@article{barker_long_2024,
	title = {The long tail of {COVID} and the tale of long {COVID}: {Diagnostic} construction and the management of ignorance},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {01419889},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85145299697&doi=10.1111%2f1467-9566.13599&partnerID=40&md5=35acb017cf30ed79f3b33bc323503ee3},
	doi = {10.1111/1467-9566.13599},
	abstract = {We bring together insights from the sociology of diagnosis and the sociology of ignorance to examine the early diagnostic unfolding of ‘Long COVID’ (LC). Originally described by patient activists, researchers set out to ponder its unwieldy clinical boundaries. Using a scoping review method in tandem with qualitative content analytic techniques, we analyse medicine’s initial struggles to construct a LC diagnosis. Paying attention to the dynamics of ignorance, we highlight three consequential conceptual manoeuvres in the early classifications of LC: causal agnosticism concerning the relationship between COVID-19 and LC, evasion of lumping LC with similar conditions; and the predictable splitting off of medically explainable cases from the LC designation. These manoeuvres are not maleficent, inept or unreasonable. They are practical but impactful responses to the classificatory dilemmas present in the construction of diagnoses amidst ignorance. Although there are unique aspects to LC, we suggest that its early fate is nevertheless emblematic of medicine’s diagnostic standardisation processes more generally. To varying degrees, diagnoses are ignorance management strategies; they create a pathway through the uncertainty at the core of disease realities. However, while diagnoses circumscribe some types of ignorance, they produce others through the creation of blind spots and paths not taken. © 2022 Foundation for the Sociology of Health \& Illness.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Sociology of Health and Illness},
	author = {Barker, Kristin Kay and Whooley, Owen and Madden, Erin F. and Ahrend, Emily E. and Greene, R. Neil},
	year = {2024},
	pmid = {36580406},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Billet, COVID-19, COVID-19 Testing, COVID-19 testing, Humans, Post-Acute COVID-19 Syndrome, Sociology, Uncertainty, contested illnesses, coronavirus disease 2019, human, long COVID, long COVID-19, scoping review, sociology, sociology of diagnosis, sociology of ignorance, sociology of medical knowledge, uncertainty},
	pages = {189 -- 207},
}

We bring together insights from the sociology of diagnosis and the sociology of ignorance to examine the early diagnostic unfolding of ‘Long COVID’ (LC). Originally described by patient activists, researchers set out to ponder its unwieldy clinical boundaries. Using a scoping review method in tandem with qualitative content analytic techniques, we analyse medicine’s initial struggles to construct a LC diagnosis. Paying attention to the dynamics of ignorance, we highlight three consequential conceptual manoeuvres in the early classifications of LC: causal agnosticism concerning the relationship between COVID-19 and LC, evasion of lumping LC with similar conditions; and the predictable splitting off of medically explainable cases from the LC designation. These manoeuvres are not maleficent, inept or unreasonable. They are practical but impactful responses to the classificatory dilemmas present in the construction of diagnoses amidst ignorance. Although there are unique aspects to LC, we suggest that its early fate is nevertheless emblematic of medicine’s diagnostic standardisation processes more generally. To varying degrees, diagnoses are ignorance management strategies; they create a pathway through the uncertainty at the core of disease realities. However, while diagnoses circumscribe some types of ignorance, they produce others through the creation of blind spots and paths not taken. © 2022 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness.

@article{lootens_inside_2024,
	title = {Inside the ivory tower, the view from a “space invader”: {An} exploratory study into the ways racialized {PhD} students experience white ignorance in elite universities in the {UK}},
	volume = {18},
	issn = {17519020},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85188301703&doi=10.1111%2fsoc4.13199&partnerID=40&md5=d251c6b70dc30675759f26fe679bc372},
	doi = {10.1111/soc4.13199},
	abstract = {This paper examines the experiences of racialized PhD students in British elite universities. It is framed by Mills' (2007) conception of white ignorance and reflects on the power of whiteness that shapes everyday experiences in such places of privilege. For Mills, the production of racism relies on epistemological processes that produce ignorance, and which promote various ways of ignoring the histories and legacies of European colonialism. Research has shown that professors find it difficult to talk about racism and coloniality within higher education. Professors responses are important as they may affect the outcomes of conducting research for PhD students, yet there is less understanding of how racialized PhD students experience or address white ignorance. Using in-depth interviews with 14 racialized PhD students, this paper critically examines the intertwined relationship between the coloniality of knowledge and white ignorance within elite universities in the United Kingdom. While universities have been regarded as “neutral” knowledge-producing institutions, this study challenges the assumptions, interactions, and practices of higher education disciplines in the social sciences, namely anthropology and sociology. Based on the findings of this work, we argue that white ignorance is an epistemic strategy that justifies racial domination within and beyond the halls of academia. © 2024 John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Sociology Compass},
	author = {Lootens, Elif and Fúnez-Flores, Jairo I.},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
}

This paper examines the experiences of racialized PhD students in British elite universities. It is framed by Mills' (2007) conception of white ignorance and reflects on the power of whiteness that shapes everyday experiences in such places of privilege. For Mills, the production of racism relies on epistemological processes that produce ignorance, and which promote various ways of ignoring the histories and legacies of European colonialism. Research has shown that professors find it difficult to talk about racism and coloniality within higher education. Professors responses are important as they may affect the outcomes of conducting research for PhD students, yet there is less understanding of how racialized PhD students experience or address white ignorance. Using in-depth interviews with 14 racialized PhD students, this paper critically examines the intertwined relationship between the coloniality of knowledge and white ignorance within elite universities in the United Kingdom. While universities have been regarded as “neutral” knowledge-producing institutions, this study challenges the assumptions, interactions, and practices of higher education disciplines in the social sciences, namely anthropology and sociology. Based on the findings of this work, we argue that white ignorance is an epistemic strategy that justifies racial domination within and beyond the halls of academia. © 2024 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

@article{licon_better_2024,
	title = {Better {Not} to {Know}: {On} the {Possibility} of {Culpable} {Knowledge}},
	issn = {0269-1728},
	shorttitle = {Better {Not} to {Know}},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2024.2326822},
	abstract = {Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Licon, J.A.},
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {Epistemic culpability, epistemic injustice, ignorance, signaling},
}

Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{richmond_ignorance_2024,
	title = {Ignorance of critical race theory predicts {White} {Americans}’ opposition to it},
	issn = {00224537},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85188503629&doi=10.1111%2fjosi.12601&partnerID=40&md5=3a3ee907ddf6608ee6daa9e7e3938034},
	doi = {10.1111/josi.12601},
	abstract = {Acknowledging systemic racism, a key tenet of Critical Race Theory (CRT), may be threatening to many Americans but it can also reduce racial biases. However, anti-CRT legislation prohibits learning about racism, thus highlighting the mutually reinforcing relationship between systemic racism and the production of ignorance. We assessed White Americans’ knowledge about CRT through participant-generated definitions (Study 1, N = 199) and via a true/false questionnaire (Study 2, N = 194), and its relation to opposition to CRT. Opposition to CRT was associated with a less accurate understanding of CRT, even when controlling for political orientation. Content analyses revealed that opponents of CRT deny anti-Black racism, believe CRT harms Whites, and view discussing race as divisive. Based on these themes, we developed a meta-cognitive corrective intervention in Study 3 (N = 289). Participants who received corrective feedback after taking a multiple-choice test about CRT showed a larger decrease in their opposition to CRT than those in the control condition. © 2024 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Journal of Social Issues},
	author = {Richmond, Brianna S. and Toosi, Negin R. and Wellman, Joseph D. and Wilkins, Clara L.},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
}

Acknowledging systemic racism, a key tenet of Critical Race Theory (CRT), may be threatening to many Americans but it can also reduce racial biases. However, anti-CRT legislation prohibits learning about racism, thus highlighting the mutually reinforcing relationship between systemic racism and the production of ignorance. We assessed White Americans’ knowledge about CRT through participant-generated definitions (Study 1, N = 199) and via a true/false questionnaire (Study 2, N = 194), and its relation to opposition to CRT. Opposition to CRT was associated with a less accurate understanding of CRT, even when controlling for political orientation. Content analyses revealed that opponents of CRT deny anti-Black racism, believe CRT harms Whites, and view discussing race as divisive. Based on these themes, we developed a meta-cognitive corrective intervention in Study 3 (N = 289). Participants who received corrective feedback after taking a multiple-choice test about CRT showed a larger decrease in their opposition to CRT than those in the control condition. © 2024 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

@article{mitova_can_2024,
	title = {Can theorising epistemic injustice help us decolonise?*},
	issn = {0020174X},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85188096855&doi=10.1080%2f0020174X.2024.2327489&partnerID=40&md5=2f764f4dea9f04bd5b705058a52164e0},
	doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2024.2327489},
	abstract = {The paper argues that some tools from the epistemic injustice literature can be fruitfully applied to the debate on epistemic decolonisation. The first step for such a project is to defuse recent misgivings about the liberatory potential of epistemic injustice scholarship. I group these misgivings under the slogan ‘Epistemic injustice is white-people stuff’, or ‘the WPS challenge’, for short, and use them to set desiderata for good theorising with epistemic injustice tools. I then look at three such tools–epistemic oppression, white ignorance, and contributory injustice–and argue that they advance theorising epistemic decolonisation while meeting the three desiderata. If the argument works, its implications for the topic of this special issue are that we don’t need to decolonise epistemic injustice; we can instead use the tools of the epistemic injustice literature to advance the decolonisation project. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Inquiry (United Kingdom)},
	author = {Mitova, Veli},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
}

The paper argues that some tools from the epistemic injustice literature can be fruitfully applied to the debate on epistemic decolonisation. The first step for such a project is to defuse recent misgivings about the liberatory potential of epistemic injustice scholarship. I group these misgivings under the slogan ‘Epistemic injustice is white-people stuff’, or ‘the WPS challenge’, for short, and use them to set desiderata for good theorising with epistemic injustice tools. I then look at three such tools–epistemic oppression, white ignorance, and contributory injustice–and argue that they advance theorising epistemic decolonisation while meeting the three desiderata. If the argument works, its implications for the topic of this special issue are that we don’t need to decolonise epistemic injustice; we can instead use the tools of the epistemic injustice literature to advance the decolonisation project. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{meylan_defence_2024,
	title = {In {Defence} of the {Normative} {Account} of {Ignorance}},
	volume = {89},
	issn = {01650106},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85132841713&doi=10.1007%2fs10670-022-00529-7&partnerID=40&md5=25c855b58c4f420529ed6770fefae4b2},
	doi = {10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7},
	abstract = {The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Erkenntnis},
	author = {Meylan, Anne},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Source contributeurs},
	pages = {207 -- 221},
}

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{reibold_who_2024,
	title = {Who {Needs} to {Tell} the {Truth}? - {Epistemic} {Injustice} and {Truth} and {Reconciliation} {Commissions} for {Minorities} in {Non}-{Transitional} {Societies}},
	issn = {17423600},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85182206211&doi=10.1017%2fepi.2023.59&partnerID=40&md5=780995ee4a2092b5698d4a2f097284f3},
	doi = {10.1017/epi.2023.59},
	abstract = {Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have become a widely used tool to reconcile societies in the aftermath of widespread injustice or social and political conflict in a state. This article focuses on TRCs that take place in non-transitional societies in which the political and social structures, institutions, and power relations have largely remained in place since the time of injustice. Furthermore, it will focus on one particular injustice that TRCs try to address through the practice of truth-telling, namely the eradication of epistemic injustice. The article takes the Canadian and Norwegian TRCs as two examples to show that under conditions of enduring injustice, willful ignorance of the majority, and power inequality, TRCs might create a double bind for victims which makes them choose between epistemic exploitation and continued injustices based on the majority's ignorance. The article argues that the set-up and accompanying measures of TRCs are of the utmost importance if TRCs in non-transitional societies are to overcome epistemic injustice, instead of creating new relations of exploitation. Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Episteme},
	author = {Reibold, Kerstin},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Type: Article},
}

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have become a widely used tool to reconcile societies in the aftermath of widespread injustice or social and political conflict in a state. This article focuses on TRCs that take place in non-transitional societies in which the political and social structures, institutions, and power relations have largely remained in place since the time of injustice. Furthermore, it will focus on one particular injustice that TRCs try to address through the practice of truth-telling, namely the eradication of epistemic injustice. The article takes the Canadian and Norwegian TRCs as two examples to show that under conditions of enduring injustice, willful ignorance of the majority, and power inequality, TRCs might create a double bind for victims which makes them choose between epistemic exploitation and continued injustices based on the majority's ignorance. The article argues that the set-up and accompanying measures of TRCs are of the utmost importance if TRCs in non-transitional societies are to overcome epistemic injustice, instead of creating new relations of exploitation. Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press.

@article{fejerskov_humanitarian_2024,
	title = {Humanitarian ignorance: towards a new paradigm of non-knowledge in digital humanitarianism},
	volume = {48},
	issn = {03613666},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85178295050&doi=10.1111%2fdisa.12609&partnerID=40&md5=086ad74d9e15ffe0501bb4d2be4237ca},
	doi = {10.1111/disa.12609},
	abstract = {This paper introduces the notion of ‘humanitarian ignorance’ to address growing concern regarding non-knowledge, as datafication becomes a central instrument and ambition of the humanitarian sector. With the turn to digital humanitarianism, contemporary humanitarian action increasingly relies on technology-driven quantification to expand the ability to collect, analyse, and present information. Utilising datafication processes, humanitarian organisations seek to assess ‘risk’ and mitigate ‘uncertainty’ more efficiently. Although central to their knowledge management and decision-making in low information circumstances, the conceptual notions of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are inadequate to capture the full spectrum of non-knowledge in a time of digital humanitarianism. We introduce ‘humanitarian ignorance’ here to challenge the assumption that datafication allows humanitarian organisations to make fully informed, delimited, and thus ‘better’ decisions. Ultimately, we accentuate the paradox that while datafication is thought to reduce risk and uncertainty in humanitarian affairs by suggesting higher levels of control, insight, and certainty, these efforts in fact open new expanses of ignorance and unknowns. © 2023 The Authors. Disasters published by John Wiley \& Sons Ltd on behalf of ODI.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Disasters},
	author = {Fejerskov, Adam Moe and Clausen, Maria-Louise and Seddig, Sarah},
	year = {2024},
	pmid = {37587840},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Altruism, Humans, Uncertainty, altruism, digitization, human, knowledge, quantitative analysis, risk factor, uncertainty, uncertainty analysis},
}

This paper introduces the notion of ‘humanitarian ignorance’ to address growing concern regarding non-knowledge, as datafication becomes a central instrument and ambition of the humanitarian sector. With the turn to digital humanitarianism, contemporary humanitarian action increasingly relies on technology-driven quantification to expand the ability to collect, analyse, and present information. Utilising datafication processes, humanitarian organisations seek to assess ‘risk’ and mitigate ‘uncertainty’ more efficiently. Although central to their knowledge management and decision-making in low information circumstances, the conceptual notions of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are inadequate to capture the full spectrum of non-knowledge in a time of digital humanitarianism. We introduce ‘humanitarian ignorance’ here to challenge the assumption that datafication allows humanitarian organisations to make fully informed, delimited, and thus ‘better’ decisions. Ultimately, we accentuate the paradox that while datafication is thought to reduce risk and uncertainty in humanitarian affairs by suggesting higher levels of control, insight, and certainty, these efforts in fact open new expanses of ignorance and unknowns. © 2023 The Authors. Disasters published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of ODI.

@article{sullivan-clarke_strategic_2024,
	title = {Strategic ignorance, is it appropriate for indigenous resistance?},
	volume = {27},
	issn = {13698230},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85183122501&doi=10.1080%2f13698230.2024.2305015&partnerID=40&md5=ed3e03527b9334d982ab41b86ba586e0},
	doi = {10.1080/13698230.2024.2305015},
	abstract = {In The Racial Contract, Charles Mills introduces the notion of an ‘inverted epistemology,’ an epistemology that construes social and racial ignorance as knowledge (p.18). As Mills points out, such ignorance can be used to oppress people by creating alternate realities or ‘white mythologies’ about race (p. 19). If the racial contract results in a society that oppresses people of color and supports white supremacy, then the question of how to correct an inverted epistemology becomes critical. Mills proposes the correction of history and the racist thinking underwriting it as a solution to the problem. Others, like Alison Bailey, seek to confront racial ignorance with active resistance by suggesting that individuals from historically marginalized groups exploit what members of dominant society don’t know (p. 77). While Bailey’s solution, referred to as strategic ignorance, may originate from good intentions, I argue that it is in general inappropriate for Indigenous people. Strategic ignorance is a product of the Western worldview, and it privileges Western values. In fact, both solutions offered by Mills and Bailey fail to consider Indigenous values. Mills’ proposed solution, however, is less objectionable. Instead of either solution, a more suitable form of resistance–one that embraces connectedness, balance, and harmony–would be ideal for the Indigenous communities of Turtle Island. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy},
	author = {Sullivan-Clarke, Andrea},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	pages = {78 -- 93},
}

In The Racial Contract, Charles Mills introduces the notion of an ‘inverted epistemology,’ an epistemology that construes social and racial ignorance as knowledge (p.18). As Mills points out, such ignorance can be used to oppress people by creating alternate realities or ‘white mythologies’ about race (p. 19). If the racial contract results in a society that oppresses people of color and supports white supremacy, then the question of how to correct an inverted epistemology becomes critical. Mills proposes the correction of history and the racist thinking underwriting it as a solution to the problem. Others, like Alison Bailey, seek to confront racial ignorance with active resistance by suggesting that individuals from historically marginalized groups exploit what members of dominant society don’t know (p. 77). While Bailey’s solution, referred to as strategic ignorance, may originate from good intentions, I argue that it is in general inappropriate for Indigenous people. Strategic ignorance is a product of the Western worldview, and it privileges Western values. In fact, both solutions offered by Mills and Bailey fail to consider Indigenous values. Mills’ proposed solution, however, is less objectionable. Instead of either solution, a more suitable form of resistance–one that embraces connectedness, balance, and harmony–would be ideal for the Indigenous communities of Turtle Island. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{bessone_leuropeen_2024,
	title = {“l’européen sait et ne sait pas” {Frantz} {Fanon} and {Epistemologies} of {Ignorance}},
	volume = {12},
	issn = {21658684},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85187452475&doi=10.5325%2fcritphilrace.12.1.0083&partnerID=40&md5=96315ec3e7b5413782e558ad76090964},
	doi = {10.5325/critphilrace.12.1.0083},
	abstract = {This article argues that Frantz Fanon’s critique of the epistemology of the colonial situation is a complex, pluralized, epistemology of ignorance, where ignorance takes three main forms. Fanon first produces a critique of colonial ideology, in which ignorance is the product of the colonizers’ false justificatory ideology. Fanon unveils how Europeans, through human sciences such as “ethnopsychiatry” and “ethnophilosophy,” deliberately produce ignorance and devaluation of colonized subjects and colonized knowledge for purposes of domination. Second, ignorance is the unintentional result of the partial, situated, standpoint of embodied knowers. Fanon does not intend to substitute a “black truth” to white ideology. He rather insists that while truth is unattainable under colonial conditions, the affective perspective of the oppressed/ colonized is a necessary constitutive part of any objective account of the world. Third, by analyzing the “Conducts of confession in North Africa,” characterized by deliberate denial, lies, and opacity as resistance mechanisms, Fanon insists that no objective knowledge is possible in a colonial situation because of the total separation, and impossible epistemic collaboration, of dominant and dominated knowers. An anticolonial politics has to focus on producing the conditions of possibility of knowledge. © 2024 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Philosophy of Race},
	author = {Bessone, Magali},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Penn State University Press
Type: Article},
	pages = {83 -- 105},
}

This article argues that Frantz Fanon’s critique of the epistemology of the colonial situation is a complex, pluralized, epistemology of ignorance, where ignorance takes three main forms. Fanon first produces a critique of colonial ideology, in which ignorance is the product of the colonizers’ false justificatory ideology. Fanon unveils how Europeans, through human sciences such as “ethnopsychiatry” and “ethnophilosophy,” deliberately produce ignorance and devaluation of colonized subjects and colonized knowledge for purposes of domination. Second, ignorance is the unintentional result of the partial, situated, standpoint of embodied knowers. Fanon does not intend to substitute a “black truth” to white ideology. He rather insists that while truth is unattainable under colonial conditions, the affective perspective of the oppressed/ colonized is a necessary constitutive part of any objective account of the world. Third, by analyzing the “Conducts of confession in North Africa,” characterized by deliberate denial, lies, and opacity as resistance mechanisms, Fanon insists that no objective knowledge is possible in a colonial situation because of the total separation, and impossible epistemic collaboration, of dominant and dominated knowers. An anticolonial politics has to focus on producing the conditions of possibility of knowledge. © 2024 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

@article{bacevic_liberal_2024,
	title = {Liberal fatalism, {COVID} 19 and the politics of impossibility},
	volume = {53},
	issn = {03085147},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85186457830&doi=10.1080%2f03085147.2024.2312710&partnerID=40&md5=a75608e3c7a9fde686b2bafc5ea3efd0},
	doi = {10.1080/03085147.2024.2312710},
	abstract = {How liberal governments manage knowledge, ignorance, prediction and uncertainty has attracted increased attention across the social sciences. In this paper, we analyse the strategy and rhetoric of the UK government during the COVID-19 pandemic, with particular attention to the first half of 2020. We see the initial UK policy response–as well as its later legitimation–as a form of ‘politics of impossibility’, effecting political change through claims of incapacity or impotence. We argue this approach departs from the uses of knowledge and ignorance in both classical liberalism and neoliberalism, and suggests the emergence of a new, hybrid form of governance which can be dubbed liberal fatalism. We discuss the relevance of this new form of governance for political futures of an increasingly volatile world. © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Economy and Society},
	author = {Bacevic, Jana and McGoey, Linsey},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	keywords = {COVID-19, United Kingdom, liberalism, political change, politics},
	pages = {163 -- 182},
}

How liberal governments manage knowledge, ignorance, prediction and uncertainty has attracted increased attention across the social sciences. In this paper, we analyse the strategy and rhetoric of the UK government during the COVID-19 pandemic, with particular attention to the first half of 2020. We see the initial UK policy response–as well as its later legitimation–as a form of ‘politics of impossibility’, effecting political change through claims of incapacity or impotence. We argue this approach departs from the uses of knowledge and ignorance in both classical liberalism and neoliberalism, and suggests the emergence of a new, hybrid form of governance which can be dubbed liberal fatalism. We discuss the relevance of this new form of governance for political futures of an increasingly volatile world. © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{alcoff_roots_2024,
	title = {“{The} roots (and routes) of the epistemology of ignorance”},
	volume = {27},
	issn = {13698230},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85182982954&doi=10.1080%2f13698230.2024.2305011&partnerID=40&md5=5adc3abb1579634b52bd53ffa1ee4826},
	doi = {10.1080/13698230.2024.2305011},
	abstract = {This paper elaborates on the idea of the epistemology of ignorance developed in Charles Mills’s work beginning in the 1980s and continuing throughout his writings. I I argue that his account developed initially from experiences of racism in north America as well as certain methods of organizing within parts of the Caribbean left. Essentially the epistemic practice of ignorance causes knowers to discredit or push away knowledge they in fact have. But this gives us cause for hope, for restoring existing knowledge through changing ideas about who knows. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy},
	author = {Alcoff, Linda Martín},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	pages = {9 -- 28},
}

This paper elaborates on the idea of the epistemology of ignorance developed in Charles Mills’s work beginning in the 1980s and continuing throughout his writings. I I argue that his account developed initially from experiences of racism in north America as well as certain methods of organizing within parts of the Caribbean left. Essentially the epistemic practice of ignorance causes knowers to discredit or push away knowledge they in fact have. But this gives us cause for hope, for restoring existing knowledge through changing ideas about who knows. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{biebel2023,
	title = {Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance},
	volume = {181},
	doi = {10.1007/s11098-023-02054-x},
	abstract = {It is widely agreed that ignorance of fact exculpates, but does moral ignorance exculpate? If so, does it exculpate in the same way as non-moral ignorance? In this paper I will argue that on one family of views explaining exculpating non-moral ignorance also explains exculpating moral ignorance. The view can be loosely stated in the following way: ignorance counts as an excuse only if it is not the result of a failure to meet some applicable reasonable epistemic standard—call this the Reasonable Epistemic Standards Thesis and call views that accept some version of this principle reasonable standards views. I argue that any plausible reasonable standards view ought to allow that moral ignorance exculpates, at least sometimes, and defend such views against the charge that they are susceptible to clear counterexamples.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	author = {Biebel, Nathan},
	year = {2024},
	pages = {1--21},
}

It is widely agreed that ignorance of fact exculpates, but does moral ignorance exculpate? If so, does it exculpate in the same way as non-moral ignorance? In this paper I will argue that on one family of views explaining exculpating non-moral ignorance also explains exculpating moral ignorance. The view can be loosely stated in the following way: ignorance counts as an excuse only if it is not the result of a failure to meet some applicable reasonable epistemic standard—call this the Reasonable Epistemic Standards Thesis and call views that accept some version of this principle reasonable standards views. I argue that any plausible reasonable standards view ought to allow that moral ignorance exculpates, at least sometimes, and defend such views against the charge that they are susceptible to clear counterexamples.

@article{navon2023,
	title = {‘{And} she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man’: androcentrism and the creation of knowledge-driven ignorance},
	volume = {26},
	doi = {10.1080/13691058.2023.2212291},
	abstract = {In this paper, I critically analyse biomedical clinical studies and literature reviews regarding the physiological phenomenon known as female ejaculation to demonstrate a process by which androcentric bias, which positions the male body as the scientific ‘standard human’, produces what I term as knowledge-driven ignorance. I show how even though knowledge about female ejaculation has expanded, its biomedical ontological status remains vague and controversial. The production of ignorance in this case does not result from active erasure or concealment, but rather from unintentional disregard, and is a by-product of knowledge-creation itself. As such, it is not only the narration of the scientific story that has the power to abject and exclude certain bodies from culture, but also what is untold and unknown.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Culture, Health \& Sexuality},
	author = {Beserman Navon, Lior},
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {377--390},
}

In this paper, I critically analyse biomedical clinical studies and literature reviews regarding the physiological phenomenon known as female ejaculation to demonstrate a process by which androcentric bias, which positions the male body as the scientific ‘standard human’, produces what I term as knowledge-driven ignorance. I show how even though knowledge about female ejaculation has expanded, its biomedical ontological status remains vague and controversial. The production of ignorance in this case does not result from active erasure or concealment, but rather from unintentional disregard, and is a by-product of knowledge-creation itself. As such, it is not only the narration of the scientific story that has the power to abject and exclude certain bodies from culture, but also what is untold and unknown.

@article{sendra2023,
	title = {{AstraZeneca} {Vaccine} {Controversies} in the {Media}: {Theorizing} {About} the {Mediatization} of {Ignorance} in the {Context} of the {COVID}-19 {Vaccination} {Campaign}},
	volume = {39},
	doi = {10.1080/10410236.2023.2171951},
	abstract = {As is the case in other situations of deep uncertainty, the unknowns related to the COVID-19 pandemic have aroused a great deal of attention in the media. Drawing insights both from mediatization theory and ignorance studies, we discuss the coverage of the AstraZeneca vaccine controversies to develop a new concept that we call the mediatization of ignorance. In doing so, we conceptualize the procedure through which unknowns become mediatized as a three-step process that results from a combination of logics from the areas of politics, health, and science/industry. Moreover, we argue that the mediatization of ignorance may have promoted vaccine hesitancy at a moment when vaccination was crucial for addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. We conclude by suggesting the need to explore in further detail the role that ignorance plays not only in the management of the COVID-19 crisis but also in different areas of society.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Health Communication},
	author = {Sendra, Anna and Torkkola, Sinikka and Parviainen, Jaana},
	year = {2024},
	pages = {541--551},
}

As is the case in other situations of deep uncertainty, the unknowns related to the COVID-19 pandemic have aroused a great deal of attention in the media. Drawing insights both from mediatization theory and ignorance studies, we discuss the coverage of the AstraZeneca vaccine controversies to develop a new concept that we call the mediatization of ignorance. In doing so, we conceptualize the procedure through which unknowns become mediatized as a three-step process that results from a combination of logics from the areas of politics, health, and science/industry. Moreover, we argue that the mediatization of ignorance may have promoted vaccine hesitancy at a moment when vaccination was crucial for addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. We conclude by suggesting the need to explore in further detail the role that ignorance plays not only in the management of the COVID-19 crisis but also in different areas of society.

@article{fan2023b,
	title = {Axiomatizing {Rumsfeld} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {53},
	doi = {10.1007/s10992-023-09725-4},
	abstract = {In a recent paper, Kit Fine presents some striking results concerning the logical properties of (first-order) ignorance, second-order ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance. However, Rumsfeld ignorance is definable in terms of ignorance, which makes some existing results and the axiomatization problem trivial. A main reason is that the accessibility relations for the implicit knowledge operator contained in the packaged operators of ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance are the same. In this work, we assume the two accessibility relations to be different so that one of them is an arbitrary subset of the other. This will avoid the definability issue and retain most of the previous validities. The main results are axiomatizations over various proper bi-frame classes. Finally we apply our framework to analyze Fine’s results.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
	author = {Fan, Jie},
	year = {2024},
	pages = {79--97},
}

In a recent paper, Kit Fine presents some striking results concerning the logical properties of (first-order) ignorance, second-order ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance. However, Rumsfeld ignorance is definable in terms of ignorance, which makes some existing results and the axiomatization problem trivial. A main reason is that the accessibility relations for the implicit knowledge operator contained in the packaged operators of ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance are the same. In this work, we assume the two accessibility relations to be different so that one of them is an arbitrary subset of the other. This will avoid the definability issue and retain most of the previous validities. The main results are axiomatizations over various proper bi-frame classes. Finally we apply our framework to analyze Fine’s results.

@book{mcculloch_mining_2023,
	title = {Mining {Gold} and {Manufacturing} {Ignorance}: {Occupational} {Lung} {Disease} and the {Buying} and {Selling} of {Labour} in {Southern} {Africa}},
	isbn = {978-981-19832-7-6 978-981-19832-6-9},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85171518494&doi=10.1007%2f978-981-19-8327-6&partnerID=40&md5=7d5bea766ff6f0c98188bf4576a7a9b0},
	abstract = {This open access book charts how South Africa’s gold mines have systematically suppressed evidence of hazardous work practices and the risks associated with mining. For most of the twentieth century, South Africa was the world’s largest producer of gold. Although the country enjoyed a reputation for leading the world in occupational health legislation, the mining companies developed a system of medical surveillance and workers’ compensation which compromised the health of black gold miners, facilitated the spread of tuberculosis, and ravaged the communities and economies of labour-sending states. The culmination of two decades of meticulous archival research, this book exposes the making, contesting, and unravelling of the companies’ capacity to shape – and corrupt – medical knowledge. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Springer Nature},
	author = {McCulloch, Jock and Miller, Pavla},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1007/978-981-19-8327-6},
	note = {Publication Title: Mining Gold and Manufacturing Ignorance: Occupational Lung Disease and the Buying and Selling of Labour in Southern Africa
Type: Book},
}

This open access book charts how South Africa’s gold mines have systematically suppressed evidence of hazardous work practices and the risks associated with mining. For most of the twentieth century, South Africa was the world’s largest producer of gold. Although the country enjoyed a reputation for leading the world in occupational health legislation, the mining companies developed a system of medical surveillance and workers’ compensation which compromised the health of black gold miners, facilitated the spread of tuberculosis, and ravaged the communities and economies of labour-sending states. The culmination of two decades of meticulous archival research, this book exposes the making, contesting, and unravelling of the companies’ capacity to shape – and corrupt – medical knowledge. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.

@article{mica_expectations_2023,
	title = {Expectations of {Failure}: {Political} {Risks} in the {Moral} {Economy} of {Ignorance} and {Social} {Injustice}},
	volume = {17},
	issn = {19718853},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85188430106&doi=10.6092%2fissn.1971-8853%2f18340&partnerID=40&md5=e62a7a5e01841ff90048e95e3cd98924},
	doi = {10.6092/issn.1971-8853/18340},
	abstract = {We are observing how contemporary failure regimes increasingly challenge ignorance and social injustice, and how this opens expectations for public policy to move beyond effectiveness and to pursue more emancipatory and progressive aims. Policy reinterpretations and expectations of failure however, are not coming solely from critical and alternative groups in the society. They are first and foremost political, which raises the question how does the moral economy and epistemology of just futures unfold? What are the effects of political exploitation and contamination? Our answer is to review political risks of emancipatory activism in abortion debates, which manifest high levels of polarization and contestation in relation to reproductive justice and human rights. We map out various hazards, showing how they produce what we term post-failure, and sustain emancipation fantasies and alternative policy futures that are linked with oppression effects. With this exploration we see that addressing ignorance and social injustice in policymaking has never been more essential, yet also unpredictable and convoluted in the political risks that it poses. Copyright © 2023 Adriana Mica, Mikołaj Pawlak, Paweł Kubicki.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Sociologica},
	author = {Mica, Adriana and Pawlak, Mikołaj and Kubicki, Paweł},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: University of Bologna
Type: Article},
	pages = {75 -- 97},
}

We are observing how contemporary failure regimes increasingly challenge ignorance and social injustice, and how this opens expectations for public policy to move beyond effectiveness and to pursue more emancipatory and progressive aims. Policy reinterpretations and expectations of failure however, are not coming solely from critical and alternative groups in the society. They are first and foremost political, which raises the question how does the moral economy and epistemology of just futures unfold? What are the effects of political exploitation and contamination? Our answer is to review political risks of emancipatory activism in abortion debates, which manifest high levels of polarization and contestation in relation to reproductive justice and human rights. We map out various hazards, showing how they produce what we term post-failure, and sustain emancipation fantasies and alternative policy futures that are linked with oppression effects. With this exploration we see that addressing ignorance and social injustice in policymaking has never been more essential, yet also unpredictable and convoluted in the political risks that it poses. Copyright © 2023 Adriana Mica, Mikołaj Pawlak, Paweł Kubicki.

@article{moojen_using_2023,
	title = {Using misperceived social norms as a license: does pluralistic ignorance trigger complacency in the food environment?},
	volume = {18},
	issn = {15534510},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85169662383&doi=10.1080%2f15534510.2023.2251643&partnerID=40&md5=42c39293d4376f8fa81aa2364a0b239c},
	doi = {10.1080/15534510.2023.2251643},
	abstract = {The current food environment strongly communicates the normality of consuming unhealthy and unsustainable food products. However, it is unclear whether people truly support this unhealthy and unsustainable social norm, or that they follow the norm (reluctantly) because they believe that other people agree with it, a phenomenon that is generally known as pluralistic ignorance. While previous research has documented the existence of pluralistic ignorance in a variety of settings, it is unknown to what extent it directly influences behavior and which mechanism may account for this influence. The present study examines whether the perception that others seem to agree with unhealthy and unsustainable eating norms acts as a license to not change one’s eating behavior and leads to complacency. We assessed pluralistic ignorance by comparing self- and other-scores on the importance, frequency, normalcy, and intentions dimensions of consuming healthy and sustainable food in a large sample of Dutch participants (N = 415). To investigate the effect of pluralistic ignorance on self-licensing and complacency, we calculated healthy and sustainable ‘misperception scores’ per dimension. Healthy eating misperceptions only marginally predicted self-licensing, but healthy misperceived intentions did predict an increase in complacency. Sustainable eating misperceptions seem more influential because misperceptions on importance and frequency predicted an increase in self-licensing, and sustainable misperceived normalcy predicted a decrease in complacency and intentions predicted an increase in complacency. These findings suggest that pluralistic ignorance may be more influential in sustainable eating since people could be uncertain what appropriate sustainable food choices are. Prospects for future research and suggestions to address pluralistic ignorance to potentially increase healthy and sustainable food choices are discussed. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Social Influence},
	author = {Moojen, Reinoud and Gillebaart, Marleen and de Ridder, Denise},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Taylor and Francis Ltd.
Type: Article},
}

The current food environment strongly communicates the normality of consuming unhealthy and unsustainable food products. However, it is unclear whether people truly support this unhealthy and unsustainable social norm, or that they follow the norm (reluctantly) because they believe that other people agree with it, a phenomenon that is generally known as pluralistic ignorance. While previous research has documented the existence of pluralistic ignorance in a variety of settings, it is unknown to what extent it directly influences behavior and which mechanism may account for this influence. The present study examines whether the perception that others seem to agree with unhealthy and unsustainable eating norms acts as a license to not change one’s eating behavior and leads to complacency. We assessed pluralistic ignorance by comparing self- and other-scores on the importance, frequency, normalcy, and intentions dimensions of consuming healthy and sustainable food in a large sample of Dutch participants (N = 415). To investigate the effect of pluralistic ignorance on self-licensing and complacency, we calculated healthy and sustainable ‘misperception scores’ per dimension. Healthy eating misperceptions only marginally predicted self-licensing, but healthy misperceived intentions did predict an increase in complacency. Sustainable eating misperceptions seem more influential because misperceptions on importance and frequency predicted an increase in self-licensing, and sustainable misperceived normalcy predicted a decrease in complacency and intentions predicted an increase in complacency. These findings suggest that pluralistic ignorance may be more influential in sustainable eating since people could be uncertain what appropriate sustainable food choices are. Prospects for future research and suggestions to address pluralistic ignorance to potentially increase healthy and sustainable food choices are discussed. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{jones_motivated_2023,
	title = {Motivated ignorance and social identity threat: the case of the {Flat} {Earth}},
	volume = {29},
	issn = {13504630},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85156188914&doi=10.1080%2f13504630.2023.2208033&partnerID=40&md5=4bab62adbca8f78ee39878178decac6c},
	doi = {10.1080/13504630.2023.2208033},
	abstract = {Belief in a conspiracy theory may, for some, provide a social identity. Because of the nature of many conspiracy theories, social identities associated with such beliefs may be subject to varied and considerable threats. Whilst various mechanisms for dealing with social identity threat have received widespread attention, this paper introduces an as yet unexplored strategy–that of ‘motivated ignorance'–as a further mechanism for social identity maintenance. This is a behavior where individuals actively avoid freely available and accessible information in order to protect a social identity from information that may be harmful to the existence of the broader social group, and thus the individual’s own sense of self. Using a netnographic approach, we explored motivated ignorance related to the social identities formed around beliefs in the Flat Earth. Data revealed two categories of motivated ignorance. Firstly, that of ‘poisoning the well', where ignorance was justified by derogating the perceived epistemic quality of the information. The second was more instrumental, through ad hominem attacks on the source rather than the epistemic quality of information. The study suggests that motivated ignorance may be used as a strategy that may be used to protect social identities that are under threat, adding a further mechanism to the literature on coping with social identity threat. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Social Identities},
	author = {Jones, Ian and Adams, Andrew and Mayoh, Joanne},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	keywords = {ethnography, identity construction, social theory},
	pages = {79 -- 94},
}

Belief in a conspiracy theory may, for some, provide a social identity. Because of the nature of many conspiracy theories, social identities associated with such beliefs may be subject to varied and considerable threats. Whilst various mechanisms for dealing with social identity threat have received widespread attention, this paper introduces an as yet unexplored strategy–that of ‘motivated ignorance'–as a further mechanism for social identity maintenance. This is a behavior where individuals actively avoid freely available and accessible information in order to protect a social identity from information that may be harmful to the existence of the broader social group, and thus the individual’s own sense of self. Using a netnographic approach, we explored motivated ignorance related to the social identities formed around beliefs in the Flat Earth. Data revealed two categories of motivated ignorance. Firstly, that of ‘poisoning the well', where ignorance was justified by derogating the perceived epistemic quality of the information. The second was more instrumental, through ad hominem attacks on the source rather than the epistemic quality of information. The study suggests that motivated ignorance may be used as a strategy that may be used to protect social identities that are under threat, adding a further mechanism to the literature on coping with social identity threat. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{dieterle_other-oriented_2023,
	title = {Other-{Oriented} {Hermeneutical} {Injustice}, {Affected} {Ignorance}, or {Human} {Ignorance}?},
	volume = {37},
	issn = {02691728},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85170694394&doi=10.1080%2f02691728.2023.2248044&partnerID=40&md5=8225f57eeece3a201b0ef279ba6ac454},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2023.2248044},
	abstract = {Paul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples–including his primary case of non-human animals–are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Dieterle, J.M.},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	pages = {852 -- 863},
}

Paul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples–including his primary case of non-human animals–are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{kadel_deliberate_2023,
	title = {Deliberate ignorance—a barrier for information interventions targeting reduced meat consumption?},
	issn = {08870446},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85149484929&doi=10.1080%2f08870446.2023.2182895&partnerID=40&md5=06d0c276402dd16a21eeef89de482fa8},
	doi = {10.1080/08870446.2023.2182895},
	abstract = {Objective: Despite abundant information about negative consequences of consuming meat, consumption in many Western countries is many times higher than recommended. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that people consciously decide to ignore such information—a phenomenon called deliberate ignorance. We investigated this potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption. Methods: In three studies, a total of 1133 participants had the opportunity to see 18 information chunks on negative consequences of meat consumption or to ignore part of the information. Deliberate ignorance was measured as the number of ignored information chunks. We assessed potential predictors and outcomes of deliberate ignorance. Interventions to reduce deliberate ignorance (i.e., self-affirmation, contemplation, and self-efficacy) were experimentally tested. Results: The more information participants ignored, the less they changed their intention to reduce their meat consumption (r = −.124). This effect was partially explained by cognitive dissonance induced by the presented information. While neither self-affirmation nor contemplation exercises reduced deliberate ignorance, self-efficacy exercises did. Conclusion: Deliberate ignorance is a potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption and needs to be considered in future interventions and research. Self-efficacy exercises are a promising approach to reduce deliberate ignorance and should be further explored. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Psychology and Health},
	author = {Kadel, Philipp and Herwig, Ira E. and Mata, Jutta},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	keywords = {adult, article, clinical assessment, cognition, exercise, female, human, major clinical study, male, meat consumption, self concept},
}

Objective: Despite abundant information about negative consequences of consuming meat, consumption in many Western countries is many times higher than recommended. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that people consciously decide to ignore such information—a phenomenon called deliberate ignorance. We investigated this potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption. Methods: In three studies, a total of 1133 participants had the opportunity to see 18 information chunks on negative consequences of meat consumption or to ignore part of the information. Deliberate ignorance was measured as the number of ignored information chunks. We assessed potential predictors and outcomes of deliberate ignorance. Interventions to reduce deliberate ignorance (i.e., self-affirmation, contemplation, and self-efficacy) were experimentally tested. Results: The more information participants ignored, the less they changed their intention to reduce their meat consumption (r = −.124). This effect was partially explained by cognitive dissonance induced by the presented information. While neither self-affirmation nor contemplation exercises reduced deliberate ignorance, self-efficacy exercises did. Conclusion: Deliberate ignorance is a potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption and needs to be considered in future interventions and research. Self-efficacy exercises are a promising approach to reduce deliberate ignorance and should be further explored. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{soutjis_dedieu_2023,
	title = {Dedieu ({François}), {Pesticides}: le confort de l’ignorance, {Paris}, {Seuil}, 2022, 391 p.},
	volume = {142},
	issn = {02952319},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85180767785&doi=10.3917%2fpox.142.0159&partnerID=40&md5=805b4b203956e2d70bbb76d764eea69c},
	doi = {10.3917/pox.142.0159},
	language = {French},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Politix},
	author = {Soutjis, Bastien},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Armand Colin
Type: Article},
	pages = {159 -- 164},
}

@article{marchetti_when_2023,
	title = {When {Political} {Ignorance} is really harmful for {Democracy}: {Moral} {Intuitions} and {Biased} {Attitudes} in {Voting} {Behaviour}},
	volume = {49},
	issn = {01914537},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85132610661&doi=10.1177%2f01914537221093742&partnerID=40&md5=88ff1647c5b782204a478eeeecc62be1},
	doi = {10.1177/01914537221093742},
	abstract = {Ignorance about political related issues has long been considered a threat to democracy. This paper revolves around the concept of political ignorance, focusing especially on Ilya Somin’s book Democracy and Political Ignorance and going beyond his standpoint in two ways. First of all, it moves away from the notion of factual knowledge by showing that political ignorance cannot be limited to a matter of information quality. On the contrary, it shows that ignorance concerns the formation of opinions about political facts, which are the bricks with which disagreement is built. Then, using the insights of the Moral Foundation Theory by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, the paper argues that moral intuitions represent an additional source of bias that current research on the problem of voters’ ignorance should address. While Somin argues that biased moral values are the outcome of ignorance, Moral Foundation Theory suggests that moral intuitions are a robust determinant of people’s political views as they make factual knowledge partially irrelevant and also make people with different moral minds unable to understand the basis of reciprocal factual argumentations. © The Author(s) 2022.},
	language = {English},
	number = {9},
	journal = {Philosophy and Social Criticism},
	author = {Marchetti, Jacopo},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc.
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Somin, democratic disagreement, moral foundation theory, political ignorance},
	pages = {1046 -- 1060},
}

Ignorance about political related issues has long been considered a threat to democracy. This paper revolves around the concept of political ignorance, focusing especially on Ilya Somin’s book Democracy and Political Ignorance and going beyond his standpoint in two ways. First of all, it moves away from the notion of factual knowledge by showing that political ignorance cannot be limited to a matter of information quality. On the contrary, it shows that ignorance concerns the formation of opinions about political facts, which are the bricks with which disagreement is built. Then, using the insights of the Moral Foundation Theory by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, the paper argues that moral intuitions represent an additional source of bias that current research on the problem of voters’ ignorance should address. While Somin argues that biased moral values are the outcome of ignorance, Moral Foundation Theory suggests that moral intuitions are a robust determinant of people’s political views as they make factual knowledge partially irrelevant and also make people with different moral minds unable to understand the basis of reciprocal factual argumentations. © The Author(s) 2022.

@article{willard-kyle_valuable_2023,
	title = {Valuable ignorance: delayed epistemic gratification},
	volume = {180},
	issn = {00318116},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85143275990&doi=10.1007%2fs11098-022-01902-6&partnerID=40&md5=cd7f60c784e67ab9bcd79d38b67a5c1f},
	doi = {10.1007/s11098-022-01902-6},
	abstract = {A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that beliefless ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	author = {Willard-Kyle, Christopher},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Delayed gratification, Epistemic value, Ignorance, Inquiry},
	pages = {363 -- 384},
}

A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that beliefless ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{lister_contractualist_2023,
	title = {Contractualist alternatives to the veil of ignorance},
	volume = {31},
	issn = {09638016},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85149623047&doi=10.1111%2fjopp.12292&partnerID=40&md5=02206d9594ca40c3f1ac788531385155},
	doi = {10.1111/jopp.12292},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy},
	author = {Lister, Andrew},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
	pages = {177 -- 197},
}

@article{wilson_philosophical_2023,
	title = {Philosophical silences: race, gender, disability, and philosophical practice},
	volume = {57},
	issn = {03098249},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85178139396&doi=10.1093%2fjopedu%2fqhad076&partnerID=40&md5=877aa9a6c261c457bab43bf0f3ba9d46},
	doi = {10.1093/jopedu/qhad076},
	abstract = {Who is recognized as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy influence both the content of a philosophical education and academic philosophy's continuing demographic skew. The 'philosophical who' and the 'philosophical what' themselves are a partial function of matters that have been passed over in collective silence, even if that now feels to some like a silence belonging to the distant past. This paper discusses some philosophical silences regarding race, gender, and disability in the context of reflection on philosophical education and on philosophical practice in the public sphere. It focusses on Charles Mills' writings on race, Susan Babbitt's on race and gender, and on more collaboratively generated work on eugenics and disability. © 2023 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4-5},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Education},
	author = {Wilson, Robert A.},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Oxford University Press
Type: Article},
	pages = {1004 -- 1024},
}

Who is recognized as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy influence both the content of a philosophical education and academic philosophy's continuing demographic skew. The 'philosophical who' and the 'philosophical what' themselves are a partial function of matters that have been passed over in collective silence, even if that now feels to some like a silence belonging to the distant past. This paper discusses some philosophical silences regarding race, gender, and disability in the context of reflection on philosophical education and on philosophical practice in the public sphere. It focusses on Charles Mills' writings on race, Susan Babbitt's on race and gender, and on more collaboratively generated work on eugenics and disability. © 2023 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. All rights reserved.

@article{lara-steidel_epistemic_2023,
	title = {Epistemic injustice? {Banning} 'critical race theory', 'divisive topics', and 'embedded racism' in the classroom},
	volume = {57},
	issn = {03098249},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85182883564&doi=10.1093%2fjopedu%2fqhad069&partnerID=40&md5=0c21d582df5b673c09dd4ef66b5f7965},
	doi = {10.1093/jopedu/qhad069},
	abstract = {In more than half of its states, the USA has recently passed or proposed legislation to limit or ban public educational curricular reference to race, gender, sexuality, or other identity topics. The stated justifications for these legislative moves are myriad, but they share a foundational claim; namely, these topics are asserted to be politically and socially divisive such that they ought not to be included within state-controlled schools. In this paper, we consider the claims of divisiveness regarding these topics and explore whether, even if taken in good faith, the popular versions of these arguments and actions are epistemically defensible. We conclude that these bans are an epistemic injustice and therefore argue for their end. The article proceeds to consider the foundational claims of epistemic injustice, followed by the invocation of epistemic standards by which the arguments for these bans can be evaluated. The article then transitions to a close application of these standards, weighing the possible epistemic gains and losses. Before concluding, we consider objections and explore the social and epistemic significance of these issues. © The Author(s) 2023.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4-5},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Education},
	author = {Lara-Steidel, Henry and Thompson, Winston C.},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Oxford University Press
Type: Article},
	pages = {862 -- 879},
}

In more than half of its states, the USA has recently passed or proposed legislation to limit or ban public educational curricular reference to race, gender, sexuality, or other identity topics. The stated justifications for these legislative moves are myriad, but they share a foundational claim; namely, these topics are asserted to be politically and socially divisive such that they ought not to be included within state-controlled schools. In this paper, we consider the claims of divisiveness regarding these topics and explore whether, even if taken in good faith, the popular versions of these arguments and actions are epistemically defensible. We conclude that these bans are an epistemic injustice and therefore argue for their end. The article proceeds to consider the foundational claims of epistemic injustice, followed by the invocation of epistemic standards by which the arguments for these bans can be evaluated. The article then transitions to a close application of these standards, weighing the possible epistemic gains and losses. Before concluding, we consider objections and explore the social and epistemic significance of these issues. © The Author(s) 2023.

@article{nygren_free_2023,
	title = {Free {Choice} in {Modal} {Inquisitive} {Logic}},
	volume = {52},
	issn = {00223611},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85136966948&doi=10.1007%2fs10992-022-09674-4&partnerID=40&md5=54b9ae9f227757bbec78fd730ac28eda},
	doi = {10.1007/s10992-022-09674-4},
	abstract = {This paper investigates inquisitive extensions of normal modal logic with an existential modal operator taken as primitive. The semantics of the existential modality is generalized to apply to questions, as well as statements. When the generalized existential modality is applied to a question, the result is a statement that roughly expresses that each way of resolving the question is consistent with the available information. I study the resulting logic both from a semantic and from a proof-theoretic point of view. I argue that it can be used for reasoning about a general notion of ignorance, and for reasoning about choice-offering permissions and obligations. The main technical results are sound and complete axiomatizations, both for the class of all Kripke frames, and for any class of frames corresponding to a canonical normal modal logic. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
	author = {Nygren, Karl},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
	pages = {347 -- 391},
}

This paper investigates inquisitive extensions of normal modal logic with an existential modal operator taken as primitive. The semantics of the existential modality is generalized to apply to questions, as well as statements. When the generalized existential modality is applied to a question, the result is a statement that roughly expresses that each way of resolving the question is consistent with the available information. I study the resulting logic both from a semantic and from a proof-theoretic point of view. I argue that it can be used for reasoning about a general notion of ignorance, and for reasoning about choice-offering permissions and obligations. The main technical results are sound and complete axiomatizations, both for the class of all Kripke frames, and for any class of frames corresponding to a canonical normal modal logic. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{wieland_indifference_2023,
	title = {Indifference as excuse},
	issn = {0020174X},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85163103484&doi=10.1080%2f0020174X.2023.2222775&partnerID=40&md5=7ecd34b626692bd08d5dbfdb81ff335a},
	doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222775},
	abstract = {According to an influential view, ‘the amount of blame people deserve varies with the extent of their indifference’. That is, the more wrongdoers act from a lack of moral concern, the more they would be blameworthy. This paper argues for the exact opposite claim: the more wrongdoers act from indifference, the less they are blameworthy–that is, in a properly interpersonal way. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Inquiry (United Kingdom)},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Vanderveen, Jojanneke},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
}

According to an influential view, ‘the amount of blame people deserve varies with the extent of their indifference’. That is, the more wrongdoers act from a lack of moral concern, the more they would be blameworthy. This paper argues for the exact opposite claim: the more wrongdoers act from indifference, the less they are blameworthy–that is, in a properly interpersonal way. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{rudy-hiller_moral_2023,
	title = {Moral ignorance and the social nature of responsible agency},
	volume = {66},
	issn = {0020174X},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85073921834&doi=10.1080%2f0020174X.2019.1667871&partnerID=40&md5=352ae1dc035776d20e711f491fdb0af9},
	doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2019.1667871},
	abstract = {In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my account to bear on the debate about the exculpatory potential of moral ignorance. I show that a prominent position in this debate–the position that denies that moral ignorance exculpates–is grounded on an individualistic and acontextualist conception of moral capacities, moral cognition, and blameworthiness, and that this conception leads those philosophers who endorse it to make a number of questionable claims regarding the ability of ordinary agents to overcome their moral ignorance and the culpability they bear for the latter. I conclude by indicating how my socially situated account addresses the issue of moral ignorance. © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {5},
	journal = {Inquiry (United Kingdom)},
	author = {Rudy-Hiller, Fernando},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	pages = {821 -- 848},
}

In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my account to bear on the debate about the exculpatory potential of moral ignorance. I show that a prominent position in this debate–the position that denies that moral ignorance exculpates–is grounded on an individualistic and acontextualist conception of moral capacities, moral cognition, and blameworthiness, and that this conception leads those philosophers who endorse it to make a number of questionable claims regarding the ability of ordinary agents to overcome their moral ignorance and the culpability they bear for the latter. I conclude by indicating how my socially situated account addresses the issue of moral ignorance. © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{cvijanovic_rawls_2023,
	title = {Rawls {Behind} the {Veil} of {Ignorance} {The} {Gap} of {Inequality} and the {Illusions} of {Justice}; [{Rawls} iza vela neznanja {Jaz} nejednakosti i iluzije pravednosti]},
	volume = {43},
	issn = {03514706},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85189019102&doi=10.21464%2ffi43303&partnerID=40&md5=0621a7039c58f37766c885036064f4e2},
	doi = {10.21464/fi43303},
	abstract = {The author examines the “veil of ignorance” thought experiment and the principles of justice of John Rawls via two main directions of criticism. First, although Rawls constructs a veil of ignorance with Kantian categories, the author derives Rawls’s motivation from the link between justice and the tradition of curbing pleonexic human nature, arguing that in this context Rawls’s Kantian rhetoric is actually driven by the Hobbesian fear of instability arising from the pro-blem of cooperation in the social contract tradition. Second, the veil of ignorance is a cunning instrument of the privileged to preserve their previously acquired advantages, control stability, and cover up socio-political injustices. At the same time, the principle of difference that derives from it does not reduce the gap of inequality – economic and historical – but legitimizes and establishes it. In fact, Rawls’s bourgeois liberalism and its theoretical constructs serve to hedge the well-off by securing and increasing what they already have. © 2023, Croatian Philosophical Society. All rights reserved.},
	language = {Croatian},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Filozofska Istrazivanja},
	author = {Cvijanović, Hrvoje},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Croatian Philosophical Society
Type: Article},
	pages = {481 -- 493},
}

The author examines the “veil of ignorance” thought experiment and the principles of justice of John Rawls via two main directions of criticism. First, although Rawls constructs a veil of ignorance with Kantian categories, the author derives Rawls’s motivation from the link between justice and the tradition of curbing pleonexic human nature, arguing that in this context Rawls’s Kantian rhetoric is actually driven by the Hobbesian fear of instability arising from the pro-blem of cooperation in the social contract tradition. Second, the veil of ignorance is a cunning instrument of the privileged to preserve their previously acquired advantages, control stability, and cover up socio-political injustices. At the same time, the principle of difference that derives from it does not reduce the gap of inequality – economic and historical – but legitimizes and establishes it. In fact, Rawls’s bourgeois liberalism and its theoretical constructs serve to hedge the well-off by securing and increasing what they already have. © 2023, Croatian Philosophical Society. All rights reserved.

@article{kostina_ignorance_2023,
	title = {Ignorance in the epistemic practices the standpoints of virtue epistemology and feminist philosophy and methodology of science},
	volume = {7},
	issn = {25878719},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85163985068&doi=10.17323%2f2587-8719-2023-2-43-59&partnerID=40&md5=1744be6c08791f3f64fdeccd9811e34f},
	doi = {10.17323/2587-8719-2023-2-43-59},
	abstract = {The issue of ignorance from the standpoint of virtue epistemology and feminist science methodology is the focus of the following article. Both research traditions, estab-lished as reactions to the crisis of the positivist approach, create new normative criteria for credibility and objectivity of knowledge. Analyzing the contents and practices of ignorance becomes essential to the process. Both traditions are set to scrutinize ignorance’s nature and functioning mechanisms in a broad social context in general and science in particular. In virtue epistemology, ignorance could give credence to unbiased epistemic activity, serving as a virtue in this case. At the same time, ignorance, imposed on personal traits of the epistemic agent, expressed as modesty and caution, potentially turns a virtue into an intellectual vice. Ignorance, expressed by an epistemic agent, could share similarities in scientific and political practices. Following this assumption, the rational, irrational, and inadvertent versions of ig-norance, suggested by J. Freidman, are described and analyzed in the given article. There is an independent project of the epistemology of ignorance, which has been developed in the course of feminist philosophy and methodology of science. The latter criticized the notion of the universal scientific method, which has had a dominant position in science for centuries. It is seen as a mediator of epistemic injustice directly related to the production and reproduction of ignorance. Here ignorance acts as an instrument that shapes scientific and political reality, intervening with each other and embodied in the institute of expertise. The expressed alternative is the standpoint theory (S. Harding) with its more just and efficient methodol-ogy. Revision of the existing methodological basis allows a non-conventional look at the issue of normativity, reliability of knowledge, and trust (trustworthiness) of epistemic agents in epistemic activities, along with the creation of a viable project of collective epistemology. © 2023, National Research University, Higher School of Econoimics. All rights reserved.},
	language = {Russian},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Filosofiya. Zhurnal Vysshey Shkoly Ekonomiki},
	author = {Kostina, Alina},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: National Research University, Higher School of Econoimics
Type: Article},
	pages = {43 -- 59},
}

The issue of ignorance from the standpoint of virtue epistemology and feminist science methodology is the focus of the following article. Both research traditions, estab-lished as reactions to the crisis of the positivist approach, create new normative criteria for credibility and objectivity of knowledge. Analyzing the contents and practices of ignorance becomes essential to the process. Both traditions are set to scrutinize ignorance’s nature and functioning mechanisms in a broad social context in general and science in particular. In virtue epistemology, ignorance could give credence to unbiased epistemic activity, serving as a virtue in this case. At the same time, ignorance, imposed on personal traits of the epistemic agent, expressed as modesty and caution, potentially turns a virtue into an intellectual vice. Ignorance, expressed by an epistemic agent, could share similarities in scientific and political practices. Following this assumption, the rational, irrational, and inadvertent versions of ig-norance, suggested by J. Freidman, are described and analyzed in the given article. There is an independent project of the epistemology of ignorance, which has been developed in the course of feminist philosophy and methodology of science. The latter criticized the notion of the universal scientific method, which has had a dominant position in science for centuries. It is seen as a mediator of epistemic injustice directly related to the production and reproduction of ignorance. Here ignorance acts as an instrument that shapes scientific and political reality, intervening with each other and embodied in the institute of expertise. The expressed alternative is the standpoint theory (S. Harding) with its more just and efficient methodol-ogy. Revision of the existing methodological basis allows a non-conventional look at the issue of normativity, reliability of knowledge, and trust (trustworthiness) of epistemic agents in epistemic activities, along with the creation of a viable project of collective epistemology. © 2023, National Research University, Higher School of Econoimics. All rights reserved.

@article{varwig_functions_2023,
	title = {Functions of uncertainty thematizations in journalistic media; [{Funktionen} von {Unsicherheitsthematisierungen} in journalistischen {Medien}]},
	volume = {45},
	issn = {10173285},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85159814722&doi=10.24989%2ffs.v45i1-2.2237&partnerID=40&md5=562dfd2c65910a7ba45f33dfc46c45ee},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2237},
	abstract = {Cornelia Varwig Abstract Theoretical and methodological approaches of discourse analysis in the wake of Foucault focus on how knowledge is constituted in discourses. They are therefore well suited for investigating the epistemic status of knowledge, and thus also uncertain knowledge and igno-rance. However, discourse research does not offer specialized analytical approaches to media discourses with their specific boundary conditions and inherent logics, while at the same time in practice many analyses deal with media products. Some writers even bemoan a “media oblivion” in discourse theory. This article aims to demonstrate how theoretical approaches in communication studies can help to specify the role of journalists as discourse producers and participants, as well as journalistic production principles. In the empirical part of the article, the scientifically ambiguous knowledge about burnout is used as an example to show ten discursive-communi-cative functions that the thematization of epistemic uncertainty can have in journalistic articles. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.},
	language = {German},
	number = {1-2},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Varwig, Cornelia},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Accès payant},
	pages = {48 -- 65},
}

Cornelia Varwig Abstract Theoretical and methodological approaches of discourse analysis in the wake of Foucault focus on how knowledge is constituted in discourses. They are therefore well suited for investigating the epistemic status of knowledge, and thus also uncertain knowledge and igno-rance. However, discourse research does not offer specialized analytical approaches to media discourses with their specific boundary conditions and inherent logics, while at the same time in practice many analyses deal with media products. Some writers even bemoan a “media oblivion” in discourse theory. This article aims to demonstrate how theoretical approaches in communication studies can help to specify the role of journalists as discourse producers and participants, as well as journalistic production principles. In the empirical part of the article, the scientifically ambiguous knowledge about burnout is used as an example to show ten discursive-communi-cative functions that the thematization of epistemic uncertainty can have in journalistic articles. © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.

@article{lee_accountable_2023,
	title = {Un(ac)countable no-bodies: the politics of ignorance in global health policymaking},
	volume = {33},
	issn = {09581596},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85122520444&doi=10.1080%2f09581596.2022.2025578&partnerID=40&md5=736f84de1c6ab8afb457c357fa245a1e},
	doi = {10.1080/09581596.2022.2025578},
	abstract = {By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories–non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities–are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Public Health},
	author = {Lee, Po-Han},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Evidence-based public health, Source MG - Validé MG, World Health Organisation, World Health Organization, article, drawing, female, human, human experiment, male, medical research, politics, public health, sexual and gender minorities, sexual and gender minority, sociology, sociology of ignorance, sociology of nothing},
	pages = {48 -- 59},
}

By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories–non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities–are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{jahaj_advise_2023,
	title = {Advise and forecast. {Uncertain} knowledge in institutional vs. mass media political advice. [{Beraten} und {Prognostizieren}. {Unsicheres} {Wissen} in der institutionellen vs. der massenmedialen {Politikberatung}]},
	volume = {45},
	issn = {10173285},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85159814979&doi=10.24989%2ffs.v45i1-2.2230&partnerID=40&md5=4f8b75d856a44160282cb144f61f4992},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2230},
	abstract = {Scientific policy advice provides a special framework for processing scientific uncertain-ties. Socio-political decisions often require a reliable scientific basis that can be used as orienta-tion and legitimation for political decisions. On the one hand, policy advice takes place institu-tionalized (e. g. by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag [TAB] and the National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina), but also in public media discourse, when scientists give interviews or inform about scientific topics in talk shows. The need for advice concerns future actions and is thus closely linked to uncertain knowledge and the providing of forecasts, i. e. a look into the future. In this article, we focus on the practices of consulting and forecasting in the context of policy advice and capture them in their differentiations as well as show what role uncertain knowledge plays in their argumentation. In addition, we analyze to what extent the for-mulation of prognoses and advice is influenced by the genre and media context of the statement (expert opinion vs. interview / talk show, i. e. also: written and oral contexts). © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.},
	language = {German},
	number = {1-2},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Jahaj, Dorothee and Rhein, Lisa},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG
Type: Article},
	pages = {66 -- 84},
}

Scientific policy advice provides a special framework for processing scientific uncertain-ties. Socio-political decisions often require a reliable scientific basis that can be used as orienta-tion and legitimation for political decisions. On the one hand, policy advice takes place institu-tionalized (e. g. by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag [TAB] and the National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina), but also in public media discourse, when scientists give interviews or inform about scientific topics in talk shows. The need for advice concerns future actions and is thus closely linked to uncertain knowledge and the providing of forecasts, i. e. a look into the future. In this article, we focus on the practices of consulting and forecasting in the context of policy advice and capture them in their differentiations as well as show what role uncertain knowledge plays in their argumentation. In addition, we analyze to what extent the for-mulation of prognoses and advice is influenced by the genre and media context of the statement (expert opinion vs. interview / talk show, i. e. also: written and oral contexts). © 2023, Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. All rights reserved.

@article{yong_risk_2023,
	title = {Risk, {Rationality} and ({Information}) {Resistance}: {De}-rationalizing {Elite}-{Group} {Ignorance}},
	issn = {01650106},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85146713149&doi=10.1007%2fs10670-022-00656-1&partnerID=40&md5=4fe4206b90bec9f9ad474f625ec527d3},
	doi = {10.1007/s10670-022-00656-1},
	abstract = {There has been a movement aiming to teach agents about their privilege by making the information about their privilege as costless as possible. However, some argue that in risk-sensitive frameworks, such as Lara Buchak’s (2013), it can be rational for privileged agents to shield themselves from learning about their privilege, even if the information is costless and relevant. This threatens the efficacy of these information-access efforts in alleviating the problem of elite-group ignorance. In response, I show that even within the same framework, in this case David Kinney and Liam Kofi Bright’s (2021), the rationality of this information avoidance rests on shaky ground in practice. In this framework, whether an agent should avoid information depends on the precise details of (1) how relevant they expect the information to be, (2) their priors about the value of various options, and (3) their risk attitudes. The model sugests that rationality of elite-group ignorance is a function of structural factors that are pervasive but nonetheless not insurmountable, thus offering a way out of pessimism about elite group education. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Erkenntnis},
	author = {Yong, Xin Hui},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
}

There has been a movement aiming to teach agents about their privilege by making the information about their privilege as costless as possible. However, some argue that in risk-sensitive frameworks, such as Lara Buchak’s (2013), it can be rational for privileged agents to shield themselves from learning about their privilege, even if the information is costless and relevant. This threatens the efficacy of these information-access efforts in alleviating the problem of elite-group ignorance. In response, I show that even within the same framework, in this case David Kinney and Liam Kofi Bright’s (2021), the rationality of this information avoidance rests on shaky ground in practice. In this framework, whether an agent should avoid information depends on the precise details of (1) how relevant they expect the information to be, (2) their priors about the value of various options, and (3) their risk attitudes. The model sugests that rationality of elite-group ignorance is a function of structural factors that are pervasive but nonetheless not insurmountable, thus offering a way out of pessimism about elite group education. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.

@article{dorozhkin_ignorance_2023,
	title = {Ignorance as an epistemological problem; [незнание как эпистемологическая проблема]},
	volume = {60},
	issn = {1811833X},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85184063423&doi=10.5840%2f202360343&partnerID=40&md5=64485a1a8dd4be6dbabdd8a1b806bfd4},
	doi = {10.5840/202360343},
	abstract = {The article explores the controversial concept of “epistemology of ignorance”, defined as an oxymoron. The use of this term in philosophical literature is primarily associated with research on the distribution of information in group-to-group interaction (L. Alkoff, E. Malewski, N. Jaramillo, C. Mills). Nevertheless, authors of this article suppose that such interpretation narrows the epistemological content of the problem of ignorance. One of the goals of this work is an attempt to give a conceptual load to the mentioned phrase. To do this we consider, first of all, the question of the meaning of the concept of ignorance, and then the rationale for the possibility of a harmonious combination of the concepts of “ignorance” and “epistemology”. The article reviews four theses that show the close relationship between ignorance and knowledge, which is in our opinion the primary justification of the epistemological nature of a problem. The first thesis is widely known in the history of philosophy and science and states that ignorance can be a condition of knowledge. The second thesis protects feedback: ignorance is realized through knowledge. The third and fourth theses address states that combine the properties of knowledge and ignorance: the first may have signs of the second, and the second may have signs of the first. This indicates the need to give the well-known concept of “epistemology” some additional aspects necessary for such a relationship; after all, it must be recognized that such a form as an oxymoron is not often found in epistemological studies. Based on this, a conclusion is made about what images epistemological analysis can be carried out. The authors see here two possible research tasks, namely, the analysis of the non – production of knowledge and the analysis of the production of ignorance. © 2023 RAS Institute of Philosophy. All rights reserved.},
	language = {Russian},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Epistemology and Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Dorozhkin, Alexander M. and Golubinskaya, Anastasia V.},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Type: Article},
	keywords = {epistemology of ignorance, ignorance, knowledge-intensive ignorance, non-production of knowledge, production of ignorance, uncertainty},
	pages = {77 -- 90},
}

The article explores the controversial concept of “epistemology of ignorance”, defined as an oxymoron. The use of this term in philosophical literature is primarily associated with research on the distribution of information in group-to-group interaction (L. Alkoff, E. Malewski, N. Jaramillo, C. Mills). Nevertheless, authors of this article suppose that such interpretation narrows the epistemological content of the problem of ignorance. One of the goals of this work is an attempt to give a conceptual load to the mentioned phrase. To do this we consider, first of all, the question of the meaning of the concept of ignorance, and then the rationale for the possibility of a harmonious combination of the concepts of “ignorance” and “epistemology”. The article reviews four theses that show the close relationship between ignorance and knowledge, which is in our opinion the primary justification of the epistemological nature of a problem. The first thesis is widely known in the history of philosophy and science and states that ignorance can be a condition of knowledge. The second thesis protects feedback: ignorance is realized through knowledge. The third and fourth theses address states that combine the properties of knowledge and ignorance: the first may have signs of the second, and the second may have signs of the first. This indicates the need to give the well-known concept of “epistemology” some additional aspects necessary for such a relationship; after all, it must be recognized that such a form as an oxymoron is not often found in epistemological studies. Based on this, a conclusion is made about what images epistemological analysis can be carried out. The authors see here two possible research tasks, namely, the analysis of the non – production of knowledge and the analysis of the production of ignorance. © 2023 RAS Institute of Philosophy. All rights reserved.

@article{kogelmann_finding_2023,
	title = {Finding the {Epistocrats}},
	volume = {20},
	issn = {17423600},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85153347932&doi=10.1017%2fepi.2022.18&partnerID=40&md5=fbf3f200703ea26c3f3ce52f5a514146},
	doi = {10.1017/epi.2022.18},
	abstract = {Concerned about widespread incompetence among voters in democratic societies, epistocrats propose quasi-democratic electoral systems that amplify the voices of competent voters while silencing (or perhaps just subduing) the voices of those deemed incompetent. In order to amplify the voices of the competent we first need to know what counts as political competence, and then we need a way of identifying those who possess the relevant characteristics. After developing an account of what it means to be politically competent, I argue that there is no way for the epistocrat to identify such persons. Therefore, epistocracy cannot be implemented. Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Episteme},
	author = {Kogelmann, Brian},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Type: Article},
	pages = {497 -- 512},
}

Concerned about widespread incompetence among voters in democratic societies, epistocrats propose quasi-democratic electoral systems that amplify the voices of competent voters while silencing (or perhaps just subduing) the voices of those deemed incompetent. In order to amplify the voices of the competent we first need to know what counts as political competence, and then we need a way of identifying those who possess the relevant characteristics. After developing an account of what it means to be politically competent, I argue that there is no way for the epistocrat to identify such persons. Therefore, epistocracy cannot be implemented. Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.

@article{tu_invisible_2023,
	title = {“{Invisible}” {Pollution}? {Knowledge} {Gridlock} in {Regulatory} {Science} on {Electronics} {Toxics}},
	volume = {17},
	issn = {18752160},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85119661361&doi=10.1080%2f18752160.2021.1924950&partnerID=40&md5=b6192347eb2c62e248a58c381ea6cb14},
	doi = {10.1080/18752160.2021.1924950},
	abstract = {“High-tech” provides a cachet of futuristic wonders to localities claiming cutting-edge technological research and industrial innovation. But the high-tech electronic manufacturing processes release hundreds of chemicals and are no doubt ridden with extremely high but hidden environmental health risks. This article aims to increase our understanding of “ignorance” about electronics hazards in the Asian context. It argues that the electronics industries have been under constant innovation, and novel uses of chemicals are introduced to the industrial operation at a much faster pace than the health and environmental assessment can work to comprehend the impacts of the chemicals. In such a context, regulatory science has often failed to effectively monitor and control toxic waste discharges in the high-tech electronics sector. Taking several high-tech pollution disputes in Taiwan as examples, and based on interviews with experts in pollution regulation, this paper discusses multiple constraints on scientific advance in studying toxics that are exacerbated by lagging regulations. These are further entangled with research resource limitations, privileging of high-tech industries in suppressing negative information about toxicity risks, and knowledge repression within the scientific community due to dependence on government and industry, all of which has crippled building knowledge for effective regulatory science–resulting in knowledge gridlock. © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {East Asian Science, Technology and Society},
	author = {Tu, Wen-Ling},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
	pages = {435 -- 461},
}

“High-tech” provides a cachet of futuristic wonders to localities claiming cutting-edge technological research and industrial innovation. But the high-tech electronic manufacturing processes release hundreds of chemicals and are no doubt ridden with extremely high but hidden environmental health risks. This article aims to increase our understanding of “ignorance” about electronics hazards in the Asian context. It argues that the electronics industries have been under constant innovation, and novel uses of chemicals are introduced to the industrial operation at a much faster pace than the health and environmental assessment can work to comprehend the impacts of the chemicals. In such a context, regulatory science has often failed to effectively monitor and control toxic waste discharges in the high-tech electronics sector. Taking several high-tech pollution disputes in Taiwan as examples, and based on interviews with experts in pollution regulation, this paper discusses multiple constraints on scientific advance in studying toxics that are exacerbated by lagging regulations. These are further entangled with research resource limitations, privileging of high-tech industries in suppressing negative information about toxicity risks, and knowledge repression within the scientific community due to dependence on government and industry, all of which has crippled building knowledge for effective regulatory science–resulting in knowledge gridlock. © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{hoffmann_petty_2023,
	title = {Petty bribery, pluralistic ignorance, and the collective action problem},
	volume = {5},
	issn = {26323249},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85165322985&doi=10.1017%2fdap.2023.19&partnerID=40&md5=b8be9b6055c84e7ffb43b0fa3a4c66ba},
	doi = {10.1017/dap.2023.19},
	abstract = {Bribery for access to public goods and services remains a widespread and seemingly innocuous practice which disproportionately targets the poor and helps keep them poor. Furthermore, its aggregate effects erode the legitimacy of government institutions and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law. Drawing on original evidence using social norms methodology, this research tests underlying beliefs and expectations which sustain persistent forms of bribery and draws attention to the presence of pluralistic ignorance and consequent collective action problems. With examples focused on bribery in traffic law enforcement, healthcare, and education - three critical areas where bribery is often identified as an entrenched practice - this article contributes new evidence of: (a) the presence of pluralistic ignorance, a common social comparison error, surrounding bribery behavior; (b) differing social evaluations of bribe-solicitation; and finally, (c) how this context might exacerbate collective action problems. This empirical case study of Nigeria shows that even though more people are likely to be directly affected by bribery during routine interactions with public officials and institutions and many believe this practice is wrong, most people incorrectly believe that others in their community tolerate or even accept bribery behavior. © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Data and Policy},
	author = {Hoffmann, Leena K. and Patel, Raj N.},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Type: Article},
}

Bribery for access to public goods and services remains a widespread and seemingly innocuous practice which disproportionately targets the poor and helps keep them poor. Furthermore, its aggregate effects erode the legitimacy of government institutions and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law. Drawing on original evidence using social norms methodology, this research tests underlying beliefs and expectations which sustain persistent forms of bribery and draws attention to the presence of pluralistic ignorance and consequent collective action problems. With examples focused on bribery in traffic law enforcement, healthcare, and education - three critical areas where bribery is often identified as an entrenched practice - this article contributes new evidence of: (a) the presence of pluralistic ignorance, a common social comparison error, surrounding bribery behavior; (b) differing social evaluations of bribe-solicitation; and finally, (c) how this context might exacerbate collective action problems. This empirical case study of Nigeria shows that even though more people are likely to be directly affected by bribery during routine interactions with public officials and institutions and many believe this practice is wrong, most people incorrectly believe that others in their community tolerate or even accept bribery behavior. © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press.

@article{gauckler_expert_2023,
	title = {Expert identification for ethics expertise informed by feminist epistemology—{Using} awareness of biases and situated ignorance as an indicator of trustworthiness},
	volume = {37},
	issn = {02699702},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85135224064&doi=10.1111%2fbioe.13082&partnerID=40&md5=591b269b0abf47090c33d262595ff72a},
	doi = {10.1111/bioe.13082},
	abstract = {The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. © 2022 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
	language = {English},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Bioethics},
	author = {Gauckler, Charlotte},
	year = {2023},
	pmid = {35920062},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Bias, Feminism, Humans, Knowledge, Morals, Philosophy, article, awareness, education, epistemology, ethics, feminism, human, human experiment, implicit bias, knowledge, layperson, morality, philosophy, statistical bias, witness},
	pages = {523 -- 532},
}

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. © 2022 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

@article{haider_google_2023,
	title = {Google {Search} and the creation of ignorance: {The} case of the climate crisis},
	volume = {10},
	issn = {20539517},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85150046024&doi=10.1177%2f20539517231158997&partnerID=40&md5=e63cd57a9ac62725c7a695c8915341cf},
	doi = {10.1177/20539517231158997},
	abstract = {The article examines the relationship between commercial search engines, using Google Search as an example, and various forms of ignorance related to climate change. It draws on concepts from the field of agnotology to explore how environmental ignorances, and specifically related to the climate crisis, are shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics. Ignorance refers to a multi-facetted understanding of the culturally contingent ways in which something may not be known. Two research questions are addressed: How are environmental ignorances, and in particular related to the climate crisis, shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics? In what ways can we conceptualise Google's role as configured into the creation of ignorances? The argument is made through four vignettes, each of which explores and illustrates how Google Search is configured into a different kind of socially produced ignorance: (1) Ignorance through information avoidance: climate anxiety; (2) Ignorance through selective choice: gaming search terms; (3) Ignorance by design: algorithmically embodied emissions; (4) Ignorance through query suggestions: directing people to data voids. The article shows that while Google Search and its underlying algorithmic and commercial logic pre-figure these ignorances, they are also co-created and co-maintained by content producers, users and other human and non-human actors, as Google Search has become integral of social practices and ideas about them. The conclusion draws attention to a new logic of ignorance that is emerging in conjunction with a new knowledge logic. © The Author(s) 2023.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Big Data and Society},
	author = {Haider, Jutta and Rödl, Malte},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Agnotology, Civil society, Climate change, Computer circuits, Embodied emissions, Environmental communication, Google+, Ignorance, Information avoidance, Relevance, Research questions, Search engines, Search terms},
}

The article examines the relationship between commercial search engines, using Google Search as an example, and various forms of ignorance related to climate change. It draws on concepts from the field of agnotology to explore how environmental ignorances, and specifically related to the climate crisis, are shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics. Ignorance refers to a multi-facetted understanding of the culturally contingent ways in which something may not be known. Two research questions are addressed: How are environmental ignorances, and in particular related to the climate crisis, shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics? In what ways can we conceptualise Google's role as configured into the creation of ignorances? The argument is made through four vignettes, each of which explores and illustrates how Google Search is configured into a different kind of socially produced ignorance: (1) Ignorance through information avoidance: climate anxiety; (2) Ignorance through selective choice: gaming search terms; (3) Ignorance by design: algorithmically embodied emissions; (4) Ignorance through query suggestions: directing people to data voids. The article shows that while Google Search and its underlying algorithmic and commercial logic pre-figure these ignorances, they are also co-created and co-maintained by content producers, users and other human and non-human actors, as Google Search has become integral of social practices and ideas about them. The conclusion draws attention to a new logic of ignorance that is emerging in conjunction with a new knowledge logic. © The Author(s) 2023.

@article{fjellheim_wind_2023,
	title = {Wind {Energy} on {Trial} in {Saepmie}: {Epistemic} {Controversies} and {Strategic} {Ignorance} in {Norway}’s {Green} {Energy} {Transition}},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {23874562},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85163834815&doi=10.23865%2farctic.v14.5586&partnerID=40&md5=91d4628788601482ecef925ce7e2f077},
	doi = {10.23865/arctic.v14.5586},
	abstract = {Climate change policies and the green energy transition have renewed colonial structures and injustices for Indigenous peoples in land-use conflicts, but not without resistance. This article explores epistemic controversies in a legal struggle concerning impacts from wind energy infrastructure on Southern Saami reindeer herding and culture in Norway. The article draws on courtroom ethnography and diverse written material concerning a court case between the wind energy company Fosen Vind DA and the Southern Saami reindeer herders in Fovsen Njaarke Sïjte. The findings show that the parties’ competing claims to truth rely on different knowledge systems and worldviews concerning what Southern Saami reindeer herding is an ought to be. However, beyond onto-epistemological struggles between the “Indigenous” and the “Western”, Fosen Vind DA and the Norwegian state strategically ignored all knowledges that threatened capitalist and green colonial interests. The Fosen case illustrates how Indigenous peoples can contest dominant knowledge regimes and colonial presumptions about their livelihoods, culture, and rights through the legal system. However, the Norwegian state’s reluctancy to respect the outcome of the Supreme Court verdict reveals that asymmetric power relations continue to pave the way for colonial dispossession of Saami landscapes, epistemes, and human rights in the green energy transition. © 2023 Eva Maria Fjellheim.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Arctic Review on Law and Politics},
	author = {Fjellheim, Eva Maria},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Cappelen Damm Akademisk
Type: Article},
	pages = {140 -- 168},
}

Climate change policies and the green energy transition have renewed colonial structures and injustices for Indigenous peoples in land-use conflicts, but not without resistance. This article explores epistemic controversies in a legal struggle concerning impacts from wind energy infrastructure on Southern Saami reindeer herding and culture in Norway. The article draws on courtroom ethnography and diverse written material concerning a court case between the wind energy company Fosen Vind DA and the Southern Saami reindeer herders in Fovsen Njaarke Sïjte. The findings show that the parties’ competing claims to truth rely on different knowledge systems and worldviews concerning what Southern Saami reindeer herding is an ought to be. However, beyond onto-epistemological struggles between the “Indigenous” and the “Western”, Fosen Vind DA and the Norwegian state strategically ignored all knowledges that threatened capitalist and green colonial interests. The Fosen case illustrates how Indigenous peoples can contest dominant knowledge regimes and colonial presumptions about their livelihoods, culture, and rights through the legal system. However, the Norwegian state’s reluctancy to respect the outcome of the Supreme Court verdict reveals that asymmetric power relations continue to pave the way for colonial dispossession of Saami landscapes, epistemes, and human rights in the green energy transition. © 2023 Eva Maria Fjellheim.

