray and Tarp, Finn},
  year = {2021},
  pages = {49--73},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  address = {{Oxford}},
  doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863960.003.0003},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863960.003.0003},
  abstract = {This paper is the first to compare global trends in income and wealth inequality this century. It is based on large income and wealth microdata samples designed to be representative of all countries in the world. Measured by the Gini coefficient, inequality between countries accounts for about two-thirds of global income inequality, but noticeably less\textemdash{} around one half\textemdash{} of wealth inequality. Broadly similar results are found for different years and different inequality indices, bar the share of the top 1 per cent. Over time, changes in countries' mean income and wealth, and population sizes, have reduced world inequality. Income inequality has changed little within countries, so the downward trend remains intact. However, within-country wealth inequality has risen, halting the downward shift in global wealth inequality and raising the share of the top 1 per cent after 2007.},
  chapter = {3},
  isbn = {978-0-19-886396-0},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper is the first to compare global trends in income and wealth inequality this century. It is based on large income and wealth microdata samples designed to be representative of all countries in the world. Measured by the Gini coefficient, inequality between countries accounts for about two-thirds of global income inequality, but noticeably less— around one half— of wealth inequality. Broadly similar results are found for different years and different inequality indices, bar the share of the top 1 per cent. Over time, changes in countries' mean income and wealth, and population sizes, have reduced world inequality. Income inequality has changed little within countries, so the downward trend remains intact. However, within-country wealth inequality has risen, halting the downward shift in global wealth inequality and raising the share of the top 1 per cent after 2007.

@article{Duran-CabreEstellerMore2021,
  title = {A Quantitative Assessment of the Net Wealth Tax: The Spanish Experience},
  author = {{Dur{\'a}n-Cabr{\'e}}, Jos{\'e} M. and Esteller Mor{\'e}, Alejandro},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {CESifo Economic Studies},
  doi = {10.1093/cesifo/ifab004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifab004},
  abstract = {There is growing debate, both social and academic, about the possibility of levying an annual net wealth tax. Until a few years ago, such a proposal appeared difficult to both implement and control, but recent technological innovations, which could greatly facilitate the periodic valuation of wealth, combined with improvements in international tax information sharing could make a ``modern wealth tax'' possible. Nonetheless, a number of challenges regarding its design still need to be addressed. Taking advantage of the Spanish experience\textemdash the only EU country to levy a wealth tax\textemdash we undertake a quantitative analysis of various key legal elements of the current tax (exemptions and the common income and wealth tax ceiling) by means of a tax simulator we have developed; we also analyze its redistributive power. Our results show that the family business exemption and the common ceilings are highly regressive. We also assess the effectiveness of alternative reforms with more comprehensive tax bases.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

There is growing debate, both social and academic, about the possibility of levying an annual net wealth tax. Until a few years ago, such a proposal appeared difficult to both implement and control, but recent technological innovations, which could greatly facilitate the periodic valuation of wealth, combined with improvements in international tax information sharing could make a ``modern wealth tax'' possible. Nonetheless, a number of challenges regarding its design still need to be addressed. Taking advantage of the Spanish experience— the only EU country to levy a wealth tax— we undertake a quantitative analysis of various key legal elements of the current tax (exemptions and the common income and wealth tax ceiling) by means of a tax simulator we have developed; we also analyze its redistributive power. Our results show that the family business exemption and the common ceilings are highly regressive. We also assess the effectiveness of alternative reforms with more comprehensive tax bases.

@article{Garbintietal2021,
  title = {Accounting for Wealth-Inequality Dynamics: Methods, Estimates, and Simulations for {{France}}},
  author = {Garbinti, Bertrand and {Goupille-Lebret}, Jonathan and Piketty, Thomas},
  year = {2021},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {620--663},
  doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvaa025},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa025},
  abstract = {Measuring and understanding the evolution of wealth inequality is a key challenge for researchers, policy makers, and the general public. This paper breaks new ground on this topic by presenting a new method to estimate and study wealth inequality. This method combines fiscal data with household surveys and national accounts in order to provide annual wealth distribution series, with detailed breakdowns by percentiles, age, and assets. Using the case of France as an illustration, we show that the resulting series can be used to better analyze the evolution and the determinants of wealth-inequality dynamics over the 1970\textendash 2014 period. We show that the decline in wealth inequality ends in the early 1980s, marking the beginning of a rise in the top 1\% wealth share, though with significant fluctuations due largely to asset price movements. Rising inequality in savings rates coupled with highly stratified rates of returns has led to rising wealth concentration in spite of the opposing effect of house price increases. We develop a simple simulation model highlighting how changes in the combination of unequal savings rates, rates of return, and labor earnings that occurred in the early 1980s generated large multiplicative effects that led to radically different steady-state levels of wealth inequality. Taking advantage of the joint distribution of income and wealth, we show that top wealth holders are almost exclusively top capital earners, and increasingly fewer are made up of top labor earners; it has become increasingly difficult in recent decades to access top wealth groups with one's labor income only.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Garbintietal2021.pdf},
  url_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/garbinti-goupillelebret-piketty-accountingforwealthinequalitydynamicsmethodsestimatesandsimulationsforfranceappendix-2020},
  url_data_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/garbinti-goupillelebret-piketty-accountingforwealthinequalitydynamicsmethodsestimatesandsimulationsforfrancedataappendix-2021},
  url_2017_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/garbinti-goupillelebret-piketty-accountingforwealthinequalitydynamicsmethodsestimatesandsimulationsforfrance18002014appendix-2017}
}

Measuring and understanding the evolution of wealth inequality is a key challenge for researchers, policy makers, and the general public. This paper breaks new ground on this topic by presenting a new method to estimate and study wealth inequality. This method combines fiscal data with household surveys and national accounts in order to provide annual wealth distribution series, with detailed breakdowns by percentiles, age, and assets. Using the case of France as an illustration, we show that the resulting series can be used to better analyze the evolution and the determinants of wealth-inequality dynamics over the 1970– 2014 period. We show that the decline in wealth inequality ends in the early 1980s, marking the beginning of a rise in the top 1% wealth share, though with significant fluctuations due largely to asset price movements. Rising inequality in savings rates coupled with highly stratified rates of returns has led to rising wealth concentration in spite of the opposing effect of house price increases. We develop a simple simulation model highlighting how changes in the combination of unequal savings rates, rates of return, and labor earnings that occurred in the early 1980s generated large multiplicative effects that led to radically different steady-state levels of wealth inequality. Taking advantage of the joint distribution of income and wealth, we show that top wealth holders are almost exclusively top capital earners, and increasingly fewer are made up of top labor earners; it has become increasingly difficult in recent decades to access top wealth groups with one's labor income only.

@techreport{GarbintiSavignac2021,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Intergenerational Homeownership in {{France}} over the 20th Century},
  author = {Garbinti, Bertrand and Savignac, Fr{\'e}d{\'e}rique},
  year = {2021},
  month = mar,
  number = {808},
  institution = {{Banque De France}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3800751},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3800751},
  urldate = {2023-02-21},
  abstract = {We estimate the intergenerational correlation in homeownership status between two generations for cohorts covering the 20th century. First, we find higher intergenerational correlation in France compared to previous results obtained for the U.K. for similar cohorts. Second, the intergenerational correlation is increasing across cohorts, with a relatively stable probability of being a homeowner for children of homeowners over time, and a decreasing probability for children whose parents were not homeowners. Third, the effect of parents' tenure status is persistent over the children's life cycle. Fourth, when isolating two subpopulations based on the receipt of intergenerational transfers, we find significant intergenerational correlation in tenure status for children who did not receive any gift or inheritance, as well as for children who received intergenerational transfers, suggesting that other factors such as intergenerational income correlation or the transmission of preferences might also explain this intergenerational correlation.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

We estimate the intergenerational correlation in homeownership status between two generations for cohorts covering the 20th century. First, we find higher intergenerational correlation in France compared to previous results obtained for the U.K. for similar cohorts. Second, the intergenerational correlation is increasing across cohorts, with a relatively stable probability of being a homeowner for children of homeowners over time, and a decreasing probability for children whose parents were not homeowners. Third, the effect of parents' tenure status is persistent over the children's life cycle. Fourth, when isolating two subpopulations based on the receipt of intergenerational transfers, we find significant intergenerational correlation in tenure status for children who did not receive any gift or inheritance, as well as for children who received intergenerational transfers, suggesting that other factors such as intergenerational income correlation or the transmission of preferences might also explain this intergenerational correlation.

@article{Ghoshrayetal2021,
  title = {On the Long-Run Dynamics of Income and Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Ghoshray, Atanu and Malki, Issam and Ord{\'o}{\~n}ez, Javier},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Empirical Economics},
  doi = {10.1007/s00181-021-02043-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-021-02043-1},
  abstract = {We analyse top income and wealth shares data, by conducting a robust estimation of trends, tests for structural breaks, and tests for determining persistence. We include Anglo-Saxon countries, continental Europe and Asian countries, grouped under different percentiles and deciles, spanning a period that is at least close to a century. We find that the top income shares for almost all countries are characterised by broken trends, or level shifts. The preponderance of trend breaks appears in the 1970s and 1980s where after a negative trend changes in magnitude or direction. Finally, shocks to the top income share data are not transitory, which have consequences for policy such as advocating redistributive measures.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We analyse top income and wealth shares data, by conducting a robust estimation of trends, tests for structural breaks, and tests for determining persistence. We include Anglo-Saxon countries, continental Europe and Asian countries, grouped under different percentiles and deciles, spanning a period that is at least close to a century. We find that the top income shares for almost all countries are characterised by broken trends, or level shifts. The preponderance of trend breaks appears in the 1970s and 1980s where after a negative trend changes in magnitude or direction. Finally, shocks to the top income share data are not transitory, which have consequences for policy such as advocating redistributive measures.

@article{Glogowsky2021,
  title = {Behavioral Responses to Inheritance and Gift Taxation: Evidence from {{Germany}}},
  author = {Glogowsky, Ulrich},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {193},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104309},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104309},
  abstract = {The desirability of inheritance and gift taxes depends on individuals' tax responsiveness. This paper demonstrates how strongly, and in what way, the German inheritance and gift tax influences taxpayer behavior. To that end, it combines administrative data with cross-bracket tax variation: a convex kink in the tax liability precedes a concave kink. Extending the bunching approach to such double-kinked tax schedules, I document that individuals tailor their taxable wealth transfers to the schedules. One type of response dominates for inheritances: testators engage in testament planning. The magnitude of the testament-planning response is comparable to that of inter vivos gifts. However, neither the overall responses of gifts nor those of inheritances heavily interfere with tax revenue collection: the associated short-run net-of-tax elasticities of taxable wealth transfers lie below 0.1.},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}},
  note = {104309}
}

The desirability of inheritance and gift taxes depends on individuals' tax responsiveness. This paper demonstrates how strongly, and in what way, the German inheritance and gift tax influences taxpayer behavior. To that end, it combines administrative data with cross-bracket tax variation: a convex kink in the tax liability precedes a concave kink. Extending the bunching approach to such double-kinked tax schedules, I document that individuals tailor their taxable wealth transfers to the schedules. One type of response dominates for inheritances: testators engage in testament planning. The magnitude of the testament-planning response is comparable to that of inter vivos gifts. However, neither the overall responses of gifts nor those of inheritances heavily interfere with tax revenue collection: the associated short-run net-of-tax elasticities of taxable wealth transfers lie below 0.1.

@article{GornickSierminska2021,
  title = {Wealth Accumulation and Retirement Preparedness in Cross-National Perspective: {{A}} Gendered Analysis of Outcomes among Single Adults},
  author = {Gornick, Janet C. and Sierminska, Eva},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Journal of European Social Policy},
  volume = {31},
  number = {5},
  pages = {549--564},
  doi = {10.1177/09589287211056174},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287211056174},
  abstract = {Wealth is an increasingly important dimension of economic well-being and is attracting rising attention in discussions of social inequality. In this article, we compare \textendash{} within and across countries \textendash{} wealth outcomes, and link those to both employment-related factors and policy solutions that have the potential to improve wealth creation and retirement security for women. By constructing country-specific portraits of wealth outcomes and `retirement preparedness', we reveal extensive cross-national variation in multiple facets of wealth. Our regression analysis finds a statistically significant and positive effect of work experience on wealth, with that effect, in general, increasing over time. The effect of work experience for single women is greater than for single men, suggesting that, among men, other, stronger forces are at work in creating wealth. The retirement preparedness outcomes indicate that single women in all three countries are in a precarious position at retirement, with much lower expected annual wealth levels than single men. The second preparedness indicator, which links expected annual wealth to income, demonstrates that men have the potential to cover larger shares of their income at retirement \textendash{} and thus are more able, than their female counterparts, to maintain standards of living achieved earlier in life. Our policy discussion indicates that employment remains a viable option for ultimately bolstering women's wealth accumulation. Many scholars, gender equality advocates and policymakers have argued for raising women's employment rates \textendash{} for a multitude of reasons \textendash{} but few, if any, have made the case for strengthening women's employment in order to ultimately bolster women's wealth building. We hope to help reduce the gap in the literature on policy supports for women's employment and re-open the discussion on how women can create more wealth.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Wealth is an increasingly important dimension of economic well-being and is attracting rising attention in discussions of social inequality. In this article, we compare – within and across countries – wealth outcomes, and link those to both employment-related factors and policy solutions that have the potential to improve wealth creation and retirement security for women. By constructing country-specific portraits of wealth outcomes and `retirement preparedness', we reveal extensive cross-national variation in multiple facets of wealth. Our regression analysis finds a statistically significant and positive effect of work experience on wealth, with that effect, in general, increasing over time. The effect of work experience for single women is greater than for single men, suggesting that, among men, other, stronger forces are at work in creating wealth. The retirement preparedness outcomes indicate that single women in all three countries are in a precarious position at retirement, with much lower expected annual wealth levels than single men. The second preparedness indicator, which links expected annual wealth to income, demonstrates that men have the potential to cover larger shares of their income at retirement – and thus are more able, than their female counterparts, to maintain standards of living achieved earlier in life. Our policy discussion indicates that employment remains a viable option for ultimately bolstering women's wealth accumulation. Many scholars, gender equality advocates and policymakers have argued for raising women's employment rates – for a multitude of reasons – but few, if any, have made the case for strengthening women's employment in order to ultimately bolster women's wealth building. We hope to help reduce the gap in the literature on policy supports for women's employment and re-open the discussion on how women can create more wealth.

@unpublished{GreggKanabar2021,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Transmission in Great Britain},
  author = {Gregg, Paul and Kanabar, Ricky},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucl:cepeow:21-06},
  abstract = {Abstract: The aim of this paper is to document the intergenerational persistence of wealth between adult offspring and their parent's using the Wealth and Assets Survey for Great Britain. As parental wealth it is not directly observed it is assessed as mean values based on age, home ownership and education from retrospective questions. Estimates are then derived employing a commonly used two stage estimator. For offspring aged around 44 and parents aged around 74, the oldest where wealth can reliably be observed in the sample, the intergenerational wealth elasticity (IWE) is 0.4 and the rank-rank elasticity 0.3. However, wealth is a stock accumulated over a person's working life and then dissaving takes place in retirement. Thus, peak wealth holding occurs around the age of 64 and this represents a proxy measure of life-time wealth accumulation. Under certain assumptions about parental wealth holding we explore wealth persistence for older offspring up to age 64. Importantly, we find at these older ages wealth persistence is generally lower than for those currently aged in their 30s and early 40s, though rank based estimates are broadly stable. The average IWE is 0.35 (ages 28-64) and rank equivalent 0.3 in 2012. For those in their 30s however, the IWE is 0.4, even though the short panel suggests a strong life cycle bias where wealth persistence is lower at ages below 64. Exploration of this contradiction shows that those who have a relatively high wealth among older cohorts came from more typical backgrounds than in younger ones. The six year panel data also shows that intergenerational wealth elasticity is 3.8 percentage points higher when comparing people with those the same age six years previously. There is, thus, very strong evidence of higher wealth intergenerational persistence in younger age cohorts. As it was already higher than for older cohorts and has risen rapidly, standing at 0.44 (ages 32-44) by 2018.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to document the intergenerational persistence of wealth between adult offspring and their parent's using the Wealth and Assets Survey for Great Britain. As parental wealth it is not directly observed it is assessed as mean values based on age, home ownership and education from retrospective questions. Estimates are then derived employing a commonly used two stage estimator. For offspring aged around 44 and parents aged around 74, the oldest where wealth can reliably be observed in the sample, the intergenerational wealth elasticity (IWE) is 0.4 and the rank-rank elasticity 0.3. However, wealth is a stock accumulated over a person's working life and then dissaving takes place in retirement. Thus, peak wealth holding occurs around the age of 64 and this represents a proxy measure of life-time wealth accumulation. Under certain assumptions about parental wealth holding we explore wealth persistence for older offspring up to age 64. Importantly, we find at these older ages wealth persistence is generally lower than for those currently aged in their 30s and early 40s, though rank based estimates are broadly stable. The average IWE is 0.35 (ages 28-64) and rank equivalent 0.3 in 2012. For those in their 30s however, the IWE is 0.4, even though the short panel suggests a strong life cycle bias where wealth persistence is lower at ages below 64. Exploration of this contradiction shows that those who have a relatively high wealth among older cohorts came from more typical backgrounds than in younger ones. The six year panel data also shows that intergenerational wealth elasticity is 3.8 percentage points higher when comparing people with those the same age six years previously. There is, thus, very strong evidence of higher wealth intergenerational persistence in younger age cohorts. As it was already higher than for older cohorts and has risen rapidly, standing at 0.44 (ages 32-44) by 2018.

@article{Guvenenetal2021,
  title = {What Do Data on Millions of {{U}}.{{S}}. Workers Reveal about Lifecycle Earnings Dynamics?},
  author = {Guvenen, Fatih and Karahan, Fatih and Ozkan, Serdar and Song, Jae},
  year = {2021},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {89},
  number = {5},
  pages = {2303--2339},
  doi = {10.3982/ECTA14603},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14603},
  abstract = {We study individual male earnings dynamics over the life cycle using panel data on millions of U.S. workers. Using nonparametric methods, we first show that the distribution of earnings changes exhibits substantial deviations from lognormality, such as negative skewness and very high kurtosis. Further, the extent of these nonnormalities varies significantly with age and earnings level, peaking around age 50 and between the 70th and 90th percentiles of the earnings distribution. Second, we estimate nonparametric impulse response functions and find important asymmetries: Positive changes for high-income individuals are quite transitory, whereas negative ones are very persistent; the opposite is true for low-income individuals. Third, we turn to long-run outcomes and find substantial heterogeneity in the cumulative growth rates of earnings and the total number of years individuals spend nonemployed between ages 25 and 55. Finally, by targeting these rich sets of moments, we estimate stochastic processes for earnings that range from the simple to the complex. Our preferred specification features normal mixture innovations to both persistent and transitory components and includes state-dependent long-term nonemployment shocks with a realization probability that varies with age and earnings.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

We study individual male earnings dynamics over the life cycle using panel data on millions of U.S. workers. Using nonparametric methods, we first show that the distribution of earnings changes exhibits substantial deviations from lognormality, such as negative skewness and very high kurtosis. Further, the extent of these nonnormalities varies significantly with age and earnings level, peaking around age 50 and between the 70th and 90th percentiles of the earnings distribution. Second, we estimate nonparametric impulse response functions and find important asymmetries: Positive changes for high-income individuals are quite transitory, whereas negative ones are very persistent; the opposite is true for low-income individuals. Third, we turn to long-run outcomes and find substantial heterogeneity in the cumulative growth rates of earnings and the total number of years individuals spend nonemployed between ages 25 and 55. Finally, by targeting these rich sets of moments, we estimate stochastic processes for earnings that range from the simple to the complex. Our preferred specification features normal mixture innovations to both persistent and transitory components and includes state-dependent long-term nonemployment shocks with a realization probability that varies with age and earnings.

@article{HalvorsenThoresen2021,
  title = {Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime-dynastic Income Concepts},
  author = {Halvorsen, Elin and Thoresen, Thor O.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
  volume = {123},
  number = {1},
  pages = {184--215},
  doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12392},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12392},
  abstract = {Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed.When standard methodology is used and wealth-tax burdens are measured against annualindividual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes.In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects ofwealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetimeof family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties,wealth tax is mostly borne by high-income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed.When standard methodology is used and wealth-tax burdens are measured against annualindividual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes.In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects ofwealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetimeof family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties,wealth tax is mostly borne by high-income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.

@article{HansenToft2021,
  title = {Wealth Accumulation and Opportunity Hoarding: Class-Origin Wealth Gaps over a Quarter of a Century in a {{Scandinavian}} Country},
  author = {Hansen, Marianne Nordli and Toft, Maren},
  year = {2021},
  month = aug,
  journal = {American Sociological Review},
  volume = {86},
  number = {4},
  pages = {603--638},
  doi = {10.1177/00031224211020012},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224211020012},
  abstract = {Although the Scandinavian countries are often considered to epitomize social democratic governance, Scandinavia's profound wealth inequalities, seen in relation to the more modest income differences, constitutes a fascinating paradox. Drawing on class theoretical concerns with strategies for reproduction and a Bourdieusian emphasis on class fractions, we explore how class-origin wealth gaps evolved over the past 25 years in Norway, and how they compare to class-origin income gaps. First, we find that class-origin wealth gaps have increased in recent years, whereas income inequalities are fairly persistent among men, and increasing among women. We find that educational attainment is important for channeling income inequality, but that education is less important for understanding wealth gaps. Second, we document differences between people whose family contexts were most highly endowed with economic capital and those who grew up in families that were engaged in cultural fields or the professions. Finally, we highlight how analyses based solely on net worth neglect important ways class origin perpetuates and accelerates wealth inequalities via the acquisition of debt. We argue that recent decades have fostered new instruments for opportunity hoarding that are most successfully used by the sons and daughters of the economic upper class.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Although the Scandinavian countries are often considered to epitomize social democratic governance, Scandinavia's profound wealth inequalities, seen in relation to the more modest income differences, constitutes a fascinating paradox. Drawing on class theoretical concerns with strategies for reproduction and a Bourdieusian emphasis on class fractions, we explore how class-origin wealth gaps evolved over the past 25 years in Norway, and how they compare to class-origin income gaps. First, we find that class-origin wealth gaps have increased in recent years, whereas income inequalities are fairly persistent among men, and increasing among women. We find that educational attainment is important for channeling income inequality, but that education is less important for understanding wealth gaps. Second, we document differences between people whose family contexts were most highly endowed with economic capital and those who grew up in families that were engaged in cultural fields or the professions. Finally, we highlight how analyses based solely on net worth neglect important ways class origin perpetuates and accelerates wealth inequalities via the acquisition of debt. We argue that recent decades have fostered new instruments for opportunity hoarding that are most successfully used by the sons and daughters of the economic upper class.

@article{Jacobsetal2021,
  title = {Wealth Concentration in the {{USA}} Using an Expanded Measure of Net Worth},
  author = {Jacobs, Lindsay and Llanes, Elizabeth and Moore, Kevin and Thompson, Jeffrey and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  year = {2021},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
  doi = {10.1093/oep/gpab054},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpab054},
  abstract = {Defined benefit (DB) pensions and Social Security are important resources for financing retirement in the USA. However, these illiquid, nonmarket forms of wealth are typically excluded from measures of net worth. To the extent that these broadly held resources substitute for savings, measures of wealth inequality that do not account for DB pensions and Social Security may be overstated. This article develops an alternative, expanded wealth concept, augmenting net worth data from the Survey of Consumer Finances with estimates of DB pension and expected Social Security wealth. We explore the concentration of wealth among households ages 40\textendash 59 and find that (i) including DB pension and Social Security results in markedly lower measures of wealth concentration and (ii) trends toward higher wealth inequality over time, while moderated, are still present. Simulation exercises show that reductions in Social Security benefits significantly increase wealth concentration for the youngest birth-year cohorts.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_supplementary_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/jacobs-llanes-moore-thompson-volz-supplementaryappendixforwealthconcentrationintheusausinganexpandedmeasureofnetworth-2021},
  url_replication_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/jacobs-llanes-moore-thompson-volz-instructionstoreplicatewealthconcentrationintheusausinganexpandedmeasureofnetworth-2021},
  note = {gpab054}
}

Defined benefit (DB) pensions and Social Security are important resources for financing retirement in the USA. However, these illiquid, nonmarket forms of wealth are typically excluded from measures of net worth. To the extent that these broadly held resources substitute for savings, measures of wealth inequality that do not account for DB pensions and Social Security may be overstated. This article develops an alternative, expanded wealth concept, augmenting net worth data from the Survey of Consumer Finances with estimates of DB pension and expected Social Security wealth. We explore the concentration of wealth among households ages 40– 59 and find that (i) including DB pension and Social Security results in markedly lower measures of wealth concentration and (ii) trends toward higher wealth inequality over time, while moderated, are still present. Simulation exercises show that reductions in Social Security benefits significantly increase wealth concentration for the youngest birth-year cohorts.

@article{Jestl2021,
  title = {Inheritance Tax Regimes: A Comparison},
  author = {Jestl, Stefan},
  year = {2021},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Public Sector Economics},
  volume = {45},
  number = {3},
  pages = {363--385},
  doi = {10.3326/pse.45.3.3},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.45.3.3},
  abstract = {This paper provides an overview of different inheritance tax regimes in selected European countries and the United States. We show that in the majority of countries the tax rate is related to the relationship between testator and the beneficiary as well as the value of the inherited assets. In most countries the transfer of wealth within families is treated preferentially (lower tax rates, tax exemptions and reliefs). This is particularly the case for business assets and family homes. The analysis further discusses the features and effects of inheritance tax regimes, which include behavioural responses of individuals and different distributional effects of an inheritance tax. Although the actual revenues of inheritance taxation are quite low in the selected countries, some indicators point to higher revenue potentials in the future. An appropriate design for inheritance taxation could further help to decelerate the increase in wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}}
}

This paper provides an overview of different inheritance tax regimes in selected European countries and the United States. We show that in the majority of countries the tax rate is related to the relationship between testator and the beneficiary as well as the value of the inherited assets. In most countries the transfer of wealth within families is treated preferentially (lower tax rates, tax exemptions and reliefs). This is particularly the case for business assets and family homes. The analysis further discusses the features and effects of inheritance tax regimes, which include behavioural responses of individuals and different distributional effects of an inheritance tax. Although the actual revenues of inheritance taxation are quite low in the selected countries, some indicators point to higher revenue potentials in the future. An appropriate design for inheritance taxation could further help to decelerate the increase in wealth inequality.

@unpublished{Kapelleretal2021,
  title = {Policy Brief: A {{European}} Wealth Tax},
  author = {Kapeller, Jakob and Leitch, Stuart and Wildauer, Rafael},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/32134/},
  abstract = {The distribution of wealth in the European Union is heavily concentration at the top. The richest 1\% of households hold a third of total aggregate net wealth while the poorest 50\% of households hold less than 5\% of total net wealth. The flipside of this strong concentration of wealth is the high revenue potential of wealth taxes. The estimates presented here suggest that a progressive tax on net wealth could generate revenues between 3\% and 10.8\% of GDP.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

The distribution of wealth in the European Union is heavily concentration at the top. The richest 1% of households hold a third of total aggregate net wealth while the poorest 50% of households hold less than 5% of total net wealth. The flipside of this strong concentration of wealth is the high revenue potential of wealth taxes. The estimates presented here suggest that a progressive tax on net wealth could generate revenues between 3% and 10.8% of GDP.

@unpublished{KapellerWildauer2021,
  title = {A {{European}} Wealth Tax for a Fair and Green Recovery},
  author = {Kapeller, Jakob and Wildauer, Rafael},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://www.gre.ac.uk/business/research/centres/gperc/pubreports/greenwich-papers-in-political-economy},
  abstract = {The European Union faces the twin crises of Covid-19 and climate change. Confronting both crises leads to an unprecedented demand on public resources which in turn leads to the question of how to raise the required funds a) without jeopardising a weak economy recovering from the pandemic and b) without undermining broad political support for climate action. This policy study investigates the potential of a European net wealth tax to raise substantial revenues while supporting the economy and the consensus on climate action. To achieve this, household survey data from the European Central Bank (covering 22 EU countries) are analysed. To address the problem of under-reporting of wealth at the top of the distribution in survey data, a Pareto distribution is fitted to the right tail of the data and used to create an amended data set which also represents these missing rich, whose wealth goes unreported.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

The European Union faces the twin crises of Covid-19 and climate change. Confronting both crises leads to an unprecedented demand on public resources which in turn leads to the question of how to raise the required funds a) without jeopardising a weak economy recovering from the pandemic and b) without undermining broad political support for climate action. This policy study investigates the potential of a European net wealth tax to raise substantial revenues while supporting the economy and the consensus on climate action. To achieve this, household survey data from the European Central Bank (covering 22 EU countries) are analysed. To address the problem of under-reporting of wealth at the top of the distribution in survey data, a Pareto distribution is fitted to the right tail of the data and used to create an amended data set which also represents these missing rich, whose wealth goes unreported.

@techreport{Kennickell2021,
  type = {Stone {{Center Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {Chasing the Tail: {{A}} Generalized {{Pareto}} Distribution Approach to Estimating Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Kennickell, Arthur B.},
  year = {2021},
  month = may,
  number = {37},
  institution = {{Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/u3zs2},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/u3zs2},
  abstract = {Since the work reported in Vermeulen [2018], a literature has developed on using the simple Pareto distribution along with ``rich list'' information to make improved estimates of the upper tail of the wealth distribution measured in surveys.  Because the construction of such external data is typically opaque and subject to potentially serious measurement error, it may be best not to depend exclusively on this approach.  This paper develops an alternative approach, using the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD), of which the simple Pareto is a subset, extending an estimation strategy developed by Castillo and Hadi [1997].  The greater flexibility of the GPD allows the possibility of modeling the tail of the wealth distribution, using a larger set of data for support than is typically the case with the simple Pareto.  Moreover, the elaboration of the estimation method presented here allows explicitly for the possibility that the extreme of the observed upper tail is measured with error or that it is not captured at all.  The approach also allows the incorporation of external data on total wealth as a constraint on the estimation.  For the applications considered here using Austrian and U.S. micro data, the model relies on an estimate of total household wealth from national accounts, rather than rich-list information.  The results suggest that where sufficiently comparable and reliable estimates of aggregate wealth are available, this approach can provide a useful way of mitigating problems in comparing distributional estimates across surveys that differ meaningfully in their effective coverage of the upper tail of the wealth distribution.  The approach may be particularly useful in the construction of distributional national accounts.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Since the work reported in Vermeulen [2018], a literature has developed on using the simple Pareto distribution along with ``rich list'' information to make improved estimates of the upper tail of the wealth distribution measured in surveys. Because the construction of such external data is typically opaque and subject to potentially serious measurement error, it may be best not to depend exclusively on this approach. This paper develops an alternative approach, using the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD), of which the simple Pareto is a subset, extending an estimation strategy developed by Castillo and Hadi [1997]. The greater flexibility of the GPD allows the possibility of modeling the tail of the wealth distribution, using a larger set of data for support than is typically the case with the simple Pareto. Moreover, the elaboration of the estimation method presented here allows explicitly for the possibility that the extreme of the observed upper tail is measured with error or that it is not captured at all. The approach also allows the incorporation of external data on total wealth as a constraint on the estimation. For the applications considered here using Austrian and U.S. micro data, the model relies on an estimate of total household wealth from national accounts, rather than rich-list information. The results suggest that where sufficiently comparable and reliable estimates of aggregate wealth are available, this approach can provide a useful way of mitigating problems in comparing distributional estimates across surveys that differ meaningfully in their effective coverage of the upper tail of the wealth distribution. The approach may be particularly useful in the construction of distributional national accounts.

@article{KuypersMarx2021,
  title = {Poverty in the {{EU}} Using Augmented Measures of Financial Resources: The Role of Assets and Debt},
  author = {Kuypers, Sarah and Marx, Ive},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Journal of European Social Policy},
  volume = {31},
  number = {5},
  pages = {496--516},
  doi = {10.1177/09589287211040421},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287211040421},
  abstract = {Despite clear limitations, poverty research in the rich world overwhelmingly relies on income-based measures. Households may have significant savings and assets that they can draw on to boost their living standards, but may also have debts that depress the living standard they can actually achieve with their disposable income. Using data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), this article offers a picture of poverty in 17 EU countries that takes into account assets and debt, using various approaches. While earlier studies have found that poverty rates tend to be lower when wealth is accounted for, this study highlights the situation of those who become or remain poor even when savings and assets are included. It focuses both on within-country patterns of joint income\textendash wealth poverty and on cross-country differences. It is shown that the elderly are generally less prone to being poor once assets are accounted for. However, for renter households with a young, female, low educated, unemployed or inactive and single head, the risk of being poor when assets and debt are accounted for remains high and in some cases even increases. That is generally the case because they have few assets, rather than because of high debts. The substantial variation in poverty rates observed across countries can to some extent be accounted for by socio-demographic factors, but a lot of variation still remains unaccounted for.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Despite clear limitations, poverty research in the rich world overwhelmingly relies on income-based measures. Households may have significant savings and assets that they can draw on to boost their living standards, but may also have debts that depress the living standard they can actually achieve with their disposable income. Using data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), this article offers a picture of poverty in 17 EU countries that takes into account assets and debt, using various approaches. While earlier studies have found that poverty rates tend to be lower when wealth is accounted for, this study highlights the situation of those who become or remain poor even when savings and assets are included. It focuses both on within-country patterns of joint income– wealth poverty and on cross-country differences. It is shown that the elderly are generally less prone to being poor once assets are accounted for. However, for renter households with a young, female, low educated, unemployed or inactive and single head, the risk of being poor when assets and debt are accounted for remains high and in some cases even increases. That is generally the case because they have few assets, rather than because of high debts. The substantial variation in poverty rates observed across countries can to some extent be accounted for by socio-demographic factors, but a lot of variation still remains unaccounted for.

@article{LerschBaxter2021,
  title = {Parental Separation during Childhood and Adult Children's Wealth},
  author = {Lersch, Philipp M. and Baxter, Janeen},
  year = {2021},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Social Forces},
  volume = {99},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1176--1208},
  doi = {10.1093/sf/soaa021},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soaa021},
  abstract = {This study examines the association between parental separations during childhood and economic wealth of adult children. We provide a new test of this relationship and address two unresolved debates in the literature concerning (1) the pathways linking parental separation and adult children's wealth and (2) the relevance of the timing of exposure. We use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey on 16,652 individuals and estimate mixed effects models after matching to predict adult children's wealth. We find that parental separation is associated with about 46 percent less net wealth for adult children. The negative association is limited to adult children who experienced parental divorce before age 15. The association does not differ between children who experienced parental divorce before age 6 and between age 6 and 14. We identify reduced education and earning capacities, unstable family structures among adult children and less future-oriented time preferences as likely mechanisms through which parental separation influences adult children's wealth.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This study examines the association between parental separations during childhood and economic wealth of adult children. We provide a new test of this relationship and address two unresolved debates in the literature concerning (1) the pathways linking parental separation and adult children's wealth and (2) the relevance of the timing of exposure. We use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey on 16,652 individuals and estimate mixed effects models after matching to predict adult children's wealth. We find that parental separation is associated with about 46 percent less net wealth for adult children. The negative association is limited to adult children who experienced parental divorce before age 15. The association does not differ between children who experienced parental divorce before age 6 and between age 6 and 14. We identify reduced education and earning capacities, unstable family structures among adult children and less future-oriented time preferences as likely mechanisms through which parental separation influences adult children's wealth.

@article{Londono-VelezAvila-Mahecha2021,
  title = {Enforcing Wealth Taxes in the Developing World: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from {{Colombia}}},
  author = {{Londo{\~n}o-V{\'e}lez}, Juliana and {\'A}vila-Mahecha, Javier},
  year = {2021},
  month = jun,
  journal = {American Economic Review: Insights},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {131--148},
  doi = {10.1257/aeri.20200319},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200319},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the feasibility of wealth taxation in developing countries. It uses rich administrative data from Colombia and leverages a government-designed program for voluntary disclosures of hidden wealth as well as the threat of detection triggered by the Panama Papers leak. There are two key findings. First, there is substantial (primarily offshore) evasion: two-fifths of the wealthiest 0.01 percent evade taxes, with these evaders concealing one-third of their wealth offshore. Second, strengthening enforcement can have a significant impact on wealth tax compliance, tax revenue, and progressivity. These results highlight both challenges and opportunities for wealth taxation in the developing world.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper investigates the feasibility of wealth taxation in developing countries. It uses rich administrative data from Colombia and leverages a government-designed program for voluntary disclosures of hidden wealth as well as the threat of detection triggered by the Panama Papers leak. There are two key findings. First, there is substantial (primarily offshore) evasion: two-fifths of the wealthiest 0.01 percent evade taxes, with these evaders concealing one-third of their wealth offshore. Second, strengthening enforcement can have a significant impact on wealth tax compliance, tax revenue, and progressivity. These results highlight both challenges and opportunities for wealth taxation in the developing world.

@article{Morellietal2021,
  title = {Inheritance, Gifts and the Accumulation of Wealth for Low-Income Households},
  author = {Morelli, Salvatore and Nolan, Brian and Palomino, Juan C. and Van Kerm, Philippe},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Journal of European Social Policy},
  volume = {31},
  number = {5},
  pages = {533--548},
  doi = {10.1177/09589287211040419},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287211040419},
  abstract = {Many low-income households in rich countries have very little wealth, but the role of intergenerational wealth transmission in underpinning this deficit is not known. This article seeks to fill that gap by investigating patterns of past wealth transfer receipt for low-income versus other households in seven rich countries and assessing the contribution that these transfers, or their absence, make to current wealth levels. We find that households on low incomes are relatively disadvantaged in terms of intergenerational transfers received in the past, both in terms of the likelihood of having received any and the amounts received by those who do benefit from such transfers. The role that this disadvantage plays in the linkage between current low-income and low wealth is assessed and evidence presented that it is significant. Simulation of a universal wealth transfer scheme or `capital endowment' on reaching adulthood for two countries shows that such a policy could lead to a marked decline in the proportion of low-income adults with negative or no wealth. This and alternative or complementary policy responses to these wealth deficits merit the most serious attention.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Many low-income households in rich countries have very little wealth, but the role of intergenerational wealth transmission in underpinning this deficit is not known. This article seeks to fill that gap by investigating patterns of past wealth transfer receipt for low-income versus other households in seven rich countries and assessing the contribution that these transfers, or their absence, make to current wealth levels. We find that households on low incomes are relatively disadvantaged in terms of intergenerational transfers received in the past, both in terms of the likelihood of having received any and the amounts received by those who do benefit from such transfers. The role that this disadvantage plays in the linkage between current low-income and low wealth is assessed and evidence presented that it is significant. Simulation of a universal wealth transfer scheme or `capital endowment' on reaching adulthood for two countries shows that such a policy could lead to a marked decline in the proportion of low-income adults with negative or no wealth. This and alternative or complementary policy responses to these wealth deficits merit the most serious attention.

@article{Morgan2021,
  title = {Taxing Wealth: General Principles, International Perspectives and Lessons for Brazil},
  author = {Morgan, Marc},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Brazilian Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {41},
  number = {1},
  pages = {44--64},
  publisher = {{Centro de Economia Pol\'itica}},
  doi = {10.1590/0101-31572021-3131},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572021-3131},
  abstract = {The international debate on wealth taxation has been subject to renewed interest amid new proposals coming out of the US electoral cycle and the salience of wealth inequality. This article reviews the case for taxing wealth and its transfer across generations (wealth and inheritance taxes), analyzing their design from an international comparative perspective, and extracting lessons for Brazil. The long-debated ``Tax on Large Fortunes'' has never been implemented and the state-level ``Tax on Inheritances'' has been watered down over time. We propose a framework for the progressive implementation and reform of both taxes in the country. We argue, given the historical record and current research, that they are technically and administratively feasible propositions, notwithstanding important political economy considerations.},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}}
}

The international debate on wealth taxation has been subject to renewed interest amid new proposals coming out of the US electoral cycle and the salience of wealth inequality. This article reviews the case for taxing wealth and its transfer across generations (wealth and inheritance taxes), analyzing their design from an international comparative perspective, and extracting lessons for Brazil. The long-debated ``Tax on Large Fortunes'' has never been implemented and the state-level ``Tax on Inheritances'' has been watered down over time. We propose a framework for the progressive implementation and reform of both taxes in the country. We argue, given the historical record and current research, that they are technically and administratively feasible propositions, notwithstanding important political economy considerations.

@article{MunozMorelli2021,
  title = {{{kmr}}: A Command to Correct Survey Weights for Unit Nonresponse Using Groups' Response Rates},
  author = {Mu{\~n}oz, Ercio and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2021},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The Stata Journal},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {206--219},
  doi = {10.1177/1536867X211000025},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X211000025},
  abstract = {In this article, we describe kmr, a command to estimate a microcompliance function using groups' nonresponse rates (Korinek, Mistiaen, and Ravallion, 2007, Journal of Econometrics 136: 213\textendash 235), which can be used to correct survey weights for unit nonresponse. We illustrate the use of kmr with an empirical example using the current population survey and state-level nonresponse rates.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

In this article, we describe kmr, a command to estimate a microcompliance function using groups' nonresponse rates (Korinek, Mistiaen, and Ravallion, 2007, Journal of Econometrics 136: 213– 235), which can be used to correct survey weights for unit nonresponse. We illustrate the use of kmr with an empirical example using the current population survey and state-level nonresponse rates.

@unpublished{Nakajima2021,
  title = {Monetary Policy with Racial Inequality},
  author = {Nakajima, Makoto},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  url = {https://makotonakajima.github.io/wp/},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  abstract = {This paper presents a heterogeneous-agent New-Keynesian model featuring racial inequality in terms of income, wealth, and labor market risks, and studies how monetary policy affects different racial groups differently. The calibrated model can replicate the fact that an accommodative monetary policy shock narrows the Black-White unemployment rate gap, as the higher job separation rate among Black workers make the value of their job more sensitive to a monetary policy shock. The model indicates that Black and Hispanic workers benefit more from accommodative monetary policy than White workers, since they are more likely to be liquidity constrained and thus hand-to-mouth, and they face higher labor market risks, which are mitigated by accommodative monetary policy. For example, average welfare gain of Black workers from an accommodative monetary policy shock is more than 20 times larger than that of (middle-class) White workers.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper presents a heterogeneous-agent New-Keynesian model featuring racial inequality in terms of income, wealth, and labor market risks, and studies how monetary policy affects different racial groups differently. The calibrated model can replicate the fact that an accommodative monetary policy shock narrows the Black-White unemployment rate gap, as the higher job separation rate among Black workers make the value of their job more sensitive to a monetary policy shock. The model indicates that Black and Hispanic workers benefit more from accommodative monetary policy than White workers, since they are more likely to be liquidity constrained and thus hand-to-mouth, and they face higher labor market risks, which are mitigated by accommodative monetary policy. For example, average welfare gain of Black workers from an accommodative monetary policy shock is more than 20 times larger than that of (middle-class) White workers.

@unpublished{NekoeiSeim2021,
  title = {How Do Inheritances Shape Wealth Inequality? {{Theory}} and Evidence from {{Sweden}}},
  author = {Nekoei, Arash and Seim, David},
  year = {2021},
  month = oct,
  url = {https://sites.google.com/site/arashnekoei/},
  urldate = {2022-03-02},
  abstract = {We use a quasi-experimental design and Swedish administrative data to document that the average heir depletes her inheritance within a decade while the inheritances of wealthy heirs remain intact. These different depletion rates are not due to different consumption or labor supply responses but due to different rates of return on inherited wealth. Upon their receipt, inheritances reduce relative measures of wealth inequality, such as top shares or percentile ratios. Theoretically, this reduction in inequality could be due to either a com-pressed inheritance distribution or similar chances of having wealthy parents (high inter-generational mobility). Empirically, the first force is more significant in Sweden. Within a decade, however, the effect is reversed: inheritances increase wealth inequality since the different depletion rates widen the inequality in inherited wealth over time. This implies that inheritance taxation can reduce long-run wealth inequality only through the taxation of wealthy heirs.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We use a quasi-experimental design and Swedish administrative data to document that the average heir depletes her inheritance within a decade while the inheritances of wealthy heirs remain intact. These different depletion rates are not due to different consumption or labor supply responses but due to different rates of return on inherited wealth. Upon their receipt, inheritances reduce relative measures of wealth inequality, such as top shares or percentile ratios. Theoretically, this reduction in inequality could be due to either a com-pressed inheritance distribution or similar chances of having wealthy parents (high inter-generational mobility). Empirically, the first force is more significant in Sweden. Within a decade, however, the effect is reversed: inheritances increase wealth inequality since the different depletion rates widen the inequality in inherited wealth over time. This implies that inheritance taxation can reduce long-run wealth inequality only through the taxation of wealthy heirs.

@article{Nolanetal2021,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Transfers and Wealth Inequality in Rich Countries: What Do We Learn from {{Gini}} Decomposition?},
  author = {Nolan, Brian and Palomino, Juan C. and Van Kerm, Philippe and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2021},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {199},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109701},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109701},
  abstract = {The role of intergenerational transfers of wealth via inheritance and gifts inter vivos in the accumulation of household wealth and the generation of wealth inequality has been hotly debated. This paper uses data from household wealth surveys for six rich countries \textendash{} Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the US \textendash{} to assess the contribution of intergenerational wealth transfers to wealth inequality using decomposition methods for the Gini coefficient. The results show that transfer wealth is consistently a good deal more unequally distributed than non-transfer wealth and total wealth. Transfer wealth accounts for only about one-tenth of overall wealth inequality for the US compared to one-third for Germany and Italy. This mirrors the importance of transfer wealth in total wealth in each country, with differences in inequality in transfer wealth and its correlation with total wealth having only a modest impact. We find that a marginal percentage increase in all transfers reduces total wealth inequality in Britain, Germany and the US, while it would increase total wealth inequality in France, Italy and Spain.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {109701}
}

The role of intergenerational transfers of wealth via inheritance and gifts inter vivos in the accumulation of household wealth and the generation of wealth inequality has been hotly debated. This paper uses data from household wealth surveys for six rich countries – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the US – to assess the contribution of intergenerational wealth transfers to wealth inequality using decomposition methods for the Gini coefficient. The results show that transfer wealth is consistently a good deal more unequally distributed than non-transfer wealth and total wealth. Transfer wealth accounts for only about one-tenth of overall wealth inequality for the US compared to one-third for Germany and Italy. This mirrors the importance of transfer wealth in total wealth in each country, with differences in inequality in transfer wealth and its correlation with total wealth having only a modest impact. We find that a marginal percentage increase in all transfers reduces total wealth inequality in Britain, Germany and the US, while it would increase total wealth inequality in France, Italy and Spain.

@book{OECD2021_InheritanceTaxationOECDCountries,
  title = {Inheritance Taxation in {{OECD}} Countries},
  author = {{OECD}},
  year = {2021},
  month = may,
  series = {{{OECD Tax Policy Studies}}},
  number = {28},
  publisher = {{OECD Publishing}},
  address = {{Paris}},
  doi = {10.1787/e2879a7d-en},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1787/e2879a7d-en},
  abstract = {The report explores the role that inheritance taxation could play in raising revenues, addressing inequalities and improving efficiency in OECD countries. It provides background on the distribution and evolution of household wealth and inheritances, assesses the case for and against inheritance taxation drawing on existing theoretical and empirical literature, and examines the design of inheritance, estate and gift taxes in OECD countries. The report concludes with a number of reform options that governments could consider to improve the design and functioning of wealth transfer taxes.},
  isbn = {978-92-64-63428-2},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,{Data Sources: Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The report explores the role that inheritance taxation could play in raising revenues, addressing inequalities and improving efficiency in OECD countries. It provides background on the distribution and evolution of household wealth and inheritances, assesses the case for and against inheritance taxation drawing on existing theoretical and empirical literature, and examines the design of inheritance, estate and gift taxes in OECD countries. The report concludes with a number of reform options that governments could consider to improve the design and functioning of wealth transfer taxes.

@techreport{PfefferWaitkus2021,
  type = {Stone {{Center Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {The Wealth Inequality of Nations},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Waitkus, Nora},
  year = {2021},
  month = apr,
  number = {35},
  institution = {{Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/6msuf},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/6msuf},
  abstract = {Comparative research on income inequality has produced several coherent frameworks to study the institutional determinants of income stratification. In contrast, no such framework and much less empirical evidence exist to explain cross-national differences in wealth inequality. This situation is particularly lamentable as cross-national patterns of inequality in wealth diverge sharply from those in income. We seek to pave the way for new explanations of cross-national differences in wealth inequality by tracing them to the influence of different wealth components. Drawing on the literatures on financialization and housing, we argue that housing equity should be the central building block of the comparative analysis of wealth inequality. Using harmonized data on fifteen countries included in the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), we first demonstrate a lack of association between national levels of income and wealth inequality and concentration. Using decomposition approaches, we then estimate the degree to which national levels of wealth inequality and concentration relate to cross-national differences in wealth portfolios and the distribution of specific asset components. Considering the role of housing equity, financial assets, non-housing real assets, and non-housing debt, we reveal that cross-national variation in wealth inequality and concentration is centrally determined by the distribution of housing equity.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Comparative research on income inequality has produced several coherent frameworks to study the institutional determinants of income stratification. In contrast, no such framework and much less empirical evidence exist to explain cross-national differences in wealth inequality. This situation is particularly lamentable as cross-national patterns of inequality in wealth diverge sharply from those in income. We seek to pave the way for new explanations of cross-national differences in wealth inequality by tracing them to the influence of different wealth components. Drawing on the literatures on financialization and housing, we argue that housing equity should be the central building block of the comparative analysis of wealth inequality. Using harmonized data on fifteen countries included in the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), we first demonstrate a lack of association between national levels of income and wealth inequality and concentration. Using decomposition approaches, we then estimate the degree to which national levels of wealth inequality and concentration relate to cross-national differences in wealth portfolios and the distribution of specific asset components. Considering the role of housing equity, financial assets, non-housing real assets, and non-housing debt, we reveal that cross-national variation in wealth inequality and concentration is centrally determined by the distribution of housing equity.

@article{PfefferWaitkus2021a,
  title = {Comparing Child Wealth Inequality across Countries},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Waitkus, Nora},
  year = {2021},
  month = aug,
  journal = {RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences},
  volume = {7},
  number = {3},
  pages = {28--49},
  doi = {10.7758/RSF.2021.7.3.02},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2021.7.3.02},
  abstract = {This article compares the wealth situation of children across fourteen countries. Children experience lower levels of wealth than the rest of the population, seniors in particular. We show that, in most countries, child wealth is distributed substantially more unequally than the wealth of seniors. We also demonstrate that an international ranking of child wealth inequality diverges sharply from one based on child income inequality. The wealth situation of children in the United States is exceptional: they lag further behind seniors in terms of their wealth and face the highest levels of wealth inequality and, by far, wealth concentration.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This article compares the wealth situation of children across fourteen countries. Children experience lower levels of wealth than the rest of the population, seniors in particular. We show that, in most countries, child wealth is distributed substantially more unequally than the wealth of seniors. We also demonstrate that an international ranking of child wealth inequality diverges sharply from one based on child income inequality. The wealth situation of children in the United States is exceptional: they lag further behind seniors in terms of their wealth and face the highest levels of wealth inequality and, by far, wealth concentration.

@unpublished{Raya-Munte2021,
  title = {Heterogeneous Saving Behavior and Permanent Income},
  author = {{Raya-Munt{\'e}}, Albert},
  year = {2021},
  month = nov,
  url = {https://www.albertrayamunte.com/research.html},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  abstract = {Do high permanent income households tend to accumulate a larger amount of wealth relative to income over the life cycle? Using Spanish household-level panel data from the Survey of Household Finances, I estimate permanent income for each household and document a positive and strong relationship between the latter and wealth-to-income ratios over the life cycle. In particular, the median household in the 8th decile and above of the permanent income distribution tends to exhibit wealth-to-income ratios at least 50\% larger than the median household in the 2nd decile. To study the determinants of this nonhomothetic behavior, I build a standard partial equilibrium life-cycle model of homothetic household consumption and saving behavior which, by construction, features homogeneous wealth accumulation relative to income. This serves as a benchmark to help investigate the quantitative contribution of different sources of non-homothetic behavior: the pension system, accidental and voluntary bequests, intergenerational transmission of ability, and preference heterogeneity. A calibrated version of this model for Spain shows that nonhomotheticities stemming from the pension system and the transmission of wealth via bequests account, on average, for 70\% of documented wealth-to-income ratios differences. However, these sources are not able to account for the large amount of wealth - relative to income - the top 20\% of households accumulate. To this end, the model calibration approach requires a sizable amount of preference heterogeneity at the top of the permanent income distribution.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Do high permanent income households tend to accumulate a larger amount of wealth relative to income over the life cycle? Using Spanish household-level panel data from the Survey of Household Finances, I estimate permanent income for each household and document a positive and strong relationship between the latter and wealth-to-income ratios over the life cycle. In particular, the median household in the 8th decile and above of the permanent income distribution tends to exhibit wealth-to-income ratios at least 50% larger than the median household in the 2nd decile. To study the determinants of this nonhomothetic behavior, I build a standard partial equilibrium life-cycle model of homothetic household consumption and saving behavior which, by construction, features homogeneous wealth accumulation relative to income. This serves as a benchmark to help investigate the quantitative contribution of different sources of non-homothetic behavior: the pension system, accidental and voluntary bequests, intergenerational transmission of ability, and preference heterogeneity. A calibrated version of this model for Spain shows that nonhomotheticities stemming from the pension system and the transmission of wealth via bequests account, on average, for 70% of documented wealth-to-income ratios differences. However, these sources are not able to account for the large amount of wealth - relative to income - the top 20% of households accumulate. To this end, the model calibration approach requires a sizable amount of preference heterogeneity at the top of the permanent income distribution.

@article{RyabovaIvanushchenko2021,
  title = {Rethinking of Inheritance Taxation in Russia},
  author = {Ryabova, Elena and Ivanushchenko, Evgeniya},
  year = {2021},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Russian Law Journal},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {34--57},
  doi = {10.17589/2309-8678-2021-9-1-34-57},
  url = {https://www.russianlawjournal.org/jour/article/view/1132},
  abstract = {This article analyses theoretical and practical implications of inheritance tax as the most debatable tax from legal and ethical viewpoints. Some countries have refused taxing inheritance. Others have applied inheritance taxation from national to local levels. The majority of developed countries tax wealth transfers. The primary purpose of inheritance taxation is the allocation of wealth within society and the mitigation of social inequality. Currently, Russia has neither an inheritance tax, nor any other wealth or wealth transfer taxes. This indicates an unfair tax system. The study is based on the analysis of the history of inheritance taxation in Russia and abroad, and the contemporary legal framework and practices in foreign countries. The authors highlight current advantages and disadvantages of inheritance taxation, the functions of the tax, and state considerations related to the potential design of inheritance tax in Russia. The main conclusion is that inheritance tax should be imposed in Russia as a social-oriented mechanism and levied on only the top-wealth societal cluster.},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}}
}

This article analyses theoretical and practical implications of inheritance tax as the most debatable tax from legal and ethical viewpoints. Some countries have refused taxing inheritance. Others have applied inheritance taxation from national to local levels. The majority of developed countries tax wealth transfers. The primary purpose of inheritance taxation is the allocation of wealth within society and the mitigation of social inequality. Currently, Russia has neither an inheritance tax, nor any other wealth or wealth transfer taxes. This indicates an unfair tax system. The study is based on the analysis of the history of inheritance taxation in Russia and abroad, and the contemporary legal framework and practices in foreign countries. The authors highlight current advantages and disadvantages of inheritance taxation, the functions of the tax, and state considerations related to the potential design of inheritance tax in Russia. The main conclusion is that inheritance tax should be imposed in Russia as a social-oriented mechanism and levied on only the top-wealth societal cluster.