@article{bartl_governance_2023,
	title = {Governance between ignorance and evidence: {Technology} assessment in the context of pandemic crisis management; [{Governance} zwischen {Nichtwissen} und {Evidenz}: {Technikfolgen}-abschätzung im {Kontext} des {Pandemie}-{Krisenmanagements}]},
	volume = {32},
	issn = {2568020X},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85164430100&doi=10.14512%2ftatup.32.2.30&partnerID=40&md5=48ba9bded389dd01f2341a6cbdaf704e},
	doi = {10.14512/tatup.32.2.30},
	abstract = {This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Zeitschrift fur Technikfolgenabschatzung in Theorie und Praxis / Journal for Technology Assessment in Theory and Practice},
	author = {Bartl, Gabriel},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Oekom Verlag
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Billet, co-production of knowledge, ignorance, pandemic simulation models, technologies of preparedness},
	pages = {30 -- 35},
}

This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.

@article{bodini_democracy_2023,
	title = {From {Democracy} to {Epistocracy} and {Back} {Again}. {Meaning} and {Normative} {Paths} of a {Rising} {Concept}; [{Dalla} democrazia all’epistocrazia e ritorno {Significato} e itinerari normativi di un concetto emergente]},
	volume = {2023},
	issn = {17202396},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85162109820&doi=10.1415%2f107274&partnerID=40&md5=e8b31a5edd0af42e27338fc0d3b0341c},
	doi = {10.1415/107274},
	abstract = {The article deals with epistocratic theorists and their reflection over people’s political ignorance. In their view, the cognitive weakness of citizens betrays the reluctance to act as political decision-makers and the consequent necessity to limit people’s power in favor of more committed epistemic agents. Goal of the paper is to explain conceptual premises of epistocracy, uncover its fallacy, but safe the intuition that epistème represents a pivotal element for democratic theory. Epistocratic criticism spotlights the role of «enlightened» demos as normative assumption of democracy. On this basis, the analysis argues that protection and diffusion of factual knowledge should be institutionalized as democracy already institutionalizes citizens’ ability to understand reality and decide accordingly. © 2023, Ragion Pratica. All Rights Reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ragion Pratica},
	author = {Bodini, Paolo},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Societa Editrice Il Mulino
Type: Article},
	pages = {291 -- 315},
}

The article deals with epistocratic theorists and their reflection over people’s political ignorance. In their view, the cognitive weakness of citizens betrays the reluctance to act as political decision-makers and the consequent necessity to limit people’s power in favor of more committed epistemic agents. Goal of the paper is to explain conceptual premises of epistocracy, uncover its fallacy, but safe the intuition that epistème represents a pivotal element for democratic theory. Epistocratic criticism spotlights the role of «enlightened» demos as normative assumption of democracy. On this basis, the analysis argues that protection and diffusion of factual knowledge should be institutionalized as democracy already institutionalizes citizens’ ability to understand reality and decide accordingly. © 2023, Ragion Pratica. All Rights Reserved.

@article{denicola_rik_2023,
	title = {Rik {Peels}' {Ignorance}: {A} {Philosophical} {Study}},
	volume = {8},
	issn = {22105700},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85174316801&doi=10.1163%2f22105700-bja10064&partnerID=40&md5=322409d39e157f1bd7296777dc71a2bf},
	doi = {10.1163/22105700-bja10064},
	abstract = {Although Rik Peels modestly subtitles his book A Philosophical Study,1 he promptly declares his ambitious, two-fold plan: to develop a "full-blown epistemology of ignorance"and then to use his epistemology "to enlighten several important debates that involve the notion of ignorance"(14, 18). The opening chapter includes a seven-page history of the philosophy of ignorance including brief notices of Hindu and Buddhist concepts, an account of the historic neglect of ignorance in analytic epistemology, and notice of recent scholarship. Though this introduction is largely self-contained, it does set a scholarly context for Peels' study, which he then previews. © 2023 Brill Academic Publishers. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {International Journal for the Study of Skepticism},
	author = {Denicola, Daniel R.},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Brill Academic Publishers
Type: Article},
}

Although Rik Peels modestly subtitles his book A Philosophical Study,1 he promptly declares his ambitious, two-fold plan: to develop a "full-blown epistemology of ignorance"and then to use his epistemology "to enlighten several important debates that involve the notion of ignorance"(14, 18). The opening chapter includes a seven-page history of the philosophy of ignorance including brief notices of Hindu and Buddhist concepts, an account of the historic neglect of ignorance in analytic epistemology, and notice of recent scholarship. Though this introduction is largely self-contained, it does set a scholarly context for Peels' study, which he then previews. © 2023 Brill Academic Publishers. All rights reserved.

@article{fraser-burgess_does_2023,
	title = {Does {Mills}' epistemology suggest a hermeneutic injustice of {White} {Afroscepticism}?},
	volume = {57},
	issn = {03098249},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85182914913&doi=10.1093%2fjopedu%2fqhad065&partnerID=40&md5=90aa1aff2686bfb936a15e55e23e00e0},
	doi = {10.1093/jopedu/qhad065},
	abstract = {Charles Mills posits an epistemology of ignorance that underwrites the complicity of Whites, or people of Western European descent, as signatories of the racial contract. There is prevailing discourse about the complicity of White persons in perpetuating racism and whether they can experience epistemic injustice. In this paper, the claim to hermeneutical injustice, in particular, makes a further assertion that moral blameworthiness is mitigated for a subcategory of White Americans because of being socialized into a White-dominant culture of caste-based Afroscepticism. I argue, based on Peirce's conceptualization of doubt, as against Descartes, that Afroscepticism is a totalizing belief system predicated on a racial group-based social epistemology and maintains a settled stance of questioning the commensurate citizenship of Blacks or American descendants of slaves. These perceived social costs warrant educational interventions that can dismantle its reasoning architecture. White Afroscepticism poses a barrier to the teacher's efforts to cultivate the democratic habitus in students; however, educator preparation that takes its existence into account can build on the standard classroom practices of critical social justice that promote equity, critical multicultural education, and critical thinking. © The Author(s) 2023.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4-5},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Education},
	author = {Fraser-Burgess, Sheron},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Oxford University Press
Type: Article},
	pages = {826 -- 841},
}

Charles Mills posits an epistemology of ignorance that underwrites the complicity of Whites, or people of Western European descent, as signatories of the racial contract. There is prevailing discourse about the complicity of White persons in perpetuating racism and whether they can experience epistemic injustice. In this paper, the claim to hermeneutical injustice, in particular, makes a further assertion that moral blameworthiness is mitigated for a subcategory of White Americans because of being socialized into a White-dominant culture of caste-based Afroscepticism. I argue, based on Peirce's conceptualization of doubt, as against Descartes, that Afroscepticism is a totalizing belief system predicated on a racial group-based social epistemology and maintains a settled stance of questioning the commensurate citizenship of Blacks or American descendants of slaves. These perceived social costs warrant educational interventions that can dismantle its reasoning architecture. White Afroscepticism poses a barrier to the teacher's efforts to cultivate the democratic habitus in students; however, educator preparation that takes its existence into account can build on the standard classroom practices of critical social justice that promote equity, critical multicultural education, and critical thinking. © The Author(s) 2023.

@article{garcia-portela_backward-looking_2023,
	title = {Backward-{Looking} {Principles} of {Climate} {Justice}: {The} {Unjustified} {Move} from the {Polluter} {Pays} {Principle} to the {Beneficiary} {Pays} {Principle}},
	volume = {29},
	issn = {13564765},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85141601775&doi=10.1007%2fs11158-022-09569-w&partnerID=40&md5=38292caeae47c435f1b55834f8d2d88b},
	doi = {10.1007/s11158-022-09569-w},
	abstract = {Climate change involves changes in the climate system caused by polluting human activities and the social and natural effects of these changes. The historical and anthropogenic grounds of climate change play an important role in climate justice claims. Many climate justice scholars believe that principles of climate justice should account for the historical and anthropogenic sources of climate change. Two main backward-looking principles have been proposed: the polluter pays principle (PPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). The BPP emerged in the literature on climate justice in response to certain objections raised against the PPP. In this paper, I focus on two of these objections: the causation objection and the excusable ignorance objection. Defenders of the BPP have traditionally assumed that this principle is not vulnerable to those objections, which renders the BPP superior to the PPP. In this paper, I challenge this underlying assumption. My argument here is simple: moving from the PPP to the BPP in response to any of these objections might be unjustified because the BPP is affected by at least some of the considerations giving rise to these objections. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Res Publica},
	author = {García-Portela, Laura},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
	keywords = {Beneficiary pays principle, Causation, Climate justice, Excusable ignorance, Fairness, Legitimate expectations, Polluter pays principle},
	pages = {367 -- 384},
}

Climate change involves changes in the climate system caused by polluting human activities and the social and natural effects of these changes. The historical and anthropogenic grounds of climate change play an important role in climate justice claims. Many climate justice scholars believe that principles of climate justice should account for the historical and anthropogenic sources of climate change. Two main backward-looking principles have been proposed: the polluter pays principle (PPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). The BPP emerged in the literature on climate justice in response to certain objections raised against the PPP. In this paper, I focus on two of these objections: the causation objection and the excusable ignorance objection. Defenders of the BPP have traditionally assumed that this principle is not vulnerable to those objections, which renders the BPP superior to the PPP. In this paper, I challenge this underlying assumption. My argument here is simple: moving from the PPP to the BPP in response to any of these objections might be unjustified because the BPP is affected by at least some of the considerations giving rise to these objections. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{kinney_risk_2023,
	title = {Risk aversion and elite-group ignorance},
	volume = {106},
	issn = {00318205},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85114706861&doi=10.1111%2fphpr.12837&partnerID=40&md5=192cad7b0e0c64bf91c890c67ec0f3ea},
	doi = {10.1111/phpr.12837},
	abstract = {Critical race theorists and standpoint epistemologists argue that agents who are members of dominant social groups are often in a state of ignorance about the extent of their social dominance, where this ignorance is explained by these agents' membership in a socially dominant group (e.g., Mills 2007). To illustrate this claim bluntly, it is argued: 1) that many white men do not know the extent of their social dominance, 2) that they remain ignorant as to the extent of their dominant social position even where this information is freely attainable, and 3) that this ignorance is due in part to the fact that they are white men. We argue that on Buchak's (2010, 2013) model of risk averse instrumental rationality, ignorance of one's privileges can be rational. This argument yields a new account of elite-group ignorance, why it may occur, and how it might be alleviated. © 2021 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC.},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
	author = {Kinney, David and Bright, Liam Kofi},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
	pages = {35 -- 57},
}

Critical race theorists and standpoint epistemologists argue that agents who are members of dominant social groups are often in a state of ignorance about the extent of their social dominance, where this ignorance is explained by these agents' membership in a socially dominant group (e.g., Mills 2007). To illustrate this claim bluntly, it is argued: 1) that many white men do not know the extent of their social dominance, 2) that they remain ignorant as to the extent of their dominant social position even where this information is freely attainable, and 3) that this ignorance is due in part to the fact that they are white men. We argue that on Buchak's (2010, 2013) model of risk averse instrumental rationality, ignorance of one's privileges can be rational. This argument yields a new account of elite-group ignorance, why it may occur, and how it might be alleviated. © 2021 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC.

@article{arfini_feeling_2023,
	title = {Feeling stuck. {Epistemic} and emotional dimensions of impasse and doubt; [{Dimensioni} epistemiche ed emotive degli stati di impasse e dubbio]},
	volume = {35},
	issn = {11209550},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85184515004&doi=10.1422%2f109319&partnerID=40&md5=2d9c63a00fafcbb241809e4b5a7f87c1},
	doi = {10.1422/109319},
	abstract = {Psychological and philosophical literature on impasse and doubt are full of assumptions regarding the unpleasantness and quick temporality of these states. These assumptions live on unquestioned thanks to a generally accepted focus on the importance of the solving part of problem-solving dynamics. In this paper we aim at introducing a perspective change that aims to reveal the inconsistency of philosophical and psychological theories with regards to the epistemic and emotional nuances of impasse and doubt. The paper is divided into five main parts: after a brief introduction on the over-and under-studied parts of problem solving, in the second section we will present and briefly discuss the psychological and philosophical theories on impasse and doubt. In the third section, we will explain some inconsistencies between these theories by referring to the lack of attention paid to two situated and crucial variables of problem-solving contexts: time and relative expertise. Then, in the fourth section, we will discuss how discussing particular scenarios, in which agents have high expertise in a field and are not too time pressured, can dramatically change our definition of impasse and doubt. Finally, the fifth section will conclude the paper; in this section we will propose ways to advance the study of these interesting cognitive phenomena, especially focusing on what the still needed empirical research should aim at explaining and describing. In order to depict a feasible line of research, we will comment on recent studies we are conducting on the phenomenology of impasse and doubt – what we call the “feeling of being stuck” – and we will propose ways to reduce the knowledge gaps on these cognitive phenomena. © (2023), (Societa Editrice Il Mulino). All Rights Reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Sistemi Intelligenti},
	author = {Arfini, Selene and Ross, Wendy},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Societa Editrice Il Mulino
Type: Article},
	keywords = {competence, doubt, ignorance, impasse, insight, problem-solving},
	pages = {587 -- 609},
}

Psychological and philosophical literature on impasse and doubt are full of assumptions regarding the unpleasantness and quick temporality of these states. These assumptions live on unquestioned thanks to a generally accepted focus on the importance of the solving part of problem-solving dynamics. In this paper we aim at introducing a perspective change that aims to reveal the inconsistency of philosophical and psychological theories with regards to the epistemic and emotional nuances of impasse and doubt. The paper is divided into five main parts: after a brief introduction on the over-and under-studied parts of problem solving, in the second section we will present and briefly discuss the psychological and philosophical theories on impasse and doubt. In the third section, we will explain some inconsistencies between these theories by referring to the lack of attention paid to two situated and crucial variables of problem-solving contexts: time and relative expertise. Then, in the fourth section, we will discuss how discussing particular scenarios, in which agents have high expertise in a field and are not too time pressured, can dramatically change our definition of impasse and doubt. Finally, the fifth section will conclude the paper; in this section we will propose ways to advance the study of these interesting cognitive phenomena, especially focusing on what the still needed empirical research should aim at explaining and describing. In order to depict a feasible line of research, we will comment on recent studies we are conducting on the phenomenology of impasse and doubt – what we call the “feeling of being stuck” – and we will propose ways to reduce the knowledge gaps on these cognitive phenomena. © (2023), (Societa Editrice Il Mulino). All Rights Reserved.

@article{aldila_mathematical_2023,
	title = {Mathematical analysis of the impact of community ignorance on the population dynamics of dengue},
	volume = {9},
	issn = {22974687},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85159036414&doi=10.3389%2ffams.2023.1094971&partnerID=40&md5=e53eeb021c11457fe4f5edb97487b092},
	doi = {10.3389/fams.2023.1094971},
	abstract = {This study proposes a dengue spread model that considers the nonlinear transmission rate to address the level of human ignorance of dengue in their environment. The SIR − UV model has been proposed, where SIR denotes the classification of the human population and UV denotes the classification of the mosquito population. Assuming that the total human population is constant, and the mosquito population is already in its steady-state condition, using the Quasi-Steady State Approximation (QSSA) method, we reduce our SIR − UV model into a more simple IR-model. Our analytical result shows that a stable disease-free equilibrium exists when the basic reproduction number is {\textless}1. Furthermore, our model also shows the possibility of a backward bifurcation. The more ignorant the society is about dengue, the higher the possibility that backward bifurcation phenomena may appear. As a result, the condition of the basic reproduction number being {\textless}1 is insufficient to guarantee the extinction of dengue in a population. Furthermore, we found that increasing the recovery rate, reducing the waning immunity rate, and mosquito life expectancy can reduce the possibility of backward bifurcation phenomena. We use dengue incidence data from Jakarta to calibrate the parameters in our model. Through the fast Fourier transform analysis, it was found that dengue incidence in Jakarta has a periodicity of 52.4, 73.4, and 146.8 weeks. This result indicates that dengue will periodically appear at least every year in Jakarta. Parameter estimation for our model parameters was carried out by assuming the infection rate of humans as a sinusoidal function by determining the three most dominant frequencies. Numerical and sensitivity analyses were conducted to observe the impact of community ignorance on dengue endemicity. From the sensitivity analysis, we found that, although a larger community ignorance can trigger a backward bifurcation, this threshold can be minimized by increasing the recovery rate, prolonging the temporal immunity, or reducing the mosquito population. Therefore, to control dengue transmission more effectively, media campaigns undertaken by the government to reduce community ignorance should be accompanied by other interventions, such as a good treatment in the hospital or vector control programs. With this combination of interventions, it will be easier to achieve a condition of dengue-free population when the basic reproduction number is less than one. Copyright © 2023 Aldila, Aulia Puspadani and Rusin.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics},
	author = {Aldila, Dipo and Aulia Puspadani, Chita and Rusin, Rahmi},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Frontiers Media S.A.
Type: Article},
}

This study proposes a dengue spread model that considers the nonlinear transmission rate to address the level of human ignorance of dengue in their environment. The SIR − UV model has been proposed, where SIR denotes the classification of the human population and UV denotes the classification of the mosquito population. Assuming that the total human population is constant, and the mosquito population is already in its steady-state condition, using the Quasi-Steady State Approximation (QSSA) method, we reduce our SIR − UV model into a more simple IR-model. Our analytical result shows that a stable disease-free equilibrium exists when the basic reproduction number is \textless1. Furthermore, our model also shows the possibility of a backward bifurcation. The more ignorant the society is about dengue, the higher the possibility that backward bifurcation phenomena may appear. As a result, the condition of the basic reproduction number being \textless1 is insufficient to guarantee the extinction of dengue in a population. Furthermore, we found that increasing the recovery rate, reducing the waning immunity rate, and mosquito life expectancy can reduce the possibility of backward bifurcation phenomena. We use dengue incidence data from Jakarta to calibrate the parameters in our model. Through the fast Fourier transform analysis, it was found that dengue incidence in Jakarta has a periodicity of 52.4, 73.4, and 146.8 weeks. This result indicates that dengue will periodically appear at least every year in Jakarta. Parameter estimation for our model parameters was carried out by assuming the infection rate of humans as a sinusoidal function by determining the three most dominant frequencies. Numerical and sensitivity analyses were conducted to observe the impact of community ignorance on dengue endemicity. From the sensitivity analysis, we found that, although a larger community ignorance can trigger a backward bifurcation, this threshold can be minimized by increasing the recovery rate, prolonging the temporal immunity, or reducing the mosquito population. Therefore, to control dengue transmission more effectively, media campaigns undertaken by the government to reduce community ignorance should be accompanied by other interventions, such as a good treatment in the hospital or vector control programs. With this combination of interventions, it will be easier to achieve a condition of dengue-free population when the basic reproduction number is less than one. Copyright © 2023 Aldila, Aulia Puspadani and Rusin.

@book{ah-king_female_2023,
	title = {The {Female} {Turn}: {How} {Evolutionary} {Science} {Shifted} {Perceptions} {About} {Females}},
	isbn = {978-981-19716-1-7 978-981-19716-0-0},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85153651128&doi=10.1007%2f978-981-19-7161-7&partnerID=40&md5=f3976a933b92a95f6ce7a64e20b56f4b},
	abstract = {This book traces the history of how evolutionary biology transformed its understanding of females from being coy, reserved and sexually passive, to having active sexual strategies and often mating with multiple males. Why did it take so long to discover female active sexual strategies? What prevented some researchers from engaging in sexually active females, and what prompted others to develop this new knowledge? The Female Turn provides a global overview of shifting perceptions about females in sexual selection research on a wide range of animals, from invertebrates to primates. Evolutionary biologist and feminist science scholar Malin Ah-King explores this history from a unique interdisciplinary vantage point. Based on extensive knowledge of the scientific literature on sexual selection and in-depth interviews with leading researchers, pioneers and feminist scientists in the field, her analysis engages with key theoretical approaches in gender studies of science. Analyzing the researchers’ scientific interests, theoretical frameworks, specific study animals, technological innovations, methodologies and sometimes feminist insights, reveals how these have shaped conclusions drawn about sex. Thereby, The Female Turn shows how certain researchers gained knowledge about active females whereas others missed, ignored or delayed it – that is, how ignorance was produced. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Springer Nature},
	author = {Ah-King, Malin},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1007/978-981-19-7161-7},
	note = {Publication Title: The Female Turn: How Evolutionary Science Shifted Perceptions about Females
Type: Book},
}

This book traces the history of how evolutionary biology transformed its understanding of females from being coy, reserved and sexually passive, to having active sexual strategies and often mating with multiple males. Why did it take so long to discover female active sexual strategies? What prevented some researchers from engaging in sexually active females, and what prompted others to develop this new knowledge? The Female Turn provides a global overview of shifting perceptions about females in sexual selection research on a wide range of animals, from invertebrates to primates. Evolutionary biologist and feminist science scholar Malin Ah-King explores this history from a unique interdisciplinary vantage point. Based on extensive knowledge of the scientific literature on sexual selection and in-depth interviews with leading researchers, pioneers and feminist scientists in the field, her analysis engages with key theoretical approaches in gender studies of science. Analyzing the researchers’ scientific interests, theoretical frameworks, specific study animals, technological innovations, methodologies and sometimes feminist insights, reveals how these have shaped conclusions drawn about sex. Thereby, The Female Turn shows how certain researchers gained knowledge about active females whereas others missed, ignored or delayed it – that is, how ignorance was produced. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022.

@article{abatemarco_optimal_2023,
	title = {Optimal redistribution behind the veil of ignorance},
	volume = {40},
	issn = {11202890},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85145866125&doi=10.1007%2fs40888-022-00290-8&partnerID=40&md5=eb0945d3a71c6e3d65f7678708e6ee0a},
	doi = {10.1007/s40888-022-00290-8},
	abstract = {We propose a formalization of the Difference Principle (maximin) by which Rawls’ contribution is shown to go beyond distributive value judgments in such a way as to embrace efficiency issues as well. In our model, inequalities are shown to be permitted as far as they stimulate a greater effort in education (or training), and so economic growth. This is the only possibility for an income disparity to be unanimously accepted by both the most-, and above all, the least-advantaged individual. In this vein, we highlight the peculiarity of the Rawlsian equity-efficiency trade off behind the veil of ignorance. Finally, by recalling the old tradition of ‘universal ex-post efficiency’, we identify the set of Rawls-optimal social contracts, which is shown to be a subset of Pareto-optimal ones. © 2023, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Economia Politica},
	author = {Abatemarco, Antonio and Stroffolini, Francesca},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Type: Article},
	pages = {995 -- 1024},
}

We propose a formalization of the Difference Principle (maximin) by which Rawls’ contribution is shown to go beyond distributive value judgments in such a way as to embrace efficiency issues as well. In our model, inequalities are shown to be permitted as far as they stimulate a greater effort in education (or training), and so economic growth. This is the only possibility for an income disparity to be unanimously accepted by both the most-, and above all, the least-advantaged individual. In this vein, we highlight the peculiarity of the Rawlsian equity-efficiency trade off behind the veil of ignorance. Finally, by recalling the old tradition of ‘universal ex-post efficiency’, we identify the set of Rawls-optimal social contracts, which is shown to be a subset of Pareto-optimal ones. © 2023, The Author(s).

@article{bonzio_logical_2023,
	title = {A {Logical} {Modeling} of {Severe} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {52},
	issn = {1573-0433},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09697-x},
	doi = {10.1007/s10992-022-09697-x},
	abstract = {In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one.},
	language = {en},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2024-03-29},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
	author = {Bonzio, S. and Fano, V. and Graziani, P. and Pra Baldi, M.},
	month = aug,
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Bochvar external logic, Ignorance, Three-valued modal logic, Weak Kleene logic},
	pages = {1053--1080},
}

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one.

@misc{thibaud-latour_ignorance_2023,
	title = {Ignorance, injustice structurelle et responsabilité [{Mémoire}]},
	url = {https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/32010},
	abstract = {S’inscrivant en épistémologie sociale, ce projet souhaite comprendre l’ignorance comme  un phénomène actif dans la production de connaissance et non comme sa simple absence. Se  détachant des théories traditionnelles d’épistémologie comprenant l’ignorance comme un état passif, comme antinomie de la connaissance, ce mémoire à l’ambition de comprendre l’ignorance  comme un phénomène multifactoriel soit comme une pratique se situant à l’intersection entre le  social, le structurel et l’épistémique. Précisément, l’objectif de ce mémoire est de démontrer que,  présentes sous plusieurs formes, les pratiques d’ignorances ont des ramifications concrètes sur  plusieurs aspects de nos vies telles que nos interactions sociales, notre univers intellectuel et notre  partage de connaissances. Se basant sur un cadre critique, sollicitant des écrits issus des études  féministes, décoloniales et intersectionnelles, la visée majeure de ce projet est de démontrer la  possibilité de considérer l’ignorance comme un élément clef de la production et du maintien  d’injustices sociales. Par exemple, le rôle de l’ignorance quant à certaines formes de racisme et de sexisme tels l’incapacité à être considéré comme un individu pouvant produire des connaissances légitimes ou le refus, non fondé, de comprendre certains individus issus des groupes marginalisés comme égaux sur le plan social et épistémique. Accorder un rôle déterminant à l’ignorance permettra d’amener une meilleure compréhension de la persistance de certaines formes d’injustices sociales en rendant compte de leur nature abstraite et parfois difficile à saisir. Nous analyserons l’ignorance en termes sociaux et en relation aux vices épistémiques ce qui rendra compte de la systématicité de certaines actions sexistes ou racistes et permettra de comprendre plus clairement les mécanismes soutenant le maintien de ces inégalités. Avec ceci, nous tenterons de rendre compte du type de vice épistémique que constitue l’ignorance, c’est-à-dire le type de traits de caractère, d’attitudes, ou de manières de penser qui nuit à l’accessibilité de la connaissance. Cette approche permet de souligner le fait que l’ignorance n’est pas la même chose que l’erreur et qu’elle peut être durable et activement maintenue.},
	language = {fra},
	urldate = {2023-11-24},
	publisher = {Université de Montréal},
	author = {Thibaud-Latour, Ellena},
	month = sep,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Accepted: 2023-10-25T19:20:08Z},
}

S’inscrivant en épistémologie sociale, ce projet souhaite comprendre l’ignorance comme un phénomène actif dans la production de connaissance et non comme sa simple absence. Se détachant des théories traditionnelles d’épistémologie comprenant l’ignorance comme un état passif, comme antinomie de la connaissance, ce mémoire à l’ambition de comprendre l’ignorance comme un phénomène multifactoriel soit comme une pratique se situant à l’intersection entre le social, le structurel et l’épistémique. Précisément, l’objectif de ce mémoire est de démontrer que, présentes sous plusieurs formes, les pratiques d’ignorances ont des ramifications concrètes sur plusieurs aspects de nos vies telles que nos interactions sociales, notre univers intellectuel et notre partage de connaissances. Se basant sur un cadre critique, sollicitant des écrits issus des études féministes, décoloniales et intersectionnelles, la visée majeure de ce projet est de démontrer la possibilité de considérer l’ignorance comme un élément clef de la production et du maintien d’injustices sociales. Par exemple, le rôle de l’ignorance quant à certaines formes de racisme et de sexisme tels l’incapacité à être considéré comme un individu pouvant produire des connaissances légitimes ou le refus, non fondé, de comprendre certains individus issus des groupes marginalisés comme égaux sur le plan social et épistémique. Accorder un rôle déterminant à l’ignorance permettra d’amener une meilleure compréhension de la persistance de certaines formes d’injustices sociales en rendant compte de leur nature abstraite et parfois difficile à saisir. Nous analyserons l’ignorance en termes sociaux et en relation aux vices épistémiques ce qui rendra compte de la systématicité de certaines actions sexistes ou racistes et permettra de comprendre plus clairement les mécanismes soutenant le maintien de ces inégalités. Avec ceci, nous tenterons de rendre compte du type de vice épistémique que constitue l’ignorance, c’est-à-dire le type de traits de caractère, d’attitudes, ou de manières de penser qui nuit à l’accessibilité de la connaissance. Cette approche permet de souligner le fait que l’ignorance n’est pas la même chose que l’erreur et qu’elle peut être durable et activement maintenue.

@article{girel_what_2023,
	title = {What {Exactly} is {Presupposed} by {Agnotology}? {The} {Challenge} of {Intentions}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0269-8595},
	shorttitle = {What {Exactly} is {Presupposed} by {Agnotology}?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2257111},
	doi = {10.1080/02698595.2023.2257111},
	abstract = {The paper seeks to contribute to clarifying agnotology as an ‘epistemic strategy’, conceived as ‘epistemically damaging and hurt[ing] the production of knowledge’. My general claim is that the grammar of intentions ‘embedded’ in agnotological arguments is often not considered accurately. I use considerations from the philosophy of action as a theoretical framework to make more explicit what is implied in agnogenetic manoeuvres. Agnotology, as a ‘theory’ about epistemic states, in particular knowledge and ignorance, would be seriously incomplete without that component. The following can thus be read as a contribution to an analysis of the presuppositions of the strategic variant of Agnotology. My first claim is that the more common objections to the introduction of intentions are in no way definitive. My second, more specific, claim is that we need a room, in our conceptual toolbox, for ‘anti-epistemic intentions’, which play a key role in agnotological arguments.},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2024-01-16},
	journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Girel, Mathias},
	month = jul,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2257111},
	keywords = {Normatively inappropriate dissent, action (philosophy of), agnotology, intentions},
	pages = {229--246},
}

The paper seeks to contribute to clarifying agnotology as an ‘epistemic strategy’, conceived as ‘epistemically damaging and hurt[ing] the production of knowledge’. My general claim is that the grammar of intentions ‘embedded’ in agnotological arguments is often not considered accurately. I use considerations from the philosophy of action as a theoretical framework to make more explicit what is implied in agnogenetic manoeuvres. Agnotology, as a ‘theory’ about epistemic states, in particular knowledge and ignorance, would be seriously incomplete without that component. The following can thus be read as a contribution to an analysis of the presuppositions of the strategic variant of Agnotology. My first claim is that the more common objections to the introduction of intentions are in no way definitive. My second, more specific, claim is that we need a room, in our conceptual toolbox, for ‘anti-epistemic intentions’, which play a key role in agnotological arguments.

@article{faini_advertising_2023,
	title = {Advertising doubt in early modern {Italy}: {Doubt} and ignorance in early modern paratexts},
	issn = {0269-1213},
	shorttitle = {Advertising doubt in early modern {Italy}},
	doi = {10.1111/rest.12900},
	abstract = {Spelled in several different ways, the word ‘doubt’, usually in the plural ‘doubts’ (dubbi, dubitazioni) appears on the frontispiece of several works printed in Venice and elsewhere in Italy in the sixteenth century. Building on different traditions, ranging from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata to Medieval didactic literature, these texts, normally in the vernacular, address questions that the average reader may have on a variety of topics: from thermal baths to indulgences, from natural philosophy to duel. While usually the term ‘doubt’ means ‘question’, things can be sometimes less straightforward, especially when it comes to religious texts or works penned by unorthodox writers, as in the case of Ortensio Lando's Quattro libri di dubbi. This article will explore paratextual elements of works addressing doubts focusing on a variety of topics such as readership, definitions of doubt and its function, the role of these works in the dissemination of knowledge. © 2023 Society for Renaissance Studies and John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Renaissance Studies},
	author = {Faini, M.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {doubt, ignorance, natural philosophy, paratexts, renaissance},
}

Spelled in several different ways, the word ‘doubt’, usually in the plural ‘doubts’ (dubbi, dubitazioni) appears on the frontispiece of several works printed in Venice and elsewhere in Italy in the sixteenth century. Building on different traditions, ranging from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata to Medieval didactic literature, these texts, normally in the vernacular, address questions that the average reader may have on a variety of topics: from thermal baths to indulgences, from natural philosophy to duel. While usually the term ‘doubt’ means ‘question’, things can be sometimes less straightforward, especially when it comes to religious texts or works penned by unorthodox writers, as in the case of Ortensio Lando's Quattro libri di dubbi. This article will explore paratextual elements of works addressing doubts focusing on a variety of topics such as readership, definitions of doubt and its function, the role of these works in the dissemination of knowledge. © 2023 Society for Renaissance Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

@article{jahaj_beraten_2023,
	title = {Beraten und {Prognostizieren}. {Unsicheres} {Wissen} in der institutionellen vs. der massenmedialen {Politikberatung}},
	volume = {45},
	copyright = {Copyright (c) 2023},
	issn = {2523-9201},
	url = {https://ejournals.facultas.at},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2230},
	abstract = {Scientific policy advice provides a special framework for processing scientific uncertainties. Socio-political decisions often require a reliable scientific basis that can be used as orientation and legitimation for political decisions. On the one hand, policy advice takes place institutionalized (e. g. by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag [TAB] and the National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina), but also in public media discourse, when scientists give interviews or inform about scientific topics in talk shows. The need for advice concerns future actions and is thus closely linked to uncertain knowledge and the providing of forecasts, i. e. a look into the future. In this article, we focus on the practices of consulting and forecasting in the context of policy advice and capture them in their differentiations as well as show what role uncertain knowledge plays in their argumentation. In addition, we analyze to what extent the formulation of prognoses and advice is influenced by the genre and media context of the statement (expert opinion vs. interview / talk show, i. e. also: written and oral contexts).},
	language = {de},
	number = {1-2},
	urldate = {2023-06-06},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Jahaj, Dorothee and Rhein, Lisa},
	month = may,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Number: 1-2},
	pages = {66--84},
}

Scientific policy advice provides a special framework for processing scientific uncertainties. Socio-political decisions often require a reliable scientific basis that can be used as orientation and legitimation for political decisions. On the one hand, policy advice takes place institutionalized (e. g. by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag [TAB] and the National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina), but also in public media discourse, when scientists give interviews or inform about scientific topics in talk shows. The need for advice concerns future actions and is thus closely linked to uncertain knowledge and the providing of forecasts, i. e. a look into the future. In this article, we focus on the practices of consulting and forecasting in the context of policy advice and capture them in their differentiations as well as show what role uncertain knowledge plays in their argumentation. In addition, we analyze to what extent the formulation of prognoses and advice is influenced by the genre and media context of the statement (expert opinion vs. interview / talk show, i. e. also: written and oral contexts).

@article{muller_corpus_2023,
	title = {Corpus {Approaches} to {Analysing} {Uncertainty} and {Ignorance} in {Academic} {Discourse}},
	volume = {45},
	copyright = {Copyright (c) 2023},
	issn = {2523-9201},
	url = {https://ejournals.facultas.at},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2232},
	abstract = {The article provides an overview of corpus approaches to researching linguistic practices for dealing with ignorance and uncertainty. Uncertainty and ignorance are first and foremost epistemological or socio-psychological categories rather than linguistic ones. But they can be applied to a corpus linguistic setting. Based on a presentation of the central terms and their relevance for digital corpus research, this paper exemplifies proposals for operationalisations using a corpus of political science texts from the field of International Relations (DIReC). It gives an overview of various methods of researching ignorance and uncertainty in academic discourse, focusing on lexicon-based, annotation-based and pattern-search-based approaches as well as combinations thereof. The structure of the explanations reflects a central conflict of aims: On the one hand, corpus-based research on ignorance and uncertainty requires a precise, interpretive approach to the contextual meaning and epistemic function of each individual piece of evidence. On the other hand, it seems advantageous to investigate the largest possible corpora for reasons of reliability. The final section presents an application sketch that addresses and exemplifies several methodological problems. It compares uncertainty markers in political science discourse as found in the DIReC corpus with those in conspiracy theories, drawing on the LOCO corpus and journalistic discourse represented in a reference corpus of US newspapers.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1-2},
	urldate = {2023-06-06},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Müller, Marcus},
	month = may,
	year = {2023},
	note = {Number: 1-2},
	pages = {28--47},
}

The article provides an overview of corpus approaches to researching linguistic practices for dealing with ignorance and uncertainty. Uncertainty and ignorance are first and foremost epistemological or socio-psychological categories rather than linguistic ones. But they can be applied to a corpus linguistic setting. Based on a presentation of the central terms and their relevance for digital corpus research, this paper exemplifies proposals for operationalisations using a corpus of political science texts from the field of International Relations (DIReC). It gives an overview of various methods of researching ignorance and uncertainty in academic discourse, focusing on lexicon-based, annotation-based and pattern-search-based approaches as well as combinations thereof. The structure of the explanations reflects a central conflict of aims: On the one hand, corpus-based research on ignorance and uncertainty requires a precise, interpretive approach to the contextual meaning and epistemic function of each individual piece of evidence. On the other hand, it seems advantageous to investigate the largest possible corpora for reasons of reliability. The final section presents an application sketch that addresses and exemplifies several methodological problems. It compares uncertainty markers in political science discourse as found in the DIReC corpus with those in conspiracy theories, drawing on the LOCO corpus and journalistic discourse represented in a reference corpus of US newspapers.

@article{bartl_governance_2023,
	title = {Governance between ignorance and evidence: {Technology} assessment in the context of pandemic crisis management},
	volume = {32},
	issn = {2568-020X},
	shorttitle = {Governance zwischen {Nichtwissen} und {Evidenz}: {Technikfolgen}-abschätzung im {Kontext} des {Pandemie}-{Krisenmanagements}},
	doi = {10.14512/tatup.32.2.30},
	abstract = {This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Zeitschrift fur Technikfolgenabschatzung in Theorie und Praxis / Journal for Technology Assessment in Theory and Practice},
	author = {Bartl, G.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {co-production of knowledge, ignorance, pandemic simulation models, technologies of preparedness},
	pages = {30--35},
}

This article examines the relationship between knowledge and ignorance in the context of crises and corresponding technological solutions. It focuses on the case of pandemic simulation models as a specific form of dealing with uncertainty, which marks a transition from classical risk management to algorithmically organized anticipa-tion practices. The thesis of the paper is that technology assessment is affected by this development when it comes to reflecting on the nor-mative premises and social and political implications of digital crisis technologies. This refers in particular to what is considered crisis-rele-vant knowledge in the first place, according to what logics it circulates, and what attributions and effects can be observed with regard to digital crisis technologies. Against this background, the paper discusses the relevance of social science knowledge as well as the role of delib-erative practices in times of crisis.. © 2023 by the authors.

@article{schulz_parity_2023,
	title = {Parity versus {Ignorance}},
	volume = {73},
	issn = {0031-8094},
	doi = {10.1093/pq/pqad038},
	abstract = {Why are hard decisions hard? According to the incomparabilists, hard choices are hard because the options cannot be compared. Proponents of parity hold that hard choices are hard because the options can be compared but only in terms of a fourth value relation - parity - in addition to the three standard relations: better, worse, and equally good. Others claim that hard choices are hard because it is vague (or indeterminate) how the options relate in terms of the three standard relations. Lastly, there is the epistemicist. For the epistemicist, hard choices are hard because one is irresolvably ignorant about how the options compare. In the debate about hard choices, epistemicism is often mentioned but rarely defended. The present paper is a contribution to closing this gap. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	author = {Schulz, M.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {epistemicism, hard choice, ignorance, incomparability, parity},
	pages = {1183--1204},
}

Why are hard decisions hard? According to the incomparabilists, hard choices are hard because the options cannot be compared. Proponents of parity hold that hard choices are hard because the options can be compared but only in terms of a fourth value relation - parity - in addition to the three standard relations: better, worse, and equally good. Others claim that hard choices are hard because it is vague (or indeterminate) how the options relate in terms of the three standard relations. Lastly, there is the epistemicist. For the epistemicist, hard choices are hard because one is irresolvably ignorant about how the options compare. In the debate about hard choices, epistemicism is often mentioned but rarely defended. The present paper is a contribution to closing this gap. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews.

@incollection{ruetsche_pragmatism_2023,
	title = {Pragmatism, {Perennialism}, and the {Physics} of {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-880545-8},
	abstract = {Investigating the foundations of quantum field theories, I have suggested that theory specification has a pragmatic dimension: strategies for equipping physical theories with content, if sensibly pursued, eventuate in contents indexed not only (or not just) to the way the world is, but also to our aims in using our theories and the circumstances we use them in. Here I assess the “fundamentalist” response, that the apparent appeal of pragmatizing content rests on transient artifacts of the present incomplete state of physics. Fundamental physics, the response continues, can be properly understood if only it’s understood as representing the way the world is. Insofar as none of the physics we have now is genuinely fundamental, we can’t directly assess this fundamentalist response. Undertaking an indirect assessment, I develop two reasons to predict that future scientific theories, including theories of “fundamental physics,” will continue to be best understood as possessing pragmatized content. © H. K. Andersen and Sandra D. Mitchell 2023.},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {The {Pragmatist} {Challenge}: {Pragmatist} {Metaphysics} for {Philosophy} of {Science}},
	author = {Ruetsche, L.},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198805458.003.0007},
	keywords = {fundamental, interpretation, pragmatism, quantum field theory, realism, renormalization group},
	pages = {180--208},
}

Investigating the foundations of quantum field theories, I have suggested that theory specification has a pragmatic dimension: strategies for equipping physical theories with content, if sensibly pursued, eventuate in contents indexed not only (or not just) to the way the world is, but also to our aims in using our theories and the circumstances we use them in. Here I assess the “fundamentalist” response, that the apparent appeal of pragmatizing content rests on transient artifacts of the present incomplete state of physics. Fundamental physics, the response continues, can be properly understood if only it’s understood as representing the way the world is. Insofar as none of the physics we have now is genuinely fundamental, we can’t directly assess this fundamentalist response. Undertaking an indirect assessment, I develop two reasons to predict that future scientific theories, including theories of “fundamental physics,” will continue to be best understood as possessing pragmatized content. © H. K. Andersen and Sandra D. Mitchell 2023.

@article{parra_systematic_2023,
	title = {Systematic literature review on agrochemicals impacts dormant eggs in temporary wetlands: an ocean of unknowingness},
	issn = {2340-8472},
	shorttitle = {Une revue systématique de la littérature sur les impacts des produits agrochimiques sur les œufs dormants dans les zones humides temporaires: un océan d'ignorance},
	doi = {10.17561/AT.22.6941},
	abstract = {Temporary wetlands are recognised biodiversity hotspots. Dormant egg banks, as part of their cryptic biodiversity, are responsible of wetlands resilience. Egg banks are also known to be sensitive indicators of anthropogenic disturbances. This study aims to assess the current state of research of agrochemical impact on dormant egg banks in temporary wetlands. The systematic literature review carried out has shown the small number of studies on this topic. This study provides evidence of commonality concerning negative impact effect on the organisms, reducing hatching success, dormant eggs production and emergence, or species richness, among others, which might weaken ecosystem stabilization mechanisms by reducing biodiversity. Our review also revealed a glaring lack of in situ and long-term studies for understanding ecosystem consequences of toxicants on temporary wetlands. These gaps in knowledge hamper our ability to design and implement evidence-based conservation and management programs but opens opportunities for new research lines. © Universidad de Jaén (España).},
	language = {English},
	number = {22},
	journal = {Agua y Territorio},
	author = {Parra, G.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Egg bank, Recovery, Resilience, Systematic review, Temporary ponds},
	pages = {167--179},
}

Temporary wetlands are recognised biodiversity hotspots. Dormant egg banks, as part of their cryptic biodiversity, are responsible of wetlands resilience. Egg banks are also known to be sensitive indicators of anthropogenic disturbances. This study aims to assess the current state of research of agrochemical impact on dormant egg banks in temporary wetlands. The systematic literature review carried out has shown the small number of studies on this topic. This study provides evidence of commonality concerning negative impact effect on the organisms, reducing hatching success, dormant eggs production and emergence, or species richness, among others, which might weaken ecosystem stabilization mechanisms by reducing biodiversity. Our review also revealed a glaring lack of in situ and long-term studies for understanding ecosystem consequences of toxicants on temporary wetlands. These gaps in knowledge hamper our ability to design and implement evidence-based conservation and management programs but opens opportunities for new research lines. © Universidad de Jaén (España).

@incollection{mcpartland_socratic_2023,
	title = {Socratic {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-350-18568-5},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {The {Bloomsbury} {Handbook} of {Socrates}, {Second} {Edition}},
	author = {McPartland, K.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {85--126},
}

@article{fan_axiomatizing_2023,
	title = {Axiomatizing {Rumsfeld} {Ignorance}},
	issn = {0022-3611},
	doi = {10.1007/s10992-023-09725-4},
	abstract = {In a recent paper, Kit Fine presents some striking results concerning the logical properties of (first-order) ignorance, second-order ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance. However, Rumsfeld ignorance is definable in terms of ignorance, which makes some existing results and the axiomatization problem trivial. A main reason is that the accessibility relations for the implicit knowledge operator contained in the packaged operators of ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance are the same. In this work, we assume the two accessibility relations to be different so that one of them is an arbitrary subset of the other. This will avoid the definability issue and retain most of the previous validities. The main results are axiomatizations over various proper bi-frame classes. Finally we apply our framework to analyze Fine’s results. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
	author = {Fan, J.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Axiomatizations, Ignorance, Rumsfeld ignorance, Second-order ignorance},
}

In a recent paper, Kit Fine presents some striking results concerning the logical properties of (first-order) ignorance, second-order ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance. However, Rumsfeld ignorance is definable in terms of ignorance, which makes some existing results and the axiomatization problem trivial. A main reason is that the accessibility relations for the implicit knowledge operator contained in the packaged operators of ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance are the same. In this work, we assume the two accessibility relations to be different so that one of them is an arbitrary subset of the other. This will avoid the definability issue and retain most of the previous validities. The main results are axiomatizations over various proper bi-frame classes. Finally we apply our framework to analyze Fine’s results. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.

@article{farias_manufactured_2023,
	title = {Manufactured {Ignorance} and the {Violence} of {Not}-{Counting}: {The} {Experience} of {Censo} {Popular} of {Unhoused} {People} in {Buenos} {Aires}},
	issn = {0066-4812},
	shorttitle = {Manufactured {Ignorance} and the {Violence} of {Not}-{Counting}},
	doi = {10.1111/anti.12967},
	abstract = {While the unhoused population continues to increase in the context of a housing crisis in the city of Buenos Aires, the local government fails to produce accurate statistics about it. As a response to this, a coalition of grassroots organisations carried out the Popular Census of Unhoused People (PC) in 2017 and 2019 to challenge the numbers yielded by official surveys and demand appropriate responses from the Government of the City of Buenos Aires (GCBA). This paper works with different meanings of the verb “to count” to explore how the PC enacts a politics of counting focused on making visible and making count the unhoused population. The PC helps us to have a better understanding of the GCBA's concealment of the houselessness problem and the violence associated with it, while it brings into play other knowledges and lived experiences of the city for a different urban politics. © 2023 The Author. Antipode © 2023 Antipode Foundation Ltd.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Antipode},
	author = {Farías, M.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Buenos Aires, Popular Census, counting, grassroots organisations, houselessness, urban politics},
}

While the unhoused population continues to increase in the context of a housing crisis in the city of Buenos Aires, the local government fails to produce accurate statistics about it. As a response to this, a coalition of grassroots organisations carried out the Popular Census of Unhoused People (PC) in 2017 and 2019 to challenge the numbers yielded by official surveys and demand appropriate responses from the Government of the City of Buenos Aires (GCBA). This paper works with different meanings of the verb “to count” to explore how the PC enacts a politics of counting focused on making visible and making count the unhoused population. The PC helps us to have a better understanding of the GCBA's concealment of the houselessness problem and the violence associated with it, while it brings into play other knowledges and lived experiences of the city for a different urban politics. © 2023 The Author. Antipode © 2023 Antipode Foundation Ltd.

@article{dorozhkin_ignorance_2023,
	title = {Ignorance as an epistemological problem},
	volume = {60},
	issn = {1811-833X},
	shorttitle = {{НЕЗНАНИЕ} КАК ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ПРОБЛЕМА},
	doi = {10.5840/202360343},
	abstract = {The article explores the controversial concept of “epistemology of ignorance”, defined as an oxymoron. The use of this term in philosophical literature is primarily associated with research on the distribution of information in group-to-group interaction (L. Alkoff, E. Malewski, N. Jaramillo, C. Mills). Nevertheless, authors of this article suppose that such interpretation narrows the epistemological content of the problem of ignorance. One of the goals of this work is an attempt to give a conceptual load to the mentioned phrase. To do this we consider, first of all, the question of the meaning of the concept of ignorance, and then the rationale for the possibility of a harmonious combination of the concepts of “ignorance” and “epistemology”. The article reviews four theses that show the close relationship between ignorance and knowledge, which is in our opinion the primary justification of the epistemological nature of a problem. The first thesis is widely known in the history of philosophy and science and states that ignorance can be a condition of knowledge. The second thesis protects feedback: ignorance is realized through knowledge. The third and fourth theses address states that combine the properties of knowledge and ignorance: the first may have signs of the second, and the second may have signs of the first. This indicates the need to give the well-known concept of “epistemology” some additional aspects necessary for such a relationship; after all, it must be recognized that such a form as an oxymoron is not often found in epistemological studies. Based on this, a conclusion is made about what images epistemological analysis can be carried out. The authors see here two possible research tasks, namely, the analysis of the non – production of knowledge and the analysis of the production of ignorance. © 2023 RAS Institute of Philosophy. All rights reserved.},
	language = {Russian},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Epistemology and Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Dorozhkin, A.M. and Golubinskaya, A.V.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {epistemology of ignorance, ignorance, knowledge-intensive ignorance, non-production of knowledge, production of ignorance, uncertainty},
	pages = {77--90},
}

The article explores the controversial concept of “epistemology of ignorance”, defined as an oxymoron. The use of this term in philosophical literature is primarily associated with research on the distribution of information in group-to-group interaction (L. Alkoff, E. Malewski, N. Jaramillo, C. Mills). Nevertheless, authors of this article suppose that such interpretation narrows the epistemological content of the problem of ignorance. One of the goals of this work is an attempt to give a conceptual load to the mentioned phrase. To do this we consider, first of all, the question of the meaning of the concept of ignorance, and then the rationale for the possibility of a harmonious combination of the concepts of “ignorance” and “epistemology”. The article reviews four theses that show the close relationship between ignorance and knowledge, which is in our opinion the primary justification of the epistemological nature of a problem. The first thesis is widely known in the history of philosophy and science and states that ignorance can be a condition of knowledge. The second thesis protects feedback: ignorance is realized through knowledge. The third and fourth theses address states that combine the properties of knowledge and ignorance: the first may have signs of the second, and the second may have signs of the first. This indicates the need to give the well-known concept of “epistemology” some additional aspects necessary for such a relationship; after all, it must be recognized that such a form as an oxymoron is not often found in epistemological studies. Based on this, a conclusion is made about what images epistemological analysis can be carried out. The authors see here two possible research tasks, namely, the analysis of the non – production of knowledge and the analysis of the production of ignorance. © 2023 RAS Institute of Philosophy. All rights reserved.

@article{denicola_rik_2023,
	title = {Rik {Peels}' {Ignorance}: {A} {Philosophical} {Study}},
	volume = {8},
	issn = {2210-5700},
	shorttitle = {Rik {Peels}' {Ignorance}},
	doi = {10.1163/22105700-bja10064},
	abstract = {Although Rik Peels modestly subtitles his book A Philosophical Study,1 he promptly declares his ambitious, two-fold plan: to develop a "full-blown epistemology of ignorance"and then to use his epistemology "to enlighten several important debates that involve the notion of ignorance"(14, 18). The opening chapter includes a seven-page history of the philosophy of ignorance including brief notices of Hindu and Buddhist concepts, an account of the historic neglect of ignorance in analytic epistemology, and notice of recent scholarship. Though this introduction is largely self-contained, it does set a scholarly context for Peels' study, which he then previews. © 2023 Brill Academic Publishers. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {International Journal for the Study of Skepticism},
	author = {Denicola, D.R.},
	year = {2023},
}

Although Rik Peels modestly subtitles his book A Philosophical Study,1 he promptly declares his ambitious, two-fold plan: to develop a "full-blown epistemology of ignorance"and then to use his epistemology "to enlighten several important debates that involve the notion of ignorance"(14, 18). The opening chapter includes a seven-page history of the philosophy of ignorance including brief notices of Hindu and Buddhist concepts, an account of the historic neglect of ignorance in analytic epistemology, and notice of recent scholarship. Though this introduction is largely self-contained, it does set a scholarly context for Peels' study, which he then previews. © 2023 Brill Academic Publishers. All rights reserved.

@article{aldila2023,
	title = {Mathematical analysis of the impact of community ignorance on the population dynamics of dengue},
	volume = {9},
	doi = {10.3389/fams.2023.1094971/full},
	abstract = {This study proposes a dengue spread model that considers the nonlinear transmission rate to address the level of human ignorance of dengue in their environment. The SIR − UV model has been proposed, where SIR denotes the classification of the human population and UV denotes the classification of the mosquito population. Assuming that the total human population is constant, and the mosquito population is already in its steady-state condition, using the Quasi-Steady State Approximation (QSSA) method, we reduce our SIR − UV model into a more simple IR-model. Our analytical result shows that a stable disease-free equilibrium exists when the basic reproduction number is {\textless}1. Furthermore, our model also shows the possibility of a backward bifurcation. The more ignorant the society is about dengue, the higher the possibility that backward bifurcation phenomena may appear. As a result, the condition of the basic reproduction number being {\textless}1 is insufficient to guarantee the extinction of dengue in a population. Furthermore, we found that increasing the recovery rate, reducing the waning immunity rate, and mosquito life expectancy can reduce the possibility of backward bifurcation phenomena. We use dengue incidence data from Jakarta to calibrate the parameters in our model. Through the fast Fourier transform analysis, it was found that dengue incidence in Jakarta has a periodicity of 52.4, 73.4, and 146.8 weeks. This result indicates that dengue will periodically appear at least every year in Jakarta. Parameter estimation for our model parameters was carried out by assuming the infection rate of humans as a sinusoidal function by determining the three most dominant frequencies. Numerical and sensitivity analyses were conducted to observe the impact of community ignorance on dengue endemicity. From the sensitivity analysis, we found that, although a larger community ignorance can trigger a backward bifurcation, this threshold can be minimized by increasing the recovery rate, prolonging the temporal immunity, or reducing the mosquito population. Therefore, to control dengue transmission more effectively, media campaigns undertaken by the government to reduce community ignorance should be accompanied by other interventions, such as a good treatment in the hospital or vector control programs. With this combination of interventions, it will be easier to achieve a condition of dengue-free population when the basic reproduction number is less than one.},
	journal = {Frontiers in Applied …},
	author = {Aldila, D. and Puspadani, C. Aulia and Rusin, R.},
	year = {2023},
}

This study proposes a dengue spread model that considers the nonlinear transmission rate to address the level of human ignorance of dengue in their environment. The SIR − UV model has been proposed, where SIR denotes the classification of the human population and UV denotes the classification of the mosquito population. Assuming that the total human population is constant, and the mosquito population is already in its steady-state condition, using the Quasi-Steady State Approximation (QSSA) method, we reduce our SIR − UV model into a more simple IR-model. Our analytical result shows that a stable disease-free equilibrium exists when the basic reproduction number is \textless1. Furthermore, our model also shows the possibility of a backward bifurcation. The more ignorant the society is about dengue, the higher the possibility that backward bifurcation phenomena may appear. As a result, the condition of the basic reproduction number being \textless1 is insufficient to guarantee the extinction of dengue in a population. Furthermore, we found that increasing the recovery rate, reducing the waning immunity rate, and mosquito life expectancy can reduce the possibility of backward bifurcation phenomena. We use dengue incidence data from Jakarta to calibrate the parameters in our model. Through the fast Fourier transform analysis, it was found that dengue incidence in Jakarta has a periodicity of 52.4, 73.4, and 146.8 weeks. This result indicates that dengue will periodically appear at least every year in Jakarta. Parameter estimation for our model parameters was carried out by assuming the infection rate of humans as a sinusoidal function by determining the three most dominant frequencies. Numerical and sensitivity analyses were conducted to observe the impact of community ignorance on dengue endemicity. From the sensitivity analysis, we found that, although a larger community ignorance can trigger a backward bifurcation, this threshold can be minimized by increasing the recovery rate, prolonging the temporal immunity, or reducing the mosquito population. Therefore, to control dengue transmission more effectively, media campaigns undertaken by the government to reduce community ignorance should be accompanied by other interventions, such as a good treatment in the hospital or vector control programs. With this combination of interventions, it will be easier to achieve a condition of dengue-free population when the basic reproduction number is less than one.

@article{arora-jonsson2023a,
	title = {Unraveling the production of ignorance in climate policymaking: {The} imperative of a decolonial feminist intervention for transformation},
	volume = {149},
	doi = {10.1016/j.envsci.2023.103564},
	journal = {Environmental Science \& Policy},
	author = {Arora-Jonsson, Seema and Wahlström, Nora},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {103564},
}

@article{kirfel2023,
	title = {Why blame the ostrich? {Understanding} culpability for willful ignorance},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kswtu},
	abstract = {Willful Ignorance (WI) is a term in Anglo-American law to refer to circumstances in which a defendant remains intentionally unaware of a fact that would render them liable. These cases pose a unique problem for the law,as it is uncertain whether deliberate ignorance can be viewed as a form of knowledge and, therefore, whether they satisfy the mens rea requirement for culpability. In this chapter, we report two experimental studies modeled on United States vs. Jewell, a case in which Jewell aided an international drug-trafficking operation by transporting a suitcase which he deliberately avoided inspecting. We manipulated various features of the defendant’s epistemic state, relating to their suspicion, its reasonableness and its specificity. Our results showed that WI partially satisfies the mens rea requirement, though not to the extent of genuine knowledge. Participants considered willful ignorance incriminating, as long as the defendant suspected that they were involved in criminal activity, and regardless of whether their suspicion was reasonable or even true. Additionally, our studies suggested that judgment of culpability are related to broader inferences about the defendant’s antisocial tendencies—in line with theories that conceptualise WI as a demonstration of ‘ill will’. In closing, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for the broader legal-theoretical debate around the normative propriety of the willful ignorance doctrine.},
	journal = {Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law},
	author = {Kirfel, L. and Hannikainen, I. R.},
	year = {2023},
}

Willful Ignorance (WI) is a term in Anglo-American law to refer to circumstances in which a defendant remains intentionally unaware of a fact that would render them liable. These cases pose a unique problem for the law,as it is uncertain whether deliberate ignorance can be viewed as a form of knowledge and, therefore, whether they satisfy the mens rea requirement for culpability. In this chapter, we report two experimental studies modeled on United States vs. Jewell, a case in which Jewell aided an international drug-trafficking operation by transporting a suitcase which he deliberately avoided inspecting. We manipulated various features of the defendant’s epistemic state, relating to their suspicion, its reasonableness and its specificity. Our results showed that WI partially satisfies the mens rea requirement, though not to the extent of genuine knowledge. Participants considered willful ignorance incriminating, as long as the defendant suspected that they were involved in criminal activity, and regardless of whether their suspicion was reasonable or even true. Additionally, our studies suggested that judgment of culpability are related to broader inferences about the defendant’s antisocial tendencies—in line with theories that conceptualise WI as a demonstration of ‘ill will’. In closing, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for the broader legal-theoretical debate around the normative propriety of the willful ignorance doctrine.

@article{kinney2023,
	title = {Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance},
	volume = {106},
	doi = {10.1111/phpr.12837},
	abstract = {Critical race theorists and standpoint epistemologists argue that agents who are members of dominant social groups are often in a state of ignorance about the extent of their social dominance, where this ignorance is explained by these agents' membership in a socially dominant group (e.g., Mills 2007). To illustrate this claim bluntly, it is argued: 1) that many white men do not know the extent of their social dominance, 2) that they remain ignorant as to the extent of their dominant social position even where this information is freely attainable, and 3) that this ignorance is due in part to the fact that they are white men. We argue that on Buchak's (2010, 2013) model of risk averse instrumental rationality, ignorance of one's privileges can be rational. This argument yields a new account of elite‐group ignorance, why it may occur, and how it might be alleviated.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
	author = {Kinney, David and Bright, Liam Kofi},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {35--57},
}

Critical race theorists and standpoint epistemologists argue that agents who are members of dominant social groups are often in a state of ignorance about the extent of their social dominance, where this ignorance is explained by these agents' membership in a socially dominant group (e.g., Mills 2007). To illustrate this claim bluntly, it is argued: 1) that many white men do not know the extent of their social dominance, 2) that they remain ignorant as to the extent of their dominant social position even where this information is freely attainable, and 3) that this ignorance is due in part to the fact that they are white men. We argue that on Buchak's (2010, 2013) model of risk averse instrumental rationality, ignorance of one's privileges can be rational. This argument yields a new account of elite‐group ignorance, why it may occur, and how it might be alleviated.

@article{boguslav_creating_2023,
	title = {Creating an ignorance-base: {Exploring} known unknowns in the scientific literature},
	volume = {143},
	issn = {1532-0464},
	shorttitle = {Creating an ignorance-base},
	doi = {10.1016/j.jbi.2023.104405},
	abstract = {Background: Scientific discovery progresses by exploring new and uncharted territory. More specifically, it advances by a process of transforming unknown unknowns first into known unknowns, and then into knowns. Over the last few decades, researchers have developed many knowledge bases to capture and connect the knowns, which has enabled topic exploration and contextualization of experimental results. But recognizing the unknowns is also critical for finding the most pertinent questions and their answers. Prior work on known unknowns has sought to understand them, annotate them, and automate their identification. However, no knowledge-bases yet exist to capture these unknowns, and little work has focused on how scientists might use them to trace a given topic or experimental result in search of open questions and new avenues for exploration. We show here that a knowledge base of unknowns can be connected to ontologically grounded biomedical knowledge to accelerate research in the field of prenatal nutrition. Results: We present the first ignorance-base, a knowledge-base created by combining classifiers to recognize ignorance statements (statements of missing or incomplete knowledge that imply a goal for knowledge) and biomedical concepts over the prenatal nutrition literature. This knowledge-base places biomedical concepts mentioned in the literature in context with the ignorance statements authors have made about them. Using our system, researchers interested in the topic of vitamin D and prenatal health were able to uncover three new avenues for exploration (immune system, respiratory system, and brain development) by searching for concepts enriched in ignorance statements. These were buried among the many standard enriched concepts. Additionally, we used the ignorance-base to enrich concepts connected to a gene list associated with vitamin D and spontaneous preterm birth and found an emerging topic of study (brain development) in an implied field (neuroscience). The researchers could look to the field of neuroscience for potential answers to the ignorance statements. Conclusion: Our goal is to help students, researchers, funders, and publishers better understand the state of our collective scientific ignorance (known unknowns) in order to help accelerate research through the continued illumination of and focus on the known unknowns and their respective goals for scientific knowledge. © 2023 The Author(s)},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Journal of Biomedical Informatics},
	author = {Boguslav, M.R. and Salem, N.M. and White, E.K. and Sullivan, K.J. and Bada, M. and Hernandez, T.L. and Leach, S.M. and Hunter, L.E.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {1 Learned ignorance, Epistemology, Information extraction, Knowledge representation, Knowledge-base, Natural language processing, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Background: Scientific discovery progresses by exploring new and uncharted territory. More specifically, it advances by a process of transforming unknown unknowns first into known unknowns, and then into knowns. Over the last few decades, researchers have developed many knowledge bases to capture and connect the knowns, which has enabled topic exploration and contextualization of experimental results. But recognizing the unknowns is also critical for finding the most pertinent questions and their answers. Prior work on known unknowns has sought to understand them, annotate them, and automate their identification. However, no knowledge-bases yet exist to capture these unknowns, and little work has focused on how scientists might use them to trace a given topic or experimental result in search of open questions and new avenues for exploration. We show here that a knowledge base of unknowns can be connected to ontologically grounded biomedical knowledge to accelerate research in the field of prenatal nutrition. Results: We present the first ignorance-base, a knowledge-base created by combining classifiers to recognize ignorance statements (statements of missing or incomplete knowledge that imply a goal for knowledge) and biomedical concepts over the prenatal nutrition literature. This knowledge-base places biomedical concepts mentioned in the literature in context with the ignorance statements authors have made about them. Using our system, researchers interested in the topic of vitamin D and prenatal health were able to uncover three new avenues for exploration (immune system, respiratory system, and brain development) by searching for concepts enriched in ignorance statements. These were buried among the many standard enriched concepts. Additionally, we used the ignorance-base to enrich concepts connected to a gene list associated with vitamin D and spontaneous preterm birth and found an emerging topic of study (brain development) in an implied field (neuroscience). The researchers could look to the field of neuroscience for potential answers to the ignorance statements. Conclusion: Our goal is to help students, researchers, funders, and publishers better understand the state of our collective scientific ignorance (known unknowns) in order to help accelerate research through the continued illumination of and focus on the known unknowns and their respective goals for scientific knowledge. © 2023 The Author(s)

@article{binuyo2023,
	title = {Pluralistic {Ignorance} and {Non}-{Use} of {Modern} {Contraceptives} in {Southwestern} {Nigeria}: {A} {Qualitative} {Study} {Using} the {Social} {Norms} {Theory}},
	volume = {7},
	abstract = {Background: The 2018 National Demographic Health Survey (NDHS)
revealed that out of the current non-users of contraceptives amongst married
women, only 38\% of them made their own decision to abstain. The remaining
62\% either decided jointly with their partner or the partner solely decided for
them. This elicits the notion that social expectations within reference networks
could influence the use of modern contraceptives (MCs) in Nigeria.
Methods: 16 structured qualitative interviews were used to gather the beliefs,
attitudes and social expectations of the respondents as regards the non-use of
MCs between March and June 2020. Through snowballing sampling method,
residents in the Ibadan Metropolis, southwest Nigeria responded to the
hypothetical scenarios presented by the vignettes during interviews. Data were
analysed using the Social Norms Analysis Plot framework. This framework
serves as the checklist for the reporting of findings. Basic ethical principles were
upheld throughout the study.
Results: Seven categories and five main themes emerged from this study.
These categories include gender norms, social influence, peer pressure, myths,
misconceptions, awareness and pluralistic ignorance. The themes were
generated using the Social Norms Analysis Plot framework and they include
empirical expectation, normative expectations, sanctions, sensitivity to
sanctions and exceptions. The majority of the respondents strongly believe that
most women in their community will not use contraceptives simply because of
their male partners and friends. Out of those who do not use MCs due to social
expectations, it was seen that the majority personally support its use.
Conclusion: To promote the uptake of modern contraceptive use in Southwest
Nigeria, it is important to update people’s social expectations. The findings of
these study studies are relevant for policymakers and civil society
organizations in designing effective intervention reproductive health programs
in different regions of Nigeria (especially areas of lower use of modern
contraceptives).},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Journal of Social Behavior and Community Heath},
	author = {Binuyo, O. A.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {980--989},
}

Background: The 2018 National Demographic Health Survey (NDHS) revealed that out of the current non-users of contraceptives amongst married women, only 38% of them made their own decision to abstain. The remaining 62% either decided jointly with their partner or the partner solely decided for them. This elicits the notion that social expectations within reference networks could influence the use of modern contraceptives (MCs) in Nigeria. Methods: 16 structured qualitative interviews were used to gather the beliefs, attitudes and social expectations of the respondents as regards the non-use of MCs between March and June 2020. Through snowballing sampling method, residents in the Ibadan Metropolis, southwest Nigeria responded to the hypothetical scenarios presented by the vignettes during interviews. Data were analysed using the Social Norms Analysis Plot framework. This framework serves as the checklist for the reporting of findings. Basic ethical principles were upheld throughout the study. Results: Seven categories and five main themes emerged from this study. These categories include gender norms, social influence, peer pressure, myths, misconceptions, awareness and pluralistic ignorance. The themes were generated using the Social Norms Analysis Plot framework and they include empirical expectation, normative expectations, sanctions, sensitivity to sanctions and exceptions. The majority of the respondents strongly believe that most women in their community will not use contraceptives simply because of their male partners and friends. Out of those who do not use MCs due to social expectations, it was seen that the majority personally support its use. Conclusion: To promote the uptake of modern contraceptive use in Southwest Nigeria, it is important to update people’s social expectations. The findings of these study studies are relevant for policymakers and civil society organizations in designing effective intervention reproductive health programs in different regions of Nigeria (especially areas of lower use of modern contraceptives).

@book{ferry-danini_pilules_2023,
	title = {Pilules roses : de l'ignorance en médecine},
	isbn = {978-2-234-09126-9},
	abstract = {Vous en avez probablement au fond de votre trousse à pharmacie. Le Spasfon est l’un des médicaments les plus prescrits et vendus en France, en majorité aux femmes. Une pilule rose familière lorsque l’on souffre de règles douloureuses. Et pourtant, aucun essai clinique ne soutient son efficacité pour cette indication.

Juliette Ferry-Danini retourne aux origines du médicament, dans les années 1960. L’histoire du Spasfon n’est pas toute rose  : des malades empoisonnés à dessein, des données scientifiques défaillantes et le sexisme ont marqué son développement, construisant une situation d’ignorance scientifique qui perdure aujourd’hui.

Dans cet essai de philosophie féministe, l’autrice analyse les conséquences de cette ignorance en médecine et propose des outils essentiels pour redonner du pouvoir et de l’autonomie aux patientes et patients.},
	language = {French},
	publisher = {Stock},
	author = {Ferry-Danini, Juliette},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Vous en avez probablement au fond de votre trousse à pharmacie. Le Spasfon est l’un des médicaments les plus prescrits et vendus en France, en majorité aux femmes. Une pilule rose familière lorsque l’on souffre de règles douloureuses. Et pourtant, aucun essai clinique ne soutient son efficacité pour cette indication. Juliette Ferry-Danini retourne aux origines du médicament, dans les années 1960. L’histoire du Spasfon n’est pas toute rose : des malades empoisonnés à dessein, des données scientifiques défaillantes et le sexisme ont marqué son développement, construisant une situation d’ignorance scientifique qui perdure aujourd’hui. Dans cet essai de philosophie féministe, l’autrice analyse les conséquences de cette ignorance en médecine et propose des outils essentiels pour redonner du pouvoir et de l’autonomie aux patientes et patients.

@book{coudray_nitrites_2023,
	title = {Nitrites dans la charcuterie : le scandale: {L}'enquête choc pour tout savoir sur les charcuteries, les nitrites et le cancer},
	isbn = {979-10-339-1392-4},
	shorttitle = {Nitrites dans la charcuterie},
	abstract = {Nitrites dans le jambon et la charcuterie : le scandaleLe nouveau rapport de l'ANSES vient de confirmer la dangerosité des charcuteries traitées aux additifs nitrités qui sont reconnus comme «cancérogènes». Que fera l’Etat : interdiction totale des  nitrites, comme le veulent les ONG ? Ou bien «  baisse symbolique  », comme le veut la filière ? Nous ne sommes qu'au début de la bataille… Il serait absurde de réduire un aliment à sa dimension sanitaire. Le jambon blanc, c'est pour beaucoup de Français un aliment apprécié, attaché à l'enfance. On l'aime pour son goût et son côté pratique. De même, le saucisson et les rillettes, ne sont-ils pas synonymes de plaisirs et de convivialité  ? Guillaume Coudray, dans ce Livre Noir de la charcuterie, revient sur le scandale des  nitrites et nous donne des clefs pour choisir ce qu’on achète et décider de ce que nous mettons dans nos assiettes et dans celles de nos enfants.Auteur  :Guillaume Coudray est journaliste d'investigation, réalisateur de documentaires et l’auteur de Cochonneries, comment la charcuterie est devenue un poison ? (La Découverte, 2017). Son enquête sur la charcuterie industrielle a fait l’objet d'un Cash Investigation présenté par Élise Lucet sur France 2. Ses révélations sur le nitrite ont donné lieu à une mission à l'Assemblée Nationale afin de protéger les français des risques de cancer du côlon.},
	language = {Français},
	publisher = {HarperCollins},
	author = {Coudray, Guillaume},
	month = feb,
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Nitrites dans le jambon et la charcuterie : le scandaleLe nouveau rapport de l'ANSES vient de confirmer la dangerosité des charcuteries traitées aux additifs nitrités qui sont reconnus comme «cancérogènes». Que fera l’Etat : interdiction totale des  nitrites, comme le veulent les ONG ? Ou bien «  baisse symbolique  », comme le veut la filière ? Nous ne sommes qu'au début de la bataille… Il serait absurde de réduire un aliment à sa dimension sanitaire. Le jambon blanc, c'est pour beaucoup de Français un aliment apprécié, attaché à l'enfance. On l'aime pour son goût et son côté pratique. De même, le saucisson et les rillettes, ne sont-ils pas synonymes de plaisirs et de convivialité  ? Guillaume Coudray, dans ce Livre Noir de la charcuterie, revient sur le scandale des  nitrites et nous donne des clefs pour choisir ce qu’on achète et décider de ce que nous mettons dans nos assiettes et dans celles de nos enfants.Auteur  :Guillaume Coudray est journaliste d'investigation, réalisateur de documentaires et l’auteur de Cochonneries, comment la charcuterie est devenue un poison ? (La Découverte, 2017). Son enquête sur la charcuterie industrielle a fait l’objet d'un Cash Investigation présenté par Élise Lucet sur France 2. Ses révélations sur le nitrite ont donné lieu à une mission à l'Assemblée Nationale afin de protéger les français des risques de cancer du côlon.

@book{sismondo_management_2023,
	address = {Paris},
	title = {Le management fantôme de la médecine : les mains invisibles de {Big} {Pharma}},
	url = {http://catalogue-editions.ens-lyon.fr/fr/livre/?GCOI=29021100357310},
	abstract = {Sismondo se propose de comprendre ce qui se passe au sein de la chaîne de production de données scientifique sur le médicament, depuis la conception de l'essai clinique jusqu’à la diffusion des résultats. Il met en évidence ce qu’il appelle la « gestion fantôme » de ce processus qui permet un contrôle très abouti de la science du médicament.},
	language = {FR},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	publisher = {ENS Éditions},
	author = {Sismondo, Sergio},
	translator = {Saïdi, Samantha},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Sismondo se propose de comprendre ce qui se passe au sein de la chaîne de production de données scientifique sur le médicament, depuis la conception de l'essai clinique jusqu’à la diffusion des résultats. Il met en évidence ce qu’il appelle la « gestion fantôme » de ce processus qui permet un contrôle très abouti de la science du médicament.

@book{le_marec__2023,
	title = {« {Fabriques} de l'ignorance », {Communication} \& langages, n°214,},
	isbn = {978-2-13-083471-7},
	url = {https://hal.science/hal-03987273},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu'elles tentent d'observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	publisher = {PUF},
	editor = {Le Marec, Joëlle and Raymond, Lucie},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Issue: 214},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu'elles tentent d'observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{rushanova_ignorance_2023,
	title = {"{Ignorance}" in ethnic culture – the philosophy of {Al}-{Farabi}},
	volume = {16},
	issn = {1337-8384},
	doi = {10.18355/XL.2023.16.03.03},
	abstract = {This article provides a brief overview of al-Farabi's contribution to science. Abu Nasr al-Farabi was the greatest philosopher and scientist of his time. Initially, he completed his studies in Farabi and Bukhara. Later, he went to Baghdad, where he studied and worked for a long time. During this time, al-Farabi mastered several languages and various branches of knowledge and technology. The article identifies specific problems of ignorance in the ethical philosophy of al-Farabi, the founder of the actual political and ethical philosophy, especially Farabi's synthesis of ancient and Muslim traditions. The paper reveals the place of the Platonic political concepts. We introduce the influence of Farabi's ideas on the further development of ethical thought in Islam. In addition, the article indicates the thoughts and treatises where al-Farabi implacably and harshly criticized ignorant, weak and lazy managers, unworthy to lead even small communities. In his works, he gives the characteristic features of a "rule". © 2023, Slovenska Vzdelavacia Obstaravacia. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {XLinguae},
	author = {Rushanova, N. and Syrgakbaeva, A. and Kulshanova, A. and Akhmetova, E. and Mukhamejanova, A.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), contribution to science, scientific treatises, significant works, the existence of a vacuum, various branches},
	pages = {27--34},
}

This article provides a brief overview of al-Farabi's contribution to science. Abu Nasr al-Farabi was the greatest philosopher and scientist of his time. Initially, he completed his studies in Farabi and Bukhara. Later, he went to Baghdad, where he studied and worked for a long time. During this time, al-Farabi mastered several languages and various branches of knowledge and technology. The article identifies specific problems of ignorance in the ethical philosophy of al-Farabi, the founder of the actual political and ethical philosophy, especially Farabi's synthesis of ancient and Muslim traditions. The paper reveals the place of the Platonic political concepts. We introduce the influence of Farabi's ideas on the further development of ethical thought in Islam. In addition, the article indicates the thoughts and treatises where al-Farabi implacably and harshly criticized ignorant, weak and lazy managers, unworthy to lead even small communities. In his works, he gives the characteristic features of a "rule". © 2023, Slovenska Vzdelavacia Obstaravacia. All rights reserved.

@article{willard-kyle_valuable_2023,
	title = {Valuable ignorance: delayed epistemic gratification},
	volume = {180},
	issn = {0031-8116},
	shorttitle = {Valuable ignorance},
	doi = {10.1007/s11098-022-01902-6},
	abstract = {A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that beliefless ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	author = {Willard-Kyle, C.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Delayed gratification, Epistemic value, Ignorance, Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, Inquiry, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {363--384},
}

A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that beliefless ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about. © 2022, The Author(s).

@book{peels_ignorance_2023,
	address = {New-York (NY)},
	title = {Ignorance: {A} {Philosophical} {Study}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-765451-4},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance},
	abstract = {This book rigorously develops a full-blown epistemology of ignorance. It answers questions that are rarely addressed in philosophy; for example, what is ignorance of facts or truths? Is it simply the absence of knowledge, or are things more complex? Can there also be ignorance of entities and ignorance of how to do something? How does ignorance of facts relate to ignorance on some topic, say, quantum mechanics? If one holds a false belief but one also believes one should not hold that belief because it is irrational, does one still count as ignorant? What varieties of ignorance are there? For instance, should we distinguish between disbelief and suspension of judgment and not even being able to grasp a proposition? What is it for groups to be ignorant? And how should we construe degrees of ignorance? This book then shows what difference this epistemology of ignorance makes by applying it to six contemporary debates on sometimes controversial topics in and beyond philosophy: white ignorance, practices of making people ignorant as studied in agnotology, the conditions under which ignorance counts as an excuse, responsibility and particularly culpability for ignorance, educational practices that aim at ignorance, and asserting that one is ignorant. In each case, it turns out that the epistemology of ignorance developed in the first part of the book provides the resources to take the debate important steps further and, in some cases, even to resolve philosophical problems. © Oxford University Press 2023. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Peels, R.},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780197654514.001.0001},
	note = {Pages: 328},
	keywords = {PRINTED (DOCUMENT IMPRIMÉ), agnotology, culpable ignorance, epistemology of ignorance, group ignorance, ignorance as an excuse, ignorance in education, nature of ignorance, varieties of ignorance, white ignorance},
}

This book rigorously develops a full-blown epistemology of ignorance. It answers questions that are rarely addressed in philosophy; for example, what is ignorance of facts or truths? Is it simply the absence of knowledge, or are things more complex? Can there also be ignorance of entities and ignorance of how to do something? How does ignorance of facts relate to ignorance on some topic, say, quantum mechanics? If one holds a false belief but one also believes one should not hold that belief because it is irrational, does one still count as ignorant? What varieties of ignorance are there? For instance, should we distinguish between disbelief and suspension of judgment and not even being able to grasp a proposition? What is it for groups to be ignorant? And how should we construe degrees of ignorance? This book then shows what difference this epistemology of ignorance makes by applying it to six contemporary debates on sometimes controversial topics in and beyond philosophy: white ignorance, practices of making people ignorant as studied in agnotology, the conditions under which ignorance counts as an excuse, responsibility and particularly culpability for ignorance, educational practices that aim at ignorance, and asserting that one is ignorant. In each case, it turns out that the epistemology of ignorance developed in the first part of the book provides the resources to take the debate important steps further and, in some cases, even to resolve philosophical problems. © Oxford University Press 2023. All rights reserved.

@book{burke_ignorance_2023,
	address = {New Haven},
	title = {Ignorance: {A} {Global} {History}},
	isbn = {978-0-300-26595-8},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance},
	abstract = {Throughout history, every age has thought of itself as more knowledgeable than the last. Renaissance humanists viewed the Middle Ages as an era of darkness, Enlightenment thinkers tried to sweep superstition away with reason, the modern welfare state sought to slay the “giant” of ignorance, and in today’s hyperconnected world seemingly limitless information is available on demand. But what about the knowledge lost over the centuries? Are we really any less ignorant than our ancestors?   In this highly original account, Peter Burke examines the long history of humanity’s ignorance across religion and science, war and politics, business and catastrophes. Burke reveals remarkable stories of the many forms of ignorance—genuine or feigned, conscious and unconscious—from the willful politicians who redrew Europe’s borders in 1919 to the politics of whistleblowing and climate change denial. The result is a lively exploration of human knowledge across the ages, and the importance of recognizing its limits.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Yale University Press},
	author = {Burke, Peter},
	month = feb,
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {PRINTED (DOCUMENT IMPRIMÉ)},
}

Throughout history, every age has thought of itself as more knowledgeable than the last. Renaissance humanists viewed the Middle Ages as an era of darkness, Enlightenment thinkers tried to sweep superstition away with reason, the modern welfare state sought to slay the “giant” of ignorance, and in today’s hyperconnected world seemingly limitless information is available on demand. But what about the knowledge lost over the centuries? Are we really any less ignorant than our ancestors?   In this highly original account, Peter Burke examines the long history of humanity’s ignorance across religion and science, war and politics, business and catastrophes. Burke reveals remarkable stories of the many forms of ignorance—genuine or feigned, conscious and unconscious—from the willful politicians who redrew Europe’s borders in 1919 to the politics of whistleblowing and climate change denial. The result is a lively exploration of human knowledge across the ages, and the importance of recognizing its limits.

@article{schweizer2023,
	title = {Ignorance: {Passive}, {Active}, or {Virtuous}},
	volume = {28},
	doi = {10.1080/10848770.2022.2074454},
	abstract = {Recension de Kourany et Carrier 2020},
	number = {2},
	journal = {The European Legacy},
	author = {Schweizer, Karl W.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {186--190},
}

Recension de Kourany et Carrier 2020

@incollection{arfini2023,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Serendipity {Science}: {An} {Emerging} {Field} and its {Methods}},
	title = {Serendipity and {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-33528-0},
	abstract = {Selene Arfini seeks to resolve a long-standing paradox and the seemingly exclusive dichotomy between knowledge and ignorance through the concept of serendipity. How can we find new knowledge when we do not know what are we looking for? This question is a brief version of Meno’s or the Learner’s Paradox, which still manages to be upsetting in contemporary philosophy, despite having been discussed since Plato’s times. Arfini believes that the paradox still upsets because we strongly connect the explicit act of searching to the event of finding, in the same way as we describe the ideas of knowledge and ignorance as opposite and unrelated. Arfini argues that these assumptions live on, thanks to a cluster of misconceptions that still envelop the ideas of discovery, which could be overcome by utilizing insights from recent studies in serendipity, and by reframing ignorance from a cognitive perspective.},
	booktitle = {Serendipity {Science}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Arfini, Selene},
	editor = {Copeland, Samantha and Ross, Wendy and Sand, Martin},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {125--143},
}

Selene Arfini seeks to resolve a long-standing paradox and the seemingly exclusive dichotomy between knowledge and ignorance through the concept of serendipity. How can we find new knowledge when we do not know what are we looking for? This question is a brief version of Meno’s or the Learner’s Paradox, which still manages to be upsetting in contemporary philosophy, despite having been discussed since Plato’s times. Arfini believes that the paradox still upsets because we strongly connect the explicit act of searching to the event of finding, in the same way as we describe the ideas of knowledge and ignorance as opposite and unrelated. Arfini argues that these assumptions live on, thanks to a cluster of misconceptions that still envelop the ideas of discovery, which could be overcome by utilizing insights from recent studies in serendipity, and by reframing ignorance from a cognitive perspective.