@article{SaezZucman2021,
  title = {A Wealth Tax on Corporations' Stock},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economic Policy},
  pages = {1--16},
  url = {https://gabriel-zucman.eu/},
  abstract = {We propose to institute a new tax on corporations' stock shares for all publicly listed companies headquartered in G20 countries. Every year, each company would have to pay 0.2 percent of the value of its stock in taxes. As the G20 stock market capitalization is around \$90 trillion, the tax would raise approximately \$180 billion each year. Because stock ownership is highly concentrated among the rich, this global tax would be progressive. The tax could be paid in-kind by corporations (by issuing new stock) so that the tax does not raise liquidity issue or affect business operations. In today's globalized and fast-moving world, companies can become enormously valuable once they establish market power, even before they start making large profits (e.g., Amazon and Tesla). This tax would make them start paying taxes sooner. The tax could be enforced by the securities commissions in each country which regulate publicly traded securities and already charge fees on stock issuance and transactions.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

We propose to institute a new tax on corporations' stock shares for all publicly listed companies headquartered in G20 countries. Every year, each company would have to pay 0.2 percent of the value of its stock in taxes. As the G20 stock market capitalization is around $90 trillion, the tax would raise approximately $180 billion each year. Because stock ownership is highly concentrated among the rich, this global tax would be progressive. The tax could be paid in-kind by corporations (by issuing new stock) so that the tax does not raise liquidity issue or affect business operations. In today's globalized and fast-moving world, companies can become enormously valuable once they establish market power, even before they start making large profits (e.g., Amazon and Tesla). This tax would make them start paying taxes sooner. The tax could be enforced by the securities commissions in each country which regulate publicly traded securities and already charge fees on stock issuance and transactions.

@unpublished{SaezZucman2021a,
  title = {A Wealth Tax on Corporations' Stock},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://eml.berkeley.edu/$\sim$saez/},
  abstract = {We propose to institute a new tax on corporations' stock shares for all publicly listed companies headquartered in G20 countries. Every year, each company would have to pay 0.2 percent of the value of its stock in taxes. As the G20 stock market capitalization is around \$90 trillion, the tax would raise approximately \$180 billion each year. Because stock ownership is highly concentrated among the rich, this global tax would be progressive. The tax could be paid in-kind by corporations (by issuing new stock) so that the tax does not raise liquidity issue or affect business operations. In today's globalized and fast-moving world, companies can become enormously valuable once they establish market power, even before they start making large profits (e.g., Amazon and Tesla). This tax would make them start paying taxes sooner. The tax could be enforced by the securities commissions in each country which regulate publicly traded securities and already charge fees on stock issuance and transactions.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We propose to institute a new tax on corporations' stock shares for all publicly listed companies headquartered in G20 countries. Every year, each company would have to pay 0.2 percent of the value of its stock in taxes. As the G20 stock market capitalization is around $90 trillion, the tax would raise approximately $180 billion each year. Because stock ownership is highly concentrated among the rich, this global tax would be progressive. The tax could be paid in-kind by corporations (by issuing new stock) so that the tax does not raise liquidity issue or affect business operations. In today's globalized and fast-moving world, companies can become enormously valuable once they establish market power, even before they start making large profits (e.g., Amazon and Tesla). This tax would make them start paying taxes sooner. The tax could be enforced by the securities commissions in each country which regulate publicly traded securities and already charge fees on stock issuance and transactions.

@unpublished{SaezZucman2021b,
  title = {How to Get \$1 Trillion from 1000 Billionaires: Tax Their Gains Now},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://eml.berkeley.edu/$\sim$saez/},
  abstract = {: Billionaires pay low effective tax rates because they can defer taxes on their capital gains for decades or forever as income tax on gains is due only upon sale of assets. US billionaires now own \$4.25 Trillion, out of which \$2.7 Trillion are gains that they haven't paid tax upon yet. During COVID, billionaires untaxed gains increased by \$1.25 Trillion. We propose to end this tax deferral advantage by imposing a one-time tax on the stock of billionaires' unrealized gains at the ordinary tax rate (39.6\%+3.8\% under Biden's plan). Practically, all gains accumulated as of April 1, 2021 will be deemed realized and the tax would be payable over 10 years. This would raise approximately \$1 trillion. Because it is a one-time tax of gains already accumulated, it does not create adverse economic incentives. Because gains will be deemed realized, it is an extra burden only on billionaires who were going to avoid taxes on their gains. Because it is imposed only on billionaires, a highly visible group of less than 1000, it is administratively doable. Billionaires can easily borrow against their wealth or sell part of their business stakes to pay the tax, without affecting the operation of the businesses they own. This is the most progressive tax imaginable and can bring substantial revenue for pressing needs. It fits with and strengthens the Biden administration goal of taxing capital gains like ordinary income.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

: Billionaires pay low effective tax rates because they can defer taxes on their capital gains for decades or forever as income tax on gains is due only upon sale of assets. US billionaires now own $4.25 Trillion, out of which $2.7 Trillion are gains that they haven't paid tax upon yet. During COVID, billionaires untaxed gains increased by $1.25 Trillion. We propose to end this tax deferral advantage by imposing a one-time tax on the stock of billionaires' unrealized gains at the ordinary tax rate (39.6%+3.8% under Biden's plan). Practically, all gains accumulated as of April 1, 2021 will be deemed realized and the tax would be payable over 10 years. This would raise approximately $1 trillion. Because it is a one-time tax of gains already accumulated, it does not create adverse economic incentives. Because gains will be deemed realized, it is an extra burden only on billionaires who were going to avoid taxes on their gains. Because it is imposed only on billionaires, a highly visible group of less than 1000, it is administratively doable. Billionaires can easily borrow against their wealth or sell part of their business stakes to pay the tax, without affecting the operation of the businesses they own. This is the most progressive tax imaginable and can bring substantial revenue for pressing needs. It fits with and strengthens the Biden administration goal of taxing capital gains like ordinary income.

@mastersthesis{Samra2021,
  title = {Examining the Racial Wealth Gap: The Impact of Income, Homeownership, Intergenerational Transfers, and Financial Investments on Wealth},
  author = {Samra, Sarajit Kaur},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://www.proquest.com/docview/2611650213/abstract/7EDBC84C3ECA49FBPQ/1},
  urldate = {2022-02-24},
  abstract = {Using data from the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances and the 2013 to 2017 Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I explore the racial wealth gap between white, Black, Hispanic or Latino, and Asian households in the United States. To examine the wealth disparities between these different racial groups, I focus on multiple factors including differences in income, homeownership, private intergenerational transfers, and financial investments. My thesis consists of four different regression models, which include ordinary least squares (OLS), weighted least squares, time fixed effects, and state fixed effects. The OLS results suggest Black households, on average, hold \$588,690 less net wealth than white households and Hispanic or Latino households hold \$15,190 less, after control variables are added to the regression. When transforming net wealth using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, I find that Black households hold 173 percent less net wealth than white households. In addition, after separating net wealth into quartiles, the racial wealth gap continues to be persistent at all quartiles. Overall, the large and statistically significant results indicate that a wealth gap is present between white and non-white households, and these results can be partially explained by financial risk taking, homeownership, education, and income variables.},
  school = {California State University, Sacramento},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Using data from the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances and the 2013 to 2017 Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I explore the racial wealth gap between white, Black, Hispanic or Latino, and Asian households in the United States. To examine the wealth disparities between these different racial groups, I focus on multiple factors including differences in income, homeownership, private intergenerational transfers, and financial investments. My thesis consists of four different regression models, which include ordinary least squares (OLS), weighted least squares, time fixed effects, and state fixed effects. The OLS results suggest Black households, on average, hold $588,690 less net wealth than white households and Hispanic or Latino households hold $15,190 less, after control variables are added to the regression. When transforming net wealth using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, I find that Black households hold 173 percent less net wealth than white households. In addition, after separating net wealth into quartiles, the racial wealth gap continues to be persistent at all quartiles. Overall, the large and statistically significant results indicate that a wealth gap is present between white and non-white households, and these results can be partially explained by financial risk taking, homeownership, education, and income variables.

@article{Seelkopfetal2021,
  title = {The Rise of Modern Taxation: {{A}} New Comprehensive Dataset of Tax Introductions Worldwide},
  author = {Seelkopf, Laura and Bubek, Moritz and Eihmanis, Edgars and Ganderson, Joseph and Limberg, Julian and Mnaili, Youssef and Zuluaga, Paula and Genschel, Philipp},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  journal = {The Review of International Organizations},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  pages = {239--263},
  doi = {10.1007/s11558-019-09359-9},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09359-9},
  abstract = {This article describes the new Tax Introduction Dataset (TID). Listing the year and the mode of the first permanent introduction of six major taxes (inheritance tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, social security contributions, general sales tax and value added tax) in 220 countries, 1750\textendash 2018, TID is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind. The comprehensiveness of our measure is of critical value to empirical work on the causes of tax innovation and its consequences for state, society and economy. In this paper, we explain the selection of our tax sample and the structure of the dataset, descriptively map temporal and regional patterns of tax introductions around the world, and draw on TID to investigate associations between tax introductions and economic development, war, and democratization.},
  keywords = {{Data Sources: Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Intergenerational Wealth},
  url_tax_introduction_database = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/genschel-seelkopf-taxintroductiondatabase-2019},
  url_codebook = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/genschel-seelkopf-codebooktaxintroductiondatasettid-2019}
}

This article describes the new Tax Introduction Dataset (TID). Listing the year and the mode of the first permanent introduction of six major taxes (inheritance tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, social security contributions, general sales tax and value added tax) in 220 countries, 1750– 2018, TID is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind. The comprehensiveness of our measure is of critical value to empirical work on the causes of tax innovation and its consequences for state, society and economy. In this paper, we explain the selection of our tax sample and the structure of the dataset, descriptively map temporal and regional patterns of tax introductions around the world, and draw on TID to investigate associations between tax introductions and economic development, war, and democratization.

@article{SemyonovLewin-Epstein2021,
  title = {The Wealth Gap between Ageing Immigrants and Native-Born in Ten {{European}} Countries},
  author = {Semyonov, Moshe and {Lewin-Epstein}, Noah},
  year = {2021},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Czech Sociological Review},
  volume = {57},
  number = {6},
  pages = {639--660},
  doi = {10.13060/csr.2021.033},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.13060/csr.2021.033},
  abstract = {Using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe from 10 European countries, this study contributes to the research on immigrants' economic incorporation by focusing on the nativity wealth gaps in mid and late life. Three origin groups of immigrants were distinguished: non-European, post-communist, and West, Central, and South European countries. We estimated the size of the wealth gap between each immigrant population and natives, the sources of the gap, and the trajectory of wealth convergence. The data revealed that the mean net worth of native-born groups was higher than that of all immigrant sub-groups. The gap was widest for non-European immigrants and lowest for West, Central, and South European immigrants. Differences in the rate of homeownership accounted for the largest portion of the gap, while neither differential levels of income nor education accounted for much of the gap between native-born and either non-European immigrants or immigrants from post-communist countries. Reception of gifts or inheritances did not account for a meaningful portion of the gaps. Estimation of the rate of convergence suggests that it would take an average of 85 years after arrival for an average immigrant household to bridge the wealth gap between it and an average native-born household. The rate of wealth convergence was somewhat faster for non-Europeans and slower for West, Central, and South Europeans.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe from 10 European countries, this study contributes to the research on immigrants' economic incorporation by focusing on the nativity wealth gaps in mid and late life. Three origin groups of immigrants were distinguished: non-European, post-communist, and West, Central, and South European countries. We estimated the size of the wealth gap between each immigrant population and natives, the sources of the gap, and the trajectory of wealth convergence. The data revealed that the mean net worth of native-born groups was higher than that of all immigrant sub-groups. The gap was widest for non-European immigrants and lowest for West, Central, and South European immigrants. Differences in the rate of homeownership accounted for the largest portion of the gap, while neither differential levels of income nor education accounted for much of the gap between native-born and either non-European immigrants or immigrants from post-communist countries. Reception of gifts or inheritances did not account for a meaningful portion of the gaps. Estimation of the rate of convergence suggests that it would take an average of 85 years after arrival for an average immigrant household to bridge the wealth gap between it and an average native-born household. The rate of wealth convergence was somewhat faster for non-Europeans and slower for West, Central, and South Europeans.

@article{StortiDagnes2021,
  title = {The Super-Rich: Origin, Reproduction, and Social Acceptance},
  author = {Storti, Luca and Dagnes, Joselle},
  year = {2021},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Sociologica},
  volume = {15},
  number = {2},
  pages = {5--23},
  doi = {10.6092/issn.1971-8853/13546},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1971-8853/13546},
  abstract = {What is the sociological understanding of the super-rich? To address this question, we propose and further elaborate three interconnected lines of investigation. After highlighting some plausible criteria for identifying the super-rich, we deal first with the generative and reproductive mechanisms underpinning the huge wealth concentration emerging over the last decades. Second, we dissect the nexus between the super-rich and places, i.e., how the super-rich shape the~spaces to implement their housing strategies, consumption patterns, and lifestyle. By doing so, we will also show how the super-rich transform spaces into social arenas in which they stand out through an original form of distinction made up of recognition and invisibility. Third, we will focus on the dynamics and the behaviours that help the super-rich gain social acceptance. This three-step analysis allows us to pinpoint in the conclusions some regressive outcomes in economic, social, and political terms fostered by the increasing concentration of private wealth.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

What is the sociological understanding of the super-rich? To address this question, we propose and further elaborate three interconnected lines of investigation. After highlighting some plausible criteria for identifying the super-rich, we deal first with the generative and reproductive mechanisms underpinning the huge wealth concentration emerging over the last decades. Second, we dissect the nexus between the super-rich and places, i.e., how the super-rich shape the spaces to implement their housing strategies, consumption patterns, and lifestyle. By doing so, we will also show how the super-rich transform spaces into social arenas in which they stand out through an original form of distinction made up of recognition and invisibility. Third, we will focus on the dynamics and the behaviours that help the super-rich gain social acceptance. This three-step analysis allows us to pinpoint in the conclusions some regressive outcomes in economic, social, and political terms fostered by the increasing concentration of private wealth.

@techreport{Thiemannetal2021,
  type = {{{JRC Working Papers}} on {{Taxation}} and {{Structural Reforms}}},
  title = {Shifting the Tax Burden Away from Labour towards Inheritances and Gifts \textendash{} Simulation Results for {{Germany}}},
  author = {Thiemann, Andreas and Ognyanova, Diana and Narazani, Edlira and Palvolgyi, Balazs and Kalyva, Athena and Leodolter, Alexander},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  number = {16/2021},
  institution = {{Joint Research Centre}},
  url = {https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/thematic-research-publications-fiscal-policy/jrc-working-papers-taxation-and-structural-reforms_en},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  abstract = {Germany's tax system places a relatively strong emphasis on direct taxes, particularly on labour. At the same time, revenues from the inheritance and gift tax are relatively low. This points towards a large-scale transfer of wealth from one generation to the next that is largely untaxed and thereby maintaining the high degree of wealth inequality observed in Germany. This is due mainly to the wide-ranging tax exemptions for business assets, which make the system complex, inefficient and regressive. This paper presents three hypothetical budget-neutral scenarios of broadening the inheritance and gift tax base while reducing the tax burden on labour income. Keeping the current progressive rates but abolishing tax exemptions would lead to about EUR 9-12 billion additional annual inheritance and gift tax revenue. Replacing the current tax regime by a flat rate of 10\% or 15\% could yield about EUR 0.5-2.3 billion or EUR 4-6.5 billion. Using EUROMOD, the microsimulation model of the EU, we show that these additional revenues could be used to reduce the tax burden on labour, which would improve income equality. Furthermore, estimations of labour supply responses to these reforms, based on the EUROLAB labour supply model, indicate that lowering the tax burden on labour may also lead to a slight increase in labour supply in particular for low-income earners.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}}
}

Germany's tax system places a relatively strong emphasis on direct taxes, particularly on labour. At the same time, revenues from the inheritance and gift tax are relatively low. This points towards a large-scale transfer of wealth from one generation to the next that is largely untaxed and thereby maintaining the high degree of wealth inequality observed in Germany. This is due mainly to the wide-ranging tax exemptions for business assets, which make the system complex, inefficient and regressive. This paper presents three hypothetical budget-neutral scenarios of broadening the inheritance and gift tax base while reducing the tax burden on labour income. Keeping the current progressive rates but abolishing tax exemptions would lead to about EUR 9-12 billion additional annual inheritance and gift tax revenue. Replacing the current tax regime by a flat rate of 10% or 15% could yield about EUR 0.5-2.3 billion or EUR 4-6.5 billion. Using EUROMOD, the microsimulation model of the EU, we show that these additional revenues could be used to reduce the tax burden on labour, which would improve income equality. Furthermore, estimations of labour supply responses to these reforms, based on the EUROLAB labour supply model, indicate that lowering the tax burden on labour may also lead to a slight increase in labour supply in particular for low-income earners.

@article{Waltl2021,
  title = {Wealth Inequality: {{A}} Hybrid Approach toward Multidimensional Distributional National Accounts in {{Europe}}},
  author = {Waltl, Sofie R.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12519},
  url = {https://liser.elsevierpure.com/en/publications/wealth-inequality-a-hybrid-approach-toward-multidimensional-distr},
  abstract = {This article proposes a practically feasible framework for compiling Multidimensional Distributional National Accounts (MDINA) serving two functions: a comprehensive measure of (components of) net worth and their distribution, and a link to macroeconomic statistics. I break down twelve components of marketable wealth by wealth and income groups, and three functions of wealth for Austria, Finland, France, Germany and Spain. MDINA complemented by summary indicators reveal large heterogeneity in the degree of inequality, and shed light on differences in the structure of wealth portfolios across and within countries. I combine data collected in the largely harmonized HFCS survey and adjust for remaining differences in survey modes regarding the treatment of the top tail using (Generalized) Pareto models estimated from rich lists or top wealth shares derived from tax data and leaked information on wealth held in offshore tax havens. Measured inequality increases strongest in countries where surveys refrain from appropriate top-tail corrections.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This article proposes a practically feasible framework for compiling Multidimensional Distributional National Accounts (MDINA) serving two functions: a comprehensive measure of (components of) net worth and their distribution, and a link to macroeconomic statistics. I break down twelve components of marketable wealth by wealth and income groups, and three functions of wealth for Austria, Finland, France, Germany and Spain. MDINA complemented by summary indicators reveal large heterogeneity in the degree of inequality, and shed light on differences in the structure of wealth portfolios across and within countries. I combine data collected in the largely harmonized HFCS survey and adjust for remaining differences in survey modes regarding the treatment of the top tail using (Generalized) Pareto models estimated from rich lists or top wealth shares derived from tax data and leaked information on wealth held in offshore tax havens. Measured inequality increases strongest in countries where surveys refrain from appropriate top-tail corrections.

@article{WeiYang2021,
  title = {The Impact of Inheritance on the Distribution of Wealth: Evidence from {{China}}},
  author = {Wei, Hongyao and Yang, Zhengyi},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12513},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12513},
  abstract = {Using the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we investigate household inheritances' structural characteristics and their effects on wealth distribution. First, we find that the proportion of households receiving inheritances in China is slightly lower than that of some European countries and the United States, and the inheritance scale, especially the proportion of inheritances in household net worth, is much lower. Second, inheritances can significantly promote wealth accumulation, and wealthy households are more likely to receive larger-scale inheritances. Therefore, inheritances can aggravate class stratification and reduce social mobility. Third, inheritances reduce relative wealth inequality but widen the absolute wealth gap. This effect's duality is that although wealthy households have inheritances on a larger scale, the relative importance of the inheritance is more significant for poorer households, who inherit more relative to their household net worth. Altruistic motivations of inheritance donors can help explain this phenomenon.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Using the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we investigate household inheritances' structural characteristics and their effects on wealth distribution. First, we find that the proportion of households receiving inheritances in China is slightly lower than that of some European countries and the United States, and the inheritance scale, especially the proportion of inheritances in household net worth, is much lower. Second, inheritances can significantly promote wealth accumulation, and wealthy households are more likely to receive larger-scale inheritances. Therefore, inheritances can aggravate class stratification and reduce social mobility. Third, inheritances reduce relative wealth inequality but widen the absolute wealth gap. This effect's duality is that although wealthy households have inheritances on a larger scale, the relative importance of the inheritance is more significant for poorer households, who inherit more relative to their household net worth. Altruistic motivations of inheritance donors can help explain this phenomenon.

@techreport{Wolff2021,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Household Wealth Trends in the {{United States}}, 1962 to 2019: Median Wealth Rebounds... but Not Enough},
  author = {Wolff, Edward N.},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  number = {28383},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  doi = {10.3386/w28383},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w28383},
  abstract = {Median household wealth shot up by 21.2 percent in real terms between 2016 and 2019, as asset prices continued to rebound. However, 2007 still remains the watershed year, and median wealth was down 20.4 percent relative to 2007, though mean wealth more than fully recovered. There was a modest remission in wealth inequality, with the share of the top one percent down by 1.4 percentage points, that of the top 20 percent down by 1.0 percentage points, the Gini coefficient down by 0.008, and the mean wealth of the top one percent also down by 1.9 percent. The homeownership rate finally rebounded a bit, by 1.2 percentage points, to 64.9 percent. The stock ownership rate advanced by 0.4 percentage points to 49.6 percent, though still down from its 2001 peak. Though the mean debt of the middle class rose by 10.7 percent in real terms, the debt-income and debt-net worth ratios remained largely unchanged. The black-white gap in mean net worth remained unchanged, as did the Hispanic-white wealth gap. The wealth of households under age 35 continued to deteriorate in both absolute and relative terms between 2016 and 2019.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Wolff2021.pdf}
}

Median household wealth shot up by 21.2 percent in real terms between 2016 and 2019, as asset prices continued to rebound. However, 2007 still remains the watershed year, and median wealth was down 20.4 percent relative to 2007, though mean wealth more than fully recovered. There was a modest remission in wealth inequality, with the share of the top one percent down by 1.4 percentage points, that of the top 20 percent down by 1.0 percentage points, the Gini coefficient down by 0.008, and the mean wealth of the top one percent also down by 1.9 percent. The homeownership rate finally rebounded a bit, by 1.2 percentage points, to 64.9 percent. The stock ownership rate advanced by 0.4 percentage points to 49.6 percent, though still down from its 2001 peak. Though the mean debt of the middle class rose by 10.7 percent in real terms, the debt-income and debt-net worth ratios remained largely unchanged. The black-white gap in mean net worth remained unchanged, as did the Hispanic-white wealth gap. The wealth of households under age 35 continued to deteriorate in both absolute and relative terms between 2016 and 2019.

@article{YuCui2021,
  title = {Difference in Housing Finance Usage and Its Impact on Housing Wealth Inequality in Urban {{China}}},
  author = {Yu, Shan and Cui, Can},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Land},
  volume = {10},
  number = {12},
  doi = {10.3390/land10121404},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121404},
  abstract = {With the increasing importance of financial loans in home purchases in urban China, the role of housing loans in the accumulation of housing wealth needs to be unraveled. Using the data from the 2017 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), this study investigates the use of housing loans and their impact on housing wealth inequality. It has been found that people with higher socioeconomic status and institutional advantages benefit more from housing provident fund loans and are more likely to fully invoke different financing channels to accumulate housing wealth. On the contrary, disadvantaged groups have to resort to costly market-based mortgages to finance their home purchases. This leads them to fall further behind in housing wealth accumulation. The spatial stratification of housing wealth accompanying the urban hierarchy was also observed and found to be closely linked to the type of housing loans. In this increasingly financialized era, relying on financial instruments in the process of household asset accumulation may further amplify the existing wealth inequality among social groups.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {1404}
}

With the increasing importance of financial loans in home purchases in urban China, the role of housing loans in the accumulation of housing wealth needs to be unraveled. Using the data from the 2017 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), this study investigates the use of housing loans and their impact on housing wealth inequality. It has been found that people with higher socioeconomic status and institutional advantages benefit more from housing provident fund loans and are more likely to fully invoke different financing channels to accumulate housing wealth. On the contrary, disadvantaged groups have to resort to costly market-based mortgages to finance their home purchases. This leads them to fall further behind in housing wealth accumulation. The spatial stratification of housing wealth accompanying the urban hierarchy was also observed and found to be closely linked to the type of housing loans. In this increasingly financialized era, relying on financial instruments in the process of household asset accumulation may further amplify the existing wealth inequality among social groups.

@unpublished{Agrawaletal2020,
  title = {Para\'isos Fiscales, Wealth Taxation, and Mobility},
  author = {Agrawal, David R. and Foremny, Dirk and {Mart{\'i}nez-Toledano}, Clara},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wilwps:halshs-03093674},
  abstract = {This paper analyzes the effect of wealth taxation on mobility and the consequences for tax revenue and wealth inequality. We exploit the unique decentralization of the Spanish wealth tax system in 2011\textemdash after which all regions levied positive tax rates except for Madrid\textemdash using linked administrative wealth and income tax records. We find that five years after the reform, the stock of wealthy individuals in the region of Madrid increases by 10\% relative to other regions, while smaller tax differentials between other regions do not matter for mobility. We rationalize our findings with a theoretical model of evasion and migration, which suggests that evasion is the mechanism most consistent with all of the mobility response being driven by the para\'iso fiscal. Combining new subnational wealth inequality series with our estimated elasticities, we show that Madrid's status as a tax haven reduces the effectiveness of raising tax revenue and exacerbates regional wealth inequalities.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper analyzes the effect of wealth taxation on mobility and the consequences for tax revenue and wealth inequality. We exploit the unique decentralization of the Spanish wealth tax system in 2011— after which all regions levied positive tax rates except for Madrid— using linked administrative wealth and income tax records. We find that five years after the reform, the stock of wealthy individuals in the region of Madrid increases by 10% relative to other regions, while smaller tax differentials between other regions do not matter for mobility. We rationalize our findings with a theoretical model of evasion and migration, which suggests that evasion is the mechanism most consistent with all of the mobility response being driven by the paraíso fiscal. Combining new subnational wealth inequality series with our estimated elasticities, we show that Madrid's status as a tax haven reduces the effectiveness of raising tax revenue and exacerbates regional wealth inequalities.

@techreport{Alfani2020,
  type = {Stone {{Center Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {Epidemics, Inequality and Poverty in Preindustrial and Early Industrial Times},
  author = {Alfani, Guido},
  year = {2020},
  month = oct,
  number = {23},
  institution = {{Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/36cqf},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/36cqf},
  abstract = {Recent research has explored the distributive consequences of major historical epidemics, and the current crisis triggered by Covid-19 prompts us to look at the past for insights about how pandemics can affect inequalities in income, wealth, and health. The fourteenth-century Black Death, which is usually believed to have led to a significant reduction in economic inequality, has attracted the greatest attention. However, the picture becomes much more complex if other epidemics are considered. This article covers the worst epidemics of preindustrial times, from Justinian's Plague of 540-41 to the last great European plagues of the seventeenth century, as well as the cholera waves of the nineteenth. It shows how the distributive outcomes of lethal epidemics do not only depend upon mortality rates, but are mediated by a range of factors, chief among them the institutional framework in place at the onset of each crisis. It then explores how past epidemics affected poverty, arguing that highly lethal epidemics could reduce its prevalence through two deeply different mechanisms: redistribution towards the poor, or extermination of the poor. It concludes by recalling the historical connection between the progressive weakening and spacing in time of lethal epidemics and improvements in life expectancy, and by discussing how epidemics affected inequality in health and living standards.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Recent research has explored the distributive consequences of major historical epidemics, and the current crisis triggered by Covid-19 prompts us to look at the past for insights about how pandemics can affect inequalities in income, wealth, and health. The fourteenth-century Black Death, which is usually believed to have led to a significant reduction in economic inequality, has attracted the greatest attention. However, the picture becomes much more complex if other epidemics are considered. This article covers the worst epidemics of preindustrial times, from Justinian's Plague of 540-41 to the last great European plagues of the seventeenth century, as well as the cholera waves of the nineteenth. It shows how the distributive outcomes of lethal epidemics do not only depend upon mortality rates, but are mediated by a range of factors, chief among them the institutional framework in place at the onset of each crisis. It then explores how past epidemics affected poverty, arguing that highly lethal epidemics could reduce its prevalence through two deeply different mechanisms: redistribution towards the poor, or extermination of the poor. It concludes by recalling the historical connection between the progressive weakening and spacing in time of lethal epidemics and improvements in life expectancy, and by discussing how epidemics affected inequality in health and living standards.

@unpublished{Anetal2020,
  title = {Wealth Redistribution in Bubbles and Crashes},
  author = {An, Li and Bian, Jiangze and Lou, Dong and Shi, Donghui},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3402254},
  url = {https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402254},
  abstract = {Using comprehensive administrative data from China, we document a substantial increase in inequality of wealth held in risky assets by Chinese households in the 2014-15 bubble-crash episode: the largest 0.5\% households in the equity market gain, while the bottom 85\% lose, 250B RMB through active trading in this period, or 30\% of either group's initial equity wealth. In comparison, the return differential between the top and bottom groups in 2012-14, a period of a relatively calm market, is an order of magnitude smaller. We examine a number of possible explanations for these findings and discuss their implications.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Using comprehensive administrative data from China, we document a substantial increase in inequality of wealth held in risky assets by Chinese households in the 2014-15 bubble-crash episode: the largest 0.5% households in the equity market gain, while the bottom 85% lose, 250B RMB through active trading in this period, or 30% of either group's initial equity wealth. In comparison, the return differential between the top and bottom groups in 2012-14, a period of a relatively calm market, is an order of magnitude smaller. We examine a number of possible explanations for these findings and discuss their implications.

@unpublished{AntunesErcolani2020,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Inequality: The Role of Demographics},
  author = {Antunes, Ant{\'o}nio and Ercolani, Valerio},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.bportugal.pt/en/paper/intergenerational-wealth-inequality-role-demographics},
  abstract = {During the last three decades in the US, the older part of the population has become significantly richer, in contrast with the younger part, which has not. We show that demographics account for a significant part of this intergenerational wealth gap rise. In particular, we develop a general equilibrium model with an OLG structure which is able to mimic the wealth distribution of the household sector in the late 1980s, conditional on its age structure. Inputting the observed rise of life expectancy and the fall in population growth rate into the model generates an increase in wealth inequality across age groups which is between one third and one half of that actually observed. Furthermore, the demographic factors help explain the change of the wealth concentration conditional on the age structure; for example, they account for more than one third of the rise of the share of the elderly within the top 5\% wealthiest households. Finally, consistent with a stronger life-cycle motive and an increase of the capital-labor ratio, the model produces an interest rate fall of 1 percentage point.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

During the last three decades in the US, the older part of the population has become significantly richer, in contrast with the younger part, which has not. We show that demographics account for a significant part of this intergenerational wealth gap rise. In particular, we develop a general equilibrium model with an OLG structure which is able to mimic the wealth distribution of the household sector in the late 1980s, conditional on its age structure. Inputting the observed rise of life expectancy and the fall in population growth rate into the model generates an increase in wealth inequality across age groups which is between one third and one half of that actually observed. Furthermore, the demographic factors help explain the change of the wealth concentration conditional on the age structure; for example, they account for more than one third of the rise of the share of the elderly within the top 5% wealthiest households. Finally, consistent with a stronger life-cycle motive and an increase of the capital-labor ratio, the model produces an interest rate fall of 1 percentage point.

@article{Barthetal2020,
  title = {Genetic Endowments and Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Barth, Daniel and Papageorge, Nicholas W. and Thom, Kevin},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {128},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1474--1522},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/705415},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1086/705415},
  abstract = {We show that genetic endowments linked to educational attainment strongly and robustly predict wealth at retirement. The estimated relationship is not fully explained by flexibly controlling for education and labor income. We therefore investigate a host of additional mechanisms that could account for the gene-wealth gradient, including inheritances, mortality, risk preferences, portfolio decisions, beliefs about the probabilities of macroeconomic events, and planning horizons. We provide evidence that genetic endowments related to human capital accumulation are associated with wealth not only through educational attainment and labor income but also through a facility with complex financial decision-making.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

We show that genetic endowments linked to educational attainment strongly and robustly predict wealth at retirement. The estimated relationship is not fully explained by flexibly controlling for education and labor income. We therefore investigate a host of additional mechanisms that could account for the gene-wealth gradient, including inheritances, mortality, risk preferences, portfolio decisions, beliefs about the probabilities of macroeconomic events, and planning horizons. We provide evidence that genetic endowments related to human capital accumulation are associated with wealth not only through educational attainment and labor income but also through a facility with complex financial decision-making.

@article{Bartscheretal2020,
  title = {The College Wealth Divide: Education and Inequality in America, 1956-2016},
  author = {Bartscher, Alina K. and Kuhn, Moritz and Schularick, Moritz},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review},
  volume = {102},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--50},
  doi = {10.20955/r.102.19-49},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.20955/r.102.19-49},
  abstract = {Using new long-run microdata, this article studies wealth and income trends of households with a college degree (college households) and without a college degree (noncollege households) in the United States since 1956. We document the emergence of a substantial college wealth premium since the 1980s, which is considerably larger than the college income premium. Over the past four decades, the wealth of college households has tripled. By contrast, the wealth of noncollege households has barely grown in real terms over the same period. Part of the rising wealth gap can be traced back to systematic portfolio differences between college and noncollege households that give rise to different exposures to asset price changes. Noncollege households have lower exposure to the equity market and have profited much less from the recent surge in the stock market. We also discuss the importance of financial literacy and business ownership for the increase in wealth inequality between college and noncollege households.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Using new long-run microdata, this article studies wealth and income trends of households with a college degree (college households) and without a college degree (noncollege households) in the United States since 1956. We document the emergence of a substantial college wealth premium since the 1980s, which is considerably larger than the college income premium. Over the past four decades, the wealth of college households has tripled. By contrast, the wealth of noncollege households has barely grown in real terms over the same period. Part of the rising wealth gap can be traced back to systematic portfolio differences between college and noncollege households that give rise to different exposures to asset price changes. Noncollege households have lower exposure to the equity market and have profited much less from the recent surge in the stock market. We also discuss the importance of financial literacy and business ownership for the increase in wealth inequality between college and noncollege households.

@article{Blacketal2020,
  title = {Poor Little Rich Kids? {{The}} Role of Nature versus Nurture in Wealth and Other Economic Outcomes and Behaviours},
  author = {Black, Sandra E and Devereux, Paul J and Lundborg, Petter and Majlesi, Kaveh},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {87},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1683--1725},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdz038},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz038},
  abstract = {Wealth is highly correlated between parents and their children; however, little is known about the extent to which these relationships are genetic or determined by environmental factors. We use administrative data on the net wealth of a large sample of Swedish adoptees merged with similar information for their biological and adoptive parents. Comparing the relationship between the wealth of adopted and biological parents and that of the adopted child, we find that, even prior to any inheritance, there is a substantial role for environment and a much smaller role for pre-birth factors and we find little evidence that nature/nurture interactions are important. When bequests are taken into account, the role of adoptive parental wealth becomes much stronger. Our findings suggest that wealth transmission is not primarily because children from wealthier families are inherently more talented or more able but that, even in relatively egalitarian Sweden, wealth begets wealth. We further build on the existing literature by providing a more comprehensive view of the role of nature and nurture on intergenerational mobility, looking at a wide range of different outcomes using a common sample and method. We find that environmental influences are relatively more important for wealth-related variables such as savings and investment decisions than for human capital. We conclude by studying consumption as an overall measure of welfare and find that, like wealth, it is more determined by environment than by biology.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Wealth is highly correlated between parents and their children; however, little is known about the extent to which these relationships are genetic or determined by environmental factors. We use administrative data on the net wealth of a large sample of Swedish adoptees merged with similar information for their biological and adoptive parents. Comparing the relationship between the wealth of adopted and biological parents and that of the adopted child, we find that, even prior to any inheritance, there is a substantial role for environment and a much smaller role for pre-birth factors and we find little evidence that nature/nurture interactions are important. When bequests are taken into account, the role of adoptive parental wealth becomes much stronger. Our findings suggest that wealth transmission is not primarily because children from wealthier families are inherently more talented or more able but that, even in relatively egalitarian Sweden, wealth begets wealth. We further build on the existing literature by providing a more comprehensive view of the role of nature and nurture on intergenerational mobility, looking at a wide range of different outcomes using a common sample and method. We find that environmental influences are relatively more important for wealth-related variables such as savings and investment decisions than for human capital. We conclude by studying consumption as an overall measure of welfare and find that, like wealth, it is more determined by environment than by biology.

@article{BouchaudFarmer2020,
  title = {Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, Quasi Non-Ergodicity and Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Bouchaud, Jean-Philippe and Farmer, Roger},
  year = {2020},
  series = {Test1},
  pages = {1--36},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2012.09445},
  abstract = {We construct a model where people trade assets contingent on an observable signal that reflects public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally and each person updates beliefs in response to observed outcomes. We show that the distribution of the observed signal is described by a quasi non-ergodic process and that people continue to disagree with each other forever. Our model generates large wealth inequalities that arise from the multiplicative nature of wealth dynamics which makes successful bold bets highly profitable. The flip side of this statement is that unsuccessful bold bets are ruinous and lead the person who makes such bets into poverty. People who agree with the market belief have a low expected subjective gain from trading. People who disagree may either become spectacularly rich, or spectacularly poor.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We construct a model where people trade assets contingent on an observable signal that reflects public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally and each person updates beliefs in response to observed outcomes. We show that the distribution of the observed signal is described by a quasi non-ergodic process and that people continue to disagree with each other forever. Our model generates large wealth inequalities that arise from the multiplicative nature of wealth dynamics which makes successful bold bets highly profitable. The flip side of this statement is that unsuccessful bold bets are ruinous and lead the person who makes such bets into poverty. People who agree with the market belief have a low expected subjective gain from trading. People who disagree may either become spectacularly rich, or spectacularly poor.

@techreport{Bourquinetal2020,
  type = {{{IFS Report}}},
  title = {Inheritances and Inequality within Generations},
  author = {Bourquin, Pascale and Joyce, Robert and Sturrock, David},
  year = {2020},
  month = jul,
  number = {R173},
  institution = {{lnstitute for Fiscal Studies}},
  doi = {10.1920/re.ifs.2020.0173},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1920/re.ifs.2020.0173},
  abstract = {This report examines the inheritances that are likely to be received by those living in England who were born in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. We explore the age at which inheritances are likely to be received and the amounts that we expect to be inherited, focusing on key inequalities in each. All figures are in 2017\textendash 18 prices.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This report examines the inheritances that are likely to be received by those living in England who were born in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. We explore the age at which inheritances are likely to be received and the amounts that we expect to be inherited, focusing on key inequalities in each. All figures are in 2017– 18 prices.

@unpublished{BrzezinskiSalach2020,
  title = {Why Wealth Inequality Differs between Post-Socialist Countries?},
  author = {Brzezi{\'n}ski, Micha{\l} and Sa{\l}ach, Katarzyna},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/en/faculty/publications/working-papers/working-papers/2020/},
  abstract = {We provide the first attempt to understand how differences in households' sociodemographic and economic characteristics account for disparities in wealth inequality between five post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We use 2013/2014 data from the second wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and the reweighted Oaxaca-Blinder-like decompositions based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions. Our results show that the differences in homeownership rates account for up to 42\% of the difference in wealth inequality measured with the Gini index and for as much as 63-109\% in case of the P50/P25 percentile ratio. Differences in homeownership rates are related to alternative designs of housing tax policies but could be also driven by other factors. We correct for the problem of the `missing rich' in household surveys by calibrating the HFCS survey weights to top wealth shares adjusted using wealth data from national rich lists. Empirically, the correction procedure strengthens the importance of homeownership rates in accounting for cross-country wealth inequality differences, which suggests that our results are not sensitive to the significant underestimation of top wealth observations in the HFCS.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We provide the first attempt to understand how differences in households' sociodemographic and economic characteristics account for disparities in wealth inequality between five post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We use 2013/2014 data from the second wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and the reweighted Oaxaca-Blinder-like decompositions based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions. Our results show that the differences in homeownership rates account for up to 42% of the difference in wealth inequality measured with the Gini index and for as much as 63-109% in case of the P50/P25 percentile ratio. Differences in homeownership rates are related to alternative designs of housing tax policies but could be also driven by other factors. We correct for the problem of the `missing rich' in household surveys by calibrating the HFCS survey weights to top wealth shares adjusted using wealth data from national rich lists. Empirically, the correction procedure strengthens the importance of homeownership rates in accounting for cross-country wealth inequality differences, which suggests that our results are not sensitive to the significant underestimation of top wealth observations in the HFCS.

@article{Capraraetal2020,
  title = {What Do We Know on Household Wealth?},
  author = {Caprara, Diego and De Bonis, Riccardo and Infante, Luigi},
  year = {2020},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Rivista di Storia Economica},
  number = {1/2020},
  pages = {43--85},
  doi = {10.1410/99051},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1410/99051},
  abstract = {We provide an in-depth analysis of household wealth in the main advanced countries. We start by analyzing the evolution of household wealth in Italy since 1950, looking at real and financial assets. Then we compare financial and real assets of households in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, the USA and Japan. We distinguish between price and quantity effects as determinants of changes in financial wealth. We study the differences in the composition of household financial wealth across countries, looking at deposits, bonds, shares, mutual funds, and insurance/pension instruments. We summarize the main trends of household debt and conclude comparing net household wealth per capita.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We provide an in-depth analysis of household wealth in the main advanced countries. We start by analyzing the evolution of household wealth in Italy since 1950, looking at real and financial assets. Then we compare financial and real assets of households in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, the USA and Japan. We distinguish between price and quantity effects as determinants of changes in financial wealth. We study the differences in the composition of household financial wealth across countries, looking at deposits, bonds, shares, mutual funds, and insurance/pension instruments. We summarize the main trends of household debt and conclude comparing net household wealth per capita.

@article{DoorleyPestel2020,
  title = {Labour Supply after Inheritances and the Role of Expectations},
  author = {Doorley, Karina and Pestel, Nico},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics},
  volume = {82},
  number = {4},
  pages = {843--863},
  doi = {10.1111/obes.12353},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12353},
  abstract = {This paper examines the effect of inheritances on labour supply, distinguishing between unanticipated and anticipated inheritances. We use household and individual level micro-data for Germany to investigate the effect of inheritances on a number of labour market outcomes. Women are less likely to work full-time after an inheritance and their desired and actual hours of work decrease by 1\textendash 2 per week, on average. The magnitude of the effect is found to be larger and more precisely estimated for households without children and liquidity constrained households. Other margins such as time use outside the labour market and satisfaction are also found to be affected by inheritance receipt.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This paper examines the effect of inheritances on labour supply, distinguishing between unanticipated and anticipated inheritances. We use household and individual level micro-data for Germany to investigate the effect of inheritances on a number of labour market outcomes. Women are less likely to work full-time after an inheritance and their desired and actual hours of work decrease by 1– 2 per week, on average. The magnitude of the effect is found to be larger and more precisely estimated for households without children and liquidity constrained households. Other margins such as time use outside the labour market and satisfaction are also found to be affected by inheritance receipt.

@article{EvgenidisFasianos2020,
  title = {Unconventional Monetary Policy and Wealth Inequalities in Great Britain},
  author = {Evgenidis, Anastasios and Fasianos, Apostolos},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Publishing Ltd}},
  doi = {10.1111/obes.12397},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12397},
  abstract = {This paper explores whether unconventional monetary policy operations have redistributive effects on household wealth. Drawing on household balance sheet data from the Wealth and Asset Survey, we construct monthly time series indicators on the distribution of different asset types held by British households for the period that the monetary policy switched, as the policy rate reached the zero-lower bound. Using this series, we estimate the response of wealth inequalities on monetary policy, taking into account the effect of unconventional policies conducted by the Bank of England in response to the Global Financial Crisis. Our evidence reveals that unconventional monetary policy shocks have significant and lingering effects on wealth inequality: the shock raises wealth inequality across households, as measured by their Gini coefficients, percentile shares and other standard inequality indicators. Additionally, we explore the effects of different transmission channels simultaneously. We find that the portfolio rebalancing channel and house price effects widen the wealth gap, outweighing the counterbalancing impact of the savings redistribution and inflation channels. The findings of our analysis help to raise awareness of central bankers about the redistributive effects of their monetary policy decisions.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper explores whether unconventional monetary policy operations have redistributive effects on household wealth. Drawing on household balance sheet data from the Wealth and Asset Survey, we construct monthly time series indicators on the distribution of different asset types held by British households for the period that the monetary policy switched, as the policy rate reached the zero-lower bound. Using this series, we estimate the response of wealth inequalities on monetary policy, taking into account the effect of unconventional policies conducted by the Bank of England in response to the Global Financial Crisis. Our evidence reveals that unconventional monetary policy shocks have significant and lingering effects on wealth inequality: the shock raises wealth inequality across households, as measured by their Gini coefficients, percentile shares and other standard inequality indicators. Additionally, we explore the effects of different transmission channels simultaneously. We find that the portfolio rebalancing channel and house price effects widen the wealth gap, outweighing the counterbalancing impact of the savings redistribution and inflation channels. The findings of our analysis help to raise awareness of central bankers about the redistributive effects of their monetary policy decisions.

@unpublished{EvgenidisFasianos2020a,
  title = {Unconventional Monetary Policy and Wealth Inequalities in Great Britain},
  author = {Evgenidis, Anastasios and Fasianos, Apostolos},
  year = {2020},
  url = {www.cepr.org},
  abstract = {This paper explores whether unconventional monetary policy operations have redistributive effects on household wealth. Drawing on household balance sheet data from the Wealth and Asset Survey, we construct monthly time series indicators on the distribution of different asset types held by British households for the period that the monetary policy switched, as the policy rate reached the zero-lower bound. Using this series, we estimate the response of wealth inequalities on monetary policy, taking into account the effect of unconventional policies conducted by the Bank of England in response to the Global Financial Crisis. Our evidence reveals that unconventional monetary policy shocks have significant and lingering effects on wealth inequality: the shock raises wealth inequality across households, as measured by their Gini coefficients, percentile shares, and other standard inequality indicators. Additionally, we explore the effects of different transmission channels simultaneously. We find that the portfolio rebalancing channel and house price effects widen the wealth gap, outweighing the counterbalancing impact of the savings redistribution and inflation channels. The findings of our analysis help to raise awareness of central bankers about the redistributive effects of their monetary policy decisions.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper explores whether unconventional monetary policy operations have redistributive effects on household wealth. Drawing on household balance sheet data from the Wealth and Asset Survey, we construct monthly time series indicators on the distribution of different asset types held by British households for the period that the monetary policy switched, as the policy rate reached the zero-lower bound. Using this series, we estimate the response of wealth inequalities on monetary policy, taking into account the effect of unconventional policies conducted by the Bank of England in response to the Global Financial Crisis. Our evidence reveals that unconventional monetary policy shocks have significant and lingering effects on wealth inequality: the shock raises wealth inequality across households, as measured by their Gini coefficients, percentile shares, and other standard inequality indicators. Additionally, we explore the effects of different transmission channels simultaneously. We find that the portfolio rebalancing channel and house price effects widen the wealth gap, outweighing the counterbalancing impact of the savings redistribution and inflation channels. The findings of our analysis help to raise awareness of central bankers about the redistributive effects of their monetary policy decisions.

@article{Fagerengetal2020,
  title = {Heterogeneity and Persistence in Returns to Wealth},
  author = {Fagereng, Andreas and Guiso, Luigi and Malacrino, Davide and Pistaferri, Luigi},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {88},
  number = {1},
  pages = {115--170},
  doi = {10.3982/ECTA14835},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14835},
  abstract = {We provide a systematic analysis of the properties of individual returns to wealth using 12 years of population data from Norway's administrative tax records. We document a number of novel results. First, individuals earn markedly different average returns on their net worth (a standard deviation of 22.1\%) and on its components. Second, heterogeneity in returns does not arise merely from differences in the allocation of wealth between safe and risky assets: returns are heterogeneous even within narrow asset classes. Third, returns are positively correlated with wealth: moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the net worth distribution increases the return by 18 percentage points (and 10 percentage points if looking at net-of-tax returns). Fourth, individual wealth returns exhibit substantial persistence over time. We argue that while this persistence partly arises from stable differences in risk exposure and assets scale, it also reflects heterogeneity in sophistication and financial information, as well as entrepreneurial talent. Finally, wealth returns are correlated across generations. We discuss the implications of these findings for several strands of the wealth inequality debate.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

We provide a systematic analysis of the properties of individual returns to wealth using 12 years of population data from Norway's administrative tax records. We document a number of novel results. First, individuals earn markedly different average returns on their net worth (a standard deviation of 22.1%) and on its components. Second, heterogeneity in returns does not arise merely from differences in the allocation of wealth between safe and risky assets: returns are heterogeneous even within narrow asset classes. Third, returns are positively correlated with wealth: moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the net worth distribution increases the return by 18 percentage points (and 10 percentage points if looking at net-of-tax returns). Fourth, individual wealth returns exhibit substantial persistence over time. We argue that while this persistence partly arises from stable differences in risk exposure and assets scale, it also reflects heterogeneity in sophistication and financial information, as well as entrepreneurial talent. Finally, wealth returns are correlated across generations. We discuss the implications of these findings for several strands of the wealth inequality debate.

@unpublished{Fismanetal2020,
  title = {Do {{Americans}} Want to Tax Wealth? {{Evidence}} from Online Surveys},
  author = {Fisman, Raymond and Gladstone, Keith and Kuziemko, Ilyana and Naidu, Suresh},
  year = {2020},
  url = {http://sites.bu.edu/fisman/research/},
  abstract = {A vast theoretical literature in public finance has studied the desirability of capital taxation. This discussion largely ignores the political feasibility of taxing wealth. We provide, to our knowledge, the first investigation of individuals' preferences over jointly taxing income and wealth. We provide subjects with a set of hypothetical individuals' incomes and wealth and elicit subjects' preferred (absolute) tax bill for each individual. Our method allows us to unobtrusively map both income earned and accumulated wealth into desired tax levels. Our regression results yield roughly linear desired tax rates on income of about 14 percent. Respondents' suggested tax rates indicate positive desired wealth taxation. When we distinguish between sources of wealth we find that, in line with recent theoretical arguments, subjects' implied tax rate on wealth is three percent when the source of wealth is inheritance, far higher than the 0.8 percent rate when wealth is from savings. Textual analysis of respondents' justifications for their tax rates imply limited concern for the elasticity of tax bases with respect to net-of-tax rates.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

A vast theoretical literature in public finance has studied the desirability of capital taxation. This discussion largely ignores the political feasibility of taxing wealth. We provide, to our knowledge, the first investigation of individuals' preferences over jointly taxing income and wealth. We provide subjects with a set of hypothetical individuals' incomes and wealth and elicit subjects' preferred (absolute) tax bill for each individual. Our method allows us to unobtrusively map both income earned and accumulated wealth into desired tax levels. Our regression results yield roughly linear desired tax rates on income of about 14 percent. Respondents' suggested tax rates indicate positive desired wealth taxation. When we distinguish between sources of wealth we find that, in line with recent theoretical arguments, subjects' implied tax rate on wealth is three percent when the source of wealth is inheritance, far higher than the 0.8 percent rate when wealth is from savings. Textual analysis of respondents' justifications for their tax rates imply limited concern for the elasticity of tax bases with respect to net-of-tax rates.

@article{FremeauxLeturcq2020,
  title = {Inequalities and the Individualization of Wealth},
  author = {Fr{\'e}meaux, Nicolas and Leturcq, Marion},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {184},
  pages = {2--19},
  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104145},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104145},
  abstract = {We document the individualization of wealth in France between 1998 and 2015, using precise survey data on the property titles of assets. It is characterized by an increase in the share of wealth which is individualized by spouses (vs. jointly owned) and by an increase in the share of wealth held by singles. We show that the usual measures of wealth inequality, which allocate the same share of household wealth to each spouse or partner, overestimate the share of wealth held by women. This results in an underestimation of both the level and the growth of a) wealth inequality between individuals and b) the gender wealth gap. We argue for better consideration of the ownership status and intra-household distribution of wealth in the measurement of wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

We document the individualization of wealth in France between 1998 and 2015, using precise survey data on the property titles of assets. It is characterized by an increase in the share of wealth which is individualized by spouses (vs. jointly owned) and by an increase in the share of wealth held by singles. We show that the usual measures of wealth inequality, which allocate the same share of household wealth to each spouse or partner, overestimate the share of wealth held by women. This results in an underestimation of both the level and the growth of a) wealth inequality between individuals and b) the gender wealth gap. We argue for better consideration of the ownership status and intra-household distribution of wealth in the measurement of wealth inequality.

@unpublished{GarzaKrozer2020,
  title = {Life on the Edge: Elites, Wealth, and Inequality in Sonora 1871\textendash 1910},
  author = {Garza, Diego Casta{\~n}eda and Krozer, Alice},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://cee.colmex.mx/502-2026},
  abstract = {This paper's contribution is a reconstruction of the distribution of wealth employing a sample of wills from El Colegio de Sonora database for the years 1871-1910. We show that the rapid industrialisation/modernisation process that ensued in northern Mexico during the late 19th and early 20th century lead to a continuous increment in wealth concentration at the top of the distribution, going from a Gini index measure of 0.48 in 1871 to 0.79 in 1910. Rather than a fundamental (kuznetsian) necessity, however, our data suggests a critical role played by the political economy at the time in a gerschenkronian fashion and highlight the importance of the control of natural resources on inequality dynamics. The paper hereby engages with and contributes to the ongoing discussion about the role of economic and political elites in inequality dynamics and their reproduction over time},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper's contribution is a reconstruction of the distribution of wealth employing a sample of wills from El Colegio de Sonora database for the years 1871-1910. We show that the rapid industrialisation/modernisation process that ensued in northern Mexico during the late 19th and early 20th century lead to a continuous increment in wealth concentration at the top of the distribution, going from a Gini index measure of 0.48 in 1871 to 0.79 in 1910. Rather than a fundamental (kuznetsian) necessity, however, our data suggests a critical role played by the political economy at the time in a gerschenkronian fashion and highlight the importance of the control of natural resources on inequality dynamics. The paper hereby engages with and contributes to the ongoing discussion about the role of economic and political elites in inequality dynamics and their reproduction over time

@unpublished{GomezGouin-Bonenfant2020,
  title = {A {{Q-theory}} of Inequality},
  author = {Gomez, Matthieu and {Gouin-Bonenfant}, {\'E}milien},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.matthieugomez.com/},
  abstract = {We study the effect of interest rates on top wealth inequality. While lower rates decrease the average growth rate of existing fortunes, they increase the growth rate of new fortunes by making it cheaper to raise capital. We evaluate the relative importance of these two forces in a parsimonious model of wealth accumulation. Using a sufficient statistic approach, we show that the second effect dominates whenever individuals in the right tail of the wealth distribution are on average net equity issuers. Quantitatively, we find that the secular decline in real interest rates has been a major contributor to the rise of top wealth inequality in the U.S.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We study the effect of interest rates on top wealth inequality. While lower rates decrease the average growth rate of existing fortunes, they increase the growth rate of new fortunes by making it cheaper to raise capital. We evaluate the relative importance of these two forces in a parsimonious model of wealth accumulation. Using a sufficient statistic approach, we show that the second effect dominates whenever individuals in the right tail of the wealth distribution are on average net equity issuers. Quantitatively, we find that the secular decline in real interest rates has been a major contributor to the rise of top wealth inequality in the U.S.

@unpublished{Grohetal2020,
  title = {Estate Taxes and Business Transfers across the Globe: {{A}} Configurational Analysis},
  author = {Groh, Maximilian and Scheef, Christine and Zellweger, Thomas Markus},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/260056/},
  abstract = {Estate taxes on business inheritance are regularly the subject of controversial debates in business, politics and economics. However, a holistic understanding and systematic analysis of what shapes cross-national differences in estate taxes is missing. Using data from 54 countries, we present a comprehensive configurational analysis of socio-economic determinants of estate taxes. We reveal six distinct configurations of country-level entrepreneurial activity, business ownership, wealth inequality as well as cultural orientation towards individualism and the long term, which explain the presence of high or low estate taxes, and theorize around the institutional principles upon which societies draw to justify these estate taxes. Our analysis also highlights the importance of treating low and high estate taxes as separate outcomes since, for example, a country's entrepreneurial activity is less relevant than business ownership in configurations for high estate taxes, while the opposite is true for configurations for low estate taxes. Our study contributes a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of international variation in estate taxes and the particular role of entrepreneurs and business owners therein.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Estate taxes on business inheritance are regularly the subject of controversial debates in business, politics and economics. However, a holistic understanding and systematic analysis of what shapes cross-national differences in estate taxes is missing. Using data from 54 countries, we present a comprehensive configurational analysis of socio-economic determinants of estate taxes. We reveal six distinct configurations of country-level entrepreneurial activity, business ownership, wealth inequality as well as cultural orientation towards individualism and the long term, which explain the presence of high or low estate taxes, and theorize around the institutional principles upon which societies draw to justify these estate taxes. Our analysis also highlights the importance of treating low and high estate taxes as separate outcomes since, for example, a country's entrepreneurial activity is less relevant than business ownership in configurations for high estate taxes, while the opposite is true for configurations for low estate taxes. Our study contributes a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of international variation in estate taxes and the particular role of entrepreneurs and business owners therein.

@unpublished{Hauneretal2020,
  title = {Inequality, Foreign Investment, and Imperialism Prior to {{World War I}}},
  author = {Hauner, Thomas and Milanovic, Branko and Naidu, Suresh},
  year = {2020},
  month = feb,
  url = {https://stonecenter.gc.cuny.edu/research/inequality-foreign-investment-and-imperialism/},
  urldate = {2022-02-25},
  abstract = {This paper presents empirical evidence for economic (imperialist) theories of the outbreak of World War I, especially the Hobson thesis, which links domestic inequality to surplus of savings, need for foreign investment and imperialist competition. We find that it stands up reasonably well to scrutiny. The belligerent countries were at the historical income and wealth inequality peaks prior to the War; the holdings of net foreign assets expanded absolutely and relatively to GDP; such assets were held almost entirely by the rich; and foreign assets bore higher average returns than similar classes of domestic assets, even adjusting for risk. We also find evidence that countries that owned more foreign assets kept larger armies.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper presents empirical evidence for economic (imperialist) theories of the outbreak of World War I, especially the Hobson thesis, which links domestic inequality to surplus of savings, need for foreign investment and imperialist competition. We find that it stands up reasonably well to scrutiny. The belligerent countries were at the historical income and wealth inequality peaks prior to the War; the holdings of net foreign assets expanded absolutely and relatively to GDP; such assets were held almost entirely by the rich; and foreign assets bore higher average returns than similar classes of domestic assets, even adjusting for risk. We also find evidence that countries that owned more foreign assets kept larger armies.

@unpublished{Hubmeretal2020,
  title = {Sources of {{U}}.{{S}}. Wealth Inequality: Past, Present, and Future},
  author = {Hubmer, Joachim and Krussell, Per and Smith, Jr., Anthony A.},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/nber-macroeconomics-annual-2020-volume-35/sources-us-wealth-inequality-past-present-and-future},
  abstract = {This paper employs a benchmark heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic model to examine a number of plausible drivers of the rise in wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last forty years. We find that the significant drop in tax progressivity starting in the late 1970s is the most important driver of the increase in wealth inequality since then. The sharp observed increases in earnings inequality and the falling labor share over the recent decades fall far short of accounting for the data. The model can also account for the dynamics of wealth inequality over the period-in particular the observed U-shape-and here the observed variations in asset returns are key. Returns on assets matter because portfolios of households differ systematically both across and within wealth groups, a feature in our model that also helps us to match, quantitatively, a key long-run feature of wealth and earnings distributions: the former is much more highly concentrated than the latter.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper employs a benchmark heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic model to examine a number of plausible drivers of the rise in wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last forty years. We find that the significant drop in tax progressivity starting in the late 1970s is the most important driver of the increase in wealth inequality since then. The sharp observed increases in earnings inequality and the falling labor share over the recent decades fall far short of accounting for the data. The model can also account for the dynamics of wealth inequality over the period-in particular the observed U-shape-and here the observed variations in asset returns are key. Returns on assets matter because portfolios of households differ systematically both across and within wealth groups, a feature in our model that also helps us to match, quantitatively, a key long-run feature of wealth and earnings distributions: the former is much more highly concentrated than the latter.

@article{IaconoRanaldi2020,
  title = {The Wage Curve across the Wealth Distribution},
  author = {Iacono, Roberto and Ranaldi, Marco},
  year = {2020},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {196},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109580},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109580},
  abstract = {This paper studies the relationship between wages and the unemployment rate across the wealth distribution. Using microdata from Norway covering the entire population of residents between 2000 and 2015, we introduce four novel findings on this relationship. First, the share of unemployed individuals belonging to the bottom decile of the gross wealth distribution is tenfold larger than that belonging to the top decile (34\% and 3.2\%, respectively). Second, the share of unemployed individuals belonging to the bottom decile of the gross wealth distribution moves in the opposite manner to that of the top decile. Third, the negative slope of the wage curve is confirmed. Fourth, the wage-to-unemployment ratio increases monotonically with gross wealth.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {109580}
}

This paper studies the relationship between wages and the unemployment rate across the wealth distribution. Using microdata from Norway covering the entire population of residents between 2000 and 2015, we introduce four novel findings on this relationship. First, the share of unemployed individuals belonging to the bottom decile of the gross wealth distribution is tenfold larger than that belonging to the top decile (34% and 3.2%, respectively). Second, the share of unemployed individuals belonging to the bottom decile of the gross wealth distribution moves in the opposite manner to that of the top decile. Third, the negative slope of the wage curve is confirmed. Fourth, the wage-to-unemployment ratio increases monotonically with gross wealth.

@unpublished{Jacobsetal2020,
  title = {Wealth Distribution and Retirement Preparation among Early Savers},
  author = {Jacobs, Lindsay and Llanes, Elizabeth and Moore, Kevin and Thompson, Jeffrey and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.17016/FEDS.2020.043},
  url = {https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/wealth-distribution-and-retirement-preparation-among-early-savers.htm},
  abstract = {This paper develops a new combined wealth measure using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances by augmenting data on net worth with estimates of defined benefit (DB) pension wealth and expected Social Security wealth. We use this combined wealth concept to explore retirement preparation among groups of households in their pre-retirement years (40-49 and 50-59) and also to explore the concentration of wealth. We find evidence of moderate, but rising, shortfalls in retirement preparation. We also show that including DB pension and Social Security wealth results in markedly lower measures of wealth concentration. Trends toward higher concentration over time are also somewhat moderated.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper develops a new combined wealth measure using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances by augmenting data on net worth with estimates of defined benefit (DB) pension wealth and expected Social Security wealth. We use this combined wealth concept to explore retirement preparation among groups of households in their pre-retirement years (40-49 and 50-59) and also to explore the concentration of wealth. We find evidence of moderate, but rising, shortfalls in retirement preparation. We also show that including DB pension and Social Security wealth results in markedly lower measures of wealth concentration. Trends toward higher concentration over time are also somewhat moderated.

@article{Jakobsenetal2020,
  title = {Wealth Taxation and Wealth Accumulation: Theory and Evidence from {{Denmark}}},
  author = {Jakobsen, Katrine and Jakobsen, Kristian and Kleven, Henrik and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2020},
  month = feb,
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {135},
  number = {1},
  pages = {329--388},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qjz032},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz032},
  abstract = {Using administrative wealth records from Denmark, we study the effects of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Denmark used to impose one of the world's highest marginal tax rates on wealth, but this tax was greatly reduced starting in 1989 and later abolished. Due to the specific design of the wealth tax, the 1989 reform provides a compelling quasi-experiment for understanding behavioral responses among the wealthiest segments of the population. We find clear reduced-form effects of wealth taxes in the short and medium run, with larger effects on the very wealthy than on the moderately wealthy. We develop a simple life cycle model with utility of residual wealth (bequests) allowing us to interpret the evidence in terms of structural primitives. We calibrate the model to the quasi-experimental moments and simulate the model forward to estimate the long-run effect of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Our simulations show that the long-run elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax return is sizable at the top of the distribution.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/jakobsen-jakobsen-kleven-zucman-onlineappendixforwealthtaxationandwealthaccumulationtheoryandevidencefromdenmark-2020},
  url_replication_data = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/jakobsen-jakobsen-kleven-zucman-replicationdataforwealthtaxationandwealthaccumulationtheoryandevidencefromdenmark-2019}
}

Using administrative wealth records from Denmark, we study the effects of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Denmark used to impose one of the world's highest marginal tax rates on wealth, but this tax was greatly reduced starting in 1989 and later abolished. Due to the specific design of the wealth tax, the 1989 reform provides a compelling quasi-experiment for understanding behavioral responses among the wealthiest segments of the population. We find clear reduced-form effects of wealth taxes in the short and medium run, with larger effects on the very wealthy than on the moderately wealthy. We develop a simple life cycle model with utility of residual wealth (bequests) allowing us to interpret the evidence in terms of structural primitives. We calibrate the model to the quasi-experimental moments and simulate the model forward to estimate the long-run effect of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Our simulations show that the long-run elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax return is sizable at the top of the distribution.

@article{Johannesenetal2020,
  title = {Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of {{US}} Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts},
  author = {Johannesen, Niels and Langetieg, Patrick and Reck, Daniel and Risch, Max and Slemrod, Joel},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {12},
  number = {3},
  pages = {312--346},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.20180410},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180410},
  abstract = {In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about \$100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by \$2\textendash\$4 billion, corresponding to \$0.6\textendash\$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2–$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6–$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.

@unpublished{Jordaetal2020,
  title = {Disasters Everywhere: The Costs of Business Cycles Reconsidered},
  author = {Jord{\`a}, {\`O}scar and Schularick, Moritz and Taylor, Alan M.},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/working-papers/2020/11/},
  abstract = {Business cycles are costlier and stabilization policies more beneficial than widely thought. This paper shows that all business cycles are asymmetric and resemble mini ``disasters''. By this we mean that growth is pervasively fat-tailed and non-Gaussian. Using long-run historical data, we show empirically that this is true for all advanced economies since 1870. Focusing on the peacetime sample, we develop a tractable local projection framework to estimate consumption growth paths for normal and financial-crisis recessions. Using random coefficient local projections we get an easy and transparent mapping from the estimates to the calibrated simulation model. Simulations show that substantial welfare costs arise not just from the large rare disasters, but also from the smaller but more frequent mini-disasters in every cycle. In postwar America, households would sacrifice more than 10 percent of consumption to avoid such cyclical fluctuations.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Business cycles are costlier and stabilization policies more beneficial than widely thought. This paper shows that all business cycles are asymmetric and resemble mini ``disasters''. By this we mean that growth is pervasively fat-tailed and non-Gaussian. Using long-run historical data, we show empirically that this is true for all advanced economies since 1870. Focusing on the peacetime sample, we develop a tractable local projection framework to estimate consumption growth paths for normal and financial-crisis recessions. Using random coefficient local projections we get an easy and transparent mapping from the estimates to the calibrated simulation model. Simulations show that substantial welfare costs arise not just from the large rare disasters, but also from the smaller but more frequent mini-disasters in every cycle. In postwar America, households would sacrifice more than 10 percent of consumption to avoid such cyclical fluctuations.

@article{KapelleLersch2020,
  title = {The Accumulation of Wealth in Marriage: Over-Time Change and within-Couple Inequalities},
  author = {Kapelle, Nicole and Lersch, Philipp M.},
  year = {2020},
  month = aug,
  journal = {European Sociological Review},
  volume = {36},
  number = {4},
  pages = {580--593},
  doi = {10.1093/esr/jcaa006},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa006},
  abstract = {This study examines the accumulation of personal wealth of husbands and wives and investigates the development of within-couple wealth inequalities over time in marriage. Going beyond previous research that mostly studied the marriage wealth premium using household-level wealth data and that conceptualized marriage as an instantaneous transition with uniform consequences over time, we argue that entry into marriage is a gendered life-course event that dynamically shapes husbands' and wives' wealth accumulation. Using high-quality data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017), we apply fixed-effects regression models to describe wealth accumulation within marriage. We find evidence that wealth premiums are lower during early years of marriage, but increase steadily thereafter. The premium is mostly concentrated in housing wealth. Results from supplementary analyses with limited data, however, suggest that the premium may not be causal for men. Regarding within-couple wealth inequalities, we find a pronounced within-couple wealth gap prior to marriage during pre-marital cohabitation. This gap remains stable over time in marriage. In contrast to findings regarding income, our study indicates that the institution of marriage may not amplify within-couple wealth inequalities further.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This study examines the accumulation of personal wealth of husbands and wives and investigates the development of within-couple wealth inequalities over time in marriage. Going beyond previous research that mostly studied the marriage wealth premium using household-level wealth data and that conceptualized marriage as an instantaneous transition with uniform consequences over time, we argue that entry into marriage is a gendered life-course event that dynamically shapes husbands' and wives' wealth accumulation. Using high-quality data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017), we apply fixed-effects regression models to describe wealth accumulation within marriage. We find evidence that wealth premiums are lower during early years of marriage, but increase steadily thereafter. The premium is mostly concentrated in housing wealth. Results from supplementary analyses with limited data, however, suggest that the premium may not be causal for men. Regarding within-couple wealth inequalities, we find a pronounced within-couple wealth gap prior to marriage during pre-marital cohabitation. This gap remains stable over time in marriage. In contrast to findings regarding income, our study indicates that the institution of marriage may not amplify within-couple wealth inequalities further.

@incollection{Knightetal2020,
  title = {The Increasing Inequality of Wealth in {{China}}},
  booktitle = {Changing Trends in {{China}}'s Inequality: Evidence, Analysis, and Prospects},
  author = {Knight, John and Li, Shi and Wan, Haiyuan},
  editor = {Sicular, Terry and Li, Shi and Yue, Ximing},
  year = {2020},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  address = {{New York}},
  doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190077938.003.0004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190077938.003.0004},
  abstract = {The inequality of wealth in China has increased rapidly in recent years. Prior to 1978 all Chinese households possessed negligible wealth. China therefore presents a fascinating case study of how inequality of household wealth increases with economic reforms, marketization, and capital accumulation. Wealth inequality and its growth are measured and decomposed by using data from the CHIP 2002 and 2013 survey datasets. Techniques for estimating the top tail of the income distribution by using a Pareto approximation are applied to measure the sensitivity of wealth inequality to plausible assumptions about the underrepresentation of the wealthy and underreporting by the wealthy. The rising wealth inequality is explained in terms of the relationships between income and wealth, house price inflation, and differential savings.},
  isbn = {978-0-19-007793-8},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  chapter = {4}
}

The inequality of wealth in China has increased rapidly in recent years. Prior to 1978 all Chinese households possessed negligible wealth. China therefore presents a fascinating case study of how inequality of household wealth increases with economic reforms, marketization, and capital accumulation. Wealth inequality and its growth are measured and decomposed by using data from the CHIP 2002 and 2013 survey datasets. Techniques for estimating the top tail of the income distribution by using a Pareto approximation are applied to measure the sensitivity of wealth inequality to plausible assumptions about the underrepresentation of the wealthy and underreporting by the wealthy. The rising wealth inequality is explained in terms of the relationships between income and wealth, house price inflation, and differential savings.

@article{Kuhnetal2020,
  title = {Income and Wealth Inequality in {{America}}, 1949\textendash 2016},
  author = {Kuhn, Moritz and Schularick, Moritz and Steins, Ulrike I.},
  year = {2020},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {128},
  number = {9},
  pages = {3469--3519},
  doi = {10.1086/708815},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1086/708815},
  abstract = {This paper introduces a new long-run data set based on archival data from historical waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. Studying the joint distribution of household income and wealth, we expose the central importance of portfolio composition and asset prices for wealth dynamics in postwar America. Asset prices shift the wealth distribution because of systematic differences in household portfolios along the wealth distribution. Middle-class portfolios are dominated by housing, while rich households predominantly own business equity. Differential changes in equity and house prices shaped wealth dynamics in postwar America and decoupled the income and wealth distribution over extended periods.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/kuhn-schularick-steins-incomeandwealthinequalityinamerica19492016-2018},
  url_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/kuhn-schularick-steins-appendixforonlinepublicationincomeandwealthinequalityinamerica19492016-2019},
  url_data_archive = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/kuhn-schularick-steins-incomeandwealthinequalityinamerica19492016dataarchive-2020}
}

This paper introduces a new long-run data set based on archival data from historical waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. Studying the joint distribution of household income and wealth, we expose the central importance of portfolio composition and asset prices for wealth dynamics in postwar America. Asset prices shift the wealth distribution because of systematic differences in household portfolios along the wealth distribution. Middle-class portfolios are dominated by housing, while rich households predominantly own business equity. Differential changes in equity and house prices shaped wealth dynamics in postwar America and decoupled the income and wealth distribution over extended periods.

@unpublished{Kuhnetal2020a,
  title = {Modigliani Meets Minsky: Inequality, Debt, and Financial Fragility in America, 1950\textendash 2016},
  author = {Kuhn, Moritz and Schularick, Moritz and Steins, Ulrike and Bartscher, Alina},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14667},
  abstract = {This paper studies the secular increase in U.S. household debt and its relation to growing income inequality and financial fragility. We exploit a new household-level dataset that covers the joint distributions of debt, income, and wealth in the United States over the past seven decades. The data show that increased borrowing by middle-class families with low income growth played a central role in rising indebtedness. Debt-to-income ratios have risen most dramatically for households between the 50th and 90th percentiles of the income distribution. While their income growth was low, middle-class families borrowed against the sizable housing wealth gains from rising home prices. Home equity borrowing accounts for about half of the increase in U.S. household debt between the 1970s and 2007. The resulting debt increase made balance sheets more sensitive to income and house price fluctuations and turned the American middle class into the epicenter of growing financial fragility.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper studies the secular increase in U.S. household debt and its relation to growing income inequality and financial fragility. We exploit a new household-level dataset that covers the joint distributions of debt, income, and wealth in the United States over the past seven decades. The data show that increased borrowing by middle-class families with low income growth played a central role in rising indebtedness. Debt-to-income ratios have risen most dramatically for households between the 50th and 90th percentiles of the income distribution. While their income growth was low, middle-class families borrowed against the sizable housing wealth gains from rising home prices. Home equity borrowing accounts for about half of the increase in U.S. household debt between the 1970s and 2007. The resulting debt increase made balance sheets more sensitive to income and house price fluctuations and turned the American middle class into the epicenter of growing financial fragility.

@techreport{Kukketal2020,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {The Gender Wealth Gap in {{Europe}}: {{A}} Comparative Study Using a Model Averaging Methodology},
  author = {Kukk, Merike and Merik{\"u}ll, Jaanika and R{\~o}{\~o}m, Tairi},
  year = {2020},
  month = jul,
  number = {7/2020},
  institution = {{Eesti Pank}},
  doi = {10.23656/25045520/072020/0181},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.23656/25045520/072020/0181},
  abstract = {There is abundant evidence on the gender wage gaps across countries, but much less is known about the gender differences in personal wealth. This paper provides comparative estimates of the gender wealth gaps for 21 European countries, employing data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. A common problem for studies focusing on this topic is that the data on wealth are usually provided at the household level and not at the individual level. This means it is only possible to estimate gender wealth gaps for single-person households. To overcome this constraint, we propose a novel approach using a model averaging methodology to predict individualised wealth data for multi-person households. We find that the gender wealth gaps tend to be in favour of men in the whole population, especially when estimated at the top of the wealth distribution. In contrast, the estimated gaps in the subset of single-person households tend to be statistically insignificant. The country-level gender wealth gaps are correlated with overall wealth inequality but not with gender gaps in pay and employment.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

There is abundant evidence on the gender wage gaps across countries, but much less is known about the gender differences in personal wealth. This paper provides comparative estimates of the gender wealth gaps for 21 European countries, employing data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. A common problem for studies focusing on this topic is that the data on wealth are usually provided at the household level and not at the individual level. This means it is only possible to estimate gender wealth gaps for single-person households. To overcome this constraint, we propose a novel approach using a model averaging methodology to predict individualised wealth data for multi-person households. We find that the gender wealth gaps tend to be in favour of men in the whole population, especially when estimated at the top of the wealth distribution. In contrast, the estimated gaps in the subset of single-person households tend to be statistically insignificant. The country-level gender wealth gaps are correlated with overall wealth inequality but not with gender gaps in pay and employment.

@incollection{Konigetal2020,
  title = {Wealth Inequalities},
  booktitle = {Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics},
  author = {K{\"o}nig, Johannes and Schr{\"o}der, Carsten and Wolff, Edward N.},
  editor = {Zimmerman, K.F.},
  year = {2020},
  pages = {1--38},
  publisher = {{Springer International Publishing}},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_168-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_168-1},
  abstract = {In many countries, wealth is highly concentrated, much more so than income. This review presents the long run trend of wealth inequality since the 1990s. Subsequently, it discusses the multitude of available datasets documenting and investigating wealth inequality and then critically evaluates the benefits and drawbacks of each. Following, an overview on descriptive studies of wealth inequality with a focus on augmented and pension wealth, portfolio composition, and intergenerational transmission is provided. Finally, the review details developments in structural models that explain the concentration of wealth. The evidence points to a sharp rise of wealth inequality beginning in the early 1990s through the mid-2010s in the United States. However, recent trends differ, for example, for Sweden and the United Kingdom. The last two decades have witnessed a virtual explosion of datasets on household wealth, including, notably, new internationally conformable databases such as the World Inequality Database, the Luxembourg Wealth Study Database, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, and new administrative data from Nordic countries. The possibility to combine different datasets via record linkage or statistical matching further enlarges their research potential. Several new studies have expanded the concept of wealth from conventional marketable wealth to augmented wealth including pension and social security wealth. On the theoretical front, new modeling approaches have been devised to account for the extreme skewness in wealth distributions, including the introduction of heterogeneous rates of return by wealth class.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

In many countries, wealth is highly concentrated, much more so than income. This review presents the long run trend of wealth inequality since the 1990s. Subsequently, it discusses the multitude of available datasets documenting and investigating wealth inequality and then critically evaluates the benefits and drawbacks of each. Following, an overview on descriptive studies of wealth inequality with a focus on augmented and pension wealth, portfolio composition, and intergenerational transmission is provided. Finally, the review details developments in structural models that explain the concentration of wealth. The evidence points to a sharp rise of wealth inequality beginning in the early 1990s through the mid-2010s in the United States. However, recent trends differ, for example, for Sweden and the United Kingdom. The last two decades have witnessed a virtual explosion of datasets on household wealth, including, notably, new internationally conformable databases such as the World Inequality Database, the Luxembourg Wealth Study Database, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, and new administrative data from Nordic countries. The possibility to combine different datasets via record linkage or statistical matching further enlarges their research potential. Several new studies have expanded the concept of wealth from conventional marketable wealth to augmented wealth including pension and social security wealth. On the theoretical front, new modeling approaches have been devised to account for the extreme skewness in wealth distributions, including the introduction of heterogeneous rates of return by wealth class.

@techreport{Mianetal2020,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {The Saving Glut of the Rich},
  author = {Mian, Atif R. and Straub, Ludwig and Sufi, Amir},
  year = {2020},
  month = apr,
  number = {26941},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  doi = {10.3386/w26941},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w26941},
  abstract = {There has been a large rise in savings by Americans in the top 1\% of the income or wealth distribution over the past 40 years, which we call the saving glut of the rich. Instead of financing investment, this saving glut has been associated with dissaving by the non-rich and dissaving by the government. An unveiling of the financial sector reveals that rich households have accumulated substantial financial assets that are direct claims on U.S. government and household debt. State-level analysis shows that the rise in top income shares has been important in generating the rise in savings by the rich.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

There has been a large rise in savings by Americans in the top 1% of the income or wealth distribution over the past 40 years, which we call the saving glut of the rich. Instead of financing investment, this saving glut has been associated with dissaving by the non-rich and dissaving by the government. An unveiling of the financial sector reveals that rich households have accumulated substantial financial assets that are direct claims on U.S. government and household debt. State-level analysis shows that the rise in top income shares has been important in generating the rise in savings by the rich.

@article{Morelli2020,
  title = {The Dynamics of Wealth Concentration: Thoughts on {{Tony Atkinson}}'s Contributions},
  author = {Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2020},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Italian Economic Journal},
  pages = {197--205},
  doi = {10.1007/s40797-019-00119-7},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40797-019-00119-7},
  abstract = {Following new evidence on increasing wealth concentration across several advanced countries, the topic has been attracting a great deal of attention. Estimating the size distribution of wealth and understanding its determinants is an exercise surrounded with high levels of uncertainty and substantial controversies, but remains crucial to guide policy interventions. This short note attempts to link Tony Atkinson's body of work on wealth concentration to the fast expanding empirical research on wealth measurement as well as on the determinants of its growing concentration.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Following new evidence on increasing wealth concentration across several advanced countries, the topic has been attracting a great deal of attention. Estimating the size distribution of wealth and understanding its determinants is an exercise surrounded with high levels of uncertainty and substantial controversies, but remains crucial to guide policy interventions. This short note attempts to link Tony Atkinson's body of work on wealth concentration to the fast expanding empirical research on wealth measurement as well as on the determinants of its growing concentration.

@article{MumtazTheophilopoulou2020,
  title = {Monetary Policy and Wealth Inequality over the Great Recession in the {{UK}}. an Empirical Analysis},
  author = {Mumtaz, Haroon and Theophilopoulou, Angeliki},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {European Economic Review},
  volume = {130},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103598},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103598},
  abstract = {We use detailed micro information at household level from the Wealth and Assets Survey to construct measures of wealth inequality from 2006 to 2018 at the monthly frequency. We investigate the dynamic relationship between monetary policy and the evolution of wealth inequality measures. Our findings suggest that expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to an increase in wealth inequality and contributed significantly to its fluctuations. This effect is heterogenous across the wealth distribution with the monetary shock affecting the median household relative to the 10th and 20th percentile by a larger amount than the right tail. Our results suggest that the shock is transmitted through changes in net property and financial wealth.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We use detailed micro information at household level from the Wealth and Assets Survey to construct measures of wealth inequality from 2006 to 2018 at the monthly frequency. We investigate the dynamic relationship between monetary policy and the evolution of wealth inequality measures. Our findings suggest that expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to an increase in wealth inequality and contributed significantly to its fluctuations. This effect is heterogenous across the wealth distribution with the monetary shock affecting the median household relative to the 10th and 20th percentile by a larger amount than the right tail. Our results suggest that the shock is transmitted through changes in net property and financial wealth.

@techreport{Nolanetal2020,
  type = {Stone {{Center Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {Intergenerational Transfers by Size and Wealth Inequality in Rich Countries},
  author = {Nolan, Brian and Palomino, Juan and Van Kerm, Philippe and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2020},
  month = sep,
  number = {21},
  institution = {{Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/eyh8s},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/eyh8s},
  abstract = {This paper uses household wealth surveys to compare patterns of intergenerational wealth transfers across six rich countries and assess the relationships between transfers, current levels of net wealth, and wealth inequality. The paper examines four Euro Area countries, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain and extends the systematic comparison to the US and the UK. It finds that many of those currently at the top of the wealth distribution did not benefit from intergenerational transfers, but those who did received particularly large amounts while those toward the bottom of the wealth distribution received very little. A substantial gap in net wealth is seen between those who received or did not receive some wealth transfer. Controlling for age, gender, education and household size reduces the size of that gap but it remains substantial, especially in the US. We further look at how a marginal increase in the proportion of recipients of transfers of differing sizes would contribute to the shape of the overall wealth distribution using influence function regressions. Crucially, we show that the impact depends not only on the locations in the wealth distributions of recipients versus non-recipients, but also on the size of the receipt, an aspect which has been overlooked to date. In most countries, increasing the proportion of recipients of large transfers generally increases overall wealth inequality. In contrast, having more recipients of small or medium-sized transfers would be expected to reduce wealth inequality modestly, as they are more concentrated around the middle of the wealth distribution than non-recipients.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This paper uses household wealth surveys to compare patterns of intergenerational wealth transfers across six rich countries and assess the relationships between transfers, current levels of net wealth, and wealth inequality. The paper examines four Euro Area countries, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain and extends the systematic comparison to the US and the UK. It finds that many of those currently at the top of the wealth distribution did not benefit from intergenerational transfers, but those who did received particularly large amounts while those toward the bottom of the wealth distribution received very little. A substantial gap in net wealth is seen between those who received or did not receive some wealth transfer. Controlling for age, gender, education and household size reduces the size of that gap but it remains substantial, especially in the US. We further look at how a marginal increase in the proportion of recipients of transfers of differing sizes would contribute to the shape of the overall wealth distribution using influence function regressions. Crucially, we show that the impact depends not only on the locations in the wealth distributions of recipients versus non-recipients, but also on the size of the receipt, an aspect which has been overlooked to date. In most countries, increasing the proportion of recipients of large transfers generally increases overall wealth inequality. In contrast, having more recipients of small or medium-sized transfers would be expected to reduce wealth inequality modestly, as they are more concentrated around the middle of the wealth distribution than non-recipients.

@article{Ohlssonetal2020,
  title = {Inherited Wealth over the Path of Development: {{Sweden}}, 1810\textendash 2016},
  author = {Ohlsson, Henry and Roine, Jesper and Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2020},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  volume = {18},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1123--1157},
  doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvz038},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz038},
  abstract = {We estimate the importance of inherited wealth in Sweden over the past 200 years. Inheritance is measured both as the annual inheritance flow divided by national income and as the share of inherited wealth in all private wealth. In the 19th century, Sweden differs from France and the United Kingdom in having much lower inheritance\textendash income flows, but at the same time exhibiting equally large shares of inherited wealth in total wealth. This pattern is in line with Sweden at the time being a poor country with low domestic capital accumulation, but at the same time exhibiting high economic growth rates. In the 20th century the importance of inheritance in relation to national income fell, but since the 1990s it has increased rapidly, today reaching almost the same levels as a century ago. The share of inherited wealth in total wealth has also fallen over time, but remains relatively low due to a rapid accumulation of new wealth. We study potential determinants and explanations, pointing especially to Swedish welfare-state institutions, and in particular to the development of an extensive public occupational pension system contributing to keeping private inheritance low.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We estimate the importance of inherited wealth in Sweden over the past 200 years. Inheritance is measured both as the annual inheritance flow divided by national income and as the share of inherited wealth in all private wealth. In the 19th century, Sweden differs from France and the United Kingdom in having much lower inheritance– income flows, but at the same time exhibiting equally large shares of inherited wealth in total wealth. This pattern is in line with Sweden at the time being a poor country with low domestic capital accumulation, but at the same time exhibiting high economic growth rates. In the 20th century the importance of inheritance in relation to national income fell, but since the 1990s it has increased rapidly, today reaching almost the same levels as a century ago. The share of inherited wealth in total wealth has also fallen over time, but remains relatively low due to a rapid accumulation of new wealth. We study potential determinants and explanations, pointing especially to Swedish welfare-state institutions, and in particular to the development of an extensive public occupational pension system contributing to keeping private inheritance low.

@unpublished{Palominoetal2020,
  title = {Wealth Inequality, Intergenerational Transfers and Socioeconomic Background},
  author = {Palomino, Juan C. and Marrero, Gustavo A. and Nolan, Brian and Rodr{\'i}guez, Juan G.},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/publications/no-2020-15-wealth-inequality-intergenerational-transfers-and-socioeconomic-background/},
  abstract = {This paper estimates the contribution of intergenerational transfers (inheritances and gifts) and socioeconomic background to wealth inequality in four OECD countries: France, Spain, Great Britain and the United States. We compare the observed wealth distribution with a non-parametric counterfactual distribution where all differences in wealth associated with the intergenerational transfers received and the socioeconomic background have been removed. Despite the diversity of the four countries analysed, we find similar patterns in the results. The combined contribution of intergenerational transfers and socioeconomic background to wealth inequality is sizeable in the four countries, ranging from 37\% in Great Britain to 48\% in the US. When interactions between the two factors are accounted for, the net contribution of inheritances and gifts is between 23\% and 30\%, while the net contribution of family background lies between 4\% and 11\%. These values are substantial and reveal that the importance of intergenerational transfers in wealth inequality, across all these countries, is at least twice that of socioeconomic background.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper estimates the contribution of intergenerational transfers (inheritances and gifts) and socioeconomic background to wealth inequality in four OECD countries: France, Spain, Great Britain and the United States. We compare the observed wealth distribution with a non-parametric counterfactual distribution where all differences in wealth associated with the intergenerational transfers received and the socioeconomic background have been removed. Despite the diversity of the four countries analysed, we find similar patterns in the results. The combined contribution of intergenerational transfers and socioeconomic background to wealth inequality is sizeable in the four countries, ranging from 37% in Great Britain to 48% in the US. When interactions between the two factors are accounted for, the net contribution of inheritances and gifts is between 23% and 30%, while the net contribution of family background lies between 4% and 11%. These values are substantial and reveal that the importance of intergenerational transfers in wealth inequality, across all these countries, is at least twice that of socioeconomic background.

@unpublished{PetachTavani2020,
  title = {Differential Rates of Return and Racial Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Petach, Luke and Tavani, Daniele},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.boeckler.de/en/faust-detail.htm?sync_id=8958},
  abstract = {Using data on household balance sheets from the Survey of Consumer Finances and data on macroeconomic rates of return from Jord\`a et al. (2019) we construct two alternate series for household rates of return by race from 1989 to 2016. Our estimates suggest a persistent racial gap in the rate of return on assets between 1 and 6 percentage points. The gap in returns remains even after conditioning on demographic factors, labor market factors, credit history, portfolio composition, household attitudes toward savings, financial literacy, and inheritance\textemdash suggestive of a role for discrimination. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions indicate that differential rates of return may explain up to 50\% of the racial wealth gap. Finally, our data on differential rates of return allow us to effectively rule out explanations for the racial wealth gap based on myopia or excessive time preference. Given observed series for consumption and rates of return, a standard lifecyle model requires non-White households to discount the future less than White households in order to match the data.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Using data on household balance sheets from the Survey of Consumer Finances and data on macroeconomic rates of return from Jordà et al. (2019) we construct two alternate series for household rates of return by race from 1989 to 2016. Our estimates suggest a persistent racial gap in the rate of return on assets between 1 and 6 percentage points. The gap in returns remains even after conditioning on demographic factors, labor market factors, credit history, portfolio composition, household attitudes toward savings, financial literacy, and inheritance— suggestive of a role for discrimination. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions indicate that differential rates of return may explain up to 50% of the racial wealth gap. Finally, our data on differential rates of return allow us to effectively rule out explanations for the racial wealth gap based on myopia or excessive time preference. Given observed series for consumption and rates of return, a standard lifecyle model requires non-White households to discount the future less than White households in order to match the data.

@book{Piketty2020,
  title = {Capital and Ideology},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas},
  translator = {Goldhammer, Arthur},
  year = {2020},
  publisher = {{The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press}},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  url = {http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/ideology},
  urldate = {2022-03-16},
  isbn = {978-0-674-24507-5},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,{Data Sources: Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

@techreport{SabelhausVolz2020,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Social {{Security}} Wealth, Inequality, and Lifecycle Saving},
  author = {Sabelhaus, John and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  year = {2020},
  month = may,
  number = {27110},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  doi = {10.3386/w27110},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w27110},
  abstract = {Wealth inequality in the US is high and rising, but Social Security is generally not considered in those wealth measures. Social Security Wealth (SSW) is the present value of future benefits that an individual will receive less the present value of future taxes they will pay. When an individual enters the labor force, they generally face a lifetime of taxes to pay before they will receive any benefits, and thus their initial SSW is generally low or negative. As an individual works and pays into the system their SSW grows and generally peaks somewhere around typical Social Security benefit claim ages. The accrual of SSW over the working life is most important for lower-income workers because the progressive Social Security benefit formula means that taxes paid while working are associated with proportionally higher benefits in retirement. We estimate SSW for individuals in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1995 through 2016 and use a pseudo-panel approach to empirically demonstrate those lifecycle patterns. We also show that including SSW in a comprehensive wealth measure generally reduces estimated levels of wealth inequality but does not reverse the upward trend in top wealth shares.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Wealth inequality in the US is high and rising, but Social Security is generally not considered in those wealth measures. Social Security Wealth (SSW) is the present value of future benefits that an individual will receive less the present value of future taxes they will pay. When an individual enters the labor force, they generally face a lifetime of taxes to pay before they will receive any benefits, and thus their initial SSW is generally low or negative. As an individual works and pays into the system their SSW grows and generally peaks somewhere around typical Social Security benefit claim ages. The accrual of SSW over the working life is most important for lower-income workers because the progressive Social Security benefit formula means that taxes paid while working are associated with proportionally higher benefits in retirement. We estimate SSW for individuals in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1995 through 2016 and use a pseudo-panel approach to empirically demonstrate those lifecycle patterns. We also show that including SSW in a comprehensive wealth measure generally reduces estimated levels of wealth inequality but does not reverse the upward trend in top wealth shares.

@article{SaezZucman2020a,
  title = {The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in {{America}}: Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2020},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {34},
  number = {4},
  pages = {3--26},
  doi = {10.1257/JEP.34.4.3},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.34.4.3},
  abstract = {This paper studies inequality in America through the lens of distributional macroeconomic accounts\textemdash comprehensive distributions of the aggregate amount of income and wealth recorded in the official macroeconomic accounts of the United States. We use these distributional macroeconomic accounts to quantify the rise of income and wealth concentration since the late 1970s, the change in tax progressivity, and the direct redistributive effects of government intervention in the economy. Between 1978 and 2018, the share of pre-tax income earned by the top 1 percent rose from 10 percent to about 19 percent, and the share of wealth owned by the top 0.1 percent rose from 7 percent to about 18 percent. In 2018, the tax system was regressive at the top-end; the top 400 wealthiest Americans paid a lower average tax rate than the macroeconomic tax rate of 29 percent. We confront our methods and findings with those of other studies, pinpoint the areas where more research is needed, and describe how additional data collection could improve inequality measurement.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  url_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-theriseofincomeandwealthinequalityinamericaevidencefromdistributionalmacroeconomicaccountsworkingpaper-2020},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-theriseofincomeandwealthinequalityinamericaevidencefromdistributionalmacroeconomicaccountsdatafile-2020}
}

This paper studies inequality in America through the lens of distributional macroeconomic accounts— comprehensive distributions of the aggregate amount of income and wealth recorded in the official macroeconomic accounts of the United States. We use these distributional macroeconomic accounts to quantify the rise of income and wealth concentration since the late 1970s, the change in tax progressivity, and the direct redistributive effects of government intervention in the economy. Between 1978 and 2018, the share of pre-tax income earned by the top 1 percent rose from 10 percent to about 19 percent, and the share of wealth owned by the top 0.1 percent rose from 7 percent to about 18 percent. In 2018, the tax system was regressive at the top-end; the top 400 wealthiest Americans paid a lower average tax rate than the macroeconomic tax rate of 29 percent. We confront our methods and findings with those of other studies, pinpoint the areas where more research is needed, and describe how additional data collection could improve inequality measurement.

@techreport{SaezZucman2020b,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Trends in {{US}} Income and Wealth Inequality: Revising after the Revisionists},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2020},
  month = oct,
  number = {27921},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  doi = {10.3386/w27921},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w27921},
  abstract = {Recent studies argue that US inequality has increased less than previously thought, in particular due to a more modest rise of wealth and capital income at the top (Smith et al., 2019; Smith, Zidar and Zwick, 2020; Auten and Splinter, 2019). We examine the claims made in these papers point by point, separating genuine improvements from arguments that do not appear to us well grounded empirically or conceptually. Taking stock of this body of work, and factoring in other improvements, we provide a comprehensive update of our estimates of US income and wealth inequality. Although some of the points raised by the revisionists are valuable, the core quantitative findings of this literature do not appear to be supported by the data. The low capital share of private business income estimated in Smith et al. (2019) is not consistent with the large capital stock of these businesses. In Smith, Zidar and Zwick (2020), the interest rate assigned to the wealthy is higher than in the datasets where both income and wealth can be observed, leading to downward biased top wealth shares; capitalizing equities using almost only dividends dramatically underestimates the wealth of billionaires relative to the Forbes 400. In Auten and Splinter (2019), business profits earned by the top 1\% but not taxable (due in particular to generous depreciation rules) are classified as tax evasion; tax evasion is then allocated to the bottom 99\% based on an erroneous reading of random audit data. Our revised series show a rise of inequality similar to Saez and Zucman (2016) and Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2018) while allowing for a more granular depiction of the composition of wealth and income at the top.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {SaezZucman2020b.pdf},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-trendsinusincomeandwealthinequalityrevisingaftertherevisionistsdatafile-2020}
}

Recent studies argue that US inequality has increased less than previously thought, in particular due to a more modest rise of wealth and capital income at the top (Smith et al., 2019; Smith, Zidar and Zwick, 2020; Auten and Splinter, 2019). We examine the claims made in these papers point by point, separating genuine improvements from arguments that do not appear to us well grounded empirically or conceptually. Taking stock of this body of work, and factoring in other improvements, we provide a comprehensive update of our estimates of US income and wealth inequality. Although some of the points raised by the revisionists are valuable, the core quantitative findings of this literature do not appear to be supported by the data. The low capital share of private business income estimated in Smith et al. (2019) is not consistent with the large capital stock of these businesses. In Smith, Zidar and Zwick (2020), the interest rate assigned to the wealthy is higher than in the datasets where both income and wealth can be observed, leading to downward biased top wealth shares; capitalizing equities using almost only dividends dramatically underestimates the wealth of billionaires relative to the Forbes 400. In Auten and Splinter (2019), business profits earned by the top 1% but not taxable (due in particular to generous depreciation rules) are classified as tax evasion; tax evasion is then allocated to the bottom 99% based on an erroneous reading of random audit data. Our revised series show a rise of inequality similar to Saez and Zucman (2016) and Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2018) while allowing for a more granular depiction of the composition of wealth and income at the top.

@unpublished{Schroderetal2020,
  title = {Improving the Coverage of the Top-Wealth Population in the Socio-Economic Panel ({{SOEP}})},
  author = {Schr{\"o}der, Carsten and Bartels, Charlotte and G{\"o}bler, Konstantin and Grabka, Markus M and K{\"o}nig, Johannes and Siegers, Rainer and Zinn, Sabine},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.806986.de/publikationen/soeppapers/2020_1114/improving_the_coverage_of_the_top-wealth_population_in_the_socio-economic_panel__soep.html},
  abstract = {We have developed and implemented a new sampling strategy to better represent very wealthy individuals in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Our strategy is based on the empirical regularity that the very wealthy have at least part of their assets invested in businesses, and that businesses document shares of relevant shareholders in their books. Our results show that combined analysis of the SOEP and the new sample (SOEP-P) provides meaningful insights into individuals at the top end of the wealth distribution in Germany. The SOEP-P population has about 21 times higher net wealth on average than the regular SOEP population. Comparing millionaires (net worth {$\geq$} 1M Euros) to the rest of the population, a number of noticeable differences emerge. Millionaires differ from the non-rich population with regard to portfolio allocation, demographics, careers, personality, satisfaction with life, and satisfaction with other important life domains.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We have developed and implemented a new sampling strategy to better represent very wealthy individuals in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Our strategy is based on the empirical regularity that the very wealthy have at least part of their assets invested in businesses, and that businesses document shares of relevant shareholders in their books. Our results show that combined analysis of the SOEP and the new sample (SOEP-P) provides meaningful insights into individuals at the top end of the wealth distribution in Germany. The SOEP-P population has about 21 times higher net wealth on average than the regular SOEP population. Comparing millionaires (net worth $≥$ 1M Euros) to the rest of the population, a number of noticeable differences emerge. Millionaires differ from the non-rich population with regard to portfolio allocation, demographics, careers, personality, satisfaction with life, and satisfaction with other important life domains.

@unpublished{Smithetal2020,
  title = {Top Wealth in {{America}}: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich},
  author = {Smith, Matthew and Zidar, Owen and Zwick, Eric},
  year = {2020},
  month = apr,
  url = {http://ericzwick.com/},
  abstract = {This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We build on the capitalization approach in Saez and Zucman (2016) while accounting for heterogeneity within asset classes when mapping income flows to wealth. Our approach reduces bias in wealth estimates because wealth and rates of return are correlated. We find that the top 0.1\% share of wealth increased from 7\% to 14\% from 1978 to 2016. While this rise is half as large as prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1\% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90\%. However, the "P90-99" class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity. Private business and public equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top, and pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth of the bottom 90\%. Our approach substantially reduces estimates of mechanical wealth tax revenue and top capital income in distributional national accounts, which depend on well-measured estimates of top wealth. From 1980 to 2014, capital income accounts for 2.4 out of 8.1 percentage points of the rise of the top 1\% income share.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_file = {Smithetal2020.pdf},
  url_published_version = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/smith-zidar-zwick-topwealthinamericanewestimatesunderheterogeneousreturns-2023},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We build on the capitalization approach in Saez and Zucman (2016) while accounting for heterogeneity within asset classes when mapping income flows to wealth. Our approach reduces bias in wealth estimates because wealth and rates of return are correlated. We find that the top 0.1% share of wealth increased from 7% to 14% from 1978 to 2016. While this rise is half as large as prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90%. However, the "P90-99" class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity. Private business and public equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top, and pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth of the bottom 90%. Our approach substantially reduces estimates of mechanical wealth tax revenue and top capital income in distributional national accounts, which depend on well-measured estimates of top wealth. From 1980 to 2014, capital income accounts for 2.4 out of 8.1 percentage points of the rise of the top 1% income share.

@phdthesis{Spieker2020,
  title = {The Role of Private Wealth and Debt in Shaping Social and Economic Inequality in the United States.},
  author = {Spieker, Jan Ludwig},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/102903},
  abstract = {This dissertation advances the sociological understanding of how privately held wealth and debt have become central to social mobility and well-being in 21st-century America. Chapter one adds to an emerging field of studying intergenerational wealth mobility by relating parents' intragenerational wealth trajectories to children's wealth standing in early to mid-adulthood. Children from continuously wealthy households have more wealth and higher net financial assets than children from any other group. This early divide is remarkable and can be expected to cement the wealth position of children from wealthy households due to compound interest and higher rates of appreciation as well as higher returns of financial assets. The second chapter focuses on the relationship between wealth transfers and transitioning into homeownership. Specifically, poorer households are less likely to receive a gift or inheritance of \$10,000 or more but, compared to households with more economic resources, are more likely to leverage this wealth transfer into a transition to homeownership. However, these associations have changed substantially: before the Great Recession, wealth transfers increased transitions into homeownership more among poor households than well-off households, but after the Great Recession, the transfer ``boost'' converged; likely as a result of changes in housing markets, stricter mortgage lending conditions, and large scale wealth destruction among working-class households. The last chapter addresses the psychological costs of a sub-phenomenon of financialization, that is, the tremendous surge in privately held debt since the 1980s. The analysis distinguishes eight kinds of debt including credit card debt, outstanding medical and legal bills, other (secured) consumer debt, student debt, family loans, mortgage loans and business debt. There are two culprits for the loss in well-being associated with going into the red. First, any kind of consumer debt \textendash{} secured or unsecured \textendash{} exerts a statistically significant negative impact on subjective well-being. Second, increases in student debt robustly lead to a loss in subjective well-being. Contextualizing the results, the magnitude of the loss in subjective well-being stemming from consumer debt and student loans is comparable to the boost in well-being from major life events such as marriage and finding employment.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This dissertation advances the sociological understanding of how privately held wealth and debt have become central to social mobility and well-being in 21st-century America. Chapter one adds to an emerging field of studying intergenerational wealth mobility by relating parents' intragenerational wealth trajectories to children's wealth standing in early to mid-adulthood. Children from continuously wealthy households have more wealth and higher net financial assets than children from any other group. This early divide is remarkable and can be expected to cement the wealth position of children from wealthy households due to compound interest and higher rates of appreciation as well as higher returns of financial assets. The second chapter focuses on the relationship between wealth transfers and transitioning into homeownership. Specifically, poorer households are less likely to receive a gift or inheritance of $10,000 or more but, compared to households with more economic resources, are more likely to leverage this wealth transfer into a transition to homeownership. However, these associations have changed substantially: before the Great Recession, wealth transfers increased transitions into homeownership more among poor households than well-off households, but after the Great Recession, the transfer ``boost'' converged; likely as a result of changes in housing markets, stricter mortgage lending conditions, and large scale wealth destruction among working-class households. The last chapter addresses the psychological costs of a sub-phenomenon of financialization, that is, the tremendous surge in privately held debt since the 1980s. The analysis distinguishes eight kinds of debt including credit card debt, outstanding medical and legal bills, other (secured) consumer debt, student debt, family loans, mortgage loans and business debt. There are two culprits for the loss in well-being associated with going into the red. First, any kind of consumer debt –{} secured or unsecured –{} exerts a statistically significant negative impact on subjective well-being. Second, increases in student debt robustly lead to a loss in subjective well-being. Contextualizing the results, the magnitude of the loss in subjective well-being stemming from consumer debt and student loans is comparable to the boost in well-being from major life events such as marriage and finding employment.

@unpublished{Stantcheva2020,
  title = {Understanding Tax Policy: How Do People Reason?},
  author = {Stantcheva, Stefanie},
  year = {2020},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w27699},
  abstract = {I study how people understand, reason, and learn about tax policy. The goal is to uncover the mental models that people use to think about income and estate taxes. To that end, I run large-scale online surveys and experiments on representative U.S. samples to elicit not only respondents' factual knowledge about tax policy and the income or wealth distributions, but also their understanding of the mechanisms of tax policy and their reasoning about it. The detailed survey questions are designed to address the three main factors emphasized in our core tax model that can shape support for or opposition to taxes: efficiency effects, distributional implications, and fairness considerations. But they also elicit broader concerns that could influence policy views such as misperceptions, views of government, perceived spillovers from taxes, and views on how tax revenues are or should be spent. To extract people's first-order considerations that come to mind when they are prompted to think about tax policy, its shortcomings, and goals without priming them, open-ended questions are used and then evaluated with text analysis methods. There are partisan divergences not just in the final policy views, but also in reasonings about the underlying mechanisms and most starkly on the fairness considerations. I decompose policy views into the various underlying factors and find that support for tax policy is most strongly correlated with views on the benefits of redistribution and fairness, as well as with views of the government. Efficiency concerns play a more minor role. These correlational patterns are confirmed by the experimental approach, which shows people instructional videos that explain the workings and consequences of one of the aspects of tax policy (the ``Redistribution'' and the ``Efficiency'' treatments) or that bring the two together and focus on the trade-off (the ``Economist'' treatment). The Redistribution treatment and Economist treatments significantly increase support for more progressive taxes.},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

I study how people understand, reason, and learn about tax policy. The goal is to uncover the mental models that people use to think about income and estate taxes. To that end, I run large-scale online surveys and experiments on representative U.S. samples to elicit not only respondents' factual knowledge about tax policy and the income or wealth distributions, but also their understanding of the mechanisms of tax policy and their reasoning about it. The detailed survey questions are designed to address the three main factors emphasized in our core tax model that can shape support for or opposition to taxes: efficiency effects, distributional implications, and fairness considerations. But they also elicit broader concerns that could influence policy views such as misperceptions, views of government, perceived spillovers from taxes, and views on how tax revenues are or should be spent. To extract people's first-order considerations that come to mind when they are prompted to think about tax policy, its shortcomings, and goals without priming them, open-ended questions are used and then evaluated with text analysis methods. There are partisan divergences not just in the final policy views, but also in reasonings about the underlying mechanisms and most starkly on the fairness considerations. I decompose policy views into the various underlying factors and find that support for tax policy is most strongly correlated with views on the benefits of redistribution and fairness, as well as with views of the government. Efficiency concerns play a more minor role. These correlational patterns are confirmed by the experimental approach, which shows people instructional videos that explain the workings and consequences of one of the aspects of tax policy (the ``Redistribution'' and the ``Efficiency'' treatments) or that bring the two together and focus on the trade-off (the ``Economist'' treatment). The Redistribution treatment and Economist treatments significantly increase support for more progressive taxes.

@unpublished{Waltl2020,
  title = {Multidimensional Wealth Inequality: {{A}} Hybrid Approach toward Distributional National Accounts in {{Europe}}},
  author = {Waltl, Sofie R.},
  year = {2020},
  address = {{Vienna}},
  url = {https://epub.wu.ac.at/7560/},
  abstract = {Distributional National Accounts (DINA) link macroeconomic aggregates with distributional information enabling a better understanding of distributional implications of macroeconomic developments and facilitate cross-country comparisons of inequality. This article proposes a practically feasible framework to allocate components of wealth to different sections of society and serves two functions: a comprehensive measure of net worth and its distribution, and a link to macroeconomic statistics. The article compiles DINA by breaking down twelve components of marketable wealth by wealth and income groups, as well as three major functions of wealth for Austria, Finland, France, Germany and Spain. The three functions of wealth considered are (i) precautionary saving, (ii) own use of housing assets and (iii) income generation via the ownership of businesses or landlordship. The resulting multidimensional wealth distributions reveal large heterogeneity in inequality and help understand (institutional) differences across countries and time. Results are top-tail adjusted using Pareto and Generalized Pareto models, and combining survey data (HFCS) with rich lists, or top wealth shares derived from tax data and leaked information on wealth held in offshore tax havens.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Distributional National Accounts (DINA) link macroeconomic aggregates with distributional information enabling a better understanding of distributional implications of macroeconomic developments and facilitate cross-country comparisons of inequality. This article proposes a practically feasible framework to allocate components of wealth to different sections of society and serves two functions: a comprehensive measure of net worth and its distribution, and a link to macroeconomic statistics. The article compiles DINA by breaking down twelve components of marketable wealth by wealth and income groups, as well as three major functions of wealth for Austria, Finland, France, Germany and Spain. The three functions of wealth considered are (i) precautionary saving, (ii) own use of housing assets and (iii) income generation via the ownership of businesses or landlordship. The resulting multidimensional wealth distributions reveal large heterogeneity in inequality and help understand (institutional) differences across countries and time. Results are top-tail adjusted using Pareto and Generalized Pareto models, and combining survey data (HFCS) with rich lists, or top wealth shares derived from tax data and leaked information on wealth held in offshore tax havens.

@unpublished{Xavier2020,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in the {{US}}: The Role of Heterogeneous Returns},
  author = {Xavier, In{\^e}s},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://www.inesxavier.com/research},
  abstract = {Why is wealth so concentrated in the United States? In this paper, I investigate the role of return heterogeneity as a source of wealth inequality. Using household-level data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (1989-2019), I provide new empirical evidence on returns to wealth in the United States, and find that wealthier households earn, on average, higher returns: moving from the 20th to the 99th percentile of the wealth distribution raises the average yearly return from 3.6\% to 8.3\%. To understand how these return differences shape the distribution of wealth, I introduce realistic return heterogeneity in a partial equilibrium model of household saving behavior. This exercise suggests that considering both earnings and return heterogeneity can fully account for the top 10\% wealth share observed in the data (76\%), which cannot be explained by earnings differences alone.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Why is wealth so concentrated in the United States? In this paper, I investigate the role of return heterogeneity as a source of wealth inequality. Using household-level data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (1989-2019), I provide new empirical evidence on returns to wealth in the United States, and find that wealthier households earn, on average, higher returns: moving from the 20th to the 99th percentile of the wealth distribution raises the average yearly return from 3.6% to 8.3%. To understand how these return differences shape the distribution of wealth, I introduce realistic return heterogeneity in a partial equilibrium model of household saving behavior. This exercise suggests that considering both earnings and return heterogeneity can fully account for the top 10% wealth share observed in the data (76%), which cannot be explained by earnings differences alone.