@incollection{arfini2023a,
	address = {Cham},
	title = {Ignorance},
	abstract = {Ignorance is an inherently broad and comprehensive notion, which, ironically, can refer to both the worst enemy of science and knowledge-related efforts and, in its Socratic form, their best ally. Indeed, by understanding the concept of ignorance, one can discuss a variety of topics, such as error, falsity, and prejudice but also surprise, wonder, and creativity. Unsurprisingly, so, the current research about ignorance is varied and interconnected. Thus, this chapter will be divided into two main sections: the first will be dedicated to a brief presentation of the different research areas that shape current ignorance studies; in the second section, a few questions will be asked: What can we do about our ignorance? How can ignorance be exploited and become useful? How can ignorance define the limits of our possibilities? Even if the answers presented in this chapter will not provide an exhaustive picture of how ignorance interacts with human chances, they will hopefully offer suggestions for further steps in its analysis and investigation.},
	booktitle = {The {Palgrave} encyclopedia of the possible},
	publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
	author = {Arfini, S.},
	year = {2023},
}

Ignorance is an inherently broad and comprehensive notion, which, ironically, can refer to both the worst enemy of science and knowledge-related efforts and, in its Socratic form, their best ally. Indeed, by understanding the concept of ignorance, one can discuss a variety of topics, such as error, falsity, and prejudice but also surprise, wonder, and creativity. Unsurprisingly, so, the current research about ignorance is varied and interconnected. Thus, this chapter will be divided into two main sections: the first will be dedicated to a brief presentation of the different research areas that shape current ignorance studies; in the second section, a few questions will be asked: What can we do about our ignorance? How can ignorance be exploited and become useful? How can ignorance define the limits of our possibilities? Even if the answers presented in this chapter will not provide an exhaustive picture of how ignorance interacts with human chances, they will hopefully offer suggestions for further steps in its analysis and investigation.

@article{wang2023,
	title = {Pritchard on ignorance and normativity},
	volume = {2},
	doi = {10.1007/s44204-022-00058-8},
	abstract = {There is a debate on the nature of ignorance in contemporary epistemology. The standard view holds that ignorance is the lack of knowledge, while the new view contends that ignorance is the lack of true belief. Rather than taking a side in this dispute, Pritchard recently offers a new proposal according to which ignorance essentially involves not just the absence of a certain epistemic good, but also an intellectual failing of inquiry. We argue that Pritchard’s new proposal advances the discussion of ignorance by incorporating insight from virtue epistemology, and hence the normative dimension of ignorance is properly noticed. Crucially, ignorance is no longer a mere static cognitive state, but also reflects the quality of inquiry and inquirers’ obligations. However, the new proposal faces two problems. First, current formulation is incomplete so that it cannot ground the epistemic blame that Pritchard requires. More details must be filled in. Second, his view would label all ignorance as normatively negative, and therefore locutions such as virtuous ignorance, blameless ignorance and the positive value of ignorance would be wrong.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Asian Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Wang, Ju and Wang, Chuhan},
	year = {2023},
}

There is a debate on the nature of ignorance in contemporary epistemology. The standard view holds that ignorance is the lack of knowledge, while the new view contends that ignorance is the lack of true belief. Rather than taking a side in this dispute, Pritchard recently offers a new proposal according to which ignorance essentially involves not just the absence of a certain epistemic good, but also an intellectual failing of inquiry. We argue that Pritchard’s new proposal advances the discussion of ignorance by incorporating insight from virtue epistemology, and hence the normative dimension of ignorance is properly noticed. Crucially, ignorance is no longer a mere static cognitive state, but also reflects the quality of inquiry and inquirers’ obligations. However, the new proposal faces two problems. First, current formulation is incomplete so that it cannot ground the epistemic blame that Pritchard requires. More details must be filled in. Second, his view would label all ignorance as normatively negative, and therefore locutions such as virtuous ignorance, blameless ignorance and the positive value of ignorance would be wrong.

@article{saxe2023,
	title = {Disrupting an epistemology of {White} ignorance through writing a racial autobiography},
	volume = {14},
	abstract = {White students who enter university having few experiences engaging with race and white supremacy are likely limited in their ability to perceive and understand structural white ignorance and racial bias towards Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC). As a result, these students and their professors tend to gloss over the insidious ways that hegemonic whiteness is upheld within the university setting. Such failure to critically examine structural whiteness misses opportunities to confront an epistemology of white ignorance, the Racial Contract, and their connection to sustained racial domination. Throughout this article, we argue that students can work towards identifying and disrupting white ignorance by writing a racial autobiography that critically reflects upon students’ own experiences of race and racism. We use this assignment to illustrate what it might mean for students to ‘become’ co-conspirators within and beyond the university setting.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Critical Education},
	author = {Saxe, JG de and Ker, A.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {86--100},
}

White students who enter university having few experiences engaging with race and white supremacy are likely limited in their ability to perceive and understand structural white ignorance and racial bias towards Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC). As a result, these students and their professors tend to gloss over the insidious ways that hegemonic whiteness is upheld within the university setting. Such failure to critically examine structural whiteness misses opportunities to confront an epistemology of white ignorance, the Racial Contract, and their connection to sustained racial domination. Throughout this article, we argue that students can work towards identifying and disrupting white ignorance by writing a racial autobiography that critically reflects upon students’ own experiences of race and racism. We use this assignment to illustrate what it might mean for students to ‘become’ co-conspirators within and beyond the university setting.

@article{zanders2023,
	title = {Rational ignorance in the search for extra-terrestrial life},
	volume = {96},
	doi = {10.1016/j.newar.2023.101675},
	abstract = {The question “are we alone in the universe?” has been asked through the ages and is beginning to be addressed by deploying spacecraft and advanced observatories capable of detecting biological signatures. Apart from the certainty that life exists on the Earth, there is no clear evidence at the time of writing for extra-terrestrial life (also termed exo-life). Although the sheer number of potentially habitable extrasolar planets in our galaxy alone makes a compelling case for widespread exo-life if taken in isolation, the constraints on the emergence of life imposed by chemistry and biology provide a counterbalance to this optimistic view. In the absence of any clear sign of exo-life and therefore our ignorance about whether it exists or not, the only way forward is to apply scientific knowledge in a rational way to discriminate between different scenarios until such a time that real evidence is forthcoming, if at all. This article reviews the main features of current astrobiological research to speculate on the likelihood of each critical transition in the development of living entities, emphasising the involvement of chemistry and informational macromolecules. It concludes that carbon-based compounds may be widespread on and in exoplanets, but the organisation of these prebiotic molecules into cellular structures with anything like the complexity of the primitive organisms on Earth could be very rare or non-existent. However, if such organisms do arise, the path to multicellularity and the functional organisation required for human capabilities may not be so daunting. Some of the key genetic features required for this development may already be present in primitive cells ready to be activated or repurposed.},
	journal = {New Astronomy Reviews},
	author = {Zanders, Edward D.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {1 Learned ignorance},
	pages = {101675},
}

The question “are we alone in the universe?” has been asked through the ages and is beginning to be addressed by deploying spacecraft and advanced observatories capable of detecting biological signatures. Apart from the certainty that life exists on the Earth, there is no clear evidence at the time of writing for extra-terrestrial life (also termed exo-life). Although the sheer number of potentially habitable extrasolar planets in our galaxy alone makes a compelling case for widespread exo-life if taken in isolation, the constraints on the emergence of life imposed by chemistry and biology provide a counterbalance to this optimistic view. In the absence of any clear sign of exo-life and therefore our ignorance about whether it exists or not, the only way forward is to apply scientific knowledge in a rational way to discriminate between different scenarios until such a time that real evidence is forthcoming, if at all. This article reviews the main features of current astrobiological research to speculate on the likelihood of each critical transition in the development of living entities, emphasising the involvement of chemistry and informational macromolecules. It concludes that carbon-based compounds may be widespread on and in exoplanets, but the organisation of these prebiotic molecules into cellular structures with anything like the complexity of the primitive organisms on Earth could be very rare or non-existent. However, if such organisms do arise, the path to multicellularity and the functional organisation required for human capabilities may not be so daunting. Some of the key genetic features required for this development may already be present in primitive cells ready to be activated or repurposed.

@phdthesis{delepouve_giec_2023,
	type = {phdthesis},
	title = {Le {GIEC}, une dialectique science et politique. {De} la quantophrénie et de l’imprévisible},
	url = {https://theses.hal.science/tel-04166748},
	abstract = {Notre thèse explore la question de la prise en compte de l’imprévisible dans les rapports du GIEC, dans sa communication ‘à l’intention des décideurs et finalement dans l’élaboration des politiques climatiques.Nous y donnons à voir l’émergence et le développement d’une dynamique internationale science et politique relative au changement climatique, dans laquelle le GIEC est rapidement devenu l’acteur central. Nos travaux sont centrés sur le croisement de cette dynamique avec la tension entre la quantophrénie (tendance à ne prendre en considération que ce qui est quantifié) et l’imprévisible. En particulier, nous avons observé cette tension dans l’utilisation des résultats de la modélisation climatique portant sur le futur, et corrélativement dans l’utilisation des scénarios climatiques pour le XXIe siècle, notamment lors de leur traduction en objectifs politiques. In fine, nous constatons la diffusion d’une sous-estimation du risque climatique sur la base de laquelle sont définis des objectifs politiques, en raison de l’absence de prise en compte de l’imprévisible.Enfin, nous introduisons un concept épistémologique inédit, le Reste causal, outil d’une conception renouvelée de l’expertise scientifique et plus largement du triptyque science, expertise et politique. L’objectif est notamment de prendre pleinement en compte l’imprévisible dans la stratégie politique. Un Reste causal est un complément associé à une représentation de l’évolution d’un phénomène donné. Il rassemble les phénomènes qui influencent cette évolution, mais qui ne sont pas pris en compte par cette représentation.Par ailleurs, l’annexe 1 montre qu’actuellement le système Terre bifurque non pas seulement vers une nouvelle époque géologique, l’Anthropocène, mais plutôt vers un nouvel éon, le 5e de l’histoire de notre planète, que nous nommons Anthropozoïque. Il s’en dégage une approche renouvelée de la place des humains dans l’histoire du Système Terre. En outre, nous illustrons de plusieurs manières la sortie de la période géologique du Quaternaire et en tirons des conséquences sur le niveau de fiabilité des modèles climatiques, dès lors que les résultats portent sur le futur.Notre thèse comporte trois études de cas. Chacune a son objet au croisement de la dynamique science et politique et de la tension entre quantophrénie et imprévisible, et chacune montre comment une quantification peut contribuer à une représentation atténuée d’un risque.- La première porte sur un objet politique quantophrénique qui masque l’imprévisible, à savoir le facteur 2, c’est-à-dire la réduction de 50 \% des émissions de Gaz à effet de serre (GES) à l’horizon 2050. Dans les années 2000 et jusqu’à récemment, ce facteur a connu une certaine appropriation dans les pays du G8. Son étude apporte un éclairage sur la dialectique entre science et politique qui s’exerce au sein du GIEC, ainsi que sur un usage politique abusif de référence au GIEC.- La deuxième porte sur quatre sources naturelles de méthane dont les émissions durant le XXIe siècle sont largement imprévisibles et non quantifiables, mais risquent de contribuer à un emballement du réchauffement climatique. Notre thèse présente ce que la production de recherche et les rapports du GIEC disent sur ce sujet, et constate l’absence totale de prise en compte de ces émissions par les scénarios du GIEC.- La troisième porte sur la place accordée à l’imprévisible et au Reste causal associé aux scénarios, dans les Résumés à l’intention des décideurs des différents Rapports d’évaluation (RE) du GIEC, du le 1er RE (1990) au 6e et dernier RE (2021). Cette étude éclaire en particulier la mission politique du GIEC.Pour finir, notre thèse apporte une vision renforcée de l’urgente nécessité de réduire les émissions de méthane et, par ailleurs, fournit une quantité de questions et de nombreux matériaux pour une variété de projets et de programmes de recherche.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-03-15},
	school = {HESAM Université},
	author = {Delepouve, Marc},
	month = jun,
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {10 Ignorance, uncertainty and risk},
}

Notre thèse explore la question de la prise en compte de l’imprévisible dans les rapports du GIEC, dans sa communication ‘à l’intention des décideurs et finalement dans l’élaboration des politiques climatiques.Nous y donnons à voir l’émergence et le développement d’une dynamique internationale science et politique relative au changement climatique, dans laquelle le GIEC est rapidement devenu l’acteur central. Nos travaux sont centrés sur le croisement de cette dynamique avec la tension entre la quantophrénie (tendance à ne prendre en considération que ce qui est quantifié) et l’imprévisible. En particulier, nous avons observé cette tension dans l’utilisation des résultats de la modélisation climatique portant sur le futur, et corrélativement dans l’utilisation des scénarios climatiques pour le XXIe siècle, notamment lors de leur traduction en objectifs politiques. In fine, nous constatons la diffusion d’une sous-estimation du risque climatique sur la base de laquelle sont définis des objectifs politiques, en raison de l’absence de prise en compte de l’imprévisible.Enfin, nous introduisons un concept épistémologique inédit, le Reste causal, outil d’une conception renouvelée de l’expertise scientifique et plus largement du triptyque science, expertise et politique. L’objectif est notamment de prendre pleinement en compte l’imprévisible dans la stratégie politique. Un Reste causal est un complément associé à une représentation de l’évolution d’un phénomène donné. Il rassemble les phénomènes qui influencent cette évolution, mais qui ne sont pas pris en compte par cette représentation.Par ailleurs, l’annexe 1 montre qu’actuellement le système Terre bifurque non pas seulement vers une nouvelle époque géologique, l’Anthropocène, mais plutôt vers un nouvel éon, le 5e de l’histoire de notre planète, que nous nommons Anthropozoïque. Il s’en dégage une approche renouvelée de la place des humains dans l’histoire du Système Terre. En outre, nous illustrons de plusieurs manières la sortie de la période géologique du Quaternaire et en tirons des conséquences sur le niveau de fiabilité des modèles climatiques, dès lors que les résultats portent sur le futur.Notre thèse comporte trois études de cas. Chacune a son objet au croisement de la dynamique science et politique et de la tension entre quantophrénie et imprévisible, et chacune montre comment une quantification peut contribuer à une représentation atténuée d’un risque.- La première porte sur un objet politique quantophrénique qui masque l’imprévisible, à savoir le facteur 2, c’est-à-dire la réduction de 50 % des émissions de Gaz à effet de serre (GES) à l’horizon 2050. Dans les années 2000 et jusqu’à récemment, ce facteur a connu une certaine appropriation dans les pays du G8. Son étude apporte un éclairage sur la dialectique entre science et politique qui s’exerce au sein du GIEC, ainsi que sur un usage politique abusif de référence au GIEC.- La deuxième porte sur quatre sources naturelles de méthane dont les émissions durant le XXIe siècle sont largement imprévisibles et non quantifiables, mais risquent de contribuer à un emballement du réchauffement climatique. Notre thèse présente ce que la production de recherche et les rapports du GIEC disent sur ce sujet, et constate l’absence totale de prise en compte de ces émissions par les scénarios du GIEC.- La troisième porte sur la place accordée à l’imprévisible et au Reste causal associé aux scénarios, dans les Résumés à l’intention des décideurs des différents Rapports d’évaluation (RE) du GIEC, du le 1er RE (1990) au 6e et dernier RE (2021). Cette étude éclaire en particulier la mission politique du GIEC.Pour finir, notre thèse apporte une vision renforcée de l’urgente nécessité de réduire les émissions de méthane et, par ailleurs, fournit une quantité de questions et de nombreux matériaux pour une variété de projets et de programmes de recherche.

@incollection{janich2023,
	address = {Berlin, Boston},
	title = {14. {Nichtwissen} und {Unsicherheit} in {Naturwissenschaften} und {Mathematik}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110296259-015},
	abstract = {Der Beitrag diskutiert die Frage, wie innerhalb und außerhalb der Naturwissenschaften Unsicherheits- und Nichtwissenszuschreibungen stattfinden, welche sprachliche Form und welche diskursive Funktion sie in der Wissenschaftskommunikation haben und welchen Beitrag die Linguistik im breiten Feld der vor allem philosophisch und sozialwissenschaftlich geprägten „Ignorance Studies“ leisten kann und sollte. Nach einem einführenden Problemaufriss der sprachlichen Vagheit von knowledge/ignorance claims wird darauf eingegangen, was unter wissenschaftlichem Wissen und Nichtwissen verstanden werden kann und an welche erkenntnistheoretischen sowie sozialkonstruktivistischen Traditionslinien der hier vorgelegte diskurslinguistische Operationalisierungsvorschlag anknüpft. In einem exemplarischen Durchgang durch verschiedene Teildisziplinen werden linguistische Forschungsfragen zur „Nichtwissenskommunikation“ formuliert und erste Erkenntnisse skizziert. Der Beitrag endet mit einem Überblick über Einstellungen zu und Bewertungen von ignorance claims in Wissenschaft, Journalismus und Öffentlichkeit.},
	language = {German},
	booktitle = {Handbuch {Sprache} in {Mathematik}, {Naturwissenschaften} und {Technik}},
	publisher = {De Gruyter},
	author = {Janich, N. and Rhein, L. and Simon, N.},
	editor = {Atayan, Vahram and Metten, Thomas and Schmidt, Vasco Alexander},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {1 Learned ignorance},
	pages = {355--378},
}

Der Beitrag diskutiert die Frage, wie innerhalb und außerhalb der Naturwissenschaften Unsicherheits- und Nichtwissenszuschreibungen stattfinden, welche sprachliche Form und welche diskursive Funktion sie in der Wissenschaftskommunikation haben und welchen Beitrag die Linguistik im breiten Feld der vor allem philosophisch und sozialwissenschaftlich geprägten „Ignorance Studies“ leisten kann und sollte. Nach einem einführenden Problemaufriss der sprachlichen Vagheit von knowledge/ignorance claims wird darauf eingegangen, was unter wissenschaftlichem Wissen und Nichtwissen verstanden werden kann und an welche erkenntnistheoretischen sowie sozialkonstruktivistischen Traditionslinien der hier vorgelegte diskurslinguistische Operationalisierungsvorschlag anknüpft. In einem exemplarischen Durchgang durch verschiedene Teildisziplinen werden linguistische Forschungsfragen zur „Nichtwissenskommunikation“ formuliert und erste Erkenntnisse skizziert. Der Beitrag endet mit einem Überblick über Einstellungen zu und Bewertungen von ignorance claims in Wissenschaft, Journalismus und Öffentlichkeit.

@article{hoffmann2023,
	title = {Petty bribery, pluralistic ignorance, and the collective action problem},
	volume = {5},
	doi = {10.1017/dap.2023.19},
	abstract = {Bribery for access to public goods and services remains a widespread and seemingly innocuous practice which disproportionately targets the poor and helps keep them poor. Furthermore, its aggregate effects erode the legitimacy of government institutions and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law. Drawing on original evidence using social norms methodology, this research tests underlying beliefs and expectations which sustain persistent forms of bribery and draws attention to the presence of pluralistic ignorance and consequent collective action problems. With examples focused on bribery in traffic law enforcement, healthcare, and education—three critical areas where bribery is often identified as an entrenched practice—this article contributes new evidence of: (a) the presence of pluralistic ignorance, a common social comparison error, surrounding bribery behavior; (b) differing social evaluations of bribe-solicitation; and finally, (c) how this context might exacerbate collective action problems. This empirical case study of Nigeria shows that even though more people are likely to be directly affected by bribery during routine interactions with public officials and institutions and many believe this practice is wrong, most people incorrectly believe that others in their community tolerate or even accept bribery behavior.},
	journal = {Data \& Policy},
	author = {Hoffmann, Leena K. and Patel, Raj N.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {e24--1--24},
}

Bribery for access to public goods and services remains a widespread and seemingly innocuous practice which disproportionately targets the poor and helps keep them poor. Furthermore, its aggregate effects erode the legitimacy of government institutions and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law. Drawing on original evidence using social norms methodology, this research tests underlying beliefs and expectations which sustain persistent forms of bribery and draws attention to the presence of pluralistic ignorance and consequent collective action problems. With examples focused on bribery in traffic law enforcement, healthcare, and education—three critical areas where bribery is often identified as an entrenched practice—this article contributes new evidence of: (a) the presence of pluralistic ignorance, a common social comparison error, surrounding bribery behavior; (b) differing social evaluations of bribe-solicitation; and finally, (c) how this context might exacerbate collective action problems. This empirical case study of Nigeria shows that even though more people are likely to be directly affected by bribery during routine interactions with public officials and institutions and many believe this practice is wrong, most people incorrectly believe that others in their community tolerate or even accept bribery behavior.

@article{griessl2023,
	title = {The {Power} of {Secret} {Knowledge}: {The} {RAND} {Corporation}, {Ignorance} {Studies} and {Sociology}},
	doi = {10.1007/s12108-023-09567-2},
	abstract = {The following contribution is concerned with the relation of Dayé’s work on the RAND Corporation during the Cold War and the field of ignorance studies. In doing so, I aim to emphasise the interconnection of three central themes that pervade Dayé’s work: secrecy, ignorance, and power. In an era of Cold War insecurity, marked by strategic attempts by both sides to obscure their own capabilities, a largely secretive organization emerged as a reliable source of knowledge, helping to guide decision-making in uncertain times and to generate policy recommendations. This not only raises significant questions about the power of certain groups or individuals to define what counts as policy-guiding knowledge, it also points to a form of ignorance that is highly productive. It not only affords the creation of new knowledge practices, but it becomes a force in itself that mobilizes the creation of further ignorance. While these connections are implicit in Dayé’s work, this study seeks to bring them to the forefront and to explore them in dialogue with classical sociological literature and in the context of seminal contributions to the field of ignorance studies. In order to do so, I will start with a brief elaboration on the secrecy that surrounded the work conducted at the RAND corporation, alongside a brief discussion of the notion of secrecy and elite power in the canon of classical literature in sociology, to then introduce the field of ignorance studies. From this angle, I will explore how a particular form of ignorance lies at the core of the workings at RAND and how ignorance studies might help to better understand the developing influence and rule of experts.},
	journal = {The American Sociologist},
	author = {Griessl, Lukas},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {2 Ignorance and secret},
}

The following contribution is concerned with the relation of Dayé’s work on the RAND Corporation during the Cold War and the field of ignorance studies. In doing so, I aim to emphasise the interconnection of three central themes that pervade Dayé’s work: secrecy, ignorance, and power. In an era of Cold War insecurity, marked by strategic attempts by both sides to obscure their own capabilities, a largely secretive organization emerged as a reliable source of knowledge, helping to guide decision-making in uncertain times and to generate policy recommendations. This not only raises significant questions about the power of certain groups or individuals to define what counts as policy-guiding knowledge, it also points to a form of ignorance that is highly productive. It not only affords the creation of new knowledge practices, but it becomes a force in itself that mobilizes the creation of further ignorance. While these connections are implicit in Dayé’s work, this study seeks to bring them to the forefront and to explore them in dialogue with classical sociological literature and in the context of seminal contributions to the field of ignorance studies. In order to do so, I will start with a brief elaboration on the secrecy that surrounded the work conducted at the RAND corporation, alongside a brief discussion of the notion of secrecy and elite power in the canon of classical literature in sociology, to then introduce the field of ignorance studies. From this angle, I will explore how a particular form of ignorance lies at the core of the workings at RAND and how ignorance studies might help to better understand the developing influence and rule of experts.

@article{earle2023,
	title = {Postracial {Presumptions}: {The} {Supreme} {Court}’s {Undoing} of the {Voting} {Rights} {Act} through {Racial} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {53},
	doi = {10.1080/02773945.2022.2129764},
	abstract = {To warrant the weakening of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority has actively manufactured ignorance of racism in the realm of voting. Through an analysis of majority opinions in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), Abbott v. Perez (2018), and cases concerning states’ antivoting fraud restrictions, I demonstrate how considerable evidence of racial discrimination is deemed to fail the standard of proof imposed by the court. I offer the term postracial presumption to account for how dominant publics are empowered to reason as if the United States was beyond race, to employ postracial premises to warrant judgments for which there is insufficient evidence and, indeed, for which there is considerable disconfirming evidence. The essay demonstrates how presumption and proof burdens can be critical tools in the study of postracism and is suggestive of how racial ignorance cannot simply be rectified by more proof.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Rhetoric Society Quarterly},
	author = {Earle, Chris S.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {247--261},
}

To warrant the weakening of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority has actively manufactured ignorance of racism in the realm of voting. Through an analysis of majority opinions in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), Abbott v. Perez (2018), and cases concerning states’ antivoting fraud restrictions, I demonstrate how considerable evidence of racial discrimination is deemed to fail the standard of proof imposed by the court. I offer the term postracial presumption to account for how dominant publics are empowered to reason as if the United States was beyond race, to employ postracial premises to warrant judgments for which there is insufficient evidence and, indeed, for which there is considerable disconfirming evidence. The essay demonstrates how presumption and proof burdens can be critical tools in the study of postracism and is suggestive of how racial ignorance cannot simply be rectified by more proof.

@article{dieterle2023,
	title = {Other-{Oriented} {Hermeneutical} {Injustice}, {Affected} {Ignorance}, or {Human} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {37},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2023.2248044},
	abstract = {Paul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples – including his primary case of non-human animals – are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case.},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Dieterle, J. M.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {852--863},
}

Paul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples – including his primary case of non-human animals – are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case.

@article{smith2023,
	title = {Chance, ignorance, and the paradoxes of cancer: {Richard} {Peto} on developing preventative strategies under uncertainty},
	volume = {38},
	doi = {10.1007/s10654-023-01090-5},
	abstract = {During the early 1980s both cancer biology and epidemiological methods were being transformed. In 1984 the leading cancer epidemiologist Richard Peto – who, in 1981, had published the landmark Causes of Cancer with Richard Doll – wrote a short chapter on “The need for ignorance in cancer research”, in which the worlds of epidemiology and speculative Darwinian biology met. His reflections on how evolutionary theory related to cancer have become known as “Peto’s paradox”, whilst his articulation of “black box epidemiology” provided the logic of subsequent practice in the field. We reprint this sparkling and prescient example of biologically-informed epidemiological theorising at its best in this issue of the European Journal of Epidemiology, together with four commentaries that focus on different aspects of its rich content. Here were provide some contextual background to the 1984 chapter, and our own speculations regarding various paradoxes in cancer epidemiology. We suggest that one reason for the relative lack of progress in indentifying novel modifiable causes of cancer over the last 40 years may reflect such exposures being ubiquitous within environments, and discuss the lessons for epidemiology that would follow from this.},
	number = {12},
	journal = {European Journal of Epidemiology},
	author = {Davey Smith, George and Hofman, Albert and Brennan, Paul},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {10 Ignorance, uncertainty and risk},
	pages = {1227--1237},
}

During the early 1980s both cancer biology and epidemiological methods were being transformed. In 1984 the leading cancer epidemiologist Richard Peto – who, in 1981, had published the landmark Causes of Cancer with Richard Doll – wrote a short chapter on “The need for ignorance in cancer research”, in which the worlds of epidemiology and speculative Darwinian biology met. His reflections on how evolutionary theory related to cancer have become known as “Peto’s paradox”, whilst his articulation of “black box epidemiology” provided the logic of subsequent practice in the field. We reprint this sparkling and prescient example of biologically-informed epidemiological theorising at its best in this issue of the European Journal of Epidemiology, together with four commentaries that focus on different aspects of its rich content. Here were provide some contextual background to the 1984 chapter, and our own speculations regarding various paradoxes in cancer epidemiology. We suggest that one reason for the relative lack of progress in indentifying novel modifiable causes of cancer over the last 40 years may reflect such exposures being ubiquitous within environments, and discuss the lessons for epidemiology that would follow from this.

@phdthesis{dai2023,
	title = {Pluralistic {Ignorance} within {Academic} {Self}-{Efficacy} and {Its} {Relationship} with {Academic} {Performance}},
	abstract = {Pluralistic ignorance (PI) is a phenomenon where people incorrectly estimate the strength and/or direction of the majority’s attitudes (Miller \& Prentice, 1994). The current study investigates the presence of PI within academic self-efficacy (ASE) among college freshmen to see whether students tend to overestimate their peers’ ASE. Associations between PI within ASE and college freshmen’s academic performance, and whether this relationship is mediated by academic behaviors, academic adjustment, and institutional attachment are also tested. A total of 101 college freshmen from introductory psychology classes completed survey measures during the first 5 weeks of their first semester in college, and 44 of them completed time two survey measures during the last four weeks of their first semester. Contrary to the hypotheses, results indicated that on average participants significantly underestimated their peers’ ASE instead of overestimating. Underestimation of peers’ ASE is also associated with higher academic performance at the end of the semester. However, the relationship between PI within ASE and academic performance is not significantly mediated by academic behaviors, academic adjustment, or institutional attachment. The current study provided initial evidence for the presence of PI in academic settings, which in turn affects students’ academic performance. Implications of the results and suggestions for future research are discussed.},
	school = {Radford University},
	author = {Dai, T.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
}

Pluralistic ignorance (PI) is a phenomenon where people incorrectly estimate the strength and/or direction of the majority’s attitudes (Miller & Prentice, 1994). The current study investigates the presence of PI within academic self-efficacy (ASE) among college freshmen to see whether students tend to overestimate their peers’ ASE. Associations between PI within ASE and college freshmen’s academic performance, and whether this relationship is mediated by academic behaviors, academic adjustment, and institutional attachment are also tested. A total of 101 college freshmen from introductory psychology classes completed survey measures during the first 5 weeks of their first semester in college, and 44 of them completed time two survey measures during the last four weeks of their first semester. Contrary to the hypotheses, results indicated that on average participants significantly underestimated their peers’ ASE instead of overestimating. Underestimation of peers’ ASE is also associated with higher academic performance at the end of the semester. However, the relationship between PI within ASE and academic performance is not significantly mediated by academic behaviors, academic adjustment, or institutional attachment. The current study provided initial evidence for the presence of PI in academic settings, which in turn affects students’ academic performance. Implications of the results and suggestions for future research are discussed.

@article{bonzio2023,
	title = {A {Logical} {Modeling} of {Severe} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {52},
	doi = {10.1007/s10992-022-09697-x},
	abstract = {In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance ofφthat stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operatorI, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formulaφis ignored by an agent ifφis neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub itsevere ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one.},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
	author = {Bonzio, S. and Fano, V. and Graziani, P. and Pra Baldi, M.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1053--1080},
}

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance ofφthat stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operatorI, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formulaφis ignored by an agent ifφis neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub itsevere ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one.

@article{alvergne2023,
	title = {Why we must fight ignorance about {COVID}-19 vaccines and menstrual cycles},
	volume = {29},
	doi = {10.1016/j.molmed.2023.06.005},
	abstract = {The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed a critical gap in female health science, fueling anxiety, polarized views, and vaccine hesitancy. Although menstrual cycles feel like a niche topic for some, efforts to augment knowledge on the 'fifth vital sign' experienced by more than 300 million people on any given day worldwide are crucial to promote gender equity in health.},
	number = {9},
	journal = {Trends in Molecular Medicine},
	author = {Alvergne, Alexandra},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {678--680},
}

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed a critical gap in female health science, fueling anxiety, polarized views, and vaccine hesitancy. Although menstrual cycles feel like a niche topic for some, efforts to augment knowledge on the 'fifth vital sign' experienced by more than 300 million people on any given day worldwide are crucial to promote gender equity in health.

@article{mendonca2023,
	title = {Can ignorance about the interest rate and macroeconomic surprises affect the stock market return? {Evidence} from a large emerging economy},
	volume = {64},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2022.101868},
	abstract = {This paper analyzes whether the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate and macroeconomic surprises affects the return in the stock exchange in a large emerging economy. Based on the Brazilian economy from January 2005 to September 2021, we build a measure of “ignorance” from the signal-to-noise ratio of the monetary policy interest rate and evaluate its effect on the stock market return. Furthermore, we analyze whether the “surprises” from macroeconomic variables can affect the stock market return. The findings indicate that increases in the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate have a negative and statistically significant effect on the stock exchange return. Moreover, macroeconomic “surprises” have effects on stock market return.},
	journal = {The North American Journal of Economics and Finance},
	author = {Mendonça, HF de and Díaz, R. R. R.},
	year = {2023},
}

This paper analyzes whether the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate and macroeconomic surprises affects the return in the stock exchange in a large emerging economy. Based on the Brazilian economy from January 2005 to September 2021, we build a measure of “ignorance” from the signal-to-noise ratio of the monetary policy interest rate and evaluate its effect on the stock market return. Furthermore, we analyze whether the “surprises” from macroeconomic variables can affect the stock market return. The findings indicate that increases in the “ignorance” of private agents regarding the monetary policy interest rate have a negative and statistically significant effect on the stock exchange return. Moreover, macroeconomic “surprises” have effects on stock market return.

@incollection{resseguier2023,
	series = {Handbook of {Critical} {Studies} of {Artificial} {Intelligence}},
	title = {Power and inequalities: lifting the veil of ignorance in {AI} ethics},
	isbn = {978-1-80392-856-2},
	abstract = {This chapter argues that AI ethics needs to engage with structures of power and inequalities. It draws lessons learned from critiques AI ethics has received of ineffectiveness and highlights that a key issue is the way mainstream ethics tends to systematically neglect power relations and structures of inequalities. The chapter then argues for a situated ethics. It points to the need to implement ethics within institutional frameworks, such as research ethics processes, with mechanisms to ensure compliance. Finally, it calls for another approach to ethics for AI, an ethics that places capacity of action at its heart. As such, this chapter highlights two types of relations between ethics and power: (1) ethics as soft law where ethics seeks to limit abuses of power (power over) and (2) ethics as a constantly renewed attention and attitude promoting power of action (power to).},
	booktitle = {Handbook of {Critical} {Studies} of {Artificial} {Intelligence}},
	publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
	author = {Resseguier, Anais},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {402--412},
}

This chapter argues that AI ethics needs to engage with structures of power and inequalities. It draws lessons learned from critiques AI ethics has received of ineffectiveness and highlights that a key issue is the way mainstream ethics tends to systematically neglect power relations and structures of inequalities. The chapter then argues for a situated ethics. It points to the need to implement ethics within institutional frameworks, such as research ethics processes, with mechanisms to ensure compliance. Finally, it calls for another approach to ethics for AI, an ethics that places capacity of action at its heart. As such, this chapter highlights two types of relations between ethics and power: (1) ethics as soft law where ethics seeks to limit abuses of power (power over) and (2) ethics as a constantly renewed attention and attitude promoting power of action (power to).

@article{chen2022,
	title = {The impact of ignorance and bias on information security protection motivation: a case of e-waste handling},
	volume = {33},
	doi = {10.1108/intr-04-2022-0238},
	abstract = {Protection motivation theory (PMT) explains that the intention to cope with information security risks is based on informed threat and coping appraisals. However, people cannot always make appropriate assessments due to possible ignorance and cognitive biases. This study proposes a research model that introduces four antecedent factors from ignorance and bias perspectives into the PMT model and empirically tests this model with data from a survey of electronic waste (e-waste) handling.Design/methodology/approachThe data collected from 356 Chinese samples are analyzed via structural equation modeling (SEM).FindingsThe results revealed that for threat appraisal, optimistic bias leads to a lower perception of risks. However, factual ignorance (lack of knowledge of risks) does not significantly affect the perceived threat. For coping appraisal, practical ignorance (lack of knowledge of coping with risks) leads to low response efficacy and self-efficacy and high perceptions of coping cost, but the illusion of control overestimates response efficacy and self-efficacy.Originality/valueFirst, this study addresses a new type of information security problem in e-waste handling. Second, this study extends the PMT model by exploring the roles of ignorance and bias as antecedents. Finally, the authors reinvestigate the basic constructs of PMT to identify how rational threat and coping assessments affect user intentions to cope with data security risks.},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Internet Research},
	author = {Chen, Hao and Yuan, Yufei},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {1 Learned ignorance},
	pages = {2244--2275},
}

Protection motivation theory (PMT) explains that the intention to cope with information security risks is based on informed threat and coping appraisals. However, people cannot always make appropriate assessments due to possible ignorance and cognitive biases. This study proposes a research model that introduces four antecedent factors from ignorance and bias perspectives into the PMT model and empirically tests this model with data from a survey of electronic waste (e-waste) handling.Design/methodology/approachThe data collected from 356 Chinese samples are analyzed via structural equation modeling (SEM).FindingsThe results revealed that for threat appraisal, optimistic bias leads to a lower perception of risks. However, factual ignorance (lack of knowledge of risks) does not significantly affect the perceived threat. For coping appraisal, practical ignorance (lack of knowledge of coping with risks) leads to low response efficacy and self-efficacy and high perceptions of coping cost, but the illusion of control overestimates response efficacy and self-efficacy.Originality/valueFirst, this study addresses a new type of information security problem in e-waste handling. Second, this study extends the PMT model by exploring the roles of ignorance and bias as antecedents. Finally, the authors reinvestigate the basic constructs of PMT to identify how rational threat and coping assessments affect user intentions to cope with data security risks.

@article{fatima2023,
	title = {What {Does} {It} {Mean} to {Be} an {American}? {American} {Ignorance} and {Social} {Imagination} of {Citizenship}},
	doi = {10.1017/hyp.2023.81},
	abstract = {In its war on terror, the United States tortured and abused individuals in its custody over a decade. This article examines a specific sort of epistemic response by Americans to the use of torture by their government, the sort of response that enables Americans to operate with epistemic ignorance to maintain a favorable construction of their identity as Americans. I lay out the concept of American ignorance as the active production of false and/or incomplete beliefs about what it means to be an American and explore the mechanism through which this ignorance operates in society. The article argues for accountability to create better epistemic environments necessary for any meaningful shift in how Americans perceive themselves qua Americans.},
	journal = {Hypatia},
	author = {Fatima, Saba},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {1--19},
}

In its war on terror, the United States tortured and abused individuals in its custody over a decade. This article examines a specific sort of epistemic response by Americans to the use of torture by their government, the sort of response that enables Americans to operate with epistemic ignorance to maintain a favorable construction of their identity as Americans. I lay out the concept of American ignorance as the active production of false and/or incomplete beliefs about what it means to be an American and explore the mechanism through which this ignorance operates in society. The article argues for accountability to create better epistemic environments necessary for any meaningful shift in how Americans perceive themselves qua Americans.

@article{taylor2024,
	title = {Resisting policing in higher education: wilful {White} ignorance in the campus safety debate},
	volume = {57},
	doi = {10.1093/jopedu/qhad062},
	abstract = {Activists have challenged the reach of the carceral state into higher education. Whether calling out the exclusion of currently and formerly incarcerated people from higher education or the ways campus police perpetuate the racial and economic biases that plague the US criminal legal system, these voices offer insights that higher education leaders should take seriously. Yet, these challenges are often met with appeals to safety, which purport to override concerns about the harms produced by extension of the criminal legal system into educational contexts. Campus safety debates offer an opportunity to examine the role of wilful ignorance in the perpetuation of systemic injustices on college and university campuses, highlighting tensions between the testimony of those challenging these systems and practices and prevailing narratives around safety. In analysing the operation of wilful ignorance in this context, we will focus on campus policing as a manifestation of carcerality in higher education. We argue that the perpetuation of policing in higher education in the USA reflects wilful White ignorance that represents both an epistemic and moral failing on the part of higher education leaders.},
	number = {4-5},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Education},
	author = {Taylor, Rebecca M. and Perez-Mugg, Martha},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {923--940},
}

Activists have challenged the reach of the carceral state into higher education. Whether calling out the exclusion of currently and formerly incarcerated people from higher education or the ways campus police perpetuate the racial and economic biases that plague the US criminal legal system, these voices offer insights that higher education leaders should take seriously. Yet, these challenges are often met with appeals to safety, which purport to override concerns about the harms produced by extension of the criminal legal system into educational contexts. Campus safety debates offer an opportunity to examine the role of wilful ignorance in the perpetuation of systemic injustices on college and university campuses, highlighting tensions between the testimony of those challenging these systems and practices and prevailing narratives around safety. In analysing the operation of wilful ignorance in this context, we will focus on campus policing as a manifestation of carcerality in higher education. We argue that the perpetuation of policing in higher education in the USA reflects wilful White ignorance that represents both an epistemic and moral failing on the part of higher education leaders.

@article{meszaros2023a,
	title = {Ignorance and {Change}: {Anticipatory} {Knowledge} and the {European} {Refugee} {Crisis}. {By} {A}. {Mica}, {A}. {Horolets}, {M}. {Pawlak} and {P}. {Kubicki}. {Routledge}, 2020, 270 p.},
	volume = {39},
	doi = {10.25071/1920-7336.41141},
	abstract = {book review},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees},
	author = {Mészáros, Edina Lilla},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {1--3},
}

book review

@article{russell2023,
	title = {Comforting and {Sustaining} {Whiteness} in the ‘{Post}-{Racial}’ {Era}: {The} {Help}, {Collective} {Nostalgia}, and {White} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {88},
	doi = {10.1080/1041794x.2022.2121003},
	abstract = {By the spring of 2022 there were nearly 200 bills making their way through 40 state legislatures that explicitly prevented public schools from teaching “divisive subjects” that could make some students feel “discomfort.” Nearly all included language that banned supposed concepts of critical race theory (CRT) or the 1619 Project. The attacks on and misrepresentations of CRT illustrate whiteness’s preferred memory of U.S. history as a rhetorical vehicle for sustaining political, economic, and social power. I offer here an argument for what a preferred memory looks like, how it is constructed, and why. I suggest that popular American movies have overwhelmingly created discourses of race that comfort and sustain whiteness. I use the 2011 film, The Help to show how narratives comfort whiteness and define racism through collective nostalgia and intentional ignorance. I then identify several key strategies whiteness employs to “insulate itself against refutation” while reaffirming racism as strictly an interpersonal phenomenon.},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Southern Communication Journal},
	author = {Russell, John Clyde},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance},
	pages = {312--327},
}

By the spring of 2022 there were nearly 200 bills making their way through 40 state legislatures that explicitly prevented public schools from teaching “divisive subjects” that could make some students feel “discomfort.” Nearly all included language that banned supposed concepts of critical race theory (CRT) or the 1619 Project. The attacks on and misrepresentations of CRT illustrate whiteness’s preferred memory of U.S. history as a rhetorical vehicle for sustaining political, economic, and social power. I offer here an argument for what a preferred memory looks like, how it is constructed, and why. I suggest that popular American movies have overwhelmingly created discourses of race that comfort and sustain whiteness. I use the 2011 film, The Help to show how narratives comfort whiteness and define racism through collective nostalgia and intentional ignorance. I then identify several key strategies whiteness employs to “insulate itself against refutation” while reaffirming racism as strictly an interpersonal phenomenon.

@phdthesis{stockley2023,
	title = {Pluralistic ignorance and social stigma},
	url = {https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/76490/1/stockley_k_mres_dissertation_final.pdf},
	abstract = {Pluralistic ignorance, a discrepancy between private beliefs and public understanding of these beliefs, is a social phenomenon which has been shown to have significant welfare consequences, but relatively little is understood about its origins. In this paper, we propose social stigma as a potential driver of pluralistic ignorance and design a survey structure intended to test for a relationship between this stigma and pluralistic ignorance across sociopolitical issues. As we are without results, we survey the literature and produce a short theoretical framework to motivate the research design, and also describe future directions for the research project.},
	school = {University of Nottingham},
	author = {Stockley, Kieran},
	year = {2023},
}

Pluralistic ignorance, a discrepancy between private beliefs and public understanding of these beliefs, is a social phenomenon which has been shown to have significant welfare consequences, but relatively little is understood about its origins. In this paper, we propose social stigma as a potential driver of pluralistic ignorance and design a survey structure intended to test for a relationship between this stigma and pluralistic ignorance across sociopolitical issues. As we are without results, we survey the literature and produce a short theoretical framework to motivate the research design, and also describe future directions for the research project.

@article{tangney2023a,
	title = {Navigating collaborative governance: {Network} ignorance and the performative planning of {South} {Australia}'s emergency management},
	volume = {96},
	doi = {10.1016/j.ijdrr.2023.103983},
	abstract = {This paper examines the roles for emergency and disaster risk management plans as policy artefacts that guide centralised governance networks. Past scholarship has been sceptical of the instrumental worth of these artefacts for informing and elaborating governance arrangements. Some suspect that such plans are purely symbolic devices, mere ‘fantasy documents’. This paper examines the role of South Australia's state emergency management plan during the Black Summer bushfires of 2019–2020. The study provides confirmation of the symbolic utility of these plans for central government, while also providing evidence for some suggested difficulties with centralised emergency management networks, about which there is still limited empirical demonstration. Drawing on focus group and interview testimony from senior actors at strategic, tactical and operational levels of South Australia's emergency network, however, we also demonstrate instrumental-heuristic worth of these plans for network actors seeking to make sense of a continually changing bureaucratic landscape, and when reflecting on the value of the network in the aftermath of extreme events.},
	journal = {International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction},
	author = {Tangney, Peter and Star, Cassandra and Sutton, Zoei and Clarke, Beverley},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {103983},
}

This paper examines the roles for emergency and disaster risk management plans as policy artefacts that guide centralised governance networks. Past scholarship has been sceptical of the instrumental worth of these artefacts for informing and elaborating governance arrangements. Some suspect that such plans are purely symbolic devices, mere ‘fantasy documents’. This paper examines the role of South Australia's state emergency management plan during the Black Summer bushfires of 2019–2020. The study provides confirmation of the symbolic utility of these plans for central government, while also providing evidence for some suggested difficulties with centralised emergency management networks, about which there is still limited empirical demonstration. Drawing on focus group and interview testimony from senior actors at strategic, tactical and operational levels of South Australia's emergency network, however, we also demonstrate instrumental-heuristic worth of these plans for network actors seeking to make sense of a continually changing bureaucratic landscape, and when reflecting on the value of the network in the aftermath of extreme events.

@article{yokoyama2023,
	title = {Public acceptance of nuclear waste disposal sites: a decision-making process utilising the 'veil of ignorance'concept},
	volume = {623},
	abstract = {This study demonstrates that a decision-making process utilising ‘the veil of ignorance’ concept, defined in process terms as beginning from a blank slate encompassing the entire country as potential sites and shortlisting candidate sites based on scientific (geological) safety, promotes public acceptance of siting a repository for the geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and fosters procedural fairness. A hypothetical scenario experiment was conducted in Japan, manipulating the site selection process by setting two conditions—one being the application/proposal condition that the Japanese government currently employs, such as an application by municipalities or a proposal by the government, and the other being the veil of ignorance condition, in which multiple candidate areas are selected from a blank slate for the entire land area based purely on geological factors. Three stages of acceptance were presumed—at the level of general management policy, the site selection process itself with a specified decision policy, and the siting of a repository in their area of residence. Two hypotheses were tested: (a) the veil of ignorance condition will be evaluated as a more acceptable and fairer procedure and will engender increased national consensus than the application/proposal condition at the site selection and repository siting stages, and (b) procedural fairness and national consensus will impact acceptance at each stage; these variables at each stage help shape the same variables in the next stage. The results supported these hypotheses. This study discusses the importance of the site selection process, beginning where any de facto site can be a candidate and shortlisting the candidate sites based on scientific criteria.},
	number = {10},
	journal = {Nature. Humanities and Social Sciences Communication},
	author = {Yokoyama, M. and Ohnuma, S. and Osawa, H. and Ohtomo…, S.},
	year = {2023},
}

This study demonstrates that a decision-making process utilising ‘the veil of ignorance’ concept, defined in process terms as beginning from a blank slate encompassing the entire country as potential sites and shortlisting candidate sites based on scientific (geological) safety, promotes public acceptance of siting a repository for the geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and fosters procedural fairness. A hypothetical scenario experiment was conducted in Japan, manipulating the site selection process by setting two conditions—one being the application/proposal condition that the Japanese government currently employs, such as an application by municipalities or a proposal by the government, and the other being the veil of ignorance condition, in which multiple candidate areas are selected from a blank slate for the entire land area based purely on geological factors. Three stages of acceptance were presumed—at the level of general management policy, the site selection process itself with a specified decision policy, and the siting of a repository in their area of residence. Two hypotheses were tested: (a) the veil of ignorance condition will be evaluated as a more acceptable and fairer procedure and will engender increased national consensus than the application/proposal condition at the site selection and repository siting stages, and (b) procedural fairness and national consensus will impact acceptance at each stage; these variables at each stage help shape the same variables in the next stage. The results supported these hypotheses. This study discusses the importance of the site selection process, beginning where any de facto site can be a candidate and shortlisting the candidate sites based on scientific criteria.

@article{weidinger2023,
	title = {Using the {Veil} of {Ignorance} to align {AI} systems with principles of justice},
	volume = {120},
	doi = {10.1073/pnas.2213709120?download=true},
	abstract = {The philosopher John Rawls proposed the Veil of Ignorance (VoI) as a thought experiment to identify fair principles for governing a society. Here, we apply the VoI to an important governance domain: artificial intelligence (AI). In five incentive- compatible studies (N = 2,508), including two preregistered protocols, participants choose principles to govern an Artificial Intelligence (AI) assistant from behind the veil: that is, without knowledge of their own relative position in the group. Compared to participants who have this information, we find a consistent preference for a principle that instructs the AI assistant to prioritize the worst-off. Neither risk attitudes nor political preferences adequately explain these choices. Instead, they appear to be driven by elevated concerns about fairness: Without prompting, participants who reason behind the VoI more frequently explain their choice in terms of fairness, compared to those in the Control condition. Moreover, we find initial support for the ability of the VoI to elicit more robust preferences: In the studies presented here, the VoI increases the likelihood of participants continuing to endorse their initial choice in a subsequent round where they know how they will be affected by the AI intervention and have a self-interested motivation to change their mind. These results emerge in both a descriptive and an immersive game. Our findings suggest that the VoI may be a suitable mechanism for selecting distributive principles to govern AI.},
	number = {18},
	journal = {PNAS},
	author = {Weidinger, L. and McKee, K. R. and Everett, R.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--9},
}

The philosopher John Rawls proposed the Veil of Ignorance (VoI) as a thought experiment to identify fair principles for governing a society. Here, we apply the VoI to an important governance domain: artificial intelligence (AI). In five incentive- compatible studies (N = 2,508), including two preregistered protocols, participants choose principles to govern an Artificial Intelligence (AI) assistant from behind the veil: that is, without knowledge of their own relative position in the group. Compared to participants who have this information, we find a consistent preference for a principle that instructs the AI assistant to prioritize the worst-off. Neither risk attitudes nor political preferences adequately explain these choices. Instead, they appear to be driven by elevated concerns about fairness: Without prompting, participants who reason behind the VoI more frequently explain their choice in terms of fairness, compared to those in the Control condition. Moreover, we find initial support for the ability of the VoI to elicit more robust preferences: In the studies presented here, the VoI increases the likelihood of participants continuing to endorse their initial choice in a subsequent round where they know how they will be affected by the AI intervention and have a self-interested motivation to change their mind. These results emerge in both a descriptive and an immersive game. Our findings suggest that the VoI may be a suitable mechanism for selecting distributive principles to govern AI.

@article{stocco2023,
	title = {The {Conspiracy} {Theory}/{Vaccine} {Hesitancy} nexus as rhetorical boundary work. {A} critical analysis of the production of scientific ignorance in literature reviews},
	volume = {15},
	abstract = {With the Covid-19 outbreak the request for useful knowledge to inform policy measures rapidly escalated. On the verge of infodemics, vaccine hesitancy and conspiracy theories have been individuated as major threats to society which need rapid responses. In this context of uncertainty, literature reviews are a great way to retrieve useful knowledge from the large and dispersed amount of knowledge produced in the last two years. Nevertheless, the structural process of reviewing is not a neutral process of evidence retrieval and can lead to the deformation of initial knowledge through synthesis and simplification. Furthermore, the boundary work in the review process, if not properly critically assessed, can polarize the distinction between scientists and non-experts. Drawing from STS literature on boundary work and scientific ignorance production, this article critically analyzes 12 literature reviews regarding the nexus between conspiracy theory and vaccine hesitancy. The results highlight how the rhetorical construction of the ignorance areas leads to the neglected arguments in the form of an implicit elitist discourse which reproduce the deficit model of policy intervention through the preference for the psychological explanation. Furthermore, the uncritical assumption of the rightfulness of the evidence retrieval leads to polarization in the construction of otherness and depoliticization of agency. The implications are discussed, along with examples of more creative and emancipative reviews.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Partecipazione e Conflitto},
	author = {Stocco, N.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {779--799},
}

With the Covid-19 outbreak the request for useful knowledge to inform policy measures rapidly escalated. On the verge of infodemics, vaccine hesitancy and conspiracy theories have been individuated as major threats to society which need rapid responses. In this context of uncertainty, literature reviews are a great way to retrieve useful knowledge from the large and dispersed amount of knowledge produced in the last two years. Nevertheless, the structural process of reviewing is not a neutral process of evidence retrieval and can lead to the deformation of initial knowledge through synthesis and simplification. Furthermore, the boundary work in the review process, if not properly critically assessed, can polarize the distinction between scientists and non-experts. Drawing from STS literature on boundary work and scientific ignorance production, this article critically analyzes 12 literature reviews regarding the nexus between conspiracy theory and vaccine hesitancy. The results highlight how the rhetorical construction of the ignorance areas leads to the neglected arguments in the form of an implicit elitist discourse which reproduce the deficit model of policy intervention through the preference for the psychological explanation. Furthermore, the uncritical assumption of the rightfulness of the evidence retrieval leads to polarization in the construction of otherness and depoliticization of agency. The implications are discussed, along with examples of more creative and emancipative reviews.

@article{steffestun2023,
	title = {Economization: {The} (re-) organization of knowledge and ignorance according to'the market'.},
	volume = {23},
	abstract = {How societies can answer crises depends - among other things - on their organization of knowledge and ignorance. In the case of societies in which processes of economization are present this organization is significantly shaped by the concept of ‘the market’ and corresponding economic theories. The paper analyses the epistemic organization of knowledge and ignorance in processes of economization that are based on the concept of ‘the market’ as it is interpreted by Friedrich A. Hayek. Furthermore, it provides a conceptual framework of four characteristics intended to differentiate economic theories regarding their suitability as foundations for economization. The analysis indicates that economization is an act of epistemic imperialism, subsuming the diversity of reality under one singular concept – ‘the market’ – that knows no boundaries, while complementarily disqualifying knowledge of those boundaries as illegitimate. The study concludes with an outlook on the implications of that knowledge lost to economization and suggests a first step to re-organize knowledge and ignorance in economized contexts.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {ephemera: theory \& politics in organization},
	author = {Steffestun, T. and Ötsch, W. O.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {135--159},
}

How societies can answer crises depends - among other things - on their organization of knowledge and ignorance. In the case of societies in which processes of economization are present this organization is significantly shaped by the concept of ‘the market’ and corresponding economic theories. The paper analyses the epistemic organization of knowledge and ignorance in processes of economization that are based on the concept of ‘the market’ as it is interpreted by Friedrich A. Hayek. Furthermore, it provides a conceptual framework of four characteristics intended to differentiate economic theories regarding their suitability as foundations for economization. The analysis indicates that economization is an act of epistemic imperialism, subsuming the diversity of reality under one singular concept – ‘the market’ – that knows no boundaries, while complementarily disqualifying knowledge of those boundaries as illegitimate. The study concludes with an outlook on the implications of that knowledge lost to economization and suggests a first step to re-organize knowledge and ignorance in economized contexts.

@inproceedings{srivastava2023,
	title = {Generation {Y} and {Generation} {Z}'s substantial technology use and mental health ignorance: {A} {Descriptive} {Analysis}},
	doi = {10.4108/eai.16-12-2022.2326174},
	abstract = {Despite more discussion about mental health during the pandemic, many surveys have shown that stigma at work makes Millennials and Gen Z hesitant to express their increased stress and anxiety to their employers, with nearly six out of ten saying they did not tell their boss how they were feeling. In addition, 49\% and 47\% of millennials and Gen Zs who have taken time off for mental health reasons have not told their boss. Over half of millennials and Gen Zs say mental health discrimination is common. School shootings, student debt, unemployment, and politics all stress Gen Z [5]. Some teens may feel isolated and lonely in a hyper-connected world. It may also give a steady supply of negative news headlines, FOMO, and social media humiliation [10]. Millennials believe work affects their mental health [16]. Increased work hours and stagnant wages contribute to millennial burnout [13]. The current study focuses on identifying factors that affect generation Y and Z's mental health. The study samples North-West Delhi residents. The study compared factors to respondent demographics and accomplished using survey questionnaires where primary data was collected and analysed.},
	publisher = {EAI},
	author = {Srivastava, Garima and Pachauri, Sanjay},
	year = {2023},
}

Despite more discussion about mental health during the pandemic, many surveys have shown that stigma at work makes Millennials and Gen Z hesitant to express their increased stress and anxiety to their employers, with nearly six out of ten saying they did not tell their boss how they were feeling. In addition, 49% and 47% of millennials and Gen Zs who have taken time off for mental health reasons have not told their boss. Over half of millennials and Gen Zs say mental health discrimination is common. School shootings, student debt, unemployment, and politics all stress Gen Z [5]. Some teens may feel isolated and lonely in a hyper-connected world. It may also give a steady supply of negative news headlines, FOMO, and social media humiliation [10]. Millennials believe work affects their mental health [16]. Increased work hours and stagnant wages contribute to millennial burnout [13]. The current study focuses on identifying factors that affect generation Y and Z's mental health. The study samples North-West Delhi residents. The study compared factors to respondent demographics and accomplished using survey questionnaires where primary data was collected and analysed.

@incollection{somin2023,
	title = {Top-down and bottom-up solutions to the problem of political ignorance},
	abstract = {There is broad agreement that widespread voter ignorance and irrational evaluation of evidence are severe threats to democracy. But there is deep disagreement over strategies for mitigating the danger. “Top-down” approaches, such as epistocracy and lodging more authority in the hands of experts, seek to alleviate ignorance by concentrating more political power in the hands of the more knowledgeable segments of the population. In contrast, “bottom-up” approaches seek to either raise the political competence of the public or empower ordinary people in ways that give them better incentives to make good decisions than conventional ballot-box voting. Examples of bottom-up strategies include increasing voter knowledge through education, various “sortition” proposals, and shifting more decisions to institutions where citizens can “vote with their feet.” This chapter surveys and critiques a range of both top-down and bottom-up strategies. I conclude that top-down approaches have systematic flaws that severely limit their potential. While we should not categorically reject them, we should be wary of adopting them on a large scale. Bottom-up strategies have significant limitations of their own. But expanding foot voting opportunities holds more promise than any available option. The idea of paying voters to increase their knowledge also deserves serious consideration.},
	booktitle = {The epistemology of democracy},
	author = {Somin, I.},
	editor = {Samaržija, H. and Cassam, Q.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {287--315},
}

There is broad agreement that widespread voter ignorance and irrational evaluation of evidence are severe threats to democracy. But there is deep disagreement over strategies for mitigating the danger. “Top-down” approaches, such as epistocracy and lodging more authority in the hands of experts, seek to alleviate ignorance by concentrating more political power in the hands of the more knowledgeable segments of the population. In contrast, “bottom-up” approaches seek to either raise the political competence of the public or empower ordinary people in ways that give them better incentives to make good decisions than conventional ballot-box voting. Examples of bottom-up strategies include increasing voter knowledge through education, various “sortition” proposals, and shifting more decisions to institutions where citizens can “vote with their feet.” This chapter surveys and critiques a range of both top-down and bottom-up strategies. I conclude that top-down approaches have systematic flaws that severely limit their potential. While we should not categorically reject them, we should be wary of adopting them on a large scale. Bottom-up strategies have significant limitations of their own. But expanding foot voting opportunities holds more promise than any available option. The idea of paying voters to increase their knowledge also deserves serious consideration.

@article{sokolic2023,
	title = {Claims to ignorance as a form of participation in transitional justice},
	volume = {58},
	doi = {10.1177/00108367221090111},
	abstract = {Transitional justice is premised on participation that allows local publics to construct, critique and have some ownership over the process. The current scholarship assumes that individuals openly express their views of the process, or that they remain silent. The scholarship has neglected a third, significant form of participation: active withholding of views by saying ‘I don’t know’. This article examines such claims to ignorance and argues that they can provide insight into participation. While both qualitative and quantitative researchers of transitional justice have observed a pervasive pattern of high ‘don’t know’ responses, such claims to ignorance have not been studied. This article develops a theoretical framework that shows that ‘don’t know’ responses are a valuable source of information and argues that they are often an expression of a lack of willingness to respond, rather than genuine ignorance. Drawing on an original corpus of data collected through inter-ethnic focus groups and surveys conducted in four former Yugoslav countries, the study demonstrates how claims to ignorance are constructed as novel manifestations of resistance, restraint or disentitlement. These point to a rejection of transitional justice, which needs to be addressed if individuals are to feel like legitimate participants in the process.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Cooperation and Conflict},
	author = {Sokolić, Ivor},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {102--128},
}

Transitional justice is premised on participation that allows local publics to construct, critique and have some ownership over the process. The current scholarship assumes that individuals openly express their views of the process, or that they remain silent. The scholarship has neglected a third, significant form of participation: active withholding of views by saying ‘I don’t know’. This article examines such claims to ignorance and argues that they can provide insight into participation. While both qualitative and quantitative researchers of transitional justice have observed a pervasive pattern of high ‘don’t know’ responses, such claims to ignorance have not been studied. This article develops a theoretical framework that shows that ‘don’t know’ responses are a valuable source of information and argues that they are often an expression of a lack of willingness to respond, rather than genuine ignorance. Drawing on an original corpus of data collected through inter-ethnic focus groups and surveys conducted in four former Yugoslav countries, the study demonstrates how claims to ignorance are constructed as novel manifestations of resistance, restraint or disentitlement. These point to a rejection of transitional justice, which needs to be addressed if individuals are to feel like legitimate participants in the process.

@article{sobe2023,
	title = {Uncertainty as {Ignorance}? {Governing} {Futures} of {Education}},
	issn = {2096-5311},
	doi = {10.1177/20965311231189518},
	abstract = {At what point does a humble and/or realistic acknowledgment of unknowing tip over into ignorance-making of a misleading or dangerous sort? This article tackles this question by examining invocations of “uncertainty” that circulate in educational futures literature. Design/Approach/Methods Through a critical reading of a selected set of education futures publications from leading global actors (e.g., OECD and UNESCO) it aims to unpack the ways that certainty/uncertainty govern the future by installing norms and disabling certain possibilities while enabling others. Findings The paper finds that not-knowing plays an important role in education futures work, with significant consequences that demand thoughtful, critical analysis of each concrete situation. Originality/Value Calculating certainty and taming chance has had a long (if checkered) career in educational planning. This is well recognized in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to “calculations of uncertainty,” specifically to the ontologies of indeterminacy that are generated through educational planning and policy that pretends to account for what is “known” and “unknown” about the future—which is the intellectual project of this article.},
	journal = {ECNU Review of Education},
	author = {Sobe, Noah W.},
	year = {2023},
}

At what point does a humble and/or realistic acknowledgment of unknowing tip over into ignorance-making of a misleading or dangerous sort? This article tackles this question by examining invocations of “uncertainty” that circulate in educational futures literature. Design/Approach/Methods Through a critical reading of a selected set of education futures publications from leading global actors (e.g., OECD and UNESCO) it aims to unpack the ways that certainty/uncertainty govern the future by installing norms and disabling certain possibilities while enabling others. Findings The paper finds that not-knowing plays an important role in education futures work, with significant consequences that demand thoughtful, critical analysis of each concrete situation. Originality/Value Calculating certainty and taming chance has had a long (if checkered) career in educational planning. This is well recognized in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to “calculations of uncertainty,” specifically to the ontologies of indeterminacy that are generated through educational planning and policy that pretends to account for what is “known” and “unknown” about the future—which is the intellectual project of this article.

@article{salter2023,
	title = {The antiepistemology of organized abuse: {Ignorance}, exploitation, inaction},
	volume = {63},
	doi = {10.1093/bjc/azac007},
	abstract = {Organized abuse, in which multiple adults sexually abuse multiple children, has an important role to play in the production of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) but has been relegated to the margins of criminological concern. This paper presents the findings of an international survey of 74 adults who described childhood victimization in CSAM and organized abuse, emphasizing the relationship between organized abuse and entrenched ignorance of it. The paper identifies the multiple zones, practices and structures of ignorance that render organized abuse unknowable and advocates for strategic forms of knowledge production in which ignorance features as a provocation towards information-seeking rather than as a defence mechanism against intolerable realities.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {The British Journal of Criminology},
	author = {Salter, Michael and Woodlock, Delanie},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {221--237},
}

Organized abuse, in which multiple adults sexually abuse multiple children, has an important role to play in the production of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) but has been relegated to the margins of criminological concern. This paper presents the findings of an international survey of 74 adults who described childhood victimization in CSAM and organized abuse, emphasizing the relationship between organized abuse and entrenched ignorance of it. The paper identifies the multiple zones, practices and structures of ignorance that render organized abuse unknowable and advocates for strategic forms of knowledge production in which ignorance features as a provocation towards information-seeking rather than as a defence mechanism against intolerable realities.

@article{sajjad2023,
	title = {A subaltern gaze on {White} ignorance, (in)security and the possibility of educating the {White} rescue plans},
	volume = {54},
	doi = {10.1177/09670106231165660},
	abstract = {In this article, I, as a subaltern, offer a reverse gaze on White security plans to rescue the world from the tide of violent extremism. Violent extremism has been identified as a global security threat by the United Nations, which announced a Plan of Action to combat the threat in 2016. Education has been considered a valuable tool for preventing violent extremism. In 2017, UNESCO published a policy guide explaining how education can be used to prevent violent extremism. This article offers a critique of the UNESCO policy guide, using the construct of White ignorance as explained by Charles Mills and Jennifer Mueller’s Theory of Racial Ignorance. This critique, coming from a location (Pakistan) where education has been under intense White scrutiny since 9/11, owing to its alleged link with violent ideologies, provides an inverse perspective on the problem of violent extremism. Using Mills’s concept of the epistemology of ignorance, I argue that international security policies view security as maintenance of White hegemony and refuse to listen to the people labelled as a security problem by White epistemic authorities. I contend that it is the White security policy that needs to be educated to prevent violence and maintain durable security.},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Security Dialogue},
	author = {Sajjad, Fatima Waqi},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {337--355},
}

In this article, I, as a subaltern, offer a reverse gaze on White security plans to rescue the world from the tide of violent extremism. Violent extremism has been identified as a global security threat by the United Nations, which announced a Plan of Action to combat the threat in 2016. Education has been considered a valuable tool for preventing violent extremism. In 2017, UNESCO published a policy guide explaining how education can be used to prevent violent extremism. This article offers a critique of the UNESCO policy guide, using the construct of White ignorance as explained by Charles Mills and Jennifer Mueller’s Theory of Racial Ignorance. This critique, coming from a location (Pakistan) where education has been under intense White scrutiny since 9/11, owing to its alleged link with violent ideologies, provides an inverse perspective on the problem of violent extremism. Using Mills’s concept of the epistemology of ignorance, I argue that international security policies view security as maintenance of White hegemony and refuse to listen to the people labelled as a security problem by White epistemic authorities. I contend that it is the White security policy that needs to be educated to prevent violence and maintain durable security.

@article{rudy-hiller2023,
	title = {Moral ignorance and the social nature of responsible agency},
	volume = {66},
	doi = {10.1080/0020174x.2019.1667871},
	abstract = {In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my account to bear on the debate about the exculpatory potential of moral ignorance. I show that a prominent position in this debate – the position that denies that moral ignorance exculpates – is grounded on an individualistic and acontextualist conception of moral capacities, moral cognition, and blameworthiness, and that this conception leads those philosophers who endorse it to make a number of questionable claims regarding the ability of ordinary agents to overcome their moral ignorance and the culpability they bear for the latter. I conclude by indicating how my socially situated account addresses the issue of moral ignorance.},
	number = {5},
	journal = {Inquiry},
	author = {Rudy-Hiller, Fernando},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {821--848},
}

In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my account to bear on the debate about the exculpatory potential of moral ignorance. I show that a prominent position in this debate – the position that denies that moral ignorance exculpates – is grounded on an individualistic and acontextualist conception of moral capacities, moral cognition, and blameworthiness, and that this conception leads those philosophers who endorse it to make a number of questionable claims regarding the ability of ordinary agents to overcome their moral ignorance and the culpability they bear for the latter. I conclude by indicating how my socially situated account addresses the issue of moral ignorance.

@article{ray2023,
	title = {A {Differential}-{Geometric} {Approach} to {Quantum} {Ignorance} {Consistent} with {Entropic} {Properties} of {Statistical} {Mechanics}},
	volume = {25},
	doi = {10.3390/e25050788},
	abstract = {In this paper, we construct the metric tensor and volume for the manifold of purifications associated with an arbitrary reduced density operator ρS. We also define a quantum coarse-graining (CG) to study the volume where macrostates are the manifolds of purifications, which we call surfaces of ignorance (SOI), and microstates are the purifications of ρS. In this context, the volume functions as a multiplicity of the macrostates that quantifies the amount of information missing from ρS. Using examples where the SOI are generated using representations of SU(2), SO(3), and SO(N), we show two features of the CG: (1) A system beginning in an atypical macrostate of smaller volume evolves to macrostates of greater volume until it reaches the equilibrium macrostate in a process in which the system and environment become strictly more entangled, and (2) the equilibrium macrostate takes up the vast majority of the coarse-grained space especially as the dimension of the total system becomes large. Here, the equilibrium macrostate corresponds to a maximum entanglement between the system and the environment. To demonstrate feature (1) for the examples considered, we show that the volume behaves like the von Neumann entropy in that it is zero for pure states, maximal for maximally mixed states, and is a concave function with respect to the purity of ρS. These two features are essential to typicality arguments regarding thermalization and Boltzmann’s original CG.},
	number = {5},
	journal = {Entropy},
	author = {Ray, Shannon and Alsing, Paul M. and Cafaro, Carlo and Jacinto, H. S.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {788},
}

In this paper, we construct the metric tensor and volume for the manifold of purifications associated with an arbitrary reduced density operator ρS. We also define a quantum coarse-graining (CG) to study the volume where macrostates are the manifolds of purifications, which we call surfaces of ignorance (SOI), and microstates are the purifications of ρS. In this context, the volume functions as a multiplicity of the macrostates that quantifies the amount of information missing from ρS. Using examples where the SOI are generated using representations of SU(2), SO(3), and SO(N), we show two features of the CG: (1) A system beginning in an atypical macrostate of smaller volume evolves to macrostates of greater volume until it reaches the equilibrium macrostate in a process in which the system and environment become strictly more entangled, and (2) the equilibrium macrostate takes up the vast majority of the coarse-grained space especially as the dimension of the total system becomes large. Here, the equilibrium macrostate corresponds to a maximum entanglement between the system and the environment. To demonstrate feature (1) for the examples considered, we show that the volume behaves like the von Neumann entropy in that it is zero for pure states, maximal for maximally mixed states, and is a concave function with respect to the purity of ρS. These two features are essential to typicality arguments regarding thermalization and Boltzmann’s original CG.

@article{portfliet2023,
	title = {How to study strategic ignorance in organizations},
	volume = {23},
	issn = {2052-1499},
	abstract = {This special issue is a testament to the interest in ignorance which has been shown across fields. However, questions remain on how to study the phenomenon. Methods diverge based on what type of ignorance is being examined and what field the study is located in. In this note, we find that a method to study a particular kind of ignorance, namely organizational strategic ignorance, is lacking, primarily due to the power and temporal dimensions at play. We offer that a material approach, specifically one focused on ‘boundary objects’, may be a fruitful avenue for investigating the topic. Objects have long been understood as sites of interpretive flexibility (Star, 2010), and there are parallels that can be drawn between materiality/absence and knowledge/ignorance, incorporating aspects of power, but also the temporal qualities that strategic ignorance encompasses. We draw on our research on whistleblowing to illustrate how boundary objects are a useful starting point for studies of strategic ignorance, and how a material approach in general may be an effective method for ignorance research more widely.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ephemera},
	author = {Portfliet, M. Van and Fanchini, M.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {217--230},
}

This special issue is a testament to the interest in ignorance which has been shown across fields. However, questions remain on how to study the phenomenon. Methods diverge based on what type of ignorance is being examined and what field the study is located in. In this note, we find that a method to study a particular kind of ignorance, namely organizational strategic ignorance, is lacking, primarily due to the power and temporal dimensions at play. We offer that a material approach, specifically one focused on ‘boundary objects’, may be a fruitful avenue for investigating the topic. Objects have long been understood as sites of interpretive flexibility (Star, 2010), and there are parallels that can be drawn between materiality/absence and knowledge/ignorance, incorporating aspects of power, but also the temporal qualities that strategic ignorance encompasses. We draw on our research on whistleblowing to illustrate how boundary objects are a useful starting point for studies of strategic ignorance, and how a material approach in general may be an effective method for ignorance research more widely.

@article{plesner2023,
	title = {Digitalize and deny: {Pluralistic} collective ignorance in an algorithmic profiling project},
	volume = {23},
	url = {https://ephemerajournal.org/contribution/digitalize-and-deny-pluralistic-collective-ignorance-algorithmic-profiling-project},
	abstract = {The digital transformation paradigm, marked by optimistic tech determinism, pushes contemporary management to constantly consider the usefulness of cutting- edge digital technologies for their organizations. When experiments with such technologies fail, the same optimistic tech determinism seems to play a role in actors’ denial of that failure. Based on an ethnographic study of a public organization, this paper analyzes an empirical case involving an unsuccessful digitalization flagship project. Despite encountering fundamental problems and clearly failing to fulfill its promises, the project was allowed to continue, and daily work took place unabated. This study explores how managers, project managers, and employees reacted to the numerous problems and failures related to the project in both the development and implementation phases. Our paper is situated within the literature on organizational ignorance and denial, and it advances the concept of ‘pluralistic collective ignorance’. Inspired by science and technology studies, the term ‘pluralistic collective ignorance’ is developed to account for the diversity in how organizational members ignore a phenomenon and the diversity of actors who do so. Tech optimism seems to prevent otherwise reflective actors from asking certain kinds of questions about technological solutions. However, as it is often unknown whether a digitalization project will have a positive impact in practice, it remains on open question whether denial should be viewed as supportive or destructive for organizational development.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {ephemera: theory \& politics in organization},
	author = {Plesner, U. and Justesen, L.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {19--48},
}

The digital transformation paradigm, marked by optimistic tech determinism, pushes contemporary management to constantly consider the usefulness of cutting- edge digital technologies for their organizations. When experiments with such technologies fail, the same optimistic tech determinism seems to play a role in actors’ denial of that failure. Based on an ethnographic study of a public organization, this paper analyzes an empirical case involving an unsuccessful digitalization flagship project. Despite encountering fundamental problems and clearly failing to fulfill its promises, the project was allowed to continue, and daily work took place unabated. This study explores how managers, project managers, and employees reacted to the numerous problems and failures related to the project in both the development and implementation phases. Our paper is situated within the literature on organizational ignorance and denial, and it advances the concept of ‘pluralistic collective ignorance’. Inspired by science and technology studies, the term ‘pluralistic collective ignorance’ is developed to account for the diversity in how organizational members ignore a phenomenon and the diversity of actors who do so. Tech optimism seems to prevent otherwise reflective actors from asking certain kinds of questions about technological solutions. However, as it is often unknown whether a digitalization project will have a positive impact in practice, it remains on open question whether denial should be viewed as supportive or destructive for organizational development.

@article{pina-romero2023,
	title = {Citizen science “from the margins”: epistemologies of ignorance in the {Movement} of {Women} with {Endometriosis} in {Mexico}},
	volume = {6},
	doi = {10.1080/25729861.2023.2247834},
	abstract = {This paper analyzes, from the perspective of feminist epistemologies of ignorance, the case of Endometriosis México: an association of women with endometriosis that denounces different types of ignorance produced around their disease. I examine how the unveiling and analysis of the production of ignorance has become a central element of their struggle and the driving force behind the creation of new knowledge. This is a case of citizen science made “from the margins” that does not fit the typical citizen science instrumental or democratic discourse. In this sense, it proposes new directions for discussing public participation in science and technology. The work accounts for the process of production of ignorance identified by the Association in the light of three forms suggested by Nancy Tuana: (i) “knowing that we do not know, but not caring to know,” (ii) “we do not even know that we do not know,” and (iii) “they do not want us to know.” I propose a citizen science “from the margins” as a form of public participation in science and technology based on an epistemology of ignorance.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Tapuya: Latin American Science, Technology and Society},
	author = {Piña-Romero, Julieta},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--19},
}

This paper analyzes, from the perspective of feminist epistemologies of ignorance, the case of Endometriosis México: an association of women with endometriosis that denounces different types of ignorance produced around their disease. I examine how the unveiling and analysis of the production of ignorance has become a central element of their struggle and the driving force behind the creation of new knowledge. This is a case of citizen science made “from the margins” that does not fit the typical citizen science instrumental or democratic discourse. In this sense, it proposes new directions for discussing public participation in science and technology. The work accounts for the process of production of ignorance identified by the Association in the light of three forms suggested by Nancy Tuana: (i) “knowing that we do not know, but not caring to know,” (ii) “we do not even know that we do not know,” and (iii) “they do not want us to know.” I propose a citizen science “from the margins” as a form of public participation in science and technology based on an epistemology of ignorance.

@article{nikolaidis2023,
	title = {Structural white ignorance and education for racial justice},
	volume = {21},
	doi = {10.1177/14778785231162106},
	abstract = {While white ignorance is primarily produced and reproduced through social-structural processes, philosophy of education scholarship has focused on agent-centered educational solutions. This article argues that agent-centered solutions are ineffective and that education for disrupting white ignorance must be structure-centered. Specifically, the article contends that (1) social-structural processes often render being in a state of white ignorance reasonable and that (2) assigning white ignorant agents individual responsibility for overcoming their ignorance is often unreasonable. Consequently, epistemic virtue-based approaches to education are insufficient and inappropriate. Instead, the author proposes prioritizing political forms of education. This includes educating students on how to participate in political action and using political action to educate the public.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Theory and Research in Education},
	author = {Nikolaidis, A. C.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {52--70},
}

While white ignorance is primarily produced and reproduced through social-structural processes, philosophy of education scholarship has focused on agent-centered educational solutions. This article argues that agent-centered solutions are ineffective and that education for disrupting white ignorance must be structure-centered. Specifically, the article contends that (1) social-structural processes often render being in a state of white ignorance reasonable and that (2) assigning white ignorant agents individual responsibility for overcoming their ignorance is often unreasonable. Consequently, epistemic virtue-based approaches to education are insufficient and inappropriate. Instead, the author proposes prioritizing political forms of education. This includes educating students on how to participate in political action and using political action to educate the public.

@article{nathan2023,
	title = {Can {Ignorance} {Be} an {Epistemic} {Virtue}},
	volume = {27},
	issn = {2036-9972},
	doi = {10.13137/2036-9972/35478},
	abstract = {Ignorance has traditionally been perceived negatively, as a hurdle. Our knowledge inevitably has gaps and blunders, which are gradually filled in as more is discovered. Over the last few decades, agnotologists and epistemologists of ignorance have challenged this standard story emphasizing that ignorance is not merely the culpable absence of information. Ignorance also has a “virtuous” component, when a specific inquiry ought to be left untouched. Yet, can ignorance become an epistemic virtue in science, a goal in and of itself? This essay shifts the spotlight to a more constructive side of ignorance and its philosophical implications. I begin by distinguishing three kinds of ignorance. Next, I illustrate the claim that ignorance can play a strongly productive role by connecting it to debates over reductionism and the status of black boxes. Finally, I offer some suggestions for incorporating the pursuit of ignorance into our textbooks and other pedagogical tools.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {APhEx},
	author = {Nathan, Marco J.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {159--175},
}

Ignorance has traditionally been perceived negatively, as a hurdle. Our knowledge inevitably has gaps and blunders, which are gradually filled in as more is discovered. Over the last few decades, agnotologists and epistemologists of ignorance have challenged this standard story emphasizing that ignorance is not merely the culpable absence of information. Ignorance also has a “virtuous” component, when a specific inquiry ought to be left untouched. Yet, can ignorance become an epistemic virtue in science, a goal in and of itself? This essay shifts the spotlight to a more constructive side of ignorance and its philosophical implications. I begin by distinguishing three kinds of ignorance. Next, I illustrate the claim that ignorance can play a strongly productive role by connecting it to debates over reductionism and the status of black boxes. Finally, I offer some suggestions for incorporating the pursuit of ignorance into our textbooks and other pedagogical tools.

@article{hojlund2023,
	title = {A shared zone of ignorance: {Considering} practices of seeing and unseeing in and around nursing stations in two psychiatric wards},
	volume = {23},
	abstract = {The notion of ignorance has become a central topic in social, political, and organizational research, with scholars thus beginning to explore the distribution and strategic uses of not-knowing (Gross and McGoey, 2015). Claiming that ignorance involves making decisions on what should be seen or unseen (Otto et al., 2019), they are calling for insights into the intermediary states produced between knowledge and non-knowledge in practice. Answering this call, the present article empirically details how practices of seeing and unseeing take place within and across the transparent architecture of a newly built psychiatric hospital in Denmark. Drawing on participant observations and interviews with nursing staff, we examine the role that spatial and material circumstances play in the situated production of ignorance. As such, we consider how the mutual visibility afforded by the transparent design of a nursing station in an inpatient setting produces what we suggest is ‘a shared zone of ignorance’. Inspired by the work of German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, this article extends current understandings of how ignorance is ‘tethered to the spatial’ (Frickel and Kinchy, 2015: 175).},
	number = {1},
	journal = {ephemera: theory \& politics in …},
	author = {Højlund, H. and Simonsen, T.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {107--131},
}

The notion of ignorance has become a central topic in social, political, and organizational research, with scholars thus beginning to explore the distribution and strategic uses of not-knowing (Gross and McGoey, 2015). Claiming that ignorance involves making decisions on what should be seen or unseen (Otto et al., 2019), they are calling for insights into the intermediary states produced between knowledge and non-knowledge in practice. Answering this call, the present article empirically details how practices of seeing and unseeing take place within and across the transparent architecture of a newly built psychiatric hospital in Denmark. Drawing on participant observations and interviews with nursing staff, we examine the role that spatial and material circumstances play in the situated production of ignorance. As such, we consider how the mutual visibility afforded by the transparent design of a nursing station in an inpatient setting produces what we suggest is ‘a shared zone of ignorance’. Inspired by the work of German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, this article extends current understandings of how ignorance is ‘tethered to the spatial’ (Frickel and Kinchy, 2015: 175).