@article{vonFintelOrthofer2020,
  title = {Wealth Inequality and Financial Inclusion: Evidence from {{South African}} Tax and Survey Records},
  author = {{von Fintel}, Dieter and Orthofer, Anna},
  year = {2020},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Economic Modelling},
  volume = {91},
  pages = {568--578},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econmod.2020.02.001},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2020.02.001},
  abstract = {Theoretical models show that financial inclusion reduces wealth inequality. Existing empirical models are restricted to estimates using income inequality because of a lack of cross country wealth inequality data. We used 2010-11 and 2014-5 waves of the National Income Dynamics Study combined with South African tax records to estimate wealth and income inequality. Using Re-centered Influence Function regressions on the micro-level records, we confirmed the negative cross-country relationship between financial inclusion and income inequality. Wealth inequality is different. Financial inclusion improved wealth shares of only the middle class. Because of predatory lending, expansion of credit reduced the wealth share of the poor. Improved savings by the middle class, providing better oversight over financial services targeted at the poor and removing impediments to the small business sector are pre-conditions for financial inclusion to reduce wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_online_supplementary_materials = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/vonfintel-orthofer-wealthinequalityandfinancialinclusionevidencefromsouthafricantaxandsurveyrecordsonlinesupplementarymaterials-2020}
}

Theoretical models show that financial inclusion reduces wealth inequality. Existing empirical models are restricted to estimates using income inequality because of a lack of cross country wealth inequality data. We used 2010-11 and 2014-5 waves of the National Income Dynamics Study combined with South African tax records to estimate wealth and income inequality. Using Re-centered Influence Function regressions on the micro-level records, we confirmed the negative cross-country relationship between financial inclusion and income inequality. Wealth inequality is different. Financial inclusion improved wealth shares of only the middle class. Because of predatory lending, expansion of credit reduced the wealth share of the poor. Improved savings by the middle class, providing better oversight over financial services targeted at the poor and removing impediments to the small business sector are pre-conditions for financial inclusion to reduce wealth inequality.

@article{Alstadsaeteretal2019,
  title = {Tax Evasion and Inequality},
  author = {Alstads{\ae}ter, Annette and Johannesen, Niels and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {109},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2073--2103},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20172043},
  url = {https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20172043},
  abstract = {Drawing on a unique dataset of leaked customer lists from offshore financial institutions matched to administrative wealth records in Scandinavia, we show that offshore tax evasion is highly concentrated among the rich. The skewed distribution of offshore wealth implies high rates of tax evasion at the top: we find that the 0.01 percent richest households evade about 25 percent of their taxes. By contrast, tax evasion detected in stratified random tax audits is less than 5 percent throughout the distribution. Top wealth shares increase substantially when accounting for unreported assets, highlighting the importance of factoring in tax evasion to properly measure inequality.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Drawing on a unique dataset of leaked customer lists from offshore financial institutions matched to administrative wealth records in Scandinavia, we show that offshore tax evasion is highly concentrated among the rich. The skewed distribution of offshore wealth implies high rates of tax evasion at the top: we find that the 0.01 percent richest households evade about 25 percent of their taxes. By contrast, tax evasion detected in stratified random tax audits is less than 5 percent throughout the distribution. Top wealth shares increase substantially when accounting for unreported assets, highlighting the importance of factoring in tax evasion to properly measure inequality.

@article{Bachetal2019,
  title = {Looking for the Missing Rich: Tracing the Top Tail of the Wealth Distribution},
  author = {Bach, Stefan and Thiemann, Andreas and Zucco, Aline},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {International Tax and Public Finance},
  volume = {26},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1234--1258},
  publisher = {{Springer New York LLC}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10797-019-09578-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-019-09578-1},
  abstract = {We analyse the top tail of the wealth distribution in France, Germany, and Spain using the first and second waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). Since top wealth is likely to be under-represented in household surveys, we integrate big fortunes from rich lists, estimate a Pareto distribution, and impute the missing rich. In addition to the Forbes list, we rely on national rich lists since they represent a broader base of the big fortunes in those countries. As a result, the top 1\% wealth share increases notably for the three selected countries after imputing the top wealth. We find that national rich lists can improve the estimation of the Pareto coefficient in particular when the list of national USD billionaires is short.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

We analyse the top tail of the wealth distribution in France, Germany, and Spain using the first and second waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). Since top wealth is likely to be under-represented in household surveys, we integrate big fortunes from rich lists, estimate a Pareto distribution, and impute the missing rich. In addition to the Forbes list, we rely on national rich lists since they represent a broader base of the big fortunes in those countries. As a result, the top 1% wealth share increases notably for the three selected countries after imputing the top wealth. We find that national rich lists can improve the estimation of the Pareto coefficient in particular when the list of national USD billionaires is short.

@article{BatchelderKamin2019,
  title = {Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options},
  author = {Batchelder, Lily L. and Kamin, David},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
  pages = {1--51},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3452274},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452274},
  abstract = {The U.S. economy exhibits high inequality and low economic mobility across generations relative to other high-income countries. The U.S. will need to raise more revenues in order to reduce these disparities, finance much-needed new services and investments, and address the nation's long-term fiscal needs. This paper outlines policy options for raising a large amount of revenues primarily from the most affluent, first discussing potential incremental reforms and then focusing on four main options for more structural reform: (1) dramatically increasing the top tax rates on labor and other ordinary income, (2) taxing the wealthy on accrued gains as they arise and at ordinary rates, (3) a wealth tax on high-net-worth individuals, and (4) a financial transactions tax. Although we summarize the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, we generally conclude that they all merit serious consideration. Several options are also complementary to one another. In practice, however, the relative strengths of each of these policies will depend to a large extent on how each is designed after it has made its way through the legislative and regulatory process.},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Wealth Taxation}
}

The U.S. economy exhibits high inequality and low economic mobility across generations relative to other high-income countries. The U.S. will need to raise more revenues in order to reduce these disparities, finance much-needed new services and investments, and address the nation's long-term fiscal needs. This paper outlines policy options for raising a large amount of revenues primarily from the most affluent, first discussing potential incremental reforms and then focusing on four main options for more structural reform: (1) dramatically increasing the top tax rates on labor and other ordinary income, (2) taxing the wealthy on accrued gains as they arise and at ordinary rates, (3) a wealth tax on high-net-worth individuals, and (4) a financial transactions tax. Although we summarize the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, we generally conclude that they all merit serious consideration. Several options are also complementary to one another. In practice, however, the relative strengths of each of these policies will depend to a large extent on how each is designed after it has made its way through the legislative and regulatory process.

@techreport{Battyetal2019,
  type = {Finance and {{Economics Discussion Series}}},
  title = {Introducing the {{Distributional Financial Accounts}} of the {{United States}}},
  author = {Batty, Michael and Bricker, Jesse and Briggs, Joseph and Holmquist, Elizabeth and McIntosh, Susan and Moore, Kevin and Nielsen, Eric and Reber, Sarah and Shatto, Molly and Sommer, Kamila and Sweeney, Tom and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  year = {2019},
  month = mar,
  number = {2019-017},
  institution = {{Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System}},
  doi = {10.17016/feds.2019.017},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.17016/feds.2019.017},
  abstract = {This paper describes the construction of the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFAs), a new dataset containing quarterly estimates of the distribution of U.S. household wealth since 1989, and provides the first look at the resulting data. The DFAs build on two existing Federal Reserve Board statistical products-quarterly aggregate measures of household wealth from the Financial Accounts of the United States and triennial wealth distribution measures from the Survey of Consumer Finances-to incorporate distributional information into a national accounting framework. The DFAs complement other existing sources of data on the wealth distribution by using a more comprehensive measure of household wealth and by providing quarterly data on a timely basis. We encourage policymakers, researchers, and other interested parties to use the DFAs to help understand issues related to the distribution of U.S. household wealth.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Battyetal2019.pdf},
  url_dfas = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/boardofgovernorsofthefederalreservesystem-dfadistributionalfinancialaccounts-2023},
  url_2020_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/batty-bricker-briggs-friedman-nemschoff-nielsen-sommer-volz-thedistributionalfinancialaccountsoftheunitedstates-2020},
  url_published_version = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/batty-bricker-briggs-friedman-nemschoff-nielsen-sommer-volz-thedistributionalfinancialaccountsoftheunitedstates-2022}
}

This paper describes the construction of the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFAs), a new dataset containing quarterly estimates of the distribution of U.S. household wealth since 1989, and provides the first look at the resulting data. The DFAs build on two existing Federal Reserve Board statistical products-quarterly aggregate measures of household wealth from the Financial Accounts of the United States and triennial wealth distribution measures from the Survey of Consumer Finances-to incorporate distributional information into a national accounting framework. The DFAs complement other existing sources of data on the wealth distribution by using a more comprehensive measure of household wealth and by providing quarterly data on a timely basis. We encourage policymakers, researchers, and other interested parties to use the DFAs to help understand issues related to the distribution of U.S. household wealth.

@article{Benhabibetal2019,
  title = {Wealth Distribution and Social Mobility in the {{US}}: {{A}} Quantitative Approach},
  author = {Benhabib, Jess and Bisin, Alberto and Luo, Mi},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {109},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1623--1647},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20151684},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151684},
  abstract = {We quantitatively identify the factors that drive wealth dynamics in the United States and are consistent with its skewed cross-sectional distribution and with social mobility. We concentrate on three critical factors: (i) skewed earnings, (ii) differential saving rates across wealth levels, and (iii) stochastic idiosyncratic returns to wealth. All of these are fundamental for matching both distribution and mobility. The stochastic process for returns which best fits the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and social mobility in the United States shares several statistical properties with those of the returns to wealth uncovered by Fagereng et al. (2017) from tax records in Norway.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We quantitatively identify the factors that drive wealth dynamics in the United States and are consistent with its skewed cross-sectional distribution and with social mobility. We concentrate on three critical factors: (i) skewed earnings, (ii) differential saving rates across wealth levels, and (iii) stochastic idiosyncratic returns to wealth. All of these are fundamental for matching both distribution and mobility. The stochastic process for returns which best fits the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and social mobility in the United States shares several statistical properties with those of the returns to wealth uncovered by Fagereng et al. (2017) from tax records in Norway.

@article{BerishaMeszaros2019,
  title = {Macroeconomic Determinants of Wealth Inequality Dynamics},
  author = {Berisha, Edmond and Meszaros, John},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Economic Modelling},
  number = {Forthcoming},
  pages = {1--13},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econmod.2019.10.001},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2019.10.001},
  abstract = {The evolution of wealth inequality over the long run depends on income growth, inflation, and interest rates. In this paper, we examine, in a dynamic setting, the effect of these three macroeconomic variables on wealth inequality in the United States over the periods 1929\textendash 2009 and 1962\textendash 2009. The results show that these macroeconomic factors explain a significant amount of the changes in wealth inequality. The results indicate that increases in inflation and income growth contribute positively to net wealth shares of adults in the bottom 50\% and middle 40\% of the wealth distribution, leading to decreases in overall wealth inequality. Interestingly, the results show increases in interest rates contribute to lower wealth inequality in the U.S. although this result does not hold across all the inequality measures.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The evolution of wealth inequality over the long run depends on income growth, inflation, and interest rates. In this paper, we examine, in a dynamic setting, the effect of these three macroeconomic variables on wealth inequality in the United States over the periods 1929– 2009 and 1962– 2009. The results show that these macroeconomic factors explain a significant amount of the changes in wealth inequality. The results indicate that increases in inflation and income growth contribute positively to net wealth shares of adults in the bottom 50% and middle 40% of the wealth distribution, leading to decreases in overall wealth inequality. Interestingly, the results show increases in interest rates contribute to lower wealth inequality in the U.S. although this result does not hold across all the inequality measures.

@unpublished{Blacketal2019,
  title = {Poor Little Rich Kids? {{The}} Role of Nature versus Nurture in Wealth and Other Economic Outcomes and Behaviors},
  author = {Black, Sandra E. and Devereux, Paul J. and Lundborg, Petter and Majlesi, Kaveh},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/papers/w21409},
  abstract = {Wealth is highly correlated between parents and their children; however, little is known about the extent to which these relationships are genetic or determined by environmental factors. We use administrative data on the net wealth of a large sample of Swedish adoptees merged with similar information for their biological and adoptive parents. Comparing the relationship between the wealth of adopted and biological parents and that of the adopted child, we find that, even prior to any inheritance, there is a substantial role for environment and a much smaller role for pre-birth factors and we find little evidence that nature/nurture interactions are important. When bequests are taken into account, the role of adoptive parental wealth becomes much stronger. Our findings suggest that wealth transmission is not primarily because children from wealthier families are inherently more talented or more able but that, even in relatively egalitarian Sweden, wealth begets wealth. We further build on the existing literature by providing a more comprehensive view of the role of nature and nurture on intergenerational mobility, looking at a wide range of different outcomes using a common sample and method. We find that environmental influences are relatively more important for wealth-related variables such as savings and investment decisions than for human capital. We conclude by studying consumption as an overall measure of welfare and find that, like wealth, it is more determined by environment than by biology.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Wealth is highly correlated between parents and their children; however, little is known about the extent to which these relationships are genetic or determined by environmental factors. We use administrative data on the net wealth of a large sample of Swedish adoptees merged with similar information for their biological and adoptive parents. Comparing the relationship between the wealth of adopted and biological parents and that of the adopted child, we find that, even prior to any inheritance, there is a substantial role for environment and a much smaller role for pre-birth factors and we find little evidence that nature/nurture interactions are important. When bequests are taken into account, the role of adoptive parental wealth becomes much stronger. Our findings suggest that wealth transmission is not primarily because children from wealthier families are inherently more talented or more able but that, even in relatively egalitarian Sweden, wealth begets wealth. We further build on the existing literature by providing a more comprehensive view of the role of nature and nurture on intergenerational mobility, looking at a wide range of different outcomes using a common sample and method. We find that environmental influences are relatively more important for wealth-related variables such as savings and investment decisions than for human capital. We conclude by studying consumption as an overall measure of welfare and find that, like wealth, it is more determined by environment than by biology.

@unpublished{Blanchetetal2019,
  title = {How Unequal Is Europe? {{Evidence}} from Distributional National Accounts, 1980\textendash 2017},
  author = {Blanchet, Thomas and Chancel, Lucas and Gethin, Amory},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://wid.world/wid-publications/},
  abstract = {This paper estimates the evolution of income inequality in 38 European countries from 1980 to 2017 by combining surveys, tax data and national accounts. We develop a harmonized methodology, using machine learning, nonlinear survey calibration and extreme value theory, in order to produce homogeneous pre-tax and post-tax income inequality estimates, comparable across countries and consistent with official national income growth rates. Inequalities have increased in a majority of European countries, both at the top and at the bottom of the distribution, especially between 1980 and 2000. The European top 1\% grew more than two times faster than the bottom 50\% and captured 17\% of regional income growth. Relative poverty in Europe went through ups and downs, increasing from 20\% in 1980 to 22\% in 2017. Inequalities yet remain lower and have increased much less in Europe than in the US, despite the persistence of strong income differences between European countries and the weaker progressivity of European-wide income redistribution.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper estimates the evolution of income inequality in 38 European countries from 1980 to 2017 by combining surveys, tax data and national accounts. We develop a harmonized methodology, using machine learning, nonlinear survey calibration and extreme value theory, in order to produce homogeneous pre-tax and post-tax income inequality estimates, comparable across countries and consistent with official national income growth rates. Inequalities have increased in a majority of European countries, both at the top and at the bottom of the distribution, especially between 1980 and 2000. The European top 1% grew more than two times faster than the bottom 50% and captured 17% of regional income growth. Relative poverty in Europe went through ups and downs, increasing from 20% in 1980 to 22% in 2017. Inequalities yet remain lower and have increased much less in Europe than in the US, despite the persistence of strong income differences between European countries and the weaker progressivity of European-wide income redistribution.

@article{Bourdieuetal2019,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Mobility in France, 19th and 20th Century},
  author = {Bourdieu, J{\'e}r{\^o}me and Kesztenbaum, Lionel and {Postel-Vinay}, Gilles and {Suwa-Eisenmann}, Akiko},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {65},
  number = {1},
  pages = {21--47},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12336},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12336},
  abstract = {This paper examines intergenerational wealth mobility between fathers and children in France between 1848 and 1960. Considering wealth mobility in the long run requires taking into account not only positional mobility (that is, how families move within a given distribution of wealth), but also structural mobility induced by changes in the distribution of wealth. Such changes are related to two structural phenomena: in the nineteenth century, the rising number of individuals leaving no estate at death and, after World War I, the decline in the number of the very rich who could live off their wealth. The paper studies the movements between these groups and estimates the intergenerational elasticity of wealth, taking into account the persistence at the bottom and at the top.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper examines intergenerational wealth mobility between fathers and children in France between 1848 and 1960. Considering wealth mobility in the long run requires taking into account not only positional mobility (that is, how families move within a given distribution of wealth), but also structural mobility induced by changes in the distribution of wealth. Such changes are related to two structural phenomena: in the nineteenth century, the rising number of individuals leaving no estate at death and, after World War I, the decline in the number of the very rich who could live off their wealth. The paper studies the movements between these groups and estimates the intergenerational elasticity of wealth, taking into account the persistence at the bottom and at the top.

@article{Brickeretal2019,
  title = {Wealth Concentration in the {{U}}.{{S}}. after Augmenting the Upper Tail of the Survey of Consumer Finances},
  author = {Bricker, Jesse and Hansen, Peter and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {184},
  pages = {1--4},
  doi = {10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108659},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108659},
  abstract = {We augment SCF wealth data with a Pareto distribution and also by adding wealth of the Forbes 400 (who are excluded in SCF sampling). The wealth share of the top 1\% typically increases by 1.5 percentage points under each correction.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

We augment SCF wealth data with a Pareto distribution and also by adding wealth of the Forbes 400 (who are excluded in SCF sampling). The wealth share of the top 1% typically increases by 1.5 percentage points under each correction.

@unpublished{Brulhartetal2019,
  title = {Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Switzerland},
  author = {Br{\"u}lhart, Marius and Gruber, Jonathan and Krapf, Matthias and Schmidheiny, Kurt},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471248},
  abstract = {We study how reported wealth responds to changes in wealth tax rates. Exploiting rich intra-national variation in Switzerland, the country with the highest revenue share of annual wealth taxation in the OECD, we find that a 1 percentage point drop in the wealth tax rate raises reported wealth by at least 43\% after 6 years. Administrative tax records of two cantons with quasi- randomly assigned differential tax reforms suggest that 24\% of the effect arise from taxpayer mobility and 20\% from house price capitalization. Savings responses appear unable to explain more than a small fraction of the remainder, suggesting sizable evasion responses in this setting with no third-party reporting of financial wealth.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We study how reported wealth responds to changes in wealth tax rates. Exploiting rich intra-national variation in Switzerland, the country with the highest revenue share of annual wealth taxation in the OECD, we find that a 1 percentage point drop in the wealth tax rate raises reported wealth by at least 43% after 6 years. Administrative tax records of two cantons with quasi- randomly assigned differential tax reforms suggest that 24% of the effect arise from taxpayer mobility and 20% from house price capitalization. Savings responses appear unable to explain more than a small fraction of the remainder, suggesting sizable evasion responses in this setting with no third-party reporting of financial wealth.

@incollection{Chauveletal2019,
  title = {Income and Wealth above the Median: New Measurements and Results for {{Europe}} and the {{United States}}},
  booktitle = {What Drives Inequality?},
  author = {Chauvel, Louis and Hartung, Anne and {Bar-Haim}, Eyal and Van Kerm, Philippe},
  editor = {Decancq, Koen and Van Kerm, Philippe},
  year = {2019},
  pages = {89--104},
  publisher = {{Emerald Publishing Limited}},
  doi = {10.1108/S1049-258520190000027007},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1108/S1049-258520190000027007},
  abstract = {The study of the upper tail of the income and wealth distributions is important to the understanding of economic inequality. By means of the `isograph', a new tool to describe income or wealth distributions, the authors compare wealth and income and wealth-to-income ratios in 16 European countries and the United States using data for years 2013/2014 from the Eurozone Household Finance and Consumption Survey and the US Survey on Consumer Finance. Focussing on the top half of the distribution, the authors find that for households in the top income quintile, wealth-to-income ratios generally increase rapidly with income; the association between high wealth and high incomes is highest among the highest percentiles. There is generally a positive relationship between median wealth in the country and the wealth of the top 1\%. However, the United States is an outlier where the median wealth is relatively low but the wealth of the top 1\% is extremely high.},
  chapter = {Ch. 6},
  isbn = {978-1-78973-378-5},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The study of the upper tail of the income and wealth distributions is important to the understanding of economic inequality. By means of the `isograph', a new tool to describe income or wealth distributions, the authors compare wealth and income and wealth-to-income ratios in 16 European countries and the United States using data for years 2013/2014 from the Eurozone Household Finance and Consumption Survey and the US Survey on Consumer Finance. Focussing on the top half of the distribution, the authors find that for households in the top income quintile, wealth-to-income ratios generally increase rapidly with income; the association between high wealth and high incomes is highest among the highest percentiles. There is generally a positive relationship between median wealth in the country and the wealth of the top 1%. However, the United States is an outlier where the median wealth is relatively low but the wealth of the top 1% is extremely high.

@unpublished{Cummins2019,
  title = {Where Is the Middle Class? {{Inequality}}, Gender and the Shape of the Upper Tail from 60 Million {{English}} Death and Probate Records, 1892-2016},
  author = {Cummins, Neil},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3314935},
  url = {https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13436},
  abstract = {This paper analyses a newly constructed individual level dataset of every English death and probate from 1892-2016. The estimated top wealth shares match closely existing estimates. However, this analysis clearly shows that the 20th century's 'Great Equalization' of wealth stalled in mid-century. The probate rate, which captures the proportion of English with any significant wealth at death rose from 10\% in the 1890s to 40\% by 1950 and has stagnated to 2016. Despite the large declines in the wealth share of the top 1\%, from 73\% to 20\%, the median English person died with almost nothing throughout. All changes in inequality after 1950 involve a reshuffling of wealth within the top 30\%. Further, I find that a log-normal distribution fits the tail of the empirical data better than a Pareto power law. Finally, I show that the top wealth shares are increasingly and systematically male as one ascends in wealth, 1892-1992, but this has equalized over the 20th century.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper analyses a newly constructed individual level dataset of every English death and probate from 1892-2016. The estimated top wealth shares match closely existing estimates. However, this analysis clearly shows that the 20th century's 'Great Equalization' of wealth stalled in mid-century. The probate rate, which captures the proportion of English with any significant wealth at death rose from 10% in the 1890s to 40% by 1950 and has stagnated to 2016. Despite the large declines in the wealth share of the top 1%, from 73% to 20%, the median English person died with almost nothing throughout. All changes in inequality after 1950 involve a reshuffling of wealth within the top 30%. Further, I find that a log-normal distribution fits the tail of the empirical data better than a Pareto power law. Finally, I show that the top wealth shares are increasingly and systematically male as one ascends in wealth, 1892-1992, but this has equalized over the 20th century.

@unpublished{Cummins2019a,
  title = {Hidden Wealth},
  author = {Cummins, Neil},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3470253},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3470253},
  abstract = {Sharp declines in wealth-concentration occurred across Europe and the US during the 20th century. But this stylized fact is based on declared wealth. It is possible that today the richest are not less rich but rather that they are hiding much of their wealth. This paper proposes a method to measure this hidden wealth, in any form. In England, 1920\textendash 1992, elites are concealing 20\textendash 32\% of their wealth. Among dynasties, hidden wealth, independent of declared wealth, predicts appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013\textendash 6, house values in 1999, and Oxbridge attendance, 1990\textendash 2016. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates one-third of the observed decline of top 10\% wealth-share over the past century.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Sharp declines in wealth-concentration occurred across Europe and the US during the 20th century. But this stylized fact is based on declared wealth. It is possible that today the richest are not less rich but rather that they are hiding much of their wealth. This paper proposes a method to measure this hidden wealth, in any form. In England, 1920– 1992, elites are concealing 20– 32% of their wealth. Among dynasties, hidden wealth, independent of declared wealth, predicts appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013– 6, house values in 1999, and Oxbridge attendance, 1990– 2016. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates one-third of the observed decline of top 10% wealth-share over the past century.

@unpublished{DAmbrosioetal2019,
  title = {Income and Wealth Volatility: Evidence from Italy and the {{U}}.{{S}}. in the Past Two Decades},
  author = {D'Ambrosio, Conchita and Menta, Giorgia and Wolff, Edward},
  year = {2019},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w26527},
  abstract = {Income volatility and wealth volatility are central objects of investigation for the literature on income and wealth inequality and dynamics. Here we analyse the two concepts in a comparative perspective for the same individuals in Italy and the U.S. over the last two decades. Contrary to our expectations, we find that in both countries wealth volatility reaches significantly higher values than income volatility, the effect being mostly driven by changes in the market value of real estate assets. We also show that there is more volatility in both dimensions in the United States and that the overall trend in both countries is increasing over time. We conclude by exploring volatility in consumption.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Income volatility and wealth volatility are central objects of investigation for the literature on income and wealth inequality and dynamics. Here we analyse the two concepts in a comparative perspective for the same individuals in Italy and the U.S. over the last two decades. Contrary to our expectations, we find that in both countries wealth volatility reaches significantly higher values than income volatility, the effect being mostly driven by changes in the market value of real estate assets. We also show that there is more volatility in both dimensions in the United States and that the overall trend in both countries is increasing over time. We conclude by exploring volatility in consumption.

@unpublished{Duran-Cabreetal2019,
  title = {Behavioural Responses to the (Re)Introduction of Wealth Taxes. Evidence from Spain},
  author = {{Duran-Cabr{\'e}}, Jos{\'e} Ma. and {Esteller-Mor{\'e}}, Alejandro and {Mas-Montserrat}, Mariona},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3393016},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3393016},
  abstract = {In the throes of economic crisis, the Spanish government decided to reintroduce the Wealth Tax, appealing to redistributive motives and its need for greater revenues. This paper studies how individuals reacted to the reintroduction of this tax by drawing on the universe of wealth tax returns submitted to the Catalan Tax Agency between 2011 and 2015. Thus, we exploit the variation in treatment exposure to analyse taxpayers' responses, in terms not only of wealth accumulation, but also of the potential avoidance strategies adopted. Indeed, our results reflect avoidance rather than real responses. They show that while facing higher wealth taxes did not have a negative effect on taxpayers' savings, it did encourage them to change their asset and income composition to take advantage of wealth tax exemptions (mostly business-related) and the existence of a limit on wealth tax liability. This translates into an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return of 0.64, or, put differently, a 0.1 percentage point increase in the average wealth tax rate leads to a reduction in taxable wealth of 3.24\% over 4 years. Overall, these avoidance responses are quite marked in terms of tax revenues: they represent a 4-year accumulated revenue loss of 2.6 times the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues. The existence of such responses mostly related to the design of the wealth tax has relevant policy implications not only in terms of revenues but also insofar as it undermines the tax's redistributive role.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

In the throes of economic crisis, the Spanish government decided to reintroduce the Wealth Tax, appealing to redistributive motives and its need for greater revenues. This paper studies how individuals reacted to the reintroduction of this tax by drawing on the universe of wealth tax returns submitted to the Catalan Tax Agency between 2011 and 2015. Thus, we exploit the variation in treatment exposure to analyse taxpayers' responses, in terms not only of wealth accumulation, but also of the potential avoidance strategies adopted. Indeed, our results reflect avoidance rather than real responses. They show that while facing higher wealth taxes did not have a negative effect on taxpayers' savings, it did encourage them to change their asset and income composition to take advantage of wealth tax exemptions (mostly business-related) and the existence of a limit on wealth tax liability. This translates into an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return of 0.64, or, put differently, a 0.1 percentage point increase in the average wealth tax rate leads to a reduction in taxable wealth of 3.24% over 4 years. Overall, these avoidance responses are quite marked in terms of tax revenues: they represent a 4-year accumulated revenue loss of 2.6 times the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues. The existence of such responses mostly related to the design of the wealth tax has relevant policy implications not only in terms of revenues but also insofar as it undermines the tax's redistributive role.

@article{Echevarriaetal2019,
  title = {Wealth Distribution in Cuba (2006\textendash 2014): {{A}} First Assessment Using Microdata},
  author = {Echevarr{\'i}a, Dayma and Gabriele, Alberto and Roman{\`o}, Sara and Schettino, Francesco},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics},
  volume = {43},
  number = {2},
  pages = {361--383},
  doi = {10.1093/cje/bey026},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bey026},
  abstract = {Recently, a trend towards increasing inequality has been detected in both developed and developing countries. Most of these studies have been focusing on formal monetary variables, since capitalism is a socioeconomic system where monetary relations play a paramount role. However, the distribution of non-monetary assets is also very important, especially so in less developed countries. This paper applies a PCA methodology to analyse the distribution of non-monetary wealth in Cuba, a socialist country where the role of monetary relations is relatively minor. Utilizing the MICS-UNICEF `microdata', the paper provides for the first time an estimation of wealth distribution for three years (2006, 2011, 2014), by area and region. The main results show a non-monotonic wealth inequality reduction. The initial worsening (2006\textendash 11) is more than counterbalanced by a recent improvement (2011\textendash 14).},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Recently, a trend towards increasing inequality has been detected in both developed and developing countries. Most of these studies have been focusing on formal monetary variables, since capitalism is a socioeconomic system where monetary relations play a paramount role. However, the distribution of non-monetary assets is also very important, especially so in less developed countries. This paper applies a PCA methodology to analyse the distribution of non-monetary wealth in Cuba, a socialist country where the role of monetary relations is relatively minor. Utilizing the MICS-UNICEF `microdata', the paper provides for the first time an estimation of wealth distribution for three years (2006, 2011, 2014), by area and region. The main results show a non-monotonic wealth inequality reduction. The initial worsening (2006– 11) is more than counterbalanced by a recent improvement (2011– 14).

@unpublished{Fagerengetal2019,
  title = {{{MPC}} Heterogeneity and Household Balance Sheets},
  author = {Fagereng, Andreas and Holm, Martin B. and Natvik, Gisle J.},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2018/working-paper/mpc-heterogeneity-and-household-balance-sheets},
  abstract = {We use sizeable lottery prizes in Norwegian administrative panel data to explore how transitory income shocks are spent and saved over time, and how households' marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) vary with household characteristics and shock size. We find that spending peaks in the year of winning and reverts to normal within five years. Controlling for all items on households' balance sheets and characteristics such as education and income, it is the amount won, age, and liquid assets that vary systematically with MPCs. Low-liquidity winners of the smallest prizes (around USD 1,500) are estimated to spend all within the year of winning. The corresponding estimate for high-liquidity winners of large prizes (USD 8,300-150,000) is slightly below one half. While conventional models will struggle to account for such high MPC levels, we show that a two-asset life-cycle model with a realistic earnings profile and a luxury bequest motive can account for both the time profile of consumption responses and their systematic co-variation with observables.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We use sizeable lottery prizes in Norwegian administrative panel data to explore how transitory income shocks are spent and saved over time, and how households' marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) vary with household characteristics and shock size. We find that spending peaks in the year of winning and reverts to normal within five years. Controlling for all items on households' balance sheets and characteristics such as education and income, it is the amount won, age, and liquid assets that vary systematically with MPCs. Low-liquidity winners of the smallest prizes (around USD 1,500) are estimated to spend all within the year of winning. The corresponding estimate for high-liquidity winners of large prizes (USD 8,300-150,000) is slightly below one half. While conventional models will struggle to account for such high MPC levels, we show that a two-asset life-cycle model with a realistic earnings profile and a luxury bequest motive can account for both the time profile of consumption responses and their systematic co-variation with observables.

@techreport{FeivesonSabelhaus2019,
  type = {Finance and {{Economics Discussion Series}}},
  title = {Lifecycle Patterns of Saving and Wealth Accumulation},
  author = {Feiveson, Laura and Sabelhaus, John},
  year = {2019},
  month = aug,
  number = {2019-010},
  institution = {{Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System}},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2019.010r1},
  abstract = {Empirical analysis of U.S. income, saving and wealth dynamics is constrained by a lack of high-quality and comprehensive household-level panel data. This paper uses a pseudo-panel approach, tracking types of agents by birth cohort and across time through a series of cross-section snapshots synthesized with macro aggregates. The key micro source data is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which captures the top of the wealth distribution by sampling from administrative records. The SCF has the detailed balance sheet components, incomes, and interfamily transfers needed to use both sides of the intertemporal budget constraint and thus solve for saving and consumption. The wealth change decomposition by age and agent type provides a new set of benchmarks for heterogeneous agent macro models, reconciling observed anomalies about lifecycle saving behavior and emphasizing the importance of generally unmeasured incomes (interfamily transfers and capital gains) in wealth accumulation dynamics.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Empirical analysis of U.S. income, saving and wealth dynamics is constrained by a lack of high-quality and comprehensive household-level panel data. This paper uses a pseudo-panel approach, tracking types of agents by birth cohort and across time through a series of cross-section snapshots synthesized with macro aggregates. The key micro source data is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which captures the top of the wealth distribution by sampling from administrative records. The SCF has the detailed balance sheet components, incomes, and interfamily transfers needed to use both sides of the intertemporal budget constraint and thus solve for saving and consumption. The wealth change decomposition by age and agent type provides a new set of benchmarks for heterogeneous agent macro models, reconciling observed anomalies about lifecycle saving behavior and emphasizing the importance of generally unmeasured incomes (interfamily transfers and capital gains) in wealth accumulation dynamics.

@article{Ford2019,
  title = {The Need for a Wealth Inequality Amendment},
  author = {Ford, Stuart},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {West Virginia Law Review},
  number = {Forthcoming},
  pages = {1--44},
  url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3340205##},
  abstract = {Wealth and income inequality have been studied across a number of fields, including economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and public health. This Article surveys and synthesizes the most recent findings across these fields to better understand the effects of high inequality on society. Those consequences are profound. High rates of inequality do not just mean that some people have more money than others. Highly unequal societies have slower economic growth than more equal societies. They have a variety of health problems, including lower life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, and higher rates of mental illness. High levels of inequality are also associated with various social problems, including lower rates of trust and social cohesion, lower levels of life satisfaction, and higher rates of crime. And finally, high levels of inequality undermine democracy by decreasing voter turnout, increasing corruption, and undermining the rule of law. Unsurprisingly, given that the United States is the most unequal advanced democracy, the U.S. is suffering from all of these problems. We have high crime rates, high infant mortality rates, low life expectancies, and low overall rates of life satisfaction. By most measures, living in America today is more like living in a country like Russia or Chile than it is like living in Norway or Denmark. The consequences of high levels of inequality represent an existential threat to both our society and our democracy. It is for this reason, that this Article proposes a constitutional amendment designed to limit wealth inequality. The amendment would prohibit the U.S. government from passing laws or rules that increase wealth inequality unless the government can demonstrate that they are narrowly tailored to accomplish an important governmental goal. It is not designed to eliminate all inequality, but there are good reasons to believe it would eventually reduce inequality in our society. This would lead to greater trust in government and society, better public health, and greater economic growth. These changes would make the United States a better place to live for everyone.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

Wealth and income inequality have been studied across a number of fields, including economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and public health. This Article surveys and synthesizes the most recent findings across these fields to better understand the effects of high inequality on society. Those consequences are profound. High rates of inequality do not just mean that some people have more money than others. Highly unequal societies have slower economic growth than more equal societies. They have a variety of health problems, including lower life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, and higher rates of mental illness. High levels of inequality are also associated with various social problems, including lower rates of trust and social cohesion, lower levels of life satisfaction, and higher rates of crime. And finally, high levels of inequality undermine democracy by decreasing voter turnout, increasing corruption, and undermining the rule of law. Unsurprisingly, given that the United States is the most unequal advanced democracy, the U.S. is suffering from all of these problems. We have high crime rates, high infant mortality rates, low life expectancies, and low overall rates of life satisfaction. By most measures, living in America today is more like living in a country like Russia or Chile than it is like living in Norway or Denmark. The consequences of high levels of inequality represent an existential threat to both our society and our democracy. It is for this reason, that this Article proposes a constitutional amendment designed to limit wealth inequality. The amendment would prohibit the U.S. government from passing laws or rules that increase wealth inequality unless the government can demonstrate that they are narrowly tailored to accomplish an important governmental goal. It is not designed to eliminate all inequality, but there are good reasons to believe it would eventually reduce inequality in our society. This would lead to greater trust in government and society, better public health, and greater economic growth. These changes would make the United States a better place to live for everyone.

@article{Galbraith2019,
  title = {Sparse, Inconsistent and Unreliable: Tax Records and the World Inequality Report 2018},
  author = {Galbraith, James K.},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Development and Change},
  volume = {50},
  number = {2},
  pages = {329--346},
  doi = {10.1111/dech.12475},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12475},
  abstract = {This article reviews the World Inequality Report 2018, a large collaborative data project based on the work of Thomas Piketty and the late Anthony Atkinson, which critiques the entire literature of inequality measurement from survey data and purports to provide superior, unprecedented and reliable coverage of income and wealth inequalities over the entire world, based primarily on tax records. The article examines three major issues: the coverage provided by tax data in the world economy, the consistency of tax data with other sources of information on income inequality, and the peculiarities of tax-based measurement of inequality in the United States. Then a comparison is made with measures drawn from other forms of administrative data \textemdash{} specifically payroll records \textemdash{} which are generally more consistent with records of inequality measured in household surveys than are tax records. Following this, the article discusses the analysis of wealth and wealth inequality before offering a few closing remarks about policy.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This article reviews the World Inequality Report 2018, a large collaborative data project based on the work of Thomas Piketty and the late Anthony Atkinson, which critiques the entire literature of inequality measurement from survey data and purports to provide superior, unprecedented and reliable coverage of income and wealth inequalities over the entire world, based primarily on tax records. The article examines three major issues: the coverage provided by tax data in the world economy, the consistency of tax data with other sources of information on income inequality, and the peculiarities of tax-based measurement of inequality in the United States. Then a comparison is made with measures drawn from other forms of administrative data — specifically payroll records — which are generally more consistent with records of inequality measured in household surveys than are tax records. Following this, the article discusses the analysis of wealth and wealth inequality before offering a few closing remarks about policy.

@unpublished{GallusserKrapf2019,
  title = {Joint Income-Wealth Inequality: An Application Using Administrative Tax Data},
  author = {Gallusser, David and Krapf, Matthias},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2019/working-paper/joint-income-wealth-inequality-application-using-administrative},
  abstract = {Using tax data from the Swiss canton of Lucerne, we study how measures of economic inequality change if they account for income and wealth rather than income alone. The joint distribution of income and wealth displays strong tail dependence at the top and a negative association for negative net wealth. Joint income-wealth, the sum of labor income and annuitized wealth, serves as a measure of combined inequality of income and wealth. Inequality measured using joint income-wealth is higher than measured using income alone. We refine existing annuitization techniques by introducing heterogeneous returns. A decomposition shows that the underlying marginal distributions of labor income and annuitized wealth account for most of joint income-wealth inequality, whereas their association matters only in the tails.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Using tax data from the Swiss canton of Lucerne, we study how measures of economic inequality change if they account for income and wealth rather than income alone. The joint distribution of income and wealth displays strong tail dependence at the top and a negative association for negative net wealth. Joint income-wealth, the sum of labor income and annuitized wealth, serves as a measure of combined inequality of income and wealth. Inequality measured using joint income-wealth is higher than measured using income alone. We refine existing annuitization techniques by introducing heterogeneous returns. A decomposition shows that the underlying marginal distributions of labor income and annuitized wealth account for most of joint income-wealth inequality, whereas their association matters only in the tails.

@article{HansenWiborg2019,
  title = {The Accumulation and Transfers of Wealth: Variations by Social Class},
  author = {Hansen, Marianne Nordli and Wiborg, {\O}yvind Nicolay},
  year = {2019},
  month = dec,
  journal = {European Sociological Review},
  volume = {35},
  number = {6},
  pages = {874--893},
  doi = {10.1093/esr/jcz036},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcz036},
  abstract = {The purpose of our study is to investigate the role of wealth in broader stratification processes. Based on unique data from Norwegian tax registers, we address questions about the association between class origin, wealth transfers, and wealth accumulation among young adults. We show that is more common to receive transfers in the higher than in the lower social classes, and that those originating in the economic upper class, i.e. large proprietors, owners, of single enterprises as well as investors with diversified portfolios, and top managers and directors, are especially likely to receive transfers, as well as especially large inter vivos gifts. As young adults, those with upper-class origins, and especially origins in the economic upper class, accumulate more wealth than those with origins in classes lower in the social hierarchy. In all social classes, those who have received wealth transfers accumulate most wealth. We argue that transferring wealth indeed appears as robust and efficient mobility or reproduction strategy.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

The purpose of our study is to investigate the role of wealth in broader stratification processes. Based on unique data from Norwegian tax registers, we address questions about the association between class origin, wealth transfers, and wealth accumulation among young adults. We show that is more common to receive transfers in the higher than in the lower social classes, and that those originating in the economic upper class, i.e. large proprietors, owners, of single enterprises as well as investors with diversified portfolios, and top managers and directors, are especially likely to receive transfers, as well as especially large inter vivos gifts. As young adults, those with upper-class origins, and especially origins in the economic upper class, accumulate more wealth than those with origins in classes lower in the social hierarchy. In all social classes, those who have received wealth transfers accumulate most wealth. We argue that transferring wealth indeed appears as robust and efficient mobility or reproduction strategy.

@article{Kennickell2019,
  title = {The Tail That Wags: Differences in Effective Right Tail Coverage and Estimates of Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Kennickell, Arthur B.},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {17},
  pages = {443--459},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-019-09424-8},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-019-09424-8},
  abstract = {This paper focuses on the sensitivity of survey-based estimates of wealth inequality to the quality of the measurement of the upper tail of the distribution. Using data from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), it develops a series of illustrative examples to highlight some of the problems in making comparisons of wealth inequality measures when there are specific defects in the measurement of the upper tail of the distribution. The results presented strongly indicate that in the absence of effective controls on the measurement of the upper tail of the wealth distribution, great caution should be the rule in the interpretation of most commonly used measures of wealth inequality from a given survey, comparison of such measures across the waves of the survey, and perhaps even more strongly, comparison across independently designed and managed surveys. A graphical decomposition of the 2013 SCF wealth distribution provides additional insight into the underlying cause of the sensitivity of the inequality measures. The paper concludes with a brief outline of a research program for improving the ability of surveys to provide more meaningful estimates of inequality measures.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper focuses on the sensitivity of survey-based estimates of wealth inequality to the quality of the measurement of the upper tail of the distribution. Using data from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), it develops a series of illustrative examples to highlight some of the problems in making comparisons of wealth inequality measures when there are specific defects in the measurement of the upper tail of the distribution. The results presented strongly indicate that in the absence of effective controls on the measurement of the upper tail of the wealth distribution, great caution should be the rule in the interpretation of most commonly used measures of wealth inequality from a given survey, comparison of such measures across the waves of the survey, and perhaps even more strongly, comparison across independently designed and managed surveys. A graphical decomposition of the 2013 SCF wealth distribution provides additional insight into the underlying cause of the sensitivity of the inequality measures. The paper concludes with a brief outline of a research program for improving the ability of surveys to provide more meaningful estimates of inequality measures.

@techreport{KitaoYamada2019,
  type = {{{CAMA Working Paper}}},
  title = {Dimensions of Inequality in {{Japan}}: Distributions of Earnings, Income and Wealth between 1984 and 2014},
  author = {Kitao, Sagiri and Yamada, Tomoaki},
  year = {2019},
  month = jun,
  number = {36/2019},
  institution = {{Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis}},
  url = {https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/publication/cama-working-paper-series/14348/dimensions-inequality-japan-distributions-earnings},
  abstract = {Inequality has become a central policy issue across the world. We study trends of inequality in earnings, income and wealth across households in Japan, using the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) from 1984 to 2014. We focus on the transition of inequality unconditionally and conditionally across various dimensions of household heterogeneity such as age, cohort, employment and marital status of household heads, sources of income, family size, etc. Inequality in earnings, income and wealth all increased during the last three decades. Changes in earnings and income inequality were mostly driven by demographic shift in the population towards the elderly, who tend to have higher inequality. Wealth inequality rose not only in the aggregate but also among the young, and this is due to a major increase in the fraction of households who own zero or very low wealth across all age groups. Critical factors in understanding inequality trends in Japan that we identified are aging demographics, changes in typical household structure, and macroeconomic trends of the past decades including the financial bubble period and a decades-long slow-down thereafter.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {KitaoYamada2019.pdf}
}

Inequality has become a central policy issue across the world. We study trends of inequality in earnings, income and wealth across households in Japan, using the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) from 1984 to 2014. We focus on the transition of inequality unconditionally and conditionally across various dimensions of household heterogeneity such as age, cohort, employment and marital status of household heads, sources of income, family size, etc. Inequality in earnings, income and wealth all increased during the last three decades. Changes in earnings and income inequality were mostly driven by demographic shift in the population towards the elderly, who tend to have higher inequality. Wealth inequality rose not only in the aggregate but also among the young, and this is due to a major increase in the fraction of households who own zero or very low wealth across all age groups. Critical factors in understanding inequality trends in Japan that we identified are aging demographics, changes in typical household structure, and macroeconomic trends of the past decades including the financial bubble period and a decades-long slow-down thereafter.

@article{Madsen2019,
  title = {Wealth and Inequality over Eight Centuries of British Capitalism},
  author = {Madsen, Jakob B.},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
  volume = {138},
  pages = {246--260},
  doi = {10.1016/J.JDEVECO.2019.01.005},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.01.005},
  abstract = {This paper constructs annual data for the wealth-income ratio, W-Y, for the UK over the period 1210\textendash 2013. It is found that the W-Y ratio has fluctuated at one-two century frequencies about a constant level of approximately 500\% over the past eight centuries. Furthermore, a U-shaped W-Y path is identified over the past two centuries and it is argued that the descending part of the U-shape is driven by the transition from pre-industrial modes of production to industrialization and that the post-1980 upturn in the W-Y ratio represents the transition from the industrial to the post-industrialization era.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper constructs annual data for the wealth-income ratio, W-Y, for the UK over the period 1210– 2013. It is found that the W-Y ratio has fluctuated at one-two century frequencies about a constant level of approximately 500% over the past eight centuries. Furthermore, a U-shaped W-Y path is identified over the past two centuries and it is argued that the descending part of the U-shape is driven by the transition from pre-industrial modes of production to industrialization and that the post-1980 upturn in the W-Y ratio represents the transition from the industrial to the post-industrialization era.

@unpublished{MichaillatSaez2019,
  title = {Resolving New Keynesian Anomalies with Wealth in the Utility Function},
  author = {Michaillat, Pascal and Saez, Emmanuel},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://eml.berkeley.edu/$\sim$saez/},
  abstract = {At the zero lower bound, the New Keynesian model predicts that output and inflation collapse to implausibly low levels, and that government spending and forward guidance have implausibly large effects. To resolve these anomalies, we introduce wealth into the utility function; the justification is that wealth is a marker of social status, and people value social status. Since people save not only for future consumption but also to accrue social status, the Euler equation is modified. As a result, when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large, the dynamical system representing the equilibrium at the zero lower bound transforms from a saddle to a source\textemdash which resolves all the anomalies.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

At the zero lower bound, the New Keynesian model predicts that output and inflation collapse to implausibly low levels, and that government spending and forward guidance have implausibly large effects. To resolve these anomalies, we introduce wealth into the utility function; the justification is that wealth is a marker of social status, and people value social status. Since people save not only for future consumption but also to accrue social status, the Euler equation is modified. As a result, when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large, the dynamical system representing the equilibrium at the zero lower bound transforms from a saddle to a source— which resolves all the anomalies.

@unpublished{MumtazTheophilopoulou2019,
  title = {Monetary Policy and Wealth Inequality over the Great Recession in the {{UK}}. an Empirical Analysis},
  author = {Mumtaz, Haroon and Theophilopoulou, Angeliki},
  year = {2019},
  url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210449},
  abstract = {We use detailed micro information at household level from the Wealth and Assets Survey to construct measures of wealth inequality from 2005 to 2016 at the monthly frequency. We investigate the dynamic relationship between monetary policy and the evolution of wealth inequality measures. Our findings suggest that expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to an increase in wealth inequality and contributed significantly to its fluctuations. This effect is heterogenous across the wealth distribution with the monetary shock affecting the median household relative to the 20th percentile by a larger amount than the right tail. Our results suggest that the shock is transmitted through changes in net property and financial wealth that constitute the bulk of total wealth of households near the median of the wealth distribution.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We use detailed micro information at household level from the Wealth and Assets Survey to construct measures of wealth inequality from 2005 to 2016 at the monthly frequency. We investigate the dynamic relationship between monetary policy and the evolution of wealth inequality measures. Our findings suggest that expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to an increase in wealth inequality and contributed significantly to its fluctuations. This effect is heterogenous across the wealth distribution with the monetary shock affecting the median household relative to the 20th percentile by a larger amount than the right tail. Our results suggest that the shock is transmitted through changes in net property and financial wealth that constitute the bulk of total wealth of households near the median of the wealth distribution.

@article{PfefferKillewald2019,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Mobility and Racial Inequality},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Killewald, Alexandra},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Socius},
  volume = {5},
  pages = {1--2},
  doi = {10.1177/2378023119831799},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023119831799},
  abstract = {The black-white gap in household wealth is large and well documented. Here, we visualize how this racial wealth gap persists across generations. Animating the flow of individuals between the relative wealth position of parents and their adult children, we show that the disadvantage of black families is a consequence both of wealth inequality in prior generations and race differences in the transmission of wealth positions across generations: Black children both have less wealthy parents on average and are far more likely to be downwardly mobile in household wealth. By displaying intergenerational movements between parental and offspring wealth quintiles, we underline how intergenerational fluctuation coexists with the maintenance of a severely racialized wealth structure.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

The black-white gap in household wealth is large and well documented. Here, we visualize how this racial wealth gap persists across generations. Animating the flow of individuals between the relative wealth position of parents and their adult children, we show that the disadvantage of black families is a consequence both of wealth inequality in prior generations and race differences in the transmission of wealth positions across generations: Black children both have less wealthy parents on average and are far more likely to be downwardly mobile in household wealth. By displaying intergenerational movements between parental and offspring wealth quintiles, we underline how intergenerational fluctuation coexists with the maintenance of a severely racialized wealth structure.

@article{Pikettyetal2019,
  title = {Capital Accumulation, Private Property, and Rising Inequality in {{China}}, 1978\textendash 2015},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Yang, Li and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  month = jul,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {109},
  number = {7},
  pages = {2469--2496},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20170973},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170973},
  abstract = {We combine national accounts, surveys, and new tax data to study the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in China from 1978 to 2015. The national wealth-income ratio increased from 350 percent in 1978 to 700 percent in 2015, while the share of public property in national wealth declined from 70 percent to 30 percent. We provide sharp upward revision of official inequality estimates. The top 10 percent income share rose from 27 percent to 41 percent between 1978 and 2015; the bottom 50 percent share dropped from 27 percent to 15 percent. China's inequality levels used to be close to Nordic countries and are now approaching US levels.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-yang-zucman-capitalaccumulationprivatepropertyandrisinginequalityinchina19782015onlineappendix-2018},
  url_data_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-yang-zucman-capitalaccumulationprivatepropertyandrisinginequalityinchina19782015datafiles-2018}
}

We combine national accounts, surveys, and new tax data to study the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in China from 1978 to 2015. The national wealth-income ratio increased from 350 percent in 1978 to 700 percent in 2015, while the share of public property in national wealth declined from 70 percent to 30 percent. We provide sharp upward revision of official inequality estimates. The top 10 percent income share rose from 27 percent to 41 percent between 1978 and 2015; the bottom 50 percent share dropped from 27 percent to 15 percent. China's inequality levels used to be close to Nordic countries and are now approaching US levels.

@techreport{SabelhausVolz2019,
  type = {{{FEDS Notes}}},
  title = {Are Disappearing Employer Pensions Contributing to Rising Wealth Inequality?},
  author = {Sabelhaus, John and Volz, Alice Henriques},
  year = {2019},
  month = feb,
  institution = {{Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System}},
  doi = {10.17016/2380-7172.2308},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2308},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

@article{SaezZucman2019,
  title = {Progressive Wealth Taxation},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Brookings Paper on Economic Activity},
  volume = {Fall},
  pages = {437--533},
  doi = {10.1353/eca.2019.0017},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2019.0017},
  abstract = {This paper discusses the progressive taxation of household wealth. We first discuss what wealth is, how it is distributed, and how much revenue a progressive wealth tax could generate in the United States. We try to reconcile discrepancies across wealth data sources. Second, we discuss the role a wealth tax can play to increase the overall progressivity of the U.S. tax system. Third, we discuss the empirical evidence on wealth tax avoidance and evasion as well as tax enforcement policies. We summarize the key elements needed to make a U.S. wealth tax work in light of the experience of other countries. Fourth, we discuss the real economic effects of wealth taxation on inequality, the capital stock, and economic activity. Fifth, we present a simple tractable model of the taxation of billionaires' wealth that can be applied to the Forbes list of the four hundred richest Americans since 1982 to illustrate the long-run effects of concrete wealth tax proposals on top fortunes.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-progressivewealthtaxationdatafile-2019}
}

This paper discusses the progressive taxation of household wealth. We first discuss what wealth is, how it is distributed, and how much revenue a progressive wealth tax could generate in the United States. We try to reconcile discrepancies across wealth data sources. Second, we discuss the role a wealth tax can play to increase the overall progressivity of the U.S. tax system. Third, we discuss the empirical evidence on wealth tax avoidance and evasion as well as tax enforcement policies. We summarize the key elements needed to make a U.S. wealth tax work in light of the experience of other countries. Fourth, we discuss the real economic effects of wealth taxation on inequality, the capital stock, and economic activity. Fifth, we present a simple tractable model of the taxation of billionaires' wealth that can be applied to the Forbes list of the four hundred richest Americans since 1982 to illustrate the long-run effects of concrete wealth tax proposals on top fortunes.

@unpublished{SaezZucman2019a,
  title = {How Would a Progressive Wealth Tax Work? {{Evidence}} from the Economics Literature},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  url = {http://gabriel-zucman.eu/},
  abstract = {Senator Elizabeth Warren recently proposed a new wealth tax on the richest Americans. Though the United States does not have a wealth tax, a number of countries around the world have or had progressive wealth taxes. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of progressive wealth taxation in light of the international experience and economic theory. In short, a progressive wealth tax focused on the ultra-wealthy (households with more than \$50 million in net wealth) could raise substantial revenues and the economic incidence of the tax would lie overwhelmingly on the richest families. After defining what a progressive wealth tax is, in section 2 we discuss issues of tax avoidance and evasion; in section 3 we discuss the real effects of wealth taxation on the economy; and in section 4 we make concrete proposals to administer a progressive wealth tax effectively in the United States.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Senator Elizabeth Warren recently proposed a new wealth tax on the richest Americans. Though the United States does not have a wealth tax, a number of countries around the world have or had progressive wealth taxes. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of progressive wealth taxation in light of the international experience and economic theory. In short, a progressive wealth tax focused on the ultra-wealthy (households with more than $50 million in net wealth) could raise substantial revenues and the economic incidence of the tax would lie overwhelmingly on the richest families. After defining what a progressive wealth tax is, in section 2 we discuss issues of tax avoidance and evasion; in section 3 we discuss the real effects of wealth taxation on the economy; and in section 4 we make concrete proposals to administer a progressive wealth tax effectively in the United States.