@article{mondon2023,
	title = {Epistemologies of ignorance in far right studies: the invisibilisation of racism and whiteness in times of populist hype},
	volume = {58},
	issn = {0001-6810 {\textbar} 1741-1416 (online)},
	doi = {10.1057/s41269-022-00271-6},
	abstract = {Research on the far right has been a booming field for decades now, with far-right parties generally being much more researched than their right, centre and left counterparts, even when they are marginal in terms of politics or electoral support. Yet, for a field that is notorious for its lively definitional debates and tendency to evolve and reinvent itself terminologically, it has appeared unwilling to engage with the concepts of race, racism and whiteness, or with its very positioning in political structures. Through a mixed-methods discursive approach, this article analyses the titles and abstracts of all articles published in peer-reviewed journal in the sub-field of far right studies between 2016 and 2021 (n = 2543) to highlight which terms and concepts are primed and which are obscured. This article highlights a tendency to prime euphemising terms and concepts such as ‘populism’ and avoid those which engage with systemic and structural forms of oppression such as racism and whiteness. This article thus aims to both map and make sense of the absence of whiteness and racism in the corpus by arguing that it is a symbol of the ongoing presence of colourblind approaches and a lack of reckoning with the scale and pervasion of systemic racism in contemporary societies.},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Acta Politica},
	author = {Mondon, Aurelien},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {876--894},
}

Research on the far right has been a booming field for decades now, with far-right parties generally being much more researched than their right, centre and left counterparts, even when they are marginal in terms of politics or electoral support. Yet, for a field that is notorious for its lively definitional debates and tendency to evolve and reinvent itself terminologically, it has appeared unwilling to engage with the concepts of race, racism and whiteness, or with its very positioning in political structures. Through a mixed-methods discursive approach, this article analyses the titles and abstracts of all articles published in peer-reviewed journal in the sub-field of far right studies between 2016 and 2021 (n = 2543) to highlight which terms and concepts are primed and which are obscured. This article highlights a tendency to prime euphemising terms and concepts such as ‘populism’ and avoid those which engage with systemic and structural forms of oppression such as racism and whiteness. This article thus aims to both map and make sense of the absence of whiteness and racism in the corpus by arguing that it is a symbol of the ongoing presence of colourblind approaches and a lack of reckoning with the scale and pervasion of systemic racism in contemporary societies.

@article{moojen2023,
	title = {Using misperceived social norms as a license: does pluralistic ignorance trigger complacency in the food environment},
	volume = {18},
	issn = {1553-4529},
	doi = {10.1080/15534510.2023.2251643},
	abstract = {The current food environment strongly communicates the normality of consuming unhealthy and unsustainable food products. However, it is unclear whether people truly support this unhealthy and unsustainable social norm, or that they follow the norm (reluctantly) because they believe that other people agree with it, a phenomenon that is generally known as pluralistic ignorance. While previous research has documented the existence of pluralistic ignorance in a variety of settings, it is unknown to what extent it directly influences behavior and which mechanism may account for this influence. The present study examines whether the perception that others seem to agree with unhealthy and unsustainable eating norms acts as a license to not change one’s eating behavior and leads to complacency. We assessed pluralistic ignorance by comparing self- and other-scores on the importance, frequency, normalcy, and intentions dimensions of consuming healthy and sustainable food in a large sample of Dutch participants (N = 415). To investigate the effect of pluralistic ignorance on self-licensing and complacency, we calculated healthy and sustainable ‘misperception scores’ per dimension. Healthy eating misperceptions only marginally predicted self-licensing, but healthy misperceived intentions did predict an increase in complacency. Sustainable eating misperceptions seem more influential because misperceptions on importance and frequency predicted an increase in self-licensing, and sustainable misperceived normalcy predicted a decrease in complacency and intentions predicted an increase in complacency. These findings suggest that pluralistic ignorance may be more influential in sustainable eating since people could be uncertain what appropriate sustainable food choices are. Prospects for future research and suggestions to address pluralistic ignorance to potentially increase healthy and sustainable food choices are discussed.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Social Influence},
	author = {Moojen, Reinoud and Gillebaart, Marleen and de Ridder, Denise},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--17},
}

The current food environment strongly communicates the normality of consuming unhealthy and unsustainable food products. However, it is unclear whether people truly support this unhealthy and unsustainable social norm, or that they follow the norm (reluctantly) because they believe that other people agree with it, a phenomenon that is generally known as pluralistic ignorance. While previous research has documented the existence of pluralistic ignorance in a variety of settings, it is unknown to what extent it directly influences behavior and which mechanism may account for this influence. The present study examines whether the perception that others seem to agree with unhealthy and unsustainable eating norms acts as a license to not change one’s eating behavior and leads to complacency. We assessed pluralistic ignorance by comparing self- and other-scores on the importance, frequency, normalcy, and intentions dimensions of consuming healthy and sustainable food in a large sample of Dutch participants (N = 415). To investigate the effect of pluralistic ignorance on self-licensing and complacency, we calculated healthy and sustainable ‘misperception scores’ per dimension. Healthy eating misperceptions only marginally predicted self-licensing, but healthy misperceived intentions did predict an increase in complacency. Sustainable eating misperceptions seem more influential because misperceptions on importance and frequency predicted an increase in self-licensing, and sustainable misperceived normalcy predicted a decrease in complacency and intentions predicted an increase in complacency. These findings suggest that pluralistic ignorance may be more influential in sustainable eating since people could be uncertain what appropriate sustainable food choices are. Prospects for future research and suggestions to address pluralistic ignorance to potentially increase healthy and sustainable food choices are discussed.

@incollection{mellink2023,
	address = {Danvers, MA},
	title = {Overcoming oceans of ignorance: {What} you should know about plastic waste before it enters the sea},
	isbn = {9789811259104 {\textbar} 9789811259111 (eISBN)},
	url = {10.1142/9789811259111_0003},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {Plastic {Pollution} {In} {The} {Global} {Ocean}},
	publisher = {World Scientific},
	author = {Mellink, Y. and Schreyers, L. and Hauk, R. and Pinto, R.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {47--76},
}

@article{martinez-ordaz2023,
	title = {Scientific understanding through big data: {From} ignorance to insights to understanding},
	volume = {1},
	url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/27538699231176523},
	doi = {10.1177/27538699231176523},
	abstract = {Here I argue that scientists can achieve some understanding of both the products of big data implementation as well as of the target phenomenon to which they are expected to refer—even when these products were obtained through essentially epistemically opaque processes. The general aim of the paper is to provide a road map for how this is done; going from the use of big data to epistemic opacity (Sec. 2), from epistemic opacity to ignorance (Sec. 3), from ignorance to insights (Sec. 4), and finally, from insights to understanding (Sec. 5, 6)},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Possibility Studies \& Society},
	author = {Martínez-Ordaz, María del Rosario},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {279--299},
}

Here I argue that scientists can achieve some understanding of both the products of big data implementation as well as of the target phenomenon to which they are expected to refer—even when these products were obtained through essentially epistemically opaque processes. The general aim of the paper is to provide a road map for how this is done; going from the use of big data to epistemic opacity (Sec. 2), from epistemic opacity to ignorance (Sec. 3), from ignorance to insights (Sec. 4), and finally, from insights to understanding (Sec. 5, 6)

@article{marchetti2023,
	title = {When {Political} {Ignorance} is really harmful for {Democracy}: {Moral} {Intuitions} and {Biased} {Attitudes} in {Voting} {Behaviour}},
	volume = {49},
	issn = {1461-734X},
	doi = {10.1177/01914537221093742},
	abstract = {Ignorance about political related issues has long been considered a threat to democracy. This paper revolves around the concept of political ignorance, focusing especially on Ilya Somin’s book Democracy and Political Ignorance and going beyond his standpoint in two ways. First of all, it moves away from the notion of factual knowledge by showing that political ignorance cannot be limited to a matter of information quality. On the contrary, it shows that ignorance concerns the formation of opinions about political facts, which are the bricks with which disagreement is built. Then, using the insights of the Moral Foundation Theory by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, the paper argues that moral intuitions represent an additional source of bias that current research on the problem of voters’ ignorance should address. While Somin argues that biased moral values are the outcome of ignorance, Moral Foundation Theory suggests that moral intuitions are a robust determinant of people’s political views as they make factual knowledge partially irrelevant and also make people with different moral minds unable to understand the basis of reciprocal factual argumentations.},
	number = {9},
	journal = {Philosophy \& Social Criticism},
	author = {Marchetti, Jacopo},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1046--1060},
}

Ignorance about political related issues has long been considered a threat to democracy. This paper revolves around the concept of political ignorance, focusing especially on Ilya Somin’s book Democracy and Political Ignorance and going beyond his standpoint in two ways. First of all, it moves away from the notion of factual knowledge by showing that political ignorance cannot be limited to a matter of information quality. On the contrary, it shows that ignorance concerns the formation of opinions about political facts, which are the bricks with which disagreement is built. Then, using the insights of the Moral Foundation Theory by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, the paper argues that moral intuitions represent an additional source of bias that current research on the problem of voters’ ignorance should address. While Somin argues that biased moral values are the outcome of ignorance, Moral Foundation Theory suggests that moral intuitions are a robust determinant of people’s political views as they make factual knowledge partially irrelevant and also make people with different moral minds unable to understand the basis of reciprocal factual argumentations.

@article{malweski2023,
	title = {Epistemologies of {Ignorance} {With}/in {Curriculum} {Studies}: {The} {Politics} of {Not} {Knowing} and {Black} {Lives} {Mattering}},
	volume = {12},
	issn = {2157-1074},
	number = {2},
	journal = {The International Journal of Critical Pedagogy},
	author = {Malweski, E. L. and Jaramillo, N. E.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {35--70},
}

@article{lin2023a,
	title = {Ignorance as a {Method}: {Rethinking} {Academic} {Burden} in an {Accelerated} {Society}},
	issn = {2096-5311},
	doi = {10.1177/20965311231155243},
	abstract = {This study applies “ignorance” as a theoretical lens to understand students’ academic burden in China as well as the value of free time in social acceleration. Design/Approach/Methods The article argues that students’ learning gradually became alienated in different times and spaces. It uses Rosa's social acceleration theory to analyze the logical paradox of the burden reduction policy in China and Benner's plasticity and self-activity principles to highlight the pedagogical value of leisure and free activities. Findings The findings suggest the need to maintain the “necessary ignorance” in leisure activities and intervene less in student learning. In this respect, “ignorance” can be viewed as a cognitive method to protect leisure time and rebuild a spontaneous order in learning, which can close the gap caused by the impossible synchronization of specific parties in the education system. Ignorance opens the door to learned spaces, providing more opportunities to reduce academic burden in an accelerated society and stimulate the imagination of education. Originality/Value This study reveals the plasticity and self-activity that students develop in free leisure time and space, and reworks the key concept of “inevitable ignorance” expounded by Friedrich Hayek into “necessary ignorance” with pedagogical and ethical meanings. The reconceptualization of academic burden opens up new ways of thinking about educational policy and educational practice.},
	journal = {ECNU Review of Education},
	author = {Lin (林小英), Xiaoying},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {209653112311552},
}

This study applies “ignorance” as a theoretical lens to understand students’ academic burden in China as well as the value of free time in social acceleration. Design/Approach/Methods The article argues that students’ learning gradually became alienated in different times and spaces. It uses Rosa's social acceleration theory to analyze the logical paradox of the burden reduction policy in China and Benner's plasticity and self-activity principles to highlight the pedagogical value of leisure and free activities. Findings The findings suggest the need to maintain the “necessary ignorance” in leisure activities and intervene less in student learning. In this respect, “ignorance” can be viewed as a cognitive method to protect leisure time and rebuild a spontaneous order in learning, which can close the gap caused by the impossible synchronization of specific parties in the education system. Ignorance opens the door to learned spaces, providing more opportunities to reduce academic burden in an accelerated society and stimulate the imagination of education. Originality/Value This study reveals the plasticity and self-activity that students develop in free leisure time and space, and reworks the key concept of “inevitable ignorance” expounded by Friedrich Hayek into “necessary ignorance” with pedagogical and ethical meanings. The reconceptualization of academic burden opens up new ways of thinking about educational policy and educational practice.

@article{licon2023,
	title = {Some moral benefits of ignorance},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {1062-9408 ;  e1879-0860},
	doi = {10.1080/09515089.2022.2042230},
	abstract = {When moral philosophers study ignorance, their efforts are almost exclusively confined to its exculpatory and blameworthy aspects. Unfortunately, though, this trend overlooks that certain kinds of propositional ignorance, namely of the personal costs and benefits of altruistic actions, can indirectly incentivize those actions. Humans require cooperation from others to survive, and that can be facilitated by a good reputation. One avenue to a good reputation is helping others, sticking to moral principles, and so forth, without calculating the personal costs of doing so, e.g., saving someone from a burning building without calculating how personally costly or beneficial it would be. These actions are indirect moral benefits (partly) resulting from that kind of propositional ignorance.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
	author = {Licon, Jimmy Alfonso},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {319--336},
}

When moral philosophers study ignorance, their efforts are almost exclusively confined to its exculpatory and blameworthy aspects. Unfortunately, though, this trend overlooks that certain kinds of propositional ignorance, namely of the personal costs and benefits of altruistic actions, can indirectly incentivize those actions. Humans require cooperation from others to survive, and that can be facilitated by a good reputation. One avenue to a good reputation is helping others, sticking to moral principles, and so forth, without calculating the personal costs of doing so, e.g., saving someone from a burning building without calculating how personally costly or beneficial it would be. These actions are indirect moral benefits (partly) resulting from that kind of propositional ignorance.

@incollection{mackenzie2023,
	edition = {Springer},
	title = {Postdigital {Epistemology} of {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-35469-4},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35469-4_8-1},
	abstract = {Contrary to common assumptions, ignorance is not simply a state of not knowing or yet-to-be-known. Ignorance can involve substantive epistemic practices that are deliberately induced, cultivated, sustained, or purposefully designed, and which wilfully bring about forgetting, not knowing, or wanting to know what ought to be known. States of ignorance are often closely aligned with oppression, subordination, and exclusion, are socially situated, and arise from unequal and unfair differentials in power. Postdigital epistemic ignorance is concerned with how these practices manifest in the online environment along with digital devices and technologies.},
	booktitle = {Encyclopedia of {Postdigital} {Science} and {Education}},
	author = {MacKenzie, A.},
	editor = {Jandric, Petar},
	year = {2023},
}

Contrary to common assumptions, ignorance is not simply a state of not knowing or yet-to-be-known. Ignorance can involve substantive epistemic practices that are deliberately induced, cultivated, sustained, or purposefully designed, and which wilfully bring about forgetting, not knowing, or wanting to know what ought to be known. States of ignorance are often closely aligned with oppression, subordination, and exclusion, are socially situated, and arise from unequal and unfair differentials in power. Postdigital epistemic ignorance is concerned with how these practices manifest in the online environment along with digital devices and technologies.

@article{leyland2023,
	title = {“{Maybe} {I} would’ve been more comfortable in my {Ignorance}?”: {Exploring} future physical therapist’s lived experience of an elective pain science course},
	volume = {39},
	doi = {10.1080/09593985.2022.2098213},
	abstract = {Through the Master of Physical Therapy program at a Canadian University, Understanding Pain in Rehabilitation (PT9551b) has been an elective option for physical therapy students with the final submission based on a reflective diary. The primary intention of the course is to introduce a critical social science perspective of pain and pain management. A secondary intention is to facilitate student reflection on how they see themselves as ‘providers of pain management’ or ‘providers of physical therapy for people in pain’ although at this point, the students’ experiences of learning in this way has not been rigorously explored. There has yet to be a systemic examination of how physical therapy students experience learning about pain through such a course, and how the course has impacted their perspectives.},
	number = {12},
	journal = {Physiotherapy Theory and Practice},
	author = {Leyland, Zoe A. and Walton, David M. and Kinsella, Elizabeth Anne},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {2688--2697},
}

Through the Master of Physical Therapy program at a Canadian University, Understanding Pain in Rehabilitation (PT9551b) has been an elective option for physical therapy students with the final submission based on a reflective diary. The primary intention of the course is to introduce a critical social science perspective of pain and pain management. A secondary intention is to facilitate student reflection on how they see themselves as ‘providers of pain management’ or ‘providers of physical therapy for people in pain’ although at this point, the students’ experiences of learning in this way has not been rigorously explored. There has yet to be a systemic examination of how physical therapy students experience learning about pain through such a course, and how the course has impacted their perspectives.

@article{lee2023,
	title = {Un(ac)countable no-bodies: the politics of ignorance in global health policymaking},
	volume = {33},
	doi = {10.1080/09581596.2022.2025578},
	abstract = {By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories – non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities – are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Public Health},
	author = {Lee, Po-Han},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {48--59},
}

By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories – non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities – are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic.

@article{konieczny2023,
	title = {Ignorance, {Disinformation}, {Manipulation} and {Hate} {Speech} as {Effective} {Tools} of {Political} {Power}: {Neznanje}, dezinformacije, manipulacija i govor mržnje kao učinkovito oruđe političke moći},
	volume = {32},
	doi = {10.59245/ps.32.2.1},
	abstract = {The outbreak of the pandemic, military conflicts and political maelstrom have changed the constellation of the information environment, generating a noticeable increase in ignorance, disinformation, manipulation resulting in fake news, conspiracy theories and the hate speech. The phenomena are escalated and intensified by rapid technological progress, widespread digitization and its impact on all areas of life, especially political activity. Due to the changes brought about by the digital revolution, a new social formation has emerged, known as the information society represented not only by politicians and social activists. The modified architecture of digital space causes the formation of new instruments, influence factors, and harmful social phenomena – previously present and recognized, but never before so intense. This article describes and analyses the issue of ignorance, misinformation, disinformation and manipulation as potential and actual tools of political power and terrorism. The study assesses the impact of disinformation, manipulation and hate speech disseminated through social media sites and abused by politicians who use it to build and extend political power. It also examines the impact of these detrimental and injurious phenomena on the functioning of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental human rights. The article defines the terms of ignorance, misinformation and manipulation proving that a language, as a means of communication should be neutral, is actually used for promoting ideology, coming to power, serving hatred, violence, and inciting criminal acts and crimes. Thus, political players worldwide use language and media to justify violence and to spread false ideologies and improve their public image.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Policija i sigurnost},
	author = {Konieczny, Marcin},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {123--134},
}

The outbreak of the pandemic, military conflicts and political maelstrom have changed the constellation of the information environment, generating a noticeable increase in ignorance, disinformation, manipulation resulting in fake news, conspiracy theories and the hate speech. The phenomena are escalated and intensified by rapid technological progress, widespread digitization and its impact on all areas of life, especially political activity. Due to the changes brought about by the digital revolution, a new social formation has emerged, known as the information society represented not only by politicians and social activists. The modified architecture of digital space causes the formation of new instruments, influence factors, and harmful social phenomena – previously present and recognized, but never before so intense. This article describes and analyses the issue of ignorance, misinformation, disinformation and manipulation as potential and actual tools of political power and terrorism. The study assesses the impact of disinformation, manipulation and hate speech disseminated through social media sites and abused by politicians who use it to build and extend political power. It also examines the impact of these detrimental and injurious phenomena on the functioning of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental human rights. The article defines the terms of ignorance, misinformation and manipulation proving that a language, as a means of communication should be neutral, is actually used for promoting ideology, coming to power, serving hatred, violence, and inciting criminal acts and crimes. Thus, political players worldwide use language and media to justify violence and to spread false ideologies and improve their public image.

@article{koivurova2023,
	title = {Randomness, determinism, and ignorance in coherence},
	volume = {48},
	doi = {10.1364/ol.493785},
	abstract = {The effect of randomness and determinism on the coherence properties of light are studied in detail. As it is well known, a random field can have widely varying coherence properties. Here, it is shown that one can also produce a deterministic field with an arbitrarily low degree of coherence. The role of constant (non-random) fields are then considered, and some simulations with a toy model laser are presented. An interpretation of coherence as a measure of “ignorance” is presented.},
	number = {12},
	journal = {Optics Letters},
	author = {Koivurova, Matias},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {3187},
}

The effect of randomness and determinism on the coherence properties of light are studied in detail. As it is well known, a random field can have widely varying coherence properties. Here, it is shown that one can also produce a deterministic field with an arbitrarily low degree of coherence. The role of constant (non-random) fields are then considered, and some simulations with a toy model laser are presented. An interpretation of coherence as a measure of “ignorance” is presented.

@article{knudsen2023a,
	title = {Organised ignorance},
	volume = {23},
	abstract = {Editorial du numéro spécial sur l’ignorance organisée. Bibliographie en conclusion de l’édito (MG)},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ephemera: Theory \& politics in organization},
	author = {Knudsen, M. and Pors, J. G. and Bakken, T.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--18},
}

Editorial du numéro spécial sur l’ignorance organisée. Bibliographie en conclusion de l’édito (MG)

@article{kirkegaard2023,
	title = {The organization of ignorance: {An} ethnographic study of the production of subjects and objects in an artificial intelligence project},
	volume = {23},
	abstract = {This article is a study of the role of organization of ignorance in an artificial intelligence project in a municipality in Denmark. It raises the issue of how to understand the process through which a seemingly ordinary project involving the development of an algorithm for decision support turns into a fantastical, creative reimagining of subjects and objects through the organization of ignorance. Unlike many ignorance studies, we do not examine ignorance and knowledge through the lens of intentionality or strategic interest. We instead adopt a distinct Deleuzian perspective on ignorance based on the idea of the  ́will to ignorance ́ as productive force that forms subjects and objects of ignorance. By observing the project management team over time, the article shows how it transforms a mundane task into an imaginative quest through the will to ignorance. The findings contribute not only empirically to the understanding of ignorance in organizations but also show the utility of adopting a non-intentional perspective in this kind of study.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ephemera. Theory and Politics in Organization},
	author = {Kirkegaard, L. and Kristensen, A. and Skov Lauridsen, T.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {161--187},
}

This article is a study of the role of organization of ignorance in an artificial intelligence project in a municipality in Denmark. It raises the issue of how to understand the process through which a seemingly ordinary project involving the development of an algorithm for decision support turns into a fantastical, creative reimagining of subjects and objects through the organization of ignorance. Unlike many ignorance studies, we do not examine ignorance and knowledge through the lens of intentionality or strategic interest. We instead adopt a distinct Deleuzian perspective on ignorance based on the idea of the ́will to ignorance ́ as productive force that forms subjects and objects of ignorance. By observing the project management team over time, the article shows how it transforms a mundane task into an imaginative quest through the will to ignorance. The findings contribute not only empirically to the understanding of ignorance in organizations but also show the utility of adopting a non-intentional perspective in this kind of study.

@article{kirfel2023a,
	title = {The pervasive impact of ignorance},
	volume = {231},
	doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105316},
	abstract = {Norm violations have been demonstrated to impact a wide range of seemingly non-normative judgments. Among other things, when agents' actions violate prescriptive norms they tend to be seen as having done those actions more freely, as having acted more intentionally, as being more of a cause of subsequent outcomes, and even as being less happy. The explanation of this effect continue to be debated, with some researchers appealing to features of actions that violate norms, and other researcher emphasizing the importance of agents' mental states when acting. Here, we report the results of two large-scale experiments that replicate and extend twelve of the studies that originally demonstrated the pervasive impact of norm violations. In each case, we build on the pre-existing experimental paradigms to additionally manipulate whether the agents knew that they were violating a norm while holding fixed the action done. We find evidence for a pervasive impact of ignorance: the impact of norm violations on non-normative judgments depends largely on the agent knowing that they were violating a norm when acting. Moreover, we find evidence that the reduction in the impact of normality is underpinned by people's counterfactual reasoning: people are less likely to consider an alternative to the agent's action if the agent is ignorant. We situate our findings in the wider debate around the role or normality in people's reasoning.},
	journal = {Cognition},
	author = {Kirfel, Lara and Phillips, Jonathan},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {105316},
}

Norm violations have been demonstrated to impact a wide range of seemingly non-normative judgments. Among other things, when agents' actions violate prescriptive norms they tend to be seen as having done those actions more freely, as having acted more intentionally, as being more of a cause of subsequent outcomes, and even as being less happy. The explanation of this effect continue to be debated, with some researchers appealing to features of actions that violate norms, and other researcher emphasizing the importance of agents' mental states when acting. Here, we report the results of two large-scale experiments that replicate and extend twelve of the studies that originally demonstrated the pervasive impact of norm violations. In each case, we build on the pre-existing experimental paradigms to additionally manipulate whether the agents knew that they were violating a norm while holding fixed the action done. We find evidence for a pervasive impact of ignorance: the impact of norm violations on non-normative judgments depends largely on the agent knowing that they were violating a norm when acting. Moreover, we find evidence that the reduction in the impact of normality is underpinned by people's counterfactual reasoning: people are less likely to consider an alternative to the agent's action if the agent is ignorant. We situate our findings in the wider debate around the role or normality in people's reasoning.

@article{kadel2023,
	title = {Deliberate ignorance—a barrier for information interventions targeting reduced meat consumption},
	doi = {10.1080/08870446.2023.2182895},
	abstract = {Objective
Despite abundant information about negative consequences of consuming meat, consumption in many Western countries is many times higher than recommended. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that people consciously decide to ignore such information—a phenomenon called deliberate ignorance. We investigated this potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption.
Methods
In three studies, a total of 1133 participants had the opportunity to see 18 information chunks on negative consequences of meat consumption or to ignore part of the information. Deliberate ignorance was measured as the number of ignored information chunks. We assessed potential predictors and outcomes of deliberate ignorance. Interventions to reduce deliberate ignorance (i.e., self-affirmation, contemplation, and self-efficacy) were experimentally tested.
Results
The more information participants ignored, the less they changed their intention to reduce their meat consumption (r = −.124). This effect was partially explained by cognitive dissonance induced by the presented information. While neither self-affirmation nor contemplation exercises reduced deliberate ignorance, self-efficacy exercises did.
Conclusion
Deliberate ignorance is a potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption and needs to be considered in future interventions and research. Self-efficacy exercises are a promising approach to reduce deliberate ignorance and should be further explored},
	journal = {Psychology \& Health},
	author = {Kadel, Philipp and Herwig, Ira E. and Mata, Jutta},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--18},
}

Objective Despite abundant information about negative consequences of consuming meat, consumption in many Western countries is many times higher than recommended. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that people consciously decide to ignore such information—a phenomenon called deliberate ignorance. We investigated this potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption. Methods In three studies, a total of 1133 participants had the opportunity to see 18 information chunks on negative consequences of meat consumption or to ignore part of the information. Deliberate ignorance was measured as the number of ignored information chunks. We assessed potential predictors and outcomes of deliberate ignorance. Interventions to reduce deliberate ignorance (i.e., self-affirmation, contemplation, and self-efficacy) were experimentally tested. Results The more information participants ignored, the less they changed their intention to reduce their meat consumption (r = −.124). This effect was partially explained by cognitive dissonance induced by the presented information. While neither self-affirmation nor contemplation exercises reduced deliberate ignorance, self-efficacy exercises did. Conclusion Deliberate ignorance is a potential barrier for information interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption and needs to be considered in future interventions and research. Self-efficacy exercises are a promising approach to reduce deliberate ignorance and should be further explored

@article{jones2023,
	title = {Motivated ignorance and social identity threat: the case of the {Flat} {Earth}},
	volume = {29},
	doi = {10.1080/13504630.2023.2208033},
	abstract = {Belief in a conspiracy theory may, for some, provide a social identity. Because of the nature of many conspiracy theories, social identities associated with such beliefs may be subject to varied and considerable threats. Whilst various mechanisms for dealing with social identity threat have received widespread attention, this paper introduces an as yet unexplored strategy – that of ‘motivated ignorance' – as a further mechanism for social identity maintenance. This is a behavior where individuals actively avoid freely available and accessible information in order to protect a social identity from information that may be harmful to the existence of the broader social group, and thus the individual’s own sense of self. Using a netnographic approach, we explored motivated ignorance related to the social identities formed around beliefs in the Flat Earth. Data revealed two categories of motivated ignorance. Firstly, that of ‘poisoning the well', where ignorance was justified by derogating the perceived epistemic quality of the information. The second was more instrumental, through ad hominem attacks on the source rather than the epistemic quality of information. The study suggests that motivated ignorance may be used as a strategy that may be used to protect social identities that are under threat, adding a further mechanism to the literature on coping with social identity threat.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Social Identities},
	author = {Jones, Ian and Adams, Andrew and Mayoh, Joanne},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {79--94},
}

Belief in a conspiracy theory may, for some, provide a social identity. Because of the nature of many conspiracy theories, social identities associated with such beliefs may be subject to varied and considerable threats. Whilst various mechanisms for dealing with social identity threat have received widespread attention, this paper introduces an as yet unexplored strategy – that of ‘motivated ignorance' – as a further mechanism for social identity maintenance. This is a behavior where individuals actively avoid freely available and accessible information in order to protect a social identity from information that may be harmful to the existence of the broader social group, and thus the individual’s own sense of self. Using a netnographic approach, we explored motivated ignorance related to the social identities formed around beliefs in the Flat Earth. Data revealed two categories of motivated ignorance. Firstly, that of ‘poisoning the well', where ignorance was justified by derogating the perceived epistemic quality of the information. The second was more instrumental, through ad hominem attacks on the source rather than the epistemic quality of information. The study suggests that motivated ignorance may be used as a strategy that may be used to protect social identities that are under threat, adding a further mechanism to the literature on coping with social identity threat.

@article{jensen2023,
	title = {Learning from errors in digital patient communication: professionals' enactment of negative knowledge and digital ignorance in the workplace},
	volume = {35},
	doi = {10.1108/JWL-12-2022-0177/full/html},
	abstract = {Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate how professionals learn from varying experiences with errors in health-care digitalization and develop and use negative knowledge and digital ignorance in efforts to improve digitalized health care.
Design/methodology/approach – A two-year qualitative field study was conducted in the context of a public health-care organization working with digital patient communication. The data consisted of participant observation, semistructured interviews and document data. Inductive coding and a theoretically informed generation of themes were applied.
Findings – The findings show that both health-care and digital communication professionals learn through experiences with digital “rule-” and “knowledge-based” errors in patient communication and develop negative knowledge and awareness of digital ignorance. In their joint efforts, they use negative knowledge to “bend the rules” and to explore digital ignorance in efforts to improve patient communication.},
	number = {5},
	journal = {Journal of Workplace Learning},
	author = {Jensen, R. A. A. and Jonasson, C. and Gartmeier, M.},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {432--449},
}

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate how professionals learn from varying experiences with errors in health-care digitalization and develop and use negative knowledge and digital ignorance in efforts to improve digitalized health care. Design/methodology/approach – A two-year qualitative field study was conducted in the context of a public health-care organization working with digital patient communication. The data consisted of participant observation, semistructured interviews and document data. Inductive coding and a theoretically informed generation of themes were applied. Findings – The findings show that both health-care and digital communication professionals learn through experiences with digital “rule-” and “knowledge-based” errors in patient communication and develop negative knowledge and awareness of digital ignorance. In their joint efforts, they use negative knowledge to “bend the rules” and to explore digital ignorance in efforts to improve patient communication.

@article{iltis2023,
	title = {Ignorance is {Not} {Bliss}: {The} {Case} for {Comprehensive} {Reproductive} {Counseling} for {Women} with {Chronic} {Kidney} {Disease}},
	volume = {35},
	doi = {10.1007/s10730-021-09463-7},
	abstract = {The bioethics literature has paid little attention to matters of informed reproductive decision-making among women of childbearing age who have chronic kidney disease (CKD), including women who are on dialysis or women who have had a kidney transplant. Women with CKD receive inconsistent and, sometimes, inadequate reproductive counseling, particularly with respect to information about pursuing pregnancy. We identify four factors that might contribute to inadequate and inconsistent reproductive counseling. We argue that women with CKD should receive comprehensive reproductive counseling, including information about the possibility of pursuing pregnancy, and that more rigorous research on pregnancy in women with CKD, including women on dialysis or who have received a kidney transplant, is warranted to improve informed reproductive decision making in this population.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {HEC Forum},
	author = {Iltis, Ana S. and Mehta, Maya and Sawinski, Deirdre},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {223--236},
}

The bioethics literature has paid little attention to matters of informed reproductive decision-making among women of childbearing age who have chronic kidney disease (CKD), including women who are on dialysis or women who have had a kidney transplant. Women with CKD receive inconsistent and, sometimes, inadequate reproductive counseling, particularly with respect to information about pursuing pregnancy. We identify four factors that might contribute to inadequate and inconsistent reproductive counseling. We argue that women with CKD should receive comprehensive reproductive counseling, including information about the possibility of pursuing pregnancy, and that more rigorous research on pregnancy in women with CKD, including women on dialysis or who have received a kidney transplant, is warranted to improve informed reproductive decision making in this population.

@article{ikkos2023,
	title = {Not doomed: sociology and psychiatry, and ignorance and expertise},
	volume = {47},
	doi = {10.1192/bjb.2022.60},
	abstract = {This paper presents and responds to On the Heels of Ignorance, a sociological study which identifies five fundamental epistemological paradigm changes in American psychiatry in the service of its survival and details several tactics that have been employed to facilitate these professional reinventions. Issues raised in this presentation include the relationship between psychiatry, society and the state, and the nature and significance of psychiatric expertise. The dynamic of these relationships and the complexities of the required expertise create their own challenges for the advancement and professional accountability of the specialty. The conclusion suggests some future imperatives.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {BJPsych Bulletin},
	author = {Ikkos, George},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {90--94},
}

This paper presents and responds to On the Heels of Ignorance, a sociological study which identifies five fundamental epistemological paradigm changes in American psychiatry in the service of its survival and details several tactics that have been employed to facilitate these professional reinventions. Issues raised in this presentation include the relationship between psychiatry, society and the state, and the nature and significance of psychiatric expertise. The dynamic of these relationships and the complexities of the required expertise create their own challenges for the advancement and professional accountability of the specialty. The conclusion suggests some future imperatives.

@article{hertwig2023,
	title = {Blinding to {Circumvent} {Human} {Biases}: {Deliberate} {Ignorance} in {Humans}, {Institutions}, and {Machines}},
	doi = {10.1177/17456916231188052},
	abstract = {Inequalities and injustices are thorny issues in liberal societies, manifesting in forms such as the gender–pay gap; sentencing discrepancies among Black, Hispanic, and White defendants; and unequal medical-resource distribution across ethnicities. One cause of these inequalities is implicit social bias—unconsciously formed associations between social groups and attributions such as “nurturing,” “lazy,” or “uneducated.” One strategy to counteract implicit and explicit human biases is delegating crucial decisions, such as how to allocate benefits, resources, or opportunities, to algorithms. Algorithms, however, are not necessarily impartial and objective. Although they can detect and mitigate human biases, they can also perpetuate and even amplify existing inequalities and injustices. We explore how a philosophical thought experiment, Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” and a psychological phenomenon, deliberate ignorance, can help shield individuals, institutions, and algorithms from biases. We discuss the benefits and drawbacks of methods for shielding human and artificial decision makers from potentially biasing information. We then broaden our discussion beyond the issues of bias and fairness and turn to a research agenda aimed at improving human judgment accuracy with the assistance of algorithms that conceal information that has the potential to undermine performance. Finally, we propose interdisciplinary research questions.},
	journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
	author = {Hertwig, Ralph and Herzog, Stefan M. and Kozyreva, Anastasia},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--11},
}

Inequalities and injustices are thorny issues in liberal societies, manifesting in forms such as the gender–pay gap; sentencing discrepancies among Black, Hispanic, and White defendants; and unequal medical-resource distribution across ethnicities. One cause of these inequalities is implicit social bias—unconsciously formed associations between social groups and attributions such as “nurturing,” “lazy,” or “uneducated.” One strategy to counteract implicit and explicit human biases is delegating crucial decisions, such as how to allocate benefits, resources, or opportunities, to algorithms. Algorithms, however, are not necessarily impartial and objective. Although they can detect and mitigate human biases, they can also perpetuate and even amplify existing inequalities and injustices. We explore how a philosophical thought experiment, Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” and a psychological phenomenon, deliberate ignorance, can help shield individuals, institutions, and algorithms from biases. We discuss the benefits and drawbacks of methods for shielding human and artificial decision makers from potentially biasing information. We then broaden our discussion beyond the issues of bias and fairness and turn to a research agenda aimed at improving human judgment accuracy with the assistance of algorithms that conceal information that has the potential to undermine performance. Finally, we propose interdisciplinary research questions.

@article{herda2023,
	title = {The {Imagined} {Immigration} and the {Criminal} {Immigrant}: {Expanding} the {Catalog} of {Immigrant}-{Related} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {20},
	doi = {10.33182/ml.v20i1.2773},
	abstract = {Whether it be about population size, origin, or legal status, what ordinary citizens imagine about immigrants is often incorrect. Furthermore, these misperceptions predict greater dislike of foreigners. But, if one considers all the facts that people could get wrong, researchers have likely only scratched the surface. To advance toward a more complete catalog of misperceptions, the current study focuses on one commonly held stereotype: immigrants’ propensity for crime. Using original data from a sample of college students, we examine the crime perception alongside nine established components of the imagined immigration, comparing their extent and consequences for a hypothetical anti-immigrant policy. Findings indicate that misperception levels vary across the ten factual questions considered. Many mistakes are consequential, but the criminal stereotype is the most damaging. It constitutes an important missing component in imagined immigration studies. The findings present implications for anti-immigrant sentiment research and for developing a more accurately informed population.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Migration Letters},
	author = {Herda, Daniel and Divadkar, Amshula},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {71--87},
}

Whether it be about population size, origin, or legal status, what ordinary citizens imagine about immigrants is often incorrect. Furthermore, these misperceptions predict greater dislike of foreigners. But, if one considers all the facts that people could get wrong, researchers have likely only scratched the surface. To advance toward a more complete catalog of misperceptions, the current study focuses on one commonly held stereotype: immigrants’ propensity for crime. Using original data from a sample of college students, we examine the crime perception alongside nine established components of the imagined immigration, comparing their extent and consequences for a hypothetical anti-immigrant policy. Findings indicate that misperception levels vary across the ten factual questions considered. Many mistakes are consequential, but the criminal stereotype is the most damaging. It constitutes an important missing component in imagined immigration studies. The findings present implications for anti-immigrant sentiment research and for developing a more accurately informed population.

@article{havas2023a,
	title = {Innovation studies, social innovation, and sustainability transitions research: {From} mutual ignorance towards an integrative perspective},
	volume = {48},
	doi = {10.1016/j.eist.2023.100754},
	journal = {Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions},
	author = {Havas, Attila and Schartinger, Doris and Weber, K. Matthias},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {100754},
}

@article{haider2023,
	title = {Google {Search} and the creation of ignorance: {The} case of the climate crisis},
	volume = {10},
	doi = {10.1177/20539517231158997},
	abstract = {The article examines the relationship between commercial search engines, using Google Search as an example, and various forms of ignorance related to climate change. It draws on concepts from the field of agnotology to explore how environmental ignorances, and specifically related to the climate crisis, are shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics. Ignorance refers to a multi-facetted understanding of the culturally contingent ways in which something may not be known. Two research questions are addressed: How are environmental ignorances, and in particular related to the climate crisis, shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics? In what ways can we conceptualise Google's role as configured into the creation of ignorances? The argument is made through four vignettes, each of which explores and illustrates how Google Search is configured into a different kind of socially produced ignorance: (1) Ignorance through information avoidance: climate anxiety; (2) Ignorance through selective choice: gaming search terms; (3) Ignorance by design: algorithmically embodied emissions; (4) Ignorance through query suggestions: directing people to data voids. The article shows that while Google Search and its underlying algorithmic and commercial logic pre-figure these ignorances, they are also co-created and co-maintained by content producers, users and other human and non-human actors, as Google Search has become integral of social practices and ideas about them. The conclusion draws attention to a new logic of ignorance that is emerging in conjunction with a new knowledge logic.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Big Data \& Society},
	author = {Haider, Jutta and Rödl, Malte},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {205395172311589},
}

The article examines the relationship between commercial search engines, using Google Search as an example, and various forms of ignorance related to climate change. It draws on concepts from the field of agnotology to explore how environmental ignorances, and specifically related to the climate crisis, are shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics. Ignorance refers to a multi-facetted understanding of the culturally contingent ways in which something may not be known. Two research questions are addressed: How are environmental ignorances, and in particular related to the climate crisis, shaped at the intersection of the logics of Google Search, everyday life and civil society/politics? In what ways can we conceptualise Google's role as configured into the creation of ignorances? The argument is made through four vignettes, each of which explores and illustrates how Google Search is configured into a different kind of socially produced ignorance: (1) Ignorance through information avoidance: climate anxiety; (2) Ignorance through selective choice: gaming search terms; (3) Ignorance by design: algorithmically embodied emissions; (4) Ignorance through query suggestions: directing people to data voids. The article shows that while Google Search and its underlying algorithmic and commercial logic pre-figure these ignorances, they are also co-created and co-maintained by content producers, users and other human and non-human actors, as Google Search has become integral of social practices and ideas about them. The conclusion draws attention to a new logic of ignorance that is emerging in conjunction with a new knowledge logic.

@article{grashuis2023,
	title = {Is the {Veil} of {Ignorance} more than a {Thought} {Experiment}? {An} {Empirical} {Application} to {Grocery} {Shopper} {Preferences} during the {COVID}-19 {Pandemic}},
	doi = {10.1080/08974438.2023.2233959},
	abstract = {During the COVID-19 pandemic, grocery shoppers face a moral dilemma: to go inside the store or to use online alternatives, such as curbside pickup or home delivery to limit physical interaction. The veil of ignorance, a hypothetical state of mind, is an experimental tool used to nudge people toward the social welfare option during a decision-making process. We empirically test the effect of the veil of ignorance on grocery shopper preferences by implementing an online choice experiment with 613 U.S. consumers. Subjects who are veiled by ignorance about the state of the COVID-19 pandemic are not willing to pay significantly more for curbside pickup or home delivery than (unveiled) subjects in the control group. We also find heterogeneous effects by vaccination status. Consistent with limited evidence in the prior literature, the veil of ignorance is seemingly unable to induce moral choice behavior in real-world scenarios.},
	journal = {Journal of International Food \& Agribusiness Marketing},
	author = {Grashuis, Jasper and Segovia, Michelle},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--17},
}

During the COVID-19 pandemic, grocery shoppers face a moral dilemma: to go inside the store or to use online alternatives, such as curbside pickup or home delivery to limit physical interaction. The veil of ignorance, a hypothetical state of mind, is an experimental tool used to nudge people toward the social welfare option during a decision-making process. We empirically test the effect of the veil of ignorance on grocery shopper preferences by implementing an online choice experiment with 613 U.S. consumers. Subjects who are veiled by ignorance about the state of the COVID-19 pandemic are not willing to pay significantly more for curbside pickup or home delivery than (unveiled) subjects in the control group. We also find heterogeneous effects by vaccination status. Consistent with limited evidence in the prior literature, the veil of ignorance is seemingly unable to induce moral choice behavior in real-world scenarios.

@article{gao2023,
	title = {Mieke {Matthyssen}: {Ignorance} is {Bliss}—{The} {Chinese} {Art} of {Not} {Knowing}},
	volume = {11},
	doi = {10.4312/as.2023.11.3.301-303},
	abstract = {Matthyssen’s monograph has an intriguing title: Ignorance is Bliss: The Chinese Art of Not Knowing. The art of not knowing is encapsulated in a pithy Chinese expression: Nande hutu (难得糊涂), which literally translates to “Hard to attain muddleheadedness”. In practice, Nande hutu entails deliberate performance of not knowing, or “playing dumb”, for one to cope with challenging circumstances. For example, a government official might pretend not to see corruption so as to keep a distance from it. More than a survival strategy, Nande hutu also allows one to maintain moral integrity or even achieve spiritual transcendence. As simple as the notion of Nande hutu might appear to be, it requires steadfast self-cultivation in the long run and skilful self-control during social interactions. For all these reasons, Nande hutu became a maxim that for centuries inspired Chinese individuals from varied walks of life. Capturing the sheer complexity of Nande hutu, Matthyssen treats it as the entrance into a labyrinth of Chinese philosophy, politics, social relations, and a cultural history spanning from ancient times to today.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Asian Studies},
	author = {Gao, Zhipeng},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {301--303},
}

Matthyssen’s monograph has an intriguing title: Ignorance is Bliss: The Chinese Art of Not Knowing. The art of not knowing is encapsulated in a pithy Chinese expression: Nande hutu (难得糊涂), which literally translates to “Hard to attain muddleheadedness”. In practice, Nande hutu entails deliberate performance of not knowing, or “playing dumb”, for one to cope with challenging circumstances. For example, a government official might pretend not to see corruption so as to keep a distance from it. More than a survival strategy, Nande hutu also allows one to maintain moral integrity or even achieve spiritual transcendence. As simple as the notion of Nande hutu might appear to be, it requires steadfast self-cultivation in the long run and skilful self-control during social interactions. For all these reasons, Nande hutu became a maxim that for centuries inspired Chinese individuals from varied walks of life. Capturing the sheer complexity of Nande hutu, Matthyssen treats it as the entrance into a labyrinth of Chinese philosophy, politics, social relations, and a cultural history spanning from ancient times to today.

@phdthesis{gagnon2023,
	title = {« {They} might discover something of their country which we could not know before » : l'ignorance dans les récits de voyage anglais des 16e et 17e siècles},
	url = {https://archipel.uqam.ca/17328/},
	abstract = {Ce mémoire de maîtrise étudie un corpus de onze récits de voyage écrits par des auteurs anglais ou des traductions anglaise lors des 16e et 17e siècles. L’objectif est de repérer et analyser l’ignorance dans sa dimension anthropologique, c’est-à-dire comme un état attribué à d’autres et essentiel à sa personne, pour comprendre comment l’Angleterre imaginait et représentait les populations extra-occidentales et comment elle se percevait elle-même. En plus de cette construction de l'altérité, le mémoire a pour objectif de repérer les racines idéologiques de l’impérialisme britannique et le rôle de l’ignorance dans leur formation. Dans les voyages vers les deux aires géographiques que nous avons privilégiées, l’Amérique et l’Asie, l’ignorance joue un rôle central dans la relation entre le voyageur et la société qu���il rencontre. Ces deux régions sont appréhendées et perçues différemment par l’Europe, mais elles se confondent dans le jugement de leur ignorance. Elles se confondent aussi par la présence et la valeur de savoirs situés et utiles aux voyageurs à l’intérieur de leurs sociétés et territoires. Ainsi, la tension entre l’ignorance du voyageur qui dépend des populations locales pour survivre et prospérer et l’ignorance représentée de l’Autre dans le récit de voyage est le coeur de notre recherche. De plus, le mémoire adopte une approche dialectique étudiant l’ignorance et les savoirs de manière synthétique en observant la relation tendue entre l’observation de savoirs et sa transformation en ignorance par des outils rhétoriques, discursifs ou des processus d’altérisations. La méthode utilisée est celle d’une recherche de constructions d’ignorances dans les récits et d’un regard attentif au contexte de production de cette construction pour découvrir et analyser les raisons, objectifs et finalités de ces instances d’ignorances. En d’autres mots, étudier différentes manipulations du concept de l’ignorance et analyser leur rôle dans un objectif de positionnement de domination. Notre constat à la suite de cette recherche est que l’état d’ignorance associée aux populations extra-occidentales par les récits de voyage de l’époque est un outil de l’impérialisme et du colonialisme anglais naissant, permettant de le justifier, de lui donner forme et de le motiver. Le thème de l’ignorance, prenant diverses formes et visible dans divers contextes, sert à fabriquer une idéologie coloniale qui légitiment l’expansion de la nation anglaise dans le monde. Face à l’ignorance consubstantielle des sociétés d’Amérique et d’Asie, l’Angleterre paraît destinée à devenir une puissance coloniale et commerciale à ces endroits et le moment semble propice pour la réalisation du rêve de longue date d’expansion et d’enrichissement de l’Angleterre.},
	school = {UQAM},
	author = {Gagnon, Nicolas},
	year = {2023},
}

Ce mémoire de maîtrise étudie un corpus de onze récits de voyage écrits par des auteurs anglais ou des traductions anglaise lors des 16e et 17e siècles. L’objectif est de repérer et analyser l’ignorance dans sa dimension anthropologique, c’est-à-dire comme un état attribué à d’autres et essentiel à sa personne, pour comprendre comment l’Angleterre imaginait et représentait les populations extra-occidentales et comment elle se percevait elle-même. En plus de cette construction de l'altérité, le mémoire a pour objectif de repérer les racines idéologiques de l’impérialisme britannique et le rôle de l’ignorance dans leur formation. Dans les voyages vers les deux aires géographiques que nous avons privilégiées, l’Amérique et l’Asie, l’ignorance joue un rôle central dans la relation entre le voyageur et la société qu���il rencontre. Ces deux régions sont appréhendées et perçues différemment par l’Europe, mais elles se confondent dans le jugement de leur ignorance. Elles se confondent aussi par la présence et la valeur de savoirs situés et utiles aux voyageurs à l’intérieur de leurs sociétés et territoires. Ainsi, la tension entre l’ignorance du voyageur qui dépend des populations locales pour survivre et prospérer et l’ignorance représentée de l’Autre dans le récit de voyage est le coeur de notre recherche. De plus, le mémoire adopte une approche dialectique étudiant l’ignorance et les savoirs de manière synthétique en observant la relation tendue entre l’observation de savoirs et sa transformation en ignorance par des outils rhétoriques, discursifs ou des processus d’altérisations. La méthode utilisée est celle d’une recherche de constructions d’ignorances dans les récits et d’un regard attentif au contexte de production de cette construction pour découvrir et analyser les raisons, objectifs et finalités de ces instances d’ignorances. En d’autres mots, étudier différentes manipulations du concept de l’ignorance et analyser leur rôle dans un objectif de positionnement de domination. Notre constat à la suite de cette recherche est que l’état d’ignorance associée aux populations extra-occidentales par les récits de voyage de l’époque est un outil de l’impérialisme et du colonialisme anglais naissant, permettant de le justifier, de lui donner forme et de le motiver. Le thème de l’ignorance, prenant diverses formes et visible dans divers contextes, sert à fabriquer une idéologie coloniale qui légitiment l’expansion de la nation anglaise dans le monde. Face à l’ignorance consubstantielle des sociétés d’Amérique et d’Asie, l’Angleterre paraît destinée à devenir une puissance coloniale et commerciale à ces endroits et le moment semble propice pour la réalisation du rêve de longue date d’expansion et d’enrichissement de l’Angleterre.

@article{fjellheim2023,
	title = {Wind {Energy} on {Trial} in {Saepmie}: {Epistemic} {Controversies} and {Strategic} {Ignorance} in {Norway}’s {Green} {Energy} {Transition}},
	volume = {14},
	doi = {10.23865/arctic.v14.5586},
	abstract = {Climate change policies and the green energy transition have renewed colonial structures and injustices for Indigenous peoples in land-use conflicts, but not without resistance. This article explores epistemic controversies in a legal struggle concerning impacts from wind energy infrastructure on Southern Saami reindeer herding and culture in Norway. The article draws on courtroom ethnography and diverse written material concerning a court case between the wind energy company Fosen Vind DA and the Southern Saami reindeer herders in Fovsen Njaarke Sïjte. The findings show that the parties’ competing claims to truth rely on different knowledge systems and worldviews concerning what Southern Saami reindeer herding is an ought to be. However, beyond onto-epistemological struggles between the “Indigenous” and the “Western”, Fosen Vind DA and the Norwegian state strategically ignored all knowledges that threatened capitalist and green colonial interests. The Fosen case illustrates how Indigenous peoples can contest dominant knowledge regimes and colonial presumptions about their livelihoods, culture, and rights through the legal system. However, the Norwegian state’s reluctancy to respect the outcome of the Supreme Court verdict reveals that asymmetric power relations continue to pave the way for colonial dispossession of Saami landscapes, epistemes, and human rights in the green energy transition.},
	journal = {Arctic Review on Law and Politics},
	author = {Fjellheim, Eva Maria},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {140--168},
}

Climate change policies and the green energy transition have renewed colonial structures and injustices for Indigenous peoples in land-use conflicts, but not without resistance. This article explores epistemic controversies in a legal struggle concerning impacts from wind energy infrastructure on Southern Saami reindeer herding and culture in Norway. The article draws on courtroom ethnography and diverse written material concerning a court case between the wind energy company Fosen Vind DA and the Southern Saami reindeer herders in Fovsen Njaarke Sïjte. The findings show that the parties’ competing claims to truth rely on different knowledge systems and worldviews concerning what Southern Saami reindeer herding is an ought to be. However, beyond onto-epistemological struggles between the “Indigenous” and the “Western”, Fosen Vind DA and the Norwegian state strategically ignored all knowledges that threatened capitalist and green colonial interests. The Fosen case illustrates how Indigenous peoples can contest dominant knowledge regimes and colonial presumptions about their livelihoods, culture, and rights through the legal system. However, the Norwegian state’s reluctancy to respect the outcome of the Supreme Court verdict reveals that asymmetric power relations continue to pave the way for colonial dispossession of Saami landscapes, epistemes, and human rights in the green energy transition.

@article{degerman2023,
	title = {In defence of fear: {COVID}-19, crises and democracy},
	volume = {26},
	doi = {10.1080/13698230.2020.1834744},
	abstract = {The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for ‘positive’ emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as ‘irrational’ or born of ‘ignorance’ seems ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests.},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy},
	author = {Degerman, Dan and Flinders, Matthew and Johnson, Matthew Thomas},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {788--809},
}

The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for ‘positive’ emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as ‘irrational’ or born of ‘ignorance’ seems ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests.

@phdthesis{cursi2023,
	title = {Le commerce de l'ignorance: le cabinet de relations publiques «{Edward} {L}. {Bernays}», de la {Première} {Guerre} mondiale à la {Guerre} froide, 1914-1961},
	abstract = {Edward L. Bernays (1891-1995) est à la fois pionnier des relations publiques, expert de la persuasion des masses, neveu de Freud (avec lequel il partage une ample correspondance), infatigable défenseur de la propagande, théoricien de l’influence et des relations publiques et enfin, cynique personnage impliqué dans divers évènements historiques tragiques tel que l’installation d’une dictature sanguinaire au Guatemala, en 1954. Cette thèse propose de revisiter tous ces lieux communs à la fois à travers l’analyse de deux cas d’études emblématique du travail d’Edward L. Bernays et du cabinet de relations publiques qu’il dirige avec Doris E. Fleischman (1891-1980), sa partenaire et compagne. Cette analyse se fonde sur l’exploitation et le croisement de divers fonds d’archives, dont ceux du cabinet. La première partie déploie ainsi successivement l’histoire d’Edward L. Bernays, de Doris Fleischman, leurs engagements politiques respectifs, l’engagement féministe important dans lequel le cabinet est pris et comment celui-ci mobilise des alliées importantes dans une célèbre campagne de relations publiques, les « Torches of Freedom », pour Lucky Strike. Cette importance du féminisme nous amène à interroger l’historiographie des relations publiques et les raisons pour lesquelles Doris E. Fleischman disparait de la plupart des récits canoniques des historiens. En outre, cette première partie revisite, la place de la psychanalyse dans les relations publiques, ce qui est notamment justifié par le fait qu’Edward L. Bernays n’a cessé d’utiliser son lien privilégié avec Sigmund Freud. La seconde partie de notre thèse prend pour cas d’étude les activités poursuivies par le cabinet entre 1942 et 1956, au nom de la United Fruit Company (UFC). Certaines activités du cabinet pour cette entreprise sont passés à la postérité en raison de l’implication d’Edward L. Bernays dans le coup d’Etat du Guatemala, en 1954. Cependant, dans ce cas, les activités du cabinet n’ont jamais été étudiées de près. Ces opérations incluent la manipulation de controverses scientifiques, la désinformation, la mésinformation, l’achat de journalistes, l’influence de la presse ou encore le lobbying auprès de l’administration fédérale, du congrès ou du sénat. Cette enquête met à jour une véritable communauté d’intérêt qui émerge dans l’ère d’Eisenhower, autour des opérations de guerre psychologique et révèle la transformation des relations publiques en une arme psychologique, qui accompagne la montée de la guerre froide.},
	school = {EHESS},
	author = {Cursi, HS de},
	year = {2023},
}

Edward L. Bernays (1891-1995) est à la fois pionnier des relations publiques, expert de la persuasion des masses, neveu de Freud (avec lequel il partage une ample correspondance), infatigable défenseur de la propagande, théoricien de l’influence et des relations publiques et enfin, cynique personnage impliqué dans divers évènements historiques tragiques tel que l’installation d’une dictature sanguinaire au Guatemala, en 1954. Cette thèse propose de revisiter tous ces lieux communs à la fois à travers l’analyse de deux cas d’études emblématique du travail d’Edward L. Bernays et du cabinet de relations publiques qu’il dirige avec Doris E. Fleischman (1891-1980), sa partenaire et compagne. Cette analyse se fonde sur l’exploitation et le croisement de divers fonds d’archives, dont ceux du cabinet. La première partie déploie ainsi successivement l’histoire d’Edward L. Bernays, de Doris Fleischman, leurs engagements politiques respectifs, l’engagement féministe important dans lequel le cabinet est pris et comment celui-ci mobilise des alliées importantes dans une célèbre campagne de relations publiques, les « Torches of Freedom », pour Lucky Strike. Cette importance du féminisme nous amène à interroger l’historiographie des relations publiques et les raisons pour lesquelles Doris E. Fleischman disparait de la plupart des récits canoniques des historiens. En outre, cette première partie revisite, la place de la psychanalyse dans les relations publiques, ce qui est notamment justifié par le fait qu’Edward L. Bernays n’a cessé d’utiliser son lien privilégié avec Sigmund Freud. La seconde partie de notre thèse prend pour cas d’étude les activités poursuivies par le cabinet entre 1942 et 1956, au nom de la United Fruit Company (UFC). Certaines activités du cabinet pour cette entreprise sont passés à la postérité en raison de l’implication d’Edward L. Bernays dans le coup d’Etat du Guatemala, en 1954. Cependant, dans ce cas, les activités du cabinet n’ont jamais été étudiées de près. Ces opérations incluent la manipulation de controverses scientifiques, la désinformation, la mésinformation, l’achat de journalistes, l’influence de la presse ou encore le lobbying auprès de l’administration fédérale, du congrès ou du sénat. Cette enquête met à jour une véritable communauté d’intérêt qui émerge dans l’ère d’Eisenhower, autour des opérations de guerre psychologique et révèle la transformation des relations publiques en une arme psychologique, qui accompagne la montée de la guerre froide.

@inproceedings{crusoe2023,
	title = {Ignorance in public sector digital transformation. {Empirical} evidence and conjecture},
	doi = {10.1145/3598469.3598507},
	abstract = {With digital government becoming increasingly relevant as a new mode of safeguarding relevance and operations of the public sector, previous research has highlighted the need for additional studies on the prerequisites of successful digital transformation. The current literature is laden with examples of said prerequisites, but so far there have been only limited empirical studies on the extent to which the prerequisites are known within public sector organizations. We study the ignorance of necessary prerequisites for digital transformation within public sector organizations through a quantitative survey conducted with 91 local authorities in Sweden in 2022. The study finds distinguishable nescient areas and patterns in the degrees of ignorance, which are then used for initial theorization and to discuss future avenues for research.},
	publisher = {ACM},
	author = {Crusoe, Jonathan and Magnusson, Johan and Torell, Jacob},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {338--348},
}

With digital government becoming increasingly relevant as a new mode of safeguarding relevance and operations of the public sector, previous research has highlighted the need for additional studies on the prerequisites of successful digital transformation. The current literature is laden with examples of said prerequisites, but so far there have been only limited empirical studies on the extent to which the prerequisites are known within public sector organizations. We study the ignorance of necessary prerequisites for digital transformation within public sector organizations through a quantitative survey conducted with 91 local authorities in Sweden in 2022. The study finds distinguishable nescient areas and patterns in the degrees of ignorance, which are then used for initial theorization and to discuss future avenues for research.

@article{crutchfield2023,
	title = {Ignorance and moral judgment: {Testing} the logical priority of the epistemic},
	volume = {108},
	doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2023.103472},
	abstract = {It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations.},
	journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
	author = {Crutchfield, Parker and Scheall, Scott and Justin Rzeszutek, Mark and Dawn Brown, Hayley and Cardoso Sao Mateus, Cristal},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {103472},
}

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations.

@incollection{boswell2023a,
	series = {States of {Ignorance}},
	title = {States, {Knowledge} and {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-941019-9},
	abstract = {Most accounts of states and knowledge see knowledge as crucial to realising state governing projects and for underpinning the ‘epistemic authority’ of the state. This chapter questions the underlying assumptions these accounts make about state motivation or rationality. Building on theories of state legitimation, it argues that we should see knowledge production as highly selective and contingent. The chapter then elaborates on the three lenses for exploring ignorance: (a) omission, inspired by theories of bounded rationality and information processing; (b) strategy, building on sociological and anthropological notions of strategic ignorance and (c) ascription, building on theories of social movements and focusing on processes of claims-making and political contestation that expose state ignorance.},
	booktitle = {States of {Ignorance}},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {Boswell, Christina},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {33--58},
}

Most accounts of states and knowledge see knowledge as crucial to realising state governing projects and for underpinning the ‘epistemic authority’ of the state. This chapter questions the underlying assumptions these accounts make about state motivation or rationality. Building on theories of state legitimation, it argues that we should see knowledge production as highly selective and contingent. The chapter then elaborates on the three lenses for exploring ignorance: (a) omission, inspired by theories of bounded rationality and information processing; (b) strategy, building on sociological and anthropological notions of strategic ignorance and (c) ascription, building on theories of social movements and focusing on processes of claims-making and political contestation that expose state ignorance.

@article{bjerring2023,
	title = {Fragmentation, metalinguistic ignorance, and logical omniscience},
	volume = {180},
	doi = {10.1007/s11098-023-01962-2},
	abstract = {To reconcile the standard possible worlds model of knowledge with the intuition that ordinary agents fall far short of logical omniscience, a Stalnakerian strategy appeals to two components. The first is the idea that mathematical and logical knowledge is at bottom metalinguistic knowledge. The second is the idea that non-ideal minds are often fragmented. In this paper, we investigate this Stalnakerian reconciliation strategy and argue, ultimately, that it fails. We are not the first to complain about the Stalnakerian strategy. But in contrast to existing complaints, we want to cause trouble for the strategy directly on its home turf. That is, we will advance our objection while granting both the plausibility of the fragmentation component—save for an extreme version of it—and that of the metalinguistic component. Once our central objection to the Stalnakerian strategy is in place, we will show how it negatively affects Adam Elga and Augustín Rayo’s recent attempt to apply the Stalnakerian strategy in the context of Bayesian decision theory.},
	number = {7},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	author = {Bjerring, Jens Christian and Tang, Weng Hong},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {2129--2151},
}

To reconcile the standard possible worlds model of knowledge with the intuition that ordinary agents fall far short of logical omniscience, a Stalnakerian strategy appeals to two components. The first is the idea that mathematical and logical knowledge is at bottom metalinguistic knowledge. The second is the idea that non-ideal minds are often fragmented. In this paper, we investigate this Stalnakerian reconciliation strategy and argue, ultimately, that it fails. We are not the first to complain about the Stalnakerian strategy. But in contrast to existing complaints, we want to cause trouble for the strategy directly on its home turf. That is, we will advance our objection while granting both the plausibility of the fragmentation component—save for an extreme version of it—and that of the metalinguistic component. Once our central objection to the Stalnakerian strategy is in place, we will show how it negatively affects Adam Elga and Augustín Rayo’s recent attempt to apply the Stalnakerian strategy in the context of Bayesian decision theory.

@article{anuar2023,
	title = {The ignorance of hypervigilance: agnotology and halal along the {Belt} and {Road}},
	doi = {10.1080/09692290.2023.2231965},
	abstract = {When actors engage in attentional biases, they focus on one area of knowledge at the expense of others. In contrast to previous literature, we contend that these biases do not necessarily result in selective ignorance. This is because different attentional biases, informed by dissimilar emotions and logics, affect not just what knowledge is approached over others but how it is approached. It hence produces different types of ignorance or non-knowledge—and by extension, forms of power—in the political economy. We develop a novel conceptual framework on hypervigilance as attentional bias. Then, through discourse analysis, we demonstrate how hypervigilance engendered practices of knowledge distortion; knowledge avoidance and elimination; and knowledge rejection which resulted in the (re)production of inaccurate knowledge and willful blindness that stifled the growth of China’s fledgling halal industry and halal Belt and Road Initiative. This article contributes to the literature on social identity’s influence on economic policies and politics, particularly to nascent scholarship on the links between non-knowledge, ethnoreligious identity and political economy. It proposes pathways through which attentional biases as ignorance extend racialized power, affecting access to resources, opportunities, and participation in the domestic and international political economy.},
	journal = {Review of International Political Economy},
	author = {Anuar, Amalina and Xin Ying, Chan},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {1--24},
}

When actors engage in attentional biases, they focus on one area of knowledge at the expense of others. In contrast to previous literature, we contend that these biases do not necessarily result in selective ignorance. This is because different attentional biases, informed by dissimilar emotions and logics, affect not just what knowledge is approached over others but how it is approached. It hence produces different types of ignorance or non-knowledge—and by extension, forms of power—in the political economy. We develop a novel conceptual framework on hypervigilance as attentional bias. Then, through discourse analysis, we demonstrate how hypervigilance engendered practices of knowledge distortion; knowledge avoidance and elimination; and knowledge rejection which resulted in the (re)production of inaccurate knowledge and willful blindness that stifled the growth of China’s fledgling halal industry and halal Belt and Road Initiative. This article contributes to the literature on social identity’s influence on economic policies and politics, particularly to nascent scholarship on the links between non-knowledge, ethnoreligious identity and political economy. It proposes pathways through which attentional biases as ignorance extend racialized power, affecting access to resources, opportunities, and participation in the domestic and international political economy.

@article{alexander2023,
	title = {Waste and {Its} {Disguises}: {Technologies} of ({Un}){Knowing}},
	volume = {88},
	doi = {10.1080/00141844.2020.1796734},
	abstract = {The introduction to this special issue starts with a brief thematisation of the key theoretical interventions in the anthropology of waste in order to situate our own contribution. We follow this by discussing, and adding to the recent anthropology and sociology of ignorance and not knowing, before turning to the intersections between waste and ignorance, thinking through how we and other scholars have theorised ways of deflecting attention away from wastes, whether they are lands, material or human bodies. We broadly categorise these technologies of deflection and unknowing into ‘spatial’, ‘temporal’, ‘epistemological’, ‘calculative’ and ‘rhetorical’. Specific techniques within these categories serve to eclipse other ways of knowing (i.e. the sensory, affective aspects of waste (e)valuation) and often depoliticise decisions concerning wastes, places, materials, people and their livelihoods.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Ethnos},
	author = {Alexander, Catherine and O’Hare, Patrick},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {419--443},
}

The introduction to this special issue starts with a brief thematisation of the key theoretical interventions in the anthropology of waste in order to situate our own contribution. We follow this by discussing, and adding to the recent anthropology and sociology of ignorance and not knowing, before turning to the intersections between waste and ignorance, thinking through how we and other scholars have theorised ways of deflecting attention away from wastes, whether they are lands, material or human bodies. We broadly categorise these technologies of deflection and unknowing into ‘spatial’, ‘temporal’, ‘epistemological’, ‘calculative’ and ‘rhetorical’. Specific techniques within these categories serve to eclipse other ways of knowing (i.e. the sensory, affective aspects of waste (e)valuation) and often depoliticise decisions concerning wastes, places, materials, people and their livelihoods.

@article{aldini2023,
	title = {A {Hierarchical} {Characterization} of {Ignorance} in {Epistemic} {Logic}},
	volume = {16},
	abstract = {Introduction au dossier sur « L’ignorance en logique épistémique »

We study different forms of ignorance and their correlations in a bi-modal logical language expressing the two modalities of knowledge and belief. In particular, we are mainly interested in clarifying which definitions of ignorance and which circumstances trigger higher-order forms of ignorance, inducing ignorance about ignorance and so on. To this aim, three ground conditions concerning knowledge and belief are presented, which may be seen as a cause of ignorance and can help us to identify the conditions enabling the emergence of higher-order forms of ignorance.},
	journal = {Argumenta},
	author = {Aldini, A. and Graziani, P. and Tagliaferri, M.},
	year = {2023},
	keywords = {Ignorance, Epistemic Logic, Doxastic Logic},
	pages = {373--386},
}

Introduction au dossier sur « L’ignorance en logique épistémique » We study different forms of ignorance and their correlations in a bi-modal logical language expressing the two modalities of knowledge and belief. In particular, we are mainly interested in clarifying which definitions of ignorance and which circumstances trigger higher-order forms of ignorance, inducing ignorance about ignorance and so on. To this aim, three ground conditions concerning knowledge and belief are presented, which may be seen as a cause of ignorance and can help us to identify the conditions enabling the emergence of higher-order forms of ignorance.

@article{muller2023,
	title = {Corpus {Approaches} to {Analysing} {Uncertainty} and {Ignorance} in {Academic} {Discourse}},
	volume = {45},
	doi = {10.24989/fs.v45i1-2.2232},
	abstract = {The article provides an overview of corpus approaches to researching linguistic practices for dealing with ignorance and uncertainty. Uncertainty and ignorance are first and foremost epistemological or socio-psychological categories rather than linguistic ones. But they can be applied to a corpus linguistic setting. Based on a presentation of the central terms and their relevance for digital corpus research, this paper exemplifies proposals for operationalisations using a corpus of political science texts from the field of International Relations (DIReC). It gives an overview of various methods of researching ignorance and uncertainty in academic discourse, focusing on lexicon-based, annotation-based and pattern-search-based approaches as well as combinations thereof. The structure of the explanations reflects a central conflict of aims: On the one hand, corpus-based research on ignorance and uncertainty requires a precise, interpretive approach to the contextual meaning and epistemic function of each individual piece of evidence. On the other hand, it seems advantageous to investigate the largest possible corpora for reasons of reliability. The final section presents an application sketch that addresses and exemplifies several methodological problems. It compares uncertainty markers in political science discourse as found in the DIReC corpus with those in conspiracy theories, drawing on the LOCO corpus and journalistic discourse represented in a reference corpus of US newspapers.},
	number = {1-2},
	journal = {Fachsprache},
	author = {Müller, Marcus},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {28--47},
}

The article provides an overview of corpus approaches to researching linguistic practices for dealing with ignorance and uncertainty. Uncertainty and ignorance are first and foremost epistemological or socio-psychological categories rather than linguistic ones. But they can be applied to a corpus linguistic setting. Based on a presentation of the central terms and their relevance for digital corpus research, this paper exemplifies proposals for operationalisations using a corpus of political science texts from the field of International Relations (DIReC). It gives an overview of various methods of researching ignorance and uncertainty in academic discourse, focusing on lexicon-based, annotation-based and pattern-search-based approaches as well as combinations thereof. The structure of the explanations reflects a central conflict of aims: On the one hand, corpus-based research on ignorance and uncertainty requires a precise, interpretive approach to the contextual meaning and epistemic function of each individual piece of evidence. On the other hand, it seems advantageous to investigate the largest possible corpora for reasons of reliability. The final section presents an application sketch that addresses and exemplifies several methodological problems. It compares uncertainty markers in political science discourse as found in the DIReC corpus with those in conspiracy theories, drawing on the LOCO corpus and journalistic discourse represented in a reference corpus of US newspapers.

@article{nelson2023,
	title = {Settler ignorance and public memory: {Kingston}, {Ontario}},
	volume = {113},
	doi = {10.1080/00167428.2022.2141631},
	abstract = {Since the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, municipalities are increasingly addressing reconciliation in their practice, including new engagement with Indigenous heritage and public memory. Nevertheless, municipal perspectives of heritage are frequently colonial and result in commemorative landscapes that reinforce official national narratives of history and identity. These landscapes limit expressions of Indigenous heritage and reinforce settler ignorance. This article explores settler-colonial commemorative practice in the context of reconciliation in Canada and presents what was learned through conversations with Indigenous peoples in Kingston, a mid-sized city in Ontario, Canada. It emphasizes the need for productive settler discomfort in addressing settler ignorance and considers how reimagined places of public memory might unsettle hegemonic heritage narratives in Canadian cities. Noting the limitations of settler-Canadian commemoration in the context of reconciliation, it posits how decolonizing commemorative practices might offer new pathways for building relations.},
	number = {5},
	journal = {Geographical Review},
	author = {Nelson, Elizabeth and Godlewska, Anne},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {666--684},
}

Since the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, municipalities are increasingly addressing reconciliation in their practice, including new engagement with Indigenous heritage and public memory. Nevertheless, municipal perspectives of heritage are frequently colonial and result in commemorative landscapes that reinforce official national narratives of history and identity. These landscapes limit expressions of Indigenous heritage and reinforce settler ignorance. This article explores settler-colonial commemorative practice in the context of reconciliation in Canada and presents what was learned through conversations with Indigenous peoples in Kingston, a mid-sized city in Ontario, Canada. It emphasizes the need for productive settler discomfort in addressing settler ignorance and considers how reimagined places of public memory might unsettle hegemonic heritage narratives in Canadian cities. Noting the limitations of settler-Canadian commemoration in the context of reconciliation, it posits how decolonizing commemorative practices might offer new pathways for building relations.

@phdthesis{ward2023,
	title = {Political {Applications} of {Agnotology} and {Constructed} {Ignorance}},
	abstract = {Note MG: le présent manuscrit semble être un mémoire de MA

Agnotology is the study of culturally and socially constructed ignorance. This paper seeks to marry the emerging field of agnotology with the institutions and mechanisms of politics by providing analyses of political ignorance focusing on a theoretical framework built on agnotological practices. As the political landscape becomes increasingly more beleaguered with misinformation, an understanding on how gaps in political knowledge are created, incentivized, and maintained can provide insights on how to move remedial ideas of misinformation from theory to praxis. The recognition of ignorance as a tool of power, particularly in areas like business, governance, and politics, has raised concerns about its impact on democracy. Agnotology plays a significant role in shaping political culture and has profound effects on public opinion, discourse, and democratic engagement, which are threatened by information manipulation and fake news. Understanding the historical and contemporary instances of ignorance production can provide insights into diagnosing, predicting, and addressing the epistemic challenges faced by modern democracy. Case studies involving political philosophy, public health, sociology, trans health, pharmaceutical operations, business, the presidency, and nuclear epistemology are used to inform the analysis.},
	school = {California State University, Fullerton},
	author = {Ward, Jalen},
	year = {2023},
}

Note MG: le présent manuscrit semble être un mémoire de MA Agnotology is the study of culturally and socially constructed ignorance. This paper seeks to marry the emerging field of agnotology with the institutions and mechanisms of politics by providing analyses of political ignorance focusing on a theoretical framework built on agnotological practices. As the political landscape becomes increasingly more beleaguered with misinformation, an understanding on how gaps in political knowledge are created, incentivized, and maintained can provide insights on how to move remedial ideas of misinformation from theory to praxis. The recognition of ignorance as a tool of power, particularly in areas like business, governance, and politics, has raised concerns about its impact on democracy. Agnotology plays a significant role in shaping political culture and has profound effects on public opinion, discourse, and democratic engagement, which are threatened by information manipulation and fake news. Understanding the historical and contemporary instances of ignorance production can provide insights into diagnosing, predicting, and addressing the epistemic challenges faced by modern democracy. Case studies involving political philosophy, public health, sociology, trans health, pharmaceutical operations, business, the presidency, and nuclear epistemology are used to inform the analysis.

@article{balietti2023,
	title = {Strategic ignorance and perceived control},
	volume = {735},
	abstract = {Information can trigger unpleasant emotions. As a result, individuals might be tempted to strategically ignore it. We experimentally investigate whether increasing perceived control can mitigate strategic ignorance. Participants from India were presented with a choice to receive information about the health risk associated with air pollution and were later asked to recall it. Perceived control leads to a substantial improvement in information recall. We find that optimists react most to perceived control, both with a reduction in information avoidance and an increase in information recall. This latter result is supported by a US sample. A theoretical framework rationalizes our findings.},
	journal = {AWI Discussion Paper Series},
	author = {Balietti, A. and Budjan, A. J. and Eymess, T. and Soldà, A.},
	year = {2023},
}

Information can trigger unpleasant emotions. As a result, individuals might be tempted to strategically ignore it. We experimentally investigate whether increasing perceived control can mitigate strategic ignorance. Participants from India were presented with a choice to receive information about the health risk associated with air pollution and were later asked to recall it. Perceived control leads to a substantial improvement in information recall. We find that optimists react most to perceived control, both with a reduction in information avoidance and an increase in information recall. This latter result is supported by a US sample. A theoretical framework rationalizes our findings.

@article{gibbons2023,
	title = {Political ignorance is both rational and radical},
	volume = {202},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04293-1},
	abstract = {It is commonly held that political ignorance is rational, a response to the high costs and low benefits of acquiring political information. But many recent critics of the claim that political ignorance is rational instead urge that it is a simple consequence of agents not concerning themselves with the acquisition of political information whatsoever. According to such critics, political ignorance is inadvertent radical ignorance rather than a rational response to the incentives faced by agents in democracies. And since political ignorance is not a response to incentives, these critics urge, it cannot be ameliorated by incentivizing the acquisition of political information. This paper has two goals. First, I show that these seemingly competing accounts of political ignorance are in fact complementary, together explaining much political ignorance. Indeed, there is a sense in which political ignorance can be both rational and radical at the same time. Second, I more closely examine the relationship between incentives, kinds of political ignorance, and the acquisition of political information. On the one hand, from the fact that political ignorance is rational it does not follow that it can be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. On the other hand, from the fact that political ignorance is radical it does not follow that it cannot be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. Lastly, the complexity of the information in question is more relevant to determining whether ignorance can be overcome than whether such ignorance is rational or radical.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Gibbons, Adam F.},
	year = {2023},
}

It is commonly held that political ignorance is rational, a response to the high costs and low benefits of acquiring political information. But many recent critics of the claim that political ignorance is rational instead urge that it is a simple consequence of agents not concerning themselves with the acquisition of political information whatsoever. According to such critics, political ignorance is inadvertent radical ignorance rather than a rational response to the incentives faced by agents in democracies. And since political ignorance is not a response to incentives, these critics urge, it cannot be ameliorated by incentivizing the acquisition of political information. This paper has two goals. First, I show that these seemingly competing accounts of political ignorance are in fact complementary, together explaining much political ignorance. Indeed, there is a sense in which political ignorance can be both rational and radical at the same time. Second, I more closely examine the relationship between incentives, kinds of political ignorance, and the acquisition of political information. On the one hand, from the fact that political ignorance is rational it does not follow that it can be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. On the other hand, from the fact that political ignorance is radical it does not follow that it cannot be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. Lastly, the complexity of the information in question is more relevant to determining whether ignorance can be overcome than whether such ignorance is rational or radical.

@article{soraperra2023a,
	title = {The social construction of ignorance: {Experimental} evidence},
	volume = {138},
	doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.002},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	author = {Soraperra, Ivan and van der Weele, Joël and Villeval, Marie Claire and Shalvi, Shaul},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {197--213},
}

@article{tan2023,
	title = {Learning to become ignorant: {Improving} the quality of epistemic knowledge in science education},
	volume = {107},
	doi = {10.1002/sce.21753},
	abstract = {In considering goals for science education, it is conventional to make arguments for the utility of scientific knowledge for a variety of purposes. Less prominent are rationales based on the beauty or truth of science. In this paper, we examine how an approach to science education might be different if we shift the goals of communication to an appreciation of the ways in which our knowledge is limited, and how the practical boundaries of our knowledge can be closer than we think—in other words, how we are collectively ignorant. Key to this approach is a renewed understanding of the role of material investigations in providing partial knowledge. Instead of providing incontrovertible evidence, empirical investigations provide a form of “explanatory excess” whereby the appropriate choice of explanation is not necessarily one that can be simplistically determined. Although scientific practices provide techniques to minimize the possibility of error in making our conclusions, these practices are performed by fallible human communities, from which the notion of “tentative, yet durable” claims derives. We argue that public scientific literacy may be better served by more circumspect claims of validity, and crucially, an enhanced understanding of the ways in which materiality influences epistemic processes and limits our claims. We illustrate these proposals through the case of the International Young Physicists' Tournament, a contest that invites participants to play with interesting physical phenomena for over a year. We identify three factors prominent in these tournament problems that present possibilities for increasing the authenticity of practical investigations. These are (i) multiple physical interactions in phenomena leading to the openness of choice of explanatory theory; (ii) the qualitative, subjective nature of the explanatory utility of theories; and (iii) the material contingency of empirical investigations. We argue that a more open‐handed embrace of the limits of our knowledge may serve as a better epistemic orientation for science instruction.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Science Education},
	author = {Tan, Michael and Koh, Teck Seng},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {9--27},
}

In considering goals for science education, it is conventional to make arguments for the utility of scientific knowledge for a variety of purposes. Less prominent are rationales based on the beauty or truth of science. In this paper, we examine how an approach to science education might be different if we shift the goals of communication to an appreciation of the ways in which our knowledge is limited, and how the practical boundaries of our knowledge can be closer than we think—in other words, how we are collectively ignorant. Key to this approach is a renewed understanding of the role of material investigations in providing partial knowledge. Instead of providing incontrovertible evidence, empirical investigations provide a form of “explanatory excess” whereby the appropriate choice of explanation is not necessarily one that can be simplistically determined. Although scientific practices provide techniques to minimize the possibility of error in making our conclusions, these practices are performed by fallible human communities, from which the notion of “tentative, yet durable” claims derives. We argue that public scientific literacy may be better served by more circumspect claims of validity, and crucially, an enhanced understanding of the ways in which materiality influences epistemic processes and limits our claims. We illustrate these proposals through the case of the International Young Physicists' Tournament, a contest that invites participants to play with interesting physical phenomena for over a year. We identify three factors prominent in these tournament problems that present possibilities for increasing the authenticity of practical investigations. These are (i) multiple physical interactions in phenomena leading to the openness of choice of explanatory theory; (ii) the qualitative, subjective nature of the explanatory utility of theories; and (iii) the material contingency of empirical investigations. We argue that a more open‐handed embrace of the limits of our knowledge may serve as a better epistemic orientation for science instruction.

@article{vu2023a,
	title = {Ignorance by choice: {A} meta-analytic review of the underlying motives of willful ignorance and its consequences.},
	volume = {149},
	doi = {10.1037/bul0000398},
	number = {9-10},
	journal = {Psychological Bulletin},
	author = {Vu, Linh and Soraperra, Ivan and Leib, Margarita and van der Weele, Joël and Shalvi, Shaul},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {611--635},
}

@article{pongiglione_climate_2022,
	title = {Climate {Change} and {Culpable} {Ignorance}: {The} {Case} of {Pseudoscience}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0269-1728},
	shorttitle = {Climate {Change} and {Culpable} {Ignorance}},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2022.2052994},
	abstract = {Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Pongiglione, F. and Martini, C.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Climate ethics, culpable ignorance, pseudoscience},
	pages = {425--435},
}

Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{liu_ignorance_2022,
	title = {Ignorance in {Plato}'s {Protagoras}},
	volume = {67},
	issn = {0031-8868},
	doi = {10.1163/15685284-bja10058},
	abstract = {Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw - the soul's domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. © 2022 Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Phronesis},
	author = {Liu, W.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Protagoras, Socrates, akrasia, ignorance, knowledge, vice},
	pages = {309--337},
}

Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw - the soul's domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. © 2022 Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

@article{arfini_how_2022,
	title = {How {Do} {We} {Become} {Ignorant}? {Affording} {Ignorance} {Through} {Epistemic} {Actions}},
	volume = {463},
	issn = {0166-6991},
	shorttitle = {How {Do} {We} {Become} {Ignorant}?},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_10},
	abstract = {Which cognitive processes allow us to become ignorant of something? In this chapter, I will discuss “to-ignorance processes” – which I will describe as processes that allow people to shift from a state of partial knowledge or unaware ignorance to another state of ignorance (of which they could be aware or not). I will argue that these processes affect how cognitive agents encounter new information and may in part explain some pressing socio-epistemological issues, such as the fake news problem. In the first section, I will describe some to-ignorance processes that commonly occur in people’s ordinary life. In the following section, I will focus on how people can become misinformed online by discussing what both “true” and “fake” news have in common, which is the fact that they present action-suggesting qualities to users, or affordances. The third section will be dedicated to how we should describe these affordances and which kinds of actions they offer to users online. In the fourth section, I will specifically discuss the action-based relations between agents and the information offered online and I will argue that some epistemic actions imply the explicit or implicit engagement to one’s ignorance. Finally, in the fifth section, I will return to the idea that to-ignorance processes affect how agents encounter information and I will argue that we should address and study to-ignorance processes to set up and manage rich environments in which people should have more opportunities to become curious and surprised than misinformed. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Synthese Library},
	author = {Arfini, S.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Affordance, Epistemic Action, Fake News, Ignorance Processes, Pragmatic Action},
	pages = {209--230},
}

Which cognitive processes allow us to become ignorant of something? In this chapter, I will discuss “to-ignorance processes” – which I will describe as processes that allow people to shift from a state of partial knowledge or unaware ignorance to another state of ignorance (of which they could be aware or not). I will argue that these processes affect how cognitive agents encounter new information and may in part explain some pressing socio-epistemological issues, such as the fake news problem. In the first section, I will describe some to-ignorance processes that commonly occur in people’s ordinary life. In the following section, I will focus on how people can become misinformed online by discussing what both “true” and “fake” news have in common, which is the fact that they present action-suggesting qualities to users, or affordances. The third section will be dedicated to how we should describe these affordances and which kinds of actions they offer to users online. In the fourth section, I will specifically discuss the action-based relations between agents and the information offered online and I will argue that some epistemic actions imply the explicit or implicit engagement to one’s ignorance. Finally, in the fifth section, I will return to the idea that to-ignorance processes affect how agents encounter information and I will argue that we should address and study to-ignorance processes to set up and manage rich environments in which people should have more opportunities to become curious and surprised than misinformed. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

@article{fonseca_demarcating_2022,
	title = {Demarcating {Patriotic} {Science} on {Digital} {Platforms}: {Covid}-19, {Chloroquine} and the {Institutionalisation} of {Ignorance} in {Brazil}},
	volume = {31},
	issn = {0950-5431},
	shorttitle = {Demarcating {Patriotic} {Science} on {Digital} {Platforms}},
	doi = {10.1080/09505431.2022.2105691},
	abstract = {As supporters of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, the Bolsonarism movement has promoted the drug chloroquine for treating Covid-19 in Brazil, despite it being mostly rejected by mainstream health institutions as an effective treatment. This situation can be investigated through the lens of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and ignorance studies supported by methods from digital sociology. Bolsonarist discourse does not contest scientific authority tout court, but rather constructs boundaries between what supporters of the president see as legitimate and illegitimate science. This institutionalised ignorance is produced and maintained through Telegram messenger, a backbone of the multi-platform media ecosystem of Bolsonarism. It is accomplished through boundary work: the exclusion or inclusion of knowledge via two complementary practices–pejorative accusations against mainstream science and the crafting of affective bonds with the chloroquine alternative. While the former aims to invalidate knowledge held by experts opposed to the use of chloroquine, the latter focuses on mobilising trust in an alternative model of science, which we refer to as patriotic science. This model of science is demarcated from mainstream science, framed as corrupt and ill-equipped for the needs of Brazilians. This case study advances STS resources for examining the epistemic demarcation between science/non-science, relevant to other polities and publics that use such boundary work to institutionalise ignorance. © 2022 Process Press.},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Science as Culture},
	author = {Fonseca, P.F.C. and Ribeiro, B.E. and Nascimento, L.F.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Bolsonarism, Chloroquine, Covid-19, Telegram, boundary work, ignorance},
	pages = {530--554},
}

As supporters of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, the Bolsonarism movement has promoted the drug chloroquine for treating Covid-19 in Brazil, despite it being mostly rejected by mainstream health institutions as an effective treatment. This situation can be investigated through the lens of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and ignorance studies supported by methods from digital sociology. Bolsonarist discourse does not contest scientific authority tout court, but rather constructs boundaries between what supporters of the president see as legitimate and illegitimate science. This institutionalised ignorance is produced and maintained through Telegram messenger, a backbone of the multi-platform media ecosystem of Bolsonarism. It is accomplished through boundary work: the exclusion or inclusion of knowledge via two complementary practices–pejorative accusations against mainstream science and the crafting of affective bonds with the chloroquine alternative. While the former aims to invalidate knowledge held by experts opposed to the use of chloroquine, the latter focuses on mobilising trust in an alternative model of science, which we refer to as patriotic science. This model of science is demarcated from mainstream science, framed as corrupt and ill-equipped for the needs of Brazilians. This case study advances STS resources for examining the epistemic demarcation between science/non-science, relevant to other polities and publics that use such boundary work to institutionalise ignorance. © 2022 Process Press.

@article{andone_arguments_2022,
	title = {On {Arguments} from {Ignorance} in {Policy}-{Making}},
	volume = {43},
	issn = {1566-7650},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-91017-4_6},
	abstract = {“Schools should remain open during the COVID-19 pandemic, because there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus.” Many European policy-makers have employed such arguments from ignorance to argue for a course of action in a situation in which science lacked vital information. What is particularly challenging about such arguments is that, despite the ignorance involved, they are used to justify policies meant to deal with practical problems. Limited information (‘there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus’) is used as a basis for decision-making that might have significant consequences for the population (‘schools should remain open’). This chapter explains the intricate but unavoidable relationship between arguments from ignorance and policy-making. Moreover, evaluation criteria are developed to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable arguments from ignorance in policy-making by taking into consideration the structure of these argument types and their contexts of application. Finally, the chapter assesses two real-life instances of arguments from ignorance employed by the European Commission and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an assessment sets important steps in understanding how arguments from ignorance can facilitate or reduce acceptance of the measures proposed by policy-makers. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Argumentation Library},
	author = {Andone, C. and Lomelí Hernández, J.A.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Arguments from ignorance, Policy-making, Risk, Uncertainty},
	pages = {105--123},
}

“Schools should remain open during the COVID-19 pandemic, because there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus.” Many European policy-makers have employed such arguments from ignorance to argue for a course of action in a situation in which science lacked vital information. What is particularly challenging about such arguments is that, despite the ignorance involved, they are used to justify policies meant to deal with practical problems. Limited information (‘there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus’) is used as a basis for decision-making that might have significant consequences for the population (‘schools should remain open’). This chapter explains the intricate but unavoidable relationship between arguments from ignorance and policy-making. Moreover, evaluation criteria are developed to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable arguments from ignorance in policy-making by taking into consideration the structure of these argument types and their contexts of application. Finally, the chapter assesses two real-life instances of arguments from ignorance employed by the European Commission and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an assessment sets important steps in understanding how arguments from ignorance can facilitate or reduce acceptance of the measures proposed by policy-makers. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{vaz_failing_2022,
	title = {Failing to ignore the ignorant: {Mistaking} ignorance for error},
	volume = {17},
	issn = {1930-2975},
	shorttitle = {Failing to ignore the ignorant},
	abstract = {Expertise is a reliable cue for accuracy – experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case – ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50\% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance. © 2022. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.},
	language = {English},
	number = {5},
	journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
	author = {Vaz, A. and Mata, A.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Advice taking, Error, Expertise, Heuristics, Ignorance, Social influence},
	pages = {937--961},
}

Expertise is a reliable cue for accuracy – experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case – ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance. © 2022. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

@article{you_resurgence_2022,
	title = {The resurgence of ‘ignorance is women’s virtue’: ‘{Leftover} women’ and constructing ‘ideal’ levels of female education in {China}},
	volume = {34},
	issn = {0954-0253},
	shorttitle = {The resurgence of ‘ignorance is women’s virtue’},
	doi = {10.1080/09540253.2022.2123897},
	abstract = {This paper considers the construction of an ‘ideal’ level of female education in China by reflecting on the social phenomenon of ‘leftover women’, and the perpetuation of this stigma by both Chinese state media. It contributes an in-depth engagement with the educational dimensions of ‘leftover women’ through innovative discourse analysis that examines the content of one of the most popular Chinese dating shows in the last decade. This analysis reveals the role of ‘experts’ in preserving myths about being or becoming ‘leftover’, as well as the influence of family, in particular mothers, on young Chinese women’s choices and self-perception. This paper argues that by attending to popular discourses and their reframing of older Chinese ideas, in particular, ‘ignorance is women’s virtue’, we can offer qualitative insights to the relatively lower numbers of Chinese women at doctoral education levels. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {8},
	journal = {Gender and Education},
	author = {You, Y. and Nussey, C.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Chinese ‘leftover women’, Higher education, discourse, gender, phD},
	pages = {1058--1073},
}

This paper considers the construction of an ‘ideal’ level of female education in China by reflecting on the social phenomenon of ‘leftover women’, and the perpetuation of this stigma by both Chinese state media. It contributes an in-depth engagement with the educational dimensions of ‘leftover women’ through innovative discourse analysis that examines the content of one of the most popular Chinese dating shows in the last decade. This analysis reveals the role of ‘experts’ in preserving myths about being or becoming ‘leftover’, as well as the influence of family, in particular mothers, on young Chinese women’s choices and self-perception. This paper argues that by attending to popular discourses and their reframing of older Chinese ideas, in particular, ‘ignorance is women’s virtue’, we can offer qualitative insights to the relatively lower numbers of Chinese women at doctoral education levels. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@incollection{van_der_weele_how_2022,
	title = {How can attention seeking be good? {From} strategic ignorance to self-experiments},
	isbn = {978-3-11-064724-2},
	shorttitle = {How can attention seeking be good?},
	abstract = {Receiving attention is widely recognized as a vital human need, closely connected to recognition as a requirement for developing a sense of safety, value and self-esteem. But what to think of instagrammers and others who are actively - and seemingly insatiably - seeking it? Why do we tend to condemn it? This chapter attempts to take a closer look at how we approach and evaluate attention seeking. I will discuss its bad moral reputation and argue that this encourages avoidance rather than the interest and curiosity that it needs, particularly in the light of problematic attention inequalities. I will argue for a transition from widespread strategic ignorance of attention seeking to more sympathetic curiosity. In this plea, Adam Phillips' recent book on attention seeking is an important ally. Realizing how important it is for all of us to receive attention, and how ashamed we tend to be of our attempts to get it, Phillips explores a more welcoming attitude. While his approach has a psychoanalytical background combined with literary sources, my own argument builds on conceptual considerations as well as empirical observations from various disciplines and historical periods. It will proceed in four steps. The first step deals with some consequences of the fact that it is impossible to give attention to everything; attention is inevitably selective. In step two, I will turn to attention in social contexts, where we not only do or do not 'give' or 'pay' attention but also hope to receive it, which leads to mechanisms of reciprocity or exchange as well as social inequalities. In step three, I introduce Adam Phillips' (2019) approach to seeking. Starting from the widely accepted insight that receiving attention is vital for us, he thinks we often seek attention without knowing precisely what we are looking for, and what kind of attention will help us. I will connect these considerations in step four, arguing that strategic ignorance of attention seeking makes us miss a lot that may help us deal more openly and responsibly with attention seeking. With the help of my students' experiences I will suggest that a more positive approach to attention seeking may lead to surprising new learning experiences concerning the quality of mutual social attention. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {Access and {Mediation}: {Transdisciplinary} {Perspectives} on {Attention}},
	author = {van der Weele, C.},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1515/9783110647242-012},
	pages = {259--278},
}

Receiving attention is widely recognized as a vital human need, closely connected to recognition as a requirement for developing a sense of safety, value and self-esteem. But what to think of instagrammers and others who are actively - and seemingly insatiably - seeking it? Why do we tend to condemn it? This chapter attempts to take a closer look at how we approach and evaluate attention seeking. I will discuss its bad moral reputation and argue that this encourages avoidance rather than the interest and curiosity that it needs, particularly in the light of problematic attention inequalities. I will argue for a transition from widespread strategic ignorance of attention seeking to more sympathetic curiosity. In this plea, Adam Phillips' recent book on attention seeking is an important ally. Realizing how important it is for all of us to receive attention, and how ashamed we tend to be of our attempts to get it, Phillips explores a more welcoming attitude. While his approach has a psychoanalytical background combined with literary sources, my own argument builds on conceptual considerations as well as empirical observations from various disciplines and historical periods. It will proceed in four steps. The first step deals with some consequences of the fact that it is impossible to give attention to everything; attention is inevitably selective. In step two, I will turn to attention in social contexts, where we not only do or do not 'give' or 'pay' attention but also hope to receive it, which leads to mechanisms of reciprocity or exchange as well as social inequalities. In step three, I introduce Adam Phillips' (2019) approach to seeking. Starting from the widely accepted insight that receiving attention is vital for us, he thinks we often seek attention without knowing precisely what we are looking for, and what kind of attention will help us. I will connect these considerations in step four, arguing that strategic ignorance of attention seeking makes us miss a lot that may help us deal more openly and responsibly with attention seeking. With the help of my students' experiences I will suggest that a more positive approach to attention seeking may lead to surprising new learning experiences concerning the quality of mutual social attention. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. All rights reserved.

@incollection{podgorny_bonplands_2022,
	title = {Bonpland's cactus, or trafficking in exotics and ignorance},
	isbn = {978-1-00-081440-8},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {The {Invention} of {Humboldt}: {On} the {Geopolitics} of {Knowledge}},
	author = {Podgorny, I.},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.4324/9781003231479-12},
	pages = {272--301},
}

@article{mondon_epistemologies_2022,
	title = {Epistemologies of ignorance in far right studies: the invisibilisation of racism and whiteness in times of populist hype},
	issn = {0001-6810},
	shorttitle = {Epistemologies of ignorance in far right studies},
	doi = {10.1057/s41269-022-00271-6},
	abstract = {Research on the far right has been a booming field for decades now, with far-right parties generally being much more researched than their right, centre and left counterparts, even when they are marginal in terms of politics or electoral support. Yet, for a field that is notorious for its lively definitional debates and tendency to evolve and reinvent itself terminologically, it has appeared unwilling to engage with the concepts of race, racism and whiteness, or with its very positioning in political structures. Through a mixed-methods discursive approach, this article analyses the titles and abstracts of all articles published in peer-reviewed journal in the sub-field of far right studies between 2016 and 2021 (n = 2543) to highlight which terms and concepts are primed and which are obscured. This article highlights a tendency to prime euphemising terms and concepts such as ‘populism’ and avoid those which engage with systemic and structural forms of oppression such as racism and whiteness. This article thus aims to both map and make sense of the absence of whiteness and racism in the corpus by arguing that it is a symbol of the ongoing presence of colourblind approaches and a lack of reckoning with the scale and pervasion of systemic racism in contemporary societies. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Acta Politica},
	author = {Mondon, A.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Discourse, Far right, Populism, Racism, Whiteness},
}

Research on the far right has been a booming field for decades now, with far-right parties generally being much more researched than their right, centre and left counterparts, even when they are marginal in terms of politics or electoral support. Yet, for a field that is notorious for its lively definitional debates and tendency to evolve and reinvent itself terminologically, it has appeared unwilling to engage with the concepts of race, racism and whiteness, or with its very positioning in political structures. Through a mixed-methods discursive approach, this article analyses the titles and abstracts of all articles published in peer-reviewed journal in the sub-field of far right studies between 2016 and 2021 (n = 2543) to highlight which terms and concepts are primed and which are obscured. This article highlights a tendency to prime euphemising terms and concepts such as ‘populism’ and avoid those which engage with systemic and structural forms of oppression such as racism and whiteness. This article thus aims to both map and make sense of the absence of whiteness and racism in the corpus by arguing that it is a symbol of the ongoing presence of colourblind approaches and a lack of reckoning with the scale and pervasion of systemic racism in contemporary societies. © 2022, The Author(s).

@article{mede_science_2022,
	title = {Science communication in the face of skepticism, populism, and ignorance: what {Don}’t {Look} {Up} tells us about science denial — and what it doesn’t},
	volume = {21},
	issn = {1824-2049},
	shorttitle = {Science communication in the face of skepticism, populism, and ignorance},
	doi = {10.22323/2.21050305},
	abstract = {Don’t Look Up tells the story of a team of astrophysicists whose efforts to warn politicians, media makers, and the public about an apocalyptic comet impact on planet Earth are undermined by fundamental skepticism toward their expertise. On the one hand, the film offers a rich portrayal of contemporary anti-science sentiments, their societal conditions, and the media and communication ecology surrounding them. But on the other hand, Don’t Look Up ignores and exaggerates several facets of those sentiments and the communicative settings in which they spread. This commentary analyzes this contrast through a science communication lens: it scrutinizes the (mis)representation of science denial and science communication in Don’t Look Up — and aims to inspire further debate about portrayals of anti-science phenomena and potential remedies within popular media. © The Author(s). This article is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution — NonCommercial — NoDerivativeWorks 4.0 License.},
	language = {English},
	number = {5},
	journal = {Journal of Science Communication},
	author = {Mede, N.G.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Public perception of science and technology, Representations of science and technology, Science and media},
}

Don’t Look Up tells the story of a team of astrophysicists whose efforts to warn politicians, media makers, and the public about an apocalyptic comet impact on planet Earth are undermined by fundamental skepticism toward their expertise. On the one hand, the film offers a rich portrayal of contemporary anti-science sentiments, their societal conditions, and the media and communication ecology surrounding them. But on the other hand, Don’t Look Up ignores and exaggerates several facets of those sentiments and the communicative settings in which they spread. This commentary analyzes this contrast through a science communication lens: it scrutinizes the (mis)representation of science denial and science communication in Don’t Look Up — and aims to inspire further debate about portrayals of anti-science phenomena and potential remedies within popular media. © The Author(s). This article is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution — NonCommercial — NoDerivativeWorks 4.0 License.

@article{marchetti_when_2022,
	title = {When {Political} {Ignorance} is really harmful for {Democracy}: {Moral} {Intuitions} and {Biased} {Attitudes} in {Voting} {Behaviour}},
	issn = {0191-4537},
	shorttitle = {When {Political} {Ignorance} is really harmful for {Democracy}},
	doi = {10.1177/01914537221093742},
	abstract = {Ignorance about political related issues has long been considered a threat to democracy. This paper revolves around the concept of political ignorance, focusing especially on Ilya Somin’s book Democracy and Political Ignorance and going beyond his standpoint in two ways. First of all, it moves away from the notion of factual knowledge by showing that political ignorance cannot be limited to a matter of information quality. On the contrary, it shows that ignorance concerns the formation of opinions about political facts, which are the bricks with which disagreement is built. Then, using the insights of the Moral Foundation Theory by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, the paper argues that moral intuitions represent an additional source of bias that current research on the problem of voters’ ignorance should address. While Somin argues that biased moral values are the outcome of ignorance, Moral Foundation Theory suggests that moral intuitions are a robust determinant of people’s political views as they make factual knowledge partially irrelevant and also make people with different moral minds unable to understand the basis of reciprocal factual argumentations. © The Author(s) 2022.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Philosophy and Social Criticism},
	author = {Marchetti, J.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Somin, democratic disagreement, moral foundation theory, political ignorance},
}

Ignorance about political related issues has long been considered a threat to democracy. This paper revolves around the concept of political ignorance, focusing especially on Ilya Somin’s book Democracy and Political Ignorance and going beyond his standpoint in two ways. First of all, it moves away from the notion of factual knowledge by showing that political ignorance cannot be limited to a matter of information quality. On the contrary, it shows that ignorance concerns the formation of opinions about political facts, which are the bricks with which disagreement is built. Then, using the insights of the Moral Foundation Theory by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, the paper argues that moral intuitions represent an additional source of bias that current research on the problem of voters’ ignorance should address. While Somin argues that biased moral values are the outcome of ignorance, Moral Foundation Theory suggests that moral intuitions are a robust determinant of people’s political views as they make factual knowledge partially irrelevant and also make people with different moral minds unable to understand the basis of reciprocal factual argumentations. © The Author(s) 2022.

@article{knudsen_multiplying_2022,
	title = {Multiplying {Ignorance}, {Deferring} {Action}: {Dynamics} in the {Communication} of {Knowledge} and {Non}-{Knowledge}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0269-1728},
	shorttitle = {Multiplying {Ignorance}, {Deferring} {Action}},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2022.2036858},
	abstract = {Under the umbrella terms, ‘agnotology’, ’strategic ignorance’, and ‘willful ignorance’, scholars have identified and unpacked the mechanisms and strategies involved in producing and maintaining ignorance. These analyses tend to have in common that strategic ignorance is about avoiding, hiding, or rendering existing knowledge unreliable. Drawing on Niklas Luhmann’s sociological concept of communication, we supplement these accounts with an analysis of how ignorance can be produced and maintained by means of communicative selection. Taking the emergence of the zoonotic disease LA-MRSA in Denmark as our empirical case, we explore the management of ignorance under conditions of non-knowing. Our analysis demonstrates how ignorance may be not only maintained but also multiplied without hiding knowledge, keeping secrets, or creating doubts. The analysis thus sheds new light on the dynamics through which ignorance is produced, while knowledge is on full display and acknowledged. The analysis furthermore shows how strategic interests are coupled to ignorance by means of communicative selection. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Knudsen, M. and Kishik, S.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Agnotology, ignorance, non-knowledge, strategic ignorance, zoonosis},
	pages = {344--359},
}

Under the umbrella terms, ‘agnotology’, ’strategic ignorance’, and ‘willful ignorance’, scholars have identified and unpacked the mechanisms and strategies involved in producing and maintaining ignorance. These analyses tend to have in common that strategic ignorance is about avoiding, hiding, or rendering existing knowledge unreliable. Drawing on Niklas Luhmann’s sociological concept of communication, we supplement these accounts with an analysis of how ignorance can be produced and maintained by means of communicative selection. Taking the emergence of the zoonotic disease LA-MRSA in Denmark as our empirical case, we explore the management of ignorance under conditions of non-knowing. Our analysis demonstrates how ignorance may be not only maintained but also multiplied without hiding knowledge, keeping secrets, or creating doubts. The analysis thus sheds new light on the dynamics through which ignorance is produced, while knowledge is on full display and acknowledged. The analysis furthermore shows how strategic interests are coupled to ignorance by means of communicative selection. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{hertwig_why_2022,
	title = {Why people choose deliberate ignorance in times of societal transformation},
	volume = {229},
	issn = {0010-0277},
	doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105247},
	abstract = {The opening of East Germany's Stasi archives in 1991 has often been lauded as a model of transparency in a transformative period. Yet many citizens have rejected the opportunity to read their files. To examine the reasons people invoke for this deliberate ignorance, we combined survey methods from psychology with historiographical methodologies. Our findings reveal a diverse range of reasons for deliberate ignorance, including regulation of negative emotions, avoidance of personal conflict, scepticism about the information compiled, and rejection of the victorious political system's authority over the files. Participants thus appear to prioritise cooperation and harmony over justice concerns—in stark contrast to the institutional norm of transparency and justice. Shining a light on the role of deliberate ignorance at the individual level—and specifically the convergence or divergence of individual and collective memory culture—may help explain the pace of societal change. © 2022 The Authors},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Cognition},
	author = {Hertwig, R. and Ellerbrock, D.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Deliberate ignorance, Emotion regulation, Information avoidance, Memory politics, Political transformation},
}

The opening of East Germany's Stasi archives in 1991 has often been lauded as a model of transparency in a transformative period. Yet many citizens have rejected the opportunity to read their files. To examine the reasons people invoke for this deliberate ignorance, we combined survey methods from psychology with historiographical methodologies. Our findings reveal a diverse range of reasons for deliberate ignorance, including regulation of negative emotions, avoidance of personal conflict, scepticism about the information compiled, and rejection of the victorious political system's authority over the files. Participants thus appear to prioritise cooperation and harmony over justice concerns—in stark contrast to the institutional norm of transparency and justice. Shining a light on the role of deliberate ignorance at the individual level—and specifically the convergence or divergence of individual and collective memory culture—may help explain the pace of societal change. © 2022 The Authors

@article{davoodi_varieties_2022,
	title = {Varieties of {Ignorance}: {Mystery} and the {Unknown} in {Science} and {Religion}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0364-0213},
	shorttitle = {Varieties of {Ignorance}},
	doi = {10.1111/cogs.13129},
	abstract = {How and why does the moon cause the tides? How and why does God answer prayers? For many, the answer to the former question is unknown; the answer to the latter question is a mystery. Across three studies testing a largely Christian sample within the United States (N = 2524), we investigate attitudes toward ignorance and inquiry as a window onto scientific versus religious belief. In Experiment 1, we find that science and religion are associated with different forms of ignorance: scientific ignorance is typically expressed as a personal unknown (“it's unknown to me”), whereas religious ignorance is expressed as a universal mystery (“it's a mystery”), with scientific unknowns additionally regarded as more viable and valuable targets for inquiry. In Experiment 2, we show that these forms of ignorance are differentially associated with epistemic goals and norms: expressing ignorance in the form of “unknown” (vs. “mystery”) more strongly signals epistemic values and achievements. Experiments 2 and 3 additionally show that ignorance is perceived to be a greater threat to science and scientific belief than to religion and religious belief. Together, these studies shed light on the psychological roles of scientific and religious belief in human cognition. © 2022 The Authors. Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Cognitive Science Society (CSS).},
	language = {English},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Cognitive Science},
	author = {Davoodi, T. and Lombrozo, T.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Ignorance, Mystery, Religion, Science, Unknown},
}

How and why does the moon cause the tides? How and why does God answer prayers? For many, the answer to the former question is unknown; the answer to the latter question is a mystery. Across three studies testing a largely Christian sample within the United States (N = 2524), we investigate attitudes toward ignorance and inquiry as a window onto scientific versus religious belief. In Experiment 1, we find that science and religion are associated with different forms of ignorance: scientific ignorance is typically expressed as a personal unknown (“it's unknown to me”), whereas religious ignorance is expressed as a universal mystery (“it's a mystery”), with scientific unknowns additionally regarded as more viable and valuable targets for inquiry. In Experiment 2, we show that these forms of ignorance are differentially associated with epistemic goals and norms: expressing ignorance in the form of “unknown” (vs. “mystery”) more strongly signals epistemic values and achievements. Experiments 2 and 3 additionally show that ignorance is perceived to be a greater threat to science and scientific belief than to religion and religious belief. Together, these studies shed light on the psychological roles of scientific and religious belief in human cognition. © 2022 The Authors. Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Cognitive Science Society (CSS).

@article{chen_impact_2022,
	title = {The impact of ignorance and bias on information security protection motivation: a case of e-waste handling},
	issn = {1066-2243},
	shorttitle = {The impact of ignorance and bias on information security protection motivation},
	doi = {10.1108/INTR-04-2022-0238},
	abstract = {Purpose: Protection motivation theory (PMT) explains that the intention to cope with information security risks is based on informed threat and coping appraisals. However, people cannot always make appropriate assessments due to possible ignorance and cognitive biases. This study proposes a research model that introduces four antecedent factors from ignorance and bias perspectives into the PMT model and empirically tests this model with data from a survey of electronic waste (e-waste) handling. Design/methodology/approach: The data collected from 356 Chinese samples are analyzed via structural equation modeling (SEM). Findings: The results revealed that for threat appraisal, optimistic bias leads to a lower perception of risks. However, factual ignorance (lack of knowledge of risks) does not significantly affect the perceived threat. For coping appraisal, practical ignorance (lack of knowledge of coping with risks) leads to low response efficacy and self-efficacy and high perceptions of coping cost, but the illusion of control overestimates response efficacy and self-efficacy. Originality/value: First, this study addresses a new type of information security problem in e-waste handling. Second, this study extends the PMT model by exploring the roles of ignorance and bias as antecedents. Finally, the authors reinvestigate the basic constructs of PMT to identify how rational threat and coping assessments affect user intentions to cope with data security risks. © 2022, Emerald Publishing Limited.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Internet Research},
	author = {Chen, H. and Yuan, Y.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Bias, E-waste information security, Empirical study, Ignorance, Information security management, Protection motivation theory, Survey},
}

Purpose: Protection motivation theory (PMT) explains that the intention to cope with information security risks is based on informed threat and coping appraisals. However, people cannot always make appropriate assessments due to possible ignorance and cognitive biases. This study proposes a research model that introduces four antecedent factors from ignorance and bias perspectives into the PMT model and empirically tests this model with data from a survey of electronic waste (e-waste) handling. Design/methodology/approach: The data collected from 356 Chinese samples are analyzed via structural equation modeling (SEM). Findings: The results revealed that for threat appraisal, optimistic bias leads to a lower perception of risks. However, factual ignorance (lack of knowledge of risks) does not significantly affect the perceived threat. For coping appraisal, practical ignorance (lack of knowledge of coping with risks) leads to low response efficacy and self-efficacy and high perceptions of coping cost, but the illusion of control overestimates response efficacy and self-efficacy. Originality/value: First, this study addresses a new type of information security problem in e-waste handling. Second, this study extends the PMT model by exploring the roles of ignorance and bias as antecedents. Finally, the authors reinvestigate the basic constructs of PMT to identify how rational threat and coping assessments affect user intentions to cope with data security risks. © 2022, Emerald Publishing Limited.

@article{lee_accountable_2022,
	title = {Un(ac)countable no-bodies: the politics of ignorance in global health policymaking},
	issn = {0958-1596},
	shorttitle = {Un(ac)countable no-bodies},
	doi = {10.1080/09581596.2022.2025578},
	abstract = {By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories–non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities–are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Critical Public Health},
	author = {Lee, P.-H.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Evidence-based public health, World Health Organisation, sexual and gender minorities, sociology of ignorance, sociology of nothing},
}

By analysing debates between member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) over health inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) from 2013 through to 2015 and 2016, this paper interrogates a WHO decision to ‘do nothing’, and the relationship between this decision and the production of ignorance and non-knowledge. This paper problematises state representatives’ discursive practices regarding the lack of evidence on SGM health inequalities, drawing on the sociology of ignorance. Informed by the sociology of nothing, two analytical categories–non-recognition (omissive) and mis-recognition (commissive) of SGM communities–are proposed to critically understand the production of ‘no-bodies’ and the tolerance of the lack of evidence. The lack of evidence, rather than prompting WHO action, was used as a rationale for intentionally neglecting the health concerns of particular social groups due to their invisibility in health research. Therefore, the paper argues that the lack of evidence in itself is symptomatic of the existence of SGM health inequities, which require the WHO to take action such as formally expressing concerns about and endorsing research on the topic. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{bodin_mise_2022,
	title = {La mise en récit du monde social par la vulgarisation, entre logiques d’appropriation triviales et sociodicée},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-111.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0111},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Bodin, Cyrille},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {111--125},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{buduchev_production_2022,
	title = {Production de l’ignorance dans le contexte de l’autoritarisme conservateur en {Russie} : éléments d’analyse},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	shorttitle = {Production de l’ignorance dans le contexte de l’autoritarisme conservateur en {Russie}},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-127.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0127},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Buduchev, Vitaly and Le Marec, Joëlle},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {127--141},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{coville_lendometriose_2022,
	title = {L’endométriose, une fabrique genrée de l’ignorance. {Expérience} corporelle, technologies médicales et savoirs expérientiels sur l’endométriose},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	shorttitle = {L’endométriose, une fabrique genrée de l’ignorance},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-73.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0073},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Coville, Marion},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {73--89},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{le_marec_fabrique_2022,
	title = {Fabrique des ignorances et responsabilités des chercheurs et chercheuses},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-25.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0025},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Le Marec, Joëlle and Raymond, Lucie},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {25--32},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{raymond_les_2022,
	title = {Les médiatisations de l’« affaire de la {Ligue} du {LOL} ».{Un} cyberharcèlement au prisme de l’ignorance},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	shorttitle = {Les médiatisations de l’« affaire de la {Ligue} du {LOL} ».},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-91.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0091},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Raymond, Lucie and Verquere, Laura},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {91--110},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{renaut_enquetes_2022,
	title = {Enquêtes incognito en e-terrains sensibles : une éthique en eaux troubles ?},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	shorttitle = {Enquêtes incognito en e-terrains sensibles},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-53.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0053},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Renaut, Laurène and Chevet, Clotilde},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {53--72},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@incollection{bain_relation_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {On the {Relation} {Between} {Ignorance} and {Epistemic} {Injustice}: {An} ignorance-first analysis},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {On the {Relation} {Between} {Ignorance} and {Epistemic} {Injustice}},
	abstract = {Scholars of ignorance have long been concerned with how what we don’t know, forget, or ignore contributes to injustice or wrongdoing. Recent philosophical scholarship has developed the notion of epistemic injustice to refer to certain kinds of harms that are distinctively epistemic, as well as seeking to understand the relationship between different kinds of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, respectively—and ignorance. This chapter explains and then defends an ‘ignorance-first’ account of the relation between ignorance and epistemic injustice, where ignorance is taken to be causally and/or explanatorily prior to epistemic injustice. This account is grounded in philosophical work on the epistemology of ignorance offered by thinkers like Charles W. Mills, Gaile Pohlhaus Jr, and others. Through examination of cases involving racism and disability discrimination (ableism), this chapter seeks to defend the claim that an ignorance-first analysis is more adequate at tracking phenomena involved in the epistemology of domination, oppression, and injustice than epistemic injustice-first accounts.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Bain, Zara},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 14},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Scholars of ignorance have long been concerned with how what we don’t know, forget, or ignore contributes to injustice or wrongdoing. Recent philosophical scholarship has developed the notion of epistemic injustice to refer to certain kinds of harms that are distinctively epistemic, as well as seeking to understand the relationship between different kinds of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, respectively—and ignorance. This chapter explains and then defends an ‘ignorance-first’ account of the relation between ignorance and epistemic injustice, where ignorance is taken to be causally and/or explanatorily prior to epistemic injustice. This account is grounded in philosophical work on the epistemology of ignorance offered by thinkers like Charles W. Mills, Gaile Pohlhaus Jr, and others. Through examination of cases involving racism and disability discrimination (ableism), this chapter seeks to defend the claim that an ignorance-first analysis is more adequate at tracking phenomena involved in the epistemology of domination, oppression, and injustice than epistemic injustice-first accounts.

@incollection{bennett_literary_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Literary {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Literature confronts us with the question of what it knows and of the kind of knowledge it may be said to yield. What does it mean to say that an author or a work ‘knows’ something or allows us to know it? Does a literary text reveal something about the world that is otherwise unknown? This chapter discusses an important tradition in literary theory and practice in which literature is seen as centrally concerned with knowing ignorance and with remaining in ignorance, in valuing and exploring the condition or the experience of not knowing. The chapter proposes that ignorance is at work on thematic, narratological, and authorial levels, but that nescience is also itself an important element in the process of interpretation and in the experience of reading. In this sense, literature may be conceived of as a form of dissident writing – of writing that, rather than claiming knowledge, claims that it can help us to know the conceptual contours and cultural value of not knowing.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Bennett, Andrew},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Literature confronts us with the question of what it knows and of the kind of knowledge it may be said to yield. What does it mean to say that an author or a work ‘knows’ something or allows us to know it? Does a literary text reveal something about the world that is otherwise unknown? This chapter discusses an important tradition in literary theory and practice in which literature is seen as centrally concerned with knowing ignorance and with remaining in ignorance, in valuing and exploring the condition or the experience of not knowing. The chapter proposes that ignorance is at work on thematic, narratological, and authorial levels, but that nescience is also itself an important element in the process of interpretation and in the experience of reading. In this sense, literature may be conceived of as a form of dissident writing – of writing that, rather than claiming knowledge, claims that it can help us to know the conceptual contours and cultural value of not knowing.

@incollection{paasche_ignorance_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Ignorance of {Model} {Uncertainty} and its {Effects} on {Ethics} and {Society} {Using} the {Example} of {Geosciences}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Numerical modeling plays an important role in geosciences when it comes to the prediction of future states of the Earth. The predictive capabilities of numerical models building on machine learning or computational modeling become increasingly relevant in political decision making. However, models are fraught with uncertainties, which currently are rarely made transparent. If we ignore maximally realistic uncertainty quantification in numerical modeling as value-adding knowledge about the unknown, we are likely to exacerbate ethical problems related to geoscientific modeling. In this chapter, we review the role of models in geosciences and types of model uncertainty. We discuss the communication of model uncertainties from societal and ethical perspectives. Currently, users of models, e.g., political and economic decision makers, do not appreciate predictive models that carry more knowledge about uncertainties. Rather, they often perceive them as more uncertain. This makes it easy for the geoscientific community to ignore the need to quantify uncertainties. We argue that it is crucial to develop improved and standardized uncertainty quantification approaches and communicate their outcomes when modeling and predicting complex systems such as the Earth.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Paasche, Hendrik and Bleicher, Alena and Loh, Wulf and Weigel, Tobias},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Numerical modeling plays an important role in geosciences when it comes to the prediction of future states of the Earth. The predictive capabilities of numerical models building on machine learning or computational modeling become increasingly relevant in political decision making. However, models are fraught with uncertainties, which currently are rarely made transparent. If we ignore maximally realistic uncertainty quantification in numerical modeling as value-adding knowledge about the unknown, we are likely to exacerbate ethical problems related to geoscientific modeling. In this chapter, we review the role of models in geosciences and types of model uncertainty. We discuss the communication of model uncertainties from societal and ethical perspectives. Currently, users of models, e.g., political and economic decision makers, do not appreciate predictive models that carry more knowledge about uncertainties. Rather, they often perceive them as more uncertain. This makes it easy for the geoscientific community to ignore the need to quantify uncertainties. We argue that it is crucial to develop improved and standardized uncertainty quantification approaches and communicate their outcomes when modeling and predicting complex systems such as the Earth.

@incollection{zimmermann_expect_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Expect the {Unexpected}: {Experimental} music, or the ignorance of sound design},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Expect the {Unexpected}},
	abstract = {Experimental music is a style of music that defines itself by opposition to other music styles. Many music lovers define their musical experience in opposition to other music styles, but experimental music bases its own characteristics not on rhythmic or melodic patterns, or specific instruments, but on the very idea of difference. Experimental music is music that differs. And quite often, together with this idea of difference, comes the idea of surprise. The audience expects that songs or performances will contain something unexpected. This chapter briefly discusses two sets of observations of the practices of experimental musicians. The first set relies on the author’s experience as a participant in a local music community in Switzerland between 1996 and 2013. The second set of data consists of observations of the activities a Chinese musician which was collected using participant observation, and in-depth qualitative field work, between 2003 and 2004 in Beijing.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Zimmermann, Basile},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Experimental music is a style of music that defines itself by opposition to other music styles. Many music lovers define their musical experience in opposition to other music styles, but experimental music bases its own characteristics not on rhythmic or melodic patterns, or specific instruments, but on the very idea of difference. Experimental music is music that differs. And quite often, together with this idea of difference, comes the idea of surprise. The audience expects that songs or performances will contain something unexpected. This chapter briefly discusses two sets of observations of the practices of experimental musicians. The first set relies on the author’s experience as a participant in a local music community in Switzerland between 1996 and 2013. The second set of data consists of observations of the activities a Chinese musician which was collected using participant observation, and in-depth qualitative field work, between 2003 and 2004 in Beijing.

@incollection{girel_pragmatics_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {The {Pragmatics} of {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {The goal of this chapter is to contribute to ignorance studies by taking advantage of the pragmatist epistemology of Peirce and Dewey, which, in my view, would be an “unfinished” business without facing sundry problems raised by ignorance studies. Five typical pragmatist claims provide the framework for this chapter. They can be endorsed by other philosophies, but their conjunction is typical of pragmatism: (1) the first is Peirce’s pragmatist maxim for clarifying our ideas, where the reference to “practical bearings”, to situations, conducts and contexts, is pivotal; (2) the second is pragmatism’s focus on inquiry as a norm-governed practice, rather than on mere knowledge; (3) the third idea is their “externalism”, the conviction that mind, reason and knowledge are not properties of atomic individuals but are distributed over community of inquirers or “publics” and their environment; (4) the fourth idea is that philosophy has condemned itself to skepticism when it was looking for absolute theoretical certainties; and (5) the last claim is their rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. My own general claim is that pragmatism has under-appreciated relevance for understanding the epistemology of ignorance and its social implications, and each section explores one possible dimension – semantic, epistemic, externalist, doxastic and normative – for this contribution.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Girel, Mathias},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 14},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

The goal of this chapter is to contribute to ignorance studies by taking advantage of the pragmatist epistemology of Peirce and Dewey, which, in my view, would be an “unfinished” business without facing sundry problems raised by ignorance studies. Five typical pragmatist claims provide the framework for this chapter. They can be endorsed by other philosophies, but their conjunction is typical of pragmatism: (1) the first is Peirce’s pragmatist maxim for clarifying our ideas, where the reference to “practical bearings”, to situations, conducts and contexts, is pivotal; (2) the second is pragmatism’s focus on inquiry as a norm-governed practice, rather than on mere knowledge; (3) the third idea is their “externalism”, the conviction that mind, reason and knowledge are not properties of atomic individuals but are distributed over community of inquirers or “publics” and their environment; (4) the fourth idea is that philosophy has condemned itself to skepticism when it was looking for absolute theoretical certainties; and (5) the last claim is their rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. My own general claim is that pragmatism has under-appreciated relevance for understanding the epistemology of ignorance and its social implications, and each section explores one possible dimension – semantic, epistemic, externalist, doxastic and normative – for this contribution.

@incollection{friedman_popper_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Popper, {Ignorance}, and the {Emptiness} of {Fallibilism}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {The starting point of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science is epistemological humility: We are ignorant and prone to error. Science is for Popper a middle way between ignorance and knowledge, an alternative to both epistemological pessimism and optimism. The pessimist is impressed with human fallibility and ignorance, as Popper was. Induction is the practice of inferring from past observations of some conjunction of phenomena, such as whiteness and swans, a universal law, such as “all swans are white.” Popper is no longer taken seriously by many philosophers of science. A criticism often leveled at Popper’s criterion of falsifiability is that the compelling logical asymmetry between falsifiability and verifiability is usually inapplicable in the real world. Critical rationalism functions as an injunction to open-mindedness. The inability to take into account our inscrutable ignorance might explain why philosophers of science tend to have faith in scientific progress.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Friedman, Shterna},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

The starting point of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science is epistemological humility: We are ignorant and prone to error. Science is for Popper a middle way between ignorance and knowledge, an alternative to both epistemological pessimism and optimism. The pessimist is impressed with human fallibility and ignorance, as Popper was. Induction is the practice of inferring from past observations of some conjunction of phenomena, such as whiteness and swans, a universal law, such as “all swans are white.” Popper is no longer taken seriously by many philosophers of science. A criticism often leveled at Popper’s criterion of falsifiability is that the compelling logical asymmetry between falsifiability and verifiability is usually inapplicable in the real world. Critical rationalism functions as an injunction to open-mindedness. The inability to take into account our inscrutable ignorance might explain why philosophers of science tend to have faith in scientific progress.

@incollection{kempner_forbidden_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Forbidden {Knowledge} in a {Post}-{Truth} {Era}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Contemporary politics is marked with an anxiety that we are now “post-truth,” a term that signifies the subordination of facts to feelings, and reality to ideology. “Post-truth,” therefore, promotes ignorance, but how so? This chapter reviews the concept of forbidden knowledge considering emergent concerns about post-truth politics.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Kempner, Joanna},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Contemporary politics is marked with an anxiety that we are now “post-truth,” a term that signifies the subordination of facts to feelings, and reality to ideology. “Post-truth,” therefore, promotes ignorance, but how so? This chapter reviews the concept of forbidden knowledge considering emergent concerns about post-truth politics.

@incollection{michael_ignorance_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Ignorance and the {Epistemic} {Choreography} of {Social} {Research}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {This chapter develops a preliminary sketch of how research events entail an epistemic choreography of ignorance and knowledge which encompasses a range of categories of knowing and not-knowing. In particular, there is a consideration of how in particular classes of research there is a systematic and layered ignoring of certain sorts of behaviour that do not fit in with the ‘rationales’, ‘frameworks’ or ‘presuppositions’ of the research. Understood as a ‘choreography’, this layering of ignorance is explored through a number of constituent elements of the research event, including the crafting of the research question and the research design, the recruitment of participants, and the derivation and analysis of data. This perspective is linked to a model of the research event as processual, open and unfolding. The chapter goes on to develop the speculative proposition that it is possible to draw on that which is ignored in order to re-work the meaning of the particular research event.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Michael, Mike},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter develops a preliminary sketch of how research events entail an epistemic choreography of ignorance and knowledge which encompasses a range of categories of knowing and not-knowing. In particular, there is a consideration of how in particular classes of research there is a systematic and layered ignoring of certain sorts of behaviour that do not fit in with the ‘rationales’, ‘frameworks’ or ‘presuppositions’ of the research. Understood as a ‘choreography’, this layering of ignorance is explored through a number of constituent elements of the research event, including the crafting of the research question and the research design, the recruitment of participants, and the derivation and analysis of data. This perspective is linked to a model of the research event as processual, open and unfolding. The chapter goes on to develop the speculative proposition that it is possible to draw on that which is ignored in order to re-work the meaning of the particular research event.

@incollection{firestein_sharing_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Sharing the {Resources} of {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Science is the production of questions not facts. Scientists don’t talk about what they know, but about what they don’t know. The crucial decisions in science are about the right question not about the correct result. Enrico Fermi told his students that if “they performed an experiment and it proved the hypothesis they had made a measurement; if it didn’t prove the hypothesis they had made a discovery.” All of this is common knowledge to the working scientist, it is implicit in everything they do. And this is just the problem. It never becomes explicit, it never gets into the public imagination about science, it remains the province of the elite professional trained scientist. The myth of science as an accumulation of facts is furthered by the educational system that teaches from compilations (textbooks) and uses a bulimic approach to science education: force as many facts as possible down the student’s throats and then have them puke them up on an exam, and then move on to the next unit with no lasting gain. This leaves us with a public in possession of a distorted view of science, and one that is easily manipulated by political and corporate interests. We do not teach the scientific approach to uncertainty, to doubt, to ignorance and to failure. And because of this we do not have a scientifically literate society, no matter how much chemistry, physics or biology they may or may not remember.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Firestein, Stuart},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 5},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Science is the production of questions not facts. Scientists don’t talk about what they know, but about what they don’t know. The crucial decisions in science are about the right question not about the correct result. Enrico Fermi told his students that if “they performed an experiment and it proved the hypothesis they had made a measurement; if it didn’t prove the hypothesis they had made a discovery.” All of this is common knowledge to the working scientist, it is implicit in everything they do. And this is just the problem. It never becomes explicit, it never gets into the public imagination about science, it remains the province of the elite professional trained scientist. The myth of science as an accumulation of facts is furthered by the educational system that teaches from compilations (textbooks) and uses a bulimic approach to science education: force as many facts as possible down the student’s throats and then have them puke them up on an exam, and then move on to the next unit with no lasting gain. This leaves us with a public in possession of a distorted view of science, and one that is easily manipulated by political and corporate interests. We do not teach the scientific approach to uncertainty, to doubt, to ignorance and to failure. And because of this we do not have a scientifically literate society, no matter how much chemistry, physics or biology they may or may not remember.

@incollection{smithson_ignorance_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Ignorance and the {Brain}: {Are} {There} {Distinct} {Kinds} of {Unknowns}?},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance and the {Brain}},
	abstract = {This chapter presents a brief review of selected findings and themes from both literatures. The brain is a human organ responsible for processing external and internal information and deciding how to respond to new information. A self-described “ultra” sceptical viewpoint on whether brain imaging tells us anything about what the mind does is Coltheart’s position. Multistability occurs when a stimulus produces alternations among different interpretations of the stimulus. However, studies of perceptual switching have not yet resolved at which stage in the hierarchy of visual cortical areas the activity corresponds to the perceptual state. An obvious obstacle to studying what the brain does in naturalistic decision making or perception is simply that the requisite technology for measuring or manipulating brain activity in a controlled fashion makes it impossible to do brain imaging while the subject is engaged in everyday life.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Smithson, Michael and Pushkarskaya, Helen},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 14},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter presents a brief review of selected findings and themes from both literatures. The brain is a human organ responsible for processing external and internal information and deciding how to respond to new information. A self-described “ultra” sceptical viewpoint on whether brain imaging tells us anything about what the mind does is Coltheart’s position. Multistability occurs when a stimulus produces alternations among different interpretations of the stimulus. However, studies of perceptual switching have not yet resolved at which stage in the hierarchy of visual cortical areas the activity corresponds to the perceptual state. An obvious obstacle to studying what the brain does in naturalistic decision making or perception is simply that the requisite technology for measuring or manipulating brain activity in a controlled fashion makes it impossible to do brain imaging while the subject is engaged in everyday life.

@incollection{hess_undone_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Undone {Science} and {Social} {MovementS}: {A} {Review} and {Typology}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Undone {Science} and {Social} {MovementS}},
	abstract = {The origin and development of the concept of undone science and its connections is reviewed, including connections with science and technology studies (STS) and social movement studies. Rooted partially in an STS perspective on the construction of knowledge, the study of undone science shifts attention to the level of the research field and its relationships with other social fields and broader societal conflicts. One research area where these relationships become visible is the study of social movements that seek industrial change (often along with broader societal change). The nexus of STS and social movement studies refocuses the question of publics in STS from the individual layperson to mobilized publics, and likewise it shifts the analysis of industrial change in social movement studies toward knowledge conflicts and the politics of design. A discussion follows of new questions that emerge about social movements, knowledge, technology, and outcomes. The chapter ends with a review of some emerging developments among researchers who have provided contributions to the analysis of undone science and related problems in the study of ignorance, power, and inequality.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Hess, David J.},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 11},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

The origin and development of the concept of undone science and its connections is reviewed, including connections with science and technology studies (STS) and social movement studies. Rooted partially in an STS perspective on the construction of knowledge, the study of undone science shifts attention to the level of the research field and its relationships with other social fields and broader societal conflicts. One research area where these relationships become visible is the study of social movements that seek industrial change (often along with broader societal change). The nexus of STS and social movement studies refocuses the question of publics in STS from the individual layperson to mobilized publics, and likewise it shifts the analysis of industrial change in social movement studies toward knowledge conflicts and the politics of design. A discussion follows of new questions that emerge about social movements, knowledge, technology, and outcomes. The chapter ends with a review of some emerging developments among researchers who have provided contributions to the analysis of undone science and related problems in the study of ignorance, power, and inequality.

@incollection{kourany_science_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Science for {Better} or {Worse}, a {Source} of {Ignorance} as {Well} as {Knowledge}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Science is gendered in a variety of ways. One is the way science has produced knowledge of men at the same time that it has produced ignorance of women. Until the end of the twentieth century, for example, archaeology investigated men’s contributions to the great turning points of human evolution while it ignored the contributions of women, and this left the impression that still persists today that men are the great innovators and controllers of human destiny, not women. Again, medical research until the end of the twentieth century defined many diseases that afflict both women and men (such as heart disease and AIDS) as men’s diseases and studied them primarily in white, middle-aged, middle-class men. And now, in the twenty-first century, medical research continues its focus on men. For example, in the U.S. although heart disease is the leading cause of death among women (in fact, since 1984 more women than men have died each year from heart disease, and the gap between women’s and men’s survival continues to widen), women still comprise only 24 percent of the participants in all heart-related studies. A second way in which science is gendered also concerns the balance of knowledge and ignorance produced by science, but this time it concerns the way science sometimes persists in producing knowledge when it might more usefully refrain—that is, when it might more usefully maintain ignorance. For example, for centuries it was claimed that women are intellectually inferior to men, and for centuries the basis for such inferiority was sought in biology and later also in psychology. And now, even after centuries of such research, scientists are still seeking to determine whether women are the intellectual equals of men—for example, whether women are as innately gifted in mathematics and the sciences as men. And although the claims of intellectual inferiority continue to be contested and corrected, they also continue to be made, and the endless succession of claims and counterclaims both feeds on and helps to sustain the stereotype of intellectual inferiority associated with women. Meanwhile, studies have documented the harm done to women and girls by the publication of scientific claims suggesting an innate female deficit in mathematics. So, the question arises whether such cognitive differences research should continue to be pursued, or whether ignorance would be preferable. I shall argue that an acceptable balance of scientifically produced knowledge and ignorance regarding men and women should reflect societal needs for gender equality as well as the need for freedom of research and the intrinsic value of knowledge.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Kourany, Janet A.},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 13},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Science is gendered in a variety of ways. One is the way science has produced knowledge of men at the same time that it has produced ignorance of women. Until the end of the twentieth century, for example, archaeology investigated men’s contributions to the great turning points of human evolution while it ignored the contributions of women, and this left the impression that still persists today that men are the great innovators and controllers of human destiny, not women. Again, medical research until the end of the twentieth century defined many diseases that afflict both women and men (such as heart disease and AIDS) as men’s diseases and studied them primarily in white, middle-aged, middle-class men. And now, in the twenty-first century, medical research continues its focus on men. For example, in the U.S. although heart disease is the leading cause of death among women (in fact, since 1984 more women than men have died each year from heart disease, and the gap between women’s and men’s survival continues to widen), women still comprise only 24 percent of the participants in all heart-related studies. A second way in which science is gendered also concerns the balance of knowledge and ignorance produced by science, but this time it concerns the way science sometimes persists in producing knowledge when it might more usefully refrain—that is, when it might more usefully maintain ignorance. For example, for centuries it was claimed that women are intellectually inferior to men, and for centuries the basis for such inferiority was sought in biology and later also in psychology. And now, even after centuries of such research, scientists are still seeking to determine whether women are the intellectual equals of men—for example, whether women are as innately gifted in mathematics and the sciences as men. And although the claims of intellectual inferiority continue to be contested and corrected, they also continue to be made, and the endless succession of claims and counterclaims both feeds on and helps to sustain the stereotype of intellectual inferiority associated with women. Meanwhile, studies have documented the harm done to women and girls by the publication of scientific claims suggesting an innate female deficit in mathematics. So, the question arises whether such cognitive differences research should continue to be pursued, or whether ignorance would be preferable. I shall argue that an acceptable balance of scientifically produced knowledge and ignorance regarding men and women should reflect societal needs for gender equality as well as the need for freedom of research and the intrinsic value of knowledge.

@incollection{parviainen_tackling_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Tackling the {Corona} {Pandemic}: {Managing} nonknowledge in political decision-making},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Tackling the {Corona} {Pandemic}},
	abstract = {During the corona pandemic, politicians have been forced to make urgent decisions under pressure while balancing between challenging options: protecting citizens’ health or causing major social and economic difficulties through security measures. Part of the dilemma has been whether the chosen security measures are oversized, causing fundamental economic and social problems, or not sufficiently enough, thus putting people’s lives at risk. In illustrating our discussion with actions taken by press conferences (PCs) of the Finnish Government, we discuss how nonknowing has governed political decision-making in the corona crisis and how tackling the pandemic has required politicians and experts to develop a capability of dealing with the epistemic conditions of nonknowledge. When information about the virus was constantly updated, the epistemic states of ‘not-yet-known’ or ‘partly-known’ substantially affect the rhythms in which political decisions are made in managing the spread of COVID-19. We suggest that Prime Minister Marin and her cabinet developed a policy of epistemic humility where the legitimation of decision is not based on scientific knowledge but rather on the temporality of nonknowing. The crisis created a favourable momentum for addressing issues of nonknowing in politics, which are easily kept outside of the public attention.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Parviainen, Jaana and Koski, Anne and Alanen, Paula},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

During the corona pandemic, politicians have been forced to make urgent decisions under pressure while balancing between challenging options: protecting citizens’ health or causing major social and economic difficulties through security measures. Part of the dilemma has been whether the chosen security measures are oversized, causing fundamental economic and social problems, or not sufficiently enough, thus putting people’s lives at risk. In illustrating our discussion with actions taken by press conferences (PCs) of the Finnish Government, we discuss how nonknowing has governed political decision-making in the corona crisis and how tackling the pandemic has required politicians and experts to develop a capability of dealing with the epistemic conditions of nonknowledge. When information about the virus was constantly updated, the epistemic states of ‘not-yet-known’ or ‘partly-known’ substantially affect the rhythms in which political decisions are made in managing the spread of COVID-19. We suggest that Prime Minister Marin and her cabinet developed a policy of epistemic humility where the legitimation of decision is not based on scientific knowledge but rather on the temporality of nonknowing. The crisis created a favourable momentum for addressing issues of nonknowing in politics, which are easily kept outside of the public attention.

@incollection{gilson_sexual_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Sexual {Injustice} and {Willful} {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Despite the way the \#MeToo movement and various other movements for gender and sexual justice have brought widespread attention to the injustice of sexual victimization, ignorance persists in the face of evidence. This chapter addresses the issue of why ignorance about sexual injustice is still so pervasive despite the overwhelming evidence, and despite the years and years of work by activists and scholars to understand and address the problem. It ties ignorance and sexual victimization to the theme of vulnerability and to ignorance of vulnerability. The chapter explicates ignorance of sexual injustice as a form of willful ignorance of systemic oppression, tracing this idea through recent philosophical work about how ignorance contributes to oppression. It explores the connections between vulnerability, ignorance, and sexual injustice by outlining five ways of being ignorant of sexual injustice. The chapter concludes that willful ignorance about sexual injustice persists because it is woven throughout dominant notions of morality, merit, responsibility, safety, normalcy, and abnormality, and thus through the very resources with which most people attempt to make sense of injustice.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Gilson, Erinn},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 12},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Despite the way the #MeToo movement and various other movements for gender and sexual justice have brought widespread attention to the injustice of sexual victimization, ignorance persists in the face of evidence. This chapter addresses the issue of why ignorance about sexual injustice is still so pervasive despite the overwhelming evidence, and despite the years and years of work by activists and scholars to understand and address the problem. It ties ignorance and sexual victimization to the theme of vulnerability and to ignorance of vulnerability. The chapter explicates ignorance of sexual injustice as a form of willful ignorance of systemic oppression, tracing this idea through recent philosophical work about how ignorance contributes to oppression. It explores the connections between vulnerability, ignorance, and sexual injustice by outlining five ways of being ignorant of sexual injustice. The chapter concludes that willful ignorance about sexual injustice persists because it is woven throughout dominant notions of morality, merit, responsibility, safety, normalcy, and abnormality, and thus through the very resources with which most people attempt to make sense of injustice.

@incollection{janich_linguistics_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Linguistics and {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {The main aim of this chapter is the analysis of the linguistic representation, the textual thematization and the discursive evaluation of ignorance and uncertainty. The main issue of the article is to propose a kind of a qualitative-hermeneutic methodology to consider and to take into account ignorance in discourse linguistics which is, so far, focused above all on knowledge. Following this purpose, the article scratches the different possible linguistic perspectives (e.g. semantics, text linguistics, stylistics, rhetorics, pragmatics and discourse analysis) and shows both the actual state of the art and research desiderata. Leading linguistics questions are, for example: What kind of role plays ignorance in specific discourses, especially in scientific ones? Which stylistic-rhetorical strategies are chosen by different actors when dealing with their own ignorance and that of others, also in comparison between written texts and spoken language? Which argumentative functions have the different linguistic representations of ignorance in different kind of genres and discourses? Which semantic concepts of ignorance and which evaluations result from texts and discourses?},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Janich, Nina and Simmerling, Anne},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 15},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

The main aim of this chapter is the analysis of the linguistic representation, the textual thematization and the discursive evaluation of ignorance and uncertainty. The main issue of the article is to propose a kind of a qualitative-hermeneutic methodology to consider and to take into account ignorance in discourse linguistics which is, so far, focused above all on knowledge. Following this purpose, the article scratches the different possible linguistic perspectives (e.g. semantics, text linguistics, stylistics, rhetorics, pragmatics and discourse analysis) and shows both the actual state of the art and research desiderata. Leading linguistics questions are, for example: What kind of role plays ignorance in specific discourses, especially in scientific ones? Which stylistic-rhetorical strategies are chosen by different actors when dealing with their own ignorance and that of others, also in comparison between written texts and spoken language? Which argumentative functions have the different linguistic representations of ignorance in different kind of genres and discourses? Which semantic concepts of ignorance and which evaluations result from texts and discourses?

@incollection{frickel_lost_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Lost in {Space}: {Place}, {Space}, and {Scale} in the {Production} of {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Lost in {Space}},
	abstract = {This chapter takes up the problem of ignorance and geographical space from the vantage point of Science and Technology Studies (STS), viewing ignorance as a cultural artifact whose production is deeply intertwined with epistemic, social, and spatial processes. A brief review of scholars’ place- and space-based arguments about ignorance production lend focus to an extended discussion of ignorance and scale. Drawing widely on STS studies of environmental science, we argue that scale matters in terms of problem framing and data organization and describe work showing how both practices condition what becomes known and what remains unknown.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Frickel, Scott and Kinchy, Abby},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter takes up the problem of ignorance and geographical space from the vantage point of Science and Technology Studies (STS), viewing ignorance as a cultural artifact whose production is deeply intertwined with epistemic, social, and spatial processes. A brief review of scholars’ place- and space-based arguments about ignorance production lend focus to an extended discussion of ignorance and scale. Drawing widely on STS studies of environmental science, we argue that scale matters in terms of problem framing and data organization and describe work showing how both practices condition what becomes known and what remains unknown.

@incollection{kleinman_ignorance_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Ignorance and {Industry}: {Agrichemicals} and {Honey} {Bee} {Deaths}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance and {Industry}},
	abstract = {In this chapter, we consider the role Bayer Corporation played in shaping the regulation and use of chemicals at the center of the controversy over the spike in honey bee deaths in the United States and elsewhere. We are concerned with how Bayer contributed to the maintenance of uncertainty about the role of their profitable insecticides in contributing to honey bee deaths. We consider how Bayer uses the norms of toxicology research to discredit evidence from beekeepers. We look at Bayer’s stress of alternative explanations for the evidence that beekeepers and scientists provide, and we consider how Bayer has bolstered uncertainty through a research collaboration with beekeepers.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Kleinman, Daniel Lee and Suryanarayanan, Sainath},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

In this chapter, we consider the role Bayer Corporation played in shaping the regulation and use of chemicals at the center of the controversy over the spike in honey bee deaths in the United States and elsewhere. We are concerned with how Bayer contributed to the maintenance of uncertainty about the role of their profitable insecticides in contributing to honey bee deaths. We consider how Bayer uses the norms of toxicology research to discredit evidence from beekeepers. We look at Bayer’s stress of alternative explanations for the evidence that beekeepers and scientists provide, and we consider how Bayer has bolstered uncertainty through a research collaboration with beekeepers.

@incollection{paul_pandemic_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {The {Pandemic} as we {Know} {It}: {A} policy studies perspective on ignorance and nonknowledge in {COVID}-19 governance                            1},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {The {Pandemic} as we {Know} {It}},
	abstract = {Values of knowledge, truth and evidence typically underpin scholarly discourses on policymaking. This strong focus on knowledge has, however, concealed the key role of ignorance and agnotology in policy. To address this omission, this chapter introduces a policy studies perspective to the study of ignorance. We capture the role of ignorance as a constitutive feature of policymaking rather than as something residual and external to it. Advocating for a ‘symmetrical’ research perspective to examining knowledge and ignorance in the policy process, we introduce an approach to policy analysis grounded in ‘agnoto-epistemological sensibilities’. Using the COVID-19 crisis as a focal point, we explore and illustrate different mechanisms of how ignorance is mobilized and deployed at different sites and scales in pandemic policymaking. In doing so, we build on established concepts of ‘strategic ignorance’, but also provide additional illustrations of less intentional, but equally political forms of ignorance practices.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Paul, Katharina T. and Haddad, Christian},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 13},
	keywords = {OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Values of knowledge, truth and evidence typically underpin scholarly discourses on policymaking. This strong focus on knowledge has, however, concealed the key role of ignorance and agnotology in policy. To address this omission, this chapter introduces a policy studies perspective to the study of ignorance. We capture the role of ignorance as a constitutive feature of policymaking rather than as something residual and external to it. Advocating for a ‘symmetrical’ research perspective to examining knowledge and ignorance in the policy process, we introduce an approach to policy analysis grounded in ‘agnoto-epistemological sensibilities’. Using the COVID-19 crisis as a focal point, we explore and illustrate different mechanisms of how ignorance is mobilized and deployed at different sites and scales in pandemic policymaking. In doing so, we build on established concepts of ‘strategic ignorance’, but also provide additional illustrations of less intentional, but equally political forms of ignorance practices.

@incollection{wehling_right_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {The {Right} not to {Know} and the {Dynamics} of {Biomedical} {Knowledge} {Production}: {Fighting} a losing battle?},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {The {Right} not to {Know} and the {Dynamics} of {Biomedical} {Knowledge} {Production}},
	abstract = {The development and acceptance of a “right not to know” in the context of genetic and genomic medicine appears to be a both provocative and fragile achievement in modern, self-proclaimed “knowledge societies”. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the right not to know one’s genetic make-up, although protected by law in many countries, is continuously contested in bioethical and medical discourses as well as challenged by new biomedical technologies such as whole genome sequencing, non-invasive prenatal testing and expanded carrier screening. While earlier bioethical criticisms were mainly based on the mistaken assumption that ignorance is fundamentally incompatible with autonomy and rationality, more recent objections tend to marginalize individual autonomy altogether, favoring instead renewed forms of medical paternalism. In addition, the right not to know increasingly is rejected by invoking a “duty to know” one’s own genetic predispositions or those of one’s prospective children in the name of solidarity or responsible parenthood. Contrary to such views, it is argued in this chapter that, given the ambiguities of genetic and genomic knowledge, not wanting to know is, and continues to be, a legitimate and reasonable response to the dynamics of biomedical knowledge production – all the more so as the purportedly superior will to knowledge is itself anything but devoid of moral and political ambivalences.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Wehling, Peter},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

The development and acceptance of a “right not to know” in the context of genetic and genomic medicine appears to be a both provocative and fragile achievement in modern, self-proclaimed “knowledge societies”. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the right not to know one’s genetic make-up, although protected by law in many countries, is continuously contested in bioethical and medical discourses as well as challenged by new biomedical technologies such as whole genome sequencing, non-invasive prenatal testing and expanded carrier screening. While earlier bioethical criticisms were mainly based on the mistaken assumption that ignorance is fundamentally incompatible with autonomy and rationality, more recent objections tend to marginalize individual autonomy altogether, favoring instead renewed forms of medical paternalism. In addition, the right not to know increasingly is rejected by invoking a “duty to know” one’s own genetic predispositions or those of one’s prospective children in the name of solidarity or responsible parenthood. Contrary to such views, it is argued in this chapter that, given the ambiguities of genetic and genomic knowledge, not wanting to know is, and continues to be, a legitimate and reasonable response to the dynamics of biomedical knowledge production – all the more so as the purportedly superior will to knowledge is itself anything but devoid of moral and political ambivalences.

@incollection{pape_intersectional_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Intersectional {Ignorance} in {Women}'s {Sport}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {In this chapter, I explore how the regulatory valorization of science be conceptualized as a form of ignorance that is intersectionally constituted and generates intersectional harms. I examine this in the context of international track-and-field, where the regulation of women athletes with naturally high testosterone levels has overwhelmingly impacted women of color from Global South nations. Given the uneven impacts of this regulatory regime, how do sports governing bodies succeed in defining this issue as one that ought to be decided on the basis of (a certain kind of) science alone? I show how this involves a double move: first, eliding a more complex account of how and to what extent testosterone defines women’s athletic ability, and second, diminishing the significance of the harms inflicted upon affected athletes. I suggest that this second move relies upon the racialized and geopolitical constitution of gender difference in international sport, which sports governing bodies deny via its designation as “unscientific.” I consider how the ascendancy of a clean scientific narrative of binary sex difference relies on wider institutional arrangements and a sporting culture that also avoids deeper engagement with the question of how and upon whom existing regulations inflict harm.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Pape, Madeleine},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

In this chapter, I explore how the regulatory valorization of science be conceptualized as a form of ignorance that is intersectionally constituted and generates intersectional harms. I examine this in the context of international track-and-field, where the regulation of women athletes with naturally high testosterone levels has overwhelmingly impacted women of color from Global South nations. Given the uneven impacts of this regulatory regime, how do sports governing bodies succeed in defining this issue as one that ought to be decided on the basis of (a certain kind of) science alone? I show how this involves a double move: first, eliding a more complex account of how and to what extent testosterone defines women’s athletic ability, and second, diminishing the significance of the harms inflicted upon affected athletes. I suggest that this second move relies upon the racialized and geopolitical constitution of gender difference in international sport, which sports governing bodies deny via its designation as “unscientific.” I consider how the ascendancy of a clean scientific narrative of binary sex difference relies on wider institutional arrangements and a sporting culture that also avoids deeper engagement with the question of how and upon whom existing regulations inflict harm.

@incollection{marder_democracy_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Democracy and {Practices} of {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {The near consensus among political theorists is that a healthy democracy in no small part depends on the participation of citizens with necessary knowledge. Democracy refers to the disruptive constitution of political space through an absence of entitlement to rule that itself is the entitlement to rule by anyone or in Ranciere’s influential terminology, “the part that has no part”. Practices of ignorance can cohere with, on the one hand, the police logic or, on the other hand, the democratic logic and facilitate either the preservation of the existing configuration or a democratic moment. Impersonal social processes, such as industrialization, similarly fail at reframing the sensible, for they have no inherent democratic thrust and no reason not to reproduce the hierarchies and divisions of the police order. Transformation also operates in Balibar’s discourse on the idea of European citizenship and European language.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Marder, Lev},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 13},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

The near consensus among political theorists is that a healthy democracy in no small part depends on the participation of citizens with necessary knowledge. Democracy refers to the disruptive constitution of political space through an absence of entitlement to rule that itself is the entitlement to rule by anyone or in Ranciere’s influential terminology, “the part that has no part”. Practices of ignorance can cohere with, on the one hand, the police logic or, on the other hand, the democratic logic and facilitate either the preservation of the existing configuration or a democratic moment. Impersonal social processes, such as industrialization, similarly fail at reframing the sensible, for they have no inherent democratic thrust and no reason not to reproduce the hierarchies and divisions of the police order. Transformation also operates in Balibar’s discourse on the idea of European citizenship and European language.

@incollection{somin_rational_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Rational {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Rational ignorance is a ubiquitous aspect of our lives. Because there are severe constraints on our time, energy, and cognitive capacity, it often makes sense to limit the amount of information we acquire. In section I, I consider what it means to be rationally ignorant, contrasting rational ignorance with irrational or inadvertent ignorance. Section II explains why rational ignorance is both widespread and often desirable. Finally, section III focuses on situations where individually rational ignorance could lead to harmful results for society as a whole. By far the most significant such case is the rational ignorance of voters about politics. Recent events highlight the dangers voter ignorance creates for democracy.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Somin, Ilya},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Rational ignorance is a ubiquitous aspect of our lives. Because there are severe constraints on our time, energy, and cognitive capacity, it often makes sense to limit the amount of information we acquire. In section I, I consider what it means to be rationally ignorant, contrasting rational ignorance with irrational or inadvertent ignorance. Section II explains why rational ignorance is both widespread and often desirable. Finally, section III focuses on situations where individually rational ignorance could lead to harmful results for society as a whole. By far the most significant such case is the rational ignorance of voters about politics. Recent events highlight the dangers voter ignorance creates for democracy.

@incollection{rappert_ignorance_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Ignorance is {Strength}?: {Intelligence}, security, and national secrets},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance is {Strength}?},
	abstract = {This chapter takes as its topic the challenge of knowing about what is often purposefully rendered difficult to know about matters of defense, intelligence and security. Within such domains, ignorance is both embraced and rejected, induced and deterred, as well as milled and disregarded. This chapter considers this ‘Janus-faced’ quality as it relates to the mobilization of ignorance as a strategic resource, how ignorance and identity are constituted in acts of violence, as well as the methodological issues arising from the study of security and ignorance. In doing so, the argument challenges polarized views that see a clear separation between ignorance and knowledge.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Rappert, Brian and Balmer, Brian},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter takes as its topic the challenge of knowing about what is often purposefully rendered difficult to know about matters of defense, intelligence and security. Within such domains, ignorance is both embraced and rejected, induced and deterred, as well as milled and disregarded. This chapter considers this ‘Janus-faced’ quality as it relates to the mobilization of ignorance as a strategic resource, how ignorance and identity are constituted in acts of violence, as well as the methodological issues arising from the study of security and ignorance. In doing so, the argument challenges polarized views that see a clear separation between ignorance and knowledge.

@incollection{roberts_organizational_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Organizational {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {This chapter explores the notion of ignorance in an organizational context. Following a brief introduction the meaning of ignorance is considered. Building on this a typology of organizational ignorance is outlined with the aim of promoting the development of a managerial approach to the unknown.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Roberts, Joanne},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter explores the notion of ignorance in an organizational context. Following a brief introduction the meaning of ignorance is considered. Building on this a typology of organizational ignorance is outlined with the aim of promoting the development of a managerial approach to the unknown.

@incollection{chua_anthropological_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Anthropological {Perspectives} on {Ritual} and {Religious} {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {This chapter examines the role that multiple forms and discourses of ignorance play in ritual and religious life, as well as their social and political effects in particular ethnographic settings. Following a brief overview of the long-standing but largely implicit presence of ignorance in the anthropology of religion, the chapter explores three broad themes: 1) the productivity of ignorance in situations of loss, change and collective amnesia; 2) ethical or strategic cultivations of ignorance; and 3) the politics of ignorance. Taken together, these contributions lay bare the many overlaps and slippages between ignorance and other cognate phenomena such as amnesia, ambiguity, loss, indifference, and ‘wilful blindness’. At the same time, they raise vital questions about how to hold analytical and ‘native’ ideas about ignorance in productive tension, as well as how scholarship on ignorance might offer nuanced, complex views of contemporary moral and political dilemmas.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Chua, Liana},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter examines the role that multiple forms and discourses of ignorance play in ritual and religious life, as well as their social and political effects in particular ethnographic settings. Following a brief overview of the long-standing but largely implicit presence of ignorance in the anthropology of religion, the chapter explores three broad themes: 1) the productivity of ignorance in situations of loss, change and collective amnesia; 2) ethical or strategic cultivations of ignorance; and 3) the politics of ignorance. Taken together, these contributions lay bare the many overlaps and slippages between ignorance and other cognate phenomena such as amnesia, ambiguity, loss, indifference, and ‘wilful blindness’. At the same time, they raise vital questions about how to hold analytical and ‘native’ ideas about ignorance in productive tension, as well as how scholarship on ignorance might offer nuanced, complex views of contemporary moral and political dilemmas.

@incollection{sayigh_burial_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {On the {Burial} of the {Palestinian} {Nakba}                            1},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {This chapter examines crucial ways in which ignorance of Palestine and the Nakba of 1948 has been produced, whether through colonial appropriation, landscape transformation, censorship, memoricide, schooling, or fear of anti-semitic labeling. As instance of suppression of knowledge about the Nakba/Palestine, the chapter presents testimonies from scholars teaching in North American universities.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Sayigh, Rosemary},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 11},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter examines crucial ways in which ignorance of Palestine and the Nakba of 1948 has been produced, whether through colonial appropriation, landscape transformation, censorship, memoricide, schooling, or fear of anti-semitic labeling. As instance of suppression of knowledge about the Nakba/Palestine, the chapter presents testimonies from scholars teaching in North American universities.

@incollection{prentice_targeting_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Targeting {Ignorance} to {Change} {Behavior}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Current approaches to reducing dysfunctional behavior posit ignorance as a root cause. These approaches seek to alleviate, circumvent, or neutralize ignorance so that people can live healthier, happier, and more sustainable lives. In this chapter, I review these approaches to behavior change, with an eye toward their implications for understanding the links between ignorance, knowledge, and behavior. This review reveals the impressive advances that have come from the application of dual-process models of human psychology to the problem of behavior change. Recognizing that the mind has two distinct systems for processing information and thereby gaining knowledge has led to the development of new intervention strategies and a more complete understanding of how the two systems jointly regulate behavior. At the same time, this review highlights the limitations of assuming people would behave better if they knew better. Not all dysfunctional behavior is rooted in ignorance: People often take actions that harm themselves and others with full knowledge of those consequences.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Prentice, Deborah A.},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 8},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Current approaches to reducing dysfunctional behavior posit ignorance as a root cause. These approaches seek to alleviate, circumvent, or neutralize ignorance so that people can live healthier, happier, and more sustainable lives. In this chapter, I review these approaches to behavior change, with an eye toward their implications for understanding the links between ignorance, knowledge, and behavior. This review reveals the impressive advances that have come from the application of dual-process models of human psychology to the problem of behavior change. Recognizing that the mind has two distinct systems for processing information and thereby gaining knowledge has led to the development of new intervention strategies and a more complete understanding of how the two systems jointly regulate behavior. At the same time, this review highlights the limitations of assuming people would behave better if they knew better. Not all dysfunctional behavior is rooted in ignorance: People often take actions that harm themselves and others with full knowledge of those consequences.

@incollection{klintman_knowledge_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Knowledge {Resistance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Knowledge resistance is when people, groups, and organisations persistently reject seemingly accurate descriptions of reality or equally persistently believe in unfounded conspiracy theories, myths, and fabrications. By integrating sociology and evolutionary theory, Klintman argues that we need to move beyond two standard ways of understanding knowledge resistance: as (A) based on a lack of even more and better facts, as suggested by Steven Pinker and Hans Rosling; or as (B) based on a human inability to process information accurately, as suggested by Richard Thaler and Daniel Kahneman. Instead, knowledge resistance is best explained as our genetically evolved prioritisation of – on average – maintaining and strengthening social bonds over seeking ‘truth’ in neutral and socially uncompromising ways. First, the chapter distinguishes between epistemic claims and loyalty claims. Second, it shows how knowledge resistance may increase social esteem in one’s community. Third, Klintman highlights the reduced social risks and increased social opportunities that the spreading of false, unfounded claims entail in current society (online and offline) compared to previous societies. Finally, the chapter suggests how to manage or prevent destructive types of knowledge resistance while protecting constructive ones. Here, it is vital to focus on structural conditions rather than individual ones.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Klintman, Mikael},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 11},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Knowledge resistance is when people, groups, and organisations persistently reject seemingly accurate descriptions of reality or equally persistently believe in unfounded conspiracy theories, myths, and fabrications. By integrating sociology and evolutionary theory, Klintman argues that we need to move beyond two standard ways of understanding knowledge resistance: as (A) based on a lack of even more and better facts, as suggested by Steven Pinker and Hans Rosling; or as (B) based on a human inability to process information accurately, as suggested by Richard Thaler and Daniel Kahneman. Instead, knowledge resistance is best explained as our genetically evolved prioritisation of – on average – maintaining and strengthening social bonds over seeking ‘truth’ in neutral and socially uncompromising ways. First, the chapter distinguishes between epistemic claims and loyalty claims. Second, it shows how knowledge resistance may increase social esteem in one’s community. Third, Klintman highlights the reduced social risks and increased social opportunities that the spreading of false, unfounded claims entail in current society (online and offline) compared to previous societies. Finally, the chapter suggests how to manage or prevent destructive types of knowledge resistance while protecting constructive ones. Here, it is vital to focus on structural conditions rather than individual ones.

@incollection{thiel_criminal_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Criminal {Ignorance}, {Environmental} {Harms} and {Processes} of {Denial}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {Ignorance and denial of the intentions and outcomes of transgressive activities are central to understanding how individuals and organisations bend, break, create and manipulate moral and legal rules. This chapter describes how these concepts have been used to understand crimes ranging from minor youthful delinquencies to major genocides and widespread environmental devastation. We begin by describing how ‘techniques of neutralisation’ are said to operate to release people from moral binds and enable transgression. We then turn to the concept of ‘pluralistic ignorance’ showing how it facilitates the commission of crimes and illustrating its pivotal role in patterning public reaction to crime and injury. Next, we examine how large and powerful organisations, in particular modern states, also manufacture ignorance and use neutralisation techniques in order to break and manipulate moral and legal rules. We then expand these perspectives to examine how states and corporations operate in conjunction to fog and deny the crimes and harms engendered by environmental destruction so that they can suppress social reaction and continue business as usual.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Thiel, Darren and South, Nigel},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 11},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Ignorance and denial of the intentions and outcomes of transgressive activities are central to understanding how individuals and organisations bend, break, create and manipulate moral and legal rules. This chapter describes how these concepts have been used to understand crimes ranging from minor youthful delinquencies to major genocides and widespread environmental devastation. We begin by describing how ‘techniques of neutralisation’ are said to operate to release people from moral binds and enable transgression. We then turn to the concept of ‘pluralistic ignorance’ showing how it facilitates the commission of crimes and illustrating its pivotal role in patterning public reaction to crime and injury. Next, we examine how large and powerful organisations, in particular modern states, also manufacture ignorance and use neutralisation techniques in order to break and manipulate moral and legal rules. We then expand these perspectives to examine how states and corporations operate in conjunction to fog and deny the crimes and harms engendered by environmental destruction so that they can suppress social reaction and continue business as usual.

@incollection{svetlova_decision-theoretic_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Decision-{Theoretic} {Approaches} to {Non}-{Knowledge} in {Economics}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {This chapter provides an overview of conceptual approaches to incorporating a decision maker’s non-knowledge into economic theory. It focuses on the particular kind of non-knowledge which consider to be one of the most important for economic discussions: non-knowledge of possible consequence-relevant uncertain events which a decision maker would have to take into account when selecting between different strategies. In economic theory, non-knowledge of the likelihood of uncertain events at the initial decision stage of a static one-person, one-shot decision problem is the crucial feature. A different way to account for the limitations of a decision maker’s knowledge of future contingencies was the development of non-probabilistic concepts, for example, fuzzy logic and possibility theory. It is important to properly understand what it means to know states, actions and consequences, to be aware or unaware of them.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Svetlova, Ekaterina and Elst, Henk van},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 13},
	keywords = {OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This chapter provides an overview of conceptual approaches to incorporating a decision maker’s non-knowledge into economic theory. It focuses on the particular kind of non-knowledge which consider to be one of the most important for economic discussions: non-knowledge of possible consequence-relevant uncertain events which a decision maker would have to take into account when selecting between different strategies. In economic theory, non-knowledge of the likelihood of uncertain events at the initial decision stage of a static one-person, one-shot decision problem is the crucial feature. A different way to account for the limitations of a decision maker’s knowledge of future contingencies was the development of non-probabilistic concepts, for example, fuzzy logic and possibility theory. It is important to properly understand what it means to know states, actions and consequences, to be aware or unaware of them.

@incollection{smithson_ignorance_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Ignorance {Studies}: {State} of the {Art}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance {Studies}},
	abstract = {The 2015 publication of the first edition of this Handbook marked the culmination across several disciplines of a growing interest in ignorance as a topic for theorizing and empirical investigation. This coda to the second Handbook edition presents an assessment of the state of the art. Several indicators suggest that the Handbook has increased scholarly interest in ignorance. Indeed, since 2015, at least 17 books focusing on ignorance have appeared, expanding the study of ignorance in law, politics, science and technology, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, and economics. Accordingly, this chapter briefly surveys these recent books and their connections with the first and second Handbook editions. It concludes by focusing on two issues meriting further attention: Integrating accounts of ignorance across disciplines, and rebalancing negative and positive views of ignorance in disciplines where a negative view still is dominant.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Smithson, Michael},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

The 2015 publication of the first edition of this Handbook marked the culmination across several disciplines of a growing interest in ignorance as a topic for theorizing and empirical investigation. This coda to the second Handbook edition presents an assessment of the state of the art. Several indicators suggest that the Handbook has increased scholarly interest in ignorance. Indeed, since 2015, at least 17 books focusing on ignorance have appeared, expanding the study of ignorance in law, politics, science and technology, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, and economics. Accordingly, this chapter briefly surveys these recent books and their connections with the first and second Handbook editions. It concludes by focusing on two issues meriting further attention: Integrating accounts of ignorance across disciplines, and rebalancing negative and positive views of ignorance in disciplines where a negative view still is dominant.