@techreport{Salverda2019,
  type = {{{WID}}.World {{Working Paper}}},
  title = {Top Incomes, Income and Wealth Inequality in the {{Netherlands}}: The First 100 Years 1914\textendash 2014 \textendash{} What's Next?},
  author = {Salverda, Wiemer},
  year = {2019},
  month = may,
  number = {2019/02},
  institution = {{World Inequality Database}},
  url = {https://wid.world/document/top-incomes-income-and-wealth-inequality-in-the-netherlands-the-first-100-years-1914-2014-whats-next-wid-world-wp-2-2019/},
  urldate = {2022-12-01},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Salverda2019.pdf},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/salverda-topincomesincomeandwealthinequalityinthenetherlandsthefirst100years19142014whatsnextdatafile-2019}
}

@unpublished{StrandMirkay2019,
  title = {Racialized Tax Inequity: Wealth, Racism, and the {{U}}.{{S}}. System of Taxation},
  author = {Strand, Palma Joy and Mirkay, Nicholas},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3442674},
  url = {https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3442674},
  abstract = {As a whole, the U.S. tax system (federal, state and local) since 1980 has served more and more to increase racialized wealth inequality. The tax system is today operating to entrench the system of advantage based on race that centuries of racial exploitation and unequal access to wealth created. As the future face of the nation becomes less White, the U.S. tax system as a whole and the anti-tax rhetoric that has fueled its shift from progressive to regressive are driving economic inequality and racial inequity. More deeply, the tax system is inhibiting broad-scale public investment in the primary resource of the future: human capital. This article presents a timely perspective of big-picture trends in federal and state taxation over the past 40 years \textemdash{} both a long-term sociological view (the why) of the historical racialization of wealth and a critical tax view (the how) of the shift from taxes on wealth to taxes on income to taxes on consumption. This shift from greater to less progressivity in taxes disproportionately benefits Whites while disproportionately burdening Blacks and other People of Color. Instead of focusing on the equity of a particular deduction or preferential tax rate, we view taxes holistically and systemically, with a focus on state and local taxes that is typically not addressed in critical tax literature. Before systematic changes can be made to tax systems to combat wealth inequality, an acknowledgement of the racialization of wealth inequality is a fundamental first step.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

As a whole, the U.S. tax system (federal, state and local) since 1980 has served more and more to increase racialized wealth inequality. The tax system is today operating to entrench the system of advantage based on race that centuries of racial exploitation and unequal access to wealth created. As the future face of the nation becomes less White, the U.S. tax system as a whole and the anti-tax rhetoric that has fueled its shift from progressive to regressive are driving economic inequality and racial inequity. More deeply, the tax system is inhibiting broad-scale public investment in the primary resource of the future: human capital. This article presents a timely perspective of big-picture trends in federal and state taxation over the past 40 years — both a long-term sociological view (the why) of the historical racialization of wealth and a critical tax view (the how) of the shift from taxes on wealth to taxes on income to taxes on consumption. This shift from greater to less progressivity in taxes disproportionately benefits Whites while disproportionately burdening Blacks and other People of Color. Instead of focusing on the equity of a particular deduction or preferential tax rate, we view taxes holistically and systemically, with a focus on state and local taxes that is typically not addressed in critical tax literature. Before systematic changes can be made to tax systems to combat wealth inequality, an acknowledgement of the racialization of wealth inequality is a fundamental first step.

@techreport{Vellutinietal2019,
  type = {Taxation Paper},
  title = {Estimating International Tax Evasion by Individuals},
  author = {Vellutini, Charles and Casamatta, Georges and Bousquet, L{\'e}a and Poniatowski, Grzegorz},
  year = {2019},
  month = sep,
  number = {76},
  institution = {{European Commission's Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union}},
  url = {https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/publications/taxation-services-papers/taxation-papers_en},
  abstract = {This study provides estimates of offshore wealth held by individuals (for the world's main economies) and corresponding estimates of international tax evasion (for the EU and EU Member States). Following the literature, the methodology relies on public statistics published by international organisations. Several additions to the standard approach are proposed including (i) estimates of offshore wealth held indirectly through shell companies, based on the identification of ``Type II'' international financial centres (defined as jurisdictions providing shell companies and similar devices); (ii) the use of foreign direct investment data to improve on available statistics for cross-borders deposits. Key results are as follows. The global offshore wealth is estimated at USD 7.8 trillion in 2016 (EUR 7.5 trillion) or 10.4\% of global GDP, a considerable amount. This estimate is largely consistent with existing published valuations. The EU share is valued at USD 1.6 trillion (EUR 1.5 trillion), or 9.7\% of GDP. The corresponding EU estimated revenue lost to international tax evasion is EUR 46 billion in 2016 (0.32\% of GDP). Among Member states, there is a great deal of heterogeneity, both in monetary terms of the estimated offshore wealth (and the corresponding tax evasion) and in GDP percentages of the same.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This study provides estimates of offshore wealth held by individuals (for the world's main economies) and corresponding estimates of international tax evasion (for the EU and EU Member States). Following the literature, the methodology relies on public statistics published by international organisations. Several additions to the standard approach are proposed including (i) estimates of offshore wealth held indirectly through shell companies, based on the identification of ``Type II'' international financial centres (defined as jurisdictions providing shell companies and similar devices); (ii) the use of foreign direct investment data to improve on available statistics for cross-borders deposits. Key results are as follows. The global offshore wealth is estimated at USD 7.8 trillion in 2016 (EUR 7.5 trillion) or 10.4% of global GDP, a considerable amount. This estimate is largely consistent with existing published valuations. The EU share is valued at USD 1.6 trillion (EUR 1.5 trillion), or 9.7% of GDP. The corresponding EU estimated revenue lost to international tax evasion is EUR 46 billion in 2016 (0.32% of GDP). Among Member states, there is a great deal of heterogeneity, both in monetary terms of the estimated offshore wealth (and the corresponding tax evasion) and in GDP percentages of the same.

@article{WanZhu2019,
  title = {Bequests, Estate Taxes, and Wealth Distributions},
  author = {Wan, Jing and Zhu, Shenghao},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Economic Theory},
  volume = {67},
  number = {1},
  pages = {179--210},
  publisher = {{Springer Berlin Heidelberg}},
  doi = {10.1007/s00199-017-1091-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-017-1091-7},
  abstract = {Bossmann et al. (J Public Econ 91:1247\textendash 1271, 2007) found that estate taxes reduce the long-run wealth inequality. This result contrasts with the findings of the previous literature with idiosyncratic labor efficiency risk. We use a decomposition technique, developed by Davies (J Labor Econ 4:538\textendash 559, 1986), to reinvestigate the impact of estate taxes on the long-run wealth inequality. We find that the different results of estate taxes are due to the different redistribution effects.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}}
}

Bossmann et al. (J Public Econ 91:1247– 1271, 2007) found that estate taxes reduce the long-run wealth inequality. This result contrasts with the findings of the previous literature with idiosyncratic labor efficiency risk. We use a decomposition technique, developed by Davies (J Labor Econ 4:538– 559, 1986), to reinvestigate the impact of estate taxes on the long-run wealth inequality. We find that the different results of estate taxes are due to the different redistribution effects.

@incollection{Wolff2019,
  title = {Wealth Trends in the {{United States}} during the Great Recession and Recovery, 2001\textendash 2016},
  booktitle = {Wealth(s) and Subjective Well-Being},
  author = {Wolff, Edward N.},
  year = {2019},
  pages = {485--503},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-05535-6_22},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-05535-6_22},
  abstract = {The last two decades have seen major economic changes with the Great Recession and Recovery. The present paper aims at investigating how the net worth, wealth portfolio and the wealth distribution, which are related to well-being, have evolved in the United States between 2001 and 2016. The data show a collapse of the middle class and a failure to recover, most likely leading to a decrease in SWB.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The last two decades have seen major economic changes with the Great Recession and Recovery. The present paper aims at investigating how the net worth, wealth portfolio and the wealth distribution, which are related to well-being, have evolved in the United States between 2001 and 2016. The data show a collapse of the middle class and a failure to recover, most likely leading to a decrease in SWB.

@article{Zucman2019,
  title = {Global Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Annual Review of Economics},
  volume = {11},
  pages = {109--138},
  doi = {10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025852},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025852},
  abstract = {This article reviews the recent literature on the dynamics of global wealth inequality. I first reconcile available estimates of wealth inequality in the United States. Both surveys and tax data show that wealth inequality has increased dramatically since the 1980s, with a top 1\% wealth share of approximately 40\% in 2016 versus 25\textendash 30\% in the 1980s. Second, I discuss the fast-growing literature on wealth inequality across the world. Evidence points toward a rise in global wealth concentration: For China, Europe, and the United States combined, the top 1\% wealth share has increased from 28\% in 1980 to 33\% today, while the bottom 75\% share hovered around 10\%. Recent studies, however, may underestimate the level and rise of inequality, as financial globalization makes it increasingly hard to measure wealth at the top. I discuss how new data sources (leaks from financial institutions, tax amnesties, and macroeconomic statistics of tax havens) can be leveraged to better capture the wealth of the rich.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/zucman-globalwealthinequalitydatafile-2019}
}

This article reviews the recent literature on the dynamics of global wealth inequality. I first reconcile available estimates of wealth inequality in the United States. Both surveys and tax data show that wealth inequality has increased dramatically since the 1980s, with a top 1% wealth share of approximately 40% in 2016 versus 25– 30% in the 1980s. Second, I discuss the fast-growing literature on wealth inequality across the world. Evidence points toward a rise in global wealth concentration: For China, Europe, and the United States combined, the top 1% wealth share has increased from 28% in 1980 to 33% today, while the bottom 75% share hovered around 10%. Recent studies, however, may underestimate the level and rise of inequality, as financial globalization makes it increasingly hard to measure wealth at the top. I discuss how new data sources (leaks from financial institutions, tax amnesties, and macroeconomic statistics of tax havens) can be leveraged to better capture the wealth of the rich.

@article{Adermonetal2018,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Mobility and the Role of Inheritance: Evidence from Multiple Generations},
  author = {Adermon, Adrian and Lindahl, Mikael and Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {128},
  number = {612},
  pages = {F482--F513},
  doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12535},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12535},
  abstract = {This study estimates intergenerational wealth correlations across up to four generations and examines the degree to which the wealth association between parents and children can be explained by inheritances. Using a Swedish data set with newly hand-collected data on wealth and bequests, we find parent-child rank correlations of 0.3\textendash 0.4 and grandparent\textendash grandchild rank correlations of 0.1\textendash{} 0.2. Bequests and gifts appear to be central in this process, accounting for at least half of the parent\textendash{} child wealth correlation while earnings and education can account for only a quarter.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This study estimates intergenerational wealth correlations across up to four generations and examines the degree to which the wealth association between parents and children can be explained by inheritances. Using a Swedish data set with newly hand-collected data on wealth and bequests, we find parent-child rank correlations of 0.3– 0.4 and grandparent– grandchild rank correlations of 0.1– 0.2. Bequests and gifts appear to be central in this process, accounting for at least half of the parent– child wealth correlation while earnings and education can account for only a quarter.

@article{Alstadsaeteretal2018,
  title = {Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? {{Macro}} Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality},
  author = {Alstads{\ae}ter, Annette and Johannesen, Niels and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {162},
  pages = {89--100},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.008},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.008},
  abstract = {Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10\% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity\textemdash from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to about 15\% in Continental Europe, and 60\% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01\% wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity— from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to about 15% in Continental Europe, and 60% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01% wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world.

@techreport{Alvaredoetal2018a,
  type = {{{WID}}.World {{Working Paper}}},
  title = {Distributional {{National Accounts}} ({{DINA}}) Guidelines: Concepts and Methods Used in {{WID}}.World},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Atkinson, Anthony B. and Chancel, Lucas and Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2018},
  month = apr,
  number = {2016/2},
  institution = {{World Inequality Database}},
  url = {https://wid.world/document/dinaguidelines-v1/},
  urldate = {2022-04-13},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

@article{Alvaredoetal2018,
  title = {Top Wealth Shares in the {{UK}} over More than a Century},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Atkinson, Anthony B. and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2018},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {162},
  pages = {26--47},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.008},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.008},
  abstract = {Recent research highlighted controversy about the evolution of concentration of personal wealth. In this paper we provide new evidence about the long-run evolution of top wealth shares for the United Kingdom. The new series covers a long period \textendash{} from 1895 to the present \textendash{} and has a different point of departure from the previous literature: we start with the analysis of the distribution of estates left at death. We find that the application to the estate data of mortality multipliers to yield estimates of wealth among the living does not substantially change the degree of concentration over much of the period both in the UK and US, allowing inferences to be made for years when this method cannot be applied. The results show that wealth concentration in the UK remained relatively constant during the first wave of globalization, but then decreased dramatically in the period from 1914 to 1979. The UK went from being more unequal in terms of wealth than the US to being less unequal. However, the decline in UK wealth concentration came to an end around 1980, and since then there is evidence of an increase in top shares, notably in the distribution of wealth excluding housing in recent years. We investigate the triangulating evidence provided by data on capital income concentration and on reported super fortunes.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-atkinson-morelli-topwealthsharesintheukovermorethanacentury-2017},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-atkinson-morelli-topwealthsharesintheukovermorethanacenturyappendicesforonlinepublication-2018},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-atkinson-morelli-topwealthsharesintheukovermorethanacenturydatafile-2018},
  note = {Special issue: honoring the work of Sir Anthony B. Atkinson (1944\textendash 2017)}
}

Recent research highlighted controversy about the evolution of concentration of personal wealth. In this paper we provide new evidence about the long-run evolution of top wealth shares for the United Kingdom. The new series covers a long period – from 1895 to the present – and has a different point of departure from the previous literature: we start with the analysis of the distribution of estates left at death. We find that the application to the estate data of mortality multipliers to yield estimates of wealth among the living does not substantially change the degree of concentration over much of the period both in the UK and US, allowing inferences to be made for years when this method cannot be applied. The results show that wealth concentration in the UK remained relatively constant during the first wave of globalization, but then decreased dramatically in the period from 1914 to 1979. The UK went from being more unequal in terms of wealth than the US to being less unequal. However, the decline in UK wealth concentration came to an end around 1980, and since then there is evidence of an increase in top shares, notably in the distribution of wealth excluding housing in recent years. We investigate the triangulating evidence provided by data on capital income concentration and on reported super fortunes.

@article{Atkinson2018,
  title = {Wealth and Inheritance in Britain from 1896 to the Present},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {16},
  number = {2},
  pages = {137--169},
  publisher = {{Springer US}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-018-9382-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-018-9382-1},
  abstract = {Personal wealth has grown since the 1970s twice as fast in real terms as national income. Has this rise in the wealth-income ratio led to a corresponding increase in the wealth being passed on from one generation to the next? Are we returning to the levels of inheritance found in the 19th century? The aim of this paper is to construct UK evidence on the extent of the transmission of wealth in the form of estates and gifts inter vivos. It takes a long-run view of inheritance, starting from 1896, when the modern Estate Duty was introduced, and exploits the extensive estate data published over the years. Construction of a long-run time series for more than a century is challenging, and there are important limitations. The resulting time-series demonstrates the major importance of inheritance in the UK before the First World War, when the total transmitted wealth represented some 20 per cent of net national income. In the inter-war period, the total was around 15 per cent, falling to some 10 per cent after the Second World War, and then falling further to below 5 per cent in the late 1970s. Since then, there has indeed been an upturn: a rise from 4.8 per cent in 1977 to 8.2 per cent in 2006. This increase was more or less in line with the increase in personal wealth, and has to be interpreted in the light of the changing net worth of the corporate and public sectors of the economy.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Personal wealth has grown since the 1970s twice as fast in real terms as national income. Has this rise in the wealth-income ratio led to a corresponding increase in the wealth being passed on from one generation to the next? Are we returning to the levels of inheritance found in the 19th century? The aim of this paper is to construct UK evidence on the extent of the transmission of wealth in the form of estates and gifts inter vivos. It takes a long-run view of inheritance, starting from 1896, when the modern Estate Duty was introduced, and exploits the extensive estate data published over the years. Construction of a long-run time series for more than a century is challenging, and there are important limitations. The resulting time-series demonstrates the major importance of inheritance in the UK before the First World War, when the total transmitted wealth represented some 20 per cent of net national income. In the inter-war period, the total was around 15 per cent, falling to some 10 per cent after the Second World War, and then falling further to below 5 per cent in the late 1970s. Since then, there has indeed been an upturn: a rise from 4.8 per cent in 1977 to 8.2 per cent in 2006. This increase was more or less in line with the increase in personal wealth, and has to be interpreted in the light of the changing net worth of the corporate and public sectors of the economy.

@unpublished{Bachetal2018,
  title = {From Saving Comes Having? {{Disentangling}} the Impact of Savings on Inequality},
  author = {Bach, Laurent and Calvet, Laurent E. and Sodini, Paolo},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3094452},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3094452},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the channels through which savings impact the wealth inequality dynamics. The analysis relies on an administrative panel that reports the assets and income of every Swedish resident between 2000 and 2007. We document that the saving rate, defined as savings from labor income divided by net worth, is on average a decreasing function of net worth itself. At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity in the saving rate within each wealth group. These two properties have conflicting effects on inequality. As a result, heterogeneity in savings from labor income has a strong impact on social mobility but only has a weak impact on the distribution of net worth. Heterogeneity in wealth returns is instead the main driver of the recent increase in top wealth shares.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper investigates the channels through which savings impact the wealth inequality dynamics. The analysis relies on an administrative panel that reports the assets and income of every Swedish resident between 2000 and 2007. We document that the saving rate, defined as savings from labor income divided by net worth, is on average a decreasing function of net worth itself. At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity in the saving rate within each wealth group. These two properties have conflicting effects on inequality. As a result, heterogeneity in savings from labor income has a strong impact on social mobility but only has a weak impact on the distribution of net worth. Heterogeneity in wealth returns is instead the main driver of the recent increase in top wealth shares.

@article{Baker2018,
  title = {Debt and the Response to Household Income Shocks: Validation and Application of Linked Financial Account Data},
  author = {Baker, Scott R.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {126},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1504--1557},
  doi = {10.1086/698106},
  url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/698106},
  abstract = {The increasing availability of data derived from linked consumer financial accounts has the potential to dramatically expand the potential for research. Examining the most comprehensive existing set of linked-account data, consisting of transaction and balance sheet data for millions of Americans, I demonstrate the power and versatility of such sources. I discuss advantages and concerns arising from this type of data and match a range of distributional moments to external sources. As one application, I test consumption elasticities across households with varying levels, and types, of debt. I find that heterogeneity in consumption elasticity can be explained entirely by credit and liquidity.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

The increasing availability of data derived from linked consumer financial accounts has the potential to dramatically expand the potential for research. Examining the most comprehensive existing set of linked-account data, consisting of transaction and balance sheet data for millions of Americans, I demonstrate the power and versatility of such sources. I discuss advantages and concerns arising from this type of data and match a range of distributional moments to external sources. As one application, I test consumption elasticities across households with varying levels, and types, of debt. I find that heterogeneity in consumption elasticity can be explained entirely by credit and liquidity.

@unpublished{Barthetal2018,
  title = {Genetic Endowments and Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Barth, Daniel and Papageorge, Nicholas W. and Thom, Kevin},
  year = {2018},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w24642},
  abstract = {We show that genetic endowments linked to educational attainment strongly and robustly predict wealth at retirement. The estimated relationship is not fully explained by flexibly controlling for education and labor income. We therefore investigate a host of additional mechanisms that could help to explain the gene-wealth gradient, including inheritances, mortality, savings, risk preferences, portfolio decisions, beliefs about the probabilities of macroeconomic events, and planning horizons. The associations we report provide preliminary evidence that genetic endowments related to human capital accumulation are associated with wealth not only through educational attainment and labor income, but also through a facility with complex financial decision-making. Our study illustrates how economic research seeking to understand sources of inequality can benefit from recent advances in behavioral genetics linking specific observed genetic endowments to economic outcomes.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We show that genetic endowments linked to educational attainment strongly and robustly predict wealth at retirement. The estimated relationship is not fully explained by flexibly controlling for education and labor income. We therefore investigate a host of additional mechanisms that could help to explain the gene-wealth gradient, including inheritances, mortality, savings, risk preferences, portfolio decisions, beliefs about the probabilities of macroeconomic events, and planning horizons. The associations we report provide preliminary evidence that genetic endowments related to human capital accumulation are associated with wealth not only through educational attainment and labor income, but also through a facility with complex financial decision-making. Our study illustrates how economic research seeking to understand sources of inequality can benefit from recent advances in behavioral genetics linking specific observed genetic endowments to economic outcomes.

@article{BenhabibBisin2018,
  title = {Skewed Wealth Distributions: Theory and Empirics},
  author = {Benhabib, Jess and Bisin, Alberto},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
  volume = {56},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1261--1291},
  doi = {10.1257/jel.20161390},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20161390},
  abstract = {Invariably across a cross-section of countries and time periods, wealth distributions are skewed to the right displaying thick upper tails, that is, large and slowly declining top wealth shares. In this survey we categorize the theoretical studies on the distribution of wealth in terms of the underlying economic mechanism generating skewness and thick tails. Further, we show how these mechanisms can be micro- founded by the consumption-saving decisions of rational agents in specific economic and demographic environments. Finally we map the large empirical work on the wealth distribution to its theoretical underpinning.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Invariably across a cross-section of countries and time periods, wealth distributions are skewed to the right displaying thick upper tails, that is, large and slowly declining top wealth shares. In this survey we categorize the theoretical studies on the distribution of wealth in terms of the underlying economic mechanism generating skewness and thick tails. Further, we show how these mechanisms can be micro- founded by the consumption-saving decisions of rational agents in specific economic and demographic environments. Finally we map the large empirical work on the wealth distribution to its theoretical underpinning.

@techreport{Bharti2018,
  type = {{{WID}}.World {{Working Paper}}},
  title = {Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in {{India}}, 1961-2012},
  author = {Bharti, Nitin Kumar},
  year = {2018},
  number = {2018/14},
  institution = {{World Inequality Database}},
  url = {https://wid.world/document/n-k-bharti-wealth-inequality-class-and-caste-in-india-1961-2012/},
  urldate = {2022-04-01},
  abstract = {This research makes two main contributions. First, I combine data from wealth surveys (NSS-AIDIS) and millionaire lists to produce wealth inequality series for India over the 1961-2012 period. I find a strong rise in wealth concentration in recent decades, in line with recent research using income data. E.g. the top 10\% wealth share rose from 45\% in year 1981 to 68\% in 2012, while the top 1\% share rose from 27\% to 41\%. Next, I gather information from censuses and surveys (NSS AIDIS and consumption, IHDS, NFHS) in order to explore the changing relationship between class and caste in India and the mechanisms behind rising inequality. Assortative mating appears to be very high in India, both at the caste level and at the education level (though not hugely larger than than in Western countries at the education level). I stress the limits of our knowledge and indicate possible lines of future research, particularly regarding the interplay between assortative mating and inequality dynamics.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Bharti2018.pdf}
}

This research makes two main contributions. First, I combine data from wealth surveys (NSS-AIDIS) and millionaire lists to produce wealth inequality series for India over the 1961-2012 period. I find a strong rise in wealth concentration in recent decades, in line with recent research using income data. E.g. the top 10% wealth share rose from 45% in year 1981 to 68% in 2012, while the top 1% share rose from 27% to 41%. Next, I gather information from censuses and surveys (NSS AIDIS and consumption, IHDS, NFHS) in order to explore the changing relationship between class and caste in India and the mechanisms behind rising inequality. Assortative mating appears to be very high in India, both at the caste level and at the education level (though not hugely larger than than in Western countries at the education level). I stress the limits of our knowledge and indicate possible lines of future research, particularly regarding the interplay between assortative mating and inequality dynamics.

@article{BofingerScheuermeyer2018,
  title = {Income Distribution and Aggregate Saving: {{A}} Non-Monotonic Relationship},
  author = {Bofinger, Peter and Scheuermeyer, Philipp},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {65},
  number = {4},
  pages = {872--907},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd}},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12376},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/roiw.12376},
  abstract = {Drawing on a panel of advanced economies, this paper documents a concave and non-monotonic link between inequality and the aggregate household saving rate. We find that, at a low level of inequality, more inequality is associated with higher saving; but we also show that a negative relationship between inequality and saving prevails where inequality is high. Using different empirical approaches, we locate the turning point, where the marginal effect of inequality turns from positive to negative, at a net income Gini coefficient of around 30. Moreover, we show that the relationship between inequality and saving also depends on financial market conditions. While inequality increases saving, when credit is scarce it tends to reduce saving at high levels of credit. This paper primarily focuses on household saving, yet we also find some evidence for a non-monotonic effect of inequality on private saving, national saving, and the current account balance.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Drawing on a panel of advanced economies, this paper documents a concave and non-monotonic link between inequality and the aggregate household saving rate. We find that, at a low level of inequality, more inequality is associated with higher saving; but we also show that a negative relationship between inequality and saving prevails where inequality is high. Using different empirical approaches, we locate the turning point, where the marginal effect of inequality turns from positive to negative, at a net income Gini coefficient of around 30. Moreover, we show that the relationship between inequality and saving also depends on financial market conditions. While inequality increases saving, when credit is scarce it tends to reduce saving at high levels of credit. This paper primarily focuses on household saving, yet we also find some evidence for a non-monotonic effect of inequality on private saving, national saving, and the current account balance.

@article{Boserupetal2018,
  title = {Born with a Silver Spoon? {{Danish}} Evidence on Wealth Inequality in Childhood},
  author = {Boserup, Simon Halphen and Kopczuk, Wojciech and Kreiner, Claus Thustrup},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {128},
  number = {612},
  pages = {F514--F544},
  doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12496},
  url = {https://academic.oup.com/ej/article/128/612/F514-F544/5089455},
  abstract = {We use Danish wealth records from three decades to characterise wealth inequality in childhood, where the main source of wealth is transfers. Wealth holdings are small in childhood but they have strong predictive power for future wealth in adulthood. At age 18, asset holdings of children are more informative than parental wealth in predicting wealth of children when they are in their 40s. We investigate why and rule out that childhood wealth in itself can accumulate enough to explain later wealth inequality. Instead, childhood wealth seems to proxy for intergenerational correlation in savings behaviour and additional transfers from parents.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

We use Danish wealth records from three decades to characterise wealth inequality in childhood, where the main source of wealth is transfers. Wealth holdings are small in childhood but they have strong predictive power for future wealth in adulthood. At age 18, asset holdings of children are more informative than parental wealth in predicting wealth of children when they are in their 40s. We investigate why and rule out that childhood wealth in itself can accumulate enough to explain later wealth inequality. Instead, childhood wealth seems to proxy for intergenerational correlation in savings behaviour and additional transfers from parents.

@techreport{Brickeretal2018,
  type = {Finance and {{Economics Discussion Series}}},
  title = {How Much Has Wealth Concentration Grown in the {{United States}}? {{A}} Re-Examination of Data from 2001-2013},
  author = {Bricker, Jesse and Henriques, Alice and Hansen, Peter},
  year = {2018},
  month = apr,
  number = {2018-024},
  institution = {{Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System}},
  doi = {10.17016/feds.2018.024},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2018.024},
  abstract = {Well known research based on capitalized income tax data shows robust growth in wealth concentration in the late 2000s. We show that these robust growth estimates rely on an assumption\textemdash homogeneous rates of return across the wealth distribution\textemdash that is not supported by data. When the capitalization model incorporates heterogeneous rates of return (on just interest-bearing assets), wealth concentration estimates in 2011 fall from 40.5\% to 33.9\%. These estimates are consistent in levels and trend with other micro wealth data and show that wealth concentration increases until the Great Recession, then declines before increasing again.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Brickeretal2018.pdf},
  url_accessible_figures = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/bricker-henriques-hansen-howmuchhaswealthconcentrationgrownintheunitedstatesareexaminationofdatafrom20012013accessiblefigures-2018}
}

Well known research based on capitalized income tax data shows robust growth in wealth concentration in the late 2000s. We show that these robust growth estimates rely on an assumption— homogeneous rates of return across the wealth distribution— that is not supported by data. When the capitalization model incorporates heterogeneous rates of return (on just interest-bearing assets), wealth concentration estimates in 2011 fall from 40.5% to 33.9%. These estimates are consistent in levels and trend with other micro wealth data and show that wealth concentration increases until the Great Recession, then declines before increasing again.

@article{Brulhartetal2018,
  title = {Inheritance Flows in Switzerland, 1911\textendash 2011},
  author = {Br{\"u}lhart, Marius and Dupertuis, Didier and Moreau, Elodie},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics},
  volume = {154},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--13},
  doi = {10.1186/s41937-017-0012-9},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s41937-017-0012-9},
  abstract = {We estimate the size of inheritance flows in Switzerland over a long span of data, in close analogy to the study for France by Piketty (Q J Econ 126(3):1071\textendash 1131, 2011). We find that inheritance flows had been growing more slowly than national income up until the 1970s, but have been outpacing income growth since. According to our central estimates, the annual flow of inheritance amounted to 13.2\% of national income in 2011. The share of total wealth that is attributable to inheritance has remained relatively stable over time, fluctuating between 45 and 60\%.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth}
}

We estimate the size of inheritance flows in Switzerland over a long span of data, in close analogy to the study for France by Piketty (Q J Econ 126(3):1071– 1131, 2011). We find that inheritance flows had been growing more slowly than national income up until the 1970s, but have been outpacing income growth since. According to our central estimates, the annual flow of inheritance amounted to 13.2% of national income in 2011. The share of total wealth that is attributable to inheritance has remained relatively stable over time, fluctuating between 45 and 60%.

@article{CannariDAlessio2018,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in {{Italy}}: {{A}} Reconstruction of 1968-1975 Data and a Comparison with Recent Estimates},
  author = {Cannari, Luigi and D'Alessio, Giovanni},
  year = {2018},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Rivista di Storia Economica},
  volume = {XXXIV},
  number = {3},
  pages = {357--396},
  doi = {10.1410/94752},
  url = {https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1410/94752},
  urldate = {2022-02-15},
  abstract = {This paper provides a reconstruction of the joint distribution of income and wealth among Italians in the years ranging from 1968 to 1975. By exploiting the information available in some historical reports recently published by the Bank of Italy, the paper reconstructs synthetic microdata compatible with the aggregate results of sample surveys carried out in those years. In this way, inequality and poverty can be estimated by using the same statistical criteria that are used today, making possible an intertemporal comparison of the estimates. The concentration of household wealth shows a downward trend in the 1970s and 1980s, an increase in the years following the 1992-1993 crisis and a relative stability in the new century. In the period 1968-1975 the concentration of wealth turns out to have been higher than in recent years. The estimates of relative poverty, calculated by using both indicators of equivalent income and indicators that combine income and wealth, show a decreasing trend until the 1990s and a subsequent increase; the upward trend of these indicators in recent years is steeper than that of the concentration indices. The poverty indicators that take wealth into account have reached levels similar to those observed in the period 1968-1975. Migration flows have significantly contributed to the recent growth in the poverty indices.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper provides a reconstruction of the joint distribution of income and wealth among Italians in the years ranging from 1968 to 1975. By exploiting the information available in some historical reports recently published by the Bank of Italy, the paper reconstructs synthetic microdata compatible with the aggregate results of sample surveys carried out in those years. In this way, inequality and poverty can be estimated by using the same statistical criteria that are used today, making possible an intertemporal comparison of the estimates. The concentration of household wealth shows a downward trend in the 1970s and 1980s, an increase in the years following the 1992-1993 crisis and a relative stability in the new century. In the period 1968-1975 the concentration of wealth turns out to have been higher than in recent years. The estimates of relative poverty, calculated by using both indicators of equivalent income and indicators that combine income and wealth, show a decreasing trend until the 1990s and a subsequent increase; the upward trend of these indicators in recent years is steeper than that of the concentration indices. The poverty indicators that take wealth into account have reached levels similar to those observed in the period 1968-1975. Migration flows have significantly contributed to the recent growth in the poverty indices.

@unpublished{CannariDAlessio2018a,
  title = {Education, Income and Wealth: Persistence across Generations in {{Italy}}},
  author = {Cannari, Luigi and D'Alessio, Giovanni},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2018-0476/index.html},
  abstract = {The paper examines the intergenerational persistence of economic conditions in terms of education, income and wealth, and the importance of starting conditions in explaining success in Italy. The intergenerational persistence of economic conditions turns out to be relatively high by international standards; in recent years this phenomenon has displayed an upward trend. Variables that are not controlled by individuals explain their economic success to a greater extent than in the past.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

The paper examines the intergenerational persistence of economic conditions in terms of education, income and wealth, and the importance of starting conditions in explaining success in Italy. The intergenerational persistence of economic conditions turns out to be relatively high by international standards; in recent years this phenomenon has displayed an upward trend. Variables that are not controlled by individuals explain their economic success to a greater extent than in the past.

@techreport{Corlett2018,
  type = {Intergenerational {{Commission Report}}},
  title = {Passing on: Options for Reforming Inheritance Taxation},
  author = {Corlett, Adam},
  year = {2018},
  month = may,
  institution = {{Resolution Foundation}},
  url = {https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/passing-on-options-for-reforming-inheritance-taxation/},
  urldate = {2022-02-01},
  abstract = {Over the past 18 months, research for the Intergenerational Commission has illustrated how the assumption that each generation will do better than the one before it is under pressure. This paper is one of a series that moves beyond the diagnosis of these problems to consider what action is needed to address generational living standards challenges. In this paper, our focus is inheritance taxation. With inheritances growing rapidly in importance at the same time as fiscal pressures, inheritance taxation must play its role in raising revenue in a fair way. But the current Inheritance Tax system manages to raise relatively little while also being especially unpopular. It is seen as unfair for three main reasons: taxing giving is seen as a bad thing, as is the tax's explicit link to death; it has a high rate; and it is seen as easy for the richest to avoid due to its wide range of exemptions. This paper proposes a Lifetime Receipts Tax that would address these problems while also encouraging individuals to spread their wealth wider and raising revenue to help fix Britain's intergenerational contract.},
  keywords = {{Data Sources: Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}},
  url_file = {Corlett2018.pdf}
}

Over the past 18 months, research for the Intergenerational Commission has illustrated how the assumption that each generation will do better than the one before it is under pressure. This paper is one of a series that moves beyond the diagnosis of these problems to consider what action is needed to address generational living standards challenges. In this paper, our focus is inheritance taxation. With inheritances growing rapidly in importance at the same time as fiscal pressures, inheritance taxation must play its role in raising revenue in a fair way. But the current Inheritance Tax system manages to raise relatively little while also being especially unpopular. It is seen as unfair for three main reasons: taxing giving is seen as a bad thing, as is the tax's explicit link to death; it has a high rate; and it is seen as easy for the richest to avoid due to its wide range of exemptions. This paper proposes a Lifetime Receipts Tax that would address these problems while also encouraging individuals to spread their wealth wider and raising revenue to help fix Britain's intergenerational contract.

@incollection{Cowelletal2018a,
  title = {Inheritance Taxation: Redistribution and Predistribution},
  booktitle = {Inequality, Taxation and Intergenerational Transmission},
  author = {Cowell, Frank A. and {Van de gaer}, Dirk and He, Chang},
  editor = {Bishop, John A and Rodr{\'i}guez, Juan Gabriel},
  year = {2018},
  series = {Research on Economic Inequality},
  volume = {26},
  pages = {1--13},
  publisher = {{Emerald Publishing Limited}},
  doi = {10.1108/S1049-258520180000026002},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1108/S1049-258520180000026002},
  abstract = {It is well known that taxes on the transfer of wealth typically raise very little revenue. However, this does not mean that they are ineffective as tools for redistribution. In this chapter, we show how important such taxes can be in the long-run distribution of wealth, reducing equilibrium inequality (the ``predistribution'' effect) by a much larger amount than what is apparent in terms of the immediate impact of the tax (the ``redistribution'' effect).},
  chapter = {1},
  isbn = {978-1-78756-458-9 978-1-78756-457-2},
  keywords = {{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}}
}

It is well known that taxes on the transfer of wealth typically raise very little revenue. However, this does not mean that they are ineffective as tools for redistribution. In this chapter, we show how important such taxes can be in the long-run distribution of wealth, reducing equilibrium inequality (the ``predistribution'' effect) by a much larger amount than what is apparent in terms of the immediate impact of the tax (the ``redistribution'' effect).

@article{Cowelletal2018,
  title = {Accounting for Cross-Country Differences in Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Cowell, Frank and Karagiannaki, Eleni and Mcknight, Abigail},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {64},
  number = {2},
  pages = {332--356},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Publishing Ltd}},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12278},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/roiw.12278},
  abstract = {There is considerable cross-country variation in levels of household wealth and in wealth inequality. This paper assesses the extent to which these differences can be accounted for by differences in the distributions of households' demographic and economic characteristics. A counterfactual decomposition analysis of micro data from five countries (Italy, U.K., U.S., Sweden and Finland) is used to identify the effects of characteristics on component wealth holdings, their value and their distribution. The findings of the paper suggest that the biggest share of cross-country differences is not attributable to the distribution of household demographic and economic characteristics but rather reflect strong unexplained country effects.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons}
}

There is considerable cross-country variation in levels of household wealth and in wealth inequality. This paper assesses the extent to which these differences can be accounted for by differences in the distributions of households' demographic and economic characteristics. A counterfactual decomposition analysis of micro data from five countries (Italy, U.K., U.S., Sweden and Finland) is used to identify the effects of characteristics on component wealth holdings, their value and their distribution. The findings of the paper suggest that the biggest share of cross-country differences is not attributable to the distribution of household demographic and economic characteristics but rather reflect strong unexplained country effects.

@article{Drometeretal2018,
  title = {Wealth and Inheritance Taxation: An Overview and Country Comparison},
  author = {Drometer, Marcus and Frank, Marco and Hofbauer P{\'e}rez, Maria and Rhode, Carla and Schworm, Sebastian and Stitteneder, Tanja},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {ifo DICE Report},
  volume = {16},
  number = {2},
  pages = {45--54},
  url = {https://www.ifo.de/en/publikationen/2018/article-journal/wealth-and-inheritance-taxation-overview-and-country-comparison},
  urldate = {2022-02-01},
  abstract = {Although having attracted more attention in recent years, wealth and wealth distributions still play a minor role compared to income distributions in discussions concerning inequalities within and across countries (see, for example, sustainable development goals from the UN; OECD 2015). This article provides an overview of existing data on wealth and wealth taxes around the globe. Firstly, we present data on wealth levels for selected OECD countries and discuss the general difficulties in measuring wealth. Secondly, we investigate the existing net wealth taxation regimes in selected OECD countries. Thirdly, we compare inheritance and gift taxation regimes across the same sample of OECD countries and illustrate that tax regimes differ vastly from one another.},
  keywords = {{Data Sources: Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes}},
  url_file = {Drometeretal2018.pdf}
}

Although having attracted more attention in recent years, wealth and wealth distributions still play a minor role compared to income distributions in discussions concerning inequalities within and across countries (see, for example, sustainable development goals from the UN; OECD 2015). This article provides an overview of existing data on wealth and wealth taxes around the globe. Firstly, we present data on wealth levels for selected OECD countries and discuss the general difficulties in measuring wealth. Secondly, we investigate the existing net wealth taxation regimes in selected OECD countries. Thirdly, we compare inheritance and gift taxation regimes across the same sample of OECD countries and illustrate that tax regimes differ vastly from one another.

@unpublished{DruedahlMartinello2018,
  title = {Long-Run Saving Dynamics: Evidence from Unexpected Inheritances},
  author = {Druedahl, Jeppe and Martinello, Alessandro},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2016_007.htm},
  abstract = {Long-run saving dynamics are a crucial component of consumption-saving behavior. This paper makes two contributions to the consumption literature. First, we exploit inheritance episodes to provide novel causal evidence on the long-run effects of a large financial windfall on saving behavior. For identification, we combine a longitudinal panel of administrative wealth reports with variation in the timing of sudden, unexpected parental deaths. We show that after inheritance net worth converges towards the path established before parental death, with only a third of the initial windfall remaining after a decade. These dynamics are qualitatively consistent with convergence to a buffer-stock target. Second, we analyze our findings through the lens of a generalized consumption-saving framework, and show that life-cycle consumption models can replicate this behavior, but only if the precautionary saving motive is stronger than usually assumed. This result also holds for two-asset models, which imply a high marginal propensity to consume.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Long-run saving dynamics are a crucial component of consumption-saving behavior. This paper makes two contributions to the consumption literature. First, we exploit inheritance episodes to provide novel causal evidence on the long-run effects of a large financial windfall on saving behavior. For identification, we combine a longitudinal panel of administrative wealth reports with variation in the timing of sudden, unexpected parental deaths. We show that after inheritance net worth converges towards the path established before parental death, with only a third of the initial windfall remaining after a decade. These dynamics are qualitatively consistent with convergence to a buffer-stock target. Second, we analyze our findings through the lens of a generalized consumption-saving framework, and show that life-cycle consumption models can replicate this behavior, but only if the precautionary saving motive is stronger than usually assumed. This result also holds for two-asset models, which imply a high marginal propensity to consume.

@article{Elinderetal2018,
  title = {Inheritance and Wealth Inequality: Evidence from Population Registers},
  author = {Elinder, Mikael and Erixson, Oscar and Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {165},
  pages = {17--30},
  doi = {10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.06.012},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.012},
  abstract = {This paper uses population register data on inheritances and wealth in Sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality. We find that inheritances reduce wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient or top wealth shares, but that they increase absolute dispersion. This duality in effects stems from the fact that even though richer heirs inherit larger amounts, the relative importance of the inheritance is larger for less wealthy heirs, who inherit more relative to their pre-inheritance wealth. This is in part driven by the fact that heirs do not inherit debts, which makes the distribution of inheritances more equal than the distribution of wealth among the heirs. Behavioral adjustments seem to mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances, possibly through higher consumption among the poorer heirs. Inheritance taxation counteracts the equalizing inheritance effect, but redistribution of inheritance tax revenues can reverse this result and make the inheritance tax equalizing. Finally, we also find that inheritances increase intragenerational wealth mobility, but the effect is short-lived.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper uses population register data on inheritances and wealth in Sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality. We find that inheritances reduce wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient or top wealth shares, but that they increase absolute dispersion. This duality in effects stems from the fact that even though richer heirs inherit larger amounts, the relative importance of the inheritance is larger for less wealthy heirs, who inherit more relative to their pre-inheritance wealth. This is in part driven by the fact that heirs do not inherit debts, which makes the distribution of inheritances more equal than the distribution of wealth among the heirs. Behavioral adjustments seem to mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances, possibly through higher consumption among the poorer heirs. Inheritance taxation counteracts the equalizing inheritance effect, but redistribution of inheritance tax revenues can reverse this result and make the inheritance tax equalizing. Finally, we also find that inheritances increase intragenerational wealth mobility, but the effect is short-lived.

@unpublished{Fagerengetal2018,
  title = {Why Do Wealthy Parents Have Wealthy Children?},
  author = {Fagereng, Andreas and Mogstad, Magne and R{\o}nning, Marte},
  year = {2018},
  address = {{Chicago}},
  url = {https://bfi.uchicago.edu/working-paper/why-do-wealthy-parents-have-wealthy-children/},
  abstract = {Strong intergenerational associations in wealth have fueled a long-standing debate over why children of wealthy parents tend to be well off themselves. We investigate the role of family background in determining children's wealth accumulation and investor behavior as adults. The analysis is made possible by linking Korean-born children who were adopted at infancy by Norwegian parents to a population panel data set with detailed information on disaggregated wealth portfolios and socio-economic characteristics. The mechanism by which these Korean-Norwegian adoptees were assigned to adoptive families is known and effectively random. We use the quasi-random assignment to estimate the causal effects from an adoptee being raised in one type of family versus another. Our findings show that family background matters significantly for children's accumulation of wealth and investor behavior as adults, even when removing the genetic connection between children and the parents raising them. In particular, adoptees raised by wealthy parents are more likely to be well off themselves, whereas adoptees' stock market participation and portfolio risk are increasing in the financial risk taking of their adoptive parents. The detailed nature of our data allows us to explore mechanisms, assess the generalizability of the lessons from adoptees, and compare our findings to results from behavioral genetics decompositions.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Strong intergenerational associations in wealth have fueled a long-standing debate over why children of wealthy parents tend to be well off themselves. We investigate the role of family background in determining children's wealth accumulation and investor behavior as adults. The analysis is made possible by linking Korean-born children who were adopted at infancy by Norwegian parents to a population panel data set with detailed information on disaggregated wealth portfolios and socio-economic characteristics. The mechanism by which these Korean-Norwegian adoptees were assigned to adoptive families is known and effectively random. We use the quasi-random assignment to estimate the causal effects from an adoptee being raised in one type of family versus another. Our findings show that family background matters significantly for children's accumulation of wealth and investor behavior as adults, even when removing the genetic connection between children and the parents raising them. In particular, adoptees raised by wealthy parents are more likely to be well off themselves, whereas adoptees' stock market participation and portfolio risk are increasing in the financial risk taking of their adoptive parents. The detailed nature of our data allows us to explore mechanisms, assess the generalizability of the lessons from adoptees, and compare our findings to results from behavioral genetics decompositions.

@techreport{FeivesonSabelhaus2018,
  type = {{{FEDS Notes}}},
  title = {How Does Intergenerational Wealth Transmission Affect Wealth Concentration?},
  author = {Feiveson, Laura and Sabelhaus, John},
  year = {2018},
  month = jun,
  institution = {{Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System}},
  doi = {10.17016/2380-7172.2209},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2209},
  abstract = {Wealth concentration is high and rising in the US, reigniting an old debate within economics about the role that intergenerational wealth transmission plays in understanding savings and wealth accumulation.1 One view is that observed wealth holdings at any point in time are almost entirely attributable to lifetime saving that is unconnected to family wealth or support, which implies that intergenerational wealth transmission is probably not particularly important for explaining wealth concentration. An alternative view is that wealthy dynastic families hold a substantial share of aggregate wealth that is systematically passed from old to young, either through direct transfers in the form of inheritances and financial gifts, or more indirect channels such as the provision of education or other opportunities that lead to future wealth accumulation.2 In this note, we seek to establish the role of intergenerational wealth transmission by using the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which contains extensive information about household balance sheets, intergenerational transfers made and received, and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Wealth concentration is high and rising in the US, reigniting an old debate within economics about the role that intergenerational wealth transmission plays in understanding savings and wealth accumulation.1 One view is that observed wealth holdings at any point in time are almost entirely attributable to lifetime saving that is unconnected to family wealth or support, which implies that intergenerational wealth transmission is probably not particularly important for explaining wealth concentration. An alternative view is that wealthy dynastic families hold a substantial share of aggregate wealth that is systematically passed from old to young, either through direct transfers in the form of inheritances and financial gifts, or more indirect channels such as the provision of education or other opportunities that lead to future wealth accumulation.2 In this note, we seek to establish the role of intergenerational wealth transmission by using the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which contains extensive information about household balance sheets, intergenerational transfers made and received, and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents

@article{Goda2018,
  title = {The Global Concentration of Wealth},
  author = {Goda, Thomas},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics},
  volume = {42},
  number = {1},
  pages = {95--115},
  doi = {10.1093/cje/bex020},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bex020},
  abstract = {This paper compares changes in relative and absolute wealth concentrations to establish whether both processes have followed similar trajectories. The findings indicate that while the relative wealth concentration level has increased in recent times, it is not extraordinarily high from a historical perspective. In contrast, the absolute wealth concentration level is most likely higher than has ever previously occurred, due to the growth of per capita wealth holdings and the population size of high net worth individuals (HNWIs). The available data also suggest that HNWIs recovered very quickly from the losses that they experienced in the financial crisis of 2008. As a result, HNWIs' wealth holdings in 2013 were at least 30\% higher than they were in 2007. The post-crisis recovery of billionaires was even stronger, with their 2014 net wealth holdings more than 85\% higher than 2007 levels.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper compares changes in relative and absolute wealth concentrations to establish whether both processes have followed similar trajectories. The findings indicate that while the relative wealth concentration level has increased in recent times, it is not extraordinarily high from a historical perspective. In contrast, the absolute wealth concentration level is most likely higher than has ever previously occurred, due to the growth of per capita wealth holdings and the population size of high net worth individuals (HNWIs). The available data also suggest that HNWIs recovered very quickly from the losses that they experienced in the financial crisis of 2008. As a result, HNWIs' wealth holdings in 2013 were at least 30% higher than they were in 2007. The post-crisis recovery of billionaires was even stronger, with their 2014 net wealth holdings more than 85% higher than 2007 levels.

@article{Islam2018,
  title = {Wealth Inequality, Democracy and Economic Freedom},
  author = {Islam, Md Rabiul},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Comparative Economics},
  volume = {46},
  number = {4},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jce.2018.01.002},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2018.01.002},
  abstract = {Using a novel panel data set from the Credit Suisse on the top wealth shares for 46 sample countries spanning 2000\textendash 2014, this paper empirically investigates to what extent wealth inequality influences economic freedom and whether this relationship is affected by the level of democracy. Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's economic freedom summary index as well as its five major sub-indices, such as government size, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations. Wealth inequality is measured by the top wealth shares. Trade union density is used as an instrument for wealth inequality. Empirical results suggest that the rising wealth inequality significantly hampers overall economic freedom, property rights protection, freedom to trade, soundness of money and regulatory environment. Furthermore, this negative effect of wealth inequality is reinforced at a lower level of democracy. These findings are robust to alternative measures of wealth inequality, economic freedom, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

Using a novel panel data set from the Credit Suisse on the top wealth shares for 46 sample countries spanning 2000– 2014, this paper empirically investigates to what extent wealth inequality influences economic freedom and whether this relationship is affected by the level of democracy. Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's economic freedom summary index as well as its five major sub-indices, such as government size, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations. Wealth inequality is measured by the top wealth shares. Trade union density is used as an instrument for wealth inequality. Empirical results suggest that the rising wealth inequality significantly hampers overall economic freedom, property rights protection, freedom to trade, soundness of money and regulatory environment. Furthermore, this negative effect of wealth inequality is reinforced at a lower level of democracy. These findings are robust to alternative measures of wealth inequality, economic freedom, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification.

@article{JohnsenDellinger2018,
  title = {The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax},
  author = {Johnsen, Dawn and Dellinger, Walter},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Indiana Law Journal},
  volume = {93},
  number = {1},
  pages = {111--137},
  url = {https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol93/iss1/8},
  abstract = {The United States needs innovative approaches to help rebuild foundational, shared understandings of American democracy, the American Dream, and opportunity and fairness. Tax policy provides one central context in which collective judgments about fundamental values help form national identity. We believe that a national wealth tax (that is, a tax on individuals' net worth) should be among the policy options under consideration to support vital infrastructure, social service, and other governmental functions. Although not a new concept, a wealth tax may be an idea whose time has come, as inequality soars toward record highs. Our aim in this Essay is to help ensure that a wealth tax is among the policy options available to Congress by challenging a common assumption that has unduly harmed its prospects: the belief that the U.S. Constitution effectively makes a national wealth tax impossible. We believe this conventional wisdom is wrong and its casual repetition has been harmful. Devising a progressive tax system that effectively taxes the wealthy is notoriously difficult, but whether a wealth tax is part of that system should depend upon the policy choices of democratically elected representatives, not faulty constitutional understandings.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

The United States needs innovative approaches to help rebuild foundational, shared understandings of American democracy, the American Dream, and opportunity and fairness. Tax policy provides one central context in which collective judgments about fundamental values help form national identity. We believe that a national wealth tax (that is, a tax on individuals' net worth) should be among the policy options under consideration to support vital infrastructure, social service, and other governmental functions. Although not a new concept, a wealth tax may be an idea whose time has come, as inequality soars toward record highs. Our aim in this Essay is to help ensure that a wealth tax is among the policy options available to Congress by challenging a common assumption that has unduly harmed its prospects: the belief that the U.S. Constitution effectively makes a national wealth tax impossible. We believe this conventional wisdom is wrong and its casual repetition has been harmful. Devising a progressive tax system that effectively taxes the wealthy is notoriously difficult, but whether a wealth tax is part of that system should depend upon the policy choices of democratically elected representatives, not faulty constitutional understandings.

@article{Kim2018,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in {{Korea}}, 2000\textendash 2013: Evidence from Inheritance Tax Statistics},
  author = {Kim, Nak Nyeon},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of the Korean Welfare State and Social Policy},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {26--57},
  url = {http://www.welfarestate.re.kr/beluxe_wtFu73/5421},
  urldate = {2022-04-01},
  abstract = {This paper estimates the individual wealth distribution since 2000 by applying the estate multiplier method to the inheritance tax statistics. Based on these estimates, the main findings are as follows. First, the top 1\% (or 10\%) of the adult population aged 20 and above owned 24\% (or 63\%) of total wealth for 2000\textendash 2007 and 25\% (or 66\%) for 2010\textendash 2013. Wealth concentration was much higher than income concentration, which was 12.1\% (or 44.1\%). Second, the wealth concentration in South Korea was lower than Anglo Saxon countries but somewhat higher than European continental countries such as France, falling in the middle of these two groups. A similar international status was true of income concentration. Third, Statistics Korea's Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions does not adequately cover the financial assets of the top wealth brackets and consequently underestimates wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper estimates the individual wealth distribution since 2000 by applying the estate multiplier method to the inheritance tax statistics. Based on these estimates, the main findings are as follows. First, the top 1% (or 10%) of the adult population aged 20 and above owned 24% (or 63%) of total wealth for 2000– 2007 and 25% (or 66%) for 2010– 2013. Wealth concentration was much higher than income concentration, which was 12.1% (or 44.1%). Second, the wealth concentration in South Korea was lower than Anglo Saxon countries but somewhat higher than European continental countries such as France, falling in the middle of these two groups. A similar international status was true of income concentration. Third, Statistics Korea's Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions does not adequately cover the financial assets of the top wealth brackets and consequently underestimates wealth inequality.

@article{Korom2018,
  title = {Inherited Advantage: Comparing Households That Receive Gifts and Bequests with Non-Receiving Households across the Distribution of Household Wealth in 11 {{European}} Countries},
  author = {Korom, Philipp},
  year = {2018},
  month = feb,
  journal = {European Sociological Review},
  volume = {34},
  number = {1},
  pages = {79--91},
  doi = {10.1093/esr/jcx084},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcx084},
  abstract = {This study examines the importance of gifts and bequests ('wealth transfers') across the distribution of household wealth. Unconditional quantile regression applied to harmonized survey data obtained from 11 European countries reveals that households that receive gifts and bequests own considerably more wealth than non-receiving households, all other things being equal. The wealth gap varies hugely along the distribution of net wealth. At the median, the wealth gap reaches about 119,000 euros and increases to 630,000 euros at the 90th percentile. With regard to the 99th percentile, survey data even indicate differences in wealth levels greater than 2.3 million euros. Further analysis finds evidence that the impact of wealth transfers on household wealth follows an inverted U-shaped pattern: gifts and bequests contribute the most to the stock of private wealth in the broad mid-section and less so at the lower and upper ends of the distribution. Overall, the study provides evidence for a strong nexus between inheritance and household wealth that is not limited to the top.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This study examines the importance of gifts and bequests ('wealth transfers') across the distribution of household wealth. Unconditional quantile regression applied to harmonized survey data obtained from 11 European countries reveals that households that receive gifts and bequests own considerably more wealth than non-receiving households, all other things being equal. The wealth gap varies hugely along the distribution of net wealth. At the median, the wealth gap reaches about 119,000 euros and increases to 630,000 euros at the 90th percentile. With regard to the 99th percentile, survey data even indicate differences in wealth levels greater than 2.3 million euros. Further analysis finds evidence that the impact of wealth transfers on household wealth follows an inverted U-shaped pattern: gifts and bequests contribute the most to the stock of private wealth in the broad mid-section and less so at the lower and upper ends of the distribution. Overall, the study provides evidence for a strong nexus between inheritance and household wealth that is not limited to the top.

@article{LundbergWaldenstrom2018,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in {{Sweden}}: What Can We Learn from Capitalized Income Tax Data?},
  author = {Lundberg, Jacob and Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2018},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {64},
  number = {3},
  pages = {517--541},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12294},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12294},
  abstract = {This paper presents new estimates of wealth inequality in Sweden during 2000\textendash 2012, linking wealth register data up to 2007 and individually capitalized wealth based on income and property tax registers for the period thereafter when a repeal of the wealth tax stopped the collection of individual wealth statistics. We find that wealth inequality increased after 2007 and that more unequal bank holdings and housing appear to be important drivers. We also evaluate the performance of the capitalization method by contrasting its estimates and their dispersion with observed stocks in register data up to 2007. The goodness-of-fit varies tremendously across assets and we conclude that although capitalized wealth estimates may well approximate overall inequality levels and trends, they are highly sensitive to assumptions and the quality of the underlying data sources.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/lundberg-waldenstrm-wealthinequalityinswedenwhatcanwelearnfromcapitalizedincometaxdataappendix-2018}
}

This paper presents new estimates of wealth inequality in Sweden during 2000– 2012, linking wealth register data up to 2007 and individually capitalized wealth based on income and property tax registers for the period thereafter when a repeal of the wealth tax stopped the collection of individual wealth statistics. We find that wealth inequality increased after 2007 and that more unequal bank holdings and housing appear to be important drivers. We also evaluate the performance of the capitalization method by contrasting its estimates and their dispersion with observed stocks in register data up to 2007. The goodness-of-fit varies tremendously across assets and we conclude that although capitalized wealth estimates may well approximate overall inequality levels and trends, they are highly sensitive to assumptions and the quality of the underlying data sources.

@unpublished{Lustig2018,
  title = {Measuring the Distribution of Household Income, Consumption and Wealth: State of Play and Measurement Challenges},
  author = {Lustig, Nora},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/tulwpaper/1801.htm},
  abstract = {This paper focuses on the data challenges encountered while measuring vertical economic inequality, i.e. inequality of income and consumption, and-whenever feasible-wealth, among households or individuals ranked by the level of their economic resources. The paper presents a critical assessment of international databases on inequality. Among the worrisome facts is that international databases not only show different levels of inequality but, for some countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), diverging trends also. A key factor behind the limitations of existing databases is the quality of the underlying household surveys (microdata) used as inputs for their construction. Among the salient challenges is that household surveys suffer from undercoverage and underreporting of top incomes, i.e. the "missing rich". Missing the rich introduces a bias in the measured inequality indicators, a bias that could go in either direction. Another limitation in existing inequality indicators is that the typical welfare metrics are disposable income and/or consumption expenditures; these, however, take into account only part of the effect that taxes and transfers have on people's economic well-being. The paper suggests that a more comprehensive assessment needs to use an income variable that includes social transfers in-kind (especially education and health), and adds the effect of consumption taxes and subsidies as well.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper focuses on the data challenges encountered while measuring vertical economic inequality, i.e. inequality of income and consumption, and-whenever feasible-wealth, among households or individuals ranked by the level of their economic resources. The paper presents a critical assessment of international databases on inequality. Among the worrisome facts is that international databases not only show different levels of inequality but, for some countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), diverging trends also. A key factor behind the limitations of existing databases is the quality of the underlying household surveys (microdata) used as inputs for their construction. Among the salient challenges is that household surveys suffer from undercoverage and underreporting of top incomes, i.e. the "missing rich". Missing the rich introduces a bias in the measured inequality indicators, a bias that could go in either direction. Another limitation in existing inequality indicators is that the typical welfare metrics are disposable income and/or consumption expenditures; these, however, take into account only part of the effect that taxes and transfers have on people's economic well-being. The paper suggests that a more comprehensive assessment needs to use an income variable that includes social transfers in-kind (especially education and health), and adds the effect of consumption taxes and subsidies as well.

@incollection{Morellietal2018,
  title = {Wealth Inequality},
  booktitle = {Generating Prosperity for Working Families in Affluent Countries},
  author = {Morelli, Salvatore and Nolan, Brian and Van Kerm, Philippe},
  year = {2018},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  address = {{Oxford}},
  doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198807056.003.0012},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807056.003.0012},
  abstract = {This chapter brings wealth into the picture, again in a comparative perspective, to bring out key features of recent trends and their implications for the prosperity and prospects of ordinary families. Data on the distribution of wealth has been improving in recent years, and new data are exploited here to examine patterns of wealth holding across the income distribution. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the extent and nature of wealth held by middle and lower income working-age families, and how this differs from those higher up the distribution. The chapter also looks at inequality in the distribution of wealth compared with income, and whether wealth inequality has widened as income inequality has grown.},
  isbn = {978-0-19-880705-6},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This chapter brings wealth into the picture, again in a comparative perspective, to bring out key features of recent trends and their implications for the prosperity and prospects of ordinary families. Data on the distribution of wealth has been improving in recent years, and new data are exploited here to examine patterns of wealth holding across the income distribution. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the extent and nature of wealth held by middle and lower income working-age families, and how this differs from those higher up the distribution. The chapter also looks at inequality in the distribution of wealth compared with income, and whether wealth inequality has widened as income inequality has grown.

@article{Novokmetetal2018,
  title = {From {{Soviets}} to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in {{Russia}} 1905-2016},
  author = {Novokmet, Filip and Piketty, Thomas and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality},
  volume = {16},
  number = {2},
  pages = {189--223},
  doi = {10.1007/s10888-018-9383-0},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-018-9383-0},
  abstract = {This paper combines national accounts, survey, wealth and fiscal data (including recently released tax data on high-income taxpayers) in order to provide consistent series on the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in Russia from the Soviet period until the present day. We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/novokmet-piketty-zucman-fromsovietstooligarchsinequalityandpropertyinrussia19052016workingpaper-2018},
  url_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/novokmet-piketty-zucman-fromsovietstooligarchsinequalityandpropertyinrussia19052016appendix-2017},
  url_main_figures_and_tables = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/novokmet-piketty-zucman-fromsovietstooligarchsinequalityandpropertyinrussia19052016mainfiguresandtables-2018}
}

This paper combines national accounts, survey, wealth and fiscal data (including recently released tax data on high-income taxpayers) in order to provide consistent series on the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in Russia from the Soviet period until the present day. We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.

@techreport{Novokmetetal2018a,
  type = {{{WID}}.World {{Working Paper}}},
  title = {From {{Soviets}} to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in {{Russia}} 1905-2016 [Working Paper]},
  author = {Novokmet, Filip and Piketty, Thomas and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2018},
  month = apr,
  number = {2017/09},
  institution = {{World Inequality Database}},
  url = {https://wid.world/document/soviets-oligarchs-inequality-property-russia-1905-2016/},
  urldate = {2022-04-01},
  abstract = {This paper combines national accounts, survey, wealth and fiscal data (including recently released tax data on high-income taxpayers) in order to provide consistent series on the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in Russia from the Soviet period until the present day. We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  url_published_version = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/novokmet-piketty-zucman-fromsovietstooligarchsinequalityandpropertyinrussia19052016-2018},
  url_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/novokmet-piketty-zucman-fromsovietstooligarchsinequalityandpropertyinrussia19052016appendix-2017},
  url_main_figures_and_tables = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/novokmet-piketty-zucman-fromsovietstooligarchsinequalityandpropertyinrussia19052016mainfiguresandtables-2018}
}

This paper combines national accounts, survey, wealth and fiscal data (including recently released tax data on high-income taxpayers) in order to provide consistent series on the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in Russia from the Soviet period until the present day. We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.

@article{Pfeffer2018,
  title = {Growing Wealth Gaps in Education},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T.},
  year = {2018},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Demography},
  volume = {55},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1033--1068},
  doi = {10.1007/s13524-018-0666-7},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-018-0666-7},
  abstract = {Prior research on trends in educational inequality has focused chiefly on changing gaps in educational attainment by family income or parental occupation. In contrast, this contribution provides the first assessment of trends in educational attainment by family wealth and suggests that we should be at least as concerned about growing wealth gaps in education. Despite overall growth in educational attainment and some signs of decreasing wealth gaps in high school attainment and college access, I find a large and rapidly increasing wealth gap in college attainment between cohorts born in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. This growing wealth gap in higher educational attainment co-occurred with a rise in inequality in children's wealth backgrounds, although the analyses also suggest that the latter does not fully account for the former. Nevertheless, the results reported here raise concerns about the distribution of educational opportunity among today's children who grow up in a context of particularly extreme wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

Prior research on trends in educational inequality has focused chiefly on changing gaps in educational attainment by family income or parental occupation. In contrast, this contribution provides the first assessment of trends in educational attainment by family wealth and suggests that we should be at least as concerned about growing wealth gaps in education. Despite overall growth in educational attainment and some signs of decreasing wealth gaps in high school attainment and college access, I find a large and rapidly increasing wealth gap in college attainment between cohorts born in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. This growing wealth gap in higher educational attainment co-occurred with a rise in inequality in children's wealth backgrounds, although the analyses also suggest that the latter does not fully account for the former. Nevertheless, the results reported here raise concerns about the distribution of educational opportunity among today's children who grow up in a context of particularly extreme wealth inequality.

@article{PfefferKillewald2018,
  title = {Generations of Advantage. Multigenerational Correlations in Family Wealth},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Killewald, Alexandra},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Social Forces},
  volume = {96},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1411--1442},
  doi = {10.1093/sf/sox086},
  url = {https://fabianpfeffer.com/research/wealth-and-opportunity/},
  abstract = {Inequality in family wealth is high, yet we know little about how much and how wealth inequality is maintained across generations. We argue that a long-term perspective reflective of wealth's cumulative nature is crucial to understand the extent and channels of wealth reproduction across generations. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that span nearly half a century, we show that a one-decile increase in parents' wealth position is associated with an increase of about four percentiles in their offspring's wealth position in adulthood. We show that grandparental wealth is a unique predictor of grandchildren's wealth, above and beyond the role of parental wealth, suggesting that a focus on only parent-child dyads understates the importance of family wealth lineages. Second, considering five channels of wealth transmission\textemdash gifts and bequests, education, marriage, homeownership, and business ownership\textemdash we find that most of the advantages arising from family wealth begin much earlier in the life course than the common focus on bequests implies, even when we consider the wealth of grandparents. We also document the stark disadvantage of African American households in terms of not only their wealth attainment but also their intergenerational wealth mobility compared to whites.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Inequality in family wealth is high, yet we know little about how much and how wealth inequality is maintained across generations. We argue that a long-term perspective reflective of wealth's cumulative nature is crucial to understand the extent and channels of wealth reproduction across generations. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that span nearly half a century, we show that a one-decile increase in parents' wealth position is associated with an increase of about four percentiles in their offspring's wealth position in adulthood. We show that grandparental wealth is a unique predictor of grandchildren's wealth, above and beyond the role of parental wealth, suggesting that a focus on only parent-child dyads understates the importance of family wealth lineages. Second, considering five channels of wealth transmission— gifts and bequests, education, marriage, homeownership, and business ownership— we find that most of the advantages arising from family wealth begin much earlier in the life course than the common focus on bequests implies, even when we consider the wealth of grandparents. We also document the stark disadvantage of African American households in terms of not only their wealth attainment but also their intergenerational wealth mobility compared to whites.

@article{Pikettyetal2018,
  title = {Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the {{United States}}},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2018},
  month = may,
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {133},
  number = {2},
  pages = {553--609},
  doi = {10.1093/QJE/QJX043},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJX043},
  abstract = {This article combines tax, survey, and national accounts data to estimate the distribution of national income in the United States since 1913. Our distributional national accounts capture 100\% of national income, allowing us to compute growth rates for each quantile of the income distribution consistent with macroeconomic growth. We estimate the distribution of both pretax and posttax income, making it possible to provide a comprehensive view of how government redistribution affects inequality. Average pretax real national income per adult has increased 60\% from 1980 to 2014, but we find that it has stagnated for the bottom 50\% of the distribution at about \$16,000 a year. The pretax income of the middle class-adults between the median and the 90th percentile-has grown 40\% since 1980, faster than what tax and survey data suggest, due in particular to the rise of tax-exempt fringe benefits. Income has boomed at the top. The upsurge of top incomes was first a labor income phenomenon but has mostly been a capital income phenomenon since 2000. The government has offset only a small fraction of the increase in inequality. The reduction of the gender gap in earnings has mitigated the increase in inequality among adults, but the share of women falls steeply as one moves up the labor income distribution, and is only 11\% in the top 0.1\% in 2014.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_data_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-saez-zucman-distributionalnationalaccountsmethodsandestimatesfortheunitedstatesdataappendix-2017}
}

This article combines tax, survey, and national accounts data to estimate the distribution of national income in the United States since 1913. Our distributional national accounts capture 100% of national income, allowing us to compute growth rates for each quantile of the income distribution consistent with macroeconomic growth. We estimate the distribution of both pretax and posttax income, making it possible to provide a comprehensive view of how government redistribution affects inequality. Average pretax real national income per adult has increased 60% from 1980 to 2014, but we find that it has stagnated for the bottom 50% of the distribution at about $16,000 a year. The pretax income of the middle class-adults between the median and the 90th percentile-has grown 40% since 1980, faster than what tax and survey data suggest, due in particular to the rise of tax-exempt fringe benefits. Income has boomed at the top. The upsurge of top incomes was first a labor income phenomenon but has mostly been a capital income phenomenon since 2000. The government has offset only a small fraction of the increase in inequality. The reduction of the gender gap in earnings has mitigated the increase in inequality among adults, but the share of women falls steeply as one moves up the labor income distribution, and is only 11% in the top 0.1% in 2014.

@article{Poterbaetal2018,
  title = {Longitudinal Determinants of End-of-Life Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Poterba, James and Venti, Steven and Wise, David A.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {162},
  pages = {78--88},
  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
  doi = {10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.04.008},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.008},
  abstract = {Inequality in wealth among elderly households, and in particular the prevalence of very low wealth holdings, can be an important consideration in the design of social insurance programs. This paper examines the incidence and determinants of low levels of financial and total wealth using repeated cross-sections of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a small longitudinal sample of HRS respondents observed both at age 65 and shortly before death. Most of those who report very low wealth holdings at the end of their life had little wealth at the traditional retirement age of 65. There is strong persistence over time in reports of very low wealth, and more generally relatively little evidence that wealth is drawn down in the first 15 years of retirement. The age-specific probability of reporting low wealth increases slowly after age 65. Low lifetime earnings are strongly predictive of low wealth at retirement and at the end of life. The post-retirement onset of a major medical condition, and, for married women, the loss of their spouse, are both associated with small increases in the probability of reporting very low wealth, but they account for a small fraction of low-wealth outcomes. Low levels of wealth accumulation before age 65, rather than gaps in the safety net after 65 or rapid spend-down of accumulated assets, appear to be the primary determinant of low levels of wealth just before death.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Inequality in wealth among elderly households, and in particular the prevalence of very low wealth holdings, can be an important consideration in the design of social insurance programs. This paper examines the incidence and determinants of low levels of financial and total wealth using repeated cross-sections of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a small longitudinal sample of HRS respondents observed both at age 65 and shortly before death. Most of those who report very low wealth holdings at the end of their life had little wealth at the traditional retirement age of 65. There is strong persistence over time in reports of very low wealth, and more generally relatively little evidence that wealth is drawn down in the first 15 years of retirement. The age-specific probability of reporting low wealth increases slowly after age 65. Low lifetime earnings are strongly predictive of low wealth at retirement and at the end of life. The post-retirement onset of a major medical condition, and, for married women, the loss of their spouse, are both associated with small increases in the probability of reporting very low wealth, but they account for a small fraction of low-wealth outcomes. Low levels of wealth accumulation before age 65, rather than gaps in the safety net after 65 or rapid spend-down of accumulated assets, appear to be the primary determinant of low levels of wealth just before death.

@unpublished{Poterbaetal2018a,
  title = {Longitudinal Determinants of End-of-Life Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Poterba, James and Venti, Steven and Wise, David A.},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/papers/w23839},
  abstract = {Inequality in wealth among elderly households, and in particular the prevalence of very low wealth holdings, can be an important consideration in the design of social insurance programs. This paper examines the incidence and determinants of low levels of financial and total wealth using repeated cross-sections of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a small longitudinal sample of HRS respondents observed both at age 65 and shortly before death. Most of those who report very low wealth holdings at the end of their life had little wealth at the traditional retirement age of 65. There is strong persistence over time in reports of very low wealth, and more generally relatively little evidence that wealth is drawn down in the first 15 years of retirement. The age-specific probability of reporting low wealth increases slowly after age 65. Low lifetime earnings are strongly predictive of low wealth at retirement and at the end of life. The post-retirement onset of a major medical condition, and, for married women, the loss of their spouse, are both associated with small increases in the probability of reporting very low wealth, but they account for a small fraction of low-wealth outcomes. Low levels of wealth accumulation before age 65, rather than gaps in the safety net after 65 or rapid spend-down of accumulated assets, appear to be the primary determinant of low levels of wealth just before death.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Inequality in wealth among elderly households, and in particular the prevalence of very low wealth holdings, can be an important consideration in the design of social insurance programs. This paper examines the incidence and determinants of low levels of financial and total wealth using repeated cross-sections of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a small longitudinal sample of HRS respondents observed both at age 65 and shortly before death. Most of those who report very low wealth holdings at the end of their life had little wealth at the traditional retirement age of 65. There is strong persistence over time in reports of very low wealth, and more generally relatively little evidence that wealth is drawn down in the first 15 years of retirement. The age-specific probability of reporting low wealth increases slowly after age 65. Low lifetime earnings are strongly predictive of low wealth at retirement and at the end of life. The post-retirement onset of a major medical condition, and, for married women, the loss of their spouse, are both associated with small increases in the probability of reporting very low wealth, but they account for a small fraction of low-wealth outcomes. Low levels of wealth accumulation before age 65, rather than gaps in the safety net after 65 or rapid spend-down of accumulated assets, appear to be the primary determinant of low levels of wealth just before death.

@article{SaezStantcheva2018,
  title = {A Simpler Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Stantcheva, Stefanie},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {162},
  pages = {120--142},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.10.004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.10.004},
  abstract = {This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a tractable optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences that can address many important policy questions. These formulas can easily be taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to the case with concave utility for consumption. The same types of formulas carry over by appropriately defining elasticities. We show that one can recover all the results from the simpler model using a new and non standard steady state approach that respects individual preferences even with a fully general utility function.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a tractable optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences that can address many important policy questions. These formulas can easily be taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to the case with concave utility for consumption. The same types of formulas carry over by appropriately defining elasticities. We show that one can recover all the results from the simpler model using a new and non standard steady state approach that respects individual preferences even with a fully general utility function.

@article{Vermeulen2018,
  title = {How Fat Is the Top Tail of the Wealth Distribution?},
  author = {Vermeulen, Philip},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {64},
  number = {2},
  pages = {357--387},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12279},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12279},
  abstract = {Differential unit non-response in household wealth surveys biases estimates of top tail wealth shares downward. Using Monte Carlo evidence, I show that adding only a few extreme observations to wealth surveys is sufficient to remove the downward bias. Combining extreme wealth observations from Forbes World's billionaires with the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Wealth and Assets Survey, and the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, I provide new improved estimates of top tail wealth in the United States, the United Kingdom, and nine euro area countries. These new estimates indicate significantly higher top wealth shares than those calculated from the wealth surveys alone.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Differential unit non-response in household wealth surveys biases estimates of top tail wealth shares downward. Using Monte Carlo evidence, I show that adding only a few extreme observations to wealth surveys is sufficient to remove the downward bias. Combining extreme wealth observations from Forbes World's billionaires with the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Wealth and Assets Survey, and the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, I provide new improved estimates of top tail wealth in the United States, the United Kingdom, and nine euro area countries. These new estimates indicate significantly higher top wealth shares than those calculated from the wealth surveys alone.

@unpublished{Alstadsaeteretal2017,
  title = {Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? {{Macro}} Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality},
  author = {Alstads{\ae}ter, Annette and Johannesen, Niels and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.008},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/papers/w23805},
  abstract = {Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10\% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity\textemdash from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to about 15\% in Continental Europe, and 60\% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01\% wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity— from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to about 15% in Continental Europe, and 60% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01% wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world.

@techreport{Alvaredoetal2017,
  type = {Department of {{Economics Working Paper}}},
  title = {Top Wealth Shares in the {{UK}} over More than a Century},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Atkinson, Anthony B. and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2017},
  month = jan,
  number = {01/WP/2017},
  institution = {{Ca' Foscari University of Venice}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2903853},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2903853},
  abstract = {Recent research highlighted controversy about the evolution of concentration of personal wealth. In this paper we provide new evidence about the long-run evolution of top wealth shares for the United Kingdom. The new series covers a long period \textendash{} from 1895 to the present \textendash{} and has a different point of departure from the previous literature: the distribution of estates left at death. We find that the application to the estate data of mortality multipliers to yield estimates of wealth among the living does not substantially change the degree of concentration over much of the period both, in the UK and US, allowing inferences to be made for years when this method cannot be applied. The results show that wealth concentration in the UK remained relatively constant during the first wave of globalization, but then decreased dramatically in the period from 1914 to 1979. The UK went from being more unequal in terms of wealth than the US to being less unequal. However, the decline in UK wealth concentration came to an end around 1980, and since then there is evidence of an increase in top shares, notably in the distribution of wealth excluding housing in recent years. We investigate the triangulating evidence provided by data on capital income concentration and on reported super fortunes.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_published_version = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-atkinson-morelli-topwealthsharesintheukovermorethanacentury-2018},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-atkinson-morelli-topwealthsharesintheukovermorethanacenturyappendicesforonlinepublication-2018},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-atkinson-morelli-topwealthsharesintheukovermorethanacenturydatafile-2018}
}

Recent research highlighted controversy about the evolution of concentration of personal wealth. In this paper we provide new evidence about the long-run evolution of top wealth shares for the United Kingdom. The new series covers a long period – from 1895 to the present – and has a different point of departure from the previous literature: the distribution of estates left at death. We find that the application to the estate data of mortality multipliers to yield estimates of wealth among the living does not substantially change the degree of concentration over much of the period both, in the UK and US, allowing inferences to be made for years when this method cannot be applied. The results show that wealth concentration in the UK remained relatively constant during the first wave of globalization, but then decreased dramatically in the period from 1914 to 1979. The UK went from being more unequal in terms of wealth than the US to being less unequal. However, the decline in UK wealth concentration came to an end around 1980, and since then there is evidence of an increase in top shares, notably in the distribution of wealth excluding housing in recent years. We investigate the triangulating evidence provided by data on capital income concentration and on reported super fortunes.

@article{Alvaredoetal2017a,
  title = {On the Share of Inheritance in Aggregate Wealth: {{Europe}} and the {{USA}}, 1900\textendash 2010},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Garbinti, Bertrand and Piketty, Thomas},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economica},
  volume = {84},
  number = {334},
  pages = {239--260},
  doi = {10.1111/ecca.12233},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/ecca.12233},
  abstract = {This paper provides historical series on the evolution of the share of inherited wealth in aggregate private wealth in Europe (France, the UK, Germany, Sweden) and the USA over the 1900\textendash 2010 period. Until 1910, the inheritance share was very high in Europe (70\textendash 80\%). It then fell abruptly following the 1914\textendash 45 shocks, down to about 30\textendash 40\% during the 1950\textendash 80 period, and is back to 50\textendash 60\% (and rising) since around 2010. The US pattern also appears to be U-shaped, albeit less marked, and with significant uncertainty regarding recent trends, due to data limitations. We discuss possible interpretations for these long-run patterns.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This paper provides historical series on the evolution of the share of inherited wealth in aggregate private wealth in Europe (France, the UK, Germany, Sweden) and the USA over the 1900– 2010 period. Until 1910, the inheritance share was very high in Europe (70– 80%). It then fell abruptly following the 1914– 45 shocks, down to about 30– 40% during the 1950– 80 period, and is back to 50– 60% (and rising) since around 2010. The US pattern also appears to be U-shaped, albeit less marked, and with significant uncertainty regarding recent trends, due to data limitations. We discuss possible interpretations for these long-run patterns.

@misc{Atkinsonetal2017,
  title = {The Chartbook of Economic Inequality},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Hasell, Joe and Morelli, Salvatore and Roser, Max},
  year = {2017},
  month = may,
  url = {https://www.chartbookofeconomicinequality.com/},
  urldate = {2022-02-25},
  abstract = {The Chartbook summarizes the evidence about long-run changes in five different dimensions of economic inequality \textendash{} overall and top income inequality, poverty, earnings dispersion, and wealth inequality \textendash{} for 25 countries covering more than one hundred years. The evidence represents an update and extension of the work done by Atkinson and Morelli (2014). The results are presented in 25 charts, one for each country, together with a full description of the method and sources. Series, sources and graphs can be downloaded at www.chartbookofeconomicinequality.com.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School}
}

The Chartbook summarizes the evidence about long-run changes in five different dimensions of economic inequality – overall and top income inequality, poverty, earnings dispersion, and wealth inequality – for 25 countries covering more than one hundred years. The evidence represents an update and extension of the work done by Atkinson and Morelli (2014). The results are presented in 25 charts, one for each country, together with a full description of the method and sources. Series, sources and graphs can be downloaded at www.chartbookofeconomicinequality.com.

@article{Benhabibetal2017,
  title = {Earnings Inequality and Other Determinants of Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Benhabib, Jess and Bisin, Alberto and Luo, Mi},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {American Economic Review: Papers \& Proceedings},
  volume = {107},
  number = {5},
  pages = {593--597},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171005},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171005},
  abstract = {We study the relation between the distribution of labor earnings and the distribution of wealth. We show, theoretically as well as empirically, that while labor earnings and precautionary savings are important determinants of wealth inequality factors, they cannot by themselves account for the thick tail of (the large top shares in) the observed distribution of wealth. Other determinants, like stochastic returns to wealth, as well as savings rates and rates of returns increasing in wealth, need to be accounted for.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We study the relation between the distribution of labor earnings and the distribution of wealth. We show, theoretically as well as empirically, that while labor earnings and precautionary savings are important determinants of wealth inequality factors, they cannot by themselves account for the thick tail of (the large top shares in) the observed distribution of wealth. Other determinants, like stochastic returns to wealth, as well as savings rates and rates of returns increasing in wealth, need to be accounted for.

@article{Brickeretal2017,
  title = {Changes in {{U}}.{{S}}. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances},
  author = {Bricker, Jesse and Dettling, Lisa J and Henriques, Alice and Hsu, Joanne W and Jacobs, Lindsay and Moore, Kevin B and Pack, Sarah and Sabelhaus, John and Thompson, Jeffrey and Windle, Richard A},
  year = {2017},
  volume = {103},
  number = {3},
  url = {https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2014/pdf/scf14.pdf.},
  abstract = {The Federal Reserve Board's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) collects information about family incomes, net worth, balance sheet components, credit use, and other financial outcomes. 1 The 2016 SCF reveals broad-based gains in income and net worth since the previous time the survey was conducted, in 2013. 2 During the three years between the beginning of the 2013 and 2016 surveys, real gross domestic product grew at an annual rate of 2.2 percent, the civilian unemployment rate fell from 7.5 percent to 5 percent, and the annual rate of change in the consumer price index averaged 0.8 percent. 3 These changes in aggregate economic performance led to broad-based income gains across many different types of families. Several observations from the SCF about family incomes stand out: 4},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The Federal Reserve Board's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) collects information about family incomes, net worth, balance sheet components, credit use, and other financial outcomes. 1 The 2016 SCF reveals broad-based gains in income and net worth since the previous time the survey was conducted, in 2013. 2 During the three years between the beginning of the 2013 and 2016 surveys, real gross domestic product grew at an annual rate of 2.2 percent, the civilian unemployment rate fell from 7.5 percent to 5 percent, and the annual rate of change in the consumer price index averaged 0.8 percent. 3 These changes in aggregate economic performance led to broad-based income gains across many different types of families. Several observations from the SCF about family incomes stand out: 4

@article{Bonkeetal2017,
  title = {How Inheritances Shape Wealth Distributions: {{An}} International Comparison},
  author = {B{\"o}nke, Timm and Werder, Marten V. and Westermeier, Christian},
  year = {2017},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {159},
  pages = {217--220},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.007},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.007},
  abstract = {We use data from the European Household Finance and Consumption Survey in order to examine the distributional effect of intergenerational wealth transfers on the net worth distribution in 8 European countries and compare it to recent findings for the US. To do so, we resort to the decomposition of the coefficient of variation as suggested and applied by Wolff (1987, 2002, 2015) and Wolff and Gittleman (2014). The results seem to imply that inheritances and gifts have a vastly equalizing effect on inequality in household wealth in all 8 countries.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

We use data from the European Household Finance and Consumption Survey in order to examine the distributional effect of intergenerational wealth transfers on the net worth distribution in 8 European countries and compare it to recent findings for the US. To do so, we resort to the decomposition of the coefficient of variation as suggested and applied by Wolff (1987, 2002, 2015) and Wolff and Gittleman (2014). The results seem to imply that inheritances and gifts have a vastly equalizing effect on inequality in household wealth in all 8 countries.

@article{Carrolletal2017,
  title = {The Distribution of Wealth and the Marginal Propensity to Consume},
  author = {Carroll, Christopher and Slacalek, Jiri and Tokuoka, Kiichi and White, Matthew N.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Quantitative Economics},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {977--1020},
  doi = {10.3982/qe694},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3982/QE694},
  abstract = {In a model calibrated to match micro- and macroeconomic evidence on house- hold income dynamics, we show that a modest degree of heterogeneity in house- hold preferences or beliefs is sufficient to match empirical measures of wealth inequality in the United States. The heterogeneity-augmented model's predic- tions are consistent with microeconomic evidence that suggests that the annual marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is much larger than the roughly 0?04 im- plied by commonly used macroeconomic models (even ones including some het- erogeneity). The high MPC arises because many consumers hold little wealth de- spite having a strong precautionary motive. Our model also plausibly predicts that the aggregate MPC can differ greatly depending on how the shock is distributed across households (depending, e.g., on their wealth, or employment status).},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

In a model calibrated to match micro- and macroeconomic evidence on house- hold income dynamics, we show that a modest degree of heterogeneity in house- hold preferences or beliefs is sufficient to match empirical measures of wealth inequality in the United States. The heterogeneity-augmented model's predic- tions are consistent with microeconomic evidence that suggests that the annual marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is much larger than the roughly 0?04 im- plied by commonly used macroeconomic models (even ones including some het- erogeneity). The high MPC arises because many consumers hold little wealth de- spite having a strong precautionary motive. Our model also plausibly predicts that the aggregate MPC can differ greatly depending on how the shock is distributed across households (depending, e.g., on their wealth, or employment status).

@article{Cesarinietal2017,
  title = {The Effect of Wealth on Individual and Household Labor Supply: Evidence from Swedish Lotteries},
  author = {Cesarini, David and Lindqvist, Erik and Notowidigdo, Matthew J. and {\"O}stling, Robert},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {107},
  number = {12},
  pages = {3917--3946},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20151589},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151589},
  abstract = {We study the effect of wealth on labor supply using the randomized assignment of monetary prizes in a large sample of Swedish lottery players. Winning a lottery prize modestly reduces earnings, with the reduction being immediate, persistent, and quite similar by age, education, and sex. A calibrated dynamic model implies lifetime marginal propensities to earn out of unearned income from -0.17 at age 20 to -0.04 at age 60, and labor supply elasticities in the lower range of previously reported estimates. The earnings response is stronger for winners than their spouses, which is inconsistent with unitary household labor supply models.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

We study the effect of wealth on labor supply using the randomized assignment of monetary prizes in a large sample of Swedish lottery players. Winning a lottery prize modestly reduces earnings, with the reduction being immediate, persistent, and quite similar by age, education, and sex. A calibrated dynamic model implies lifetime marginal propensities to earn out of unearned income from -0.17 at age 20 to -0.04 at age 60, and labor supply elasticities in the lower range of previously reported estimates. The earnings response is stronger for winners than their spouses, which is inconsistent with unitary household labor supply models.

@incollection{Cowelletal2017,
  title = {Wealth, Top Incomes and Inequality},
  booktitle = {National Wealth: What Is Missing, Why It Matters},
  author = {Cowell, Frank and Nolan, Brian and Olivera, Javier and Van Kerm, Philippe},
  editor = {Hepburn, Cameron and Hamilton, Kirk},
  year = {2017},
  pages = {175--204},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  url = {https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198803720.001.0001/oso-9780198803720},
  abstract = {Although it is heartening to see wealth inequality being taken seriously, key concepts are often muddled, including the distinction between income and wealth, what is included in "wealth", and facts about wealth distributions. This chapter highlights issues that arise in making ideas and facts about wealth inequality precise, and employs newly-available data to take a fresh look at wealth and wealth inequality in a comparative perspective. The composition of wealth is similar across countries, with housing wealth being the key asset. Wealth is considerably more unequally distributed than income, and it is distinctively so in the United States. Extending definitions to include pension wealth however reduces inequality substantially. Analysis also sheds light on life-cycle patterns and the role of inheritance. Discussion of the joint distributions of income and wealth suggests that interactions between increasing top income shares and the concentration of wealth and income from wealth towards the top is critical.},
  chapter = {Ch. 8},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Although it is heartening to see wealth inequality being taken seriously, key concepts are often muddled, including the distinction between income and wealth, what is included in "wealth", and facts about wealth distributions. This chapter highlights issues that arise in making ideas and facts about wealth inequality precise, and employs newly-available data to take a fresh look at wealth and wealth inequality in a comparative perspective. The composition of wealth is similar across countries, with housing wealth being the key asset. Wealth is considerably more unequally distributed than income, and it is distinctively so in the United States. Extending definitions to include pension wealth however reduces inequality substantially. Analysis also sheds light on life-cycle patterns and the role of inheritance. Discussion of the joint distributions of income and wealth suggests that interactions between increasing top income shares and the concentration of wealth and income from wealth towards the top is critical.

@unpublished{Cowelletal2017a,
  title = {Wealth, Top Incomes and Inequality},
  author = {Cowell, Frank and Nolan, Brian and Olivera, Javier and Van Kerm, Philippe},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/lis/lwswps/24.html},
  abstract = {Although it is heartening to see wealth inequality being taken seriously, key concepts are often muddled, including the distinction between income and wealth, what is included in "wealth", and facts about wealth distributions. This chapter highlights issues that arise in making ideas and facts about wealth inequality precise, and employs newly-available data to take a fresh look at wealth and wealth inequality in a comparative perspective. The composition of wealth is similar across countries, with housing wealth being the key asset. Wealth is considerably more unequally distributed than income, and it is distinctively so in the United States. Extending definitions to include pension wealth however reduces inequality substantially. Analysis also sheds light on life-cycle patterns and the role of inheritance. Discussion of the joint distributions of income and wealth suggests that interactions between increasing top income shares and the concentration of wealth and income from wealth towards the top is critical.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Although it is heartening to see wealth inequality being taken seriously, key concepts are often muddled, including the distinction between income and wealth, what is included in "wealth", and facts about wealth distributions. This chapter highlights issues that arise in making ideas and facts about wealth inequality precise, and employs newly-available data to take a fresh look at wealth and wealth inequality in a comparative perspective. The composition of wealth is similar across countries, with housing wealth being the key asset. Wealth is considerably more unequally distributed than income, and it is distinctively so in the United States. Extending definitions to include pension wealth however reduces inequality substantially. Analysis also sheds light on life-cycle patterns and the role of inheritance. Discussion of the joint distributions of income and wealth suggests that interactions between increasing top income shares and the concentration of wealth and income from wealth towards the top is critical.

@article{Daviesetal2017a,
  title = {Wealth Inequality: Theory, Measurement and Decomposition},
  author = {Davies, James B. and Fortin, Nicole and Lemieux, Thomas},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'\'economique},
  volume = {50},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1224--1261},
  doi = {10.1111/caje.12313},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12313},
  abstract = {This paper reviews the basic principles of inequality measurement, underlining the advantages and shortcomings of alternative measures from a theoretical standpoint and in the context of the study of the distribution of wealth. Adopting the two most popular measures, the Gini index and the P-shares, the paper documents wealth inequality in Canada using the 1999, 2005 and 2012 Survey of Financial Security (SFS). It carries out several decompositions with covariates, featuring DFL-type reweighting methods and Gini and P-shares RIF regressions. The latter parallel decompositions deepen our understanding of how changes in socio-demographic characteristics, including the compensating role of family formation and human capital, impact wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper reviews the basic principles of inequality measurement, underlining the advantages and shortcomings of alternative measures from a theoretical standpoint and in the context of the study of the distribution of wealth. Adopting the two most popular measures, the Gini index and the P-shares, the paper documents wealth inequality in Canada using the 1999, 2005 and 2012 Survey of Financial Security (SFS). It carries out several decompositions with covariates, featuring DFL-type reweighting methods and Gini and P-shares RIF regressions. The latter parallel decompositions deepen our understanding of how changes in socio-demographic characteristics, including the compensating role of family formation and human capital, impact wealth inequality.

@article{Daviesetal2017,
  title = {Estimating the Level and Distribution of Global Wealth, 2000\textendash 2014},
  author = {Davies, James B. and Lluberas, Rodrigo and Shorrocks, Anthony F.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {63},
  number = {4},
  pages = {731--759},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12318},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12318},
  abstract = {This paper estimates the level and distribution of household wealth globally, as well as for regions and countries, for the period 2000\textendash 2014. The data used are mainly from household surveys and national accounts balance sheets, covering about two thirds of the world's population and over 95\% of global household wealth. Lists of the most wealthy published in the media are used to adjust the upper tail. Wealth levels and distributions are imputed for countries without data. Estimated global household wealth stood at USD 251 trillion in 2014, having grown from USD 117 trillion in the year 2000. Wealth per adult in 2014 was USD 53,000. The estimated Gini coefficient of global wealth was 92.2\% in 2014 and the share of the top 10\% was 88.3\%. Wealth inequality fell from 2000 to 2007, with the share of the top 10\% falling from 89.4\% to 86.5\%, before rising steadily to 2014. From 2000 to 2008 the share of financial assets in gross wealth, an important driver of wealth inequality, fell from 55.2\% to 50.2\%, before climbing to 55.0\% in 2014. Household debt rose from 13.6\% of gross assets in 2000 to 16.0\% in 2008, and has since fallen to 13.9\%.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper estimates the level and distribution of household wealth globally, as well as for regions and countries, for the period 2000– 2014. The data used are mainly from household surveys and national accounts balance sheets, covering about two thirds of the world's population and over 95% of global household wealth. Lists of the most wealthy published in the media are used to adjust the upper tail. Wealth levels and distributions are imputed for countries without data. Estimated global household wealth stood at USD 251 trillion in 2014, having grown from USD 117 trillion in the year 2000. Wealth per adult in 2014 was USD 53,000. The estimated Gini coefficient of global wealth was 92.2% in 2014 and the share of the top 10% was 88.3%. Wealth inequality fell from 2000 to 2007, with the share of the top 10% falling from 89.4% to 86.5%, before rising steadily to 2014. From 2000 to 2008 the share of financial assets in gross wealth, an important driver of wealth inequality, fell from 55.2% to 50.2%, before climbing to 55.0% in 2014. Household debt rose from 13.6% of gross assets in 2000 to 16.0% in 2008, and has since fallen to 13.9%.

@unpublished{Fisheretal2017,
  title = {Inequality in {{3D}}: Income, Consumption, and Wealth},
  author = {Fisher, Jonathan and Johnson, David and Smeeding, Timothy and Thompson, Jeffrey},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/inequality-3d-income-consumption-wealth/},
  abstract = {We do not need to and should not have to choose amongst income, consumption, or wealth as the superior measure of well-being. All three individually and jointly determine well-being. We are the first to study inequality in three conjoint dimensions for the same households, using income, consumption, and wealth from the 1989-2016 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF). The paper focuses on two questions. What does inequality in two and three dimensions look like? Has inequality in multiple dimensions increased by less, by more, or by about the same as inequality in any one dimension? We find an increase in inequality in two dimensions and in three dimensions, with a faster increase in multi-dimensional inequality than in one-dimensional inequality. Viewing inequality through one dimension greatly understates the level and the growth in inequality in two and three dimensions. The U.S. is becoming more economically unequal than is generally understood.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We do not need to and should not have to choose amongst income, consumption, or wealth as the superior measure of well-being. All three individually and jointly determine well-being. We are the first to study inequality in three conjoint dimensions for the same households, using income, consumption, and wealth from the 1989-2016 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF). The paper focuses on two questions. What does inequality in two and three dimensions look like? Has inequality in multiple dimensions increased by less, by more, or by about the same as inequality in any one dimension? We find an increase in inequality in two dimensions and in three dimensions, with a faster increase in multi-dimensional inequality than in one-dimensional inequality. Viewing inequality through one dimension greatly understates the level and the growth in inequality in two and three dimensions. The U.S. is becoming more economically unequal than is generally understood.

@unpublished{HalvorsenThoresen2017,
  title = {Distributional Effects of the Wealth Tax under a Lifetime-Dynastic Income Concept},
  author = {Halvorsen, Elin and Thoresen, Thor O.},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2017/working-paper/distributional-effects-wealth-tax-under-lifetime-dynastic-income},
  abstract = {Recent books by Thomas Piketty (Piketty, 2014) and Anthony Atkinson (Atkinson, 2015) have brought the annual wealth tax back on the policy agenda. Both authors suggest using the annual wealth tax to supplement the redistributional effects of the income tax, assigning it a role as a redistributional backstop mechanism. However, when measured against annual income, the wealth tax is often not delivering the expected effects \textendash{} a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low income. We argue that instead of using yearly income, one should measure wealth tax burdens with respect to individual lifetime income in family dynasties. Using rich Norwegian administrative data, we describe how a lifetime-dynastic income concept can be established. Under our preferred income concept, the wealth tax shows advantageous distributional effects \textendash{} it represents a clear redistributional supplement to the income tax and is overall progressive in income.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Recent books by Thomas Piketty (Piketty, 2014) and Anthony Atkinson (Atkinson, 2015) have brought the annual wealth tax back on the policy agenda. Both authors suggest using the annual wealth tax to supplement the redistributional effects of the income tax, assigning it a role as a redistributional backstop mechanism. However, when measured against annual income, the wealth tax is often not delivering the expected effects – a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low income. We argue that instead of using yearly income, one should measure wealth tax burdens with respect to individual lifetime income in family dynasties. Using rich Norwegian administrative data, we describe how a lifetime-dynastic income concept can be established. Under our preferred income concept, the wealth tax shows advantageous distributional effects – it represents a clear redistributional supplement to the income tax and is overall progressive in income.

@article{HallstenPfeffer2017,
  title = {Grand Advantage: Family Wealth and Grandchildren's Educational Achievement in Sweden},
  author = {H{\"a}llsten, Martin and Pfeffer, Fabian T.},
  year = {2017},
  month = apr,
  journal = {American Sociological Review},
  volume = {82},
  number = {2},
  pages = {328--360},
  doi = {10.1177/0003122417695791},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122417695791},
  abstract = {We study the role of family wealth for children's educational achievement using novel Swedish register data. In particular, we focus on the relationship between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's educational achievement. Doing so allows us to reliably establish the independent role of wealth in contributing to long-term inequalities in opportunity. We use regression models with extensive controls to account for observed socioeconomic characteristics of families, cousin fixed effects to net out potentially unobserved grandparent effects, and marginal structural models to account for endogenous selection. We find substantial associations between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's grade point averages (GPA) in the 9th grade that are only partly mediated by parents' socioeconomic characteristics and wealth. Our findings indicate that family wealth inequality\textemdash even in a comparatively egalitarian context like Sweden\textemdash has profound consequences for the distribution of opportunity across multiple generations. We posit that our estimates of the long-term consequences of wealth inequality may be conservative for nations other than Sweden, like the United States, where family wealth\textemdash in addition to its insurance and normative functions\textemdash allows the direct purchase of educational quality and access.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

We study the role of family wealth for children's educational achievement using novel Swedish register data. In particular, we focus on the relationship between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's educational achievement. Doing so allows us to reliably establish the independent role of wealth in contributing to long-term inequalities in opportunity. We use regression models with extensive controls to account for observed socioeconomic characteristics of families, cousin fixed effects to net out potentially unobserved grandparent effects, and marginal structural models to account for endogenous selection. We find substantial associations between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's grade point averages (GPA) in the 9th grade that are only partly mediated by parents' socioeconomic characteristics and wealth. Our findings indicate that family wealth inequality— even in a comparatively egalitarian context like Sweden— has profound consequences for the distribution of opportunity across multiple generations. We posit that our estimates of the long-term consequences of wealth inequality may be conservative for nations other than Sweden, like the United States, where family wealth— in addition to its insurance and normative functions— allows the direct purchase of educational quality and access.

@unpublished{HallstenPfeffer2017a,
  title = {Grand Advantage: Family Wealth and Grandchildren's Educational Achievement in Sweden},
  author = {H{\"a}llsten, Martin and Pfeffer, Fabian T.},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://www.ifau.se/en/Research/Publications/Working-papers/2017/grand-advantage-family-wealth-and-grandchildrens-educational-achievement-in-sweden/},
  abstract = {We study the role of family wealth for children's educational achievement using novel Swedish register data. In particular, we focus on the relationship between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's educational achievement. Doing so allows us to reliably establish the independent role of wealth in contributing to long-term inequalities in opportunity. We use regression models with extensive controls to account for observed socioeconomic characteristics of families, cousin fixed effects to net out potentially unobserved grandparent effects, and marginal structural models to account for endogenous selection. We find substantial associations between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's grade point averages (GPA) in the 9th grade that are only partly mediated by parents' socioeconomic characteristics and wealth. Our findings indicate that family wealth inequality\textemdash even in a comparatively egalitarian context like Sweden\textemdash has profound consequences for the distribution of opportunity across multiple generations. We posit that our estimates of the long-term consequences of wealth inequality may be conservative for nations other than Sweden, like the United States, where family wealth\textemdash in addition to its insurance and normative functions\textemdash allows the direct purchase of educational quality and access.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We study the role of family wealth for children's educational achievement using novel Swedish register data. In particular, we focus on the relationship between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's educational achievement. Doing so allows us to reliably establish the independent role of wealth in contributing to long-term inequalities in opportunity. We use regression models with extensive controls to account for observed socioeconomic characteristics of families, cousin fixed effects to net out potentially unobserved grandparent effects, and marginal structural models to account for endogenous selection. We find substantial associations between grandparents' wealth and their grandchildren's grade point averages (GPA) in the 9th grade that are only partly mediated by parents' socioeconomic characteristics and wealth. Our findings indicate that family wealth inequality— even in a comparatively egalitarian context like Sweden— has profound consequences for the distribution of opportunity across multiple generations. We posit that our estimates of the long-term consequences of wealth inequality may be conservative for nations other than Sweden, like the United States, where family wealth— in addition to its insurance and normative functions— allows the direct purchase of educational quality and access.

@unpublished{JohannesenStolper2017,
  title = {The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing: An Event Study of Leaked Customer Information from Banks in Tax Havens},
  author = {Johannesen, Niels and Stolper, Tim B.M.},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2976321},
  url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/ifauwp/2017_003.html},
  abstract = {We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax haven bank caused a significant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks known to be assisting with tax evasion and that the decrease was largest for the banks most strongly involved. These findings suggest that markets expected the leak to increase the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion and thus to lower both demand and supply in the market for criminal offshore banking services. This interpretation finds support in further evidence that the leak caused a sharp drop in foreign-owned deposits in tax havens.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax haven bank caused a significant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks known to be assisting with tax evasion and that the decrease was largest for the banks most strongly involved. These findings suggest that markets expected the leak to increase the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion and thus to lower both demand and supply in the market for criminal offshore banking services. This interpretation finds support in further evidence that the leak caused a sharp drop in foreign-owned deposits in tax havens.

@article{Karagiannaki2017,
  title = {The Impact of Inheritance on the Distribution of Wealth: Evidence from Great Britain},
  author = {Karagiannaki, Eleni},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {63},
  number = {2},
  pages = {394--408},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12217},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/roiw.12217},
  abstract = {Using the British Household Panel Survey, we investigate the role of inheritance in shaping the distribution of household wealth in Great Britain during 1995\textendash 2005a period characterized by a substantial increase in wealth and an equally important decrease in wealth inequality. Abstracting from behavioral effects, we find that inheritances received during this period accounted for 30 percent of the increase in wealth of inheritors. Regression estimates of the effect of inheritance on wealth accumulation suggest that households spend 30 percent of their inheritances on average, and that there is substantial heterogeneity in household responses. Households that accumulated more wealth saved a larger share of their inheritances, as did middle aged households and those with lower initial wealth. Although inheritances are highly unequal they had a small impact on overall wealth inequality. This mainly reflected the fact that their size relative to other sources of wealth was very small.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Using the British Household Panel Survey, we investigate the role of inheritance in shaping the distribution of household wealth in Great Britain during 1995– 2005a period characterized by a substantial increase in wealth and an equally important decrease in wealth inequality. Abstracting from behavioral effects, we find that inheritances received during this period accounted for 30 percent of the increase in wealth of inheritors. Regression estimates of the effect of inheritance on wealth accumulation suggest that households spend 30 percent of their inheritances on average, and that there is substantial heterogeneity in household responses. Households that accumulated more wealth saved a larger share of their inheritances, as did middle aged households and those with lower initial wealth. Although inheritances are highly unequal they had a small impact on overall wealth inequality. This mainly reflected the fact that their size relative to other sources of wealth was very small.

@article{Killewaldetal2017,
  title = {Wealth Inequality and Accumulation},
  author = {Killewald, Alexandra and Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Schachner, Jared N.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Annual Review of Sociology},
  volume = {43},
  number = {1},
  pages = {379--404},
  doi = {10.1146/annurev-soc-060116-053331},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-060116-053331},
  abstract = {Research on wealth inequality and accumulation and the data upon which it relies have expanded substantially in the twenty-first century. Although the field has experienced rapid growth, conceptual and methodological challenges remain. We begin by discussing two major unresolved methodological concerns facing wealth research: how to address challenges to causal inference posed by wealth's cumulative nature and how to operationalize net worth given its highly skewed distribution. Next, we provide an overview of data sources available for wealth research. To underscore the need for continued empirical attention to net worth, we review trends in wealth levels and inequality and evaluate wealth's distinctiveness as an indicator of social stratification. We then review recent empirical evidence on the effects of wealth on other social outcomes, as well as research on the determinants of wealth. We close with a list of promising avenues for future research on wealth, its causes, and its consequences.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Research on wealth inequality and accumulation and the data upon which it relies have expanded substantially in the twenty-first century. Although the field has experienced rapid growth, conceptual and methodological challenges remain. We begin by discussing two major unresolved methodological concerns facing wealth research: how to address challenges to causal inference posed by wealth's cumulative nature and how to operationalize net worth given its highly skewed distribution. Next, we provide an overview of data sources available for wealth research. To underscore the need for continued empirical attention to net worth, we review trends in wealth levels and inequality and evaluate wealth's distinctiveness as an indicator of social stratification. We then review recent empirical evidence on the effects of wealth on other social outcomes, as well as research on the determinants of wealth. We close with a list of promising avenues for future research on wealth, its causes, and its consequences.

@article{Lersch2017,
  title = {The Marriage Wealth Premium Revisited: Gender Disparities and within-Individual Changes in Personal Wealth in {{Germany}}},
  author = {Lersch, Philipp M.},
  year = {2017},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Demography},
  volume = {54},
  number = {3},
  pages = {961--983},
  doi = {10.1007/s13524-017-0572-4},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-017-0572-4},
  abstract = {This study examines the association between marriage and economic wealth of women and men. Going beyond previous research that focused on household wealth, I examine personal wealth, which allows identifying gender disparities in the association between marriage and wealth. Using unique data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (2002, 2007, and 2012), I apply random-effects and fixed-effects regression models to test my expectations. I find that both women and men experience substantial marriage wealth premiums not only in household wealth but also in personal wealth. However, I do not find consistent evidence for gender disparities in these general marriage premiums. Additional analyses indicate, however, that women's marriage premiums are substantially lower than men's premiums in older cohorts and when only nonhousing wealth is considered. Overall, this study provides new evidence that women and men gain unequally in their wealth attainment through marriage.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This study examines the association between marriage and economic wealth of women and men. Going beyond previous research that focused on household wealth, I examine personal wealth, which allows identifying gender disparities in the association between marriage and wealth. Using unique data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (2002, 2007, and 2012), I apply random-effects and fixed-effects regression models to test my expectations. I find that both women and men experience substantial marriage wealth premiums not only in household wealth but also in personal wealth. However, I do not find consistent evidence for gender disparities in these general marriage premiums. Additional analyses indicate, however, that women's marriage premiums are substantially lower than men's premiums in older cohorts and when only nonhousing wealth is considered. Overall, this study provides new evidence that women and men gain unequally in their wealth attainment through marriage.

@article{Luoetal2017,
  title = {Rational Inattention and the Dynamics of Consumption and Wealth in General Equilibrium},
  author = {Luo, Yulei and Nie, Jun and Wang, Gaowang and Young, Eric R.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {172},
  pages = {55--87},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2017.08.005},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.08.005},
  abstract = {We propose a recursive utility version of a basic Huggett (1993) model to study the implications of rational inattention (or RI, Sims, 2003, 2010) for the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption and wealth (relative to income) in general equilibrium. We find that incorporating RI can significantly improve the model's predictions in both dimensions in general equilibrium. In addition, we find that intertemporal substitution plays an important role in determining the two key dispersion moments via affecting the degree of optimal attention in equilibrium. Finally, we show that alternative models that rely on habit formation, incomplete information about current income, or borrowing constraints are not consistent with the facts we document.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We propose a recursive utility version of a basic Huggett (1993) model to study the implications of rational inattention (or RI, Sims, 2003, 2010) for the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption and wealth (relative to income) in general equilibrium. We find that incorporating RI can significantly improve the model's predictions in both dimensions in general equilibrium. In addition, we find that intertemporal substitution plays an important role in determining the two key dispersion moments via affecting the degree of optimal attention in equilibrium. Finally, we show that alternative models that rely on habit formation, incomplete information about current income, or borrowing constraints are not consistent with the facts we document.

@unpublished{Luoetal2017a,
  title = {Rational Inattention and the Dynamics of Consumption and Wealth in General Equilibrium},
  author = {Luo, Yulei and Nie, Jun and Wang, Gaowang and Young, Eric R.},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2017.08.005},
  url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/80045.html},
  abstract = {We use a recursive utility version of a basic Huggett (1993) model to study the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption and wealth (relative to income). The basic model implies too little dispersion compared to the data, whereas a one-parameter extension to include rational inattention (limited information processing) delivers a better fit to both facts in general equilibrium. In particular, intertemporal substitution plays an important role in determining the two key dispersion moments via affecting the degree of optimal attention in equilibrium. Alternative models that rely on habit formation, incomplete information about current income, or borrowing constraints are not consistent with the facts we document.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We use a recursive utility version of a basic Huggett (1993) model to study the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption and wealth (relative to income). The basic model implies too little dispersion compared to the data, whereas a one-parameter extension to include rational inattention (limited information processing) delivers a better fit to both facts in general equilibrium. In particular, intertemporal substitution plays an important role in determining the two key dispersion moments via affecting the degree of optimal attention in equilibrium. Alternative models that rely on habit formation, incomplete information about current income, or borrowing constraints are not consistent with the facts we document.