@incollection{werner_institutions_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Institutions as {Cognitive} {Niches}: {A} {Dynamic} of {Knowledge} and {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	shorttitle = {Institutions as {Cognitive} {Niches}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_8},
	abstract = {Institutions have become fashionable. There is a growing field of institutional economics, as well as more abstract studies of institutions undertaken by socio-ontology. People have also recognized a morally troubling side of institutions, having to do with institutionalized (or systemic) racism or inequality. Two accounts of institutions are usually distinguished in the literature: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria. I am not about to argue that these views are wrong, although I portray them as insufficient. Instead, institutions shall be characterized as products of certain situated, embodied cognitive endeavors – as cognitive niches. The latter’s purpose is to ease some aspects of our cognitive functioning, but first of all to render the world around us cognitively available. The role of ignorance as a constitutive ingredient of the cognitive niche is elicited, with references to relevant literature. I propose that within cognitive niches, ignorance has a somewhat paradoxical role of producing practical knowledge. With the latter in mind, I argue that institutions, conceived of as cognitive niches, also bring forth such knowledge-from-ignorance compounds at a higher level of social complexity, based on certain patterns of behavior and fixed infrastructural factors. Finally, institutions differ in terms of how much they succeed or fail in the task of making certain entities available as goods.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Werner, Konrad},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_8},
	keywords = {Cognitive niche, Ignorance, Institution, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Socio-ontology},
	pages = {161--189},
}

Institutions have become fashionable. There is a growing field of institutional economics, as well as more abstract studies of institutions undertaken by socio-ontology. People have also recognized a morally troubling side of institutions, having to do with institutionalized (or systemic) racism or inequality. Two accounts of institutions are usually distinguished in the literature: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria. I am not about to argue that these views are wrong, although I portray them as insufficient. Instead, institutions shall be characterized as products of certain situated, embodied cognitive endeavors – as cognitive niches. The latter’s purpose is to ease some aspects of our cognitive functioning, but first of all to render the world around us cognitively available. The role of ignorance as a constitutive ingredient of the cognitive niche is elicited, with references to relevant literature. I propose that within cognitive niches, ignorance has a somewhat paradoxical role of producing practical knowledge. With the latter in mind, I argue that institutions, conceived of as cognitive niches, also bring forth such knowledge-from-ignorance compounds at a higher level of social complexity, based on certain patterns of behavior and fixed infrastructural factors. Finally, institutions differ in terms of how much they succeed or fail in the task of making certain entities available as goods.

@incollection{ross_creative_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Creative {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_3},
	abstract = {Much research in creativity proceeds from the hylomorphic model, that is the notion that the creator imposes a preconceived form on inert matter and a detailed plan is followed. In such a model, the unknowability of material engagement is erased to the extent that the creative process is often reduced to the genesis of the creative plan, the spark of insight as it were. This model is being increasingly questioned and there is a steadily growing research literature demonstrating how engagement with an uncertain material and socially rich world shapes and forms cognitive processes and that rather than a linear and rational model, there is a deep knowing-through-doing at the heart of creative thinking. This chapter extends this literature in two complementary ways. First, I shall discuss how material objects in the world serve to scaffold our understanding precisely by revealing our underlying ignorance, an ignorance that cannot be revealed apart from through engagement with the world. This engagement leads to knowing and understanding which reverses the traditional direction of knowledge. I will suggest that this unknowing through doing marks both scientific and artistic creative thinking even if it is often erased in the former. Second, I will make the stronger claim that in the case of artistic creativity, the ignorance which the process of material engagement inspires in the artist is both generative and necessary and, further, constitutes the heart of the creative act.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Ross, Wendy},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_3},
	keywords = {Creative ignorance, Creativity, Insight, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Unknowing through doing},
	pages = {37--57},
}

Much research in creativity proceeds from the hylomorphic model, that is the notion that the creator imposes a preconceived form on inert matter and a detailed plan is followed. In such a model, the unknowability of material engagement is erased to the extent that the creative process is often reduced to the genesis of the creative plan, the spark of insight as it were. This model is being increasingly questioned and there is a steadily growing research literature demonstrating how engagement with an uncertain material and socially rich world shapes and forms cognitive processes and that rather than a linear and rational model, there is a deep knowing-through-doing at the heart of creative thinking. This chapter extends this literature in two complementary ways. First, I shall discuss how material objects in the world serve to scaffold our understanding precisely by revealing our underlying ignorance, an ignorance that cannot be revealed apart from through engagement with the world. This engagement leads to knowing and understanding which reverses the traditional direction of knowledge. I will suggest that this unknowing through doing marks both scientific and artistic creative thinking even if it is often erased in the former. Second, I will make the stronger claim that in the case of artistic creativity, the ignorance which the process of material engagement inspires in the artist is both generative and necessary and, further, constitutes the heart of the creative act.

@incollection{pritchard_extended_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Extended {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_4},
	abstract = {According to extended cognition, a subject’s biological cognitive processes can become integrated with features of the subject’s cognitive environment (and thereby “extended”), such as technology. When such extended cognitive processes lead to knowledge, the knowledge that results is extended knowledge. This chapter explores how the phenomenon of extended cognition relates to the epistemology of ignorance. In particular, our concern will be with not only forms of extended cognition that are epistemically problematic (and which one might be expected to have negative epistemic ramifications) but also forms of extended cognition that are generally epistemically sound. As we will see, some prima facie plausible arguments for how extended cognition might lead to ignorance are not compelling on closer inspection. In addition, some other ways in which extended cognition might lead to ignorance depend on the account of ignorance that one endorses, and in particular whether one opts for a normative or nonnormative account of ignorance.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Pritchard, Duncan},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_4},
	keywords = {Epistemology, Extended Cognition, Extended Epistemology, Ignorance, Knowledge, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {59--75},
}

According to extended cognition, a subject’s biological cognitive processes can become integrated with features of the subject’s cognitive environment (and thereby “extended”), such as technology. When such extended cognitive processes lead to knowledge, the knowledge that results is extended knowledge. This chapter explores how the phenomenon of extended cognition relates to the epistemology of ignorance. In particular, our concern will be with not only forms of extended cognition that are epistemically problematic (and which one might be expected to have negative epistemic ramifications) but also forms of extended cognition that are generally epistemically sound. As we will see, some prima facie plausible arguments for how extended cognition might lead to ignorance are not compelling on closer inspection. In addition, some other ways in which extended cognition might lead to ignorance depend on the account of ignorance that one endorses, and in particular whether one opts for a normative or nonnormative account of ignorance.

@incollection{sans_pinillos_how_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {How {Do} {We} {Think} about the {Unknown}? {The} {Self}-{Awareness} of {Ignorance} as a {Tool} for {Managing} the {Anguish} of {Not} {Knowing}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	shorttitle = {How {Do} {We} {Think} about the {Unknown}?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_9},
	abstract = {This chapter offers a revision of the concept of ignorance discussed in recent models of abduction. Both ignorance preservation (GW-schema) and the tentative explanationism (AKM-schema) will be reanalyzed from an ecological and distributed perspective on cognition, instead coherent with the so-called EC-Model of abduction. We are convinced that a successful revision of the notion of ignorance in both AKM-schema and GW-schema of abduction can be exactly realized thanks to the EC-model. These theories present ignorance as an absence that occurs when the agents cannot reach useful explanations of a phenomenon in their epistemic environment. This absence surprises them, and this emotion triggers agents’ abductive reasoning, which, in turn, mitigates their ignorance. Abduction offers the agents a guessed “provisional” hypothesis capable to solve the ignorance-problem. However, both the state of being ignorant of something and the mitigation of not-knowing are complex processes. If we describe the agents as parts of cognitive systems, we can see them as engaged with the so-called affordances, which always provide qualitative and procedural information capable to help and trigger abductive inferential processes. We will argue that when a possible relation with the fact, which is investigated is unknown, and so affordances are absent – and consequently “unknown” – the lack of available knowledge is absolute. When this happens, the agent is compelled to abduce from an unknown affordance: In this case, it is the agents’ self-awareness of their ignorance that plays a role of a helpful tool. The reached full self-awareness of the complete ignorance at stake triggers unusual chances that favor exceptional abductive inferential processes capable to manage the cognitive situation. At the same time, the agent may experience these cases characterized by unknown affordances with a high degree of anguish. Indeed, the hypothesis will be more strongly supported by the motivation and will of the agent than by the cognitive role played by commonly accepted data and will be formed by unusual intuitions and data considered strange or exceptional. We will illustrate that in these cases, the management of anxiety – and control of it – is committed to general principles of research integrity related to the role of cognizant’s responsibility for his own actions.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Sans Pinillos, Alger and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_9},
	keywords = {Abductive reasoning, Anguish, Continuous trigger, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Self-awareness of ignorance, Unknown affordance},
	pages = {191--207},
}

This chapter offers a revision of the concept of ignorance discussed in recent models of abduction. Both ignorance preservation (GW-schema) and the tentative explanationism (AKM-schema) will be reanalyzed from an ecological and distributed perspective on cognition, instead coherent with the so-called EC-Model of abduction. We are convinced that a successful revision of the notion of ignorance in both AKM-schema and GW-schema of abduction can be exactly realized thanks to the EC-model. These theories present ignorance as an absence that occurs when the agents cannot reach useful explanations of a phenomenon in their epistemic environment. This absence surprises them, and this emotion triggers agents’ abductive reasoning, which, in turn, mitigates their ignorance. Abduction offers the agents a guessed “provisional” hypothesis capable to solve the ignorance-problem. However, both the state of being ignorant of something and the mitigation of not-knowing are complex processes. If we describe the agents as parts of cognitive systems, we can see them as engaged with the so-called affordances, which always provide qualitative and procedural information capable to help and trigger abductive inferential processes. We will argue that when a possible relation with the fact, which is investigated is unknown, and so affordances are absent – and consequently “unknown” – the lack of available knowledge is absolute. When this happens, the agent is compelled to abduce from an unknown affordance: In this case, it is the agents’ self-awareness of their ignorance that plays a role of a helpful tool. The reached full self-awareness of the complete ignorance at stake triggers unusual chances that favor exceptional abductive inferential processes capable to manage the cognitive situation. At the same time, the agent may experience these cases characterized by unknown affordances with a high degree of anguish. Indeed, the hypothesis will be more strongly supported by the motivation and will of the agent than by the cognitive role played by commonly accepted data and will be formed by unusual intuitions and data considered strange or exceptional. We will illustrate that in these cases, the management of anxiety – and control of it – is committed to general principles of research integrity related to the role of cognizant’s responsibility for his own actions.

@incollection{maiese_mindshaping_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Mindshaping, {Racist} {Habits}, and {White} {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_5},
	abstract = {Theorists such as Charles Mills have argued that racism and white supremacy are pernicious, in part, because they result in an “epistemology of ignorance” whereby white people come to know the world in systematically distorted ways. Drawing upon insights from the enactivist approach and associated notions of habit and mindshaping, I argue that so-called white ignorance is the result of overdetermining social influences that frequently operate covertly and lead to inflexible habits of mind. These socially inculcated habits make it difficult for individuals to attend to relevant considerations, form accurate interpretations, or revise their beliefs in response to new evidence. But in addition, white subjects actively, though not necessarily self-consciously or intentionally, maintain their ignorance and investment in whiteness in order to hold on to racial privilege, preserve their self-image, and avoid painful confrontations. In my view, an enactivist account of mindshaping and habit can help us to make sense of how subjects are both molded by their social environment, and also play an active role in enacting and reproducing oppressive patterns of cognitive and practical engagement.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Maiese, Michelle},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_5},
	keywords = {Enactivism, Habit, Mindshaping, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), White ignorance, White supremacy},
	pages = {77--98},
}

Theorists such as Charles Mills have argued that racism and white supremacy are pernicious, in part, because they result in an “epistemology of ignorance” whereby white people come to know the world in systematically distorted ways. Drawing upon insights from the enactivist approach and associated notions of habit and mindshaping, I argue that so-called white ignorance is the result of overdetermining social influences that frequently operate covertly and lead to inflexible habits of mind. These socially inculcated habits make it difficult for individuals to attend to relevant considerations, form accurate interpretations, or revise their beliefs in response to new evidence. But in addition, white subjects actively, though not necessarily self-consciously or intentionally, maintain their ignorance and investment in whiteness in order to hold on to racial privilege, preserve their self-image, and avoid painful confrontations. In my view, an enactivist account of mindshaping and habit can help us to make sense of how subjects are both molded by their social environment, and also play an active role in enacting and reproducing oppressive patterns of cognitive and practical engagement.

@incollection{glaveanu_ignorance_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Ignorance and ({Im}){Possibility}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_6},
	abstract = {This chapter is dedicated to an exploration of the connections between ignorance, possibility, and impossibility. While traditionally studies of ignorance have been firmly anchored in debates about knowledge (and the lack of knowledge), what I propose here is that this phenomenon is (also) essential for our engagement with the possible. The sociocultural theory of the possible claims that possibility emerges at the intersection between multiple perspectives that, in turn, build on differences of position within a shared social, material, cultural, and psychological space. Conversely, the impossible is concerned less with what cannot be actualized as much as with the singularity of perspectives and the negation of difference. The argument I develop is that ignorance plays a key role in both the dynamic of possibility and impossibility. More concretely, ignorance can keep us away from recognizing and embracing other perspectives, while it can also make us humble and curious about those perspectives and positions in the world that are inaccessible to us. I will take the case of the perspective of others, especially migrants and refugees, to illustrate a small typology including: default ignorance or the state of not being aware, on a daily basis, of perspectives different than our own; deliberate ignorance or the conscious decision not to engage with the perspective of specific others; masked ignorance or the assumption of understanding a perspective one has no understanding of; and wondrous ignorance or a state of complete openness to new perspective without the expectation of final or certain knowledge. In the end, the embodied and distributed nature of each of these forms of ignorance will be discussed in light of how they contribute to the (im)possibility of an authentic engagement with others and otherness.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Glăveanu, Vlad P.},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_6},
	keywords = {Ignorance, Impossibility, Migration, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Perspective, Position, Possibility, Wonder},
	pages = {99--118},
}

This chapter is dedicated to an exploration of the connections between ignorance, possibility, and impossibility. While traditionally studies of ignorance have been firmly anchored in debates about knowledge (and the lack of knowledge), what I propose here is that this phenomenon is (also) essential for our engagement with the possible. The sociocultural theory of the possible claims that possibility emerges at the intersection between multiple perspectives that, in turn, build on differences of position within a shared social, material, cultural, and psychological space. Conversely, the impossible is concerned less with what cannot be actualized as much as with the singularity of perspectives and the negation of difference. The argument I develop is that ignorance plays a key role in both the dynamic of possibility and impossibility. More concretely, ignorance can keep us away from recognizing and embracing other perspectives, while it can also make us humble and curious about those perspectives and positions in the world that are inaccessible to us. I will take the case of the perspective of others, especially migrants and refugees, to illustrate a small typology including: default ignorance or the state of not being aware, on a daily basis, of perspectives different than our own; deliberate ignorance or the conscious decision not to engage with the perspective of specific others; masked ignorance or the assumption of understanding a perspective one has no understanding of; and wondrous ignorance or a state of complete openness to new perspective without the expectation of final or certain knowledge. In the end, the embodied and distributed nature of each of these forms of ignorance will be discussed in light of how they contribute to the (im)possibility of an authentic engagement with others and otherness.

@incollection{copeland_relational_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Relational {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_2},
	abstract = {This chapter explores ignorance that relates to our ability to fully understand our own role in an epistemic community, specifically in relation to the roles of others. It is an explicitly social approach to ignorance, to the ignorance that shapes our relationships with others, and constrains our ability to know, requiring us to trust. This ignorance is embodied within our relations with one another as epistemic agents; it exists in the space between. Focussing in particular on the ways we regularly extend our cognition by depending on others (or on our tools) to perform steps in our cognitive labour on our behalf, I use an account from relational autonomy theory in feminist bioethics to examine the importance of reliability and its complements, trust and self-trust in these relationships. Further, I look to how such relationships can either cultivate or hinder our epistemic agency and the agency of others, particularly in contexts where there is potential for oppression or collaboration, exploitation or intimacy.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Copeland, Samantha},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_2},
	keywords = {Epistemic exploitation, Epistemic interdependence, Extended mind, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Relationality},
	pages = {15--35},
}

This chapter explores ignorance that relates to our ability to fully understand our own role in an epistemic community, specifically in relation to the roles of others. It is an explicitly social approach to ignorance, to the ignorance that shapes our relationships with others, and constrains our ability to know, requiring us to trust. This ignorance is embodied within our relations with one another as epistemic agents; it exists in the space between. Focussing in particular on the ways we regularly extend our cognition by depending on others (or on our tools) to perform steps in our cognitive labour on our behalf, I use an account from relational autonomy theory in feminist bioethics to examine the importance of reliability and its complements, trust and self-trust in these relationships. Further, I look to how such relationships can either cultivate or hinder our epistemic agency and the agency of others, particularly in contexts where there is potential for oppression or collaboration, exploitation or intimacy.

@incollection{arfini_introduction_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Introduction: {Externalist} {Perspectives} on {Ignorance} and {Cognition}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	shorttitle = {Introduction},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_1},
	abstract = {The externalist currents in cognitive science have overturned different assumptions regarding how our cognition works: disembodiment, computationalism, and representationalism have been dethroned as untouchable premises and openly discussed from both ontological and epistemological perspectives. To be sure, different good old-fashioned concepts such as knowledge, information, and belief have been adapted to resonate in embodied, extended, and distributed perspectives on cognition. Ignorance, conversely, still needs to be adequately addressed in this new light. This volume aims at rethinking the analysis of ignorance, viewing it through the lens of an externalist take on cognition. To do so, authors working from different disciplines and perspectives discuss the features, definitions, and instances of ignorance, considering its role in the agents’ embodied, extended, and distributed cognitive states and processes. Given this approach’s novelty and complexity, this introductory chapter provides a preliminary discussion regarding the current research in Ignorance Studies and how the investigation of ignorance can open further lines of research in different externalist approaches. This chapter also briefly introduces the other contributors’ work and establishes an encompassing perspective on the volume’s content.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_1},
	keywords = {Distributed cognition, Embodied cognition, Enactivism, Extended mind, Ignorance, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {1--13},
}

The externalist currents in cognitive science have overturned different assumptions regarding how our cognition works: disembodiment, computationalism, and representationalism have been dethroned as untouchable premises and openly discussed from both ontological and epistemological perspectives. To be sure, different good old-fashioned concepts such as knowledge, information, and belief have been adapted to resonate in embodied, extended, and distributed perspectives on cognition. Ignorance, conversely, still needs to be adequately addressed in this new light. This volume aims at rethinking the analysis of ignorance, viewing it through the lens of an externalist take on cognition. To do so, authors working from different disciplines and perspectives discuss the features, definitions, and instances of ignorance, considering its role in the agents’ embodied, extended, and distributed cognitive states and processes. Given this approach’s novelty and complexity, this introductory chapter provides a preliminary discussion regarding the current research in Ignorance Studies and how the investigation of ignorance can open further lines of research in different externalist approaches. This chapter also briefly introduces the other contributors’ work and establishes an encompassing perspective on the volume’s content.

@incollection{arfini_how_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {How {Do} {We} {Become} {Ignorant}? {Affording} {Ignorance} {Through} {Epistemic} {Actions}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	shorttitle = {How {Do} {We} {Become} {Ignorant}?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_10},
	abstract = {Which cognitive processes allow us to become ignorant of something? In this chapter, I will discuss “to-ignorance processes” – which I will describe as processes that allow people to shift from a state of partial knowledge or unaware ignorance to another state of ignorance (of which they could be aware or not). I will argue that these processes affect how cognitive agents encounter new information and may in part explain some pressing socio-epistemological issues, such as the fake news problem. In the first section, I will describe some to-ignorance processes that commonly occur in people’s ordinary life. In the following section, I will focus on how people can become misinformed online by discussing what both “true” and “fake” news have in common, which is the fact that they present action-suggesting qualities to users, or affordances. The third section will be dedicated to how we should describe these affordances and which kinds of actions they offer to users online. In the fourth section, I will specifically discuss the action-based relations between agents and the information offered online and I will argue that some epistemic actions imply the explicit or implicit engagement to one’s ignorance. Finally, in the fifth section, I will return to the idea that to-ignorance processes affect how agents encounter information and I will argue that we should address and study to-ignorance processes to set up and manage rich environments in which people should have more opportunities to become curious and surprised than misinformed.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Arfini, Selene},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_10},
	keywords = {Affordance, Epistemic Action, Fake News, Ignorance Processes, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Pragmatic Action},
	pages = {209--230},
}

Which cognitive processes allow us to become ignorant of something? In this chapter, I will discuss “to-ignorance processes” – which I will describe as processes that allow people to shift from a state of partial knowledge or unaware ignorance to another state of ignorance (of which they could be aware or not). I will argue that these processes affect how cognitive agents encounter new information and may in part explain some pressing socio-epistemological issues, such as the fake news problem. In the first section, I will describe some to-ignorance processes that commonly occur in people’s ordinary life. In the following section, I will focus on how people can become misinformed online by discussing what both “true” and “fake” news have in common, which is the fact that they present action-suggesting qualities to users, or affordances. The third section will be dedicated to how we should describe these affordances and which kinds of actions they offer to users online. In the fourth section, I will specifically discuss the action-based relations between agents and the information offered online and I will argue that some epistemic actions imply the explicit or implicit engagement to one’s ignorance. Finally, in the fifth section, I will return to the idea that to-ignorance processes affect how agents encounter information and I will argue that we should address and study to-ignorance processes to set up and manage rich environments in which people should have more opportunities to become curious and surprised than misinformed.

@incollection{figa_talamanca_mind_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Mind {Invasion} {Through} {Cognitive} {Integration}: {Facebook} and the {Exploitation} of {Users}’ {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	shorttitle = {Mind {Invasion} {Through} {Cognitive} {Integration}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_7},
	abstract = {Our aim in this chapter is to analyze the conditions for exploitative practices online through the application of the theories of cognitive integration. In this case, we examine Facebook as a technology that, thanks to its high cognitive integrability, can foster and exploit the ignorance of users and be used to perpetrate epistemic injustice. Facebook enables other agents—the service providers—to place the platform’s users in a position of high vulnerability. They achieve this through manipulative design; they are able to remain hidden to users’ awareness while still being in a position of power towards those users. By examining the way the interface of this website integrates and accommodates certain cognitive practices, we will show how the reach of the online service provider goes further than we originally might have thought. The case of the Facebook Emotional Contagion Experiment is a prime example to illustrate the dangerous implications of this dynamic of not just cognitive integration, but covert mind invasion. In this experiment, Facebook manipulated the emotional state of their users through their Newsfeed, without their knowledge. Since social media can invade our mind, rather than just influence it, it is crucial that our relationship with them is well understood and safeguarded.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Figà Talamanca, Giacomo and Hunting, Elisabeth},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_7},
	keywords = {Cognitive integration, Facebook, Hermeneutical injustice, Mind invasion, OA, Online ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {119--160},
}

Our aim in this chapter is to analyze the conditions for exploitative practices online through the application of the theories of cognitive integration. In this case, we examine Facebook as a technology that, thanks to its high cognitive integrability, can foster and exploit the ignorance of users and be used to perpetrate epistemic injustice. Facebook enables other agents—the service providers—to place the platform’s users in a position of high vulnerability. They achieve this through manipulative design; they are able to remain hidden to users’ awareness while still being in a position of power towards those users. By examining the way the interface of this website integrates and accommodates certain cognitive practices, we will show how the reach of the online service provider goes further than we originally might have thought. The case of the Facebook Emotional Contagion Experiment is a prime example to illustrate the dangerous implications of this dynamic of not just cognitive integration, but covert mind invasion. In this experiment, Facebook manipulated the emotional state of their users through their Newsfeed, without their knowledge. Since social media can invade our mind, rather than just influence it, it is crucial that our relationship with them is well understood and safeguarded.

@book{arfini_embodied_2022,
	title = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	shorttitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}},
	abstract = {This book offers a new and externalist perspective in ignorance studies. Agnotology, the epistemology of ignorance, and, more generally, ignorance studies have grown to cover and explore different phenomena and subjects of research, from known events in history and sociology of science to the investigation of ordinary reasoning and cognitive processing. Nonetheless, although interested scholars have discussed ignorance phenomena and their impact on cognition, most of them have only adopted an internalist perspective to approach this theme. Meanwhile, even though externalist perspectives on cognition flourished in recent literature, authors have paid little attention to the emerging field of ignorance studies. Ignorance has been generally left out from the inquiries on the extension of cognitive states, cognitive processes, and predictive reasoning. Thus, in this volume, we seek to merge the two growing areas of research and to fill this research gap fruitfully. By addressing the uncomfortable themes that pertain to ignorance and related phenomena through an externalist perspective, this book aims to provide much food for thoughts to cognitive scientists and philosophers alike, enriching the current range and reach of both ignorance studies and externalist approaches to cognition.},
	language = {en},
	publisher = {Springer Nature},
	author = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	month = may,
	year = {2022},
	note = {Google-Books-ID: JwxxEAAAQBAJ},
	keywords = {OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Philosophy / Epistemology, Philosophy / General, Philosophy / Mind \& Body, Philosophy / Movements / General, Philosophy / Political, Philosophy / Reference, Psychology / Cognitive Psychology \& Cognition},
}

This book offers a new and externalist perspective in ignorance studies. Agnotology, the epistemology of ignorance, and, more generally, ignorance studies have grown to cover and explore different phenomena and subjects of research, from known events in history and sociology of science to the investigation of ordinary reasoning and cognitive processing. Nonetheless, although interested scholars have discussed ignorance phenomena and their impact on cognition, most of them have only adopted an internalist perspective to approach this theme. Meanwhile, even though externalist perspectives on cognition flourished in recent literature, authors have paid little attention to the emerging field of ignorance studies. Ignorance has been generally left out from the inquiries on the extension of cognitive states, cognitive processes, and predictive reasoning. Thus, in this volume, we seek to merge the two growing areas of research and to fill this research gap fruitfully. By addressing the uncomfortable themes that pertain to ignorance and related phenomena through an externalist perspective, this book aims to provide much food for thoughts to cognitive scientists and philosophers alike, enriching the current range and reach of both ignorance studies and externalist approaches to cognition.

@article{bourgatte_trumpisation_2022,
	title = {La trumpisation du monde. {Pourquoi} le monde adore {Trump}, y compris ceux qui le détestent. {Olivier} {Fournout}, {Lormont}, {Le} {Bord} de l’{Eau}, 2020.},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	shorttitle = {La trumpisation du monde. {Pourquoi} le monde adore {Trump}, y compris ceux qui le détestent},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-165.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0165},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Bourgatte, Michaël},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {165--166},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{verdier_coupe_2022,
	title = {La coupe jusqu’à la lie. Être une femme dans les fictions télévisuelles traitant de la vigne et du vin},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-143.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0143},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Verdier, Benoît and Cailloux, Marianne},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {143--161},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{pene_les_2022,
	title = {Les théories de la surveillance. {Du} panoptique aux {Surveillance} {Studies}. {Olivier} {Aïm}, {Paris}, {Armand} {Colin}, 2020, 247 p.},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	shorttitle = {Les théories de la surveillance. {Du} panoptique aux {Surveillance} {Studies}},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-163.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0163},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-11-16},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Pène, Sophie},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {163--165},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{valdivia_neither_2022,
	title = {Neither opaque nor transparent: {A} transdisciplinary methodology to investigate datafication at the {EU} borders},
	volume = {9},
	issn = {2053-9517},
	shorttitle = {Neither opaque nor transparent},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517221124586},
	doi = {10.1177/20539517221124586},
	abstract = {In 2020, the European Union announced the award of the contract for the biometric part of the new database for border control, the Entry Exit System, to two companies: IDEMIA and Sopra Steria. Both companies had been previously involved in the development of databases for border and migration management. While there has been a growing amount of publicly available documents that show what kind of technologies are being implemented, for how much money, and by whom, there has been limited engagement with digital methods in this field. Moreover, critical border and security scholarship has largely focused on qualitative and ethnographic methods. Building on a data feminist approach, we propose a transdisciplinary methodology that goes beyond binaries of qualitative/quantitative and opacity/transparency, examines power asymmetries and makes the labour of coding visible. Empirically, we build and analyse a dataset of the contracts awarded by two European Union agencies key to its border management policies ? the European Agency for Large-Scale Information Systems (eu-LISA) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). We supplement the digital analysis and visualisation of networks of companies with close reading of tender documents. In so doing, we show how a transdisciplinary methodology can be a device for making datafication ?intelligible? at the European Union borders.},
	language = {en},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2022-11-17},
	journal = {Big Data \& Society},
	author = {Valdivia, Ana and Aradau, Claudia and Blanke, Tobias and Perret, Sarah},
	month = jul,
	year = {2022},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {20539517221124586},
}

In 2020, the European Union announced the award of the contract for the biometric part of the new database for border control, the Entry Exit System, to two companies: IDEMIA and Sopra Steria. Both companies had been previously involved in the development of databases for border and migration management. While there has been a growing amount of publicly available documents that show what kind of technologies are being implemented, for how much money, and by whom, there has been limited engagement with digital methods in this field. Moreover, critical border and security scholarship has largely focused on qualitative and ethnographic methods. Building on a data feminist approach, we propose a transdisciplinary methodology that goes beyond binaries of qualitative/quantitative and opacity/transparency, examines power asymmetries and makes the labour of coding visible. Empirically, we build and analyse a dataset of the contracts awarded by two European Union agencies key to its border management policies ? the European Agency for Large-Scale Information Systems (eu-LISA) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). We supplement the digital analysis and visualisation of networks of companies with close reading of tender documents. In so doing, we show how a transdisciplinary methodology can be a device for making datafication ?intelligible? at the European Union borders.

@article{girel_pragmatisme_2022,
	title = {Le pragmatisme au défi des études sur l’ignorance},
	volume = {214},
	issn = {0336-1500},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-communication-et-langages-2022-4-page-33.htm},
	doi = {10.3917/comla1.214.0033},
	abstract = {Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?},
	language = {fr},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-08-22},
	journal = {Communication \& langages},
	author = {Girel, Mathias},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Place: Paris cedex 14
Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France},
	keywords = {Agnotologie, Dewey, Externalisme, Fait/Valeur (Opposition), Ignorance, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Peirce, Sémantique, Théories de l’enquête},
	pages = {33--51},
}

Si la thématique des « fabriques de l’ignorance » touche de nombreux domaines, nous proposons ici de centrer l’analyse sur les pratiques actuelles de la recherche ainsi que sur les formes et les dynamiques communicationnelles et médiatiques qui conditionnent la visibilité de certains savoirs dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Ce dossier invite donc à penser divers processus, inscrits (et parfois masqués eux-mêmes) aussi bien dans nos pratiques de recherche et dans les objets que nous observons, que dans le tissu des médiations qui relient ou séparent les espaces sociaux de la production, de la mise en circulation, de la hiérarchisation, et du cadrage des productions issues des métiers de l’enquête. Comment, en effet, nos propres pratiques de recherche sont-elles parfois prises dans les points aveugles des objets ou des phénomènes qu’elles tentent d’observer ou de comprendre ? Et comment les médiatisations de controverses scientifiques ou politiques et sociales participent-elles à un effacement de certains enjeux, de certains savoirs, alors que paradoxalement les médias produisent des discours au nom d’une exigence informative, voire même d’une prétention à lutter contre l’ignorance ?

@article{mills_ignorance_2022,
	title = {L'ignorance blanche},
	volume = {1},
	copyright = {(c) Tous droits réservés Charles W. Mills; Solène Brun, Claire Cosquer 2022},
	url = {https://www.marronnages.org/index.php/revue/article/view/11},
	doi = {10.5281/zenodo.7620865},
	abstract = {White ignorance
\ },
	language = {fr},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2023-10-04},
	journal = {Marronnages: les questions raciales au crible des sciences sociales},
	author = {Mills, Charles W. and Brun, Solène and Cosquer, Claire},
	month = nov,
	year = {2022},
	note = {Number: 1},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), ignorance blanche},
	pages = {96--116},
}

White ignorance  

@article{aradau_politics_2022,
	title = {The politics of (non-)knowledge at {Europe}'s borders: {Errors}, fakes, and subjectivity},
	volume = {48},
	issn = {0260-2105, 1469-9044},
	shorttitle = {The politics of (non-)knowledge at {Europe}'s borders},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/politics-of-nonknowledge-at-europes-borders-errors-fakes-and-subjectivity/C3B0967C47082157EED1569DFEEB64E1},
	doi = {10.1017/S0260210522000080},
	abstract = {From statistical calculations to psychological knowledge, from profiling to scenario planning, and from biometric data to predictive algorithms, International Relations scholars have shed light on the multiple forms of knowledge deployed in the governing of populations and their political effects. Recent scholarship in critical border and security studies has drawn attention to ‘the other side of knowledge’ and has developed a vibrant conversation with the emergent interdisciplinary field of ignorance studies. This article proposes to advance these conversations on governing through non-knowledge by nuancing the analysis of power/(non-)knowledge/subjectivity relations. Firstly, we expand the analysis of non-knowledge by attending to the problematisation of errors and fakes in controversies at Europe's borders. Errors have emerged in relation to border actors’ practices and technologies, while migrant practices, documentation, and narratives are deemed to be potentially ‘fake’, ‘fraudulent’, or ‘false’. Secondly, we explore how different subjectivities are produced through regimes of error/truth and fake/authenticity. We argue that there are important epistemic differences between ‘fake’ and ‘error’, that they are entangled with different techniques of power and produce highly differentiated subjectivities. Finally, we attend to how these subjectivities are enacted within racialised hierarchies and ask whether non-knowledge can be mobilised to challenge these hierarchies.},
	language = {en},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2022-11-21},
	journal = {Review of International Studies},
	author = {Aradau, Claudia and Perret, Sarah},
	month = jul,
	year = {2022},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
	keywords = {Asylum, Borders, Ignorance Studies, Non-Knowledge, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Power/Knowledge},
	pages = {405--424},
}

From statistical calculations to psychological knowledge, from profiling to scenario planning, and from biometric data to predictive algorithms, International Relations scholars have shed light on the multiple forms of knowledge deployed in the governing of populations and their political effects. Recent scholarship in critical border and security studies has drawn attention to ‘the other side of knowledge’ and has developed a vibrant conversation with the emergent interdisciplinary field of ignorance studies. This article proposes to advance these conversations on governing through non-knowledge by nuancing the analysis of power/(non-)knowledge/subjectivity relations. Firstly, we expand the analysis of non-knowledge by attending to the problematisation of errors and fakes in controversies at Europe's borders. Errors have emerged in relation to border actors’ practices and technologies, while migrant practices, documentation, and narratives are deemed to be potentially ‘fake’, ‘fraudulent’, or ‘false’. Secondly, we explore how different subjectivities are produced through regimes of error/truth and fake/authenticity. We argue that there are important epistemic differences between ‘fake’ and ‘error’, that they are entangled with different techniques of power and produce highly differentiated subjectivities. Finally, we attend to how these subjectivities are enacted within racialised hierarchies and ask whether non-knowledge can be mobilised to challenge these hierarchies.

@article{garcia-portela_backward-looking_2022,
	title = {Backward-{Looking} {Principles} of {Climate} {Justice}: {The} {Unjustified} {Move} from the {Polluter} {Pays} {Principle} to the {Beneficiary} {Pays} {Principle}},
	issn = {1572-8692},
	shorttitle = {Backward-{Looking} {Principles} of {Climate} {Justice}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-022-09569-w},
	doi = {10.1007/s11158-022-09569-w},
	abstract = {Climate change involves changes in the climate system caused by polluting human activities and the social and natural effects of these changes. The historical and anthropogenic grounds of climate change play an important role in climate justice claims. Many climate justice scholars believe that principles of climate justice should account for the historical and anthropogenic sources of climate change. Two main backward-looking principles have been proposed: the polluter pays principle (PPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). The BPP emerged in the literature on climate justice in response to certain objections raised against the PPP. In this paper, I focus on two of these objections: the causation objection and the excusable ignorance objection. Defenders of the BPP have traditionally assumed that this principle is not vulnerable to those objections, which renders the BPP superior to the PPP. In this paper, I challenge this underlying assumption. My argument here is simple: moving from the PPP to the BPP in response to any of these objections might be unjustified because the BPP is affected by at least some of the considerations giving rise to these objections.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-02-03},
	journal = {Res Publica},
	author = {García-Portela, Laura},
	month = nov,
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Beneficiary pays principle, Causation, Climate justice, Excusable ignorance, Fairness, Legitimate expectations, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Polluter pays principle},
}

Climate change involves changes in the climate system caused by polluting human activities and the social and natural effects of these changes. The historical and anthropogenic grounds of climate change play an important role in climate justice claims. Many climate justice scholars believe that principles of climate justice should account for the historical and anthropogenic sources of climate change. Two main backward-looking principles have been proposed: the polluter pays principle (PPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). The BPP emerged in the literature on climate justice in response to certain objections raised against the PPP. In this paper, I focus on two of these objections: the causation objection and the excusable ignorance objection. Defenders of the BPP have traditionally assumed that this principle is not vulnerable to those objections, which renders the BPP superior to the PPP. In this paper, I challenge this underlying assumption. My argument here is simple: moving from the PPP to the BPP in response to any of these objections might be unjustified because the BPP is affected by at least some of the considerations giving rise to these objections.

@article{low_undone_2022,
	title = {Undone science in climate interventions: {Contrasting} and contesting anticipatory assessments by expert networks},
	volume = {137},
	issn = {1462-9011},
	shorttitle = {Undone science in climate interventions},
	doi = {10.1016/j.envsci.2022.08.026},
	abstract = {In global climate governance, anticipatory assessments map future options and pathways, in light of prospective risks and uncertainties, to inform present-day planning. Using data from 125 interviews, we ask: How are foundational experts contesting the conduct of anticipatory assessment of carbon removal and solar geoengineering – as two emerging but controversial strategies for engaging with climate change and achieving Net Zero targets? We find that efforts at carbon removal and solar geoengineering assessment leverage and challenge systems modeling that has become dominant in mapping and communicating future climate impacts and mitigation strategies via IPCC reports. Both suites of climate intervention have become stress-tests for the capacity of modeling to assess socio-technical strategies with complex, systemic dimensions. Meanwhile, exploring societal dimensions demands new modes of disciplinary expertise, qualitative and deliberative practices, and stakeholder inclusion that modelling processes struggle to incorporate. Finally, we discuss how the patterns of expert contestation identified in our results speak to multiple fault-lines within ongoing debates on reforming global environmental assessments, and highlights key open questions to be addressed. © 2022 The Authors},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Environmental Science and Policy},
	author = {Low, S. and Baum, C.M. and Sovacool, B.K.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {7 Ignorance and Undone Science, Anticipation, Carbon removal, Climate assessment, Global environmental assessment, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Solar geoengineering, Systems modeling},
	pages = {249--270},
}

In global climate governance, anticipatory assessments map future options and pathways, in light of prospective risks and uncertainties, to inform present-day planning. Using data from 125 interviews, we ask: How are foundational experts contesting the conduct of anticipatory assessment of carbon removal and solar geoengineering – as two emerging but controversial strategies for engaging with climate change and achieving Net Zero targets? We find that efforts at carbon removal and solar geoengineering assessment leverage and challenge systems modeling that has become dominant in mapping and communicating future climate impacts and mitigation strategies via IPCC reports. Both suites of climate intervention have become stress-tests for the capacity of modeling to assess socio-technical strategies with complex, systemic dimensions. Meanwhile, exploring societal dimensions demands new modes of disciplinary expertise, qualitative and deliberative practices, and stakeholder inclusion that modelling processes struggle to incorporate. Finally, we discuss how the patterns of expert contestation identified in our results speak to multiple fault-lines within ongoing debates on reforming global environmental assessments, and highlights key open questions to be addressed. © 2022 The Authors

@article{le_morvan_ignorance_2022,
	title = {Ignorance, truth, and falsehood},
	volume = {35},
	doi = {10.1111/rati.12341},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Ratio},
	author = {Le Morvan, Pierre},
	month = sep,
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {169--180},
}

@article{meylan_defence_2022,
	title = {In {Defence} of the {Normative} {Account} of {Ignorance}},
	volume = {89},
	doi = {10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7},
	abstract = {The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Erkenntnis},
	author = {Meylan, Anne},
	month = jun,
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {207--221},
}

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.

@book{boudia_politiques_2022,
	address = {Paris},
	title = {Politiques de l'ignorance},
	isbn = {978-2-13-083389-5},
	language = {Français},
	publisher = {PUF},
	editor = {Boudia, Soraya and Henry, Emmanuel},
	month = mar,
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

@article{maffi_production_2022,
	title = {The production of ignorance about medication abortion in {Tunisia}: between state policies, medical opposition, patriarchal logics and {Islamic} revival},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {2405-6618},
	shorttitle = {The production of ignorance about medication abortion in {Tunisia}},
	doi = {10.1016/j.rbms.2021.11.001},
	abstract = {In Tunisia, medication abortion has been available in government reproductive and sexual health clinics since the early 2000s. Since its introduction, it has rapidly replaced the surgical method, and between 75\% and 80\% of abortions in the public sector were performed using the pharmacological protocol in 2016. In this article, I intend to discuss the various forms of ignorance about medication abortion that exist in Tunisia among several categories of actors in relation to the legal, medical and religious domains. I explore how the existing ‘varieties of ignorance’ are related to the specific political, social and economic positions of the involved actors, the dominant gender regime, specific institutional policies and economic interests. I also investigate how some forms of ignorance are wilfully produced by institutions and individuals, whereas others are the result of positionality or organizational features. I first describe when and how medication abortion was introduced in Tunisia and the forms of resistance it elicited; later, I examine the production of ignorance about this technology after the revolution of 2011. I mainly consider practices and discourses of health professionals, but also those of women seeking abortion care in the public sector, and those of the activists of a Tunisian non-governmental organization operating in the domain of women's health and rights. © 2021 The Author(s)},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Reproductive Biomedicine and Society Online},
	author = {Maffi, I.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance, Ignorance, Law, Medication abortion, Opposition, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Tunisia},
	pages = {111--120},
}

In Tunisia, medication abortion has been available in government reproductive and sexual health clinics since the early 2000s. Since its introduction, it has rapidly replaced the surgical method, and between 75% and 80% of abortions in the public sector were performed using the pharmacological protocol in 2016. In this article, I intend to discuss the various forms of ignorance about medication abortion that exist in Tunisia among several categories of actors in relation to the legal, medical and religious domains. I explore how the existing ‘varieties of ignorance’ are related to the specific political, social and economic positions of the involved actors, the dominant gender regime, specific institutional policies and economic interests. I also investigate how some forms of ignorance are wilfully produced by institutions and individuals, whereas others are the result of positionality or organizational features. I first describe when and how medication abortion was introduced in Tunisia and the forms of resistance it elicited; later, I examine the production of ignorance about this technology after the revolution of 2011. I mainly consider practices and discourses of health professionals, but also those of women seeking abortion care in the public sector, and those of the activists of a Tunisian non-governmental organization operating in the domain of women's health and rights. © 2021 The Author(s)

@article{hudson_missed_2022,
	title = {The missed disease? {Endometriosis} as an example of ‘undone science’},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {2405-6618},
	shorttitle = {The missed disease?},
	doi = {10.1016/j.rbms.2021.07.003},
	abstract = {Endometriosis is a chronic gynaecological condition which has been referred to as the ‘missed disease’ due to its unclear aetiology and inconsistencies in its diagnosis and management. Unlike other long-term conditions such as diabetes and asthma, endometriosis has remained largely ignored in government policy and research funding globally. Drawing on scholarship from the growing field of ‘ignorance studies’, this paper considers how ambiguity around endometriosis is part of a wider constellation of discursive, material and political factors which enrol certain forms of knowledge whilst silencing, ignoring or marginalizing other forms of knowledge. It uses concepts of ‘undone science’ and ‘wilful ignorance’ to explore how an absence of knowledge on endometriosis is a result of structural, cultural and political processes and forces which privilege certain voices and communities. This paper suggests that the association of endometriosis with historically specific constructions of menstruation and women's pain has informed contemporary imaginaries around the condition, including ideas about women being somehow accountable for their own illnesses. Applying an ignorance lens demonstrates how the legacy of invisibility of endometriosis shapes its place in the present political and social arena, and is reflective of a process of undone science. The paper concludes by arguing that the social and political significance of endometriosis as a chronic, life-limiting condition which affects millions of women globally continues to need attention, illumination and critique. © 2021},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Reproductive Biomedicine and Society Online},
	author = {Hudson, N.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Disease classification, Endometriosis, Ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Pain},
	pages = {20--27},
}

Endometriosis is a chronic gynaecological condition which has been referred to as the ‘missed disease’ due to its unclear aetiology and inconsistencies in its diagnosis and management. Unlike other long-term conditions such as diabetes and asthma, endometriosis has remained largely ignored in government policy and research funding globally. Drawing on scholarship from the growing field of ‘ignorance studies’, this paper considers how ambiguity around endometriosis is part of a wider constellation of discursive, material and political factors which enrol certain forms of knowledge whilst silencing, ignoring or marginalizing other forms of knowledge. It uses concepts of ‘undone science’ and ‘wilful ignorance’ to explore how an absence of knowledge on endometriosis is a result of structural, cultural and political processes and forces which privilege certain voices and communities. This paper suggests that the association of endometriosis with historically specific constructions of menstruation and women's pain has informed contemporary imaginaries around the condition, including ideas about women being somehow accountable for their own illnesses. Applying an ignorance lens demonstrates how the legacy of invisibility of endometriosis shapes its place in the present political and social arena, and is reflective of a process of undone science. The paper concludes by arguing that the social and political significance of endometriosis as a chronic, life-limiting condition which affects millions of women globally continues to need attention, illumination and critique. © 2021

@article{herbrand_silences_2022,
	title = {Silences, omissions and oversimplification? {The} {UK} debate on mitochondrial donation},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {2405-6618},
	shorttitle = {Silences, omissions and oversimplification?},
	doi = {10.1016/j.rbms.2021.07.005},
	abstract = {Drawing on scholarship from ignorance studies, this paper uses the case of the UK debates on mitochondrial donation (2012–2015) to emphasize the importance of deploying an analysis of ignorance that goes beyond medical and safety concerns when scrutinizing debates or campaigns around new reproductive technologies. In contrast to what happened with previous reproductive health treatments or drugs, the potential medical risks of mitochondrial donation were explicitly acknowledged and examined during its public and parliamentary discussions. However, I show, using the concepts of ‘acknowledged unknowns’ and ‘ignored knowns’, how the attention drawn to the medical risks contributed to obscuring the assessment of its economic and social impacts by silencing key knowledge regarding the limitations of mitochondrial donation in relation to the potential beneficiaries, the scope of the techniques, their alternatives and their costs. This article therefore calls for more systematic use of an integrated analytical framework of ignorance to be applied in the field of reproductive public policies, paying particular attention not only to the ways that medical risks are addressed, but also to the type of knowledge and disciplines this allows to silence or side-line in the framing and assessment of new biotechnologies. © 2021},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Reproductive Biomedicine and Society Online},
	author = {Herbrand, C.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Ignorance studies, Ignored knowns, Mitochondrial donation, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Reproductive technologies, Three-parent baby, UK biomedical politics},
	pages = {53--62},
}

Drawing on scholarship from ignorance studies, this paper uses the case of the UK debates on mitochondrial donation (2012–2015) to emphasize the importance of deploying an analysis of ignorance that goes beyond medical and safety concerns when scrutinizing debates or campaigns around new reproductive technologies. In contrast to what happened with previous reproductive health treatments or drugs, the potential medical risks of mitochondrial donation were explicitly acknowledged and examined during its public and parliamentary discussions. However, I show, using the concepts of ‘acknowledged unknowns’ and ‘ignored knowns’, how the attention drawn to the medical risks contributed to obscuring the assessment of its economic and social impacts by silencing key knowledge regarding the limitations of mitochondrial donation in relation to the potential beneficiaries, the scope of the techniques, their alternatives and their costs. This article therefore calls for more systematic use of an integrated analytical framework of ignorance to be applied in the field of reproductive public policies, paying particular attention not only to the ways that medical risks are addressed, but also to the type of knowledge and disciplines this allows to silence or side-line in the framing and assessment of new biotechnologies. © 2021

@article{fillion_like_2022,
	title = {Like mother, like daughter, like granddaughter… {Transgenerational} ignorance engendered by a defective reproductive health technology},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {2405-6618},
	doi = {10.1016/j.rbms.2021.10.001},
	abstract = {From 1941, the synthetic oestrogen diethylstilbestrol (DES) was administered to millions of women around the world to prevent miscarriages. In 1971, a clear and direct link was shown between taking DES during pregnancy and its subsequent long-term morbid effects on offspring. In the last 50 years, the list of side effects of in-utero exposure to DES has grown to include cancer, infertility, significant prematurity and urogenital malformation, amongst others. Based on qualitative sociological research conducted between 2010 and 2013, compiling archives, judicial documents and 108 interviews, this article illustrates a continuous production of ignorance in France. By focusing on DES as a reproductive health technology, three aspects are stressed. First, in terms of recognition of adverse effects, despite DES being identified as a prototype for other technologies such as the contraceptive pill or hormone replacement therapy, there remained a strong reluctance to import knowledge from the USA on its dangers and risks. Second, there was indifference to transgenerational side effects: even when the most visible effects of DES were finally acknowledged, there was a lack of consideration of the health of descendants; an inability to deem the knowledge of these repercussions as emancipatory or potentially empowering for the offspring. Third, regarding the health care of DES daughters, an important propensity to undone science is highlighted, with notable indifference to the risks of hormonalization of the female body, even on the part of activists. Thus, decades after it was last given to pregnant women, the shadow of DES still lingers as a failed reproductive health technology. © 2021 The Authors},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Reproductive Biomedicine and Society Online},
	author = {Fillion, E. and Torny, D.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, Agnotology, Diethylstilbestrol, Drug side effects, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Reproductive technologies, Social production of ignorance, Transgenerational effects},
	pages = {101--110},
}

From 1941, the synthetic oestrogen diethylstilbestrol (DES) was administered to millions of women around the world to prevent miscarriages. In 1971, a clear and direct link was shown between taking DES during pregnancy and its subsequent long-term morbid effects on offspring. In the last 50 years, the list of side effects of in-utero exposure to DES has grown to include cancer, infertility, significant prematurity and urogenital malformation, amongst others. Based on qualitative sociological research conducted between 2010 and 2013, compiling archives, judicial documents and 108 interviews, this article illustrates a continuous production of ignorance in France. By focusing on DES as a reproductive health technology, three aspects are stressed. First, in terms of recognition of adverse effects, despite DES being identified as a prototype for other technologies such as the contraceptive pill or hormone replacement therapy, there remained a strong reluctance to import knowledge from the USA on its dangers and risks. Second, there was indifference to transgenerational side effects: even when the most visible effects of DES were finally acknowledged, there was a lack of consideration of the health of descendants; an inability to deem the knowledge of these repercussions as emancipatory or potentially empowering for the offspring. Third, regarding the health care of DES daughters, an important propensity to undone science is highlighted, with notable indifference to the risks of hormonalization of the female body, even on the part of activists. Thus, decades after it was last given to pregnant women, the shadow of DES still lingers as a failed reproductive health technology. © 2021 The Authors

@article{nemec_duogynon_2022,
	title = {The {Duogynon} controversy and ignorance production in post-thalidomide {West} {Germany}},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {2405-6618},
	doi = {10.1016/j.rbms.2021.09.003},
	abstract = {This article examines the West German controversy over Duogynon, a ‘hormone pregnancy test’ and the drug at the centre of the first major, international debate over iatrogenic birth defects in the post-thalidomide era. It recovers an asymmetrical power struggle over the uneven distribution of biomedical knowledge and ignorance (about teratogenic risk) that pitted parent-activists, whistleblowers and investigative journalists against industrialists, scientific experts and government officials. It sheds new light on the nexus of reproduction, disability, epidemiology and health activism in West Germany. In addition, it begins to recover an internationally influential discourse that, in the post-thalidomide world, seems to have resuscitated antenatal drug use as safe until proven harmful. © 2021 The Authors},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Reproductive Biomedicine and Society Online},
	author = {Nemec, B. and Olszynko-Gryn, J.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, Congenital malformations, Health activism, Ignorance production, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Pregnancy testing, Schering AG, West Germany},
	pages = {75--86},
}

This article examines the West German controversy over Duogynon, a ‘hormone pregnancy test’ and the drug at the centre of the first major, international debate over iatrogenic birth defects in the post-thalidomide era. It recovers an asymmetrical power struggle over the uneven distribution of biomedical knowledge and ignorance (about teratogenic risk) that pitted parent-activists, whistleblowers and investigative journalists against industrialists, scientific experts and government officials. It sheds new light on the nexus of reproduction, disability, epidemiology and health activism in West Germany. In addition, it begins to recover an internationally influential discourse that, in the post-thalidomide world, seems to have resuscitated antenatal drug use as safe until proven harmful. © 2021 The Authors

@article{mirouse_ignoring_2022,
	title = {Ignoring international alerts? {The} routinization of episiotomy in {France} in the 1980s and 1990s},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {2405-6618},
	shorttitle = {Ignoring international alerts?},
	doi = {10.1016/j.rbms.2021.07.002},
	abstract = {As scientific evidence from the UK and the USA in the 1980s was questioning the usefulness of episiotomy, the rate in France increased from 38\% in 1981 to 58.4\% in 1996. In 1996, the World Health Organization recommended limiting the episiotomy rate to 10\%. This article aims to examine this paradox through an analysis of the French medical debate on episiotomy during the 1980s and 1990s. Drawing on an analytical corpus composed of 192 articles published in French professional journals of obstetrician-gynaecologists and midwives, it shows that the majority of these health professionals considered episiotomy to be a preventive intervention. The most influential professional organizations and experts manage to refute most of the international alerts on the limitations and side effects of episiotomy through the constant production of new justifications and competing knowledge for the procedure. In the 1980s, episiotomy was seen as a means to prevent tearing and thus avoid perineal dysfunction. Episiotomy and perineal re-education (which developed into a new health sector) were put forward as ‘the’ solution to the problem. From the mid-1990s onwards, the focus shifted from the mother to the baby as episiotomy was promoted as a way to reduce the risk of newborn mortality and morbidity. This article shows that the alerts and controversies on the assumed iatrogenic effects of biomedical technologies and practices were silenced through efficient and dynamic production of competing knowledge about their assumed benefits. © 2021 The Author},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Reproductive Biomedicine and Society Online},
	author = {Mirouse, L.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, Episiotomy, France, Knowledge production, Medical controversies, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Sociology of ignorance},
	pages = {42--52},
}

As scientific evidence from the UK and the USA in the 1980s was questioning the usefulness of episiotomy, the rate in France increased from 38% in 1981 to 58.4% in 1996. In 1996, the World Health Organization recommended limiting the episiotomy rate to 10%. This article aims to examine this paradox through an analysis of the French medical debate on episiotomy during the 1980s and 1990s. Drawing on an analytical corpus composed of 192 articles published in French professional journals of obstetrician-gynaecologists and midwives, it shows that the majority of these health professionals considered episiotomy to be a preventive intervention. The most influential professional organizations and experts manage to refute most of the international alerts on the limitations and side effects of episiotomy through the constant production of new justifications and competing knowledge for the procedure. In the 1980s, episiotomy was seen as a means to prevent tearing and thus avoid perineal dysfunction. Episiotomy and perineal re-education (which developed into a new health sector) were put forward as ‘the’ solution to the problem. From the mid-1990s onwards, the focus shifted from the mother to the baby as episiotomy was promoted as a way to reduce the risk of newborn mortality and morbidity. This article shows that the alerts and controversies on the assumed iatrogenic effects of biomedical technologies and practices were silenced through efficient and dynamic production of competing knowledge about their assumed benefits. © 2021 The Author

@article{owens_passivists_2022,
	title = {The passivists: {Managing} risk through institutionalized ignorance in genomic medicine},
	volume = {294},
	issn = {0277-9536},
	shorttitle = {The passivists},
	doi = {10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114715},
	abstract = {As the era of big data transforms modern medicine, clinicians have access to more health data than ever. How do medical providers determine which data are relevant to patient care, which are irrelevant, and which may be inappropriately used to justify potentially harmful interventions? One of the most prominent medical fields to address these questions head on – clinical genomics – is actively debating how to assess the value of genomic data. In-depth interviews with clinicians and a content analysis of policy documents demonstrate that while many clinicians believe that collecting as much patient data as possible will lead to better patient care, a sizeable minority of clinicians preferred to collect less data. These clinicians worried that large genomic tests provided too much data, leading to confusion and inappropriate treatment. Clinical geneticists have also started developing the concept of “actionability” to assess which types of genomic data are worth collecting and interpreting. By classifying data as useful when it can or should lead to action, clinicians can formalize and institutionalize what types of data should be ignored. But achieving consensus about what counts as “actionable” has proven difficult and highlights the different values and risk philosophies of clinicians. At the same time, many clinicians are fighting against the ignorance arising from genomic databases predominantly filled with samples from European ancestry populations. Debates about how and when to institutionalize ignorance of health data are not unique to clinical genomics, but have spread throughout many fields of medicine. As the amount of health data available to clinicians and patients grows, social science research on the politics of knowledge and ignorance should inform debates about the value of data in medicine. © 2022 The Author},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Social Science and Medicine},
	author = {Owens, K.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Biomedicine, Clinical genomics, Data, Ignorance, Knowledge, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Risk},
}

As the era of big data transforms modern medicine, clinicians have access to more health data than ever. How do medical providers determine which data are relevant to patient care, which are irrelevant, and which may be inappropriately used to justify potentially harmful interventions? One of the most prominent medical fields to address these questions head on – clinical genomics – is actively debating how to assess the value of genomic data. In-depth interviews with clinicians and a content analysis of policy documents demonstrate that while many clinicians believe that collecting as much patient data as possible will lead to better patient care, a sizeable minority of clinicians preferred to collect less data. These clinicians worried that large genomic tests provided too much data, leading to confusion and inappropriate treatment. Clinical geneticists have also started developing the concept of “actionability” to assess which types of genomic data are worth collecting and interpreting. By classifying data as useful when it can or should lead to action, clinicians can formalize and institutionalize what types of data should be ignored. But achieving consensus about what counts as “actionable” has proven difficult and highlights the different values and risk philosophies of clinicians. At the same time, many clinicians are fighting against the ignorance arising from genomic databases predominantly filled with samples from European ancestry populations. Debates about how and when to institutionalize ignorance of health data are not unique to clinical genomics, but have spread throughout many fields of medicine. As the amount of health data available to clinicians and patients grows, social science research on the politics of knowledge and ignorance should inform debates about the value of data in medicine. © 2022 The Author

@book{gross_routledge_2022,
	address = {London New York (N.Y.)},
	edition = {Second edition},
	series = {Routledge international handbooks},
	title = {Routledge international handbook of ignorance studies},
	isbn = {978-0-367-60806-4 978-0-367-60814-9},
	language = {eng},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	editor = {Gross, Matthias and McGoey, Linsey},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

@article{lawrence_ignorance_2022,
	title = {Ignorance as strategy: ‘{Shadow} places’ and the social impacts of the ranger uranium mine},
	volume = {93},
	issn = {0195-9255},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance as strategy},
	doi = {10.1016/j.eiar.2021.106723},
	abstract = {Public and corporate policies regarding mine closure focus on bio-physical remediation and ignore the social impacts associated with the end of mine life and the legacies that mining leaves. In a departure from most existing writing on social impact assessment and extractive industry, we show that this situation does not simply reflect the disciplinary dominance of environmental science or a gap in knowledge regarding social impacts that can be addressed by allocation of additional resources and research effort. Rather it reflects the strategic application of ignorance, allowing the social impacts of mining to be ignored and extraction to continue unhindered. We use the contentious Ranger uranium mine on Mirarr Aboriginal land in the Kakadu region of the Northern Territory of Australia to illustrate our argument. Information on the negative social impacts of mining on the Mirrar has been available through the life cycle of the Ranger mine. It has been consistently ignored by the State and by the mine's corporate owners, and social impacts remain conspicuously absent in the mining company's mine closure plans and governmental assessments. In an important theoretical innovation we brings Val Plumwood's concept of “shadow places” into conversation with the ignorance studies literature to explore how the practices of ignorance do not just involve the absence of knowledge but are actively mobilised in order to obscure the social impacts of mining on Indigenous lands, and perpetuate long-standing social and environmental injustices in settler colonies such as Australia. © 2021 Elsevier Inc.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Environmental Impact Assessment Review},
	author = {Lawrence, R. and O'Faircheallaigh, C.},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {5 Ignorance and manufactured doubt, Aboriginal peoples, Environmental justice, Ignorance studies, Mine closure, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Social impacts},
}

Public and corporate policies regarding mine closure focus on bio-physical remediation and ignore the social impacts associated with the end of mine life and the legacies that mining leaves. In a departure from most existing writing on social impact assessment and extractive industry, we show that this situation does not simply reflect the disciplinary dominance of environmental science or a gap in knowledge regarding social impacts that can be addressed by allocation of additional resources and research effort. Rather it reflects the strategic application of ignorance, allowing the social impacts of mining to be ignored and extraction to continue unhindered. We use the contentious Ranger uranium mine on Mirarr Aboriginal land in the Kakadu region of the Northern Territory of Australia to illustrate our argument. Information on the negative social impacts of mining on the Mirrar has been available through the life cycle of the Ranger mine. It has been consistently ignored by the State and by the mine's corporate owners, and social impacts remain conspicuously absent in the mining company's mine closure plans and governmental assessments. In an important theoretical innovation we brings Val Plumwood's concept of “shadow places” into conversation with the ignorance studies literature to explore how the practices of ignorance do not just involve the absence of knowledge but are actively mobilised in order to obscure the social impacts of mining on Indigenous lands, and perpetuate long-standing social and environmental injustices in settler colonies such as Australia. © 2021 Elsevier Inc.

@article{boullier_toxic_2022,
	title = {Toxic {Ignorance}. {How} {Regulatory} {Procedures} and {Industrial} {Knowledge} {Jeopardise} the {Risk} {Assessment} of {Chemicals}},
	volume = {31},
	issn = {0950-5431, 1470-1189},
	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09505431.2022.2062319},
	doi = {10.1080/09505431.2022.2062319},
	language = {en},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-10-17},
	journal = {Science as Culture},
	author = {Boullier, Henri and Henry, Emmanuel},
	month = oct,
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {480--503},
}

@incollection{gross_revolutionary_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Revolutionary {Epistemology}: {The} promise and peril of ignorance studies},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {Revolutionary {Epistemology}},
	abstract = {The value of acknowledging limitations within existent theories of political and social challenge is where the promise of ignorance studies lies. The term was deliberately chosen as broad, non-pejorative phrase allowing for wide variety of studies dealing with unknowns, uncertainties and knowledge gaps – good or bad – to avoid one-sided analyses from narrow disciplinary perspectives, and to urge scholars to examine how disciplinary silos can compound ignorance. The problem of epistemic privilege and epistemic disadvantage is particularly acute in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resuscitated long-standing questions about the rights and duties of private individuals in societies that are intractably interdependent. More empirical research is needed and underway that seeks to understand why some people are hesitant to trust the evidence-base for new vaccines while other groups, even those who insist that benefits far outweigh known risks, are wary of imposed vaccine mandates. The chapter also presents an overview on the key concepts discussed in this book.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Gross, Matthias and McGoey, Linsey},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 12},
	keywords = {PRINTED (DOCUMENT IMPRIMÉ)},
}

The value of acknowledging limitations within existent theories of political and social challenge is where the promise of ignorance studies lies. The term was deliberately chosen as broad, non-pejorative phrase allowing for wide variety of studies dealing with unknowns, uncertainties and knowledge gaps – good or bad – to avoid one-sided analyses from narrow disciplinary perspectives, and to urge scholars to examine how disciplinary silos can compound ignorance. The problem of epistemic privilege and epistemic disadvantage is particularly acute in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resuscitated long-standing questions about the rights and duties of private individuals in societies that are intractably interdependent. More empirical research is needed and underway that seeks to understand why some people are hesitant to trust the evidence-base for new vaccines while other groups, even those who insist that benefits far outweigh known risks, are wary of imposed vaccine mandates. The chapter also presents an overview on the key concepts discussed in this book.

@incollection{haas_ignorance_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Ignorance and {Investigation}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {What is ignorance? The chapter begins with the observation that we speak of ignorance in more than one way. Kinds of ignorance differ normatively: ignorance can be a lack or the mere absence of knowledge. They also differ with respect to the states of mind of the cognizer: ignorance can go along with investigative attitudes, it can be dogmatic, or a mental blank. The chapter offers a distinction between investigative ignorance, presumed knowledge, preferred ignorance, and complete ignorance. It argues that typically we have reason to prefer states of ignorance that motivate inquiry over states of ignorance that do not.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Haas, Jens and Vogt, Katja Maria},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 9},
	keywords = {PRINTED (DOCUMENT IMPRIMÉ)},
}

What is ignorance? The chapter begins with the observation that we speak of ignorance in more than one way. Kinds of ignorance differ normatively: ignorance can be a lack or the mere absence of knowledge. They also differ with respect to the states of mind of the cognizer: ignorance can go along with investigative attitudes, it can be dogmatic, or a mental blank. The chapter offers a distinction between investigative ignorance, presumed knowledge, preferred ignorance, and complete ignorance. It argues that typically we have reason to prefer states of ignorance that motivate inquiry over states of ignorance that do not.

@incollection{franke_apophatic_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Apophatic {Ignorance} and {Its} {ApplicationS}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {The intercultural and the interdisciplinary configure spaces of the “between” that most effectively challenge us to think beyond our accustomed models and frameworks. This, indeed, is already what it means to think apophatically, since such thinking cannot be confined by any specifiable method. The new turn in apophatic thinking that the author envisage, then, consists especially in emphasizing its productive applications. The most meaningful way to describe the purport of apophatic thinking is not by discourses about “Nothing” that are left floating in the air. Instead, the relevance of apophatic thought stands to be tested and verified through engaging in debate on the burning issues of the humanities—and of humanity—inside and outside of the academy. The fertility of apophatic thinking can be shown only by its fruits in application to the full diversity of topics that call for thought at the present, especially those that present and display thought’s ultimate difficulties and dead-ends in our contemporary world.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Franke, William},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 10},
	keywords = {PRINTED (DOCUMENT IMPRIMÉ)},
}

The intercultural and the interdisciplinary configure spaces of the “between” that most effectively challenge us to think beyond our accustomed models and frameworks. This, indeed, is already what it means to think apophatically, since such thinking cannot be confined by any specifiable method. The new turn in apophatic thinking that the author envisage, then, consists especially in emphasizing its productive applications. The most meaningful way to describe the purport of apophatic thinking is not by discourses about “Nothing” that are left floating in the air. Instead, the relevance of apophatic thought stands to be tested and verified through engaging in debate on the burning issues of the humanities—and of humanity—inside and outside of the academy. The fertility of apophatic thinking can be shown only by its fruits in application to the full diversity of topics that call for thought at the present, especially those that present and display thought’s ultimate difficulties and dead-ends in our contemporary world.

@incollection{mills_global_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {Global {White} {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	abstract = {In this seminal chapter, Charles Mills considers the global significance of the concept of "white ignorance," defined as a type of an ignorance among whites—an absence of belief, a false belief, a set of false beliefs, a pervasively deforming outlook—that is not contingent but rather causally linked to their whiteness. As he explains in this work, Mills’ first formulation of the concept was focused mainly on the United States. This chapter explores the fact that insofar as the modern world has been created by European colonialism and imperialism, and insofar as racist assumptions/frameworks/norms were central to the theories justifying white Western conquest and domination of that world, white ignorance can be seen as global.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Mills, Charles W.},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 11},
	keywords = {PRINTED (DOCUMENT IMPRIMÉ)},
}

In this seminal chapter, Charles Mills considers the global significance of the concept of "white ignorance," defined as a type of an ignorance among whites—an absence of belief, a false belief, a set of false beliefs, a pervasively deforming outlook—that is not contingent but rather causally linked to their whiteness. As he explains in this work, Mills’ first formulation of the concept was focused mainly on the United States. This chapter explores the fact that insofar as the modern world has been created by European colonialism and imperialism, and insofar as racist assumptions/frameworks/norms were central to the theories justifying white Western conquest and domination of that world, white ignorance can be seen as global.

@article{moore_architects_2021,
	title = {Architects and {Engineers}: {Two} {Types} of {Technocrat} and {Their} {Relation} to {Democracy}},
	shorttitle = {Architects and {Engineers}},
	doi = {10.1080/08913811.2020.1857610},
	abstract = {Technocracy is a contested concept, but it is typically associated with the exercise of political power justified by claims to expertise, and is often contrasted with populist forms of politics. In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman reframes the concept of technocracy as a form of politics oriented to solving social and economic problems, and thereby extends it to cover not only epistemic elites but ordinary people. This move usefully challenges the simplistic framing of populism and technocracy as opposites, but at the expense of effacing other dimensions of democratic politics. Friedman also suggests that maximizing individuals’ exit opportunities will allow them to take advantage of their relatively reliable personal knowledge. The architecture of “exitocracy” would itself, however, be designed by experts who, as such, might be tempted to insulate the institutional architecture they design against democratic interference. © 2021 Critical Review Foundation.},
	journal = {Critical Review},
	author = {Moore, A.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {democratic technocracy, epistocracy, exitocracy, naïve technocratic realism, public ignorance, radical ignorance, technocracy},
}

Technocracy is a contested concept, but it is typically associated with the exercise of political power justified by claims to expertise, and is often contrasted with populist forms of politics. In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman reframes the concept of technocracy as a form of politics oriented to solving social and economic problems, and thereby extends it to cover not only epistemic elites but ordinary people. This move usefully challenges the simplistic framing of populism and technocracy as opposites, but at the expense of effacing other dimensions of democratic politics. Friedman also suggests that maximizing individuals’ exit opportunities will allow them to take advantage of their relatively reliable personal knowledge. The architecture of “exitocracy” would itself, however, be designed by experts who, as such, might be tempted to insulate the institutional architecture they design against democratic interference. © 2021 Critical Review Foundation.

@article{pamuk_what_2021,
	title = {What {Follows} from the {Problem} of {Ignorance}?},
	volume = {0},
	issn = {0891-3811},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1846309},
	doi = {10.1080/08913811.2020.1846309},
	abstract = {In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman develops a critique of social science to argue that current technocratic practices are prone to predictive failures and unintended consequences. However, he does not provide evidence that the cause he singles out—“ideational heterogeneity”—is in fact a non-negligible source of technocratic limitations, more than or alongside better-known problems such as missing data, measurement issues, interpretive difficulties, and researcher bias. Even if we grant ideational heterogeneity, Friedman’s preferred institutional solution of exitocracy does not necessarily follow. His critical epistemology would also be compatible with radical forms of collective action.},
	number = {0},
	urldate = {2021-02-23},
	journal = {Critical Review},
	author = {Pamuk, Zeynep},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1846309},
	keywords = {democracy, expertise, ignorance, prediction, social science, technocracy},
	pages = {1--10},
}

In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman develops a critique of social science to argue that current technocratic practices are prone to predictive failures and unintended consequences. However, he does not provide evidence that the cause he singles out—“ideational heterogeneity”—is in fact a non-negligible source of technocratic limitations, more than or alongside better-known problems such as missing data, measurement issues, interpretive difficulties, and researcher bias. Even if we grant ideational heterogeneity, Friedman’s preferred institutional solution of exitocracy does not necessarily follow. His critical epistemology would also be compatible with radical forms of collective action.

@article{perry_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance or culture war? {Christian} nationalism and scientific illiteracy},
	issn = {0963-6625},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance or culture war?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/09636625211006271},
	doi = {10.1177/09636625211006271},
	abstract = {Religiously conservative Americans consistently demonstrate lower scientific literacy than other Americans. Some argue, however, that Americans’ scientific literacy is contingent on subcultural conflict, showing differences in scientific literacy that emerge only on religiously contested scientific claims. Building on these insights, we find that the most salient factor explaining Americans’ divergence on contested (though not on uncontested) scientific claims is not religious commitment or conservatism per se, but an ideology that seeks political—and consequently epistemic—dominance: Christian nationalism. National data show that Christian nationalism is unassociated with Americans’ answers on questions about uncontested scientific knowledge. However, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of incorrect answers on questions about religiously contested scientific claims. Contemporary “culture war” debates over science have little to do with outright ignorance of science, nor are they strictly about religiosity or theological conservatism. Rather, disputes over science and religion reflect politically motivated denials of scientific facts that threaten Christian nationalism’s claims to epistemic and cultural authority.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2021-05-06},
	journal = {Public Understanding of Science},
	author = {Perry, Samuel L. and Baker, Joseph O. and Grubbs, Joshua B.},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd},
	keywords = {Christian nationalism, acceptance of evolution, evangelicals, politics, public views of science, science and religion, scientific literacy},
	pages = {09636625211006271},
}

Religiously conservative Americans consistently demonstrate lower scientific literacy than other Americans. Some argue, however, that Americans’ scientific literacy is contingent on subcultural conflict, showing differences in scientific literacy that emerge only on religiously contested scientific claims. Building on these insights, we find that the most salient factor explaining Americans’ divergence on contested (though not on uncontested) scientific claims is not religious commitment or conservatism per se, but an ideology that seeks political—and consequently epistemic—dominance: Christian nationalism. National data show that Christian nationalism is unassociated with Americans’ answers on questions about uncontested scientific knowledge. However, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of incorrect answers on questions about religiously contested scientific claims. Contemporary “culture war” debates over science have little to do with outright ignorance of science, nor are they strictly about religiosity or theological conservatism. Rather, disputes over science and religion reflect politically motivated denials of scientific facts that threaten Christian nationalism’s claims to epistemic and cultural authority.

@article{woodard_ignorance_2021,
	title = {The {Ignorance} {Norm} and {Paradoxical} {Assertions}},
	volume = {49},
	issn = {0276-2080},
	doi = {10.5840/PHILTOPICS202149227},
	abstract = {Can agents rationally inquire into things that they know? On my view, the answer is yes. Call this view the Compatibility Thesis. One challenge to this thesis is to explain why assertions like “I know that p, but I’m wondering whether p” sound odd, if not Moore-Paradoxical. In response to this challenge, I argue that we can reject one or both premises that give rise to it. First, we can deny that inquiry requires interrogative attitudes. Second, we can deny the ignorance norm, on which agents are not permitted to both know and have interrogative attitudes, such as wondering. I argue that there are compelling reasons to deny the former and reasons to question the latter. Both options pave the way for further work on further inquiry. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Philosophical Topics},
	author = {Woodard, E.},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {321--332},
}

Can agents rationally inquire into things that they know? On my view, the answer is yes. Call this view the Compatibility Thesis. One challenge to this thesis is to explain why assertions like “I know that p, but I’m wondering whether p” sound odd, if not Moore-Paradoxical. In response to this challenge, I argue that we can reject one or both premises that give rise to it. First, we can deny that inquiry requires interrogative attitudes. Second, we can deny the ignorance norm, on which agents are not permitted to both know and have interrogative attitudes, such as wondering. I argue that there are compelling reasons to deny the former and reasons to question the latter. Both options pave the way for further work on further inquiry. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.

@article{wehling_why_2021,
	title = {Why {Science} {Does} {Not} {Know}: {A} {Brief} {History} of (the {Notion} of) {Scientific} {Ignorance} in the {Twentieth} and {Early} {Twenty}-{First} {Centuries}},
	volume = {2},
	copyright = {Copyright (c) 2021},
	issn = {2632-282X},
	shorttitle = {Why {Science} {Does} {Not} {Know}},
	url = {https://journalhistoryknowledge.org/article/view/11366},
	doi = {10.5334/jhk.40},
	abstract = {Currently, “scientific ignorance,” that is, the blind spots and knowledge gaps of science itself, appears to be an important and legitimate research topic in the sociology, history, and philosophy of science. In this article, it is argued that this unusual and provocative topic could only emerge as an object of research in its own right to the extent that the traditional modernist view of scientific ignorance as a merely ephemeral and ultimately irrelevant phenomenon was challenged, starting about one hundred years ago. The article follows the controversial shaping of the notion of scientific ignorance through the works of influential scholars in the twentieth century. It then traces the concept through the evolution of various research programs in the early twenty-first century, focusing on the reasons for and causes of that ignorance. One should nevertheless be careful not to (mis-)understand this history as a linear and irreversible “success story,” given that the familiar (self-)image of science as the eminent modern institution producing knowledge and eliminating ignorance is still highly influential.This article is part of a special issue entitled “Histories of Ignorance,” edited by Lukas M. Verburgt and Peter Burke.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2022-09-26},
	journal = {Journal for the History of Knowledge},
	author = {Wehling, Peter},
	month = nov,
	year = {2021},
	pages = {6--6},
}

Currently, “scientific ignorance,” that is, the blind spots and knowledge gaps of science itself, appears to be an important and legitimate research topic in the sociology, history, and philosophy of science. In this article, it is argued that this unusual and provocative topic could only emerge as an object of research in its own right to the extent that the traditional modernist view of scientific ignorance as a merely ephemeral and ultimately irrelevant phenomenon was challenged, starting about one hundred years ago. The article follows the controversial shaping of the notion of scientific ignorance through the works of influential scholars in the twentieth century. It then traces the concept through the evolution of various research programs in the early twenty-first century, focusing on the reasons for and causes of that ignorance. One should nevertheless be careful not to (mis-)understand this history as a linear and irreversible “success story,” given that the familiar (self-)image of science as the eminent modern institution producing knowledge and eliminating ignorance is still highly influential.This article is part of a special issue entitled “Histories of Ignorance,” edited by Lukas M. Verburgt and Peter Burke.

@article{brown_group_2021,
	title = {Group {Excuse} from {Blameless} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {49},
	issn = {0276-2080},
	doi = {10.5840/PHILTOPICS202149212},
	abstract = {We routinely treat groups, such as governments and corporations, as agents with beliefs and aims who are morally responsible for their actions. For instance, we might blame the government for its response to the coronavirus pandemic. If groups are morally responsible agents, then it’s plausible that they can have an excuse for wrongdoing from ignorance in just the way individuals can. For instance, a government might attempt to excuse its performance in the coronavirus pandemic by saying that it didn’t know how infectious the new variant was. In this paper, I assume that groups are morally responsible agents to develop an account of what it is for a group to have an excuse from blameless ignorance. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Philosophical Topics},
	author = {Brown, J.},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {1--16},
}

We routinely treat groups, such as governments and corporations, as agents with beliefs and aims who are morally responsible for their actions. For instance, we might blame the government for its response to the coronavirus pandemic. If groups are morally responsible agents, then it’s plausible that they can have an excuse for wrongdoing from ignorance in just the way individuals can. For instance, a government might attempt to excuse its performance in the coronavirus pandemic by saying that it didn’t know how infectious the new variant was. In this paper, I assume that groups are morally responsible agents to develop an account of what it is for a group to have an excuse from blameless ignorance. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.

@article{boult_virtue_2021,
	title = {The (virtue) epistemology of political ignorance},
	volume = {58},
	issn = {0003-0481},
	abstract = {One typical aim of responsibilist virtue epistemology is to employ the notion of intellectual virtue in pursuit of an ameliorative epistemology. This paper focuses on “political inquiry” as a case study for examining the ameliorative value of intellectual virtue. The main claim is that the case of political inquiry threatens to expose responsibilist virtue epistemology in a general way as focusing too narrowly on the role of individual intellectual character traits in attempting to improve our epistemic practices. © 2021 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
	author = {Boult, C.},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {217--232},
}

One typical aim of responsibilist virtue epistemology is to employ the notion of intellectual virtue in pursuit of an ameliorative epistemology. This paper focuses on “political inquiry” as a case study for examining the ameliorative value of intellectual virtue. The main claim is that the case of political inquiry threatens to expose responsibilist virtue epistemology in a general way as focusing too narrowly on the role of individual intellectual character traits in attempting to improve our epistemic practices. © 2021 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

@article{aradau_will_2021,
	title = {The will to ignorance},
	volume = {14},
	issn = {1753-0350},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2021.1882536},
	doi = {10.1080/17530350.2021.1882536},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2022-11-21},
	journal = {Journal of Cultural Economy},
	author = {Aradau, Claudia},
	month = may,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2021.1882536},
	pages = {359--361},
}

@article{dellantonio_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance, misconceptions and critical thinking},
	volume = {198},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02529-7},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02529-7},
	abstract = {In this paper we investigate ignorance in relation to our capacity to justify our beliefs. To achieve this aim we specifically address scientific misconceptions, i.e. beliefs that are considered to be false in light of accepted scientific knowledge. The hypothesis we put forward is that misconceptions are not isolated false beliefs, but rather form part of a system of inferences—an explanation—which does not match current scientific theory. We further argue that, because misconceptions are embedded in a system, they cannot be rectified simply by replacing false beliefs with true ones. To address our misconceptions, we must rather act on the system of beliefs that supports them. In the first step of our analysis, we distinguish between misconceptions that are easy to dispel because they represent simple errors that occur against the background of a correct explanatory apparatus and misconceptions that are, on the contrary, very difficult to dispel because they are the product of pseudo explanations. We show that, in the latter case, misconceptions constitute an integral part of an incorrect explanation and the reasons that support such misconceptions are deeply misleading. In the second step, we discuss various approaches that have been adopted to address the problem of misconceptions. Challenging the notion that directly addressing and criticizing specific misconceptions is an effective approach, we propose that critical thinking is the most fruitful means to deal with misconceptions. We define the core competences and knowledge relevant for the practice of critical thinking and discuss how they help us avoid misconceptions that arise from accepting beliefs that form part of a mistaken explanation.},
	language = {en},
	number = {8},
	urldate = {2022-02-22},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Dellantonio, Sara and Pastore, Luigi},
	month = aug,
	year = {2021},
	pages = {7473--7501},
}

In this paper we investigate ignorance in relation to our capacity to justify our beliefs. To achieve this aim we specifically address scientific misconceptions, i.e. beliefs that are considered to be false in light of accepted scientific knowledge. The hypothesis we put forward is that misconceptions are not isolated false beliefs, but rather form part of a system of inferences—an explanation—which does not match current scientific theory. We further argue that, because misconceptions are embedded in a system, they cannot be rectified simply by replacing false beliefs with true ones. To address our misconceptions, we must rather act on the system of beliefs that supports them. In the first step of our analysis, we distinguish between misconceptions that are easy to dispel because they represent simple errors that occur against the background of a correct explanatory apparatus and misconceptions that are, on the contrary, very difficult to dispel because they are the product of pseudo explanations. We show that, in the latter case, misconceptions constitute an integral part of an incorrect explanation and the reasons that support such misconceptions are deeply misleading. In the second step, we discuss various approaches that have been adopted to address the problem of misconceptions. Challenging the notion that directly addressing and criticizing specific misconceptions is an effective approach, we propose that critical thinking is the most fruitful means to deal with misconceptions. We define the core competences and knowledge relevant for the practice of critical thinking and discuss how they help us avoid misconceptions that arise from accepting beliefs that form part of a mistaken explanation.