@article{Lusardietal2017,
  title = {Optimal Financial Knowledge and Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Lusardi, Annamaria and Michaud, Pierre-Carl and Mitchell, Olivia S.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {125},
  number = {2},
  pages = {431--477},
  doi = {10.1086/690950},
  url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/690950},
  abstract = {We show that financial knowledge is a key determinant of wealth inequality in a stochastic life cycle model with endogenous financial knowledge accumulation, where financial knowledge enables individuals to better allocate lifetime resources in a world of uncertainty and imperfect insurance. Moreover, because of how the US social insurance system works, better-educated individuals have most to gain from investing in financial knowledge. Our parsimonious specification generates substantial wealth inequality relative to a one-asset saving model and one in which returns on wealth depend on portfolio composition alone. We estimate that 30\textendash 40 percent of retirement wealth inequality is accounted for by financial knowledge.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We show that financial knowledge is a key determinant of wealth inequality in a stochastic life cycle model with endogenous financial knowledge accumulation, where financial knowledge enables individuals to better allocate lifetime resources in a world of uncertainty and imperfect insurance. Moreover, because of how the US social insurance system works, better-educated individuals have most to gain from investing in financial knowledge. Our parsimonious specification generates substantial wealth inequality relative to a one-asset saving model and one in which returns on wealth depend on portfolio composition alone. We estimate that 30– 40 percent of retirement wealth inequality is accounted for by financial knowledge.

@unpublished{Martinez2017,
  title = {Beggar-Thy-Neighbour Tax Cuts: Mobility after a Local Income and Wealth Tax Reform in Switzerland},
  author = {Mart{\'i}nez, Isabel Z.},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://ssrn.com/abstract=2979275},
  abstract = {This paper analyzes mobility responses to a large, regressive local income tax cut benefiting the top 1\% in the Swiss Canton of Obwalden in 2006. DiD estimations comparing Obwalden with neighboring cantons confirm that the reform was suc- cessful in increasing the share of rich taxpayers in the canton (+20-30\%). Using individual tax data, I find a large elasticity of the inflow of rich taxpayers with respect to the average net-of-tax rate ranging from 3.2 to 6.5. DiD estimates of cantonal revenue, however, show that the tax cuts did not lead to an increase in cantonal tax revenue per capita. This is in line with a theoretical analysis suggesting Obwalden was not on the wrong side of the Laffer curve before the reform.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper analyzes mobility responses to a large, regressive local income tax cut benefiting the top 1% in the Swiss Canton of Obwalden in 2006. DiD estimations comparing Obwalden with neighboring cantons confirm that the reform was suc- cessful in increasing the share of rich taxpayers in the canton (+20-30%). Using individual tax data, I find a large elasticity of the inflow of rich taxpayers with respect to the average net-of-tax rate ranging from 3.2 to 6.5. DiD estimates of cantonal revenue, however, show that the tax cuts did not lead to an increase in cantonal tax revenue per capita. This is in line with a theoretical analysis suggesting Obwalden was not on the wrong side of the Laffer curve before the reform.

@incollection{Milanovic2017,
  title = {Increasing Capital Income Share and Its Effect on Personal Income Inequality},
  booktitle = {After {{Piketty}}: The Agenda for Economics and Inequality},
  author = {Milanovic, Branko},
  editor = {Boushey, Heather and DeLong, J. Bradford and Steinbaum, Marshall},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  url = {https://stonecenter.gc.cuny.edu/research/increasing-capital-income-share-and-its-effect-on-personal-income-inequality/},
  urldate = {2022-02-28},
  abstract = {We tend to assume that those with high incomes from capital are also those who are the richest overall; that is, that the association between being capital-rich and overall-income-rich is very close. This is implicit in Piketty's analysis. He argues that as the share of capital in national income rises, interpersonal inequality will also rise. In our first chapter addressing the dimensions of inequality, economist Branko Milanovic asks under what conditions this is likely to be true. Milanovic imagines three kinds of societies: socialist, where there is an equal per capita distribution of capital assets; classical capitalist, where workers draw their entire income from labor and capitalists derive their entire income from capital; and ``new'' capitalist, where everyone receives income from both labor and capital. He uses these archetypes to examine what happens to the inequality\textemdash as measured by the Gini coefficient of interpersonal income inequality\textemdash if Piketty's {$\alpha$}\textemdash the share of capital in net income\textemdash rises. Unsurprisingly, he finds that the institutional setup matters. The way the rising share of capital income gets transmitted into greater interpersonal inequality varies between different social systems as a function of the underlying asset distribution. In new capitalism, a rising share of capital income almost directly translates into a higher Gini, while in classical capitalism, this is true once the share of capitalists becomes sufficiently high. In a socialist world, however, a rising capital share does not imply rising interpersonal Gini.},
  isbn = {978-0-674-97819-5},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  chapter = {10}
}

We tend to assume that those with high incomes from capital are also those who are the richest overall; that is, that the association between being capital-rich and overall-income-rich is very close. This is implicit in Piketty's analysis. He argues that as the share of capital in national income rises, interpersonal inequality will also rise. In our first chapter addressing the dimensions of inequality, economist Branko Milanovic asks under what conditions this is likely to be true. Milanovic imagines three kinds of societies: socialist, where there is an equal per capita distribution of capital assets; classical capitalist, where workers draw their entire income from labor and capitalists derive their entire income from capital; and ``new'' capitalist, where everyone receives income from both labor and capital. He uses these archetypes to examine what happens to the inequality— as measured by the Gini coefficient of interpersonal income inequality— if Piketty's $α$— the share of capital in net income— rises. Unsurprisingly, he finds that the institutional setup matters. The way the rising share of capital income gets transmitted into greater interpersonal inequality varies between different social systems as a function of the underlying asset distribution. In new capitalism, a rising share of capital income almost directly translates into a higher Gini, while in classical capitalism, this is true once the share of capitalists becomes sufficiently high. In a socialist world, however, a rising capital share does not imply rising interpersonal Gini.

@misc{Pikettyetal2017,
  title = {Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the {{United States}} Data Appendix},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2017},
  month = nov,
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJX043},
  abstract = {This Data Appendix supplements our paper ``Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States.'' It provides complete details on the methodology, data, and programs.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_parent_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-saez-zucman-distributionalnationalaccountsmethodsandestimatesfortheunitedstates-2018}
}

This Data Appendix supplements our paper ``Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States.'' It provides complete details on the methodology, data, and programs.

@article{Seim2017,
  title = {Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from {{Sweden}}},
  author = {Seim, David},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {395--421},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.20150290},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150290},
  abstract = {This paper provides an empirical assessment of an annual wealth tax. Using Swedish administrative data, I estimate net-of-tax-rate elas-ticities of taxable wealth in the range [0.09, 0.27]. Cross-checking self-reported assets against asset data unavailable to the tax agency reveals that around a third of the elasticity estimates are due to underreporting of asset values. Difference-indifference designs further suggest that the responses reflect evasion and avoidance rather than changes in saving.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper provides an empirical assessment of an annual wealth tax. Using Swedish administrative data, I estimate net-of-tax-rate elas-ticities of taxable wealth in the range [0.09, 0.27]. Cross-checking self-reported assets against asset data unavailable to the tax agency reveals that around a third of the elasticity estimates are due to underreporting of asset values. Difference-indifference designs further suggest that the responses reflect evasion and avoidance rather than changes in saving.

@techreport{Wolff2017,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Household Wealth Trends in the {{United States}}, 1962 to 2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered?},
  author = {Wolff, Edward N.},
  year = {2017},
  month = nov,
  number = {24085},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  doi = {10.3386/w24085},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w24085},
  abstract = {Asset prices plunged between 2007 and 2010 but then rebounded from 2010 to 2016. The most telling finding is that median wealth plummeted by 44 percent over years 2007 to 2010. The inequality of net worth, after almost two decades of little movement, went up sharply from 2007 to 2010, and relative indebtedness for the middle class expanded. The sharp fall in median net worth and the rise in overall wealth inequality over these years are largely traceable to the high leverage of middle class families and the high share of homes in their portfolio. Mean and median wealth rebounded from 2010 to 2016, by 17 and 28 percent, respectively. While mean wealth surpassed its previous peak in 2007, median wealth was still down by 34 percent. More than 100 percent of the recovery in both was due to a high return on wealth but this factor was offset by negative savings. Relative indebtedness continued to fall for the middle class from 2010 to 2016, and wealth inequality increased somewhat. The racial and ethnic disparity in wealth holdings widened considerably between 2007 and 2016, and the wealth of households under age 45 declined in relative terms.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Wolff2017.pdf}
}

Asset prices plunged between 2007 and 2010 but then rebounded from 2010 to 2016. The most telling finding is that median wealth plummeted by 44 percent over years 2007 to 2010. The inequality of net worth, after almost two decades of little movement, went up sharply from 2007 to 2010, and relative indebtedness for the middle class expanded. The sharp fall in median net worth and the rise in overall wealth inequality over these years are largely traceable to the high leverage of middle class families and the high share of homes in their portfolio. Mean and median wealth rebounded from 2010 to 2016, by 17 and 28 percent, respectively. While mean wealth surpassed its previous peak in 2007, median wealth was still down by 34 percent. More than 100 percent of the recovery in both was due to a high return on wealth but this factor was offset by negative savings. Relative indebtedness continued to fall for the middle class from 2010 to 2016, and wealth inequality increased somewhat. The racial and ethnic disparity in wealth holdings widened considerably between 2007 and 2016, and the wealth of households under age 45 declined in relative terms.

@book{Wolff2017a,
  title = {A Century of Wealth in {{America}}},
  author = {Wolff, Edward N.},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {{The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press}},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  url = {https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674495142},
  urldate = {2023-09-27},
  abstract = {Understanding wealth in the United States\textemdash who has it, how they acquired it, and how they preserve it\textemdash is crucial to addressing the economic and political challenges facing the nation. But until now we have had little reliable information. Edward Wolff, one of the world's great experts on the economics of wealth, offers an authoritative account of patterns in the accumulation and distribution of wealth since 1900. A Century of Wealth in America demonstrates that the most remarkable change has been the growth of per capita household wealth, which climbed almost eightfold prior to the 2007 recession. But overlaid on this base rate are worrying trends. The share of personal wealth claimed by the richest one percent almost doubled between the mid-1970s and 2013, concurrent with a steep run-up of debt in the middle class. As the wealth of the average family dropped precipitously\textemdash by 44 percent\textemdash between 2007 and 2013, with black families hit hardest, the debt-income ratio more than doubled. The Great Recession also caused a sharp spike in asset poverty, as more and more families barely survived from one paycheck to the next. In short, the United States has changed from being one of the most economically equal of the advanced industrialized countries to being one of the most unequal. At a time of deep uncertainty about the future, A Century of Wealth in America provides a sober bedrock of facts and astute analysis. It will become one of the few indispensable resources for contemporary public debate.},
  isbn = {978-0-674-49514-2},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Understanding wealth in the United States— who has it, how they acquired it, and how they preserve it— is crucial to addressing the economic and political challenges facing the nation. But until now we have had little reliable information. Edward Wolff, one of the world's great experts on the economics of wealth, offers an authoritative account of patterns in the accumulation and distribution of wealth since 1900. A Century of Wealth in America demonstrates that the most remarkable change has been the growth of per capita household wealth, which climbed almost eightfold prior to the 2007 recession. But overlaid on this base rate are worrying trends. The share of personal wealth claimed by the richest one percent almost doubled between the mid-1970s and 2013, concurrent with a steep run-up of debt in the middle class. As the wealth of the average family dropped precipitously— by 44 percent— between 2007 and 2013, with black families hit hardest, the debt-income ratio more than doubled. The Great Recession also caused a sharp spike in asset poverty, as more and more families barely survived from one paycheck to the next. In short, the United States has changed from being one of the most economically equal of the advanced industrialized countries to being one of the most unequal. At a time of deep uncertainty about the future, A Century of Wealth in America provides a sober bedrock of facts and astute analysis. It will become one of the few indispensable resources for contemporary public debate.

@article{vanBavelFrankema2017,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in the {{Netherlands}}, c. 1950-2015. the Paradox of a Northern {{European}} Welfare State},
  author = {{van Bavel}, Bas and Frankema, Ewout},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {TSEG - The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  pages = {29--62},
  doi = {10.18352/tseg.916},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.18352/tseg.916},
  abstract = {This paper reviews the available evidence on post-war trends in Dutch private wealth inequality using a range of scattered sources. Wealth tax records suggest a substantial decline in inequality to the 1970s and, more tentatively, a gradual rise thereafter. In the post-1990 years, Gini-coefficients of private wealth inequality range from 0.8 to 0.9, which is at the high end of the international comparison. Such high levels of private wealth inequality contrast with relatively low levels of net income inequality; a paradox that the Netherlands share with other Northern European welfare states. We hypothesise that publicly funded life-time income security limits the wealth-formation by ordinary Dutch households, while the redistributive taxes required to finance this system are targeting income rather than wealth.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {vanBavelFrankema2017.pdf}
}

This paper reviews the available evidence on post-war trends in Dutch private wealth inequality using a range of scattered sources. Wealth tax records suggest a substantial decline in inequality to the 1970s and, more tentatively, a gradual rise thereafter. In the post-1990 years, Gini-coefficients of private wealth inequality range from 0.8 to 0.9, which is at the high end of the international comparison. Such high levels of private wealth inequality contrast with relatively low levels of net income inequality; a paradox that the Netherlands share with other Northern European welfare states. We hypothesise that publicly funded life-time income security limits the wealth-formation by ordinary Dutch households, while the redistributive taxes required to finance this system are targeting income rather than wealth.

@book{HepburnHamilton2017,
  title = {National Wealth: What Is Missing, Why It Matters},
  editor = {Hepburn, Cameron and Hamilton, Kirk},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  url = {https://global.oup.com/academic/product/national-wealth-9780198803720?cc=us&lang=en&#:$\sim$:targetText=National Wealth%3A What is Missing,policy issues around national wealth.&targetText=Part one provides the political context and defines the key concepts.},
  abstract = {Why are some nations wealthy and others poor? How did the wealthy nations become rich? What are the components of wealth? How should nations manage their wealth for the future? These are among the most important questions in economics. They are also impossible to answer without defining wealth, and understanding how it can be created, destroyed, stored, and managed. National Wealth: What is Missing, Why it Matters assembles a collection of high-quality contributions to define the key concepts and address the economic and policy issues around national wealth. It considers insights from economic history, addresses the impacts of the changes to national accounting, and teases out the policy implications for both rich and poor countries and the institutions within them. Using expert analysis and theory backed by empirical work, this book evaluates the progress that has been made in measuring national wealth, as well as the recent developments in theory and practice which tell us that the change in real wealth (net saving) is an essential indicator of economic progress. Net national saving, measured comprehensively and adjusted to reflect the investment in and the depreciation of the full range of assets measured in national wealth, is an indicator of the change in future wellbeing. Governments can use this measure to answer a fundamental question: How much does the stream of future wellbeing of the population rise or fall as a result of policy actions today? The book is organized into four parts. Part one provides the political context and defines the key concepts. Part two examines the history of wealth creation and destruction. Part three provides a more detailed analysis of the individual components of wealth, and finally, part four examines the lessons for managing wealth for sustainable national prosperity.},
  isbn = {978-0-19-880372-0},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Why are some nations wealthy and others poor? How did the wealthy nations become rich? What are the components of wealth? How should nations manage their wealth for the future? These are among the most important questions in economics. They are also impossible to answer without defining wealth, and understanding how it can be created, destroyed, stored, and managed. National Wealth: What is Missing, Why it Matters assembles a collection of high-quality contributions to define the key concepts and address the economic and policy issues around national wealth. It considers insights from economic history, addresses the impacts of the changes to national accounting, and teases out the policy implications for both rich and poor countries and the institutions within them. Using expert analysis and theory backed by empirical work, this book evaluates the progress that has been made in measuring national wealth, as well as the recent developments in theory and practice which tell us that the change in real wealth (net saving) is an essential indicator of economic progress. Net national saving, measured comprehensively and adjusted to reflect the investment in and the depreciation of the full range of assets measured in national wealth, is an indicator of the change in future wellbeing. Governments can use this measure to answer a fundamental question: How much does the stream of future wellbeing of the population rise or fall as a result of policy actions today? The book is organized into four parts. Part one provides the political context and defines the key concepts. Part two examines the history of wealth creation and destruction. Part three provides a more detailed analysis of the individual components of wealth, and finally, part four examines the lessons for managing wealth for sustainable national prosperity.

@unpublished{Adermonetal2016,
  title = {Intergenerational Wealth Mobility and the Role of Inheritance: Evidence from Multiple Generations},
  author = {Adermon, Adrian and Lindahl, Mikael and Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12535},
  url = {https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/10126/intergenerational-wealth-mobility-and-the-role-of-inheritance-evidence-from-multiple-generations},
  abstract = {This study estimates intergenerational correlations in mid-life wealth across three generations, and a young fourth generation, and examines how much of the parent-child association that can be explained by inheritances. Using a Swedish data set we find parent- child rank correlations of 0.3\textendash 0.4 and grandparents-grandchild rank correlations of 0.1\textendash 0.2. Conditional on parents' wealth, grandparents' wealth is weakly positively associated with grandchild's wealth and the parent-child correlation is basically unchanged if we control for grandparents' wealth. Bequests and gifts strikingly account for at least 50 per cent of the parent-child wealth correlation while earnings and education are only able to explain 25 per cent.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This study estimates intergenerational correlations in mid-life wealth across three generations, and a young fourth generation, and examines how much of the parent-child association that can be explained by inheritances. Using a Swedish data set we find parent- child rank correlations of 0.3– 0.4 and grandparents-grandchild rank correlations of 0.1– 0.2. Conditional on parents' wealth, grandparents' wealth is weakly positively associated with grandchild's wealth and the parent-child correlation is basically unchanged if we control for grandparents' wealth. Bequests and gifts strikingly account for at least 50 per cent of the parent-child wealth correlation while earnings and education are only able to explain 25 per cent.

@article{Alvaredoetal2016,
  title = {The Challenge of Measuring {{UK}} Wealth Inequality in the 2000s},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Atkinson, Anthony B. and Morelli, Salvatore},
  year = {2016},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Fiscal Studies},
  volume = {37},
  number = {1},
  pages = {13--33},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1475-5890.2016.12084},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2016.12084},
  abstract = {The concentration of personal wealth is now receiving a great deal of attention \textendash{} after having been neglected for many years. One reason is the growing recognition that, in seeking explanations for rising income inequality, we need to look not only at wages and earned income but also at income from capital, particularly at the top of the distribution. In this paper, we use evidence from existing data sources to attempt to answer three questions: (i) What is the share of total personal wealth that is owned by the top 1 per cent, or the top 0.1 per cent? (ii) Is wealth much more unequally distributed than income? (iii) Is the concentration of wealth at the top increasing over time? The main conclusion of the paper is that the evidence about the UK concentration of wealth post-2000 is seriously incomplete and significant investment in a variety of sources is necessary if we are to provide satisfactory answers to the three questions.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

The concentration of personal wealth is now receiving a great deal of attention – after having been neglected for many years. One reason is the growing recognition that, in seeking explanations for rising income inequality, we need to look not only at wages and earned income but also at income from capital, particularly at the top of the distribution. In this paper, we use evidence from existing data sources to attempt to answer three questions: (i) What is the share of total personal wealth that is owned by the top 1 per cent, or the top 0.1 per cent? (ii) Is wealth much more unequally distributed than income? (iii) Is the concentration of wealth at the top increasing over time? The main conclusion of the paper is that the evidence about the UK concentration of wealth post-2000 is seriously incomplete and significant investment in a variety of sources is necessary if we are to provide satisfactory answers to the three questions.

@inproceedings{BenhabibBisin2016,
  title = {Skewed Wealth Distributions: Theory and Empirics},
  author = {Benhabib, Jess and Bisin, Alberto},
  year = {2016},
  month = may,
  url = {https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2016/honormichaelwoodford},
  abstract = {Invariably across a cross-section of countries and time periods, wealth distributions are skewed to the right displaying thick upper tails, that is, large and slowly declining top wealth shares. In this survey we categorize the theoretical studies on the distribution of wealth in terms of the underlying economic mechanism generating skewness and thick tails. Further, we show how these mechanisms can be micro-founded by the consumption-saving decisions of rational agents in speci\textbackslash ldotsc economic and demographic environments. Finally we map the large empirical work on the wealth distribution to its theoretical underpinning.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  organization = {{A Conference in Honor of Michael Woodford's Contributions to Economics}}
}

Invariably across a cross-section of countries and time periods, wealth distributions are skewed to the right displaying thick upper tails, that is, large and slowly declining top wealth shares. In this survey we categorize the theoretical studies on the distribution of wealth in terms of the underlying economic mechanism generating skewness and thick tails. Further, we show how these mechanisms can be micro-founded by the consumption-saving decisions of rational agents in speci\ ldotsc economic and demographic environments. Finally we map the large empirical work on the wealth distribution to its theoretical underpinning.

@unpublished{BofingerScheuermeyer2016,
  title = {Income Distribution and Aggregate Saving: {{A}} Non-Monotonic Relationship},
  author = {Bofinger, Peter and Scheuermeyer, Philipp},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12376},
  url = {https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11435},
  abstract = {Drawing on a panel of advanced economies, this paper documents a concave and non-monotonic link between inequality and the aggregate household saving rate. We find that, at a low level of inequality, more inequality is associated with higher saving; but we also show that a negative relationship between inequality and saving prevails where inequality is high. Using different empirical approaches, we locate the turning point, where the marginal effect of inequality turns from positive to negative, at a net income Gini coefficient of around 30. Moreover, we show that the relationship between inequality and saving also depends on financial market conditions. While inequality increases saving, when credit is scarce it tends to reduce saving at high levels of credit. This paper primarily focuses on household saving, yet we also find some evidence for a non-monotonic effect of inequality on private saving, national saving, and the current account balance.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Drawing on a panel of advanced economies, this paper documents a concave and non-monotonic link between inequality and the aggregate household saving rate. We find that, at a low level of inequality, more inequality is associated with higher saving; but we also show that a negative relationship between inequality and saving prevails where inequality is high. Using different empirical approaches, we locate the turning point, where the marginal effect of inequality turns from positive to negative, at a net income Gini coefficient of around 30. Moreover, we show that the relationship between inequality and saving also depends on financial market conditions. While inequality increases saving, when credit is scarce it tends to reduce saving at high levels of credit. This paper primarily focuses on household saving, yet we also find some evidence for a non-monotonic effect of inequality on private saving, national saving, and the current account balance.

@unpublished{Boserupetal2016,
  title = {Born with a Silver Spoon? {{Danish}} Evidence on Wealth Inequality in Childhood},
  author = {Boserup, Simon Halphen and Kopczuk, Wojciech and Kreiner, Claus Thustrup},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {128},
  doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12496},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w22549},
  abstract = {We study wealth inequality in childhood using Danish wealth records from three decades. While teenagers have some earnings, we estimate that transfers account for at least 50 percent of wealth at age 18, and much more so for the rich children. Inheritance from grandparents does not appear quantitatively important, but we do find evidence that children receive inter vivos transfers. While wealth holdings are small in childhood, they have strong predictive power for future wealth in adulthood. Asset holdings at age 18 are more informative than parental wealth in predicting wealth of children many years later when they are in their 40s. Hence, childhood wealth reveals significant heterogeneity in the intergenerational transmission of wealth, which is not simply captured by parental wealth alone. We investigate why this is the case and rule out that childhood wealth in itself can accumulate enough to explain later wealth inequality. Our evidence indicates that childhood wealth is a proxy for a broad set of circumstances related to intergenerational transmission and future wealth accumulation, including savings/investment behavior and additional transfers.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We study wealth inequality in childhood using Danish wealth records from three decades. While teenagers have some earnings, we estimate that transfers account for at least 50 percent of wealth at age 18, and much more so for the rich children. Inheritance from grandparents does not appear quantitatively important, but we do find evidence that children receive inter vivos transfers. While wealth holdings are small in childhood, they have strong predictive power for future wealth in adulthood. Asset holdings at age 18 are more informative than parental wealth in predicting wealth of children many years later when they are in their 40s. Hence, childhood wealth reveals significant heterogeneity in the intergenerational transmission of wealth, which is not simply captured by parental wealth alone. We investigate why this is the case and rule out that childhood wealth in itself can accumulate enough to explain later wealth inequality. Our evidence indicates that childhood wealth is a proxy for a broad set of circumstances related to intergenerational transmission and future wealth accumulation, including savings/investment behavior and additional transfers.

@article{Boserupetal2016a,
  title = {The Role of Bequests in Shaping Wealth Inequality: Evidence from {{Danish}} Wealth Records},
  author = {Boserup, Simon H. and Kopczuk, Wojciech and Kreiner, Claus T.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {American Economic Review: Papers \& Proceedings},
  volume = {106},
  number = {5},
  pages = {656--661},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20161036},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161036},
  abstract = {Using Danish administrative data, we estimate the impact of bequests on the level and inequality of wealth. We compare the distributions of wealth over time of people whose parent died and those whose parent did not. Bequests account for 26 percent of the average post-bequest wealth 1-3 years after parental death and significantly affect wealth throughout the distribution. Bequests increase absolute wealth inequality (variance of the distribution censored at the top/bottom 1\% increases by 33 percent), but reduce relative inequality (the top 1\% share declines by 6 percentage points from the base of 31 percent).},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Using Danish administrative data, we estimate the impact of bequests on the level and inequality of wealth. We compare the distributions of wealth over time of people whose parent died and those whose parent did not. Bequests account for 26 percent of the average post-bequest wealth 1-3 years after parental death and significantly affect wealth throughout the distribution. Bequests increase absolute wealth inequality (variance of the distribution censored at the top/bottom 1% increases by 33 percent), but reduce relative inequality (the top 1% share declines by 6 percentage points from the base of 31 percent).

@unpublished{Boserupetal2016b,
  title = {The Role of Bequests in Shaping Wealth Inequality: Evidence from Danish Wealth Records},
  author = {Boserup, Simon H. and Kopczuk, Wojciech and Kreiner, Claus T.},
  year = {2016},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w21896},
  abstract = {Using Danish administrative data, we estimate the impact of bequests on the level and inequality of wealth. We employ an event study design where we follow the distribution of wealth over time of people who are 45-50 years old, and divide them into treatment group and control group depending on whether a parent dies or not. Bequests account for 26 percent of the average post-bequest wealth 1-3 years after parental death and significantly affect wealth throughout the distribution. We find that bequests increase measures of absolute wealth inequality (variance), but reduce relative inequality (top wealth shares). Following the receipt of bequests, variance of the distribution censored at the top/bottom 1\% increases by 33 percent, but the top 1\% share declines by 6 percentage points from an initial level of 31 percent and the top 10\% share declines by 10 percentage points from a base of around 81 percent.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Using Danish administrative data, we estimate the impact of bequests on the level and inequality of wealth. We employ an event study design where we follow the distribution of wealth over time of people who are 45-50 years old, and divide them into treatment group and control group depending on whether a parent dies or not. Bequests account for 26 percent of the average post-bequest wealth 1-3 years after parental death and significantly affect wealth throughout the distribution. We find that bequests increase measures of absolute wealth inequality (variance), but reduce relative inequality (top wealth shares). Following the receipt of bequests, variance of the distribution censored at the top/bottom 1% increases by 33 percent, but the top 1% share declines by 6 percentage points from an initial level of 31 percent and the top 10% share declines by 10 percentage points from a base of around 81 percent.

@article{Brickeretal2016,
  title = {Measuring Income and Wealth at the Top Using Administrative and Survey Data},
  author = {Bricker, Jesse and Henriques, Alice and Krimmel, Jacob and Sabelhaus, John},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity},
  volume = {Spring},
  pages = {261--331},
  doi = {10.1353/eca.2016.0016},
  url = {https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/measuring-income-and-wealth-at-the-top-using-administrative-and-survey-data/},
  urldate = {2023-06-05},
  abstract = {Most available estimates of U.S. wealth and income concentration indicate that the top shares are high and have been rising in recent decades, but there is some disagreement about specific levels and trends. Household surveys are the traditional data source used to measure the top shares, but recent studies using administrative tax records suggest that these survey-based top share estimates may not be capturing all of the increasing concentration. In this paper, we reconcile the divergent top share estimates, showing how the choices of data sets and methodological decisions affect levels and trends. Relative to the new and most widely cited top share estimates based on administrative tax data alone, our preferred estimates for both wealth and income concentration are lower and have been rising less rapidly in recent years.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_file = {Brickeretal2016.pdf},
  url_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/bricker-henriques-krimmel-sabelhaus-onlineappendixformeasuringincomeandwealthatthetopusingadministrativeandsurveydata-2016},
  url_figures = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/bricker-henriques-krimmel-sabelhaus-measuringincomeandwealthatthetopusingadministrativeandsurveydatafigures-2016}
}

Most available estimates of U.S. wealth and income concentration indicate that the top shares are high and have been rising in recent decades, but there is some disagreement about specific levels and trends. Household surveys are the traditional data source used to measure the top shares, but recent studies using administrative tax records suggest that these survey-based top share estimates may not be capturing all of the increasing concentration. In this paper, we reconcile the divergent top share estimates, showing how the choices of data sets and methodological decisions affect levels and trends. Relative to the new and most widely cited top share estimates based on administrative tax data alone, our preferred estimates for both wealth and income concentration are lower and have been rising less rapidly in recent years.

@article{Brickeretal2016a,
  title = {Estimating Top Income and Wealth Shares: Sensitivity to Data and Methods},
  author = {Bricker, Jesse and Henriques, Alice and Krimmel, Jacob and Sabelhaus, John},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {106},
  number = {5},
  pages = {641--645},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20161020},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161020},
  abstract = {Administrative income tax data indicate that U.S. top income and wealth shares are both substantial and larger than shares observed in household surveys. However, these estimates are sensitive to the unit of analysis, the income concept measured in tax records, and, in the case of wealth, to assumptions about the correlation between income and wealth. We constrain a household survey\textendash the Survey of Consumer Finances\textendash to be conceptually comparable to tax records and are able to reconcile the much of the difference between the survey and administrative estimates. Wealth estimates from administrative income tax data are sensitive to model parameters.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Administrative income tax data indicate that U.S. top income and wealth shares are both substantial and larger than shares observed in household surveys. However, these estimates are sensitive to the unit of analysis, the income concept measured in tax records, and, in the case of wealth, to assumptions about the correlation between income and wealth. We constrain a household survey– the Survey of Consumer Finances– to be conceptually comparable to tax records and are able to reconcile the much of the difference between the survey and administrative estimates. Wealth estimates from administrative income tax data are sensitive to model parameters.

@unpublished{Brulhartetal2016,
  title = {Taxing Wealth: Evidence from Switzerland},
  author = {Br{\"u}lhart, Marius and Gruber, Jonathan and Krapf, Matthias and Schmidheiny, Kurt},
  year = {2016},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w22376},
  abstract = {We study the effects of wealth taxation on reported wealth. Our analysis is based on data for Switzerland, which has the highest rate of annual wealth taxation in the developed world. While the wealth tax base is defined at the federal level, tax rates vary considerably across locations and over time. We use aggregate data on wealth holdings by canton and individual-level data for the canton of Bern. Our estimated behavioral elasticities substantially exceed those of the taxable income literature. We also find that taxpayers bunch below the tax threshold, that observed responses are driven by changes in wealth holdings rather than mobility, and that financial wealth is somewhat more responsive than non-financial wealth.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We study the effects of wealth taxation on reported wealth. Our analysis is based on data for Switzerland, which has the highest rate of annual wealth taxation in the developed world. While the wealth tax base is defined at the federal level, tax rates vary considerably across locations and over time. We use aggregate data on wealth holdings by canton and individual-level data for the canton of Bern. Our estimated behavioral elasticities substantially exceed those of the taxable income literature. We also find that taxpayers bunch below the tax threshold, that observed responses are driven by changes in wealth holdings rather than mobility, and that financial wealth is somewhat more responsive than non-financial wealth.

@article{Cooperetal2016,
  title = {Business in the United States: Who Owns It, and How Much Tax Do They Pay?},
  author = {Cooper, Michael and McClelland, John and Pearce, James and Prisinzano, Richard and Sullivan, Joseph and Yagan, Danny and Zidar, Owen and Zwick, Eric},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Tax Policy and the Economy},
  volume = {30},
  number = {1},
  pages = {91--128},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/685594},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1086/685594},
  abstract = {``Pass-through'' businesses like partnerships and S-corporations now generate over half of U.S. business income and account for much of the post-1980 rise in the top- 1\% income share. We use administrative tax data from 2011 to identify pass-through business owners and estimate how much tax they pay. We present three findings. (1) Relative to traditional business income, pass-through business income is substantially more concentrated among high-earners. (2) Partnership ownership is opaque: 20\% of the income goes to unclassifiable partners, and 15\% of the income is earned in circularly owned partnerships. (3) The average federal income tax rate on U.S. pass- through business income is 19\%|much lower than the average rate on traditional corporations. If pass-through activity had remained at 1980's low level, strong but straightforward assumptions imply that the 2011 average U.S. tax rate on total U.S. business income would have been 28\% rather than 24\%, and tax revenue would have been approximately 100 billion higher.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

``Pass-through'' businesses like partnerships and S-corporations now generate over half of U.S. business income and account for much of the post-1980 rise in the top- 1% income share. We use administrative tax data from 2011 to identify pass-through business owners and estimate how much tax they pay. We present three findings. (1) Relative to traditional business income, pass-through business income is substantially more concentrated among high-earners. (2) Partnership ownership is opaque: 20% of the income goes to unclassifiable partners, and 15% of the income is earned in circularly owned partnerships. (3) The average federal income tax rate on U.S. pass- through business income is 19%|much lower than the average rate on traditional corporations. If pass-through activity had remained at 1980's low level, strong but straightforward assumptions imply that the 2011 average U.S. tax rate on total U.S. business income would have been 28% rather than 24%, and tax revenue would have been approximately 100 billion higher.

@article{CrawfordHood2016,
  title = {Lifetime Receipt of Inheritances and the Distribution of Wealth in {{England}}},
  author = {Crawford, Rowena and Hood, Andrew},
  year = {2016},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Fiscal Studies},
  volume = {37},
  number = {1},
  pages = {55--75},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1475-5890.2016.12087},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2016.12087},
  abstract = {We investigate the impact of inheritances and gifts received on the distribution of wealth. Whereas previous work has looked only at marketable wealth, we consider broader measures of wealth including state and private pensions. We find that once pension wealth is included, inheritances and gifts no longer have an equalising impact on the distribution of wealth. Without pension wealth, including wealth transfers reduces the Gini coefficient for wealth from 0.57 to 0.52. With pension wealth, the impact is negligible. We argue that this latter effect gives a better indication of the impact of inheritances on the distribution of lifetime income.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

We investigate the impact of inheritances and gifts received on the distribution of wealth. Whereas previous work has looked only at marketable wealth, we consider broader measures of wealth including state and private pensions. We find that once pension wealth is included, inheritances and gifts no longer have an equalising impact on the distribution of wealth. Without pension wealth, including wealth transfers reduces the Gini coefficient for wealth from 0.57 to 0.52. With pension wealth, the impact is negligible. We argue that this latter effect gives a better indication of the impact of inheritances on the distribution of lifetime income.

@unpublished{Daviesetal2016,
  title = {Estimating the Level and Distribution of Global Wealth, 2000\textendash 2014},
  author = {Davies, James B. and Lluberas, Rodrigo and Shorrocks, Anthony F.},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2016/046-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2016/046-1},
  abstract = {Davies et al. (2008, 2011) provided the first estimates of the global distribution of wealth, using 2000 as the benchmark year. These estimates have been revised and updated since 2010, and the purpose of this paper is to explain the ways in which the estimation methodology has evolved and improved in recent years. Further, the paper summarizes lessons learned about trends in the level and distribution of global wealth for the period 2000-14. Finally, the paper discusses the results in the context of the discourse provoked by Piketty (2014).},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Davies et al. (2008, 2011) provided the first estimates of the global distribution of wealth, using 2000 as the benchmark year. These estimates have been revised and updated since 2010, and the purpose of this paper is to explain the ways in which the estimation methodology has evolved and improved in recent years. Further, the paper summarizes lessons learned about trends in the level and distribution of global wealth for the period 2000-14. Finally, the paper discusses the results in the context of the discourse provoked by Piketty (2014).

@unpublished{DeNardietal2016,
  title = {The Implications of Richer Earning Dynamics for Consumption and Wealth},
  author = {De Nardi, Mariacristina and Fella, Giulio and Pardo, Gonzalo Paz and Hope, Rebecca},
  year = {2016},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  doi = {10.3386/w21917},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w21917},
  abstract = {Earnings dynamics are much richer than those typically used in macro models with heterogenous agents. This paper provides multiple contributions. First, it proposes a simple non-parametric method to model rich earnings dynamics that is easy to estimate and introduce in structural models. Second, it applies our method to estimate a nonparametric earnings process using two data sets: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and a large, synthetic, data set that matches the dynamics of the U.S. tax earnings. Third, it uses a life cycle model of consumption to compare the consumption and saving implications of our two estimated processes to those of a standard AR(1). We find that, unlike the standard AR(1) process, our estimated, richer earnings process generates an increase in consumption inequality over the life cycle that is consistent with the data and better fits the savings of the households at the bottom 60\%of the wealth distribution.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Earnings dynamics are much richer than those typically used in macro models with heterogenous agents. This paper provides multiple contributions. First, it proposes a simple non-parametric method to model rich earnings dynamics that is easy to estimate and introduce in structural models. Second, it applies our method to estimate a nonparametric earnings process using two data sets: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and a large, synthetic, data set that matches the dynamics of the U.S. tax earnings. Third, it uses a life cycle model of consumption to compare the consumption and saving implications of our two estimated processes to those of a standard AR(1). We find that, unlike the standard AR(1) process, our estimated, richer earnings process generates an increase in consumption inequality over the life cycle that is consistent with the data and better fits the savings of the households at the bottom 60%of the wealth distribution.

@article{Devlin-Foltzetal2016,
  title = {Is the {{U}}.{{S}}. Retirement System Contributing to Rising Wealth Inequality?},
  author = {{Devlin-Foltz}, Sebastian and Henriques, Alice and Sabelhaus, John},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {59--85},
  doi = {10.7758/rsf.2016.2.6.04},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.04},
  abstract = {Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances for 1989 through 2013 reveal five broad findings. First, overall retirement plan participation was stable or rising through 2007, though overall participation fell noticeably in the wake of the Great Recession and has remained lower. Second, cohort- based analysis of life- cycle tra- jectories shows that participation in retirement plans is strongly correlated with income, and that the recent decline in participation is concentrated among younger and low- to middle- income families. Third, the shift in the type of pension coverage from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) occurred within\textemdash not just across\textemdash income groups. Fourth, retirement wealth is less concentrated than nonretirement wealth, so the growth of retirement wealth relative to nonretirement wealth helped offset the increasing concentration in nonretirement wealth. Fifth, the shift from DB to DC had only a modest effect in the other direction be- cause DC wealth is more concentrated than DB wealth.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances for 1989 through 2013 reveal five broad findings. First, overall retirement plan participation was stable or rising through 2007, though overall participation fell noticeably in the wake of the Great Recession and has remained lower. Second, cohort- based analysis of life- cycle tra- jectories shows that participation in retirement plans is strongly correlated with income, and that the recent decline in participation is concentrated among younger and low- to middle- income families. Third, the shift in the type of pension coverage from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) occurred within— not just across— income groups. Fourth, retirement wealth is less concentrated than nonretirement wealth, so the growth of retirement wealth relative to nonretirement wealth helped offset the increasing concentration in nonretirement wealth. Fifth, the shift from DB to DC had only a modest effect in the other direction be- cause DC wealth is more concentrated than DB wealth.

@article{EadsTach2016,
  title = {Wealth and Inequality in the Stability of Romantic Relationships},
  author = {Eads, Alicia and Tach, Laura},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {197--224},
  doi = {10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.10},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.10},
  abstract = {The family is a key institution that transmits inequality, and racial and socioeconomic inequalities in family life have grown markedly. We use data from the 1996 to 2008 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to offer a comprehensive account of how wealth relates to family stability and how that relationship varies by union type, age cohort, and both type and amount of wealth. We find that liquid and illiquid assets and secured debts are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of dissolution, and that large unsecured debts are associated with an increase. These associations do not differ significantly for married and cohabiting couples. We find evidence of both the material and the symbolic importance of wealth for stability. We also find that wealth explains a significant degree of the racial inequality in family stability.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

The family is a key institution that transmits inequality, and racial and socioeconomic inequalities in family life have grown markedly. We use data from the 1996 to 2008 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to offer a comprehensive account of how wealth relates to family stability and how that relationship varies by union type, age cohort, and both type and amount of wealth. We find that liquid and illiquid assets and secured debts are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of dissolution, and that large unsecured debts are associated with an increase. These associations do not differ significantly for married and cohabiting couples. We find evidence of both the material and the symbolic importance of wealth for stability. We also find that wealth explains a significant degree of the racial inequality in family stability.

@unpublished{Elinderetal2016,
  title = {Inheritance and Wealth Inequality: Evidence from Population Registers},
  author = {Elinder, Mikael and Erixson, Oscar and Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11191},
  abstract = {We use new population-wide register data on inheritances and wealth in Sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality. We find that inheritances reduce relative wealth inequality (e.g., the Gini coefficient falls by 5\textendash 10 percent) but that absolute dispersion increases. Examining different parts of the wealth distribution, we find that the top decile's wealth share decreases substantially, whereas the wealth share of the bottom half increases from a negative to a positive share. In essence, wealthier heirs inherit larger amounts, but less wealthy heirs inherit more relative to their pre-inheritance wealth. We also find that post-inheritance behavioral adjustments mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances because less wealthy heirs consume larger shares of their inheritances. Moreover, we find that the Swedish inheritance tax reduced the equalizing inheritance effect but that the redistribution of tax revenues could reverse this result. Finally, we show that inheritances increase wealth mobility.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We use new population-wide register data on inheritances and wealth in Sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality. We find that inheritances reduce relative wealth inequality (e.g., the Gini coefficient falls by 5– 10 percent) but that absolute dispersion increases. Examining different parts of the wealth distribution, we find that the top decile's wealth share decreases substantially, whereas the wealth share of the bottom half increases from a negative to a positive share. In essence, wealthier heirs inherit larger amounts, but less wealthy heirs inherit more relative to their pre-inheritance wealth. We also find that post-inheritance behavioral adjustments mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances because less wealthy heirs consume larger shares of their inheritances. Moreover, we find that the Swedish inheritance tax reduced the equalizing inheritance effect but that the redistribution of tax revenues could reverse this result. Finally, we show that inheritances increase wealth mobility.

@article{Fox2016,
  title = {Parental Wealth and the Black-White Mobility Gap in the {{U}}.{{S}}.},
  author = {Fox, Liana E.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {62},
  number = {4},
  pages = {706--723},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd (10.1111)}},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12200},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/roiw.12200},
  abstract = {Utilizing longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this paper examines the relationship between parental wealth and intergenerational income mobility for black and white families. I find that total parental wealth is positively associated with upward mobility for low-income white families, but is not associated with reduced likelihood of downward mobility for white families from the top half of the income distribution. Conversely, I find that total parental wealth does not have the same positive association for low-income black families, while home ownership may have negative associations with the likelihood of upward mobility for these families. However, for black families from the top half of the income distribution, home equity is associated with a decreased likelihood of downward mobility, suggesting a heterogeneous relationship between home ownership and mobility for black families.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Utilizing longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this paper examines the relationship between parental wealth and intergenerational income mobility for black and white families. I find that total parental wealth is positively associated with upward mobility for low-income white families, but is not associated with reduced likelihood of downward mobility for white families from the top half of the income distribution. Conversely, I find that total parental wealth does not have the same positive association for low-income black families, while home ownership may have negative associations with the likelihood of upward mobility for these families. However, for black families from the top half of the income distribution, home equity is associated with a decreased likelihood of downward mobility, suggesting a heterogeneous relationship between home ownership and mobility for black families.

@unpublished{FreundOliver2016,
  title = {The Origins of the Superrich: The Billionaire Characteristics Database},
  author = {Freund, Caroline and Oliver, Sarah},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/origins-superrich-billionaire-characteristics-database},
  abstract = {This working paper presents a new dataset on the sources of billionaire wealth and uses it to describe changes in extreme wealth in the United States, Europe, and other advanced countries. Th e data classify wealth as either self-made or inherited and identify the company and industry from which it comes. Among self-made billionaires, individuals are further classifi ed as company founders, executives, politically-connected, or in finance. Data analysis shows that the superrich in the United States are more dynamic than in Europe. Just over half of European billionaires inherited their fortunes, as compared with one-third in the United States. The median age of a company of a European billionaire is nearly 20 years older than that of an American billionaire. Traditional sectors explain more than half of the rise in wealth in Europe; the financial sector and technology-related sectors together are largely responsible for the rise in US wealth. There is some evidence that rents are higher in the United States than Europe, as not only is the number of US billionaires expanding rapidly, but US billionaires are also getting richer on average over time, especially when wealth is connected to resources, nontradables, or finance.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This working paper presents a new dataset on the sources of billionaire wealth and uses it to describe changes in extreme wealth in the United States, Europe, and other advanced countries. Th e data classify wealth as either self-made or inherited and identify the company and industry from which it comes. Among self-made billionaires, individuals are further classifi ed as company founders, executives, politically-connected, or in finance. Data analysis shows that the superrich in the United States are more dynamic than in Europe. Just over half of European billionaires inherited their fortunes, as compared with one-third in the United States. The median age of a company of a European billionaire is nearly 20 years older than that of an American billionaire. Traditional sectors explain more than half of the rise in wealth in Europe; the financial sector and technology-related sectors together are largely responsible for the rise in US wealth. There is some evidence that rents are higher in the United States than Europe, as not only is the number of US billionaires expanding rapidly, but US billionaires are also getting richer on average over time, especially when wealth is connected to resources, nontradables, or finance.

@article{Gabaixetal2016,
  title = {The Dynamics of Inequality},
  author = {Gabaix, Xavier and Lasry, Jean-Michel and Lions, Pierre-Louis and Moll, Benjamin},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {84},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2071--2111},
  doi = {10.3982/ecta13569},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13569},
  abstract = {The past forty years have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality in the United States. While there is a large number of existing theories of the Pareto tail of the long-run income distributions, almost none of these address the fast rise in top inequality observed in the data. We show that standard theories, which build on a random growth mechanism, generate transition dynamics that are too slow relative to those observed in the data. We then suggest two parsimonious deviations from the canonical model that can explain such changes: "scale dependence" that may arise from changes in skill prices, and "type dependence," that is, the presence of some "high-growth types." These deviations are consistent with theories in which the increase in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

The past forty years have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality in the United States. While there is a large number of existing theories of the Pareto tail of the long-run income distributions, almost none of these address the fast rise in top inequality observed in the data. We show that standard theories, which build on a random growth mechanism, generate transition dynamics that are too slow relative to those observed in the data. We then suggest two parsimonious deviations from the canonical model that can explain such changes: "scale dependence" that may arise from changes in skill prices, and "type dependence," that is, the presence of some "high-growth types." These deviations are consistent with theories in which the increase in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers.

@mastersthesis{Galiana2016,
  title = {Wealth Distribution in {{Australia}}: Evidence from Income Capitalization},
  author = {Galiana, Lino},
  year = {2016},
  month = aug,
  url = {http://www.piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/enseignement/10-page-statique/19-memoires},
  urldate = {2022-04-01},
  abstract = {Australian wealth shares have known large fluctuations due to asset pricing volatility on Australian financial and housing markets. This paper intends to analyze those fluctuations through the relatively innovative approach that consists in drawing individual income data from aggregated fiscal data and in applying the income capitalization method to derive household wealth. First of all, we show that after an initial drop of top wealth shares up to 1996, the upward housing price dynamic triggered off a sharp increase in top wealth shares in 2003-2004 and a second one in 2006-2007. At the acme, the 1\% wealthiest individuals owned 20\% of the total wealth. Secondly, we argue that this period of housing price growth has been marked by the penetration of home-owners in top-wealth groups, which initially included mostly owners of financial assets. Nonetheless, homeowners are no longer present in top-wealth groups above P99. Then, we intend to show that financial instruments, especially stocks, and business assets constitute between 70 and 90\% of the wealth of the people belonging to the top 0.01\%. Finally,using the household survey HILDA, we show through non-parametric techniques that the behavior of Australian households is consistent with the life-cycle theory.},
  school = {Paris School of Economics},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Australian wealth shares have known large fluctuations due to asset pricing volatility on Australian financial and housing markets. This paper intends to analyze those fluctuations through the relatively innovative approach that consists in drawing individual income data from aggregated fiscal data and in applying the income capitalization method to derive household wealth. First of all, we show that after an initial drop of top wealth shares up to 1996, the upward housing price dynamic triggered off a sharp increase in top wealth shares in 2003-2004 and a second one in 2006-2007. At the acme, the 1% wealthiest individuals owned 20% of the total wealth. Secondly, we argue that this period of housing price growth has been marked by the penetration of home-owners in top-wealth groups, which initially included mostly owners of financial assets. Nonetheless, homeowners are no longer present in top-wealth groups above P99. Then, we intend to show that financial instruments, especially stocks, and business assets constitute between 70 and 90% of the wealth of the people belonging to the top 0.01%. Finally,using the household survey HILDA, we show through non-parametric techniques that the behavior of Australian households is consistent with the life-cycle theory.

@book{Harrington2016,
  title = {Capital without Borders: Wealth Managers and the One Percent},
  author = {Harrington, Brooke},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}},
  url = {https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674743809},
  abstract = {Capital without Borders reveals how wealth managers use offshore banks, shell corporations, and trusts to shield billions in private wealth not only from taxation but from all manner of legal obligations. And it shows how practitioners justify their work, despite evidence that it erodes government authority and contributes to global inequality.},
  isbn = {978-0-674-24477-1},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Wealth Taxation}
}

Capital without Borders reveals how wealth managers use offshore banks, shell corporations, and trusts to shield billions in private wealth not only from taxation but from all manner of legal obligations. And it shows how practitioners justify their work, despite evidence that it erodes government authority and contributes to global inequality.

@article{HiltRahn2016,
  title = {Turning Citizens into Investors: Promoting Savings with Liberty Bonds during World War {{I}}},
  author = {Hilt, Eric and Rahn, Wendy M},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {23},
  doi = {10.7758/rsf.2016.2.6.05},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.05},
  abstract = {Increasing savings rates among households of modest incomes would strengthen their balance sheets and reduce wealth inequality. This paper analyzes one of the largest and most successful efforts to increase the savings of ordinary households in American history. The Liberty Bond drives of World War I persuaded tens of millions of Americans to buy government bonds, which were sold in denominations as low as \$50, and could be purchased in installment plans. Using newly collected data on the sales of Liberty Bonds at the county level, we analyze the factors that influenced the degree to which the bond drives were successful. The results highlight the importance of the participation of civil society organizations and local banks in market- ing the bonds. We discuss the implications of these findings for the design of modern programs to increase savings.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

Increasing savings rates among households of modest incomes would strengthen their balance sheets and reduce wealth inequality. This paper analyzes one of the largest and most successful efforts to increase the savings of ordinary households in American history. The Liberty Bond drives of World War I persuaded tens of millions of Americans to buy government bonds, which were sold in denominations as low as $50, and could be purchased in installment plans. Using newly collected data on the sales of Liberty Bonds at the county level, we analyze the factors that influenced the degree to which the bond drives were successful. The results highlight the importance of the participation of civil society organizations and local banks in market- ing the bonds. We discuss the implications of these findings for the design of modern programs to increase savings.

@unpublished{Hubmeretal2016,
  title = {The Historical Evolution of the Wealth Distribution: {{A}} Quantitative-Theoretic Investigation},
  author = {Hubmer, Joachim and Krusell, Per and Smith, Jr., Anthony A.},
  year = {2016},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  doi = {10.3386/w23011},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w23011},
  abstract = {This paper employs the benchmark heterogeneous-agent model used in macroeconomics to examine drivers of the rise in wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last thirty years. Several plausible candidates are formulated, calibrated to data, and examined through the lens of the model. There is one main finding: by far the most important driver is the significant drop in tax progressivity that started in the late 1970s, intensified during the Reagan years, and then subsequently flattened out, with only a minor bounce back. The sharp observed increases in earnings inequality, the falling labor share over the recent decades, and potential mechanisms underlying changes in the gap between the interest rate and the growth rate (Piketty's r-g story) all fall far short of accounting for the data.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper employs the benchmark heterogeneous-agent model used in macroeconomics to examine drivers of the rise in wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last thirty years. Several plausible candidates are formulated, calibrated to data, and examined through the lens of the model. There is one main finding: by far the most important driver is the significant drop in tax progressivity that started in the late 1970s, intensified during the Reagan years, and then subsequently flattened out, with only a minor bounce back. The sharp observed increases in earnings inequality, the falling labor share over the recent decades, and potential mechanisms underlying changes in the gap between the interest rate and the growth rate (Piketty's r-g story) all fall far short of accounting for the data.

@unpublished{Humeretal2016,
  title = {Bequests and the Accumulation of Wealth in the Eurozone},
  author = {Humer, Stefan and Moser, Mathias and Schnetzer, Matthias},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://epub.wu.ac.at/4841/},
  abstract = {This paper empirically compares the contribution of the two major wealth accumulation factors \textendash{} earned income and inheritances \textendash{} to the net wealth position of households in the Eurozone. The elasticities of both wealth sources differ considerably across countries and are overly non-linear. Depending on the position in the wealth distribution, an increase of one percentile in the income distribution corresponds to 0.1-0.6 percentiles in the net wealth dis-tribution. We find substantially stronger effects for inheritances vis-\'a-vis income. In Greece, Portugal, and Austria, households have to climb around three percentiles in the income distri-bution to compensate a one percentile increase in the inheritance distribution. The findings clearly suggest that bequests play a stronger role in wealth accumulation than earned income.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper empirically compares the contribution of the two major wealth accumulation factors – earned income and inheritances – to the net wealth position of households in the Eurozone. The elasticities of both wealth sources differ considerably across countries and are overly non-linear. Depending on the position in the wealth distribution, an increase of one percentile in the income distribution corresponds to 0.1-0.6 percentiles in the net wealth dis-tribution. We find substantially stronger effects for inheritances vis-á-vis income. In Greece, Portugal, and Austria, households have to climb around three percentiles in the income distri-bution to compensate a one percentile increase in the inheritance distribution. The findings clearly suggest that bequests play a stronger role in wealth accumulation than earned income.

@article{KaticLeigh2016,
  title = {Top Wealth Shares in {{Australia}} 1915\textendash 2012},
  author = {Katic, Pamela and Leigh, Andrew},
  year = {2016},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Review of Income and Wealth},
  volume = {62},
  number = {2},
  pages = {209--222},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12177},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12177},
  abstract = {Combining data from surveys, inheritance tax records, and rich lists, we estimate top wealth shares for Australia from World War I until the present day. We find that the top 1 percent share declined by two-thirds from 1915 until the late 1960s, and rose from the late 1970s to 2010. The recent increase is sharpest at the top of the distribution, with the top 0.001 percent wealth share tripling from 1984 to 2012. The trend in top wealth shares is similar to that in Australian top income shares (though the drop in the first half of the twentieth century is larger for wealth than income shares). Since the early twentieth century, top wealth shares in Australia have been lower than in the U.K. and U.S.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  url_supporting_information = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/katic-leigh-topwealthsharesinaustralia19152012supportinginformation-2016}
}

Combining data from surveys, inheritance tax records, and rich lists, we estimate top wealth shares for Australia from World War I until the present day. We find that the top 1 percent share declined by two-thirds from 1915 until the late 1960s, and rose from the late 1970s to 2010. The recent increase is sharpest at the top of the distribution, with the top 0.001 percent wealth share tripling from 1984 to 2012. The trend in top wealth shares is similar to that in Australian top income shares (though the drop in the first half of the twentieth century is larger for wealth than income shares). Since the early twentieth century, top wealth shares in Australia have been lower than in the U.K. and U.S.