@article{raikka_distribution_2021,
	title = {Distribution and ignorance},
	volume = {198},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02236-3},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02236-3},
	abstract = {According to the so-called presumption of equality, a person who does not know whether there is an acceptable reason for differential treatment should just presume the similarity of the cases and treat them equally. If we assume that the presumption of equality is an acceptable moral principle, at least when the allocation cannot be postponed and an equal distribution of goods is possible, then an important question arises: when exactly does the allocator have sufficient reasons for differential treatment and is not relevantly ignorant? This is a question about the required strength of the “acceptable reasons” for differential treatment. It has been commonplace to think that the presumption of equality demands that the reasons that refute the presumption must be very strong and that differential treatment requires that there is a proper justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. I will argue, however, that refuting the presumption and solving the issue (of whether the cases are relevantly similar or relevantly different) are two separate matters. A person can have good enough reasons for rejecting the presumption that the cases are relevantly similar without having reasons that she could present as a full justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. A precondition of the applicability of the presumption of equality is ignorance, but not ignorance in the sense of “not having a full justification”.},
	language = {en},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2022-02-22},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Räikkä, Juha},
	month = mar,
	year = {2021},
	pages = {2641--2657},
}

According to the so-called presumption of equality, a person who does not know whether there is an acceptable reason for differential treatment should just presume the similarity of the cases and treat them equally. If we assume that the presumption of equality is an acceptable moral principle, at least when the allocation cannot be postponed and an equal distribution of goods is possible, then an important question arises: when exactly does the allocator have sufficient reasons for differential treatment and is not relevantly ignorant? This is a question about the required strength of the “acceptable reasons” for differential treatment. It has been commonplace to think that the presumption of equality demands that the reasons that refute the presumption must be very strong and that differential treatment requires that there is a proper justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. I will argue, however, that refuting the presumption and solving the issue (of whether the cases are relevantly similar or relevantly different) are two separate matters. A person can have good enough reasons for rejecting the presumption that the cases are relevantly similar without having reasons that she could present as a full justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. A precondition of the applicability of the presumption of equality is ignorance, but not ignorance in the sense of “not having a full justification”.

@article{kubyshkina_logic_2021,
	title = {A logic for factive ignorance},
	volume = {198},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02440-1},
	abstract = {In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$, then \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.},
	number = {6},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Kubyshkina, Ekaterina and Petrolo, Mattia},
	month = jun,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Agnoiology, Epistemic logic, Factive ignorance, Ignorance representation},
	pages = {5917--5928},
}

In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of $$\phi $$, then $$\phi $$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.

@article{le_morvan_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance, {Knowledge}, and {Two} {Epistemic} {Intuitions}},
	doi = {10.1007/s11406-021-00342-6},
	abstract = {One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of true belief) and supports the Standard View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of knowledge). © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.},
	journal = {Philosophia (United States)},
	author = {Le Morvan, P.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Belief, Ignorance, Intuition, Knowledge, Socrates, Truth},
}

One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of true belief) and supports the Standard View of Ignorance (according to which ignorance is the absence of knowledge). © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.

@incollection{andler_vi_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{VI}. {Le} doute stratégique, ou comment retourner la rationalité contre elle-même},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-105.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Andler, Daniel},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0105},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {105--116},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{brague_iii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{III}. {Rationalité} et irrationalité en {Islam}},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-41.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Brague, Rémi},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0041},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {41--53},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{cordonier_xv_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XV}. {Le} succès des théories du complot : flambée d’irrationalité ou symptôme d’une crise de confiance ?},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	shorttitle = {{XV}. {Le} succès des théories du complot},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-225.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Cordonier, Laurent},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0225},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {225--243},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{demeulenaere_v_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {V. {Les} sentiments de groupe sont-ils irrationnels ?},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-87.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Demeulenaere, Pierre},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0087},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {87--104},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{dieguez_xx_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XX}. {Réflexions} sur la forme de la {Terre}},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-323.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Dieguez, Sebastian and Wagner-Egger, Pascal},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0323},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {323--400},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{engel_xi_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XI}. {L}’obscurantisme subtil des conceptions démystificatrices de la raison},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-171.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Engel, Pascal},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0171},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {171--188},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{baechler_i_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {I. {Qu}’est-ce que l’irrationnel ?},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-15.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Baechler, Jean},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0015},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {15--31},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{baechler_ix_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{IX}. {Spiritualité} et spiritualisme},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-141.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Baechler, Jean},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0141},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {141--157},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{brechet_xii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XII}. {Science}, {Technologie} : de la rationalité des analyses à l’irrationalité des décisions},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	shorttitle = {{XII}. {Science}, {Technologie}},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-189.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Bréchet, Yves},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0189},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {189--197},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{bronner_x_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {X. {Les} pseudo-démonstrations par adjonction d’arguments},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-159.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Bronner, Gérald},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0159},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {159--169},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{delmas-marty_ii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{II}. {Le} « bricolage juridique » est-il irrationnel ?},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-33.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l��assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Delmas-Marty, Mireille},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0033},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {33--40},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l��assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{gingras_xvii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XVII}. {Néo}-romantisme, multiplication des « savoirs » et opportunisme politique : le cas des « connaissances autochtones » au {Canada}},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	shorttitle = {{XVII}. {Néo}-romantisme, multiplication des « savoirs » et opportunisme politique},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-285.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Gingras, Yves},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0285},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {285--299},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{hervieu-leger_xiv_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XIV}. {La} ferveur contre la raison : de l’irrationalité religieuse en contexte catholique post-chrétien},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	shorttitle = {{XIV}. {La} ferveur contre la raison},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-209.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Hervieu-Léger, Danièle},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0209},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {209--224},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{kessler_xix_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XIX}. {Quelques} réflexions sur la perfection et l’imperfection du marché des idées},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-307.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Kessler, Denis},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0307},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {307--321},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{reichstadt_xviii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XVIII}. {Complotisme} : entre « droit au doute » et choix de l’ignorance},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	shorttitle = {{XVIII}. {Complotisme}},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-301.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Reichstadt, Rudy},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0301},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {301--306},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{gauvrit_viii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{VIII}. {Internet} nous rend-il fous ?},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-127.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Gauvrit, Nicolas},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0127},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {127--137},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{heinich_xiii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XIII}. {Axiologie} de l’irrationalité : {Les} outils de la sociologie des valeurs face à l’irrationnel},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	shorttitle = {{XIII}. {Axiologie} de l’irrationalité},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-199.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Heinich, Nathalie},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0199},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {199--208},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{heran_xvi_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XVI}. {Science} et complot : l’étrange fortune du rapport de l’{ONU} sur les « migrations de remplacement » (2000-2020)},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	shorttitle = {{XVI}. {Science} et complot},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-247.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Héran, François},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0247},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {247--284},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{leiser_vii_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{VII}. {Les} principes de la mécompréhension économique},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-117.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Leiser, David},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0117},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {117--126},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{tiercelin_iv_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{IV}. {Les} émotions sont-elles irrationnelles ?},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-55.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l���irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Tiercelin, Claudine},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0055},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {55--85},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l���irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@incollection{tournay_xxi_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	series = {Hors collection},
	title = {{XXI}. {Le} monde politique est-il devenu irrationnel ?},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/l-irrationnel-aujourd-hui--9791037006936-p-401.htm},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.

Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2024-02-19},
	booktitle = {L’irrationnel aujourd’hui},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	author = {Tournay, Virginie},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.3917/herm.baech.2021.02.0401},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {401--413},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences. Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@article{best_seeing_2021,
	title = {Seeing and {Not}-seeing {Like} a {Political} {Economist}: {The} {Historicity} of {Contemporary} {Political} {Economy} and its {Blind} {Spots}},
	volume = {26},
	issn = {1356-3467},
	shorttitle = {Seeing and {Not}-seeing {Like} a {Political} {Economist}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2020.1841143},
	doi = {10.1080/13563467.2020.1841143},
	abstract = {Contemporary political economy is predicated on widely shared ideas and assumptions, some explicit but many implicit, about the past. Our aim in this Special Issue is to draw attention to, and to assess critically, these historical assumptions. In doing so, we hope to contribute to a political economy that is more attentive to the analytic assumptions on which it is premised, more aware of the potential oversights, biases, and omissions they contain, and more reflexive about the potential costs of these blind spots. This is an Introduction to one of two Special Issues that are being published simultaneously by New Political Economy and Review of International Political Economy reflecting on blind spots in international political economy. Together, these Special Issues seek to identify the key blind spots in the field and to make sense of how many scholars missed or misconstrued important dynamics that define contemporary capitalism and the other systems and sources of social inequality that characterise our present. This particular Special Issue pursues this goal by looking backwards, to the history of political economy and at the ways in which we have come to tell that history, in order to understand how we got to the present moment.},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2022-08-10},
	journal = {New Political Economy},
	author = {Best, Jacqueline and Hay, Colin and LeBaron, Genevieve and Mügge, Daniel},
	month = mar,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2020.1841143},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Blind spots, PRINTED (Fonds papier), history, international political economy, political economy},
	pages = {217--228},
}

Contemporary political economy is predicated on widely shared ideas and assumptions, some explicit but many implicit, about the past. Our aim in this Special Issue is to draw attention to, and to assess critically, these historical assumptions. In doing so, we hope to contribute to a political economy that is more attentive to the analytic assumptions on which it is premised, more aware of the potential oversights, biases, and omissions they contain, and more reflexive about the potential costs of these blind spots. This is an Introduction to one of two Special Issues that are being published simultaneously by New Political Economy and Review of International Political Economy reflecting on blind spots in international political economy. Together, these Special Issues seek to identify the key blind spots in the field and to make sense of how many scholars missed or misconstrued important dynamics that define contemporary capitalism and the other systems and sources of social inequality that characterise our present. This particular Special Issue pursues this goal by looking backwards, to the history of political economy and at the ways in which we have come to tell that history, in order to understand how we got to the present moment.

@article{mcgoey_hiding_2021,
	title = {Hiding the {Rentier} {Elephant} in {Plain} {Sight}: {The} {Epistemology} of {Vanishing} {Rent}},
	volume = {15},
	issn = {1971-8853},
	shorttitle = {Hiding the {Rentier} {Elephant} in {Plain} {Sight}},
	doi = {10.6092/issn.1971-8853/12720},
	abstract = {Economic rent is defined as excessive financial returns made possible by control or monopoly over a particular market. A minority of economists suggest that we live in an era of “rentier capitalism” characterized by exploitative extreme wealth. Their arguments are framed in new and powerful ways, but their focus has a long heritage, flowing back to classical economists such as Adam Smith who criticized the wealthy for reaping “where they never sowed.” While interest in rentierism is growing, other economists, including on the left, disagree that rentier gains underpin most extreme fortunes today. I introduce the concept of “ignorance pathways” to raise new points about the perceptual divide between those who “see” rent and those who do not. Mapping different ignorance pathways within modern economic thought, I theorize the reasons for why rentier returns remain “unseen”. Terminology is policy: it is harder to make a policy case for redistributing rentier returns when the contentious object of scrutiny - in this case “rent” - is believed to be something that does not exist. Copyright © 2021 Linsey McGoey},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Sociologica},
	author = {McGoey, L.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Billionaires, Economic Inequality, Exploitation, Ignorance Studies, Ignorance in sociologie, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Rentier Capitalism},
	pages = {75--93},
}

Economic rent is defined as excessive financial returns made possible by control or monopoly over a particular market. A minority of economists suggest that we live in an era of “rentier capitalism” characterized by exploitative extreme wealth. Their arguments are framed in new and powerful ways, but their focus has a long heritage, flowing back to classical economists such as Adam Smith who criticized the wealthy for reaping “where they never sowed.” While interest in rentierism is growing, other economists, including on the left, disagree that rentier gains underpin most extreme fortunes today. I introduce the concept of “ignorance pathways” to raise new points about the perceptual divide between those who “see” rent and those who do not. Mapping different ignorance pathways within modern economic thought, I theorize the reasons for why rentier returns remain “unseen”. Terminology is policy: it is harder to make a policy case for redistributing rentier returns when the contentious object of scrutiny - in this case “rent” - is believed to be something that does not exist. Copyright © 2021 Linsey McGoey

@incollection{pohlhaus_epistemic_2021,
	title = {Epistemic oppression, ignorance, and resistance},
	isbn = {978-0-19-062892-5},
	abstract = {This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignorance, in terms of epistemic oppression and epistemic resistance, with particular attention to how different forms of ignorance operate in relation to epistemic agency and epistemic autonomy. It analyzes three ways in which ignorance has been conceived in relation to epistemic oppression and resistance: ignorance as absence of knowledge, ignorance as active ignoring, and the use of ignorance as resistance to oppression. In addition, this chapter questions whether the frame of ignorance continues to be helpful for resisting epistemic oppression and considers an alternative frame for tracking the infringements on epistemic agency and autonomy highlighted in the literature on ignorance. © Oxford University Press 2021.},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {The {Oxford} {Handbook} of {Feminist} {Philosophy}},
	author = {Pohlhaus, Jr, G.},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190628925.013.33},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance, Epistemic agency, Epistemic authority, Epistemic oppression, Epistemic resistance, Epistemologies of ignorance, Ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {418--428},
}

This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignorance, in terms of epistemic oppression and epistemic resistance, with particular attention to how different forms of ignorance operate in relation to epistemic agency and epistemic autonomy. It analyzes three ways in which ignorance has been conceived in relation to epistemic oppression and resistance: ignorance as absence of knowledge, ignorance as active ignoring, and the use of ignorance as resistance to oppression. In addition, this chapter questions whether the frame of ignorance continues to be helpful for resisting epistemic oppression and considers an alternative frame for tracking the infringements on epistemic agency and autonomy highlighted in the literature on ignorance. © Oxford University Press 2021.

@article{pritchard_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance and {Normativity}},
	volume = {49},
	issn = {0276-2080},
	doi = {10.5840/PHILTOPICS202149223},
	abstract = {In the contemporary epistemological literature, ignorance is normally understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, usually either knowledge or true belief. It is argued here that this way of thinking about ignorance misses a crucial ingredient, which is the normative aspect of ignorance. In particular, to be ignorant is not merely to lack the target epistemic standing, but also entails that this is an epistemic standing that one ought to have. I explore the motivations for this claim, and show how it can help us make sense of a range of cases concerning ignorance that the conventional, non-normative, accounts of ignorance struggle with. I also use this normative conception of ignorance to help elucidate the specific kind of epistemic standing the lack of which is entailed by ignorance. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Philosophical Topics},
	author = {Pritchard, D.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {225--243},
}

In the contemporary epistemological literature, ignorance is normally understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, usually either knowledge or true belief. It is argued here that this way of thinking about ignorance misses a crucial ingredient, which is the normative aspect of ignorance. In particular, to be ignorant is not merely to lack the target epistemic standing, but also entails that this is an epistemic standing that one ought to have. I explore the motivations for this claim, and show how it can help us make sense of a range of cases concerning ignorance that the conventional, non-normative, accounts of ignorance struggle with. I also use this normative conception of ignorance to help elucidate the specific kind of epistemic standing the lack of which is entailed by ignorance. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.

@book{conway_les_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	title = {Les {Marchands} de doute},
	isbn = {978-2-7465-2273-2},
	url = {https://www.editions-lepommier.fr/les-marchands-de-doute-1},
	abstract = {Depuis les années 1950, et plus particulièrement la fin des années 1980, une poignée de scientifiques américains, à la solde de lobbies industriels (tabac, énergie, pétrole), ont élaboré un savant travail de sape des vérités scientifiques. Une stratégie toute simple, qui a consisté à nier en bloc les preuves de la dangerosité du tabac, du DDT, de la réalité du trou de la couche d'ozone, des atteintes environnementales des pluies acides... Discréditer la science et les scientifiques, semer la confusion : grâce aux efforts d'un petit groupe d'« experts indépendants » et de médias naïfs ou complaisants, cette stratégie a fonctionné et fonctionne toujours. Il a fallu cinq ans à Naomi Oreskes et Erik M. Conway pour documenter et analyser les techniques de manipulation utilisées par ces marchands de doute, auxquels on doit une bonne part du climatoscepticisme contemporain. Cet ouvrage, qui ne relève en rien du pamphlet conspirationniste écrit à la légère, est aujourd'hui un classique, que chacun, scientifique ou citoyen, devrait lire.},
	language = {Français},
	publisher = {POMMIER},
	author = {Conway, Erik M. and Oreskes, Naomi},
	translator = {Treiner, Jacques},
	collaborator = {Foucart, Stéphane},
	month = jul,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Seconde édition revue et augmentée (1ere Édition : 2012)},
	keywords = {5 Ignorance and manufactured doubt, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Depuis les années 1950, et plus particulièrement la fin des années 1980, une poignée de scientifiques américains, à la solde de lobbies industriels (tabac, énergie, pétrole), ont élaboré un savant travail de sape des vérités scientifiques. Une stratégie toute simple, qui a consisté à nier en bloc les preuves de la dangerosité du tabac, du DDT, de la réalité du trou de la couche d'ozone, des atteintes environnementales des pluies acides... Discréditer la science et les scientifiques, semer la confusion : grâce aux efforts d'un petit groupe d'« experts indépendants » et de médias naïfs ou complaisants, cette stratégie a fonctionné et fonctionne toujours. Il a fallu cinq ans à Naomi Oreskes et Erik M. Conway pour documenter et analyser les techniques de manipulation utilisées par ces marchands de doute, auxquels on doit une bonne part du climatoscepticisme contemporain. Cet ouvrage, qui ne relève en rien du pamphlet conspirationniste écrit à la légère, est aujourd'hui un classique, que chacun, scientifique ou citoyen, devrait lire.

@book{baechler_irrationnel_2021,
	address = {Paris},
	title = {L'irrationnel aujourd'hui},
	isbn = {979-10-370-0693-6},
	abstract = {Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.},
	language = {Français},
	publisher = {Hermann},
	editor = {Baechler, Jean and Bronner, Gérald},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Les sophistes grecs soutenaient que, l’homme étant la mesure de toutes choses, il n’existait aucun point d’appui permettant de distinguer le bien du mal, le vrai du faux, le juste de l’injuste… Socrate s’est dressé contre eux et la philosophie grecque a pris son envol. Notre temps pourrait tirer le plus grand profit d’une réaction même plus modeste, car l’irrationnel a fait son grand retour, comme si le balancement entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel devait fatalement aller de l’un à l’autre, sans jamais pouvoir s’arrêter sur la position rationnelle. Depuis un bon demi-siècle, le subjectivisme, le relativisme et le culturalisme partent sans répit à l’assaut de l’objectivité, de l’universalité et de la rationalité. Aujourd’hui comme hier, ce constat soulève trois questions conjointes. La première porte sur la propension humaine à l’irrationnel. La deuxième concerne sa production, ses animateurs, ses thèmes, ses campagnes, ses manœuvres. La dernière s’occupe de sa réception, ses canaux, ses relais, ses séductions, ses victimes, ses conséquences.Vingt-cinq spécialistes reconnus de l’irrationnel contemporain, réunis en colloque du 19 au 21 novembre 2019 à la fondation Del Duca, ont cherché à dégager les racines profondes du phénomène et à repérer ses principales excroissances, de manière à le comprendre et l’expliquer.

@article{ballantyne_tragic_2021,
	title = {Tragic {Flaws}},
	issn = {2053-4477, 2053-4485},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/tragic-flaws/5FD53FAC82203E0A46CEFEA5B48D7249},
	doi = {10.1017/apa.2020.39},
	abstract = {In many tragic plays, the protagonist is brought down by a disaster that is a consequence of the protagonist's own error, his or her hamartia, the tragic flaw. Tragic flaws are disconcerting to the audience because they are not known or fully recognized by the protagonist—at least not until it is too late. In this essay, I take tragic flaws to be unreliable belief-forming dispositions that are unrecognized by us in some sense. I describe some different types of flaws and consider what we might do about them. Then I examine three types of policies for managing our tragic flaws: doxastic, dispositional, and methodological.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2021-09-29},
	journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association},
	author = {Ballantyne, Nathan},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Ignorance in philosophy and logic, PRINTED (Fonds papier), biases, ignorance, intellectual humility, self-judgment, social epistemology},
	pages = {1--21},
}

In many tragic plays, the protagonist is brought down by a disaster that is a consequence of the protagonist's own error, his or her hamartia, the tragic flaw. Tragic flaws are disconcerting to the audience because they are not known or fully recognized by the protagonist—at least not until it is too late. In this essay, I take tragic flaws to be unreliable belief-forming dispositions that are unrecognized by us in some sense. I describe some different types of flaws and consider what we might do about them. Then I examine three types of policies for managing our tragic flaws: doxastic, dispositional, and methodological.

@article{topcu_adopting_2021,
	title = {Adopting an ‘unlearner’ technology? {Knowledge} battles over pharmaceutical pain relief in childbirth in post-1968 {France}},
	volume = {13},
	issn = {2405-6618},
	shorttitle = {Adopting an ‘unlearner’ technology?},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S240566182100006X},
	doi = {10.1016/j.rbms.2021.03.002},
	abstract = {With a national rate of 82.4\%, France is currently one of the world’s leading users of epidural analgesia (EA), which is promoted not just as a pain reliever but also as a technology that makes childbirth safer. Drawing on analytical tools from science and technology studies, reproductive studies and ignorance studies, I will show how this obstetric drug came to be widely used after significant knowledge/ignorance battles had been fought during heated public and medical controversy in the 1970s. Different visions of the ‘knowns’, the ‘unknowns’ and ‘know-how’ came into conflict in this context, supported by a series of moral, political and feminist justifications that were often at odds with one another. While the defenders of natural birth clashed with feminists, created ambiguities around conceptions of the maternal body, and struggled to produce large-scale clinical knowledge on the risks of EA, the defenders of EA put forward technological promises and biomedical modernization as a means to outstrip the knowledge wars. In the aftermath of this epistemic battle, EA was to gradually become an ‘unlearner’ technology; that is, a modern tool that radically silenced the maternal body and led to denial, disregard or unawareness of a whole range of shared and alternative knowledges and ‘know-how’ relating to female physiology and the birth process that are free of pharmaceutical products and medical interventions.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2022-03-03},
	journal = {Reproductive Biomedicine \& Society Online},
	author = {Topçu, Sezin},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {France, PRINTED (Fonds papier), biomedical controversies, birth without violence, epidural analgesia, feminism, technology-driven ignorance},
	pages = {1--13},
}

With a national rate of 82.4%, France is currently one of the world’s leading users of epidural analgesia (EA), which is promoted not just as a pain reliever but also as a technology that makes childbirth safer. Drawing on analytical tools from science and technology studies, reproductive studies and ignorance studies, I will show how this obstetric drug came to be widely used after significant knowledge/ignorance battles had been fought during heated public and medical controversy in the 1970s. Different visions of the ‘knowns’, the ‘unknowns’ and ‘know-how’ came into conflict in this context, supported by a series of moral, political and feminist justifications that were often at odds with one another. While the defenders of natural birth clashed with feminists, created ambiguities around conceptions of the maternal body, and struggled to produce large-scale clinical knowledge on the risks of EA, the defenders of EA put forward technological promises and biomedical modernization as a means to outstrip the knowledge wars. In the aftermath of this epistemic battle, EA was to gradually become an ‘unlearner’ technology; that is, a modern tool that radically silenced the maternal body and led to denial, disregard or unawareness of a whole range of shared and alternative knowledges and ‘know-how’ relating to female physiology and the birth process that are free of pharmaceutical products and medical interventions.

@article{rincon_production_2021,
	title = {Production of ignorance and the gender gap in {STEM}: {An} approach to engineering education},
	volume = {11},
	issn = {1989-8487},
	shorttitle = {Producción de ignorancia y la brecha de género en {STEM}: {Un} acercamiento a la formación en ingeniería},
	doi = {10.24197/st.Extra_1.2021.139-159},
	abstract = {The study offers an alternative for the debate about the gender gap in STEM fields based on the relationship between engineering, gender, and ignorance. Unlike other approaches to the gap, its focus is epistemic. Its thesis is that gender can be taken as an epistemic factor of production of ignorance in engineering education. To support this thesis, the object of analysis is an extracurricular program employed for the education of engineering students in a Colombian university. Its method of data collection is the charrette workshop. © 2021 Universidad de Valladolid. All rights reserved.},
	language = {Spanish},
	number = {EXTRA 1},
	journal = {Sociologia y Tecnociencia},
	author = {Rincón, J.A. and Ortiz, J.M.E.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Agnotology, Engineering, Gender, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Production of ignorance, STEM gap},
	pages = {139--159},
}

The study offers an alternative for the debate about the gender gap in STEM fields based on the relationship between engineering, gender, and ignorance. Unlike other approaches to the gap, its focus is epistemic. Its thesis is that gender can be taken as an epistemic factor of production of ignorance in engineering education. To support this thesis, the object of analysis is an extracurricular program employed for the education of engineering students in a Colombian university. Its method of data collection is the charrette workshop. © 2021 Universidad de Valladolid. All rights reserved.

@article{white_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance and the regulation of artificial intelligence},
	issn = {1366-9877},
	doi = {10.1080/13669877.2021.1957985},
	abstract = {Much has been written about the risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI). This article is interested not only in what is known about these risks, but what remains unknown and how that unknowing is and should be approached. By reviewing and expanding on the scientific literature, it explores how social knowledge contributes to the understanding of AI and its regulatory challenges. The analysis is conducted in three steps. First, the article investigates risks associated with AI and shows how social scientists have challenged technically-oriented approaches that treat the social instrumentally. It then identifies the invisible and visible characteristics of AI, and argues that not only is it hard for outsiders to comprehend risks attached to the technology, but also for developers and researchers. Finally, it asserts the need to better recognise ignorance of AI, and explores what this means for how their risks are handled. The article concludes by stressing that proper regulation demands not only independent social knowledge about the pervasiveness, economic embeddedness and fragmented regulation of AI, but a social non-knowledge that is attuned to its complexity, and inhuman and incomprehensible behaviour. In properly allowing for ignorance of its social implications, the regulation of AI can proceed in a more modest, situated, plural and ultimately robust manner. © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Journal of Risk Research},
	author = {White, J.M. and Lidskog, R.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {10 Ignorance, uncertainty and risk, Artificial intelligence, PRINTED (Fonds papier), ignorance, non-knowledge, risk regulation},
}

Much has been written about the risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI). This article is interested not only in what is known about these risks, but what remains unknown and how that unknowing is and should be approached. By reviewing and expanding on the scientific literature, it explores how social knowledge contributes to the understanding of AI and its regulatory challenges. The analysis is conducted in three steps. First, the article investigates risks associated with AI and shows how social scientists have challenged technically-oriented approaches that treat the social instrumentally. It then identifies the invisible and visible characteristics of AI, and argues that not only is it hard for outsiders to comprehend risks attached to the technology, but also for developers and researchers. Finally, it asserts the need to better recognise ignorance of AI, and explores what this means for how their risks are handled. The article concludes by stressing that proper regulation demands not only independent social knowledge about the pervasiveness, economic embeddedness and fragmented regulation of AI, but a social non-knowledge that is attuned to its complexity, and inhuman and incomprehensible behaviour. In properly allowing for ignorance of its social implications, the regulation of AI can proceed in a more modest, situated, plural and ultimately robust manner. © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@incollection{bernecker_epistemic_2021,
	title = {An epistemic defense of news abstinence},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	abstract = {If we have reason to believe that by following the news, we acquire more false beliefs than true ones or we acquire true but irrelevant beliefs, then we may be justified in taking a newsbreak. We are propositionally justified in temporarily ignoring the news either in a domain or from a source if (i) we are in a fake news environment or are justified in believing that we are, and (ii) it is cognitively difficult or time consuming to discriminate genuine from fake news or to obtain genuine news. The defense of news abstinence rests either on reliabilism about justification or the defeasibility theory. When reliabilism is combined with epistemic consequentialism, news abstinence in a fake news environment is not only epistemically permitted but also epistemically required. © Sven Bernecker 2021.},
	language = {English},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	author = {Bernecker, S.},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.00014},
	keywords = {Blinding, Coverage reliability, Epistemic consequentialism, Epistemic value, Fake news environment, Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, Motivated ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {286--309},
}

If we have reason to believe that by following the news, we acquire more false beliefs than true ones or we acquire true but irrelevant beliefs, then we may be justified in taking a newsbreak. We are propositionally justified in temporarily ignoring the news either in a domain or from a source if (i) we are in a fake news environment or are justified in believing that we are, and (ii) it is cognitively difficult or time consuming to discriminate genuine from fake news or to obtain genuine news. The defense of news abstinence rests either on reliabilism about justification or the defeasibility theory. When reliabilism is combined with epistemic consequentialism, news abstinence in a fake news environment is not only epistemically permitted but also epistemically required. © Sven Bernecker 2021.

@book{frickel_residues_2021,
	address = {New Brunswick, NJ},
	title = {Residues: {Thinking} {Through} {Chemical} {Environments}},
	isbn = {978-1-978818-01-9},
	shorttitle = {Residues},
	language = {Anglais},
	publisher = {Rutgers University Press},
	author = {Frickel, Scott and Creager, Angela N. H. and Boudia, Soraya and Henry, Emmanuel and Jas, Nathalie and Reinhardt, Carsten and Roberts, Jody A.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

@article{pritchard_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance and {Inquiry}},
	volume = {58},
	issn = {0003-0481},
	url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/48613999},
	doi = {10.2307/48613999},
	abstract = {It is argued that the two main accounts of ignorance in the contemporary literature—in the terms of the lack of knowledge and the lack of true belief—are lacking in key respects. A new way of thinking about ignorance is offered that can accommodate the motivations for both of the standard views, but which in the process also avoids the problems that afflict these proposals. In short, this new account of ignorance incorporates the idea that ignorance essentially involves not just the absence of a certain epistemic good, but also an intellectual failing of inquiry. It is further contended that making sense of this normative dimension to ignorance requires one to situate one’s account of ignorance within a wider epistemic axiology.},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2021-10-07},
	journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
	author = {Pritchard, Duncan},
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: [North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press]},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {111--124},
}

It is argued that the two main accounts of ignorance in the contemporary literature—in the terms of the lack of knowledge and the lack of true belief—are lacking in key respects. A new way of thinking about ignorance is offered that can accommodate the motivations for both of the standard views, but which in the process also avoids the problems that afflict these proposals. In short, this new account of ignorance incorporates the idea that ignorance essentially involves not just the absence of a certain epistemic good, but also an intellectual failing of inquiry. It is further contended that making sense of this normative dimension to ignorance requires one to situate one’s account of ignorance within a wider epistemic axiology.

@article{arfini_embodied_2021,
	title = {Embodied {Irrationality}? {Knowledge} {Avoidance}, {Willful} {Ignorance}, and the {Paradox} of {Autonomy}},
	volume = {12},
	issn = {1664-1078},
	shorttitle = {Embodied {Irrationality}?},
	doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2021.769591},
	abstract = {In the current philosophical and psychological literature, knowledge avoidance and willful ignorance seem to be almost identical conditions involved in irrational patterns of reasoning. In this paper, we will argue that not only these two phenomena should be distinguished, but that they also fall into different parts of the epistemic rationality-irrationality spectrum. We will adopt an epistemological and embodied perspective to propose a definition for both terms. Then, we will maintain that, while willful ignorance is involved in irrational patterns of reasoning and beliefs, knowledge avoidance should be considered epistemically rational under particular circumstances. We will begin our analysis by considering which of the two phenomena is involved in patterns of reasoning that are still amply recognized as irrational—as wishful thinking, self-deception, and akrasia. We will then discuss the impact of epistemic feelings—which are emotional events that depend on epistemic states—on agents' decision-making. Then, we will consider the impact of willful ignorance and knowledge avoidance on agents' autonomy. By considering these issues, we will argue that when agents are aware that they are avoiding certain information (and aware of what kind of feelings acquiring the information would trigger), knowledge avoidance should be considered a rational, autonomy-increasing, hope-depended selection of information. Copyright © 2021 Arfini and Magnani.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
	author = {Arfini, S. and Magnani, L.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, PRINTED (Fonds papier), autonomy, bounded rationality, embodied cognition, epistemic feelings, hope, knowledge avoidance, self-deception, willful ignorance},
}

In the current philosophical and psychological literature, knowledge avoidance and willful ignorance seem to be almost identical conditions involved in irrational patterns of reasoning. In this paper, we will argue that not only these two phenomena should be distinguished, but that they also fall into different parts of the epistemic rationality-irrationality spectrum. We will adopt an epistemological and embodied perspective to propose a definition for both terms. Then, we will maintain that, while willful ignorance is involved in irrational patterns of reasoning and beliefs, knowledge avoidance should be considered epistemically rational under particular circumstances. We will begin our analysis by considering which of the two phenomena is involved in patterns of reasoning that are still amply recognized as irrational—as wishful thinking, self-deception, and akrasia. We will then discuss the impact of epistemic feelings—which are emotional events that depend on epistemic states—on agents' decision-making. Then, we will consider the impact of willful ignorance and knowledge avoidance on agents' autonomy. By considering these issues, we will argue that when agents are aware that they are avoiding certain information (and aware of what kind of feelings acquiring the information would trigger), knowledge avoidance should be considered a rational, autonomy-increasing, hope-depended selection of information. Copyright © 2021 Arfini and Magnani.

@article{ducourant_science_2021,
	title = {Science or {Ignorance} of {Animal} {Welfare}? {A} {Case} {Study}: {Scientific} {Reports} {Published} in {Preparation} for the {First} {European} {Directive} on {Animal} {Welfare} (1979-1980)},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Science or {Ignorance} of {Animal} {Welfare}?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211040179},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211040179},
	abstract = {In 1979, the Council of the European Communities declared its intention to ban battery cages for laying hens; one year later, everything about the ban is forgotten. During this preparatory year (1979-1980), all that happened is the publication of scientific reports, that is, attempts at producing knowledge as a basis for and justification of the ban decision. This paper aims at understanding to what extent ignorance and doubt were produced instead. By examining the reports, I demonstrate that there are three interrelated levels of ignorance production: (1) the missions given by the Commission to scientists were ambiguous, (2) questions inherent to animal welfare sciences, such as the significant variability of their measures and results, lead to a systematic standardization, and (3) the battery cage works as a techno-scientific promise and an “obligatory passage point” where scientists and industry meet. Disciplinary identity issues therefore lead scientists to adopt a double standard about the welfare of laying hens.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2021-09-29},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Ducourant, Samuel},
	month = aug,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	keywords = {European directives, PRINTED (Fonds papier), agnotology, animal welfare, egg industry, production of ignorance},
	pages = {01622439211040179},
}

In 1979, the Council of the European Communities declared its intention to ban battery cages for laying hens; one year later, everything about the ban is forgotten. During this preparatory year (1979-1980), all that happened is the publication of scientific reports, that is, attempts at producing knowledge as a basis for and justification of the ban decision. This paper aims at understanding to what extent ignorance and doubt were produced instead. By examining the reports, I demonstrate that there are three interrelated levels of ignorance production: (1) the missions given by the Commission to scientists were ambiguous, (2) questions inherent to animal welfare sciences, such as the significant variability of their measures and results, lead to a systematic standardization, and (3) the battery cage works as a techno-scientific promise and an “obligatory passage point” where scientists and industry meet. Disciplinary identity issues therefore lead scientists to adopt a double standard about the welfare of laying hens.

@book{henry_fabrique_2021,
	title = {La fabrique des non‐problèmes},
	isbn = {978-2-7246-2795-4},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/la-fabrique-des-non-problemes--9782724627954.htm},
	abstract = {Pourquoi certains problèmes – la pollution des sols et les cancers professionnels par exemple – restent-ils durablement invisibles ? Pourquoi les décideurs publics semblent-ils attendre qu’un énorme scandale éclate pour se sentir contraints à leur apporter des réponses politiques ? Comment expliquer le désintérêt persistant à leur endroit, au point qu’ils deviennent des « non-problèmes », contrairement à d’autres qui font l’objet de politiques volontaristes ?Le politiste et sociologue Emmanuel Henry, s’appuyant sur de nombreux cas, montre comment l’industrie déploie de véritables stratégies pour soustraire du débat public les sujets les plus préjudiciables à ses activités. Il s’agit d’éloigner les risques du regard des citoyens en produisant de l’ignorance scientifique (tabac), de lutter contre l’émergence de nouvelles connaissances en orientant les financements (amiante), de techniciser les sujets pour construire les normes avec les experts de l’État en toute discrétion (produits chimiques), d’entretenir l’indifférence en s’appuyant sur les inégalités sociales pour maintenir le statu quo. Autant d’éléments pour que les non-décisions s’accumulent.},
	language = {fr},
	urldate = {2021-10-07},
	publisher = {Presses de Sciences Po},
	author = {Henry, Emmanuel},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Cairndomain: www.cairn.info},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Pourquoi certains problèmes – la pollution des sols et les cancers professionnels par exemple – restent-ils durablement invisibles ? Pourquoi les décideurs publics semblent-ils attendre qu’un énorme scandale éclate pour se sentir contraints à leur apporter des réponses politiques ? Comment expliquer le désintérêt persistant à leur endroit, au point qu’ils deviennent des « non-problèmes », contrairement à d’autres qui font l’objet de politiques volontaristes ?Le politiste et sociologue Emmanuel Henry, s’appuyant sur de nombreux cas, montre comment l’industrie déploie de véritables stratégies pour soustraire du débat public les sujets les plus préjudiciables à ses activités. Il s’agit d’éloigner les risques du regard des citoyens en produisant de l’ignorance scientifique (tabac), de lutter contre l’émergence de nouvelles connaissances en orientant les financements (amiante), de techniciser les sujets pour construire les normes avec les experts de l’État en toute discrétion (produits chimiques), d’entretenir l’indifférence en s’appuyant sur les inégalités sociales pour maintenir le statu quo. Autant d’éléments pour que les non-décisions s’accumulent.

@article{thomas_defects_2021,
	title = {Defects in {Doubt} {Manufacturing}: {The} {Trajectory} of a {Pro}-industrial {Argument} in the {Struggle} for the {Definition} of {Carcinogenic} {Substances}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Defects in {Doubt} {Manufacturing}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211026746},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211026746},
	abstract = {Recent work in science and technology studies has looked at how chemical industries manufacture doubt about the toxicity of their products and manage to establish their scientific views in the field of international regulations on toxic substances. Rather than examining yet another “victory” for the industry, this article analyzes the deployment of a “pro-industrial” scientific position, punctuated mainly by failure and opposition. This trajectory is tracked through the analysis of several data sets: archives, scientific documentation, and sociological interviews. The first part of the article charts the development of a biochemical concept, “peroxisome proliferation,” within an academic subfield and its subsequent appropriation by certain industrial parties who used it as a defensive weapon for their commercial interests. Through the example of the International Agency for Research on Cancer and its network of interdependent institutions, the article goes on to analyze the multiple attempts of chemical industry players to establish their interpretation of the concept within the regulatory bodies for carcinogenic substances. The study of such systems of sociological interdependence shows that a full analysis of the “doubt manufacturing” requires an examination not only of the manufacturing process but also of the reception of the ideas produced.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2021-09-08},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Thomas, Valentin},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	keywords = {International Agency for Research on Cancer, PRINTED (Fonds papier), doubt manufacturing, industry influence, peroxisome proliferation, regulation of carcinogens},
	pages = {998--1020},
}

Recent work in science and technology studies has looked at how chemical industries manufacture doubt about the toxicity of their products and manage to establish their scientific views in the field of international regulations on toxic substances. Rather than examining yet another “victory” for the industry, this article analyzes the deployment of a “pro-industrial” scientific position, punctuated mainly by failure and opposition. This trajectory is tracked through the analysis of several data sets: archives, scientific documentation, and sociological interviews. The first part of the article charts the development of a biochemical concept, “peroxisome proliferation,” within an academic subfield and its subsequent appropriation by certain industrial parties who used it as a defensive weapon for their commercial interests. Through the example of the International Agency for Research on Cancer and its network of interdependent institutions, the article goes on to analyze the multiple attempts of chemical industry players to establish their interpretation of the concept within the regulatory bodies for carcinogenic substances. The study of such systems of sociological interdependence shows that a full analysis of the “doubt manufacturing” requires an examination not only of the manufacturing process but also of the reception of the ideas produced.

@article{lanier-christensen_creating_2021,
	title = {Creating {Regulatory} {Harmony}: {The} {Participatory} {Politics} of {OECD} {Chemical} {Testing} {Standards} in the {Making}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Creating {Regulatory} {Harmony}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211029369},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211029369},
	abstract = {In recent decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become a powerful forum for trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. OECD members have worked to reconcile divergent national regulatory approaches, applying a single framework across sovereign states, in effect determining whose knowledge-making practices would guide regulatory action throughout the industrialized world. Focusing on US regulators, industry associations, and environmental groups, this article explores the participatory politics of OECD chemical regulation harmonization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. These efforts were conditioned by differential institutional access and resources among stakeholders who sought to shape regulatory knowledge rules. Facing competing European and US approaches to chemical data—a minimum “base set” of test data versus case-by-case determinations—OECD members chose the European approach in 1980. However, US regulatory politics shifted with the election of President Reagan, prompting industry associations to lobby the US government to block the agreement. Examining the micropolitics of these standards in the making, I demonstrate that while long-term structures advantaged industrial actors, ideological alignment with the US government precipitated their decisive influence. The case illustrates the importance of attending to the distinctive politics of international harmonization and the effects on transnational knowledge-making and regulatory intervention.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2021-09-08},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Lanier-Christensen, Colleen},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), chemical regulation, expertise, governance, markets/economies, participation, politics, power, regulatory science},
	pages = {925--952},
}

In recent decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become a powerful forum for trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. OECD members have worked to reconcile divergent national regulatory approaches, applying a single framework across sovereign states, in effect determining whose knowledge-making practices would guide regulatory action throughout the industrialized world. Focusing on US regulators, industry associations, and environmental groups, this article explores the participatory politics of OECD chemical regulation harmonization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. These efforts were conditioned by differential institutional access and resources among stakeholders who sought to shape regulatory knowledge rules. Facing competing European and US approaches to chemical data—a minimum “base set” of test data versus case-by-case determinations—OECD members chose the European approach in 1980. However, US regulatory politics shifted with the election of President Reagan, prompting industry associations to lobby the US government to block the agreement. Examining the micropolitics of these standards in the making, I demonstrate that while long-term structures advantaged industrial actors, ideological alignment with the US government precipitated their decisive influence. The case illustrates the importance of attending to the distinctive politics of international harmonization and the effects on transnational knowledge-making and regulatory intervention.

@article{henry_governing_2021,
	title = {Governing {Occupational} {Exposure} {Using} {Thresholds}: {A} {Policy} {Biased} {Toward} {Industry}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {Governing {Occupational} {Exposure} {Using} {Thresholds}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211015300},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211015300},
	abstract = {Strongly grounded in scientific knowledge, the instrument known as occupational exposure limits or threshold limit values has changed government modalities of exposure to hazardous chemicals in workplaces, transforming both the substance of the problem at hand and the power dynamics between the actors involved. Some of the characteristics of this instrument favor the interests of industries at the expense of employees, their representatives, and the authorities in charge of regulating these risks. First, this instrument can be analyzed as a boundary object that has very different uses in space and time. In particular, it is increasingly masking its industrial origins to appear as an instrument that is almost exclusively based on scientific rationale. In the case of asbestos and its substitutes, the use of an instrument relying on scientific expertise generates a specific temporality of implementation that allows manufacturers to take advantage of periods during which regulations are either nonexistent or very loose. Finally, the choice of a technoscientific definition of the issues contributes to shifting the negotiations to a field where companies are in a position of strength and their opponents are weakened.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2021-09-08},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Henry, Emmanuel},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, PRINTED (Fonds papier), expertise, governance, health regulation, industry, occupational health, politics, power},
	pages = {953--974},
}

Strongly grounded in scientific knowledge, the instrument known as occupational exposure limits or threshold limit values has changed government modalities of exposure to hazardous chemicals in workplaces, transforming both the substance of the problem at hand and the power dynamics between the actors involved. Some of the characteristics of this instrument favor the interests of industries at the expense of employees, their representatives, and the authorities in charge of regulating these risks. First, this instrument can be analyzed as a boundary object that has very different uses in space and time. In particular, it is increasingly masking its industrial origins to appear as an instrument that is almost exclusively based on scientific rationale. In the case of asbestos and its substitutes, the use of an instrument relying on scientific expertise generates a specific temporality of implementation that allows manufacturers to take advantage of periods during which regulations are either nonexistent or very loose. Finally, the choice of a technoscientific definition of the issues contributes to shifting the negotiations to a field where companies are in a position of strength and their opponents are weakened.

@article{creager_test_2021,
	title = {To {Test} or {Not} to {Test}: {Tools}, {Rules}, and {Corporate} {Data} in {US} {Chemicals} {Regulation}},
	volume = {46},
	issn = {0162-2439},
	shorttitle = {To {Test} or {Not} to {Test}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/01622439211013373},
	doi = {10.1177/01622439211013373},
	abstract = {When the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was passed by the US Congress in 1976, its advocates pointed to new generation of genotoxicity tests as a way to systematically screen chemicals for carcinogenicity. However, in the end, TSCA did not require any new testing of commercial chemicals, including these rapid laboratory screens. In addition, although the Environmental Protection Agency was to make public data about the health effects of industrial chemicals, companies routinely used the agency’s obligation to protect confidential business information to prevent such disclosures. This paper traces the contested history of TSCA and its provisions for testing, from the circulation of the first draft bill in the Nixon administration through the debates over its implementation, which stretched into the Reagan administration. The paucity of publicly available health and environmental data concerning chemicals, I argue, was a by-product of the law and its execution, leading to a situation of institutionalized ignorance, the underside of regulatory knowledge.},
	language = {en},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2021-09-08},
	journal = {Science, Technology, \& Human Values},
	author = {Creager, Angela N. H.},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), chemicals, environmental practices, law, markets/economies},
	pages = {975--997},
}

When the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was passed by the US Congress in 1976, its advocates pointed to new generation of genotoxicity tests as a way to systematically screen chemicals for carcinogenicity. However, in the end, TSCA did not require any new testing of commercial chemicals, including these rapid laboratory screens. In addition, although the Environmental Protection Agency was to make public data about the health effects of industrial chemicals, companies routinely used the agency’s obligation to protect confidential business information to prevent such disclosures. This paper traces the contested history of TSCA and its provisions for testing, from the circulation of the first draft bill in the Nixon administration through the debates over its implementation, which stretched into the Reagan administration. The paucity of publicly available health and environmental data concerning chemicals, I argue, was a by-product of the law and its execution, leading to a situation of institutionalized ignorance, the underside of regulatory knowledge.

@incollection{priest_how_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {How {Vice} {Can} {Motivate} {Distrust} in {Elites} and {Trust} in {Fake} {News}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-9},
	abstract = {This chapter discusses the vices of epistemic insensitivity and epistemic obstruction in special relation to contemporary political divides and contemporary habits of media consumption. It argues that both vices threaten to worsen political and social divisions between self-identified conservatives on the one hand, and those that the said self-identified conservatives themselves identify as “elites,” “liberal elites,” “experts,” “progressives,” or, “the left.” In turn, this worsening divide worsens distrust in news sources associated with “the wrong” political perspective. Partisans can become increasingly suspect of all news sources outside of their own political bubble; the entrenchment of the aforementioned vices makes persons more and more likely to deem any source outside their bubble “fake news.”},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Priest, Maura},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0009},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), elitism, epistemic insensitivity, epistemic obstruction, feigned disagreement, media consumption},
}

This chapter discusses the vices of epistemic insensitivity and epistemic obstruction in special relation to contemporary political divides and contemporary habits of media consumption. It argues that both vices threaten to worsen political and social divisions between self-identified conservatives on the one hand, and those that the said self-identified conservatives themselves identify as “elites,” “liberal elites,” “experts,” “progressives,” or, “the left.” In turn, this worsening divide worsens distrust in news sources associated with “the wrong” political perspective. Partisans can become increasingly suspect of all news sources outside of their own political bubble; the entrenchment of the aforementioned vices makes persons more and more likely to deem any source outside their bubble “fake news.”

@incollection{grundmann_facing_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Facing {Epistemic} {Authorities}: {Where} {Democratic} {Ideals} and {Critical} {Thinking} {Mislead} {Cognition}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	shorttitle = {Facing {Epistemic} {Authorities}},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-7},
	abstract = {Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. This chapter argues that these two Enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also further the spread of conspiracy theories and undermine trust in experts. As a result, we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Grundmann, Thomas},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0007},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), deliberative democracy, democratic ideals, epistemic deference, experts, pre-emption view},
}

Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. This chapter argues that these two Enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also further the spread of conspiracy theories and undermine trust in experts. As a result, we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter

@incollection{ferrari_enquiry_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Enquiry and {Normative} {Deviance}: {The} {Role} of {Fake} {News} in {Science} {Denialism}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	shorttitle = {Enquiry and {Normative} {Deviance}},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-6},
	abstract = {It is argued that science denialism brings about an aberrant form of enquiry that deviates in significant ways from the epistemic norms governing scientific enquiry. Science denialism doesn’t involve just a rejection of a scientific theory; it also challenges the practice of continuously and impartially testing research methods, theories, and evidential sources with the aim of improving the accuracy of our theories. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the epistemic mechanisms at work. It develops a fine-grained framework to model a variety of normative deviances that may take place in enquiry. Through analysing two case studies, it is argued that fake news plays two pivotal roles in shaping epistemic norms operating within science denialism. First, it discredits a variety of (institutional) sources of evidence; second, it also plays a part in building the alternative explanation of the target phenomena.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Ferrari, Filippo and Moruzzi, Sebastiano},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0006},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), anti-vaxxers, enquiry, fake news, flat-earthers, normative deviance, science denialism},
}

It is argued that science denialism brings about an aberrant form of enquiry that deviates in significant ways from the epistemic norms governing scientific enquiry. Science denialism doesn’t involve just a rejection of a scientific theory; it also challenges the practice of continuously and impartially testing research methods, theories, and evidential sources with the aim of improving the accuracy of our theories. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the epistemic mechanisms at work. It develops a fine-grained framework to model a variety of normative deviances that may take place in enquiry. Through analysing two case studies, it is argued that fake news plays two pivotal roles in shaping epistemic norms operating within science denialism. First, it discredits a variety of (institutional) sources of evidence; second, it also plays a part in building the alternative explanation of the target phenomena.

@incollection{coady_fake_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {The {Fake} {News} about {Fake} {News}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-4},
	abstract = {It is widely believed that we are facing a problem, caused by something called ‘fake news’. Governments and other powerful institutions around the world have adopted a variety of measures to restrict the reporting and dissemination of claims they deem to be fake news. Many of these measures are clear breaches of fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press. This chapter arsgues that, contrary to common opinion, there is no new or growing problem of fake news. There is instead a new and growing problem caused by the term ‘fake news’. Although this term has no fixed meaning it does have a fixed function. It functions to restrict permissible public speech and opinion in ways that serve the interests of powerful people and institutions.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Coady, David},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0004},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), deliberative democracy, fake news, free speech, information warfare, state censorship},
}

It is widely believed that we are facing a problem, caused by something called ‘fake news’. Governments and other powerful institutions around the world have adopted a variety of measures to restrict the reporting and dissemination of claims they deem to be fake news. Many of these measures are clear breaches of fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press. This chapter arsgues that, contrary to common opinion, there is no new or growing problem of fake news. There is instead a new and growing problem caused by the term ‘fake news’. Although this term has no fixed meaning it does have a fixed function. It functions to restrict permissible public speech and opinion in ways that serve the interests of powerful people and institutions.

@incollection{pritchard_good_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Good {News}, {Bad} {News}, {Fake} {News}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-3},
	abstract = {An account is offered of the nature of fake news, and it is explained how this account differs from the main proposals in the contemporary philosophical literature in this regard. One key feature of the account is the idea that fake news is not a genuine form of news. In particular, fake news is to be distinguished from genuine news that is epistemically problematic. It is argued that this point is important because it entails that what is required to differentiate news with a sound epistemic pedigree from news that has a poor epistemic pedigree is distinct from what is required to differentiate genuine news from fake news. This has implications for how we should manage the challenge posed by fake news, at both the individual and the structural levels.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Pritchard, Duncan},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0003},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, Keywords, PRINTED (Fonds papier), epistemic pedigree, epistemic virtue, fake news, intellectual humility, misinformation},
}

An account is offered of the nature of fake news, and it is explained how this account differs from the main proposals in the contemporary philosophical literature in this regard. One key feature of the account is the idea that fake news is not a genuine form of news. In particular, fake news is to be distinguished from genuine news that is epistemically problematic. It is argued that this point is important because it entails that what is required to differentiate news with a sound epistemic pedigree from news that has a poor epistemic pedigree is distinct from what is required to differentiate genuine news from fake news. This has implications for how we should manage the challenge posed by fake news, at both the individual and the structural levels.

@book{bernecker_epistemology_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	series = {Engaging {Philosophy}},
	title = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977},
	abstract = {This volume consists of a series of essays on the epistemology of fake news, written by leading philosophers. The epistemology of fake news is a branch of applied epistemology, and an exercise in non-ideal epistemology. It provides insight into the nature and spread of misinformation, fake news, conspiratorial thinking, echo chambers, epistemic pathologies in the formation of public opinion, and the relation between epistemic ideals and fake news. The volume is arranged into three parts. The chapters in Part I are concerned with the meaning of ‘fake news’ and related notions such as ‘conspiracy theory’ as well as with the novelty of the phenomenon of fake news. This part also addresses the question whether ‘fake news’ and related notions can be properly used within science. Part II discusses various practices that generate fake news, promote its spread, or are purported to do so. These practices include science denialism, Google algorithms, democratic ideals, vice in experts, and unreliable echo chambers. Part III explores potential therapies for fake news. Authors’ proposals include developing the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, abstaining from news, and developing good epistemic practices.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2021-09-08},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Flowerree, Amy K. and Grundmann, Thomas},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), conspiracy theories, democratic deliberation, democratic ideals, echo chambers, fake news, non-ideal epistemology, science denialism, social epistemology},
}

This volume consists of a series of essays on the epistemology of fake news, written by leading philosophers. The epistemology of fake news is a branch of applied epistemology, and an exercise in non-ideal epistemology. It provides insight into the nature and spread of misinformation, fake news, conspiratorial thinking, echo chambers, epistemic pathologies in the formation of public opinion, and the relation between epistemic ideals and fake news. The volume is arranged into three parts. The chapters in Part I are concerned with the meaning of ‘fake news’ and related notions such as ‘conspiracy theory’ as well as with the novelty of the phenomenon of fake news. This part also addresses the question whether ‘fake news’ and related notions can be properly used within science. Part II discusses various practices that generate fake news, promote its spread, or are purported to do so. These practices include science denialism, Google algorithms, democratic ideals, vice in experts, and unreliable echo chambers. Part III explores potential therapies for fake news. Authors’ proposals include developing the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, abstaining from news, and developing good epistemic practices.

@incollection{novaes_is_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Is {Fake} {News} {Old} {News}?},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-8},
	abstract = {Do we live in a post-truth era where fake news and alternative facts run rampant? This suggestion has become a staple of recent non-fiction writing. Others disagree and suggest that contemporary fake news is really nothing new. This chapter examines what, if anything, is novel about contemporary fake news. After clarifying the meaning of fake news for the present purposes, the chapter presents three models of manipulation of public opinion and argues that they are recognizable throughout history. Next, the chapter looks at various features of contemporary fake news that could account for its novelty. Based on a survey of historical and empirical evidence, it is proposed that the novelty of contemporary fake news primarily lies in how the Internet and social media have changed the ways in which (fake) news can be distributed and consumed},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Novaes, Catarina Dutilh and de Ridder, Jeroen},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0008},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), deliberative democracy, fake news, information warfare, internet, propaganda, social media},
}

Do we live in a post-truth era where fake news and alternative facts run rampant? This suggestion has become a staple of recent non-fiction writing. Others disagree and suggest that contemporary fake news is really nothing new. This chapter examines what, if anything, is novel about contemporary fake news. After clarifying the meaning of fake news for the present purposes, the chapter presents three models of manipulation of public opinion and argues that they are recognizable throughout history. Next, the chapter looks at various features of contemporary fake news that could account for its novelty. Based on a survey of historical and empirical evidence, it is proposed that the novelty of contemporary fake news primarily lies in how the Internet and social media have changed the ways in which (fake) news can be distributed and consumed

@incollection{napolitano_conspiracy_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Conspiracy {Theories} and {Evidential} {Self}-{Insulation}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-5},
	abstract = {What are conspiracy theories? And what, if anything, is epistemically wrong with them? This chapter offers an account on which conspiracy theories are a unique way of holding a belief in a conspiracy. Specifically, conspiracy theories are taken to be self-insulating beliefs in conspiracies. On this view, conspiracy theorists have their conspiratorial beliefs in a way that is immune to revision by counter-evidence. It is argued that conspiracy theories are always irrational. Although conspiracy theories involve an expectation to encounter some seemingly disconfirming evidence (allegedly planted by the conspirators), resistance to all counter-evidence cannot be justified on these grounds.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Napolitano, M. Giulia},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0005},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), conspiracy theories, conspiracy-belief, conspiratorial explanations, evidence, irrationality},
}

What are conspiracy theories? And what, if anything, is epistemically wrong with them? This chapter offers an account on which conspiracy theories are a unique way of holding a belief in a conspiracy. Specifically, conspiracy theories are taken to be self-insulating beliefs in conspiracies. On this view, conspiracy theorists have their conspiratorial beliefs in a way that is immune to revision by counter-evidence. It is argued that conspiracy theories are always irrational. Although conspiracy theories involve an expectation to encounter some seemingly disconfirming evidence (allegedly planted by the conspirators), resistance to all counter-evidence cannot be justified on these grounds.

@incollection{jaster_speaking_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Speaking of {Fake} {News}: {Definitions} and {Dimensions}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	shorttitle = {Speaking of {Fake} {News}},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-2},
	abstract = {This chapter shows why defining “fake news” is worthwhile and what a suitable definition of “fake news” might look like. It begins by introducing the authors’ definition of “fake news” (§2) and employs it to set fake news apart from related phenomena that are often conflated with it (§3). It then extracts seven potential dimensions of the concept of fake news from the literature (§4) and compares the most representative definitions that have been proposed so far along those dimensions (§5). The chapter’s primary aims are (i) to enable a systematic evaluation of prevalent definitions with respect to their extensional scope, practical utility, and conceptual transparency, (ii) to demonstrate that there is more widespread agreement than one would think at the outset, and (iii) to show (in §6) that defining “fake news” is not only far from futile, but of vital importance to confront the epistemic threats posed by fake news.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Jaster, Romy and Lanius, David},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0002},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), bullshit, conspiracy theories, fake news, propaganda, truth, truthfulness},
}

This chapter shows why defining “fake news” is worthwhile and what a suitable definition of “fake news” might look like. It begins by introducing the authors’ definition of “fake news” (§2) and employs it to set fake news apart from related phenomena that are often conflated with it (§3). It then extracts seven potential dimensions of the concept of fake news from the literature (§4) and compares the most representative definitions that have been proposed so far along those dimensions (§5). The chapter’s primary aims are (i) to enable a systematic evaluation of prevalent definitions with respect to their extensional scope, practical utility, and conceptual transparency, (ii) to demonstrate that there is more widespread agreement than one would think at the outset, and (iii) to show (in §6) that defining “fake news” is not only far from futile, but of vital importance to confront the epistemic threats posed by fake news.

@incollection{wright_virtue_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {The {Virtue} of {Epistemic} {Trustworthiness} and {Re}-{Posting} on {Social} {Media}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-12},
	abstract = {Re-posting fake news on social media exposes others to epistemic risks that include not only false belief but also misguided trust in the source of the fake news. The risk of misguided trust comes from the fact that re-posting is a kind of credentialing; as a new kind of speech-act, re-posting does not yet have established norms and so runs an additional risk of “bent credentialing.” This chapter proposes that other-regarding epistemic virtues can help us mitigate the epistemic risks that come with re-posting—specifically the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness. It further considers how an epistemically trustworthy person should regulate her re-posting behavior in light of the psychological evidence that retracting false beliefs is far more difficult than might be supposed. Behaving in an epistemically trustworthy way requires being responsive to the real risks that our actions expose others to, as well as recognizing the real ways that others depend on us.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Wright, Sarah},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0012},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), bent credentialing, bent testimony, epistemic virtue, fake news, social media, trustworthiness},
}

Re-posting fake news on social media exposes others to epistemic risks that include not only false belief but also misguided trust in the source of the fake news. The risk of misguided trust comes from the fact that re-posting is a kind of credentialing; as a new kind of speech-act, re-posting does not yet have established norms and so runs an additional risk of “bent credentialing.” This chapter proposes that other-regarding epistemic virtues can help us mitigate the epistemic risks that come with re-posting—specifically the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness. It further considers how an epistemically trustworthy person should regulate her re-posting behavior in light of the psychological evidence that retracting false beliefs is far more difficult than might be supposed. Behaving in an epistemically trustworthy way requires being responsive to the real risks that our actions expose others to, as well as recognizing the real ways that others depend on us.

@incollection{baurmann_trust_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Trust {No} {One}?: {The} ({Social}) {Epistemological} {Consequences} of {Belief} in {Conspiracy} {Theories}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	shorttitle = {Trust {No} {One}?},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-16},
	abstract = {Conspiracy theorists are typically sceptical about the trustworthiness of central governmental institutions. Some philosophers have argued that, therefore, conspiracy theorists in general play an important role in modern democracies. Their scepticism may lead to the exposure of actual governmental conspiracies and strengthens institutions of open societies that control the different branches of government. This chapter argues that this optimism is misplaced. Belief in false conspiracy theories doesn’t make one interested in strong controlling institutions. On the contrary, it is not surprising that the conspiracy theorists who voted people like Trump into office don’t mind at all when the president questions the very legitimacy of such institutions.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Baurmann, Michael and Cohnitz, Daniel},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0016},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), conspiracy theories, debunking, epistemological effects, inconsistency, infiltration, irrationality, trust-networks},
}

Conspiracy theorists are typically sceptical about the trustworthiness of central governmental institutions. Some philosophers have argued that, therefore, conspiracy theorists in general play an important role in modern democracies. Their scepticism may lead to the exposure of actual governmental conspiracies and strengthens institutions of open societies that control the different branches of government. This chapter argues that this optimism is misplaced. Belief in false conspiracy theories doesn’t make one interested in strong controlling institutions. On the contrary, it is not surprising that the conspiracy theorists who voted people like Trump into office don’t mind at all when the president questions the very legitimacy of such institutions.

@incollection{gelfert_fake_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Fake {News}, {False} {Beliefs}, and the {Fallible} {Art} of {Knowledge} {Maintenance}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-15},
	abstract = {The term ‘fake news’, it is argued in this chapter, captures a novel kind of social-epistemic dysfunction that arises from systemic distortions of established processes of creating, disseminating, and consuming news-like content. Navigating informational environments populated by fake news requires the cultivation of epistemic routines that reduce our exposure to misleading and deceptive information, while at the same time continuing to allow us to partake in the collective growth of knowledge. Shifting the focus to epistemic routines steers a middle path between two frequently encountered dichotomous responses to the problem of fake news: viz., between emphasizing the individual’s responsibility to ‘think critically and check one’s sources’ and advocating technological tweaks (such as automated fact-checking). While epistemic agents ought to be held responsible for the epistemic routines they commit themselves to, there is also a collective need for making the predictable effects of such choices transparent to individuals, wherever technologically possible.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Gelfert, Axel},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0015},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), attention economy, epistemic coverage, epistemic routines, fake news, prebunking},
}

The term ‘fake news’, it is argued in this chapter, captures a novel kind of social-epistemic dysfunction that arises from systemic distortions of established processes of creating, disseminating, and consuming news-like content. Navigating informational environments populated by fake news requires the cultivation of epistemic routines that reduce our exposure to misleading and deceptive information, while at the same time continuing to allow us to partake in the collective growth of knowledge. Shifting the focus to epistemic routines steers a middle path between two frequently encountered dichotomous responses to the problem of fake news: viz., between emphasizing the individual’s responsibility to ‘think critically and check one’s sources’ and advocating technological tweaks (such as automated fact-checking). While epistemic agents ought to be held responsible for the epistemic routines they commit themselves to, there is also a collective need for making the predictable effects of such choices transparent to individuals, wherever technologically possible.

@incollection{genot_dissemination_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {The {Dissemination} of {Scientific} {Fake} {News}: {On} the {Ranking} of {Retracted} {Articles} in {Google}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	shorttitle = {The {Dissemination} of {Scientific} {Fake} {News}},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-11},
	abstract = {Fake news can originate from scientific fraud. An article can be retracted upon discovery of fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake science can be visible in Google even after the article is retracted. Authors hypothesize that the explanation lies in the popularity-based logic governing Google’s foundational PageRank algorithm, in conjunction with the “law of retraction”: a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interesting and therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. This chapter presents an empirical study drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud (fabrication of data) in the Retraction Watch public database. It finds that both Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not rank a link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted. Thus, both Google Search and Google Scholar risk disseminating fake science through their ranking algorithms.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Genot, Emmanuel J. and Olsson, Erik J.},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0011},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), algorithm accuracy, fake news, retraction watch, scientific fraud, social media},
}

Fake news can originate from scientific fraud. An article can be retracted upon discovery of fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake science can be visible in Google even after the article is retracted. Authors hypothesize that the explanation lies in the popularity-based logic governing Google’s foundational PageRank algorithm, in conjunction with the “law of retraction”: a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interesting and therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. This chapter presents an empirical study drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud (fabrication of data) in the Retraction Watch public database. It finds that both Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not rank a link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted. Thus, both Google Search and Google Scholar risk disseminating fake science through their ranking algorithms.

@incollection{lackey_echo_2021,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Echo {Chambers}, {Fake} {News}, and {Social} {Epistemology}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
	url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-10},
	abstract = {A familiar criticism of Donald Trump is that, in watching only Fox News and similar news sources, he is creating a dangerous echo chamber for himself. Echo chambers are said to be responsible for a host of today’s problems, including the degradation of democracy. This diagnosis is fundamentally incorrect, and this chapter examines the two dominant explanations of the distinctively epistemic problem with echo chambers and shows that each is wanting. Echo chambers, by themselves, are not epistemically problematic. Echo chambers are characterized in purely structural terms, but what is needed to capture what is wrong with Trump’s exposure to only Fox News is content-sensitive. It is not that Trump is relying on a single source for news, but that he is relying on one that is unreliable. Finally, the chapter calls attention to the challenge of social media bots and the role of non-ideal social epistemology.},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2022-05-17},
	booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Lackey, Jennifer},
	year = {2021},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0010},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), bots, diversity, echo chamber, fake news, lack of awareness, lack of independence, social epistemology},
}

A familiar criticism of Donald Trump is that, in watching only Fox News and similar news sources, he is creating a dangerous echo chamber for himself. Echo chambers are said to be responsible for a host of today’s problems, including the degradation of democracy. This diagnosis is fundamentally incorrect, and this chapter examines the two dominant explanations of the distinctively epistemic problem with echo chambers and shows that each is wanting. Echo chambers, by themselves, are not epistemically problematic. Echo chambers are characterized in purely structural terms, but what is needed to capture what is wrong with Trump’s exposure to only Fox News is content-sensitive. It is not that Trump is relying on a single source for news, but that he is relying on one that is unreliable. Finally, the chapter calls attention to the challenge of social media bots and the role of non-ideal social epistemology.

@article{funkenstein_extraits_2021,
	title = {Extraits de {La} {Sociologie} de l’{Ignorance}},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/24110},
	abstract = {Cet article est une traduction d’extraits de l’introduction et de la conclusion de l’ouvrage intitulé l’intitulé HaSociologia Shel HaBaaruth [La sociologie de l’ignorance], publié en hébreu en 1987 à Tel Aviv (Éditions du Ministère de la Défense) par deux historiens des idées renommés, à partir d’une série de conférences radiophoniques. Jamais traduit, cet ouvrage novateur a eu peu d’influence sur la vague de travaux traitant l’ignorance, publiés à partir des années 2000. Amos Funkenstein et Adin Steinsaltz proposent une réflexion originale sur la production active l’ignorance, une entreprise qui demande un effort considérable et qui est tout-à-fait distincte de la production des connaissances.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Funkenstein, Amos and Steinsaltz, Adin},
	translator = {Löwy, Ilana},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {Funkenstain (Amos), PRINTED (Fonds papier), Steinsaltz (Adin), désinformation, propagande, savoir ouvert, savoir-faire, secret militaire},
}

Cet article est une traduction d’extraits de l’introduction et de la conclusion de l’ouvrage intitulé l’intitulé HaSociologia Shel HaBaaruth [La sociologie de l’ignorance], publié en hébreu en 1987 à Tel Aviv (Éditions du Ministère de la Défense) par deux historiens des idées renommés, à partir d’une série de conférences radiophoniques. Jamais traduit, cet ouvrage novateur a eu peu d’influence sur la vague de travaux traitant l’ignorance, publiés à partir des années 2000. Amos Funkenstein et Adin Steinsaltz proposent une réflexion originale sur la production active l’ignorance, une entreprise qui demande un effort considérable et qui est tout-à-fait distincte de la production des connaissances.

@article{demonteil__2021,
	title = {« {On} n’est évidemment pas forcé de tout dire »},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/23913},
	abstract = {L’ambition de cet article est de montrer les apports d’une approche en termes d’ignorance pour la sociologie de l’administration. À partir du cas des rapports d’inspection, il inverse les termes classiques de l’étude des rapports, qui mettent l’accent sur la connaissance produite comme outil de gouvernement, et se fonde sur l’hypothèse selon laquelle cette littérature grise contribue à maintenir l’ordre établi moins par ce qu’elle dévoile que par ce qu’elle tait. Suivant la carrière du rapport d’inspection, il met en évidence les formes quotidiennes et préreflexives qui caractérisent la production inspectorale ainsi que ses conditions de possibilité institutionnelles. En articulant une micro-ignorance et une macro-ignorance, la démonstration contribue à l’analyse des vertus institutionnelles de la méconnaissance.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Demonteil, Marion},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Ignorance in sociologie, PRINTED (Fonds papier), ignorance stratégique, inspection, politique culturelle, sociologie de l’administration},
}

L’ambition de cet article est de montrer les apports d’une approche en termes d’ignorance pour la sociologie de l’administration. À partir du cas des rapports d’inspection, il inverse les termes classiques de l’étude des rapports, qui mettent l’accent sur la connaissance produite comme outil de gouvernement, et se fonde sur l’hypothèse selon laquelle cette littérature grise contribue à maintenir l’ordre établi moins par ce qu’elle dévoile que par ce qu’elle tait. Suivant la carrière du rapport d’inspection, il met en évidence les formes quotidiennes et préreflexives qui caractérisent la production inspectorale ainsi que ses conditions de possibilité institutionnelles. En articulant une micro-ignorance et une macro-ignorance, la démonstration contribue à l’analyse des vertus institutionnelles de la méconnaissance.

@article{marichalar_production_2021,
	title = {La production de l’irresponsabilité juridique},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/23990},
	abstract = {Ce texte est une réponse de l’auteur à la lecture par Stéphane Le Lay de son livre Qui a tué les verriers de Givors ?. Sont notamment soulignées les différentes conceptions de la responsabilité, morale ou juridique, qui peuvent avoir cours dans une situation de travail.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Marichalar, Pascal},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), droit, responsabilité, santé, travail},
}

Ce texte est une réponse de l’auteur à la lecture par Stéphane Le Lay de son livre Qui a tué les verriers de Givors ?. Sont notamment soulignées les différentes conceptions de la responsabilité, morale ou juridique, qui peuvent avoir cours dans une situation de travail.

@article{jouzel_surveiller_2021,
	title = {Surveiller sans savoir},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/23769},
	abstract = {La « nouvelle sociologie politique des sciences » appelle de ses vœux une analyse de l’ignorance scientifique qui mette l’accent sur les conditions institutionnelles de sa production. À partir de l’étude des difficultés rencontrées par un projet de surveillance épidémiologique de la santé des travailleurs exposés aux nanomatériaux manufacturés en France, nous proposons de suivre cette intuition, en mettant en évidence les luttes de juridictions institutionnelles qui ont obéré la capacité de ce projet à produire des données. Nous montrons que, si l’identification des risques professionnels liés aux nanomatériaux constitue une gageure en raison des incertitudes qui les caractérisent et des réticences des employeurs concernés à jouer le jeu, ces obstacles sont démultipliés par les tensions qui traversent l’infrastructure institutionnelle de la surveillance de la santé au travail.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, PRINTED (Fonds papier), cohorte, nanomatériaux, santé au travail, surveillance},
}

La « nouvelle sociologie politique des sciences » appelle de ses vœux une analyse de l’ignorance scientifique qui mette l’accent sur les conditions institutionnelles de sa production. À partir de l’étude des difficultés rencontrées par un projet de surveillance épidémiologique de la santé des travailleurs exposés aux nanomatériaux manufacturés en France, nous proposons de suivre cette intuition, en mettant en évidence les luttes de juridictions institutionnelles qui ont obéré la capacité de ce projet à produire des données. Nous montrons que, si l’identification des risques professionnels liés aux nanomatériaux constitue une gageure en raison des incertitudes qui les caractérisent et des réticences des employeurs concernés à jouer le jeu, ces obstacles sont démultipliés par les tensions qui traversent l’infrastructure institutionnelle de la surveillance de la santé au travail.

@article{gaillardet_zone_2021,
	title = {La {Zone} critique},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/25340},
	abstract = {Cet entretien revient sur l’émergence du concept de Zone critique qui désigne la fine pellicule entre le sous-sol et la basse atmosphère où se concentre la vie terrestre et la construction d’une nouvelle infrastructure de recherche, les observatoires de la Zone critique (OZCAR) dans le contexte des reconfigurations des sciences de la Terre et de l’environnement face au changement climatique et la crise écologique. L’entretien retrace ainsi les efforts pour disposer d’infrastructures permettant de surmonter l’ignorance et l’incomplétude des connaissances sur les interactions complexes entre gaz de l’atmosphère, roches, eau et êtres vivants.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Gaillardet, Jérôme and Boudia, Soraya},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, OZCAR (Observatoires de la Zone Critique : Applications et Recherche), PRINTED (Fonds papier), anthropocène, infrastructure de recherche, observatoire, politique de la Terre, socio-écologie, zone critique},
}

Cet entretien revient sur l’émergence du concept de Zone critique qui désigne la fine pellicule entre le sous-sol et la basse atmosphère où se concentre la vie terrestre et la construction d’une nouvelle infrastructure de recherche, les observatoires de la Zone critique (OZCAR) dans le contexte des reconfigurations des sciences de la Terre et de l’environnement face au changement climatique et la crise écologique. L’entretien retrace ainsi les efforts pour disposer d’infrastructures permettant de surmonter l’ignorance et l’incomplétude des connaissances sur les interactions complexes entre gaz de l’atmosphère, roches, eau et êtres vivants.

@article{daniel_normalisation_2021,
	title = {Normalisation et « retour au sol » des résidus organiques},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/23884},
	abstract = {En vigueur depuis les années 1970, la norme AFNOR NF U44-051 encadre en France les conditions de mise en marché des composts produits à partir des déchets organiques. Elle impose depuis 2007 des seuils à ne pas dépasser pour chaque catégorie de polluants afin de prévenir les risques de contamination des sols. Toutefois, le rôle de cette norme dans les mécanismes de sortie du statut de déchet des matières résiduelles reste ambigu. En occultant certaines des propriétés de ces matières, la norme passe sous silence les incertitudes qui pèsent sur le devenir de ces amendements organiques dans les sols. L’article montre que, dans ce contexte où les savoirs toxicologiques sont balbutiants et où la figure de la victime n’est pas clairement identifiée, les débats épistémiques s’enracinent dans des dynamiques de fétichisation-défétichisation des savoirs. L’absence de données épidémiologiques accentue les effets d’autorité de la norme, mais révèle aussi des manières originales de lutter contre ces savoirs réducteurs. Elle met en jeu des formes alternatives d’évaluation de la toxicité (y compris sensorielles) et engendre des positionnements moraux antagonistes sur la fixation des valeurs-seuils.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Daniel, François-Joseph},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), agnotologie, compost, déchet, ignorance, sol, économie circulaire},
}

En vigueur depuis les années 1970, la norme AFNOR NF U44-051 encadre en France les conditions de mise en marché des composts produits à partir des déchets organiques. Elle impose depuis 2007 des seuils à ne pas dépasser pour chaque catégorie de polluants afin de prévenir les risques de contamination des sols. Toutefois, le rôle de cette norme dans les mécanismes de sortie du statut de déchet des matières résiduelles reste ambigu. En occultant certaines des propriétés de ces matières, la norme passe sous silence les incertitudes qui pèsent sur le devenir de ces amendements organiques dans les sols. L’article montre que, dans ce contexte où les savoirs toxicologiques sont balbutiants et où la figure de la victime n’est pas clairement identifiée, les débats épistémiques s’enracinent dans des dynamiques de fétichisation-défétichisation des savoirs. L’absence de données épidémiologiques accentue les effets d’autorité de la norme, mais révèle aussi des manières originales de lutter contre ces savoirs réducteurs. Elle met en jeu des formes alternatives d’évaluation de la toxicité (y compris sensorielles) et engendre des positionnements moraux antagonistes sur la fixation des valeurs-seuils.

@article{barbier_ignorances_2021,
	title = {Ignorance(s)},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/25513},
	abstract = {L’ignorance est depuis plus d’une vingtaine d’années une thématique de recherche en vogue aussi bien en sociologie, en philosophie, en histoire ou en anthropologie, donnant lieu à une littérature foisonnante. Cet article propose de reconsidérer de manière critique les apports et les limites des études de l’ignorance. Il cherche à rendre compte de ce que les travaux réalisés, en particulier ceux produits dans le cadre de l’agnotologie, de la nouvelle sociologie politique des sciences et de l’étude de l’ignorance stratégique, ont permis faire émerger. Il montre comment ces travaux, autant qu'ils ont renouvelé les questions investies, ont également réduits et laissé dans l'ombre plusieurs aspects. Sur cette base, il propose de dépasser certaines de ces limites en approfondissant les pistes déjà ouvertes par les Ignorances Studies en élargissant la focale pour renouveler et élargir les études de l’ignorance dans leur diversité, en travaillant à clarifier les dynamiques complexes qui lient ignorances, savoirs, et incertitudes dans différentes configurations.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Barbier, Laura and Boudia, Soraya and Goumri, Maël and Moizard-Lanvin, Justyna},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {7 Ignorance and Undone Science, PRINTED (Fonds papier), agnotologie, ignorance, ignorance institutionnelle, ignorance stratégique, incertitude, undone science},
}

L’ignorance est depuis plus d’une vingtaine d’années une thématique de recherche en vogue aussi bien en sociologie, en philosophie, en histoire ou en anthropologie, donnant lieu à une littérature foisonnante. Cet article propose de reconsidérer de manière critique les apports et les limites des études de l’ignorance. Il cherche à rendre compte de ce que les travaux réalisés, en particulier ceux produits dans le cadre de l’agnotologie, de la nouvelle sociologie politique des sciences et de l’étude de l’ignorance stratégique, ont permis faire émerger. Il montre comment ces travaux, autant qu'ils ont renouvelé les questions investies, ont également réduits et laissé dans l'ombre plusieurs aspects. Sur cette base, il propose de dépasser certaines de ces limites en approfondissant les pistes déjà ouvertes par les Ignorances Studies en élargissant la focale pour renouveler et élargir les études de l’ignorance dans leur diversité, en travaillant à clarifier les dynamiques complexes qui lient ignorances, savoirs, et incertitudes dans différentes configurations.

@article{al_dahdah_ignorance_2021,
	title = {Ignorance et santé globale},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/23685},
	abstract = {La pandémie de Covid-19 constitue un prisme inédit pour l’étude de la production de connaissances face à une maladie globale « inconnue mais connaissable », en particulier dans les contextes d’intervention privilégiés de la « santé globale », les pays dits « des Suds ». Cet article se concentre sur les réponses de quinze pays africains et asiatiques (en portant une attention particulière à l’Inde et à la RDC). Ces réponses rentrent dans trois grandes catégories qui sont, chacune à leur façon, productrices d’ignorance : le déni de l’existence du virus, la reproduction de mesures étrangères ou historiques, et le « recyclage » d’expériences locales. Nous documentons également les acteurs et les outils précis qui contribuent à la production d’ignorance sur la Covid-19, notamment la construction et la mobilisation des données de santé et les « Covid-19 taskforces », ces groupes d’urgence qui constituent l’instance de diffusion des connaissances et/ou de production de l’ignorance sur la pandémie.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Al Dahdah, Marine and Falisse, Jean-Benoît and Lurton, Grégoire},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Covid-19, Inde, PRINTED (Fonds papier), RDC, Suds, diversité cognitive, ignorance, santé globale, santé publique, science non faite, épidémiologie},
}

La pandémie de Covid-19 constitue un prisme inédit pour l’étude de la production de connaissances face à une maladie globale « inconnue mais connaissable », en particulier dans les contextes d’intervention privilégiés de la « santé globale », les pays dits « des Suds ». Cet article se concentre sur les réponses de quinze pays africains et asiatiques (en portant une attention particulière à l’Inde et à la RDC). Ces réponses rentrent dans trois grandes catégories qui sont, chacune à leur façon, productrices d’ignorance : le déni de l’existence du virus, la reproduction de mesures étrangères ou historiques, et le « recyclage » d’expériences locales. Nous documentons également les acteurs et les outils précis qui contribuent à la production d’ignorance sur la Covid-19, notamment la construction et la mobilisation des données de santé et les « Covid-19 taskforces », ces groupes d’urgence qui constituent l’instance de diffusion des connaissances et/ou de production de l’ignorance sur la pandémie.

@article{moizard-lanvin_selectionner_2021,
	title = {Sélectionner et agréger les ignorances},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/25114},
	abstract = {Le 16 décembre 2015, la Ville de Paris publie le Plan Paris Santé Environnement, la feuille de route municipale en santé environnementale qui cherche à réduire à la fois les pollutions et nuisances environnementales et les inégalités sociales de santé. L’une des traductions de cette double ambition politique est l’identification des zones de la « fragilité en santé environnementale » qui correspondent à des espaces devant faire l’objet d’une priorisation dans l’action publique. Ceci se matérialise par la construction d’un outil cartographique. À l’issue de deux ans de travail, l’équipe en charge de la production de cet outil, rend une carte unique qui agrège trois catégories de données : « pollutions et nuisances environnementales », « populations vulnérables » et « offre en aménité environnementale et urbaine ». Cet article étudie comment cette équipe construit la carte de « pollutions et nuisances environnementales » à Paris qui incorpore et reproduit différentes formes d’ignorances des problèmes de santé environnementale.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Moizard-Lanvin, Justyna},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Service Parisien de Santé Environnementale, fragilité, ignorance, pollution environnementale},
}

Le 16 décembre 2015, la Ville de Paris publie le Plan Paris Santé Environnement, la feuille de route municipale en santé environnementale qui cherche à réduire à la fois les pollutions et nuisances environnementales et les inégalités sociales de santé. L’une des traductions de cette double ambition politique est l’identification des zones de la « fragilité en santé environnementale » qui correspondent à des espaces devant faire l’objet d’une priorisation dans l’action publique. Ceci se matérialise par la construction d’un outil cartographique. À l’issue de deux ans de travail, l’équipe en charge de la production de cet outil, rend une carte unique qui agrège trois catégories de données : « pollutions et nuisances environnementales », « populations vulnérables » et « offre en aménité environnementale et urbaine ». Cet article étudie comment cette équipe construit la carte de « pollutions et nuisances environnementales » à Paris qui incorpore et reproduit différentes formes d’ignorances des problèmes de santé environnementale.