@article{KillewaldBryan2016,
  title = {Does Your Home Make You Wealthy?},
  author = {Killewald, Alexandra and Bryan, Brielle},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {110--128},
  doi = {10.7758/rsf.2016.2.6.06},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.06},
  abstract = {Estimating the lifetime wealth consequences of homeownership is complicated by ongoing events, such as divorce or inheritance, that may shape both homeownership decisions and later-life wealth. We argue that prior research that has not accounted for these dynamic selection processes has overstated the causal effect of homeownership on wealth. Using NLSY79 data and marginal structural models, we find that each ad-ditional year of homeownership increases midlife wealth in 2008 by about \$6,800, more than 25 percent less than estimates from models that do not account for dynamic selection. Hispanic and African American wealth benefits from each homeownership year are 62 percent and 48 percent as large as those of whites, respectively. Homeownership remains wealth-enhancing in 2012, but shows smaller returns. Our results confirm homeownership's role in wealth accumulation and that variation in both homeownership rates and the wealth benefits of homeownership contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in midlife wealth holdings.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Estimating the lifetime wealth consequences of homeownership is complicated by ongoing events, such as divorce or inheritance, that may shape both homeownership decisions and later-life wealth. We argue that prior research that has not accounted for these dynamic selection processes has overstated the causal effect of homeownership on wealth. Using NLSY79 data and marginal structural models, we find that each ad-ditional year of homeownership increases midlife wealth in 2008 by about $6,800, more than 25 percent less than estimates from models that do not account for dynamic selection. Hispanic and African American wealth benefits from each homeownership year are 62 percent and 48 percent as large as those of whites, respectively. Homeownership remains wealth-enhancing in 2012, but shows smaller returns. Our results confirm homeownership's role in wealth accumulation and that variation in both homeownership rates and the wealth benefits of homeownership contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in midlife wealth holdings.

@unpublished{Kumar2016,
  title = {Capital and the Hindu Rate of Growth: Top Indian Wealth Holders 1961\textendash 1986},
  author = {Kumar, Rishabh},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/new/wpaper/1608.html},
  abstract = {Did India's stagnant growth performance until the 1980s increase or decrease the wealth of the elite? Using estate tax data I compute a series which highlights the relative importance of top wealth holders in India between 1961-1986. I find that a combination of policies and shocks were able to significantly depress the personal wealth of the Top 0.1\% over this period. A portfolio decomposition by asset categories for the rich reveals that there was a U shaped trend in the average value of movable assets while wealth invested in land significantly declined. Disparity within top wealth groups also follows a shrinking and swelling, consistent with the intervention of the state in private capital. These results have implications for the equalizing forces inherent in tax policy vis-a-vis the rich and the role of the state in regulating capital in poor nations.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Did India's stagnant growth performance until the 1980s increase or decrease the wealth of the elite? Using estate tax data I compute a series which highlights the relative importance of top wealth holders in India between 1961-1986. I find that a combination of policies and shocks were able to significantly depress the personal wealth of the Top 0.1% over this period. A portfolio decomposition by asset categories for the rich reveals that there was a U shaped trend in the average value of movable assets while wealth invested in land significantly declined. Disparity within top wealth groups also follows a shrinking and swelling, consistent with the intervention of the state in private capital. These results have implications for the equalizing forces inherent in tax policy vis-a-vis the rich and the role of the state in regulating capital in poor nations.

@unpublished{Leitner2016,
  title = {Drivers of Wealth Inequality in Euro Area Countries: The Effect of Inheritance and Gifts on Household Gross and Net Wealth Distribution Analysed by Applying the Shapley Value Approach to Decomposition},
  author = {Leitner, Sebastian},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.4337/ejeep.2016.01.10},
  url = {https://wiiw.ac.at/drivers-of-wealth-inequality-in-euro-area-countries-p-3787.html},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the sources of inequality in household gross, net and real estate gross wealth across eight euro area countries applying the Shapley value approach to decomposition. The research draws on micro data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2010. Dispersion in bequests and inter vivos transfers obtained by households are found to have a remarkable effect on wealth inequality that is stronger than the one of income differences. In South European countries, Austria and Germany the contribution to wealth inequality of real and financial assets inherited or received as gifts attains 30\% to 40\%. Nevertheless, also the distribution of household characteristics (age, education, size, number of adults and children in the household, marital status) within countries shapes the observed wealth dispersion.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper investigates the sources of inequality in household gross, net and real estate gross wealth across eight euro area countries applying the Shapley value approach to decomposition. The research draws on micro data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2010. Dispersion in bequests and inter vivos transfers obtained by households are found to have a remarkable effect on wealth inequality that is stronger than the one of income differences. In South European countries, Austria and Germany the contribution to wealth inequality of real and financial assets inherited or received as gifts attains 30% to 40%. Nevertheless, also the distribution of household characteristics (age, education, size, number of adults and children in the household, marital status) within countries shapes the observed wealth dispersion.

@article{Leitner2016a,
  title = {Drivers of Wealth Inequality in Euro Area Countries: The Effect of Inheritance and Gifts on Household Gross and Net Wealth Distribution Analysed by Applying the Shapley Value Approach to Decomposition},
  author = {Leitner, Sebastian},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention},
  volume = {13},
  number = {1},
  pages = {114--136},
  publisher = {{Edward Elgar Publishing}},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.4337/ejeep.2016.01.10},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the sources of inequality in household gross and net wealth across eight euro area countries applying the Shapley value approach to decomposition. The research draws on micro data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2010. Dispersion in bequests and inter vivos transfers obtained by households are found to have a remarkable effect on wealth inequality that is stronger than that of income differences. In Austria, Germany and Cyprus the contribution of real and financial assets inherited or received as gifts to gross and net wealth inequality attains about 40 per cent. Nevertheless, the distribution of household characteristics (age, education, size, number of adults and children in the household, marital status) within countries also shapes the observed wealth dispersion.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

This paper investigates the sources of inequality in household gross and net wealth across eight euro area countries applying the Shapley value approach to decomposition. The research draws on micro data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2010. Dispersion in bequests and inter vivos transfers obtained by households are found to have a remarkable effect on wealth inequality that is stronger than that of income differences. In Austria, Germany and Cyprus the contribution of real and financial assets inherited or received as gifts to gross and net wealth inequality attains about 40 per cent. Nevertheless, the distribution of household characteristics (age, education, size, number of adults and children in the household, marital status) within countries also shapes the observed wealth dispersion.

@unpublished{Pellegrinietal2016,
  title = {What Do External Statistics Tell Us about Undeclared Assets Held Abroad and Tax Evasion?},
  author = {Pellegrini, Valeria and Sanelli, Alessandra and Tosti, Enrico},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2917184},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917184},
  abstract = {The analysis of international investment position and balance of payments statistics suggests that foreign assets held abroad are greatly underestimated. This paper has three main goals. First, it examines the role played by tax havens in tax evasion. Second, it estimates unreported capital to range globally between \$6 trillion and \$7 trillion at end-2013, on the basis of mirror statistics on portfolio securities and on cross-border deposits of non-banks. Third, it estimates the portion of tax evasion connected to the under-reporting of foreign assets to range between \$20 billion and \$42 billion a year over the period 2001-2013 for capital income tax, and between \$2.1 trillion and \$2.8 trillion at end-2013 for personal income tax. The estimate for personal income tax is based on the assumption that the entire stock of unreported capital outstanding at end-2013 was made up of income that had escaped income tax. Finally, the paper gives a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the recent policy responses to international tax evasion.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

The analysis of international investment position and balance of payments statistics suggests that foreign assets held abroad are greatly underestimated. This paper has three main goals. First, it examines the role played by tax havens in tax evasion. Second, it estimates unreported capital to range globally between $6 trillion and $7 trillion at end-2013, on the basis of mirror statistics on portfolio securities and on cross-border deposits of non-banks. Third, it estimates the portion of tax evasion connected to the under-reporting of foreign assets to range between $20 billion and $42 billion a year over the period 2001-2013 for capital income tax, and between $2.1 trillion and $2.8 trillion at end-2013 for personal income tax. The estimate for personal income tax is based on the assumption that the entire stock of unreported capital outstanding at end-2013 was made up of income that had escaped income tax. Finally, the paper gives a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the recent policy responses to international tax evasion.

@unpublished{Pfeffer2016,
  title = {Growing Wealth Gaps in Education},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T.},
  year = {2016},
  url = {http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/working_papers/?publication_id=268&},
  abstract = {Prior research on trends in educational inequality has focused chiefly on changing gaps in educational attainment by family income or parental occupation. In contrast, this contribution provides the first assessment of trends in educational attainment by family wealth and suggests that we should be at least as much concerned about growing wealth gaps in education. Despite overall growth in educational attainment and some signs of decreasing wealth gaps in high school attainment and college access, I find a large and rapidly increasing wealth gap in college attainment between cohorts born in the 1970 and 1980s, respectively. This growing wealth gap in higher educational attainment co-occurred with a rise in inequality in children's wealth backgrounds, though the analyses also suggest that the latter does not fully account for the former. Nevertheless, the results reported here raise concerns about the distribution of educational opportunity among today's children who grow up in a context of particularly extreme wealth inequality.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Prior research on trends in educational inequality has focused chiefly on changing gaps in educational attainment by family income or parental occupation. In contrast, this contribution provides the first assessment of trends in educational attainment by family wealth and suggests that we should be at least as much concerned about growing wealth gaps in education. Despite overall growth in educational attainment and some signs of decreasing wealth gaps in high school attainment and college access, I find a large and rapidly increasing wealth gap in college attainment between cohorts born in the 1970 and 1980s, respectively. This growing wealth gap in higher educational attainment co-occurred with a rise in inequality in children's wealth backgrounds, though the analyses also suggest that the latter does not fully account for the former. Nevertheless, the results reported here raise concerns about the distribution of educational opportunity among today's children who grow up in a context of particularly extreme wealth inequality.

@incollection{PfefferKillewald2016,
  title = {Intergenerational Correlations in Wealth},
  booktitle = {Economic Mobility: Research and Ideas on Strengthening Families, Communities, and the Economy.},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Killewald, Alexandra},
  editor = {{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the} and {Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System}},
  year = {2016},
  pages = {176--201},
  publisher = {{Federal Reserve System}},
  address = {{Washington, D.C.}},
  url = {https://www.stlouisfed.org/community-development/publications/economic-mobility},
  abstract = {Our analyses substantially improve and expand the few prior estimates of intergenerational correlations in wealth. Existing evidence on intergenerational rigidity in the U.S. wealth distribution comes from a small number of studies, which, like ours, use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) but, unlike ours, were only able to examine the wealth outcomes of younger adults (Charles and Hurst 2003; Conley and Glauber 2008; Mulligan 1997). This limitation was imposed by data restrictions at the time of analysis and already acknowledged in that research, suggesting that it would be more appropriate to measure wealth at later ages when adults have had more time to accumulate assets (Charles and Hurst 2003, fn.5; Conley and Glauber 2008, p. 10). We hypothesize that adults' wealth will more closely resemble that of their parents as both generations enter middle and late adulthood, aging out of the period of intensive investments in young adulthood and increasingly accumulating assets. Drawing on newly available data from the PSID, we update estimates of intergenerational wealth correlations and test whether intergenerational wealth transmission indeed strengthens from early through late adulthood. Additionally, we examine the contours of the intergenerational reproduction of wealth. We hypothesize that wealth positions at the top and bottom of the distribution may be particularly sticky, with very wealthy parents able to secure a substantial wealth advantage for their children, and parents without assets especially likely to have adult children who also fail to accumulate any wealth. When the intergenerational transmission of wealth is measured with a single parameter, such as an intergenerational elasticity, this variability is lost. Evaluating the persistence of the highest levels of wealth across generations also speaks to concerns about a wealthy elite that wields dynastic financial power. Together, our analyses offer a rich description of the intergenerational persistence of wealth across generations, how these patterns differ across the wealth distribution, and to what extent education and inheritance can account for these intergenerational associations. Our analyses mitigate the great imbalance of a large literature focused on the description of intergenerational correlations in other dimensions of socioeconomic standing, mostly occupational classes or income.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

Our analyses substantially improve and expand the few prior estimates of intergenerational correlations in wealth. Existing evidence on intergenerational rigidity in the U.S. wealth distribution comes from a small number of studies, which, like ours, use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) but, unlike ours, were only able to examine the wealth outcomes of younger adults (Charles and Hurst 2003; Conley and Glauber 2008; Mulligan 1997). This limitation was imposed by data restrictions at the time of analysis and already acknowledged in that research, suggesting that it would be more appropriate to measure wealth at later ages when adults have had more time to accumulate assets (Charles and Hurst 2003, fn.5; Conley and Glauber 2008, p. 10). We hypothesize that adults' wealth will more closely resemble that of their parents as both generations enter middle and late adulthood, aging out of the period of intensive investments in young adulthood and increasingly accumulating assets. Drawing on newly available data from the PSID, we update estimates of intergenerational wealth correlations and test whether intergenerational wealth transmission indeed strengthens from early through late adulthood. Additionally, we examine the contours of the intergenerational reproduction of wealth. We hypothesize that wealth positions at the top and bottom of the distribution may be particularly sticky, with very wealthy parents able to secure a substantial wealth advantage for their children, and parents without assets especially likely to have adult children who also fail to accumulate any wealth. When the intergenerational transmission of wealth is measured with a single parameter, such as an intergenerational elasticity, this variability is lost. Evaluating the persistence of the highest levels of wealth across generations also speaks to concerns about a wealthy elite that wields dynastic financial power. Together, our analyses offer a rich description of the intergenerational persistence of wealth across generations, how these patterns differ across the wealth distribution, and to what extent education and inheritance can account for these intergenerational associations. Our analyses mitigate the great imbalance of a large literature focused on the description of intergenerational correlations in other dimensions of socioeconomic standing, mostly occupational classes or income.

@unpublished{Pfefferetal2016a,
  title = {The Concentration of Wealth within Family Lineages and Intergenerational Transfers},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Killewald, Alexandra and Siliunas, Andreja},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Publications/Workshops/IntergenTransfers/Papers.aspx},
  abstract = {Compared to income and earnings, wealth in the United States is substantially more unequally distributed (Budr\'ia Rodr\'iguez et al. 2002; Scholz and Levine 2004). Access to wealth is in turn associated with a wide range of outcomes, including longevity, family formation, and the educational achievement and labor market outcomes of offspring (Attanasio and Emmerson 2003; Charles, Hurst, and Killewald 2013; Conley 1999, 2001; Pfeffer 2011; Bond Huie et al. 2003; Orr 2003; Schneider 2011). Furthermore, these associations are not fully explained by standard measures of socioeconomic advantage, such as income or education. The wealth distribution is thus an important measure of the concentration of social inequality and advantage. Unlike education and income, wealth can also be directly passed down to subsequent generations through bequests or inter vivos transfers. We analyze the role of these transfers in contributing to the concentration of wealth within family lineages. To measure the intergenerational persistence of family wealth, we use sibling correlations that capture the total variance in wealth shared by offspring from the same family. These correlations provide an overall measure of inequality in the opportunity to attain wealth \textendash{} tied to a variety of factors, including not only specific parental characteristics (such as mother's education, parental income, or parental wealth) but also all other circumstances that individuals are born into (including, for instance, shared genetic material, cultural influences, neighborhood conditions, etc.). While sibling correlations provide little insight into the channels of intergenerational influences, they yield a meaningful overall measure of the type of inequality in opportunity to attain wealth based on the circumstances of birth that conflicts with common interpretations of justice (Roemer 1998, Dwarkin 2000). Sibling correlations have frequently been used to assess inequality in the opportunity to attain education, earnings, and other markers of socio-economic success (e.g., Jencks 1972, Solon et al. 1991). To our knowledge, there is only one study that estimates sibling correlations in wealth, finding them to be of similar size to those in earnings (Conley and Glauber 2005). We extend this research in two important ways.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Compared to income and earnings, wealth in the United States is substantially more unequally distributed (Budría Rodríguez et al. 2002; Scholz and Levine 2004). Access to wealth is in turn associated with a wide range of outcomes, including longevity, family formation, and the educational achievement and labor market outcomes of offspring (Attanasio and Emmerson 2003; Charles, Hurst, and Killewald 2013; Conley 1999, 2001; Pfeffer 2011; Bond Huie et al. 2003; Orr 2003; Schneider 2011). Furthermore, these associations are not fully explained by standard measures of socioeconomic advantage, such as income or education. The wealth distribution is thus an important measure of the concentration of social inequality and advantage. Unlike education and income, wealth can also be directly passed down to subsequent generations through bequests or inter vivos transfers. We analyze the role of these transfers in contributing to the concentration of wealth within family lineages. To measure the intergenerational persistence of family wealth, we use sibling correlations that capture the total variance in wealth shared by offspring from the same family. These correlations provide an overall measure of inequality in the opportunity to attain wealth – tied to a variety of factors, including not only specific parental characteristics (such as mother's education, parental income, or parental wealth) but also all other circumstances that individuals are born into (including, for instance, shared genetic material, cultural influences, neighborhood conditions, etc.). While sibling correlations provide little insight into the channels of intergenerational influences, they yield a meaningful overall measure of the type of inequality in opportunity to attain wealth based on the circumstances of birth that conflicts with common interpretations of justice (Roemer 1998, Dwarkin 2000). Sibling correlations have frequently been used to assess inequality in the opportunity to attain education, earnings, and other markers of socio-economic success (e.g., Jencks 1972, Solon et al. 1991). To our knowledge, there is only one study that estimates sibling correlations in wealth, finding them to be of similar size to those in earnings (Conley and Glauber 2005). We extend this research in two important ways.

@article{PfefferSchoeni2016,
  title = {How Wealth Inequality Shapes Our Future},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Schoeni, Robert F.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2--22},
  doi = {10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.01},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.01},
  abstract = {The experiences of Lakesha, Liz, Mike, Mary, and Howard\textemdash and the papers in this volume\textemdash{} illustrate that wealth and wealth inequality are intertwined with almost all aspects of social and economic life: child development, educa- tion and human capital, success in the labor market, marriage and divorce, health, con- sumption, retirement decisions and policies, macroeconomic conditions, and historical events. One goal of this volume is to address many of these dimensions together in one pub- lication to underscore the broad set of causes and consequences of wealth inequality. To that end, the authors bring perspectives from a range of academic disciplines, including eco- nomics, sociology, political science, history, demography, and health sciences. The ten manuscripts were identified through an open competition sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation. Proposals were reviewed and each manuscript went through the normal peer review process. Although all of the ten articles are described here, the goal of this in- troduction is not to simply summarize the findings of those manuscripts. Instead, it is intended as a broad and hopefully accessible overview of relevant research and provides as well some original analyses to describe why wealth inequality is a central factor influencing the nation's economic, social, and political outcomes and processes and why it therefore deserves the increased attention of scholars, policymakers, and the public.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

The experiences of Lakesha, Liz, Mike, Mary, and Howard— and the papers in this volume— illustrate that wealth and wealth inequality are intertwined with almost all aspects of social and economic life: child development, educa- tion and human capital, success in the labor market, marriage and divorce, health, con- sumption, retirement decisions and policies, macroeconomic conditions, and historical events. One goal of this volume is to address many of these dimensions together in one pub- lication to underscore the broad set of causes and consequences of wealth inequality. To that end, the authors bring perspectives from a range of academic disciplines, including eco- nomics, sociology, political science, history, demography, and health sciences. The ten manuscripts were identified through an open competition sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation. Proposals were reviewed and each manuscript went through the normal peer review process. Although all of the ten articles are described here, the goal of this in- troduction is not to simply summarize the findings of those manuscripts. Instead, it is intended as a broad and hopefully accessible overview of relevant research and provides as well some original analyses to describe why wealth inequality is a central factor influencing the nation's economic, social, and political outcomes and processes and why it therefore deserves the increased attention of scholars, policymakers, and the public.

@article{Pfefferetal2016,
  title = {Measuring Wealth and Wealth Inequality: Comparing Two {{U}}.{{S}}. Surveys},
  author = {Pfeffer, Fabian T. and Schoeni, Robert F. and Kennickell, Arthur and Andreski, Patricia},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Journal of Economic and Social Measurement},
  volume = {41},
  number = {2},
  pages = {103--120},
  publisher = {{IOS Press}},
  doi = {10.3233/JEM-160421},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3233/jem-160421},
  abstract = {Household wealth and its distribution are topics of broad public debate and increasing scholarly in- terest. We compare the relative strength of two of the main data sources used in research on the wealth holdings of U.S. households, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), by providing a description and explanation of differences in the level and distribution of wealth captured in these two surveys. We identify the factors that account for differences in average net worth but also show that estimates of net worth are similar throughout most of the distribution. Median net worth in the SCF is 6\% higher than in the PSID and the largest differences between the two surveys are concentrated in the 1\textendash 2 percent wealthiest households, leading to a different view of wealth concentration at the very top but similar results for wealth inequality across most of the distribution.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality}
}

Household wealth and its distribution are topics of broad public debate and increasing scholarly in- terest. We compare the relative strength of two of the main data sources used in research on the wealth holdings of U.S. households, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), by providing a description and explanation of differences in the level and distribution of wealth captured in these two surveys. We identify the factors that account for differences in average net worth but also show that estimates of net worth are similar throughout most of the distribution. Median net worth in the SCF is 6% higher than in the PSID and the largest differences between the two surveys are concentrated in the 1– 2 percent wealthiest households, leading to a different view of wealth concentration at the very top but similar results for wealth inequality across most of the distribution.

@unpublished{Pikettyetal2016,
  title = {Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2016},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w22945},
  abstract = {This paper combines tax, survey, and national accounts data to estimate the distribution of national income in the United States since 1913. Our distributional national accounts capture 100\% of national income, allowing us to compute growth rates for each quantile of the income distribution consistent with macroeconomic growth. We estimate the distribution of both pre-tax and post-tax income, making it possible to provide a comprehensive view of how government redistribution affects inequality. Average pre-tax national income per adult has increased 60\% since 1980, but we find that it has stagnated for the bottom 50\% of the distribution at about \$16,000 a year. The pre-tax income of the middle class-adults between the median and the 90th percentile-has grown 40\% since 1980, faster than what tax and survey data suggest, due in particular to the rise of tax-exempt fringe benefits. Income has boomed at the top: in 1980, top 1\% adults earned on average 27 times more than bottom 50\% adults, while they earn 81 times more today. The upsurge of top incomes was first a labor income phenomenon but has mostly been a capital income phenomenon since 2000. The government has offset only a small fraction of the increase in inequality. The reduction of the gender gap in earnings has mitigated the increase in inequality among adults. The share of women, however, falls steeply as one moves up the labor income distribution, and is only 11\% in the top 0.1\% today.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper combines tax, survey, and national accounts data to estimate the distribution of national income in the United States since 1913. Our distributional national accounts capture 100% of national income, allowing us to compute growth rates for each quantile of the income distribution consistent with macroeconomic growth. We estimate the distribution of both pre-tax and post-tax income, making it possible to provide a comprehensive view of how government redistribution affects inequality. Average pre-tax national income per adult has increased 60% since 1980, but we find that it has stagnated for the bottom 50% of the distribution at about $16,000 a year. The pre-tax income of the middle class-adults between the median and the 90th percentile-has grown 40% since 1980, faster than what tax and survey data suggest, due in particular to the rise of tax-exempt fringe benefits. Income has boomed at the top: in 1980, top 1% adults earned on average 27 times more than bottom 50% adults, while they earn 81 times more today. The upsurge of top incomes was first a labor income phenomenon but has mostly been a capital income phenomenon since 2000. The government has offset only a small fraction of the increase in inequality. The reduction of the gender gap in earnings has mitigated the increase in inequality among adults. The share of women, however, falls steeply as one moves up the labor income distribution, and is only 11% in the top 0.1% today.

@article{Rauscher2016,
  title = {Passing It on: Parent-to-Adult Child Financial Transfers for School and Socioeconomic Attainment},
  author = {Rauscher, Emily},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {172--196},
  doi = {10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.09},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.09},
  abstract = {As wealth inequality increases, the importance of parental financial transfers for socioeconomic attainment may also rise. Using data from the 2013 Panel Study of Income Dynamics Rosters and Transfers Module, this study investigates two questions: how parental financial transfers for education have changed over time, and what the relationship is between these transfers and adult socioeconomic outcomes. Results suggest that transfers for education have increased, have become more commonplace, and have become more dependent on parental wealth over time. Holding constant several individual and parental measures, the relationship between parental transfers for school and adult socioeconomic attainment is positive. This relationship holds when using three-stage least squares models to account for potential endogeneity of financial transfers for school. Overall, results support arguments that parental financial transfers for education facilitate the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic standing.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

As wealth inequality increases, the importance of parental financial transfers for socioeconomic attainment may also rise. Using data from the 2013 Panel Study of Income Dynamics Rosters and Transfers Module, this study investigates two questions: how parental financial transfers for education have changed over time, and what the relationship is between these transfers and adult socioeconomic outcomes. Results suggest that transfers for education have increased, have become more commonplace, and have become more dependent on parental wealth over time. Holding constant several individual and parental measures, the relationship between parental transfers for school and adult socioeconomic attainment is positive. This relationship holds when using three-stage least squares models to account for potential endogeneity of financial transfers for school. Overall, results support arguments that parental financial transfers for education facilitate the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic standing.

@misc{Rosenthal2016,
  title = {Integrating the Corporate and Individual Tax Systems: The Dividends Paid Deduction Considered},
  author = {Rosenthal, Steven M.},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {{Brookings Institute}},
  url = {https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/integrating-corporate-and-individual-tax-systems-dividends-paid-deduction-considered},
  urldate = {2023-07-31},
  abstract = {This testimony describes how taxes on corporate earnings have dropped because of corporate moves to avoid taxes and because of shareholder shifts from taxable to nontaxable accounts. Secondly, the testimony describes how a lower estimate of the taxable share of US stock complicates attempts to integrate corporate and individual taxes further. Finally, the testimony suggests some areas for further research on the competitiveness of US corporate taxes.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center}
}

This testimony describes how taxes on corporate earnings have dropped because of corporate moves to avoid taxes and because of shareholder shifts from taxable to nontaxable accounts. Secondly, the testimony describes how a lower estimate of the taxable share of US stock complicates attempts to integrate corporate and individual taxes further. Finally, the testimony suggests some areas for further research on the competitiveness of US corporate taxes.

@article{RosenthalAustin2016,
  title = {The Dwindling Taxable Share of {{U}}.{{S}}. Corporate Stock},
  author = {Rosenthal, Steven M. and Austin, Lydia S.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Tax Notes},
  volume = {151},
  number = {6},
  pages = {923--934},
  doi = {10.1161/STROKEAHA.115.008782},
  url = {https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/dwindling-taxable-share-us-corporate-stock},
  abstract = {In this report, Rosenthal and Austin demonstrate that the share of U.S. stocks held by taxable ac- counts has declined sharply over the last 50 years, and they urge lawmakers to carefully consider this shareholder base erosion when determining how best to tax corporate earnings.},
  isbn = {8175481358},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

In this report, Rosenthal and Austin demonstrate that the share of U.S. stocks held by taxable ac- counts has declined sharply over the last 50 years, and they urge lawmakers to carefully consider this shareholder base erosion when determining how best to tax corporate earnings.

@unpublished{SaezStantcheva2016,
  title = {A Simpler Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Stantcheva, Stefanie},
  year = {2016},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w22664},
  abstract = {This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a tractable optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences that can address many important policy questions. These formulas can easily be taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to the case with concave utility for consumption. The same types of formulas carry over by appropriately defining elasticities. We show that one can recover all the results from the simpler model using a new and non standard steady state approach that respects individual preferences even with a fully general utility function or uncertainty.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a tractable optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences that can address many important policy questions. These formulas can easily be taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to the case with concave utility for consumption. The same types of formulas carry over by appropriately defining elasticities. We show that one can recover all the results from the simpler model using a new and non standard steady state approach that respects individual preferences even with a fully general utility function or uncertainty.

@article{SaezZucman2016,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in the {{United States}} since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2016},
  month = may,
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {131},
  number = {2},
  pages = {519--578},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qjw004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw004},
  abstract = {This paper combines income tax returns with macroeconomic household balance sheets to estimate the distribution of wealth in the United States since 1913. We estimate wealth by capitalizing the incomes reported by individual taxpayers, accounting for assets that do not generate taxable income. We successfully test our capitalization method in three micro datasets where we can observe both income and wealth: the Survey of Consumer Finance, linked estate and income tax returns, and foundations' tax records. We find that wealth concentration was high in the beginning of the twentieth century, fell from 1929 to 1978, and has continuously increased since then. The top 0.1\% wealth share has risen from 7\% in 1978 to 22\% in 2012, a level almost as high as in 1929. Top wealth-holders are younger today than in the 1960s and earn a higher fraction of the economy's labor income. The bottom 90\% wealth share first increased up to the mid-1980s and then steadily declined. The increase in wealth inequality in recent decades is due to the upsurge of top incomes combined with an increase in saving rate inequality. We explain how our findings can be reconciled with Survey of Consumer Finances and estate tax data.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-wealthinequalityintheunitedstatessince1913evidencefromcapitalizedincometaxdata-2014},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-onlineappendixofwealthinequalityintheunitedstatessince1913evidencefromcapitalizedincometaxdata-2015},
  url_main_data = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-wealthinequalityintheunitedstatessince1913evidencefromcapitalizedincometaxdatamaindata-2015}
}

This paper combines income tax returns with macroeconomic household balance sheets to estimate the distribution of wealth in the United States since 1913. We estimate wealth by capitalizing the incomes reported by individual taxpayers, accounting for assets that do not generate taxable income. We successfully test our capitalization method in three micro datasets where we can observe both income and wealth: the Survey of Consumer Finance, linked estate and income tax returns, and foundations' tax records. We find that wealth concentration was high in the beginning of the twentieth century, fell from 1929 to 1978, and has continuously increased since then. The top 0.1% wealth share has risen from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012, a level almost as high as in 1929. Top wealth-holders are younger today than in the 1960s and earn a higher fraction of the economy's labor income. The bottom 90% wealth share first increased up to the mid-1980s and then steadily declined. The increase in wealth inequality in recent decades is due to the upsurge of top incomes combined with an increase in saving rate inequality. We explain how our findings can be reconciled with Survey of Consumer Finances and estate tax data.

@article{Schwartz2016,
  title = {Wealth and Secular Stagnation: The Role of Industrial Organization and Intellectual Property Rights},
  author = {Schwartz, Herman Mark},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {226--249},
  doi = {10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.11},
  abstract = {Changes in firm strategy and structure partially explain the sources and consequences of rising wealth inequality in America. Combining use of state-created monopolies around intellectual property rights (IPRs) for profitability and firm-level strategies to transform their industrial organization by pushing physical capital and noncore labor outside the boundaries of the firm leads to rising levels of wealth and income inequality among firms as well as individuals. Income inequality among firms in turn reduces growth in productive investment and thus in aggregate demand. Slower growth reflexively deters firms from new investment, aggravating the shortfall in aggregate demand. Decreased protection for IPRs and increased protection for subcontracted workers would help increase aggregate demand and thus push growth back to its prior level, as well as reducing wealth and income inequality among individuals.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

Changes in firm strategy and structure partially explain the sources and consequences of rising wealth inequality in America. Combining use of state-created monopolies around intellectual property rights (IPRs) for profitability and firm-level strategies to transform their industrial organization by pushing physical capital and noncore labor outside the boundaries of the firm leads to rising levels of wealth and income inequality among firms as well as individuals. Income inequality among firms in turn reduces growth in productive investment and thus in aggregate demand. Slower growth reflexively deters firms from new investment, aggravating the shortfall in aggregate demand. Decreased protection for IPRs and increased protection for subcontracted workers would help increase aggregate demand and thus push growth back to its prior level, as well as reducing wealth and income inequality among individuals.

@article{SykesMaroto2016,
  title = {A Wealth of Inequalities: Mass Incarceration, Employment, and Racial Disparities in {{U}}.{{S}}. Household Wealth, 1996 to 2011},
  author = {Sykes, Bryan L. and Maroto, Michelle},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {129--152},
  doi = {10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.07},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.07},
  abstract = {Despite the strong relationship between the rise in mass incarceration over the last forty years and racial inequality in employment and wages, few studies have examined the long-term consequences and spillover effects of criminal justice contact on the black-white wealth gap in the United States. In this paper, we investigate the mechanisms whereby the local and distal incarceration of a family member affects household wealth, focusing on wealth disparities by race and education. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Current Population Survey, and the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities and Local Jails, we apply fixed-effects and probit models to estimate how a family member's incarceration influences household assets and debt over panel waves. We find that having an incarcerated family member reduced household assets by 64.3 percent and debt by 85.1 percent after we adjusted for the underrepresentation of institutionalization in SIPP data. We also discuss these findings in the context of broader racial disparities in wealth and employment. Our findings demonstrate how contemporary patterns of mass incarceration contribute to the maintenance of social inequality in wealth and form barriers to economic security for other household members.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

Despite the strong relationship between the rise in mass incarceration over the last forty years and racial inequality in employment and wages, few studies have examined the long-term consequences and spillover effects of criminal justice contact on the black-white wealth gap in the United States. In this paper, we investigate the mechanisms whereby the local and distal incarceration of a family member affects household wealth, focusing on wealth disparities by race and education. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Current Population Survey, and the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities and Local Jails, we apply fixed-effects and probit models to estimate how a family member's incarceration influences household assets and debt over panel waves. We find that having an incarcerated family member reduced household assets by 64.3 percent and debt by 85.1 percent after we adjusted for the underrepresentation of institutionalization in SIPP data. We also discuss these findings in the context of broader racial disparities in wealth and employment. Our findings demonstrate how contemporary patterns of mass incarceration contribute to the maintenance of social inequality in wealth and form barriers to economic security for other household members.

@article{ThompsonConley2016,
  title = {Health Shocks and Social Drift: Examining the Relationship between Acute Illness and Family Wealth},
  author = {Thompson, Jason and Conley, Dalton},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {153--171},
  doi = {10.7758/rsf.2016.2.6.08},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.08},
  abstract = {This paper analyzes the extent to which health shocks play a role in black- white wealth inequality. Deploying data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we implement a first- differences identification strategy in estimating the effects of acute health events on changes in wealth for couples across waves of data from 1999 to 2011. We find that although such shocks affect both white and black families, they make black families more vulnerable financially as family heads near retirement. In comparison with their white counterparts, black families that experience an acute health shock are more likely to rely on social safety nets, such as food stamps and Social Security Disability Insurance. Findings hold implications across multiple policy arenas, including health-care and labor law.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth}
}

This paper analyzes the extent to which health shocks play a role in black- white wealth inequality. Deploying data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we implement a first- differences identification strategy in estimating the effects of acute health events on changes in wealth for couples across waves of data from 1999 to 2011. We find that although such shocks affect both white and black families, they make black families more vulnerable financially as family heads near retirement. In comparison with their white counterparts, black families that experience an acute health shock are more likely to rely on social safety nets, such as food stamps and Social Security Disability Insurance. Findings hold implications across multiple policy arenas, including health-care and labor law.

@article{Waldenstrom2016,
  title = {The National Wealth of {{Sweden}}, 1810\textendash 2014},
  author = {Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Scandinavian Economic History Review},
  volume = {64},
  number = {1},
  pages = {36--54},
  doi = {10.1080/03585522.2015.1132759},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.2015.1132759},
  abstract = {This study presents a new database, the Swedish National Wealth Database, which contains annual data on private, public, and national wealth and sectoral saving rates in Sweden over the past two centuries. The paper reviews previous investigations of national wealth, compares their estimates with the ones presented here and discusses method approaches and measurement problems. The main results from data series are presented for assets and liabilities and their subcomponents, for the private and public domestic and foreign sectors. By complementing the past literature with its traditional focus on economic flow variables to understand long-run economic developments, this new database offers potentially new perspectives on a number of important issues in Sweden's economic history.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

This study presents a new database, the Swedish National Wealth Database, which contains annual data on private, public, and national wealth and sectoral saving rates in Sweden over the past two centuries. The paper reviews previous investigations of national wealth, compares their estimates with the ones presented here and discusses method approaches and measurement problems. The main results from data series are presented for assets and liabilities and their subcomponents, for the private and public domestic and foreign sectors. By complementing the past literature with its traditional focus on economic flow variables to understand long-run economic developments, this new database offers potentially new perspectives on a number of important issues in Sweden's economic history.

@book{Williams2016,
  title = {The Privileges of Wealth: Rising Inequality and the Growing Racial Divide},
  author = {Williams, Robert B.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {The Priveledge of Wealth:},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  url = {https://www.crcpress.com/The-Privileges-of-Wealth-Rising-inequality-and-the-growing-racial-divide/Williams/p/book/9781138227507},
  abstract = {The American Dream is under assault. This threat results not from a lack of means, but from an unwillingness to share. Total household wealth increased by half in the past generation, but barely one fifth of American households captured this new wealth. For the rest, the dream of owning a home, gaining a secure retirement, and ensuring a college education for their kids is disappearing. Worse still, the widening wealth divide largely tracks our racial fault lines. The Privileges of Wealth investigates the impact of the rising concentration of wealth. It describes how households accumulate wealth along three pathways: household saving, appreciation of assets, and family gifts and inheritances. In addition, federal wealth policies, in the form of assorted tax deductions and credits, act as a fourth pathway that favors wealthy households. For those with means, each pathway operates as a virtuous cycle enabling families to build wealth with increasing ease. For those without, these same pathways are experienced as vicious cycles. The issue of wealth privilege is even more pronounced when examining the racial wealth gap. Typically, White households own ten times the wealth of Black or Latino families. This chasm results from the durability and transferability of wealth across generations and serves as a persistent legacy of our history of racial enslavement, expropriation, and exclusion. Current policies favoring the wealthy are simply cementing these wealth disparities. This book explains how these sources of wealth privilege are systemic features of our economy and the basis of rising disparities. The arguments and evidence presented here offer a compelling case for how our current policies are undermining the American Dream for most Americans while fortifying a White plutocracy, with dire consequences for us all.},
  isbn = {978-1-138-22750-7},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

The American Dream is under assault. This threat results not from a lack of means, but from an unwillingness to share. Total household wealth increased by half in the past generation, but barely one fifth of American households captured this new wealth. For the rest, the dream of owning a home, gaining a secure retirement, and ensuring a college education for their kids is disappearing. Worse still, the widening wealth divide largely tracks our racial fault lines. The Privileges of Wealth investigates the impact of the rising concentration of wealth. It describes how households accumulate wealth along three pathways: household saving, appreciation of assets, and family gifts and inheritances. In addition, federal wealth policies, in the form of assorted tax deductions and credits, act as a fourth pathway that favors wealthy households. For those with means, each pathway operates as a virtuous cycle enabling families to build wealth with increasing ease. For those without, these same pathways are experienced as vicious cycles. The issue of wealth privilege is even more pronounced when examining the racial wealth gap. Typically, White households own ten times the wealth of Black or Latino families. This chasm results from the durability and transferability of wealth across generations and serves as a persistent legacy of our history of racial enslavement, expropriation, and exclusion. Current policies favoring the wealthy are simply cementing these wealth disparities. This book explains how these sources of wealth privilege are systemic features of our economy and the basis of rising disparities. The arguments and evidence presented here offer a compelling case for how our current policies are undermining the American Dream for most Americans while fortifying a White plutocracy, with dire consequences for us all.

@article{Wolff2016,
  title = {Household Wealth Trends in the {{United States}}, 1962-2013: What Happened over the Great Recession},
  author = {Wolff, Edward N.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {RSF: Russell Sage Foundation Journal of Social Sciences},
  volume = {2},
  number = {6},
  pages = {24--42},
  doi = {10.1007/s13398-014-0173-7.2},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.6.02},
  abstract = {I look at wealth trends from 1962 to 2013, particularly for the middle class. Asset prices plunged between 2007 and 2010 but then rebounded from 2010 to 2013. The most telling finding is that median wealth plum- meted by 44 percent between 2007 and 2010, almost double the drop in housing prices. Wealth inequality, after almost two decades of little movement, was up sharply from 2007 to 2010. This sharp fall in median net worth and rise in overall wealth inequality are traceable primarily to the high leverage of middle- class families, the high share of homes in their portfolio, and the plunge in house prices. Rather remarkably, me- dian (and mean) wealth did not essentially change from 2010 to 2013 despite the rebound in asset prices. The proximate cause was the high dissavings of the middle class. Wealth inequality also remained largely unchanged.},
  isbn = {9780874216561},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  pmid = {15003161}
}

I look at wealth trends from 1962 to 2013, particularly for the middle class. Asset prices plunged between 2007 and 2010 but then rebounded from 2010 to 2013. The most telling finding is that median wealth plum- meted by 44 percent between 2007 and 2010, almost double the drop in housing prices. Wealth inequality, after almost two decades of little movement, was up sharply from 2007 to 2010. This sharp fall in median net worth and rise in overall wealth inequality are traceable primarily to the high leverage of middle- class families, the high share of homes in their portfolio, and the plunge in house prices. Rather remarkably, me- dian (and mean) wealth did not essentially change from 2010 to 2013 despite the rebound in asset prices. The proximate cause was the high dissavings of the middle class. Wealth inequality also remained largely unchanged.

@unpublished{vanderWeideetal2016,
  title = {Is Inequality Underestimated in {{Egypt}}? {{Evidence}} from House Prices},
  author = {{van der Weide}, Roy and Lakner, Christoph and Ianchovichina, Elena},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1111/roiw.12338},
  url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24645},
  abstract = {Household income surveys often fail to capture top incomes, which leads to an underestimation of income inequality. A popular solution is to combine the household survey with data from income tax records, which has been found to result in significant upward corrections of inequality estimates. Unfortunately, tax records are unavailable in many countries, including most of the developing world. In the absence of data from tax records, this study explores the feasibility of using data on house prices to estimate the top tail of the income distribution. In an application to Egypt, where estimates of inequality based on household surveys alone are low by international standards, the study finds strong evidence that inequality is indeed being underestimated by a considerable margin. The Gini index of household per capita income for urban Egypt is found to increase from 39 to 52 after correcting for the missing top tail.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Household income surveys often fail to capture top incomes, which leads to an underestimation of income inequality. A popular solution is to combine the household survey with data from income tax records, which has been found to result in significant upward corrections of inequality estimates. Unfortunately, tax records are unavailable in many countries, including most of the developing world. In the absence of data from tax records, this study explores the feasibility of using data on house prices to estimate the top tail of the income distribution. In an application to Egypt, where estimates of inequality based on household surveys alone are low by international standards, the study finds strong evidence that inequality is indeed being underestimated by a considerable margin. The Gini index of household per capita income for urban Egypt is found to increase from 39 to 52 after correcting for the missing top tail.

@unpublished{Alvaredoetal2015,
  title = {On the Share of Inheritance in Aggregate Wealth: {{Europe}} and the {{USA}}, 1900-2010},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Garbinti, Bertrand and Piketty, Thomas},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1111/ecca.12233},
  url = {https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/publications/no-2015-07-on-the-share-of-inheritance-in-aggregate-wealth-europe-and-the-united-states-1900-2010/},
  abstract = {This paper provides historical series on the evolution of the share of inherited wealth in aggregate private wealth in Europe (France, the UK, Germany, Sweden) and the USA over the 1900\textendash 2010 period. Until 1910, the inheritance share was very high in Europe (70\textendash 80\%). It then fell abruptly following the 1914\textendash 45 shocks, down to about 30\textendash 40\% during the 1950\textendash 80 period, and is back to 50\textendash 60\% (and rising) since around 2010. The US pattern also appears to be U-shaped, albeit less marked, and with significant uncertainty regarding recent trends, due to data limitations. We discuss possible interpretations for these long-run patterns.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Intergenerational Wealth},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper provides historical series on the evolution of the share of inherited wealth in aggregate private wealth in Europe (France, the UK, Germany, Sweden) and the USA over the 1900– 2010 period. Until 1910, the inheritance share was very high in Europe (70– 80%). It then fell abruptly following the 1914– 45 shocks, down to about 30– 40% during the 1950– 80 period, and is back to 50– 60% (and rising) since around 2010. The US pattern also appears to be U-shaped, albeit less marked, and with significant uncertainty regarding recent trends, due to data limitations. We discuss possible interpretations for these long-run patterns.

@book{Atkinson2015,
  title = {Inequality: What Can Be Done?},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B.},
  year = {2015},
  url = {https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674504769},
  abstract = {Inequality is one of our most urgent social problems. Curbed in the decades after World War II, it has recently returned with a vengeance. We all know the scale of the problem\textemdash talk about the 99\% and the 1\% is entrenched in public debate\textemdash but there has been little discussion of what we can do but despair. According to the distinguished economist Anthony Atkinson, however, we can do much more than skeptics imagine. Atkinson has long been at the forefront of research on inequality, and brings his theoretical and practical experience to bear on its diverse problems. He presents a comprehensive set of policies that could bring about a genuine shift in the distribution of income in developed countries. The problem, Atkinson shows, is not simply that the rich are getting richer. We are also failing to tackle poverty, and the economy is rapidly changing to leave the majority of people behind. To reduce inequality, we have to go beyond placing new taxes on the wealthy to fund existing programs. We need fresh ideas. Atkinson thus recommends ambitious new policies in five areas: technology, employment, social security, the sharing of capital, and taxation. He defends these against the common arguments and excuses for inaction: that intervention will shrink the economy, that globalization makes action impossible, and that new policies cannot be afforded. More than just a program for change, Atkinson's book is a voice of hope and informed optimism about the possibilities for political action.},
  isbn = {978-0-674-50476-9},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,{Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes},Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Inequality is one of our most urgent social problems. Curbed in the decades after World War II, it has recently returned with a vengeance. We all know the scale of the problem— talk about the 99% and the 1% is entrenched in public debate— but there has been little discussion of what we can do but despair. According to the distinguished economist Anthony Atkinson, however, we can do much more than skeptics imagine. Atkinson has long been at the forefront of research on inequality, and brings his theoretical and practical experience to bear on its diverse problems. He presents a comprehensive set of policies that could bring about a genuine shift in the distribution of income in developed countries. The problem, Atkinson shows, is not simply that the rich are getting richer. We are also failing to tackle poverty, and the economy is rapidly changing to leave the majority of people behind. To reduce inequality, we have to go beyond placing new taxes on the wealthy to fund existing programs. We need fresh ideas. Atkinson thus recommends ambitious new policies in five areas: technology, employment, social security, the sharing of capital, and taxation. He defends these against the common arguments and excuses for inaction: that intervention will shrink the economy, that globalization makes action impossible, and that new policies cannot be afforded. More than just a program for change, Atkinson's book is a voice of hope and informed optimism about the possibilities for political action.

@unpublished{Bachetal2015,
  title = {Rich Pickings? {{Risk}}, Return, and Skill in the Portfolios of the Wealthy},
  author = {Bach, Laurent and Calvet, Laurent E. and Sodini, Paolo},
  year = {2015},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706207},
  abstract = {We investigate wealth returns on an administrative panel containing the disaggregated balance sheets of Swedish residents. The expected return on household net wealth increases with net worth, exceeding the risk-free rate by 9\% for households in the top 0.01\%. The expected wealth return is driven by systematic risk-taking and exhibits strong persistence. Idiosyncratic risk is transitory but sufficiently large among business owners to generate substantial long-term disper- sion in returns in top brackets. We estimate the distribution of the geometric average return on gross wealth over a generation. Heterogeneity in returns explains most of the historical increase in top wealth shares.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We investigate wealth returns on an administrative panel containing the disaggregated balance sheets of Swedish residents. The expected return on household net wealth increases with net worth, exceeding the risk-free rate by 9% for households in the top 0.01%. The expected wealth return is driven by systematic risk-taking and exhibits strong persistence. Idiosyncratic risk is transitory but sufficiently large among business owners to generate substantial long-term disper- sion in returns in top brackets. We estimate the distribution of the geometric average return on gross wealth over a generation. Heterogeneity in returns explains most of the historical increase in top wealth shares.

@unpublished{Benhabibetal2015a,
  title = {Wealth Distribution and Social Mobility in the {{US}}: {{A}} Quantitative Approach},
  author = {Benhabib, Jess and Bisin, Alberto and Luo, Mi},
  year = {2015},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20151684},
  url = {https://www.nber.org/papers/w21721},
  abstract = {This paper attempts to quantitatively identify the factors that drive wealth dynamics in the U.S. and are consistent with its observed skewed cross-sectional distribution and social mobility. We concentrate on three critical factors: a skewed and persistent distribution of earnings, differential saving and bequest rates across wealth levels, and capital income risk. All of these factors are necessary for matching both distribution and mobility, with a distinct role in inducing wealth accumulation near the borrowing constraints, contributing to the thick top tail of wealth, and affecting upward and/or downward social mobility.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper attempts to quantitatively identify the factors that drive wealth dynamics in the U.S. and are consistent with its observed skewed cross-sectional distribution and social mobility. We concentrate on three critical factors: a skewed and persistent distribution of earnings, differential saving and bequest rates across wealth levels, and capital income risk. All of these factors are necessary for matching both distribution and mobility, with a distinct role in inducing wealth accumulation near the borrowing constraints, contributing to the thick top tail of wealth, and affecting upward and/or downward social mobility.

@article{Benhabibetal2015,
  title = {The Wealth Distribution in Bewley Economies with Capital Income Risk},
  author = {Benhabib, Jess and Bisin, Alberto and Zhu, Shenghao},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {159},
  pages = {489--515},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.013},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.013},
  abstract = {We study the wealth distribution in Bewley economies with idiosyncratic capital income risk. We show analytically that under rather general conditions on the stochastic structure of the economy, a unique ergodic distribution of wealth displays a fat tail.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

We study the wealth distribution in Bewley economies with idiosyncratic capital income risk. We show analytically that under rather general conditions on the stochastic structure of the economy, a unique ergodic distribution of wealth displays a fat tail.

@unpublished{Cesarinietal2015,
  title = {The Effect of Wealth on Individual and Household Labor Supply: Evidence from Swedish Lotteries},
  author = {Cesarini, David and Lindqvist, Erik and Notowidigdo, Matthew J. and {\"O}stling, Robert},
  year = {2015},
  url = {https://www.ifn.se/eng/publications/wp/2015/1094},
  abstract = {We study the effect of wealth on labor supply using the randomized assignment of monetary prizes in a large sample of Swedish lottery players. We find winning a lottery prize modestly reduces labor earnings, with the reduction being immediate, persistent, and similar by age, education, and sex. A calibrated dynamic model of individual labor supply implies an average lifetime marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income of -0.11, and labor-supply elasticities in the lower range of previously reported estimates. The earnings response is stronger for winners than their spouses, which is inconsistent with unitary household labor supply models.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

We study the effect of wealth on labor supply using the randomized assignment of monetary prizes in a large sample of Swedish lottery players. We find winning a lottery prize modestly reduces labor earnings, with the reduction being immediate, persistent, and similar by age, education, and sex. A calibrated dynamic model of individual labor supply implies an average lifetime marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income of -0.11, and labor-supply elasticities in the lower range of previously reported estimates. The earnings response is stronger for winners than their spouses, which is inconsistent with unitary household labor supply models.

@misc{Chamberlain2015,
  title = {Wealth in {{Great Britain}} Wave 3: Relationship between Wealth, Income and Personal Well-Being, {{July}} 2011 to {{June}} 2012},
  author = {Chamberlain, Elaine},
  year = {2015},
  month = sep,
  url = {https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/debt/articles/wealthingreatbritainwave3/2015-09-04},
  urldate = {2022-02-23},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Office for National Statistics}
}

@article{CowellVanKerm2015,
  title = {Wealth Inequality: A Survey},
  author = {Cowell, Frank and Van Kerm, Philippe},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Journal of Econoimc Surveys},
  volume = {29},
  number = {4},
  pages = {671--710},
  doi = {10.1111/joes.12114},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12114},
  abstract = {We survey the issues involved in comparing wealth distributions and measuring wealth inequality with illustrations from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality}
}

We survey the issues involved in comparing wealth distributions and measuring wealth inequality with illustrations from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey.

@unpublished{Gabaixetal2015,
  title = {The Dynamics of Inequality},
  author = {Gabaix, Xavier and Lasry, Jean-Michel and Lions, Pierre-Louis and Moll, Benjamin},
  year = {2015},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w21363},
  abstract = {The past forty years have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality in the United States. While there is a large number of existing theories of the Pareto tails of the income and wealth distributions at a given point in time, almost none of these address the fast rise in top inequality observed in the data. We show that standard theories, which build on a random growth mechanism, generate transition dynamics that are an order of magnitude too slow relative to those observed in the data. We then suggest parsimonious deviations from the basic model that can explain such changes, namely heterogeneity in mean growth rates or deviations from Gibrat's law. These deviations are consistent with theories in which the increase in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

The past forty years have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality in the United States. While there is a large number of existing theories of the Pareto tails of the income and wealth distributions at a given point in time, almost none of these address the fast rise in top inequality observed in the data. We show that standard theories, which build on a random growth mechanism, generate transition dynamics that are an order of magnitude too slow relative to those observed in the data. We then suggest parsimonious deviations from the basic model that can explain such changes, namely heterogeneity in mean growth rates or deviations from Gibrat's law. These deviations are consistent with theories in which the increase in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers.

@article{Jones2015,
  title = {Pareto and {{Piketty}}: The Macroeconomics of Top Income and Wealth Inequality},
  author = {Jones, Charles I.},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {29},
  number = {1},
  pages = {29--46},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.29.1.29},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.1.29},
  abstract = {Since the early 2000s, research by Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and their coauthors has revolutionized our understanding of income and wealth inequality. In this paper, I highlight some of the key empirical facts from this research and comment on how they relate to macroeconomics and to economic theory more generally. One of the key links between data and theory is the Pareto distribution. The paper describes simple mechanisms that give rise to Pareto distributions for income and wealth and considers the economic forces that influence top inequality over time and across countries. For example, it is in this context that the role of the famous r - g expression is best understood.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality}
}

Since the early 2000s, research by Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and their coauthors has revolutionized our understanding of income and wealth inequality. In this paper, I highlight some of the key empirical facts from this research and comment on how they relate to macroeconomics and to economic theory more generally. One of the key links between data and theory is the Pareto distribution. The paper describes simple mechanisms that give rise to Pareto distributions for income and wealth and considers the economic forces that influence top inequality over time and across countries. For example, it is in this context that the role of the famous r - g expression is best understood.

@article{Kamin2015,
  title = {How to Tax the Rich},
  author = {Kamin, David},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Tax Notes},
  volume = {146},
  number = {1},
  pages = {119--129},
  url = {https://ssrn.com/abstract=2550936},
  abstract = {This article reviews the menu of major options for increasing tax liabilities for the richest Americans. It concludes that a number of options that have received considerable attention and support are not viable as a practical matter \textemdash{} looking at actual amounts of revenue raised and taking into account administrative considerations. This includes such options as taxing capital gains as ordinary income, which according to the official budget offices would raise little revenue due to the effect on realization behavior, and annual wealth taxes or broad mark-to-market accounting, which would be extraordinarily challenging to administer. The article then goes on to identify more viable options, the most promising of which may be taxing \textemdash{} at least partially \textemdash{} unrealized gains at death or gift, but also include a number of other policies like substantially expanding transfer taxes or increasing the tax rate on ordinary income.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

This article reviews the menu of major options for increasing tax liabilities for the richest Americans. It concludes that a number of options that have received considerable attention and support are not viable as a practical matter — looking at actual amounts of revenue raised and taking into account administrative considerations. This includes such options as taxing capital gains as ordinary income, which according to the official budget offices would raise little revenue due to the effect on realization behavior, and annual wealth taxes or broad mark-to-market accounting, which would be extraordinarily challenging to administer. The article then goes on to identify more viable options, the most promising of which may be taxing — at least partially — unrealized gains at death or gift, but also include a number of other policies like substantially expanding transfer taxes or increasing the tax rate on ordinary income.