@article{lowy_sociologie_2021,
	title = {La sociologie de l’ignorance de {Amos} {Funkenstein} et {Adin} {Steinsaltz}},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/24015},
	abstract = {Cet article introduit et met en contexte un essai, La sociologie de l’ignorance, publié en hébreu 1987 par deux historiens d’idées renommés, Amos Funkenstein et Adin Steinsatz. Cet ouvrage explique que l’idée d’un « savoir ouvert » accessible à tous est née dans deux traditions culturelle distinctes : la tradition hébraïque, avec une étude des textes sacrés sous forme d’une discussion collective, et la tradition grecque, avec le développement de la preuve mathématique. Cette production du « savoir ouvert » a été accompagné par une production parallèle de l’ignorance. Pour les deux auteurs, bien que la production du savoir et d’ignorance sont liées, il s’agit de deux domaines distincts. L’ignorance n’est pas définie comme une simple absence des connaissances, mais comme une entité distincte, activement produite et maintenue par des mécanismes spécifiques et puissants qu’ils analysent : l’occultation des informations, leur dévalorisation sociale, ou encore la désinformation délibérée.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Löwy, Ilana},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {Funkenstain (Amos), PRINTED (Fonds papier), Steinsaltz (Adin), désinformation, propagande, savoir ouvert, savoir-faire, secret militaire},
}

Cet article introduit et met en contexte un essai, La sociologie de l’ignorance, publié en hébreu 1987 par deux historiens d’idées renommés, Amos Funkenstein et Adin Steinsatz. Cet ouvrage explique que l’idée d’un « savoir ouvert » accessible à tous est née dans deux traditions culturelle distinctes : la tradition hébraïque, avec une étude des textes sacrés sous forme d’une discussion collective, et la tradition grecque, avec le développement de la preuve mathématique. Cette production du « savoir ouvert » a été accompagné par une production parallèle de l’ignorance. Pour les deux auteurs, bien que la production du savoir et d’ignorance sont liées, il s’agit de deux domaines distincts. L’ignorance n’est pas définie comme une simple absence des connaissances, mais comme une entité distincte, activement produite et maintenue par des mécanismes spécifiques et puissants qu’ils analysent : l’occultation des informations, leur dévalorisation sociale, ou encore la désinformation délibérée.

@article{le_lay_production_2021,
	title = {La production de l’ignorance en matière de dangers professionnels est-elle un processus cognitif uniquement contrôlé par le patronat ?},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/23203},
	abstract = {À partir d’une discussion critique menée avec l’ouvrage de Pascal Marichalar, Qui a tué les verriers de Givors ?, cet article vise à mettre en lumière l’intérêt, pour les recherches portant sur la production de l’ignorance dans le champ de la santé au travail, à prendre en considération le rapport subjectif entretenu par les travailleurs à leurs activités. En s’appuyant sur les apports de la psychodynamique du travail, il apparaît en effet que la production d’ignorance du danger au sein de la verrerie de Givors ne relève pas seulement d’une volonté délibérée des employeurs de dissimuler un certain nombre d’informations aux verriers, mais découle sans doute également de pratiques professionnelles propres à ces derniers, dans un but de préservation de leur santé mentale. En méconnaissant cette dimension pathique du rapport au travail, les analyses fournissent une description partielle et déformée des réalités professionnelles et des mouvements collectifs qui s’y ancrent.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Le Lay, Stéphane},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {Marichalar (Pascal), PRINTED (Fonds papier), agnotologie, danger professionnel, ignorance, patronat, production de l’ignorance, rationalité pathique, responsabilité, verrier},
}

À partir d’une discussion critique menée avec l’ouvrage de Pascal Marichalar, Qui a tué les verriers de Givors ?, cet article vise à mettre en lumière l’intérêt, pour les recherches portant sur la production de l’ignorance dans le champ de la santé au travail, à prendre en considération le rapport subjectif entretenu par les travailleurs à leurs activités. En s’appuyant sur les apports de la psychodynamique du travail, il apparaît en effet que la production d’ignorance du danger au sein de la verrerie de Givors ne relève pas seulement d’une volonté délibérée des employeurs de dissimuler un certain nombre d’informations aux verriers, mais découle sans doute également de pratiques professionnelles propres à ces derniers, dans un but de préservation de leur santé mentale. En méconnaissant cette dimension pathique du rapport au travail, les analyses fournissent une description partielle et déformée des réalités professionnelles et des mouvements collectifs qui s’y ancrent.

@article{goumri_lignorance_2021,
	title = {L’ignorance matérielle},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/25214},
	abstract = {La connaissance des accidents nucléaires graves constitue un enjeu important pour l’industrie nucléaire qui tente depuis plus de 60 ans de se développer tout en évitant l’accident majeur. Pourtant, si ce domaine a fait l’objet de très nombreux développements, de nombreuses zones d’incertitudes demeurent. Cet article montre comment ces incertitudes, en s’ancrant dans la matérialité même de la technologie nucléaire, constituent une forme particulière d’ignorance. Elle s’explique à la fois par la complexité de la technologie qui s’est renforcée au cours du temps et l’augmentation de la puissance des réacteurs. Elle tient également à la complexité des phénomènes physiques à l’œuvre lors de l’accident qui rend son étude très complexe et son sous-produit, le « corium » insaisissable.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Goumri, Maël},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), accident grave, ignorance, incertitude radicale, matérialité, nucléaire},
}

La connaissance des accidents nucléaires graves constitue un enjeu important pour l’industrie nucléaire qui tente depuis plus de 60 ans de se développer tout en évitant l’accident majeur. Pourtant, si ce domaine a fait l’objet de très nombreux développements, de nombreuses zones d’incertitudes demeurent. Cet article montre comment ces incertitudes, en s’ancrant dans la matérialité même de la technologie nucléaire, constituent une forme particulière d’ignorance. Elle s’explique à la fois par la complexité de la technologie qui s’est renforcée au cours du temps et l’augmentation de la puissance des réacteurs. Elle tient également à la complexité des phénomènes physiques à l’œuvre lors de l’accident qui rend son étude très complexe et son sous-produit, le « corium » insaisissable.

@article{tall_choisir_2021,
	title = {Choisir de lutter contre certaines pollutions plutôt que d’autres},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/24754},
	abstract = {L’ensemble des activités en lien avec l’eau du lac de Guiers au Sénégal a potentiellement des conséquences importantes sur son état écologique. Cet article part du constat que la pollution par les pesticides concentre l’essentiel des débats et des actions entreprises tandis que l’enrichissement en nutriments des eaux du lac (représentant un risque d’eutrophisation) n’est un problème que rarement évoqué. Ce constat conduit les auteurs à s’interroger sur les facteurs sociopolitiques qui conduisent à « l’invisibilisation » de certaines causes de dégradation des milieux aquatiques. En nous appuyant sur une enquête de terrain auprès des gestionnaires et usagers du lac, nous montrons les concurrences entre les différents services administratifs qui conduisent à diverses formes de segmentation des causes de dégradation et à la sélection de l’une d’entre elles. Nous montrons ensuite comment cette formalisation du problème est diffusée et renforcée par la mise en œuvre de bonnes pratiques agricoles, essentiellement centrées sur la question des produits phytosanitaires et relayées par des acteurs territoriaux. Cette analyse de la construction institutionnelle de l’ignorance est enfin complétée par une étude des représentations que les usagers se font de la dégradation de leur lac, permettant d’identifier les dynamiques sociales, les conflits et les jeux de pouvoir autour de l’appropriation de l’espace et de l’accès à l’eau, qui conduisent à l’invisibilisation du problème de l’eutrophisation.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Tall, Youssoupha and Deroubaix, José Frédéric and Dia, Ibrahima and Mitroï, Veronica and Ndoye, Tidiane and Faye, Sylvain Landry Birane and Humbert, Jean-François},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {(hyper)segmentation, (in)visibilisation, 6 Ignorance and public policies, PRINTED (Fonds papier), conflit, espace, eutrophisation, pesticide, ressource en eau},
}

L’ensemble des activités en lien avec l’eau du lac de Guiers au Sénégal a potentiellement des conséquences importantes sur son état écologique. Cet article part du constat que la pollution par les pesticides concentre l’essentiel des débats et des actions entreprises tandis que l’enrichissement en nutriments des eaux du lac (représentant un risque d’eutrophisation) n’est un problème que rarement évoqué. Ce constat conduit les auteurs à s’interroger sur les facteurs sociopolitiques qui conduisent à « l’invisibilisation » de certaines causes de dégradation des milieux aquatiques. En nous appuyant sur une enquête de terrain auprès des gestionnaires et usagers du lac, nous montrons les concurrences entre les différents services administratifs qui conduisent à diverses formes de segmentation des causes de dégradation et à la sélection de l’une d’entre elles. Nous montrons ensuite comment cette formalisation du problème est diffusée et renforcée par la mise en œuvre de bonnes pratiques agricoles, essentiellement centrées sur la question des produits phytosanitaires et relayées par des acteurs territoriaux. Cette analyse de la construction institutionnelle de l’ignorance est enfin complétée par une étude des représentations que les usagers se font de la dégradation de leur lac, permettant d’identifier les dynamiques sociales, les conflits et les jeux de pouvoir autour de l’appropriation de l’espace et de l’accès à l’eau, qui conduisent à l’invisibilisation du problème de l’eutrophisation.

@article{sicot_alexandre_2021,
	title = {Alexandre {Mathieu}-{Fritz}, {Le} praticien, le patient et les artefacts. {Genèse} des mondes de la télémédecine},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/25613},
	abstract = {Les enjeux sociétaux de la télémédecine sont en partie ceux d’un « virage ambulatoire » promu depuis quelques années comme ce qui permettra tout à la fois une meilleure qualité de vie des malades, la rationalisation des soins et l’amélioration de l’accès aux professionnels. Mais ce n’est pas l’objet de l’ouvrage d’Alexandre Mathieu-Fritz qui s’intéresse lui à « la dynamique de développement de la télémédecine française en partant du point de vue et des activités concrètes des praticiens qui l...},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Sicot, François},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Les enjeux sociétaux de la télémédecine sont en partie ceux d’un « virage ambulatoire » promu depuis quelques années comme ce qui permettra tout à la fois une meilleure qualité de vie des malades, la rationalisation des soins et l’amélioration de l’accès aux professionnels. Mais ce n’est pas l’objet de l’ouvrage d’Alexandre Mathieu-Fritz qui s’intéresse lui à « la dynamique de développement de la télémédecine française en partant du point de vue et des activités concrètes des praticiens qui l...

@article{serra-mallol_strategie_2021,
	title = {Une stratégie de la connaissance négative},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/24188},
	abstract = {L’industrie et la grande distribution alimentaires constituent un secteur stratégique en France qui fait face à des crises récurrentes concernant la qualité sanitaire et nutritionnelle de ses produits ainsi qu’à une hausse rapide de pathologies liées à l’alimentation, induisant une méfiance accrue face au risque alimentaire et une demande des consommateurs pour plus d’information et de transparence. Ces éléments constituent des conditions pour l’émergence de stratégies de l’ignorance dans un conflit opposant acteurs industriels et pouvoirs publics par le biais d’énoncés scientifiques. Nous l’illustrerons à travers l’exemple de la production de « connaissance négative » (Knorr Cetina, 1996) autour de la mise en œuvre d’un système d’information nutritionnelle simplifiée, le Nutri-Score, repoussée de plusieurs années malgré les recommandations des institutions publiques sanitaires et des experts scientifiques.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Serra-Mallol, Christophe},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), alimentation, doute, ignorance, nutrition, étiquetage nutritionnel},
}

L’industrie et la grande distribution alimentaires constituent un secteur stratégique en France qui fait face à des crises récurrentes concernant la qualité sanitaire et nutritionnelle de ses produits ainsi qu’à une hausse rapide de pathologies liées à l’alimentation, induisant une méfiance accrue face au risque alimentaire et une demande des consommateurs pour plus d’information et de transparence. Ces éléments constituent des conditions pour l’émergence de stratégies de l’ignorance dans un conflit opposant acteurs industriels et pouvoirs publics par le biais d’énoncés scientifiques. Nous l’illustrerons à travers l’exemple de la production de « connaissance négative » (Knorr Cetina, 1996) autour de la mise en œuvre d’un système d’information nutritionnelle simplifiée, le Nutri-Score, repoussée de plusieurs années malgré les recommandations des institutions publiques sanitaires et des experts scientifiques.

@article{rainhorn_plomb_2021,
	title = {Le plomb, le peintre et la flèche de {Notre}-{Dame}},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/25438},
	abstract = {Donnant une brusque et éphémère visibilité au risque d’intoxication environnementale par le plomb, l’incendie de la cathédrale Notre-Dame de Paris (2019) est envisagé à la lumière de l’histoire longue de l’amnésie collective, durable et intermittente, des dangers avérés de l’usage de ce toxique. L’identification scientifique et juridique du plomb comme poison n’a pas entravé la multiplication de ses usages artisanaux et industriels, en faisant un « poison légal ». À travers l’histoire du blanc de plomb (céruse), composé le plus répandu dans l’industrie depuis le XIXe siècle, l’article interroge les outils de la construction et les usages de l’ignorance comme instrument de gouvernement du toxique dans l’espace public. Il met en lumière une entreprise de brouillage scientifique, de segmentation des savoirs et de dénégation des maux du travail dont l’accident de Notre-Dame atteste aujourd’hui la pérennité.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Rainhorn, Judith},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {6 Ignorance and public policies, Notre-Dame de Paris, PRINTED (Fonds papier), céruse, environnement, ignorance, plomb, saturnisme},
}

Donnant une brusque et éphémère visibilité au risque d’intoxication environnementale par le plomb, l’incendie de la cathédrale Notre-Dame de Paris (2019) est envisagé à la lumière de l’histoire longue de l’amnésie collective, durable et intermittente, des dangers avérés de l’usage de ce toxique. L’identification scientifique et juridique du plomb comme poison n’a pas entravé la multiplication de ses usages artisanaux et industriels, en faisant un « poison légal ». À travers l’histoire du blanc de plomb (céruse), composé le plus répandu dans l’industrie depuis le XIXe siècle, l’article interroge les outils de la construction et les usages de l’ignorance comme instrument de gouvernement du toxique dans l’espace public. Il met en lumière une entreprise de brouillage scientifique, de segmentation des savoirs et de dénégation des maux du travail dont l’accident de Notre-Dame atteste aujourd’hui la pérennité.

@article{parageau_pour_2021,
	title = {Pour une histoire intellectuelle de l’ignorance},
	volume = {15},
	copyright = {Les contenus de la Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.},
	issn = {1760-5393},
	url = {https://journals.openedition.org/rac/23570},
	abstract = {Cet article s’attache à démontrer que l’ignorance est un objet historique, c’est-à-dire que ses représentations, ses usages et les valeurs qu’on lui attribue sont pris dans des évolutions historiques qui en modifient et en perturbent le sens. On y montre en particulier que, dans un certain nombre de traditions intellectuelles de la période moderne, l’ignorance est perçue comme une vertu, un principe du savoir ou une forme de sagesse. Par ailleurs, dans le contexte de l’avènement de la science moderne aux XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles, elle devient un outil épistémologique qui permet de se représenter l’entendement et ses mécanismes. Enfin, à la même époque, l’ignorance est progressivement redéfinie comme une limite anthropologique, ce qui permet de l’envisager non plus comme un obstacle à la connaissance, mais comme un objet du discours scientifique.},
	language = {mul},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2021-12-03},
	journal = {Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances},
	author = {Parageau, Sandrine},
	month = dec,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 4
Publisher: Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Locke (John), PRINTED (Fonds papier), Réforme protestante, docte ignorance, ignorance, inspiration, lumière intérieure, période moderne, sagesse},
}

Cet article s’attache à démontrer que l’ignorance est un objet historique, c’est-à-dire que ses représentations, ses usages et les valeurs qu’on lui attribue sont pris dans des évolutions historiques qui en modifient et en perturbent le sens. On y montre en particulier que, dans un certain nombre de traditions intellectuelles de la période moderne, l’ignorance est perçue comme une vertu, un principe du savoir ou une forme de sagesse. Par ailleurs, dans le contexte de l’avènement de la science moderne aux XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles, elle devient un outil épistémologique qui permet de se représenter l’entendement et ses mécanismes. Enfin, à la même époque, l’ignorance est progressivement redéfinie comme une limite anthropologique, ce qui permet de l’envisager non plus comme un obstacle à la connaissance, mais comme un objet du discours scientifique.

@book{hertwig_deliberate_2021,
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts},
	title = {Deliberate {Ignorance}: {Choosing} {Not} to {Know}},
	isbn = {978-0-262-04559-9},
	shorttitle = {Deliberate {Ignorance}},
	abstract = {Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information.The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or use knowledge (or information) deliberate ignorance. When is this a virtue, when is it a vice, and what can be learned from formally modeling the underlying motives? On which normative grounds can it be judged? Which institutional interventions can promote or prevent it? In this book, psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the scope of deliberate ignorance.},
	language = {Anglais},
	publisher = {The MIT Press},
	author = {Hertwig, Ralph and Engel, Christoph},
	month = mar,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information.The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or use knowledge (or information) deliberate ignorance. When is this a virtue, when is it a vice, and what can be learned from formally modeling the underlying motives? On which normative grounds can it be judged? Which institutional interventions can promote or prevent it? In this book, psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the scope of deliberate ignorance.

@article{hegarty_viral_2021,
	title = {Viral forgetting, or how to have ignorance in an syndemic},
	volume = {0},
	issn = {1369-1058},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13691058.2021.1974560},
	doi = {10.1080/13691058.2021.1974560},
	abstract = {This paper argues for the concept of viral forgetting to understand how and why the lessons of HIV were not easy to remember in the context of COVID. Building on recently drawn analogies between the two epidemics, we argue that new normative injunctions to ‘flatten the curve’ and ‘stay at home’ individualise responses to COVID that make memory of the first decade of HIV vital in recent viral times. Individualistic responses, including those that bind individuals to social identity groups, obscure the ways in which effective care for others and the self requires a recognition of the partiality of community, the inevitability of vulnerability, and a complex interpretation of scientific evidence and human ontology. We draw on Eve Sedgwick’s thinking about ignorance and power to critique how political leadership in 2020, particularly in the USA, created chaos that suggested that an individualist masculine response to the epidemic was the only thing that could save us.},
	number = {0},
	urldate = {2021-09-29},
	journal = {Culture, Health \& Sexuality},
	author = {Hegarty, Peter and Rollins, Joe},
	month = sep,
	year = {2021},
	pmid = {34511039},
	note = {Publisher: Taylor \& Francis
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/13691058.2021.1974560},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance, HIV, PRINTED (Fonds papier), gay men, policy implementation},
	pages = {1--14},
}

This paper argues for the concept of viral forgetting to understand how and why the lessons of HIV were not easy to remember in the context of COVID. Building on recently drawn analogies between the two epidemics, we argue that new normative injunctions to ‘flatten the curve’ and ‘stay at home’ individualise responses to COVID that make memory of the first decade of HIV vital in recent viral times. Individualistic responses, including those that bind individuals to social identity groups, obscure the ways in which effective care for others and the self requires a recognition of the partiality of community, the inevitability of vulnerability, and a complex interpretation of scientific evidence and human ontology. We draw on Eve Sedgwick’s thinking about ignorance and power to critique how political leadership in 2020, particularly in the USA, created chaos that suggested that an individualist masculine response to the epidemic was the only thing that could save us.

@article{whooley_uncertain_2021,
	title = {Uncertain and under {Quarantine}: {Toward} a {Sociology} of {Medical} {Ignorance}},
	volume = {62},
	issn = {0022-1465},
	shorttitle = {Uncertain and under {Quarantine}},
	doi = {10.1177/00221465211009202},
	abstract = {At the center of the COVID-19 pandemic lies a ubiquitous feature of medicine. Medicine is permeated with ignorance. Seizing this moment to assess the current state of medical sociology, this article articulates a sociology of medical ignorance. We join insights from earlier medical sociological scholarship on uncertainty with emerging research in the sociology of ignorance to help make sense of the omnipresent but sometimes invisible dynamics related to the unknowns in medicine. Then we examine two streams of inquiry with a focus on uncertainty and ignorance—(1) research on the interconnections between technology, medical authority, and ignorance and (2) research on lay expertise within the context of ever-present uncertainties. For decades, and to good effect, medical sociologists have asked, “What does medicine know, and what are the consequences of such knowing?” Going forward, we encourage medical sociologists to examine the unknown in medicine and the consequences of not knowing. © American Sociological Association 2021.},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Journal of Health and Social Behavior},
	author = {Whooley, O. and Barker, K.K.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, PRINTED (Fonds papier), ignorance, lay expertise, medical authority, medical technology, uncertainty},
	pages = {271--285},
}

At the center of the COVID-19 pandemic lies a ubiquitous feature of medicine. Medicine is permeated with ignorance. Seizing this moment to assess the current state of medical sociology, this article articulates a sociology of medical ignorance. We join insights from earlier medical sociological scholarship on uncertainty with emerging research in the sociology of ignorance to help make sense of the omnipresent but sometimes invisible dynamics related to the unknowns in medicine. Then we examine two streams of inquiry with a focus on uncertainty and ignorance—(1) research on the interconnections between technology, medical authority, and ignorance and (2) research on lay expertise within the context of ever-present uncertainties. For decades, and to good effect, medical sociologists have asked, “What does medicine know, and what are the consequences of such knowing?” Going forward, we encourage medical sociologists to examine the unknown in medicine and the consequences of not knowing. © American Sociological Association 2021.

@article{parageau__2021,
	title = {« {Colomb} ignorant trouva le nouveau monde » : ignorance, découverte fortuite et expérimentation à la première modernité},
	volume = {Tome 74},
	issn = {0151-4105},
	shorttitle = {« {Colomb} ignorant trouva le nouveau monde »},
	url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-des-sciences-2021-1-page-41.htm},
	abstract = {Cet article part du topos de la découverte par hasard, qui, à la première modernité, est souvent attribuée à des « ignorants ». En effet, il est généralement admis alors que la découverte de l’Amérique, l’invention de la poudre à canon, de la boussole, de l’imprimerie ou encore de la première lunette astronomique auraient été faites par hasard par des hommes qui n’étaient pas formés aux sciences. À partir de ce topos, l’article pose deux questions : d’une part, l’ignorant possède-t-il des qualités spécifiques, en tant qu’ignorant, qui le rendent plus susceptible que le savant d’être à l’origine de découvertes fortuites ? D’autre part, le mode de connaissance que constitue la découverte fortuite est-il pris en compte dans les programmes d’avancement du savoir à la première modernité ou bien est-il au contraire écarté car il représenterait une forme non méthodique et donc non scientifique d’accès au savoir ? Pour répondre à ces questions, l’article montre en particulier le rôle de la sagacité dans la découverte par hasard et la manière dont cette qualité peut être mise au service d’une méthode, notamment dans le cadre de l’experientia literata de Francis Bacon, qui prévoit d’insérer le hasard au sein même du processus d’expérimentation.},
	language = {fr},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2021-09-08},
	journal = {Revue d'histoire des sciences},
	author = {Parageau, Sandrine},
	month = jun,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Bibliographie\_available: 0
Cairndomain: www.cairn.info
Cite Par\_available: 0
Publisher: Armand Colin},
	keywords = {1 Learned ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {41--62},
}

Cet article part du topos de la découverte par hasard, qui, à la première modernité, est souvent attribuée à des « ignorants ». En effet, il est généralement admis alors que la découverte de l’Amérique, l’invention de la poudre à canon, de la boussole, de l’imprimerie ou encore de la première lunette astronomique auraient été faites par hasard par des hommes qui n’étaient pas formés aux sciences. À partir de ce topos, l’article pose deux questions : d’une part, l’ignorant possède-t-il des qualités spécifiques, en tant qu’ignorant, qui le rendent plus susceptible que le savant d’être à l’origine de découvertes fortuites ? D’autre part, le mode de connaissance que constitue la découverte fortuite est-il pris en compte dans les programmes d’avancement du savoir à la première modernité ou bien est-il au contraire écarté car il représenterait une forme non méthodique et donc non scientifique d’accès au savoir ? Pour répondre à ces questions, l’article montre en particulier le rôle de la sagacité dans la découverte par hasard et la manière dont cette qualité peut être mise au service d’une méthode, notamment dans le cadre de l’experientia literata de Francis Bacon, qui prévoit d’insérer le hasard au sein même du processus d’expérimentation.

@incollection{cavalin_ignorance_2021,
	title = {L'ignorance en chaîne : la sous-reconnaissance des hémopathies professionnelles liées aux pesticides},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Brunier, Sylvain and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Prete, Giovanni},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {215--234},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_introduction_2021,
	title = {Introduction : {La} prévention et la justice},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Marichalar, Pascal},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {191--194},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_reconnaissance_2021,
	title = {La reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles dans les tribunaux},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Serre, Delphine},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {255--274},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_fabrication_2021,
	title = {De la fabrication de la preuve à la décision},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Gaboriau, Marion},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {235--254},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_indemnisation_2021,
	title = {L'indemnisation des dommages sanitaires liés à l'amiante},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Menéndez-Navarro, Alfredo and Garcia-Gómez, Montserrat},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {195--214},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_funeste_2021,
	title = {Funeste unanimité},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Geerkens, Éric},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {81--100},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_categorie_2021,
	title = {La catégorie « cancer professionnel » : une construction conflictuelle},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Marchand, Anne},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {59--80},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_introduction_2021-1,
	title = {Introduction : 1919 : {Réparer} la nation, réparer les corps},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Rasmussen, Anne},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {31--38},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_redefinitions_2021,
	title = {Redéfinitions des maladies professionnelles au {Brésil}},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Ávila Assunção, Ada and Henry, Emmanuel},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {165--188},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_lemergence_2021,
	title = {L'émergence de la silicose des travailleurs de la pierre artificielle en {Espagne}},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Cavalin, Catherine and Menéndez-Navarro, Alfredo},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {145--164},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_reparation_2021,
	title = {La réparation du risque radio-induit en {France}},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Ghis Malfilatre, Marie},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {125--144},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_droit_2021,
	title = {Un droit des cœurs meurtris},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Ponge, Rémy},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {107--124},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_introduction_2021-2,
	title = {Introduction : {Entre} savoirs et expertises, des cheminements problématiques},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Hatzfeld, Nicolas},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {103--106},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_tableau_2021,
	title = {Le tableau numéro 1 sur le saturnisme, cadre princeps de la sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Rainhorn, Judith},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {39--58},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@incollection{cavalin_introduction_2021-3,
	title = {Introduction : {Travail}, santé et maladie professionnelle : un siècle de sous-reconnaissance},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	booktitle = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	author = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {11--28},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@article{fan_logic_2021,
	title = {A {Logic} for {Disjunctive} {Ignorance}},
	issn = {1573-0433},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09599-4},
	doi = {10.1007/s10992-021-09599-4},
	abstract = {In this paper, we introduce a notion of ‘disjunctive ignorance’, which is a weak combination of two forms of ignorance in the literature. We propose a logical language with ‘disjunctive ignorance’ as a sole modality, explore the logical properties of this notion and its related notions, and axiomatize it over various frame classes. By finding suitable reduction axioms, we extend the results to the case of public announcements and apply it to Moore-like sentences.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2021-04-28},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
	author = {Fan, Jie},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Ignorance in philosophy and logic, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

In this paper, we introduce a notion of ‘disjunctive ignorance’, which is a weak combination of two forms of ignorance in the literature. We propose a logical language with ‘disjunctive ignorance’ as a sole modality, explore the logical properties of this notion and its related notions, and axiomatize it over various frame classes. By finding suitable reduction axioms, we extend the results to the case of public announcements and apply it to Moore-like sentences.

@article{goldberg_science_2021,
	title = {The science of spin: targeted strategies to manufacture doubt with detrimental effects on environmental and public health},
	volume = {20},
	issn = {1476-069X},
	shorttitle = {The science of spin},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-021-00723-0},
	doi = {10.1186/s12940-021-00723-0},
	abstract = {Numerous groups, such as the tobacco industry, have deliberately altered and misrepresented knowable facts and empirical evidence to promote an agenda, often for monetary benefit, with consequences for environmental and public health. Previous research has explored cases individually, but none have conducted an in-depth comparison between cases. The purpose of this study was to compile a comprehensive list of tactics used by disparate groups and provide a framework for identifying further instances of manufactured doubt.},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2021-04-22},
	journal = {Environmental Health},
	author = {Goldberg, Rebecca F. and Vandenberg, Laura N.},
	month = mar,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {5 Ignorance and manufactured doubt, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Tobacco Papers, hyperbole, logical fallacy, misrepresentation, regulation, scientific literacy, study design},
	pages = {33},
}

Numerous groups, such as the tobacco industry, have deliberately altered and misrepresented knowable facts and empirical evidence to promote an agenda, often for monetary benefit, with consequences for environmental and public health. Previous research has explored cases individually, but none have conducted an in-depth comparison between cases. The purpose of this study was to compile a comprehensive list of tactics used by disparate groups and provide a framework for identifying further instances of manufactured doubt.

@article{folch_ceremony_2021,
	title = {Ceremony, {Medicine}, {Caffeinated} {Tea}: {Unearthing} the {Forgotten} {Faces} of the {North} {American} {Stimulant} {Yaupon} ({Ilex} vomitoria)},
	volume = {63},
	issn = {0010-4175, 1475-2999},
	shorttitle = {Ceremony, {Medicine}, {Caffeinated} {Tea}},
	url = {http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/ceremony-medicine-caffeinated-tea-unearthing-the-forgotten-faces-of-the-north-american-stimulant-yaupon-ilex-vomitoria/C852C184158DAA328739E2B4BAE3D0F3#},
	doi = {10.1017/S0010417521000116},
	abstract = {Yaupon (the unfortunately named Ilex vomitoria) is a holly commonly used as yard décor in the southeast United States, but many North Americans will be surprised to learn that it is the source of a stimulant tea that has been in continuous use for nearly a millennium. Yaupon is more than a drink; it is a window into questions of identity, community belonging, and how the New World was inserted into the global economy. From Cabeza de Vaca's sixteenth-century brush with the beverage, yaupon has iterated between ceremony, medicine, and caffeinated tea as inhabitants of North America—Indigenous, enslaved, and settler colonial inhabitants of North America—have harnessed the leaf's properties to different, culturally situated aims. This article traces narratives, recipes, and medical descriptions of yaupon from contact to the present, and compares these against material and archeological records to explore differences between settler and extractive colonial encounters with Indigenous psychoactive substances (and thus indigeneity). The story of yaupon reveals contests between regimes of knowledge, the political economy of colonialisms, and the fraught intersections of identity and cuisine. Despite abundant ethnographic, documentary, and scientific evidence to the contrary, the scientific and medical literature long mislabeled yaupon as emetic. This raises questions about how knowledge is transferred and how scientific authority is constructed. I argue that indigeneity, race, and class have steered how yaupon has been understood, and help to explain why a popular caffeinated product waned at a time when the use of stimulants was increasing, and “proletarian hunger-killers” were on the rise.},
	language = {en},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2021-04-27},
	journal = {Comparative Studies in Society and History},
	author = {Folch, Christine},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance, Atlantic world, Ilex drinks, PRINTED (Fonds papier), caffeine, commodity chains, indigenous food, plant relations, scientific knowledge and ignorance, settler colonialism},
	pages = {464--498},
}

Yaupon (the unfortunately named Ilex vomitoria) is a holly commonly used as yard décor in the southeast United States, but many North Americans will be surprised to learn that it is the source of a stimulant tea that has been in continuous use for nearly a millennium. Yaupon is more than a drink; it is a window into questions of identity, community belonging, and how the New World was inserted into the global economy. From Cabeza de Vaca's sixteenth-century brush with the beverage, yaupon has iterated between ceremony, medicine, and caffeinated tea as inhabitants of North America—Indigenous, enslaved, and settler colonial inhabitants of North America—have harnessed the leaf's properties to different, culturally situated aims. This article traces narratives, recipes, and medical descriptions of yaupon from contact to the present, and compares these against material and archeological records to explore differences between settler and extractive colonial encounters with Indigenous psychoactive substances (and thus indigeneity). The story of yaupon reveals contests between regimes of knowledge, the political economy of colonialisms, and the fraught intersections of identity and cuisine. Despite abundant ethnographic, documentary, and scientific evidence to the contrary, the scientific and medical literature long mislabeled yaupon as emetic. This raises questions about how knowledge is transferred and how scientific authority is constructed. I argue that indigeneity, race, and class have steered how yaupon has been understood, and help to explain why a popular caffeinated product waned at a time when the use of stimulants was increasing, and “proletarian hunger-killers” were on the rise.

@article{hayashi_collective_2021,
	title = {Collective decision under ignorance},
	doi = {10.1007/s00355-021-01320-3},
	abstract = {This paper studies aggregation of preferences under ignorance, in which everybody knows that the true probability distribution over outcomes lies in some objective set but knows nothing about which one in it is true or which one in it is more likely to be true. We consider two decision models which express the precautionary principle under ignorance, the maximin criterion and the α-maximin criterion. We show that the Pareto axiom implies dictatorship, in each decision model. The impossibility results force us to choose between two options, one is to give up the precautionary principle as modelled at the social level, the other is to weaken the Pareto axiom. We provide possibility results for each of the options. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.},
	journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
	author = {Hayashi, T.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Ignorance in philosophy and logic, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This paper studies aggregation of preferences under ignorance, in which everybody knows that the true probability distribution over outcomes lies in some objective set but knows nothing about which one in it is true or which one in it is more likely to be true. We consider two decision models which express the precautionary principle under ignorance, the maximin criterion and the α-maximin criterion. We show that the Pareto axiom implies dictatorship, in each decision model. The impossibility results force us to choose between two options, one is to give up the precautionary principle as modelled at the social level, the other is to weaken the Pareto axiom. We provide possibility results for each of the options. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

@article{mihai_foundational_2021,
	title = {Foundational {Moments}, {Representative} {Claims} and the {Ecology} of {Social} {Ignorance}},
	doi = {10.1177/0032321721995639},
	abstract = {This article identifies a blind spot in constructivist theories of representation and their account of legitimacy in terms of the challenge posed by ecologies of social ignorance, generally and especially during foundational moments. Social ignorance is conceptualised here not merely as the absence of knowledge or true belief but as a social practice of legitimising epistemically problematic political imaginaries and the institutional systems they underpin. In dialogue with social epistemologists and phenomenologists, the article shows how representation can nurture social ignorance, despite the availability of ample opportunities for political contestation and alternative opinion formation. A permanent feature of democratic politics, this problem becomes most salient during moments of constitutional re-founding, such as regime change, post-conflict reconstruction or constitutional referenda, when representative claims can reconfigure a community’s political imaginary, rendering it more or less ignorant. The representative claims made by the Vote Leave’s key figures during the Brexit referendum campaign serve as illustration. © The Author(s) 2021.},
	journal = {Political Studies},
	author = {Mihai, M.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {4 Social aspects of ignorance, Brexit, Keywords, PRINTED (Fonds papier), constructivist theories of representation, founding moments, political emotions, social ignorance},
}

This article identifies a blind spot in constructivist theories of representation and their account of legitimacy in terms of the challenge posed by ecologies of social ignorance, generally and especially during foundational moments. Social ignorance is conceptualised here not merely as the absence of knowledge or true belief but as a social practice of legitimising epistemically problematic political imaginaries and the institutional systems they underpin. In dialogue with social epistemologists and phenomenologists, the article shows how representation can nurture social ignorance, despite the availability of ample opportunities for political contestation and alternative opinion formation. A permanent feature of democratic politics, this problem becomes most salient during moments of constitutional re-founding, such as regime change, post-conflict reconstruction or constitutional referenda, when representative claims can reconfigure a community’s political imaginary, rendering it more or less ignorant. The representative claims made by the Vote Leave’s key figures during the Brexit referendum campaign serve as illustration. © The Author(s) 2021.

@misc{lewandowsky_covid-19_2021,
	title = {The {COVID}-19 {Vaccine} {Communication} {Handbook} {\textbar} {A} practical guide for improving vaccine communication and fighting misinformation},
	url = {https://rri-tools.eu/-/the-covid-19-vaccine-communication-handbook-a-practical-guide-for-improving-vaccine-communication-and-fighting-misinformation},
	abstract = {This handbook is for journalists, doctors, nurses, policy makers, researchers, teachers, students, parents – in short, it’s for everyone who wants to know more: 

 
	 about the COVID-19 vaccines, 
	 how to talk to others about them, 
	 how to challenge misinformation about the vaccines. 
 

 The handbook is available in form of a PDF and also of\  a "living wiki".\ The  pdf\  version\  is self-contained but additionally provides access to the “wiki” with more detailed information 

 Vaccination behaviour is a complex topic and many of the concepts involved are interlinked. The visualisation below gives an idea of the interconnectivity of higher and lower level mappings of the pages in the Wiki 

   

 Here is a contents list for all existing pages in the Wiki, grouped by topic. 

  Behaviour  

 
	  The success of behavioural measures in controlling COVID-19  
	  Public attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccines  
	  Cultural differences in vaccine uptake  
	  Why freeriding is a disastrous strategy  
 

  Communication  

 
	  The importance of health care professionals  
	  Trust in scientists  
	 I am not at risk…or am I?  COVID-19 risk perception  
	  Successful strategic communication measures  
 

  Policy and COVID-19 Vaccines  

 
	  The role of vaccination mandates  
	  Nudging: Flattening the curve of the infodemic  
 

  What are the facts?  

 
	  Facts about COVID-19  
	  Facts about COVID-19 vaccines  
	  Success of vaccines  
	  The COVID-19 vaccine development process  
	  Potential side effects of COVID-19 vaccines  
 

  Misinformation  

 
	 Watch out! Misinformation coming your way:  Myths about vaccination  
	  Fallout from COVID-19 misinformation  
	  Common anti-vaccination misinformation  
	  COVID-19 conspiracy theories  
	  The politics of COVID-19 vaccination and misinformation  
	  Vaccine deniers  
	  Argument quality and fallacies  
 

 \  

 \  

  FAQs  

 
	 Who is behind this project? 
	 How can I contribute? 
	 How can I give you feedback? 
 

 \  

 -- 

  
(*) The handbook has benefited from a number of detailed guides and documents created by and for organizations such as the WHO, UNICEF (e.g., Vaccine Misinformation Management Field Guide), the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and the Royal Society 

 \  

 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

     

 \  

 \  

 \  

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------},
	language = {en-GB},
	urldate = {2021-03-16},
	author = {Lewandowsky, S. and Cook, J. and and al.},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This handbook is for journalists, doctors, nurses, policy makers, researchers, teachers, students, parents – in short, it’s for everyone who wants to know more: about the COVID-19 vaccines, how to talk to others about them, how to challenge misinformation about the vaccines. The handbook is available in form of a PDF and also of  a "living wiki". The pdf  version  is self-contained but additionally provides access to the “wiki” with more detailed information Vaccination behaviour is a complex topic and many of the concepts involved are interlinked. The visualisation below gives an idea of the interconnectivity of higher and lower level mappings of the pages in the Wiki Here is a contents list for all existing pages in the Wiki, grouped by topic. Behaviour The success of behavioural measures in controlling COVID-19 Public attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccines Cultural differences in vaccine uptake Why freeriding is a disastrous strategy Communication The importance of health care professionals Trust in scientists I am not at risk…or am I? COVID-19 risk perception Successful strategic communication measures Policy and COVID-19 Vaccines The role of vaccination mandates Nudging: Flattening the curve of the infodemic What are the facts? Facts about COVID-19 Facts about COVID-19 vaccines Success of vaccines The COVID-19 vaccine development process Potential side effects of COVID-19 vaccines Misinformation Watch out! Misinformation coming your way: Myths about vaccination Fallout from COVID-19 misinformation Common anti-vaccination misinformation COVID-19 conspiracy theories The politics of COVID-19 vaccination and misinformation Vaccine deniers Argument quality and fallacies     FAQs Who is behind this project? How can I contribute? How can I give you feedback?   – (*) The handbook has benefited from a number of detailed guides and documents created by and for organizations such as the WHO, UNICEF (e.g., Vaccine Misinformation Management Field Guide), the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and the Royal Society   —————————————————————————————————————————————————–       —————————————————————————————————————————————————–

@book{cavalin_cent_2021,
	title = {Cent ans de sous-reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles},
	isbn = {978-2-35671-629-3},
	abstract = {La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.},
	language = {Français},
	publisher = {Presses de l'Ecole des mines},
	editor = {Cavalin, Catherine and Henry, Emmanuel and Jouzel, Jean-Noël and Pélisse, Jérôme},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

La sous-reconnaissance des maladies liées au travail constitue aujourd'hui, en France comme dans d'autres pays industrialisés, un fait social massif. Qu'il s'agisse de cancers provoqués par l'exposition à des produits toxiques, de troubles musculo-squelettiques induits par des postures répétitives ou par le port de charges lourdes, ou d'atteintes psychologiques associées à certains modes de management, les effets du travail sur la santé restent un problème insuffisamment pris en charge par les pouvoirs publics. Les dispositifs devant assurer leur reconnaissance et leur indemnisation ne fonctionnent pas de façon satisfaisante, rendant en grande partie invisibles les origines professionnelles de nombreuses maladies et décès. Cette situation n'est pas nouvelle. Elle perdure depuis le début du 20e siècle malgré l'adoption, dans plusieurs pays occidentaux, de législations permettant d'indemniser les pathologies engendrées par les conditions de travail. Remarquablement résistantes à l'épreuve du temps, ces lois fondatrices structurent en effet toujours aujourd'hui le soubassement légal et épistémique de la reconnaissance des maladies professionnelles, continuant à s'avérer incapables de réparer correctement les maux du travail. Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions d'historiens et de sociologues qui étudient les raisons de cette inertie, et donnent à voir les causes de la sous-reconnaissance chronique des maladies professionnelles, depuis les débats fondateurs jusqu'aux controverses contemporaines sur les dégâts que le travail peut induire pour la santé physique et mentale. Ces recherches ouvrent des pistes de réflexion pour revoir les modalités de la réparation de ces dégâts, et sortir de l'impasse que ceux-ci, depuis plus d'un siècle, occasionnent pour la justice sociale dans nos sociétés.

@book{seurat_controverses_2021,
	title = {Controverses mode d'emploi},
	isbn = {978-2-7246-2715-2},
	abstract = {Face aux problèmes environnementaux et sanitaires qui nous submergent, face à la cadence inédite des innovations technologiques, les expertes s'affrontent, se contredisent ou s'avouent sans réponse. Les controverses surgissent à un rythme bien plus rapide que ta production des savoirs. Dans cet âge d'incertitude, où la décision doit souvent précéder la connaissance, il nous faut imaginer de nouvelles manières de penser et d'agir collectivement. La cartographie des controverses fournit ce cadre. Pratique pédagogique pionnière en sciences sociales, elle apprend à regarder le monde sans jamais séparer sciences, techniques et société. A tenir compte de tous les points de vue et du contexte dans lequel ils sont émis. A analyser finement l'écosystème qui fait naître un objet, une invention, un phénomène. Pour se repérer dans l'incertitude, nous dit-elle, il faut d'abord se perdre dans la complexité. Ce livre en offre le mode d'emploi, en s'appuyant sur des exemples de controverses contemporaines soigneusement sélectionnées pour leur diversité et la richesse de leurs enseignements. Ouvrage rédigé collectivement, sous la direction éditoriale de Clémence Seurat et de Thomas Tari, pour la clôture du programme Forccast (Formation par la cartographie des controverses à l'analyse des sciences et des techniques) porté parle médialab de Sciences Po.},
	language = {Français},
	publisher = {Les Presses de Sciences Po},
	editor = {Seurat, Clémence and Tari, Thomas},
	collaborator = {Latour, Bruno},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Face aux problèmes environnementaux et sanitaires qui nous submergent, face à la cadence inédite des innovations technologiques, les expertes s'affrontent, se contredisent ou s'avouent sans réponse. Les controverses surgissent à un rythme bien plus rapide que ta production des savoirs. Dans cet âge d'incertitude, où la décision doit souvent précéder la connaissance, il nous faut imaginer de nouvelles manières de penser et d'agir collectivement. La cartographie des controverses fournit ce cadre. Pratique pédagogique pionnière en sciences sociales, elle apprend à regarder le monde sans jamais séparer sciences, techniques et société. A tenir compte de tous les points de vue et du contexte dans lequel ils sont émis. A analyser finement l'écosystème qui fait naître un objet, une invention, un phénomène. Pour se repérer dans l'incertitude, nous dit-elle, il faut d'abord se perdre dans la complexité. Ce livre en offre le mode d'emploi, en s'appuyant sur des exemples de controverses contemporaines soigneusement sélectionnées pour leur diversité et la richesse de leurs enseignements. Ouvrage rédigé collectivement, sous la direction éditoriale de Clémence Seurat et de Thomas Tari, pour la clôture du programme Forccast (Formation par la cartographie des controverses à l'analyse des sciences et des techniques) porté parle médialab de Sciences Po.

@article{dedieu_organized_2021,
	title = {Organized denial at work: {The} difficult search for consistencies in {French} pesticide regulation},
	shorttitle = {Organized denial at work},
	doi = {10.1111/rego.12381},
	abstract = {Why does it always take a long time to acknowledge environmental hazards such as climate change or air pollution, even when knowledge on their dangers has been available for years? Drawing on the case of French pesticide regulation, this article shows that this gap between knowledge and consequent action results not only from secretive corporate leverage on public decisions and expertise but also from the expertise and bureaucratic machinery behind pesticide regulation. This machinery fosters an organized denial where regulators systematically exclude uncomfortable knowledge that could challenge official risk assessment. Organized denial that legally maintains ignorance fulfills an implicit function. It preserves the legitimacy of the risk management system and, through it, the administrative and commercial organization of agricultural production in France. © 2021 John Wiley \& Sons Australia, Ltd},
	journal = {Regulation and Governance},
	author = {Dedieu, F.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), denial, ignorance, pesticides, regulation, regulatory science, uncomfortable knowledge},
}

Why does it always take a long time to acknowledge environmental hazards such as climate change or air pollution, even when knowledge on their dangers has been available for years? Drawing on the case of French pesticide regulation, this article shows that this gap between knowledge and consequent action results not only from secretive corporate leverage on public decisions and expertise but also from the expertise and bureaucratic machinery behind pesticide regulation. This machinery fosters an organized denial where regulators systematically exclude uncomfortable knowledge that could challenge official risk assessment. Organized denial that legally maintains ignorance fulfills an implicit function. It preserves the legitimacy of the risk management system and, through it, the administrative and commercial organization of agricultural production in France. © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd

@article{tiffany_conceptualizing_2021,
	title = {Conceptualizing {Coercive} {Indoctrination} in {Moral} and {Legal} {Philosophy}},
	doi = {10.1007/s11572-020-09556-3},
	abstract = {This paper argues that there are compelling grounds for thinking that coercive indoctrination can defeat or mitigate moral culpability in virtue of being a form of non-culpable moral ignorance. That is, I defend a two-tier account such that what (at least partially) excuses an agent for a wrongful act is the agent’s ignorance regarding the moral quality of their act; and what excuses the defendant for their ignorance is that coercion or manipulation deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to avoid that ignorance. I further argue that criminal defense theory would better track moral culpability were it to broaden existing defenses whose desert-base is moral ignorance—such as insanity or mistaken-belief self-defense—to include non-culpable ignorance due to diminished situational control. In this way, criminal law can plausibly recognize a defense of coercive indoctrination without postulating any new categories of defense. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.},
	journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
	author = {Tiffany, E.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Coercive indoctrination, Culpability, Excuse, Fair opportunity, Ignorance in philosophy and logic, Manipulation, Moral ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

This paper argues that there are compelling grounds for thinking that coercive indoctrination can defeat or mitigate moral culpability in virtue of being a form of non-culpable moral ignorance. That is, I defend a two-tier account such that what (at least partially) excuses an agent for a wrongful act is the agent’s ignorance regarding the moral quality of their act; and what excuses the defendant for their ignorance is that coercion or manipulation deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to avoid that ignorance. I further argue that criminal defense theory would better track moral culpability were it to broaden existing defenses whose desert-base is moral ignorance—such as insanity or mistaken-belief self-defense—to include non-culpable ignorance due to diminished situational control. In this way, criminal law can plausibly recognize a defense of coercive indoctrination without postulating any new categories of defense. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.

@article{husak_larry_2021,
	title = {Larry {Alexander} and {Kimberly} {Kessler} {Ferzan} on {Omissions} and {Normative} {Ignorance}: {A} {Critical} {Reply}},
	issn = {1871-9805},
	shorttitle = {Larry {Alexander} and {Kimberly} {Kessler} {Ferzan} on {Omissions} and {Normative} {Ignorance}},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-020-09559-0},
	doi = {10.1007/s11572-020-09559-0},
	abstract = {Reflections on Crime and Culpability seeks to elaborate, extend, and occasionally qualify the insights reached by Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan in their influential prior collaboration, Crime and Culpability. They deftly explore any number of new issue that all criminal theorists should be encouraged to address. In my essay, I discuss and challenge their positions on omissions as well as on moral ignorance. Their treatment of the latter issue is a clear improvement over that in their earlier book. But their views on omissions suggest to me that they should have had reservations about some of the most fundamental claims of their overarching theory.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2021-01-20},
	journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
	author = {Husak, Douglas},
	month = jan,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Ignorance in philosophy and logic, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

Reflections on Crime and Culpability seeks to elaborate, extend, and occasionally qualify the insights reached by Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan in their influential prior collaboration, Crime and Culpability. They deftly explore any number of new issue that all criminal theorists should be encouraged to address. In my essay, I discuss and challenge their positions on omissions as well as on moral ignorance. Their treatment of the latter issue is a clear improvement over that in their earlier book. But their views on omissions suggest to me that they should have had reservations about some of the most fundamental claims of their overarching theory.

@article{gold_when_2021,
	title = {When do caregivers ignore the veil of ignorance? {An} empirical study on medical triage decision–making},
	shorttitle = {When do caregivers ignore the veil of ignorance?},
	doi = {10.1007/s11019-020-09992-x},
	abstract = {In principle, all patients deserve to receive optimal medical treatment equally. However, in situations in which there is scarcity of time or resources, medical treatment must be prioritized based on a triage. The conventional guidelines of medical triage mandate that treatment should be provided based solely on medical necessity regardless of any non-medical value-oriented considerations (“worst-first”). This study empirically examined the influence of value-oriented considerations on medical triage decision–making. Participants were asked to prioritize medical treatment relating to four case scenarios of an emergency situation resulting from a car collision. The cases differ by situational characteristics pertaining to the at-fault driver, which were related to culpability attribution. In three case scenarios most participants gave priority to the most severely injured individual, unless the less severely injured individual was their brother. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of a vehicle-ramming terror attack most participants prioritized the less severely injured individual (“victim-first”). Our findings indicate that when caregivers are presented with concrete highly conflictual triage situations their choices may be based on value-oriented considerations related to contextual characteristics of the emergency situation. Philosophical and practical ramifications of our findings are discussed. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.},
	journal = {Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy},
	author = {Gold, A. and Greenberg, B. and Strous, R. and Asman, O.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {Blame attribution, Decision making, Ignorance in medical ethics, Medical ethics, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Resource allocation, Terror, Triage},
}

In principle, all patients deserve to receive optimal medical treatment equally. However, in situations in which there is scarcity of time or resources, medical treatment must be prioritized based on a triage. The conventional guidelines of medical triage mandate that treatment should be provided based solely on medical necessity regardless of any non-medical value-oriented considerations (“worst-first”). This study empirically examined the influence of value-oriented considerations on medical triage decision–making. Participants were asked to prioritize medical treatment relating to four case scenarios of an emergency situation resulting from a car collision. The cases differ by situational characteristics pertaining to the at-fault driver, which were related to culpability attribution. In three case scenarios most participants gave priority to the most severely injured individual, unless the less severely injured individual was their brother. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of a vehicle-ramming terror attack most participants prioritized the less severely injured individual (“victim-first”). Our findings indicate that when caregivers are presented with concrete highly conflictual triage situations their choices may be based on value-oriented considerations related to contextual characteristics of the emergency situation. Philosophical and practical ramifications of our findings are discussed. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.

@article{edenbrandt_interested_2021,
	title = {Interested, indifferent or active information avoiders of carbon labels: {Cognitive} dissonance and ascription of responsibility as motivating factors},
	shorttitle = {Interested, indifferent or active information avoiders of carbon labels},
	doi = {10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102036},
	abstract = {Active avoidance of information is gaining attention in the behavioural sciences. We explore motivations for active avoidance of carbon emissions information. In the first stage of a stated preference survey, respondents indicated whether they wished to access carbon emissions information (info-takers) or not (info-decliners) when selecting a protein source. In the second stage, all respondents were provided with carbon emissions information. The info-takers reduced emissions from their food choices by 32\%, while the info-decliners also reduced their emissions (by 12\%). This indicates active information avoidance among at least some info-decliners. We explore how cognitive dissonance, responsibility feelings and personal norms affect a person's actions when information is imposed upon them, and their role as motivators for actively avoiding carbon emissions information on meat products. Individuals who experience climate-related cognitive dissonance and/or responsibility feelings change behaviour more following climate information, and it also increases choice task uncertainty mostly among these. These findings point to the potential of increasing impact from information by simultaneously increasing personal responsibility feelings and activating social norms. © 2021 Elsevier Ltd},
	journal = {Food Policy},
	author = {Edenbrandt, A.K. and Lagerkvist, C.J. and Nordström, J.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Carbon emission reduction, Climate label, Cognitive dissonance, Consumer behaviour, Ignorance in economics, Ignorance in psychology and cognitive science, Information avoidance, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Strategic ignorance},
}

Active avoidance of information is gaining attention in the behavioural sciences. We explore motivations for active avoidance of carbon emissions information. In the first stage of a stated preference survey, respondents indicated whether they wished to access carbon emissions information (info-takers) or not (info-decliners) when selecting a protein source. In the second stage, all respondents were provided with carbon emissions information. The info-takers reduced emissions from their food choices by 32%, while the info-decliners also reduced their emissions (by 12%). This indicates active information avoidance among at least some info-decliners. We explore how cognitive dissonance, responsibility feelings and personal norms affect a person's actions when information is imposed upon them, and their role as motivators for actively avoiding carbon emissions information on meat products. Individuals who experience climate-related cognitive dissonance and/or responsibility feelings change behaviour more following climate information, and it also increases choice task uncertainty mostly among these. These findings point to the potential of increasing impact from information by simultaneously increasing personal responsibility feelings and activating social norms. © 2021 Elsevier Ltd

@article{bowden_i_2021,
	title = {“{I} don’t think anybody really knows”: {Constructing} reflexive ignorance in climate change adaptation},
	shorttitle = {“{I} don’t think anybody really knows”},
	doi = {10.1111/1468-4446.12818},
	abstract = {Responding to the existential threat of climate change is often seen as requiring greater reflexivity. Imbued with notions of resilience and reflection, reflexivity is assumed to contribute to pro-environmental change. However, as the need to manage climate impacts becomes more immediate, political struggles over climate adaptation have become increasingly apparent. These impacts occur most often within local communities, in the context of competing economic interests and differing interpretations of climate science. Thus while it is increasingly difficult to deny climate change, conflicting priorities can lead to ignorance. In these circumstances, how communities build and share knowledge, and negotiate responses is central. Based on a study of a vulnerable region in Australia, we identify three processes through which the local community mobilized to disrupt local climate change adaptation. These included emphasizing uncertainty about the science of climate change, encouraging fear about property prices, and repositioning property owners as victims of climate adaptation policy. We argue that this response to climate adaptation constitutes the production of reflexive ignorance, which reinforces skepticism around scientific authority and defends particular economic interests. © 2021 London School of Economics and Political Science},
	journal = {British Journal of Sociology},
	author = {Bowden, V. and Nyberg, D. and Wright, C.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {5 Ignorance and manufactured doubt, PRINTED (Fonds papier), adaptation, climate change, ignorance, reflexivity, risk},
}

Responding to the existential threat of climate change is often seen as requiring greater reflexivity. Imbued with notions of resilience and reflection, reflexivity is assumed to contribute to pro-environmental change. However, as the need to manage climate impacts becomes more immediate, political struggles over climate adaptation have become increasingly apparent. These impacts occur most often within local communities, in the context of competing economic interests and differing interpretations of climate science. Thus while it is increasingly difficult to deny climate change, conflicting priorities can lead to ignorance. In these circumstances, how communities build and share knowledge, and negotiate responses is central. Based on a study of a vulnerable region in Australia, we identify three processes through which the local community mobilized to disrupt local climate change adaptation. These included emphasizing uncertainty about the science of climate change, encouraging fear about property prices, and repositioning property owners as victims of climate adaptation policy. We argue that this response to climate adaptation constitutes the production of reflexive ignorance, which reinforces skepticism around scientific authority and defends particular economic interests. © 2021 London School of Economics and Political Science

@article{aradau_algorithmic_2021,
	title = {Algorithmic {Surveillance} and the {Political} {Life} of {Error}},
	volume = {2},
	copyright = {Copyright (c) 2021},
	issn = {2632-282X},
	url = {https://journalhistoryknowledge.org/article/view/11370},
	doi = {10.5334/jhk.42},
	abstract = {Concerns with errors, mistakes, and inaccuracies have shaped political debates about what technologies do, where and how certain technologies can be used, and for which purposes. However, error has received scant attention in the emerging field of ignorance studies. In this article, we analyze how errors have been mobilized in scientific and public controversies over surveillance technologies. In juxtaposing nineteenth-century debates about the errors of biometric technologies for policing and surveillance to current criticisms of facial recognition systems, we trace a transformation of error and its political life. We argue that the modern preoccupation with error and the intellectual habits inculcated to eliminate or tame it have been transformed with machine learning. Machine learning algorithms do not eliminate or tame error, but they optimize it. Therefore, despite reports by digital rights activists, civil liberties organizations, and academics highlighting algorithmic bias and error, facial recognition systems have continued to be rolled out. Drawing on a landmark legal case around facial recognition in the UK, we show how optimizing error also remakes the conditions for a critique of surveillance.This article is part of a special issue entitled “Histories of Ignorance,” edited by Lukas M. Verburgt and Peter Burke.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2022-11-17},
	journal = {Journal for the History of Knowledge},
	author = {Aradau, Claudia and Blanke, Tobias},
	month = nov,
	year = {2021},
	note = {Number: 1},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), error},
	pages = {10--10},
}

Concerns with errors, mistakes, and inaccuracies have shaped political debates about what technologies do, where and how certain technologies can be used, and for which purposes. However, error has received scant attention in the emerging field of ignorance studies. In this article, we analyze how errors have been mobilized in scientific and public controversies over surveillance technologies. In juxtaposing nineteenth-century debates about the errors of biometric technologies for policing and surveillance to current criticisms of facial recognition systems, we trace a transformation of error and its political life. We argue that the modern preoccupation with error and the intellectual habits inculcated to eliminate or tame it have been transformed with machine learning. Machine learning algorithms do not eliminate or tame error, but they optimize it. Therefore, despite reports by digital rights activists, civil liberties organizations, and academics highlighting algorithmic bias and error, facial recognition systems have continued to be rolled out. Drawing on a landmark legal case around facial recognition in the UK, we show how optimizing error also remakes the conditions for a critique of surveillance.This article is part of a special issue entitled “Histories of Ignorance,” edited by Lukas M. Verburgt and Peter Burke.

@article{beres_ignorance_2021,
	title = {From ignorance to knowledge: {Sexual} consent and queer stories},
	issn = {0959-3535},
	shorttitle = {From ignorance to knowledge},
	doi = {10.1177/09593535211059003},
	abstract = {The problem of sexual assault has received increasing public attention over the last few years, with an increasing focus on the concept of sexual consent to solve the problem. Education efforts focus on teaching people what consent is and how to explicitly communicate about sex, constructing consent as a knowledge problem. Using the stories of queer adults, this study calls for the development of an epistemology of sexual consent. I argue that the current research and scholarship fail to recognise existing knowledge about sexual consent, relegating sexual consent to an epistemology of ignorance. Queer participants in this study demonstrated sophisticated knowledge of sexual consent through their talk on the role of verbal consent cues and articulating how they “tune in” to their partners during sex. Within their talk, verbal consent was sometimes viewed as essential to consent, while at times was not necessary, and at other times was not enough to understand a partner's sexual consent. Importantly, they described deep knowledge about partners’ comfort, discomfort or hesitation through “tuning in”. Developing an epistemology of sexual consent requires recognising and valuing what participants tell us about what they know about their partners’ willingness to engage in sex. © The Author(s) 2021.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Feminism and Psychology},
	author = {Beres, M.A.},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {New Zealand, PRINTED (Fonds papier), epistemology of ignorance, rape prevention, sexual consent, sexual ethics},
}

The problem of sexual assault has received increasing public attention over the last few years, with an increasing focus on the concept of sexual consent to solve the problem. Education efforts focus on teaching people what consent is and how to explicitly communicate about sex, constructing consent as a knowledge problem. Using the stories of queer adults, this study calls for the development of an epistemology of sexual consent. I argue that the current research and scholarship fail to recognise existing knowledge about sexual consent, relegating sexual consent to an epistemology of ignorance. Queer participants in this study demonstrated sophisticated knowledge of sexual consent through their talk on the role of verbal consent cues and articulating how they “tune in” to their partners during sex. Within their talk, verbal consent was sometimes viewed as essential to consent, while at times was not necessary, and at other times was not enough to understand a partner's sexual consent. Importantly, they described deep knowledge about partners’ comfort, discomfort or hesitation through “tuning in”. Developing an epistemology of sexual consent requires recognising and valuing what participants tell us about what they know about their partners’ willingness to engage in sex. © The Author(s) 2021.

@article{aradau_covid-19_2021,
	title = {Covid-19 and rebordering the world},
	copyright = {CC BY-NC-ND},
	issn = {0300-211X},
	url = {https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/covid-19-and-rebordering-the-world},
	abstract = {In April 2021, dozens of asylum seekers were moved back to the Napier Barracks in the UK, after the barracks had been emptied a month earlier following protests and media reports on its unsuitable conditions. Migrant support groups and NGOs denounced ...},
	language = {en\_GB},
	number = {210},
	urldate = {2022-11-21},
	journal = {Radical Philosophy},
	author = {Aradau, Claudia and Tazzioli, Martina},
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {3--10},
}

In April 2021, dozens of asylum seekers were moved back to the Napier Barracks in the UK, after the barracks had been emptied a month earlier following protests and media reports on its unsuitable conditions. Migrant support groups and NGOs denounced ...

@article{meylan_ignorance_2020,
	title = {Ignorance and {Its} {Disvalue}},
	volume = {97},
	doi = {10.1163/18756735-000106},
	abstract = {It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
	author = {Meylan, Anne},
	month = aug,
	year = {2020},
	pages = {433--447},
}

It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.

@article{tommasi_attitudes_2020,
	title = {Attitudes towards scientific knowledge: social dispositions and personality traits},
	shorttitle = {Attitudes towards scientific knowledge},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02632-0},
	abstract = {The present pilot study investigates the relationships between scientific ignorance and several individual attitudes, personality traits and cultural behaviors. Starting from well-established practices and standards of psychometric analysis, our work has produced a complex cross-scalar survey of scientific competency between students attending an art and multimedia high school. Data are classified through six scales about self-esteem, scientific attitudes, paranormal beliefs, scientific competency, social desirability and personality traits. The results are considered in relation to three hypotheses: the correlation between positive scientific attitude and lower paranormal beliefs plus higher scientific competencies; the scientific attitude is enhanced by cultural and scientific activities and negatively related to superstition; people who show specific personality traits have higher positive attitude and interest toward science, while other traits are more related to superstitious beliefs. The outcome of our poll confirms our hypotheses and shows additional traits correlations. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Tommasi, M. and Petricca, P. and Cozzolino, G. and Casadio, C.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Personality traits, Scientific attitudes, Scientific competency, Scientific ignorance},
}

The present pilot study investigates the relationships between scientific ignorance and several individual attitudes, personality traits and cultural behaviors. Starting from well-established practices and standards of psychometric analysis, our work has produced a complex cross-scalar survey of scientific competency between students attending an art and multimedia high school. Data are classified through six scales about self-esteem, scientific attitudes, paranormal beliefs, scientific competency, social desirability and personality traits. The results are considered in relation to three hypotheses: the correlation between positive scientific attitude and lower paranormal beliefs plus higher scientific competencies; the scientific attitude is enhanced by cultural and scientific activities and negatively related to superstition; people who show specific personality traits have higher positive attitude and interest toward science, while other traits are more related to superstitious beliefs. The outcome of our poll confirms our hypotheses and shows additional traits correlations. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.

@article{kyle_truth_2020,
	title = {Truth and ignorance},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02546-x},
	abstract = {I argue that the Standard View of ignorance is at odds with the claim that knowledge entails truth. In particular, if knowledge entails truth then we cannot explain away some apparent absurdities that arise from the Standard View of ignorance. I then discuss a modified version of the Standard View, which simply adds a truth requirement to the original Standard View. I show that the two main arguments for the original Standard View fail to support this modified view. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Kyle, B.G.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Ignorance, Knowledge, New view of ignorance, Standard view of ignorance, Truth},
}

I argue that the Standard View of ignorance is at odds with the claim that knowledge entails truth. In particular, if knowledge entails truth then we cannot explain away some apparent absurdities that arise from the Standard View of ignorance. I then discuss a modified version of the Standard View, which simply adds a truth requirement to the original Standard View. I show that the two main arguments for the original Standard View fail to support this modified view. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.

@article{fano_working_2020,
	title = {A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02681-5},
	abstract = {The Dunning–Kruger effect focuses our attention on the notion of invisibility of ignorance, i.e., the ignorance of ignorance. Such a phenomenon is not only important for everyday life, but also, above all, for some philosophical disciplines, such as epistemology of sciences. When someone tries to understand formally the phenomenon of ignorance of ignorance, they usually end up with a nested epistemic operator highly resistant to proper regimentation. In this paper, we argue that to understand adequately the ignorance of ignorance phenomenon we have to understand satisfactorily the concept of disbelief and, as we call it, the concept of “radical ignorance”. We propose also prerequisites that a notion of radical ignorance useful for the philosophy of science ought to fulfill, and we sketch a possible formalization of this notion. Finally, we propose some comments on the problem of propagation of ignorance proposed by Fine (Synthese, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1406-z). © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Fano, V. and Graziani, P.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Disbelief, Epistemic logic, Ignorance, Ignorance of ignorance},
}

The Dunning–Kruger effect focuses our attention on the notion of invisibility of ignorance, i.e., the ignorance of ignorance. Such a phenomenon is not only important for everyday life, but also, above all, for some philosophical disciplines, such as epistemology of sciences. When someone tries to understand formally the phenomenon of ignorance of ignorance, they usually end up with a nested epistemic operator highly resistant to proper regimentation. In this paper, we argue that to understand adequately the ignorance of ignorance phenomenon we have to understand satisfactorily the concept of disbelief and, as we call it, the concept of “radical ignorance”. We propose also prerequisites that a notion of radical ignorance useful for the philosophy of science ought to fulfill, and we sketch a possible formalization of this notion. Finally, we propose some comments on the problem of propagation of ignorance proposed by Fine (Synthese, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1406-z). © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.

@article{peels_educating_2020,
	title = {Educating for ignorance},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02544-z},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02544-z},
	abstract = {It is widely thought that education should aim at positive epistemic standings, like knowledge, insight, and understanding. In this paper, we argue that, surprisingly, in pursuit of this aim, it is sometimes necessary to also cultivate ignorance. We examine several types of case. First, in various circumstances educators should present students with defeaters for their knowledge, so that they come to lack knowledge, at least temporarily. Second, there is the phenomenon of ‘scaffolding’ in education, which we note might sometimes involve the educator quite properly ensuring that the student is ignorant of certain kinds of information. Third, if ignorance is lack of true belief, as a number of commentators have claimed, then in those cases in which students believe something truly without knowing it and teachers show that they lack knowledge, students may abandon that belief and thus become ignorant. In examining the role of ignorance in education, we explore exactly which kinds of ignorance are valuable in teaching situations and draw attention to important epistemic differences between ignorance on different levels.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2020-10-29},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Peels, Rik and Pritchard, Duncan},
	month = jan,
	year = {2020},
}

It is widely thought that education should aim at positive epistemic standings, like knowledge, insight, and understanding. In this paper, we argue that, surprisingly, in pursuit of this aim, it is sometimes necessary to also cultivate ignorance. We examine several types of case. First, in various circumstances educators should present students with defeaters for their knowledge, so that they come to lack knowledge, at least temporarily. Second, there is the phenomenon of ‘scaffolding’ in education, which we note might sometimes involve the educator quite properly ensuring that the student is ignorant of certain kinds of information. Third, if ignorance is lack of true belief, as a number of commentators have claimed, then in those cases in which students believe something truly without knowing it and teachers show that they lack knowledge, students may abandon that belief and thus become ignorant. In examining the role of ignorance in education, we explore exactly which kinds of ignorance are valuable in teaching situations and draw attention to important epistemic differences between ignorance on different levels.

@article{rosario_martinez-ordaz_ignorance_2020,
	title = {The ignorance behind inconsistency toleration},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02593-4},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02593-4},
	abstract = {Inconsistency toleration is the phenomenon of working with inconsistent information without threatening one’s rationality. Here I address the role that ignorance plays for the tolerance of contradictions in the empirical sciences. In particular, I contend that there are two types of ignorance that, when present, can make epistemic agents to be rationally inclined to tolerate a contradiction. The first is factual ignorance, understood as temporary undecidability of the truth values of the conflicting propositions. The second is what I call “ignorance of theoretical structure”, which is lack of knowledge of relevant inference patterns within a specific theory. I argue that these two types of ignorance can be explanatory of the scientists’ rational disposition to be tolerant towards contradictions, and I illustrate this with a case study from neutrino physics.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2020-10-29},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Rosario Martínez-Ordaz, María del},
	month = mar,
	year = {2020},
}

Inconsistency toleration is the phenomenon of working with inconsistent information without threatening one’s rationality. Here I address the role that ignorance plays for the tolerance of contradictions in the empirical sciences. In particular, I contend that there are two types of ignorance that, when present, can make epistemic agents to be rationally inclined to tolerate a contradiction. The first is factual ignorance, understood as temporary undecidability of the truth values of the conflicting propositions. The second is what I call “ignorance of theoretical structure”, which is lack of knowledge of relevant inference patterns within a specific theory. I argue that these two types of ignorance can be explanatory of the scientists’ rational disposition to be tolerant towards contradictions, and I illustrate this with a case study from neutrino physics.

@article{magnani_computational_2020,
	title = {Computational domestication of ignorant entities},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02530-5},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02530-5},
	abstract = {Eco-cognitive computationalism considers computation in context, following some of the main tenets advanced by the recent cognitive science views on embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. It is in the framework of this eco-cognitive perspective that we can usefully analyze the recent attention in computer science devoted to the importance of the simplification of cognitive and motor tasks caused in organic entities by the morphological features: ignorant bodies can be domesticated to become useful “mimetic bodies”, that is able to render an intertwined computation simpler, resorting to that “simplexity” of animal embodied cognition, which represents one of the main quality of organic agents. Through eco-cognitive computationalism we can clearly acknowledge that the concept of computation changes, depending on historical and contextual causes, and we can build an epistemological view that illustrates the “emergence” of new kinds of computations, such as the one regarding morphological computation. This new perspective shows how the computational domestication of ignorant entities can originate new unconventional cognitive embodiments. In the last part of the article I will introduce the concept of overcomputationalism, showing that my proposed framework helps us see the related concepts of pancognitivism, paniformationalism, and pancomputationalism in a more naturalized and prudent perspective, avoiding the excess of old-fashioned ontological or metaphysical overstatements.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2020-10-29},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Magnani, Lorenzo},
	month = jan,
	year = {2020},
}

Eco-cognitive computationalism considers computation in context, following some of the main tenets advanced by the recent cognitive science views on embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. It is in the framework of this eco-cognitive perspective that we can usefully analyze the recent attention in computer science devoted to the importance of the simplification of cognitive and motor tasks caused in organic entities by the morphological features: ignorant bodies can be domesticated to become useful “mimetic bodies”, that is able to render an intertwined computation simpler, resorting to that “simplexity” of animal embodied cognition, which represents one of the main quality of organic agents. Through eco-cognitive computationalism we can clearly acknowledge that the concept of computation changes, depending on historical and contextual causes, and we can build an epistemological view that illustrates the “emergence” of new kinds of computations, such as the one regarding morphological computation. This new perspective shows how the computational domestication of ignorant entities can originate new unconventional cognitive embodiments. In the last part of the article I will introduce the concept of overcomputationalism, showing that my proposed framework helps us see the related concepts of pancognitivism, paniformationalism, and pancomputationalism in a more naturalized and prudent perspective, avoiding the excess of old-fashioned ontological or metaphysical overstatements.

@article{moore_whitenesspoliteness_2020,
	title = {Whiteness=politeness: interest-convergence in {Australian} history textbooks, 1950–2010},
	volume = {17},
	shorttitle = {Whiteness=politeness},
	doi = {10.1080/17405904.2019.1637760},
	abstract = {This paper examines discursive change in Australia from 1950 to 2010 through the lens of critical whiteness studies. Using textbooks as records of dominant narratives, I evaluate discourses of whiteness and Aboriginality in Australian history textbooks over this period of substantial social change. I show that overt discourses of white exceptionalism and Aboriginal deficiency are only present in the earliest decades of my sample. However, these discourses persist in later decades in ‘polite’ forms, maintaining the racial status quo while enabling whites to be positioned favourably. I argue that discursive change only becomes embedded in textbooks if it bolsters the status of whites, evidencing Bell’s thesis of interest-convergence. © 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Critical Discourse Studies},
	author = {Moore, R.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Aboriginality, Australian history, Whiteness, discourse, ignorance, interest-convergence},
	pages = {111--129},
}

This paper examines discursive change in Australia from 1950 to 2010 through the lens of critical whiteness studies. Using textbooks as records of dominant narratives, I evaluate discourses of whiteness and Aboriginality in Australian history textbooks over this period of substantial social change. I show that overt discourses of white exceptionalism and Aboriginal deficiency are only present in the earliest decades of my sample. However, these discourses persist in later decades in ‘polite’ forms, maintaining the racial status quo while enabling whites to be positioned favourably. I argue that discursive change only becomes embedded in textbooks if it bolsters the status of whites, evidencing Bell’s thesis of interest-convergence. © 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{panikkar_litigation_2020,
	title = {"litigation is our last resort" addressing uncertainty, undone science, and bias in court to assert indigenous rights},
	volume = {15},
	doi = {10.3167/NC.2020.150204},
	abstract = {The permitting of large-scale industrial mines is often controversial and litigious. This article examines three legal battles over the exploratory permitting of the Pebble mine in southwestern Alaska to examine the logics and rationalities used to legitimize the permitting, the alternate epistemic arguments made by the resistance movements to redraw state-constructed boundaries, and differing definitions of land-based resources, pollution, and bias. It asks how conflicting knowledge claims and epistemic injustice are debated and settled in court. All three legal cases observed demonstrate conditions of scientific uncertainty, undone science, and bias, failing to hold space for diverse representations within legal claims. Citizen science is partially successful in addressing epistemic injustice, but to effectively mediate justice, law must distinctively question both knowledge construction and phronetic risks, including values, intent, bias, privilege, and agency, and take into consideration the ontological multiplicities and civic epistemologies of the parties within legal claims. © Berghahn Books.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Nature and Culture},
	author = {Panikkar, B.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Civic epistemologies, Environmental conflicts, Indigenous rights, Knowledge justice, Large mine permitting, Undone science},
	pages = {173--198},
}

The permitting of large-scale industrial mines is often controversial and litigious. This article examines three legal battles over the exploratory permitting of the Pebble mine in southwestern Alaska to examine the logics and rationalities used to legitimize the permitting, the alternate epistemic arguments made by the resistance movements to redraw state-constructed boundaries, and differing definitions of land-based resources, pollution, and bias. It asks how conflicting knowledge claims and epistemic injustice are debated and settled in court. All three legal cases observed demonstrate conditions of scientific uncertainty, undone science, and bias, failing to hold space for diverse representations within legal claims. Citizen science is partially successful in addressing epistemic injustice, but to effectively mediate justice, law must distinctively question both knowledge construction and phronetic risks, including values, intent, bias, privilege, and agency, and take into consideration the ontological multiplicities and civic epistemologies of the parties within legal claims. © Berghahn Books.

@article{santos_echo_2020,
	title = {Echo {Chambers}, {Ignorance} and {Domination}},
	doi = {10.1080/02691728.2020.1839590},
	abstract = {My aim in this paper is to engage with C. Thi Nguyen’s characterization of the echo chamber and to propose two things. First, I argue that a proper reading of his concept of echo chamber should make use of the notion of ignorance in the form of a structural epistemic insensitivity. My main contention is that ignorance as a substantive structural practice accounts for the epistemically deleterious effects of echo chambers. Second, I propose that from the talk of ignorance we should be able to see echo chambers in terms of their more harmful impacts in our daily lives. To do that, I argue that we should think of echo chambers as tools to promote hermeneutical domination. If my representation of Nguyen’s concept is accurate, I believe we can see some important theoretical consequences stemming from the way Nguyen understands it. © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	journal = {Social Epistemology},
	author = {Santos, B.R.G.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Echo chamber, domination, epistemic injustice, ignorance},
}

My aim in this paper is to engage with C. Thi Nguyen’s characterization of the echo chamber and to propose two things. First, I argue that a proper reading of his concept of echo chamber should make use of the notion of ignorance in the form of a structural epistemic insensitivity. My main contention is that ignorance as a substantive structural practice accounts for the epistemically deleterious effects of echo chambers. Second, I propose that from the talk of ignorance we should be able to see echo chambers in terms of their more harmful impacts in our daily lives. To do that, I argue that we should think of echo chambers as tools to promote hermeneutical domination. If my representation of Nguyen’s concept is accurate, I believe we can see some important theoretical consequences stemming from the way Nguyen understands it. © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

@article{osrecki_autonomisierung_2020,
	title = {Autonomisierung durch {Nichtwissen}:: {Unberechenbarkeit} in der {Konstitution} von {Publikumsrollen}},
	volume = {49},
	issn = {2366-0325, 0340-1804},
	shorttitle = {Autonomisierung durch {Nichtwissen}},
	url = {https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/zfsoz/49/2-3/article-p125.xml},
	doi = {10.1515/zfsoz-2020-0014},
	abstract = {Der Beitrag umreißt eine bislang wenig diskutierte Perspektive auf Laien- bzw. Publikumsrollen in der modernen Gesellschaft. Anders als in gegenwärtigen Debatten um eine strukturelle Aufwertung von Publikumsrollen durch Informiertheit und aktives Engagement, wird hier argumentiert, dass Laienpublika gerade dann eine vergleichsweise starke Position zukommt, wenn ihr Verhalten unberechenbar wird. Diese Unberechenbarkeit stellt sich unter anderem dann ein, wenn Träger von Publikumsrollen nicht wissen, welche ihrer vielen Interessen und Rollen sie konsequent zur Handlungsgrundlage machen sollen. Diese Perspektive wird am Fall des politischen Systems erläutert. Hier führt die Unberechenbarkeit des Wahlverhaltens dazu, dass Parteien verstärkt um die Gunst des Elektorats buhlen müssen, wodurch auch die Autonomisierung des politischen Systems befördert wird.},
	language = {de},
	number = {2-3},
	urldate = {2020-11-10},
	journal = {Zeitschrift für Soziologie},
	author = {Osrecki, Fran},
	month = jun,
	year = {2020},
	note = {Publisher: De Gruyter Oldenbourg
Section: Zeitschrift für Soziologie},
	pages = {125--144},
}

Der Beitrag umreißt eine bislang wenig diskutierte Perspektive auf Laien- bzw. Publikumsrollen in der modernen Gesellschaft. Anders als in gegenwärtigen Debatten um eine strukturelle Aufwertung von Publikumsrollen durch Informiertheit und aktives Engagement, wird hier argumentiert, dass Laienpublika gerade dann eine vergleichsweise starke Position zukommt, wenn ihr Verhalten unberechenbar wird. Diese Unberechenbarkeit stellt sich unter anderem dann ein, wenn Träger von Publikumsrollen nicht wissen, welche ihrer vielen Interessen und Rollen sie konsequent zur Handlungsgrundlage machen sollen. Diese Perspektive wird am Fall des politischen Systems erläutert. Hier führt die Unberechenbarkeit des Wahlverhaltens dazu, dass Parteien verstärkt um die Gunst des Elektorats buhlen müssen, wodurch auch die Autonomisierung des politischen Systems befördert wird.

@article{michel_productions_2020,
	title = {Productions of visibility, intimation and absence female geographers in {Germany} before 1960},
	volume = {108},
	shorttitle = {Produktionen von {Sichtbarkeit}, {Andeutung} und {Abwesenheit} {Geographinnen} in {Deutschland} vor 1960},
	doi = {10.25162/gz-2019-0019},
	abstract = {The history of geography is usually written as a history of the ideas and actions of white men; the absence of women is presupposed and left unquestioned. The work of women which has hitherto been invisible in the memory of the discipline, can be traced back to a number of acts of rendering invisible and the production of ignorance. The historiography of the discipline is problematised on the basis of three approaches: with the help of visible publications and academic titles, at the level of traces in publications of male geographers and in relation to the boundaries of the archives and the absent. By showing that women did enter the discipline before 1945, the article follows discussions in the history of science about the production of non-knowledge and ignorance and contributes to the feminist history of German-language geography. © 2020 Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH. All rights reserved.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Geographische Zeitschrift},
	author = {Michel, B. and Paulus, K.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {1920s, Archives, Feminist geography, Germany, History of geography, Production of ignorance},
	pages = {125--147},
}

The history of geography is usually written as a history of the ideas and actions of white men; the absence of women is presupposed and left unquestioned. The work of women which has hitherto been invisible in the memory of the discipline, can be traced back to a number of acts of rendering invisible and the production of ignorance. The historiography of the discipline is problematised on the basis of three approaches: with the help of visible publications and academic titles, at the level of traces in publications of male geographers and in relation to the boundaries of the archives and the absent. By showing that women did enter the discipline before 1945, the article follows discussions in the history of science about the production of non-knowledge and ignorance and contributes to the feminist history of German-language geography. © 2020 Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH. All rights reserved.

@article{withers_waiting_2020,
	title = {Waiting for a diagnosis in {Rubinstein}–{Taybi}: {The} journey from “ignorance is bliss” to the value of “a label”},
	shorttitle = {Waiting for a diagnosis in {Rubinstein}–{Taybi}},
	doi = {10.1002/ajmg.a.61920},
	abstract = {The journey to receiving a diagnosis for rare genetic disease can be long and emotionally impactful. This study describes parental experiences of receiving their child's diagnosis of Rubinstein–Taybi syndrome (RTS), a rare genetic condition characterized by growth and developmental delay together with dysmorphic features. Parents from the RTS Australia support group participated in qualitative, semi-structured phone interviews, which were transcribed verbatim and thematically analyzed. Questions focused on psychosocial challenges and benefits pre and post-diagnosis. Ten mothers and three fathers participated, with the mean age of diagnosis being 8 months. Parents reported positive psychological effects from a slight delay in diagnosis, and negative effects from an extended diagnostic delay, suggesting the ideal time for a parent to receive a diagnosis lies in the post attachment stage, prior to the development of significant parental concerns. This stage would vary depending on condition severity. Parents desired a diagnosis to reduce uncertainty; however, uncertainty remained post diagnosis, and shifted its focus from broadly encompassing etiology and prognosis, to specifically focusing on concerns regarding severity within the spectrum. Perceived benefits of a diagnosis mainly centered on the provision of a label. Parents articulated that a label increased social acceptance, enhanced coping, promoted communication, and improved access to medical, financial, and support services. This study provides insights into the experience of families prior to and following receipt of a diagnosis. It also highlights the possibility of an optimal time window to receive a diagnosis; in which bonding is maximized and parental distress is minimized. © 2020 Wiley Periodicals LLC},
	journal = {American Journal of Medical Genetics, Part A},
	author = {Withers, C.M. and Fleming, J. and Wallingford, C.K. and Gabbett, M.T. and Peterson, M. and Humphreys, L. and McInerney-Leo, A.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Rubinstein–Taybi syndrome, delayed diagnosis, genetic, psychosocial, uncertainty},
}